CHAPTER 3

FROM THE STRUCTURE OF RELIGION TO POETICS:

THE QUALITY OF THE 'DARK EMBRYO'

I

So much has been written in the preceding chapters on the problem of belief that even the slightest attempt at recapitulating the main arguments might shift the focus of this thesis from what we have set out to do. Our effort in this chapter will be to show how the structure of Eliot's poetics evolves out of the structure of religion as he sees it. This is not to give our arguments a theological grounding. Far from it. We shall try to draw attention to what seems to constitute T S Eliot's chief concern throughout his career as a creative artist and a critic who matters even today.

The dictionary meanings of 'religion' make a very interesting reading. Webster's New World Dictionary lists the following:

1. (a) a belief in superhuman power or powers to be obeyed and worshipped as the creator(s) and ruler(s) of the universe
(b) expression of this belief in conduct and rituals
2. any specific system of belief, worship etc., often involving a code of ethics.\(^1\)

T S Eliot traces the evolution of poetry, in its most primitive form, to the religious ritual, to explain that this was its deliberate and conscious social purpose. The hymns sung at the time of religious services are an example of this tradition. Eliot draws our attention in particular to the Greek drama which has its roots in the religious rites and remains even now a formal public ceremony — a part of traditional religious celebrations marking the harvesting season. He notes how

these definite uses of poetry gave poetry
a framework which made possible the
attainment of perfection in particular kinds.\(^2\)

But all this does not really help show the nature of the relationship between poetry and religion from which poetry draws its sustenance. We might need to search for evidence elsewhere. And in all possibilities, that evidence may not provide a direct answer to questions about the way in which religious sensibility shapes our aesthetic sensibility.

Addressing his largely Christian audience at the University of Virginia in the USA in 1933, T S Eliot told them that he believed that a right tradition for them (he included himself too) must be also a Christian tradition, and that orthodoxy in general implied (to him) Christian orthodoxy. These were not
the rantings of a man who did not know what he was talking about. That he was sure of his convictions is borne out by the "Preface" he wrote for *After Strange Gods* (published in 1934) which includes this and two other lectures delivered before the same audience, wherein he says: "A person with strong convictions might state a point and leave it at that." More indirect evidence is available in *The Idea of a Christian Society* (published in 1939), where Eliot remarks:

> religion must be primarily a matter of behaviour and habit, must be integrated with its social life, with its business and its pleasures; and the specifically religious emotions must be a kind of extension and sanctification of the domestic and social emotions.\(^4\)

Would it be unnatural to think that Eliot might have meant even the kinds of emotions triggered by an aesthetic reaction to a work of art in terms of the pleasure it gives and the value it has? The answer to this question is more likely to be in the affirmative. A clearer view eludes us while we are busy with these two works because Eliot was still grappling with the problem of belief in the immediate aftermath of his conversion.
A firmer affirmation of Eliot's conviction is to be found in his *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* (published in 1948) and we would like to focus our fullest attention on Section II of the 'Appendix' where he asserts that

The dominant force in creating a common culture between peoples each of which has its distinct culture, is religion.  

In choosing the phrase 'the dominant force', Eliot, we should like to think, put emphasis on 'dominant' and sent a signal on the kind of importance he attached to religion within the context of a culture. In other words religion cements different cultural entities everywhere the same way as it does in Europe. And, hence, Eliot argues:

It is in Christianity that our arts have developed; it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe have... been rooted. It is against the background of Christianity that all our thought has significance.

When Eliot says that 'it is in Christianity that our arts have developed,' he is not referring to something he believes to be true only of the past but also holds it to be so of the present. His in-depth study of the European culture and its classics seems to have given him deeper insights into the nature of the relationship of a culture to a work of art which is produced under its aegis. And, of course, this includes religion.
Furthermore, Eliot bases his observations on the strength of his investigation into the genesis, growth and development of poetry in the history of the European literary tradition. Several works — most of them very well known — can be cited in evidence and some of them have been included in all sections of his *Selected Essays* (1963 rprt) except Section I.

We are aware that 1939 and 1948 are points farther away from the period we have selected for discussion. But this is unavoidable because Eliot's later essays are the extensions, modifications and, maybe, even reaffirmations of his earlier stand. What emerges quite clearly out of the discussion so far may be organised this way:

(a) Religion is any specific system of belief, worship etc, often involving a code of ethics

(b) Poetry developed out of religious rites performed as a part of formal public ceremonies of traditional religious celebrations

(c) A tradition and orthodoxy derive their meaning and sanction from religion

(d) Religion covers behaviour and habits as well as social life with which it must be integrated in such a way that religious emotions become extensions of social emotions

(e) The creation of a common culture is dependent upon religion which is the dominant force
(f) The thought and life of a nation has significance only against the background of religion which is a part of tradition.

This, then, is to provide the bulwark for literature which has a meaning only within the broader framework of a tradition that breathes life into it. It is in this context that Eliot's effort to seek support from the writings of Mr. Maritain must be seen. Eliot finds 'less acceptable' Maritain's observation that religion saves poetry from what he calls the absurdity of appropriating to itself the role of a force which is destined to transform ethics and life 'by showing us where moral truth and the genuine supernatural are situate' and, in so doing, 'saves it from overweening arrogance'.

It is Maritain's categorisation of the supernatural as genuine (and thus appearing to suggest that there might be other categories of the supernatural) that seems to us to provide reason for Eliot's 'qualm'. Eliot himself suggests that this is so, though not in so many words, when he says that this is 'very easy to accept without examination'. There are warning bells sounded closer towards the end of the lecture on "The Modern Mind" (published later but delivered in 1933).

Any theory which relates poetry very closely to a religious or a social scheme of things aims, probably, to explain poetry by discovering its natural laws.
Such laws since they are of a kind of binding (Eliot's emphasis) by legislation cannot be recognised if only because

the criticism of no one man and no
one age can be expected to embrace
the whole nature of poetry or exhaust
all of its uses. (added emphasis).

The fact that Eliot comes to this conclusion after evaluating the theories of poetry proposed by eminent figures through the ages, before him, is to our mind a plus point. More so, because it provides a semi-empirical basis to Eliot's conclusions. It comprehends within the body of the thesis all strains, divergent enough, and this is what gives it its authenticity and relevance. But at the same time one is bewildered about the way in which the function of poetry is discussed.

In 1956, Eliot revised the lecture he had delivered in 1923 under the title "The Function of Criticism" and called it "The Frontiers of Criticism." A point worth remembering here is that the creative and the critical aspects of literary creation are one and the same for Eliot. Thus "The Social Function of Poetry" written in 1945 is equally relevant. Moreover, the essay of 1923 draws upon the one written in 1919, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," and its relation, therefore, to the work in 1945 assumes an enormous value. As Eliot notes in the 1923 essay referred above, his concern in 1919 with
the artist and the tradition was a problem of order and he sees this to be the problem with the function of criticism too. For, being 'organic wholes' and systems, they (the two together) provide the contextual link and it is only in relation to these that 'individual works of literary art, and the works of individual artists, have their significance.' There is a corollary to this argument. Artists are united with each other 'most commonly' in an 'unconscious' way through a 'common' inheritance and cause. Tradition provides that vital contextual link. Eliot had brought within the purview of tradition not merely dogmatic beliefs but habits, conventions, feelings and the unity of religious background. Tradition becomes an all-encompassing institution.

Seen in the light of these assertions, Eliot's observation that 'the trouble of the modern age is not merely the inability to believe certain things about God and man' the same way as our ancestors believed, 'but the inability to feel towards God and man as they did,' gets a new meaning. (Eliot's emphasis). Eliot's contention that 'when religious feeling (which varies from age to age as does poetic feeling) disappears, the words in which men have struggled to express it become meaningless' is equally important and meaningful. (added emphasis). This, in spite of the fact that 'the belief, the doctrine, remains the same' even when the religious and the poetic feelings vary, is not merely an assertion of a personal feeling in case of Eliot. It is his conviction. Men
have struggled through the ages to give words to their religious feelings — to merge, as it were, their religious perceptions into their aesthetic sensibility. We see this as the very foundation of Eliot's new poetics. We must hurry to add that we mean this not in its very narrow, parochial sense but as a reaffirmation of a broader vision of the creative and the critical processes that subsumes everything that strengthens the belief. Hence, Eliot's insistence that 'function' as a term, thought crucial to any discussion, implies 'what the thing (of which it is a function) ought to do rather than what it does do or has done.' ('ought' is emphasised by Eliot. The rest have added emphases). 15 And Eliot is not the only one in insisting that ought is not what we want, but is. Haines (1989: 35) notes that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is', perhaps, simply because they can't be separated. 16 Was Eliot (and those who shared his view) being narrow in their interpretation? Far from it. Eliot is obviously voicing his concern, his irritation, about the separation of 'ought' and 'is', a separation of 'fact' and 'value'. A closer study of the relevant quote from Eliot's work should make this clear.

Thus, the separation of fact from value is what leads a casual reader and a not-so-conscious critic and, maybe, even a creative artist, who is not conscious of the literary tradition, to misrepresent and misinterpret the meaning of the critical as well as the creative processes. Haines goes on to
assert that

Fact and value can't be cut off from each other: nothing 'is' without the 'ought'... The interpreter's indivisible world of 'ought' and 'is' should be such that it provides a good context for a text. (Haines' emphasis).  

But the same can be said of the writer, the creative artist, for whom nothing may be 'ought' without the 'is', for even the world of the artist is essentially indivisible and permits cohabitation, or even a merger of the 'ought' and the 'is'. Given this assertion, it remains to be seen how poetry which sprung up from religious rites and which attained 'perfection in particular kinds' within the framework that the Greek drama gave it, could abdicate that vital function and afford to abort the tradition. The following sections, we hope, will help us arrive at some conclusions which may be acceptable even if they seem to be tentative.

We must admit that Eliot's is an explorative mind which might appear at times to be elusive too. Maybe, this feeling derives from his supposed diffidence in not trying to define along clear-cut lines the various theories and terminology which he made current in literature. But Eliot never claimed to be a practitioner who took upon himself this apparently impossible task. His is only a point of view and it is
up to us, his readers, to search for meanings that emerge even if they do by implication. And it is thus, that we need to view his statements as an attempt at defining the theories and terms that he either developed or explained. It was this that gave him the halo of a genius: humble, yet incessantly inquisitive, revealing a passion born out of convictions. This chapter is devoted to examining the content of Eliot's thought with a view to arriving at the structure of religion as it unfolds in his prose works primarily and his poetry only secondarily. In so doing, the effort is to lead to the thematic concerns of his poetics. Therefore, beginning with a discussion on the importance of dogma and the problems of orthodoxy and heresy, the arguments evolve around the formulation of the relation between religion and literature towards the end.

Having done that, we propose to discuss and, in this way, to develop the points of view towards the evaluation of the function of criticism as Eliot sees it. The earlier discussion will provide the background for this. In other words, the effort will be to relate the structure of religion, as conceived by Eliot, to the formulation of his poetics, which will form the focus of attention in Chapter 7, "Notes towards Eliot's New Poetics". We shall concern ourselves here with building up and providing the bases for that chapter at the end of the thesis.
II

'Religion', as a term, refers to a belief in the superhuman power to be obeyed and worshipped as the creator and ruler of the universe. It is also the name given to the expression of this belief in conduct and rituals. Religion is an inseparable part of tradition which brings within its purview even dogmatic beliefs. But Eliot notes that

Tradition is not solely, or even primarily, the maintenance of certain dogmatic beliefs; these beliefs have come to take their living form in the course of the formation of a tradition. (added emphases)

It should be quite obvious to any serious reader of Eliot's works that the interpretation in the present case hinges on those portions that have been emphasised. It is not Eliot's argument that tradition is solely, or even primarily the maintenance of certain dogmatic beliefs. Quite apparently, there are other attributes as well that contribute to the maintenance of beliefs. Nor is tradition 'primarily' such maintenance which fact only suggests that there are many other factors and units contributing to this and tradition is, per se, the most formidable of the units of the composite whole called life. More importantly, he finds that the term tradition, being used 'to include a good deal more than' what he calls 'traditional religious beliefs' has wider connotations. Undoubtedly,
even traditional religious beliefs are a part of tradition. Moreover, they spring from religion. Eliot tells us that the right tradition and orthodoxy for the people of Europe is Christianity. At the same time we are also told that

It is not enthusiasm, but dogma, that differentiates a Christian from a pagan society.²²

It is clear, then, that he holds dogma to be something that differentiates a Christian society from a pagan one.²³ Christian morals are based on fixed beliefs which cannot change, thus making even the morals essentially a fixed and an unchanging institution.

To be religious is firstly to believe and this belief must centre around a certain 'dogmatic' (only in the sense of using the dogma and not in its theological sense) religious moral code which derives from it and which is what follows Belief proper. As B says in "A Dialogue on Dramatic Poetry",

If we are religious, then we shall only be aware of the Mass as art, in so far as it is badly done and interferes with our devotion consequently.²⁴

And this because assisting at Mass; assistance is participating. (Eliot's emphasis). It must be well done and not interfere with our devotion. If we are irreligious, then we shall also be aware of the Mass only as art. The difference hinges
clearly on taking the Mass as a reaffirmation of Belief and not on Mass for its own sake. It is the act of reaffirmation that means participation both mentally and physically which leads to the awareness and feeling of the presence of the Divine. Dogma is what makes a religious act Christian. But what is a dogma? Vergilius Ferm (1945: 232) has the following two notings on 'dogma':

A. Dogma may mean any fixed belief... doctrine formulated in Creeds and Articles of acceptance by the Christian community.

B. Dogma is the body of truth in which people who grow up within the Church are instructed; for Roman Catholics it is authoritative law of Church and acceptance of it is necessary... (added emphases).

Tanquerey and Bord (1959: 2) note that Dogmatic theology is concerned with the truths which theoretically must be believed; it is called the rule of what must be believed. (their emphases except that on 'the truths' and 'theoretically... believed').

And the idea of dogma is important according to Tanquerey and Bord, who explain that the word dogma has many meanings which include the following in particular:

- a firm opinion, a decree or a law, all
- Christian truths, all truths formally revealed;
and, in a strict sense, the truths
of the divine — Catholic faith. (added emphases).  

Added to this, we have Frithjof Schuon (1953: 11) who, commenting on the inaccessibility of dogma, explains,

though dogma is not accessible to all men in its intrinsic truth, which can only be directly attained by the Intellect, it is none the less accessible through faith, which is, for most people, the only possible mode of participation in the divine truths. (added emphases).  

Schuon (1953: 150) further argues that

This inaccessibility of the Christian dogmas is expressed by calling them 'mysteries', a word which has a positive meaning only in the initiatory domain to which moreover it belongs, but which, when applied in the religious sphere, seems to attempt to justify or conceal the fact that Christian dogmas carry with them no 'direct' intellectual proof. (added emphases).  

Before going on further and setting out to explain the importance of dogma, let us take a look at what Monsignor Canon George D Smith (1960: 32) has to say about it, more so, because
it is based on the Vatican Council's decree:

A dogma... is a truth contained *in
the Word of God, written or handed down,*
and *which the Church,* either by a solemn
judgement or by her ordinary and universal
teaching *proposes for belief as having been
divinely revealed.* (added emphases).

To summarise briefly these views on and definitions of a 'dogma'
should be the next logical step. Ferm opines that a dogma may
mean any fixed belief formulated in Creeds and Articles. A
Creed refers to a summary of Articles of religious belief
especially those called the Apostles' Creed. And Articles of
faith are binding statement of points of belief of a Church.
But why are Creeds necessary? They are necessary (a) to define
the faith, (b) to provide a norm, standard and touchstone, and
(c) to provide the material of Christian teaching and preach-
ing. And it is true that no Creed can be complete or final
and, hence, Eliot's insistence that 'perfect orthodoxy in the
individual artist is not always necessary or even desirable.'
If as Monsignor Smith says, heresy (also called heterodoxy) is
the wilful denial of a dogma, then orthodoxy is the acceptance
of the dogmas without any question. In other words, belief
subsumes the acceptance of the dogmas.

Ferm also states that a dogma is the body of truth,
the authoritative law of Church whose acceptance is necessary.
This is so because dogmas are the basis of faith. Faith is
incomplete without such an acceptance. Heresy is the wilful
denial of dogma, weakness in belief and, therefore, it shows
lack of faith (Eliot would like to call it a partial percep-
tion of truth brought about by the fact of the heretics being
highly educated). Tanquerey and Bord hold the view that
dogmatic theology is concerned with the truths which theore-
tically must be believed. More so, because it is called the
rule of what must be believed. 'Must' implies that there is
no option, for it suggests an element of compulsion. Also,
Tanquerey and Bord define a dogma as a firm opinion (firm, as
a word, an adjective, gives 'opinion' a stronger base) and
comprehends all Christian truths formally revealed about the
divine, maybe, even by the divine. Who reveals these truths?
Christ, his apostles after him, the Church established by Christ,
the Vatican Council and the Conference of Bishops. Some of
these revelations took the form of miracles performed by Christ
and the prophecies made by him. Schuon sees dogma as something
which is not accessible to everyone insofar as its intrinsic
truth is concerned. If it is accessible through faith, which
is the only way it can be accessible (since it is the only mode
of participation), their inaccessibility is to be seen in the
'mysteries' of Christian faith, for example, the dual nature
of Christ in being both the Son of God and Son of Man, his
resurrection and, before it, the mystery of his death, the
mystery of Christmas and the Eucharist.
All mysteries have a positive meaning only in the initiatory domain. 'To initiate' is to cause to begin or to admit into membership or, even, to give basic instruction to someone. The initiatory domain would thus refer to the domain where a beginning is caused or admission given or basic instruction is set in motion. In Christianity, this lies in the immediate aftermath of the sacrament of baptism which is a religious and formal initiation into the Church of Christ. Baptism is also a mystery. These are dogmas too and, when applied to religion, they seem to make an attempt at the justification or concealment of the fact that the dogmas do not carry any 'direct' intellectual proof. Whatever proof there might be is only indirect. It is, therefore, necessarily something that must be believed as one of the truths. Monsignor Smith views dogma to be a truth contained in the Word of God which the Church proposes for belief as having been divinely revealed. The Scriptures contain the Word of God. What goes against the Word is blasphemous and heretical. To believe in something and then profane what one profoundly believes in is to blaspheme (Heretics are those who do just that!).

Eliot says that 'an heresy is apt to have seductive simplicity to make a directive and persuasive appeal to intellect and emotions'. He explains that it is 'altogether more plausible than the truth.' This is so because a heretic has an exceptionally acute perception, or profound insight into a part of the truth. A part cannot be the whole and the moral insight
and passion coupled with dreary rationalism, turns the work of the writer concerned away from orthodoxy and, subsequently, from tradition. For, orthodoxy is an inseparable part of a tradition which subsumes religion.

G K Chesterton, in his book, *Haretics*, has a chapter which has a section called 'Concluding Remarks on the Importance of Orthodoxy' and which makes a very interesting reading. He starts off by calling the modern notion of mental progress as a vice because it is concerned with the breaking of bonds with the past, with the tradition, and with all that was hitherto considered good. Secondly, its concern with the effacing of boundaries, maybe, not only geographical, but also others related to areas of knowledge which the development of the sciences has suddenly made available to man. Thirdly, the concern is also with the casting away of dogmas. With the wilful denial of the dogmas, we may be said to have cast them away. And this break from the religious truths has forced man into a state of proud isolation, cut off from God as well as his fellow-men and the Church. Chesterton argues that any mental advance can only be seen as what he calls 'the construction of a definite philosophy of life' — a philosophy which is several removes away from the earlier one based around Belief. So critical is the situation that progress has become one of our new dogmas as has the principle of what is, in the words of Chesterton, *fact for facts' sake*. It is the truth of life that whatever is denied would slowly become a Creed through
hersesy. This will, in fact, hasten the process of self-destruction.

Turning to art, Chesterton notes that 'a small artist is content with art' — merely art — and not with 'everything'. Art is only a part of the artist's work. To give shape to art is not to give shape to a work of art like a beautiful vase, for it obviously involves more than art. The literary artist is consciously or unconsciously investing a part of himself, his beliefs, when he creates a character. Thus, Chesterton avers that 'a great artist is content with nothing except everything' because if he is concerned only with art, a mere part of the whole, the work of art itself, he is limiting himself to the projection of half the truth. He might even be guilty of simplifying the truth which is what a heretic usually does. Again in talking loosely about certain things as being an aspect of the truth, it is thought implied that we claim to know the truth. That claim in itself is a tall order. And it is this that necessitates the existence of an ideal. Fanaticism is the product of a man who lacks ideals, values, and convictions. Fanaticism results from the excessive danger of 'religious and philosophical beliefs' carried to extremes of the magnitude we have been seeing in India and the rest of the world in recent times. We can overcome this fanaticism by adopting such beliefs as are 'steeped in philosophy' and 'soaked in religion'. Beliefs are basic matters of human thought and cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Even if 'we think religion insoluble', it cannot be thought of as being
irrelevant. This, in sum, explains the importance of heresy and orthodoxy. Both Chesterton and Eliot seem to share an understanding which is common in most of the cases and only partially different in others.

This brings us to the importance of dogma. To a Christian — and Eliot is one — these dogmas could only be Christian dogmas. Dogma is a doctrine, a tenet or a belief. In other words, dogmas are doctrines formally and authoritatively affirmed. The 'Final Articles of Faith' as listed by James Hastings (ed) are as follows:

01. the unity of God and Trinity of Persons
02. Original Sin
03. the two natures of Christ (the Hypostatic Union)
04. Justification
05. the Church
06. Baptism
07. the Eucharist
08. Penance
09. the use of sacraments
10. ministers of the Church
11. the rites of the Church
12. civil affairs
13. the resurrection of bodies and final judgement.

These are accepted as the truths. The entries at 10, 11 and 12 are those directly pertaining to the government of the Church — decisions based on the deliberations of the Vatican
Council. The unity of God is what we have affirmed since the time of the Old Testament, as is the dogma of Original Sin. The Hypostatic Union is a reference to that union which makes it possible for the Divine nature and human nature of Christ to be united in the person of the Word, for the Word became flesh. And, of course, we have the concept of Incarnation whose ultimate end is the glory of God and the proximate end is Redemption. Grace is necessary for eternal life and consists of the 'illuminations of the intellect and inspirations of the will'. Its signification is in the form of Sacraments. There are seven Sacraments in the New Law, according to Tanque-rey and Bord, and these are: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order and Matrimony. New Law refers to the laws enunciated in the New Testament. Baptism is important because it is through this man is signed as a disciple of Christ's and is believed to signal the spiritual regeneration of the one baptised. Martyrdom is another form of baptism — baptism of blood.

The importance of dogmas lies in the assertion of faith and tradition. Although an artist is expected to be conscious about this, the very fact that the art has the impress of the dogmas is in itself a proof that the artist is steeped in philosophy and soaked in religion. His art would reflect the vision of a man who sees life in all its colours, as a whole. Partial cognition or partial perception is what is to
be found in heretical writings and, since heretics are usually highly educated, it is their education that deadens their religious sensibility and leads them to the perverse. It is to be noted that Eliot was not making a plea for more religion but to give it its legitimate place in the universe of a creative artist. The structure of religion is clearly based on the unity of God, the concept of Trinity and a reaffirmation of the dogmas.

III

T S Eliot's essay, "Religion and Literature" remains by far a major contribution to literary studies. His attempts at showing how the two are complementary to each other is indeed a signal statement in the annals of the history of literary criticism — a perspective that changed literary criticism into a meaningful activity which comprehends a simultaneity with its creative counterpart.

Commenting on what he expected of a really good piece of literary work, Eliot says, 'what I want is a literature which should be unconsciously, rather than deliberately and defiantly Christian.' (Eliot's emphasis) And that is where he differs from Chesterton. In proposing an unconscious bias in the writing, Eliot is obviously pleading for a work which unconsciously fosters the values of a truly Christian life. He cites the work of Chesterton to illustrate the point of a
consciously Christian writing making its appearance in a world which is definitely not Christian. Such an effort, he seems to suggest, is suspect. Although Eliot does not refer to Chesterton in "The Social Function of Poetry", his observation that 'People... are suspicious of any poetry... in which the poet is advocating social, moral, political or religious view' may be seen as the evidence in this case. At the same time, however, Eliot is wary of the complete irrationality involved in the effort of literary artists — creative as well as critical — to separate literary judgements from the religious ones. For, as he notes, the relation between Religion and Literature (the order of their appearance contains the clue to the primacy given to religion) 'is a conscious and limited relating'. What is conscious is also limited and, therefore, the plea for an unconscious bias.

We have to contend with the positing of the two opposites in this way if we are to arrive at the essence of his thought. In arguing that the relationship between religion and literature is conscious only in a limited sense, Eliot appears to be hinting at the main traditions of European poetry. The reason is not far to seek. The main traditions of European poetry are secular, maybe, even pagan. Milton's *Paradise Lost* is a case in the point. Milton could not help presenting the struggle between God and Satan (in the aftermath of the latter's disobedience) wherein God appears to be an autocrat who brooks no opposition. The dilemma of Dante was one of using the 'epic'
mode for his literary works what with its heavy reliance on the myths. It is the epic in which we have what is called heroic poetry with the depiction of the battles of the hero with dragons and people older than he, and superior to him in every way, which he always won. Eliot cites the last Canto (XXXIV) of the Inferno, especially of the vision of Satan suffering and notes that

I confess that I tend to get from Dante the impression of a Devil suffering like the human damned souls; whereas I feel that the kind of suffering experienced by the Spirit of Evil should be represented as utterly different. (Eliot emphasis).49

There is a catch here. The apparent similarity in the sufferings of 'a Devil' and 'the human damned souls' may lead to the arousal of pity. A heretic, unschooled in the mainstays of orthodoxy, of tradition, would highlight the suffering; the result, not the cause: the disobedience, the Original Sin. This is not to suggest that this was the line taken by Eliot explicitly. It is implied in Eliot's concluding remarks on "Dante" (1929) where he says that

Dante's mind is more remote from the ways of thinking and feeling in which we have been brought up. What we need is not information but knowledge: the
first step to knowledge is to recognize
the differences between his form of thought
and feeling and ours. (added emphases)\textsuperscript{50}

Eliot wants us to learn to accept the forms used by Dante,
\textit{viz}, 'imagination, phantas-magoria, and sensibility' which
would be strange to those who think and feel differently from
him, and remarks that 'this acceptance is more important than
anything that can be called belief'. (Eliot's emphasis).\textsuperscript{51} We
shall leave this argument here.

To return to the question of the relationship be­
ween religion and literature, let us return to the essay we
have been considering. Eliot makes a pertinent point when he
remarks that 'the common ground between religion and fiction'
(any literary work including poetry contains an element of
fiction) 'is behaviour'.\textsuperscript{52} And 'behaviour' is a word having
several layers of meaning and is never restricted merely to
the psychological one. Illustrating his point, he links up
religion and behaviour, which are even otherwise not separate,
although we may see them as divorced from each other most of
the time. To quote Eliot,

\begin{quote}
Our religion imposes our ethics, our judg­
ment and criticism of ourselves and our
behaviour toward our fellow men.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

Thus, it is the literary work we read that affects our behaviour
towards our fellow men and, at the same time, it affects 'our
patterns of ourselves'. Behaviour is always guided by belief and is its affective component. An assertion of this kind can hardly be taken lightly or even ignored. It is the key to the understanding of the relationship between religion and literature inasmuch as it presupposes the existence of a community of people sharing common beliefs, a code of ethics, rites and rituals, and so on. Only in this way does it affect our behaviour towards our fellow men.

Apparently, individual beliefs, individual ethics, do not have any meaning, for these are not matters of individual acceptance or rejection much in the same way as they never were so earlier. Unless all the members constituting a group accept a common code, consciously or otherwise, these things do not get social sanction. This is, perhaps, the most appropriate and even proper groundwork of a human morality which must, under any set of circumstances, include the individual member's behaviour towards the other members of the group or towards other individuals in the group separately. Morality, of any order whatsoever, can never be individualistic. And even when a minority within the community prefers a morality different from that of the larger section within it, it becomes a fit case for a sect. The sects, so identified, are ultimately, a part of a religious order and can function only within its broad parameters.
T.S. Eliot argues that when a writer creates a character, he invests in him or her a part of himself. This may or may not be a conscious effort. In other words, the behaviour of his character(s) has his (the writer's) 'approval' and 'benediction'. The statement acquires a subtler meaning when we take into account the subsequent one, which is, 'his attitude towards the result of the behaviour arranged by himself'. Needless to say that this is wholly relevant. Can the artist who has arranged the behaviour of his character afford to keep out of his work his own attitude towards the result of his character's behaviour? If he does, then, he attracts strictures as being an accomplice after the fact. Man is, by his very nature, imitative and, hence, Eliot's conclusion that in our acquaintance with the work, wherein the writer has 'arranged' the behaviour of his characters, 'We (the readers) can be influenced towards behaving in the same way'. And thus it would constitute irresponsible propaganda. Eliot cites the authority of Montgomery Belgion whose work, *The Human Parrot* (we cannot afford to miss the negative implication of the title) and draws our attention, in particular, to the chapter called "The Irresponsible Propagandist". That it shaped Eliot's thinking is only too apparent to need any restatement.

Be that as it may, one thing seems to be definitely certain. Eliot's statements about how literary works affect our behaviour towards our fellow men and our patterns of
ourselves are hardly wholly intelligible at the surface level. Eliot's hint is at a different kind of meaning that lies within the deeper layers. A contextual reading becomes imperative if the real meaning is to be retrieved. 'Behaviour' is always seen as a subject's response to a stimulus, and can be thus be said to presume a stimulus: be that another individual, manner, action or a representation. Behaviour may also be referred to as 'conduct' which comprehends 'manners or deportment'. Matthew Arnold seems to be close to Eliot on this when he says that the object of religion is conduct and conduct, according to him, is 'three-fourths of life' (added emphases). Eliot is not content with this because he implies in After Strange Gods that behaviour is also belief. The question of morality assumes extra importance at this stage because when we talk of the conduct of a character, we do make use of some set of norms consciously or unconsciously. Thus we arrive at the important decisions on whether it represents good or evil.

What is moral is also ethical because a behaviour governed by a morality is always in conformity with a code of ethics. Such conformity informs the correctness of the choice made. Again, what is moral is also virtuous and virtuousness in matters of sex is expected when behaviour corresponds to the accepted code of ethics. Thus, 'immoral' or even 'amoral' attitude in matters of sex triggers an outrage because the attitude is unChristian. Moreover, since all this is dependent
on culture, tradition, orthodoxy and the like, which an individual draws upon, it reflects on our upbringing and training. Now, if it is 'our religion' which 'imposes' (attention is drawn to the choice of the word) 'our ethics' as well as 'our judgement and criticism of ourselves', it should be clear at there is no scope for any choice. What is imposed — and the word underscores a negative connotation — hardly offers choice, rightly or wrongly, and its acceptance is taken for granted. And since our ethics and our judgement and criticism of ourselves is so bound by our religion, it is sure to find reflection in our literature. If the impress is deliberate and conscious, it becomes a fine example of material used for religious propaganda. But if the impress is unconscious, though deliberate, it becomes the take-off point for tradition. Is must never be lost sight of.

The term 'ethics' is, in the words of Roger Fowler, used to denote 'the study of principles defining man's duty to his neighbours'. Christianity preaches the necessity of loving one's neighbour. Even Moses' commandments in the Old Testament do. A life in harmony with the teaching of the Church is a necessary pre-condition for a believer. Charity and the attitude of being helpful to others are the underlying principles of a religious way of life. Commitment to a prevailing code of morality guided by orthodoxy of sensibility, therefore, seems to be Eliot's primary preoccupation. Since
D H Lawrence chose to highlight the hidden passions in *Lady Chatterley's Lovers* and *Sons and Lovers* and so had Thomas Hardy through several of his novels, especially *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, they are dubbed as heretics. If, on the one hand, Eliot feels that Lawrence was 'insensible to ordinary social morality', primarily because of the absence of spirituality in him, then, on the other hand, he believes that Hardy wrote 'for the sake of self-expression' and was not interested in men's minds. (Eliot's emphasis). He made use of the landscape to shed light on their emotions. Self-expression, in the pure tradition, which Eliot talks about time and again, goes contrary to the idea of the universality of experience. When an artist creates a work of art, his creation is expected to reflect what is tangibly universal. The creation cannot be expected to be torn away from this frame of the universality of experience only for the sake of artistic newness which is unregenerate.

Thus, both Lawrence and Hardy stand censured, for Eliot finds these deviations from the tradition, symptoms of decadence. Some of this will form the subject of discussion in one of the following chapters. But all said and done, a literature that fails to foster moral values and cannot propagate a system of ethics that governs a meaningful religious ethos fails in its duty as a creative writing. Creativity is not a matter of taking liberties with the tradition and ethics which are a part of it. However, Eliot does not stop at this.
He goes on to take the stand that though our purpose of reading literature may be merely 'to entertain' ourselves or seek 'aesthetic enjoyment', the literature we read 'affects us as entire human beings; it affects our moral and religious existence'. (added emphasis). This, then, seems to be the chief refrain of Eliot's all through his career as a literary critic.

Religion and Literature cannot be wholly separated in Eliot's scheme of things. In his essay, "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca", he rejects the famous Arnoldian thesis that poetry could be a substitute for religion with the observation that it is not a substitute at all. Not even for philosophy or theology. To Eliot, the function of poetry is to cater to both the emotional and the intellectual needs of man at the same time. It can neither be purely emotional satisfaction nor can it be a purely intellectual exercise. A healthy combination of these two components alone is the test of real poetry. Eliot sounds caution. He says that he does not mean poetry need have no intellectual content (added emphasis) or meaning when he opines that poetry is concerned with the expression of emotion and feeling. (added emphasis). He observes that such a function of poetry which fuses both the emotional and intellectual content implies the impress of religion on it because otherwise we would have a secular literature like the one that contemporary literature is. Moreover, it would help us in understanding things in their proper perspective if we could recall how he stresses that he is not thinking of enjoyment.
and understanding when he talks about the emotion and intellectual contents. (added emphases). The facts speak otherwise. Enjoyment is related to emotion much in the same way as understanding is related to intellect.

The influence of F H Bradley on Eliot is too well known to warrant any restatement. Bradley, writing in his work, Essays on Truth and Reality, traces the 'origin of faith' to emotion. He says:

The origin of faith... may be what we call emotional; and, even perhaps apart from emotion, faith can rise through what may be termed as a non-active suggestion. (added emphasis).

And again that religious faith consists... in the identification of my will with a certain object. (added emphasis).

To the last one, we may add unhesitatingly that it may even be with 'the will of God'. In identifying one's 'will' with 'the will of God', one only reaffirms one's faith. By the same token, if a writer were to fuse his or her will through complete identification with a problem, then the fusion leads to near perfection inasmuch as the resultant product would take shape out of conviction. That is why Marxist writing appears to be written out of conviction, and even committed and is,
therefore, quite appealing, for it seems to mirror reality as it were. None the less, it is heretical because it takes into account only a part of the truth. If, as Bradley says, the origin of faith may be emotional, then, it is what Eliot takes to be central to his thesis. The tie-up between emotion, on the one hand, and feeling, on the other, is an important element in the dialectical structure of Eliot's thought.

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919), Eliot had called emotion 'structural' and had argued that the whole effect of a drama is due to the fact that a number of 'floating' feelings combine with the 'structural' (and, therefore, static) emotion to give us a new art emotion. The floating feelings have an affinity with and are triggered by the structural emotion. The structural or the structuring emotion is also referred to by Eliot as the 'significant' emotion and he argues that it is in the expression of the 'significant' emotion, 'which has its life in the poem', that the poem gets its meaning. For appreciation is the result of the identification and understanding of the 'sincere' emotion which the poem gives expression to along with the technical excellence it may demonstrate. It would not be wrong to see in this the influence of Sanskrit poetics on Eliot, especially, in view of the fact that he had taken courses in Sanskrit under the guidance of Charles Lanman and Patanjali's metaphysics under James Woods. Three years of a close study of Sanskrit poetics is a pretty long time indeed and, on Eliot's own admission, this
left him in 'a state of enlightened mystification'.\textsuperscript{73} The phrase 'enlightened mystification' suggests that it freed Eliot from prejudices and opened up newer avenues of knowledge and, at the same time, left him bewildered in the light of this new knowledge. He comments that his effort at 'understanding what the Indian philosophers were after' and 'their subtleties' made 'most of the great European philosophers look like schoolboys'.\textsuperscript{74} And "the 'influence' of Brahmin and Buddhist thought upon Europe, as in Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Deussen, had largely been through romantic misunderstanding" (added emphasis)\textsuperscript{75} and he realized that he could penetrate into the heart of the mystery only by 'forgetting how to think and feel as an American or a European'. But he confesses that he did not want to do this for practical and sentimental reasons. (added emphases). 'Practical' because he could not have expected to put his point across effectively to his European audience as well as he could do without it because he could not afford to digress from the Christian tradition which was what he believed in. 'Sentimental' reasons are to be seen in the latter. For, he would have ultimately (so he might have feared) ended up negating Christian thought. This is quite understandable. The net result of this mental exercise: a return to Christian tradition and European Classics! But it left its indelible mark and Eliot, it would not be a far-fetched thought to believe, continued albeit unconsciously, to synthesize the Western with the Oriental philosophies.
To return to the theme of the European tradition within the context of Christian beliefs, Eliot traces the origins of poetry to religious rituals. He avers that a people emote through poetry. In On Poetry and Poets, Eliot observes, the trouble of the modern age is not merely the inability to believe certain things about God and man... but the inability to feel towards God and man. (added emphasis on the phrase). 76

If it had only been 'the inability to believe' in 'certain things about God and man', modern man would still have before him something to look up to or hope for. It is the 'inability to feel' towards God and man that has created a hopeless situation, making everything look disparaging in its wake. Bradley also feels that faith rises from emotion. One may argue that feelings and emotions are different. But Bradley's corollary in allowing for the possibility of faith rising through 'what may be termed as a non-active suggestion' is a significant point. Can we take 'non-active' to mean passive? Apparently not. What could provide a useful synonym? Eliot, though he does not say so, comes out with the term 'autotelic'. The New Webster's Dictionary of English Language has the following entry against the term: "A word used in philosophy to mean 'having a subconscious, unreasoning instinct for existence'." 78 Eliot is not ready to concede that criticism is an
'autotelic activity' because he believes that the relationship between religion and literature is 'a conscious and limited relating'. What is conscious cannot also be subconscious at the same time. Nor is it that the existence is 'unreasoning'. Far from it. It is something both of which are partially, if not wholly, reasoned reactions. They can be explained. And what can be explained does not, in any way, approximate belief.

T S Eliot notes that there have been chiefly three phases in the secularization of the novel. The phase to which Fielding, Dickens and Thackeray belong is the first phase in which the novel took the Faith for granted and dropped from it its picture of life. The second phase was the one to which George Eliot, George Meredith and Thomas Hardy belonged and in which the novel doubted, worried about, or contested the Faith. The third phase is the one to which nearly all contemporary novelists except James Joyce belong -- a phase to which people 'who have never heard the Christian Faith spoken of as anything but an anachronism' belong. (added emphasis). 'Anachronism' is a word used to talk about something or its representation as one that exists or occurs at other than its proper time. James Joyce is the only exception. A point worth noting! What Eliot says about Blaise Pascal in his essay, "The Pensees of Pascal", should clear the misunderstanding. We may still have about the relationship between religion and thought (literature is the manifestation of thought). Tracing the development of Pascal's thought, he comments, 'when he
turned his thoughts wholly towards religion, his worldly knowledge was a part of his composition which is essential to the value of his work." Pascal's *Pensées*, written in 1660, is an attempt at 'a carefully constructed defence of Christianity', and Eliot notes that 'we still find that it occupies a unique place in the history of French literature and in the history of religious meditation'. What makes the work rise to such heights is the fact that Pascal was not 'a theologian'. Nor was he 'a systematic philosopher' but 'a man with an immense genius for science and, at the same time, a natural psychologist and moralist.' Eliot found in him 'a great literary artist' whose 'intellectual passion for truth was reinforced by his passionate dissatisfaction with human life unless a spiritual explanation could be found.' (added emphasis).

An inquiry into Pascal's method explains the impress of the mental processes of 'the intelligent believer' on *Pensées*. To Eliot, Pascal was a typical example of the ideal Christian thinker. Eliot's comments on the qualifications of an ideal Christian thinker are quite revealing inasmuch as they seem to unfold his complex thinking on this point. First of all, the Christian thinker tries to explain to himself 'consciously and conscientiously the sequence which culminates in faith'. In this, he is different from the public apologist. A religious person seeking to interpret the external world slowly discovers hints and suggestions of the impress of God in his own creation in what Hopkins calls 'the inscape of things'. His search for
God begins at this point and all the experiences which he acquires on his way, veritably an inner 'pilgrim's progress', finally come to a point when he discovers faith within himself. This may be loosely described as Christian mysticism. Secondly, in order to do this, he has to proceed using the twin methods of rejection and elimination. Thirdly, he seeks to explain the condition of the world as he finds it to be 'inexplicable by any non-religious theory'. Finally, in religious preferences, he is a Christian and even there a Catholic, for he finds these preferences accounting 'most satisfactorily' for the moral worlds both within and without. And thus, he finds himself 'inexorably committed to the dogma of the Incarnation'.

Notes Paul Weiss (1947: 117) that one of the functions of religion and art is to provoke anguish and ecstasy. Explaining the function of 'the artistic mind', he records that it is 'to generate metaphors, to bring together diverse perceptions into unities which are revelatory of all beings.' (added emphases) The truth is that religion bases itself on these revelatory unities of perceptions. The idea is not to draw parallels between Paul Weiss' theory and that of Eliot's but to illustrate how metaphors generated in a literary work can become a source for bringing together diverse perceptions into revelatory unities. If we were to go back to the arguments of Blaise Pascal, especially the last of them, we would find that the imagination of the Christian thinker and, by the same logic, a literary artist must be committed to the Christian dogma of
the Incarnation. In other words, Christ must be the centre of all this exercise. This is again what a true Anglo-Catholic like Eliot would want.

Gustave Weigel, SJ and A G Madden (1961: 24), who have devoted a chapter to "Metaphysical Answers", note that there are certain implicits in the Catholic position:

1. There is insistence that human reason as such, without any intrinsic elevation, is capable and prone to discover the numinous.

2. The achievement of the numinous as numinous... is a supernatural act. It commits the Catholic to the belief of reality beyond cosmic structure. It also commits the Catholic to believe: (a) that man is capable of supernatural action and being, provided this capacity be called into act by God — nothing in nature could call it forth; (b) that there is a continuous spectrum of reality...

3. Although Catholicism is stoutly intellectualist, it does not overlook those facts which are stressed by voluntarism: Catholicism insists: (a) on the free gift of revelation, the contingence of the giving of the numinous; (b) that the acceptance of revelation is a free action on the part of the human believer, and (c) that will-forces lead the believer to his faith. (NB: Not wholly original in this form we have summarised the views after 'insists'.)
4. Catholicism is committed to a wide metaphysics:

(1) With the naturalist it admits that there is a natural order which is the proper background of man.

(2) With the rationalist it admits that truth can be achieved by using self-evident principles of reason, which are only the expressions of basic intuitions of the human mind.

(3) With the idealist it admits that reality is primarily spiritual, i.e., of the stuff that thought is made of.

(4) With the empiricist it admits that experience brings with it thinking but against him it refuses to restrict all thought to empirical objects.

(5) With the voluntarist it admits that basic pushes in man lead even his thinking, but against him, it refuses to say that all thought is nothing but voluntaristic subjectivism.

(6) With the existentialist it admits that man is contingent and subject to free play of forces, but against him, it refuses to say that this contingency is pure contingency, but rather direction from a free creator himself necessary, wise and good.89

Some of the important terms used in the quotation need to be explained. The word 'numinous' comes from the Latin word 'numinis', meaning of divine power as well as 'spiritually or religiously inspired or inspiring.'90
When we say that something is 'contingent', we mean that it happens 'by chance'. It might also mean 'possible but not certain'. Secondly, it may be 'possible' only within certain conditions and is, therefore, something 'conditional'. Weigel and Madden opine that the first implicit condition is that 'there is in man an obediential potency for supernatural action', and the second one that 'being is necessarily an analogous quasi-concept'. Both these, we believe, are fundamental to Catholic philosophy. It is here, seen in this particular context, that the views of Helen Gardner attain special significance. She finds the change from 'the terror of the supernatural' in Murder in the Cathedral to the rapturous recognition of glory as the very life of the play. Thomas Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the re-enactment of the martyrdom of Jesus Christ, reaffirms his faith in the Word of God echoing in the memories of the Faithful: He died so that others may live. Martyrdom is also called the Baptism of Blood, according to Tanquerey and Bord (1959: 227), who explain that it is 'the suffering of death or of torture which of itself brings death, by reason of one's Catholic faith or of another Christian virtue'. That is not all. Adults must bear this patiently as a precondition. Two internal dispositions are required of a would-be martyr: supernatural attrition and at least an implicit desire for Baptism. (added emphases). Supernatural attrition is more than likely to refer to the war taking place within the mind between Good and Evil with belief crowning Good with victory over Evil after a long-drawn struggle.
The soul must hold out the longest against the Evil. Implicit desire would similarly stand for an absolute or unquestioning desire (the parallel applied here is that of 'implicit belief'). When these two are posited, we get endurance through belief and an absolute desire for baptism as the internal disposition of a martyr. Should there be room for doubt that Becket is a martyr in this sense? The original meaning of martyr is a witness. Becket is both a witness and a sufferer who has been made to pay not for his beliefs but for disobeying the king.

One way and, perhaps, the best of the ways, is to look for evidence in the text of the play. Becket emerges victorious out of the trial by fire rejecting every temptation with equanimity for most part of the time. He gets angry, retorts partially, but checks himself at one or two important points in the play. Also his desire for martyrdom is implicit in that he offers his own blood in return for the blood shed by Christ. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to suggest that Becket thought himself in the role of Christ who suffered on the Cross for the sins of Man. Christ's crucifixion was seen by Christ as a historic necessity — the foundation on which Faith was built. Becket's martyrdom is seen by him also as a historic necessity — the current that would rejuvenate a wavering Faith. Murder in the Cathedral thus venerates the martyr in the cause of the Church.
We have called Becket's martyrdom a historical necessity (recognised by Becket himself) because, though a trusted friend of the King of England, Henry the Second, and his appointee as the Archbishop of Canterbury, he finds himself in a frightful predicament. No sooner does the mantle of office as the leader of the Church fall on his shoulders than he starts experiencing the gradual and unconscious reversal of roles. One can easily discern in his dialogue both with the Tempters and the Knights, tell-tale signs of a traumatic experience of estrangement from the king, his one-time friend, as well as his resignation from an enviable political office, to step into the shoes of his very illustrious predecessors at the head of the Anglican Church. He discovers in the course of time that, in his new role as the Patriarch of the Church, his primary duty is to the Church of England and not to the king. This realisation is painful, for he could go on with the kind of relationship he shared with the king only at the cost of betraying the Church whose dignity he must uphold now. Seeing himself in the role of the defender of Faith, he readily takes on the king who is all set to undermine the spiritual authority of the Church. And only because he wants the Church to put its seal of approval on all his actions whether they be good or bad. It may be noted that Becket, the King's vassal, rises above his past when he discovers the numinous, albeit unconsciously.
The discovery of the 'numinous', which means a 'spiritually inspiring' or 'religiously inspired' incident or occurrence, is the mark of the change that is perceptible. Nor is that enough. 'The achievement of the numinous as numinous', we must remind ourselves, is but 'a supernatural act'. However, this capacity for supernatural action of a being is subject to the will of God though a human being may have such a potential. Jesus Christ was both the Son of God and Son of Man and, in the act of resurrection, proved his credentials, for the act was a supernatural act willed by God. Christians may be said to have inherited this potential because they are saved by the blood of Christ. Christ proved that man (because he was the Son of Man as well) is capable of supernatural action through benediction. In imitating the crucifixion of Christ, Becket re-enacts this action, invested with the halo of the supernatural, for it appears as real as the original one. Eliot uses the Four Tempters and Four Knights much in the same way as Fyodor Dostoevsky uses the three temptations, in the scene involving 'The Grand Inquisitor' as the three limitations of the Christian Faith in _The Brothers Karamazov_. The difference is that while the former helps reaffirm faith, the latter shakes our faith in the Word.

Secondly, if the revelation (of the Christian faith) is 'a free gift', contingent upon the fact of it being the gift made by the numinous, the acceptance of it as 'a free action on the part of the human believer' is a must. Thus, there is
the possibility of a free choice and a commitment to do so. The implication of this proposition is that all this is subject to the acceptance by the believer whose will is a necessary precondition for making choices and commitment, made possible by a free gift which alone lead him to faith. D E Jones (1960: 50-81), surveying the Thomistic view of the universe, notes that this view held that the maintenance of order in Creation (Eliot was dealing with the problem of order as well) is dependent upon the subordination in Man of the sensual to the spiritual. This is that very point where Evil might concentrate the thrust of its attack upon the Divine order. The resistance is complete when the spiritual gains an upper hand. So long as Thomas Becket remains an ordinary individual initiated into the Christian faith, all the preconditions are met but his actions are not free. However, in the aftermath of his temporal state and his spiritual transformation into the spiritual father of the king and the people of England, all his actions are free and so are the choices and commitments he makes. His decision to confront the king, who is hell-bent on violating the Church sanctions, is free and born out of his concern to uphold the sanctity of the Christian faith even if that meant embracing martyrdom. No one could have forced him into the situation that led to his martyrdom but his will.

The defiant attitude he adopts is born out of the conviction that he is fighting for a rightful cause. Similarly, the way in which he bravely rejects all allurements and embraces martyrdom, is the result of his faith that he is a
Christian 'saved by the blood of Christ'. He is convinced that

... Death will come only when I am worthy,
And if I am worthy, there is no danger.
I have therefore only to make perfect my will.
(added emphasis). 97

Faith, then, may be defined as the result of the perfection of will made by man through Divine Grace. Martz (1954: 246) explains that it is the conformity between the soul's will and God's will which leads to mystic ecstasy. This kind of ecstasy may be seen in Becket's behaviour when he talks of making perfect his will. Eliot seems to have drawn upon Bradley for whom 'religious faith' consists of 'the identification of my (any individual's) will with a certain object.' (Parenthesis supplied). We can conclude that the object selected for identification may even be the Will of God. The result: mystic ecstasy.

In his sermon to the congregation in the Cathedral on the Christmas morning, Becket sheds light on the nature of Christian martyrdom. To quote him,

A Christian martyrdom is never an accident...
Still less is a Christian martyrdom the effect of a man's will to become a Saint... A martyrdom is always the design of God... for the true martyr is he who has... lost his will in the will of God... (added emphasis). 98
Apparently, the losing of one's will in 'the will of God' is acceptable to Eliot as the idea of the perfection of the human will. Earlier in this chapter, we had quoted from Tanquerey and Bord (1959: 229) on the topic of martyrdom. We had seen how this is called Baptism of Blood involving internal dispositions of 'supernatural attrition' and 'implicit desire' for Baptism. It was explained how implicit desire stands for an absolute or unquestioning desire. Now, if this be the requirement, then how can a Christian martyrdom be considered an accident? Also, how can it be the effect of a man's will to become a Saint? Since it is always the design of God, the suffering of death or torture, which of itself brings death by reason of one's faith — Catholic faith, must be borne patiently by the martyr.

There could not have been a better illustration of how religion is related to literature than Murder in the Cathedral. One would be dishonest if one were to classify Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral into any of the three categories of what he calls 'religious literature'. It is not (added emphasis) an example of 'religious literature' like The Bible is. Whereas The Bible is the record of the Word of God, Murder in the Cathedral is not. At the best, it only uses the incidents in The Bible though its purpose is not propagandist by any means. Nor can Murder in the Cathedral be called an example of 'devotional writing', because the sole purpose of such a writing is to arouse the religious sentiments in treating
the subject matter in a religious spirit. Last of all, Murder
in the Cathedral cannot be classified as a literary work
written with the express purpose of 'forwarding the cause of
religion' which makes it an example of propagandist writing.
Eliot does not want the literary work to be a propagandist
work. In fact, it was an effort to channelize 'a religious
experience' into 'an art experience'. Such a channelization
alone ensures our religious sensibility getting transformed
into aesthetic sensibility and thus, Eliot pleads for both
'entertainment' and 'aesthetic enjoyment' in a work of art. We
shall shed more light on the nature of real literature in the
following chapter.

Murder in the Cathedral follows the rules of tragedy,
a dramatic genre, which is essentially non-Christian in its
origin. There is a lot that can be said about the double
nature of religious art. This fact finds support in the
comments of Karl Jaspers, who notes in his book, Tragedy Is
Not Enough, that

Christian salvation opposes tragic knowledge.
The chance of being saved destroys the
tragic sense of being trapped without a chance
of escape. Therefore no genuinely Christian
tragedy can exist.100

What Jaspers means is, of course, quite clear. A genuinely
Christian tragedy is an impossibility in the Christian world
because Christians believe that Christ is their Saviour by merely believing in whom they will gain salvation. There is, thus, the hope of salvation. Eliot has tried to use this alien genre in *Murder in the Cathedral* in order to give it a special colour. The play is a clear example of the double nature of religious art. By religious art is meant art that sanctifies a religious experience and gives it a universal shape like that in a classic. Religious art is thus both art and an expression of religious candour. It cannot be only art or only a form of religious expressionism.

What made it stick out as a separate entity on its own is the projection of religious experience through art. A synthesis has to be achieved or brought about wherein art universalizes that experience turning it into a classic. Eliot would have found it very difficult to accept Wallace Stevens' thesis that

Religion is dependent on faith. But aesthetics is independent of faith. The relative position of the two might be reversed. It is possible to establish aesthetics in the individual mind as immeasurably a greater thing than religion. Its present state is the difficulty of establishing it except in the individual mind in its totality. That religion is dependent on faith is a point well taken and Eliot would have accepted it without any argument.
But what follows would have appeared to Eliot to be a fine example of a heretic thought. For, Eliot seems to hold views identical with those of Martz (1955: 245) for whom God is both the 'object of knowledge' and 'the means of knowing'. The idea of aesthetics being independent of faith negates the idea of the transformation of a religious experience into art experience in such a way that there is a fusion of the two, making it a perfect art. The medium in that case can only be perfect, thus, taking care of Oscar Wilde's charge of 'the perfect use of an imperfect medium' constituting the morality of art. We shall deal with this question at length in the next chapter.

It is difficult to think in terms of the reversal of positions. If we did that, we would end up putting the cart before the horse because as the argument goes: (1) religion is dependent on faith; (2) aesthetics is independent of faith; and, therefore, it would be only natural to conclude that (3) aesthetics is independent of religion. And it is logical too. But such a proposition in spite of its logic is untenable inasmuch as it is violative of Eliot's belief that religion is all pervasive and, all things being secondary to it, they must grow in the shadow of religion. That position is clearly closer to aestheticism than theory based on tradition and culture. Wallace Stevens, who talks of establishing aesthetics 'in the individual mind' as distinct from the community, can be seen moving closer to the unregenerate self that Eliot frowns at
and rejects. Stevens confesses that aesthetics cannot but be established in the individual mind 'in its present state' and thereby appears to be unconsciously accepting the charge that it may not be ripe enough to universalize and move on to higher planes of consciousness. But, in so doing, Stevens is merely repeating the charge Eliot preferred about contemporary literature. Thus, the basic argument remains the same.

An investigation into the history of literary criticism gives us an idea of how Romanticism tried to replace religion by poetry. Arnold was the chief proponent of this new thesis. It was he who found in poetry an apt substitute for religion though his comments seem to have been blown out of proportion on many points. Coleridge tried to equate the creative process in art with the creative process in general. "The Book of Genesis" in The Bible records that when God had finished creating the universe and the earth, he said, 'Let there be light!' and there was light and so on. This is the precursor to the creation of human beings. Logos merely represented the Word of God in the alphabet deriving its name and legitimacy from 'aleph' and 'alpha'. The Word became flesh in Man and he started using some form of language to communicate with the members of his group. The communication of the primitives, our ancestors, was simple and reflected their faith in God. They used imagination on a smaller scale. But the scales were soon tipped wholly in favour of imagination.
The Romantics were fired with imagination in spite of their affinity to nature. This kind of imagination was quite unchecked by reason, but when discoveries and inventions started clearing the mist of doubt from the minds of men, it was found that imagination could no longer remain shackled or kept in check by a disciplined mind. In Eliot's scheme of things, imagination can hardly afford to be free because it is subject to the principles that govern the establishment and maintenance of a culture. It is thus controlled by culture. If it were to remain free, it would become useless and subsequently lead to the reaffirmation of Art for Arts' Sake theory or to aestheticism. Arnold erred in making poetry a substitute for religion which it can never become. Therefore, poetry must accept religion as its sustainer.

IV

Almost all tragedies involve murder as does Murder in the Cathedral. But the significance of the murder of Archbishop Becket is hardly lost upon the readers who see in it tragic undertones. Any serious reader of the play, or member of the audience watching the play being performed, would discern religion at the centre of it. That was also the purpose of Eliot's. The tradition of the re-enactment of martyrdom is bound by religion as are the baptismal rites and other rituals in the Christian faith. Thus, all these are both a
Christian commitment as well as a matter of free choice.

William Blake (1961: 584) asks:

What does thou here Elijah?
Can a Poet doubt the Visions of Jehovah?
Nature has no Outline,
but Imagination has. Nature has no Tune,
but Imagination has.
Nature has no supernatural and dissolves:
Imagination is Eternity. 104

The kind of imagination referred to here is that of a Christian thinker who is also the upholder of the Christian tradition. And this limited sense in which Eliot uses his imagination to recreate the past is what may be called 'Received Imagination'. This might need further elaboration. What happens when a poet writes a poem is that he shapes or rather concretizes some experience of his within the context of a tradition into art experience. Maybe, this experience is religious in nature or even purely personal. A good poet would not be interested in giving rein to the latter. There is a certain transformation taking place while the experience is being concretized. Whatever the nature of such a transformation, the poet is shaping something new.

Loosely speaking poetry is being 'made' and the maker, the poet as well as the experience, is then the thing.
Where imagination is involved, there has to be a degree of autonomy. There has to be some freedom given to the poet. Imagination is, to a very large extent, the product of the creative faculty and creativity, as a process, involves the shaping of an inorganic form of experience into an organic form. This organic form, which is a part of the poetic creation, assumes importance in the background of a tradition. Eliot works towards it all through and this is what may be called 'received imagination' keeping in mind the special conditions in which it takes shape. Or, to put it in different words, 'received imagination' may be seen the process of converting the incoming images into sound and rhythm, thus reproducing in a refined manner the images or sensory perceptions into their verbal equivalents. The process thus seen is analogous with what happens in the process of normal communication. Moreover, when Eliot talks about 'auditory imagination', he also hints at a different kind of imagination which is 'received' in nature. This must be seen in the context of Eliot's concern with creation taking shape out of imagination, not of the kind which has never been actually experienced, but one that involves the creation of new images, through the transformation of previous experiences. And this, in its own turn, being shaped by a sensibility which draws upon the cultural heritage and traditions of a people. It may not be difficult to see in this concern of Eliot's, his effort to draw upon his understanding of history, though it is in a sense quite different
from that of a historian's. We may now be in a position to appreciate better Eliot's successful attempts to trace the roots of the relationship between religion and literature in the history of a civilization. In citing the development of Greek drama, which is related to religious rites, and a formal public ceremony taking place as a part of traditional religious celebrations, Eliot was actually trying to drive home his point. Simply stated, this kind of imagination is eternity.

Eliot's pointed reference to the carnival of music, dance and drama (that marked the end of the harvesting season in ancient Greece) becomes only too obvious. He is trying to relate this development as an important link even in 'pagan' religions. As a part of the celebrations, groups of people roamed the streets of the ancient Greek City-states, carrying a totem pole with the phallic symbol on it. For the ancient ancestors of the people the world over, the phallus, the male sex organ, was both the source of creation and reverence. It is known to have been worshipped in many religious rites as the creative principle or a symbol denoting the origin of all creation. Christian ethos holds this to be something 'pagan' but that is beside the point, for in India even today, the 'Shivling' is worshipped in Shiva temples. The crowds in the Greek City-states assembled to witness the festival of drama in the local amphi-theatres when the living legends of those
times entered the competitions by staging their respective plays for public consumption. It was left to the audience to choose or identify the best of these plays, whose playwrights were honoured publicly at the end of the carnival.

To return to the point of the relationship between religion and literature, as viewed by Eliot, he is thought to be supposedly quite vague about the nature of this relationship. One wonders if that were not a red herring. His essay, "Religion and Literature", attempts at delineating and redefining it which is why even Helen Gardner finds it difficult, or at least gives such a feeling, to come to definite conclusions about the relationship as they emerge from the essay. Although Helen Gardner makes valiant attempts, she seems to meet with little success. We submit that the meaning rests on certain obvious inferences which offer themselves and the conclusions can only be based on these. Eliot's frequent forays into the works of other literary giants before him and, among his contemporaries, and his interpretation of their thought do give us a clear picture of what he had in his mind. And, thus, the inferences drawn ought not to be far-fetched. In an effort, a concerted one in that, to shed light on the relationship which, we believe, is central to the appreciation of his own creative work, Eliot summons and seeks shelter behind the authority of writers like Jacques Maritain, though not necessarily agreeing with everything they have said. His
essay, "The Modern Mind", published in 1933, contains numerous references to Maritain's observations. Eliot particularly draws upon his remark that 'religion saves poetry from the absurdity of believing itself destined to transform ethics and life' and signals his qualified agreement with it to a large extent. But he finds this 'less acceptable' in comparison with some of the other statements of Maritain's. What makes this 'less acceptable' is the argument that the saving of poetry by religion lies in its 'showing us where the moral truth and genuine supernatural are situate'. Religion also saves poetry 'from overweening arrogance' this way. Torn out of its context, this may not mean much. The context provided by Maritain is contained partially in the earlier observation of his quoted by Eliot:

The unconcealed and palpable influence of the devil on an important part of contemporary literature is one of the significant phenomena of the history of our time.

Eliot concedes readily that this pinpoints what he calls 'the great weakness of much poetry and criticism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries'. Obviously, 'moral truth' and 'the genuine supernatural' referred to by Maritain are situated in the collective conscious of the people sharing the same beliefs and tradition much in the same way as the code of ethics.
To put this in other words, literature is expected to structure the art experience contained within its organic structure using 'moral truths' and 'the genuine supernatural' like, for instance, the dual nature of Christ and the resurrection, both of which are miracles. And it is in the occurrences of these miracles that we find the proof of the genuine supernatural. It is only natural then that these are taken as events which are meant to provide depth to a given literary work. But the true test of greatness lies in weaving these into their aesthetic equivalents so that they may not seem to be a propagandist's exploitation of the good and the beautiful. A significant point in this regard is the apparent conformity of all great works of literary creation to this shaping principle.

However, when we turn to Eliot's comments on Shakespeare, we find that Eliot, when he puts the bard in relation to Dante, finds in his work great poetry but not great philosophy. The reason may be that while Shakespeare seems to be a humanist, Dante is not. Dante gives expression to his belief 'but his private belief becomes a different thing in becoming poetry'. He remarks that 'Dante is a purer poet' unlike any other philosophical poet. D G James (1960: 253) makes a pertinent point when he says that 'Religion is not philosophy'. Since dogma is the sheet anchor of good poetry, it would become a philosophy 'if it were stated
abstractly in propositional form and as such cease to command the minds of men. A philosophy of life is nevertheless essential. Maybe, not in abstract propositional terms but woven into the work of which belief forms an inseparable part.

George Herbert is cast in the same mould as Eliot. What binds them together is the beauty of their verses which have the impress of belief on them. Herbert's Jordan Poems are a very clear example of how experiences take the shape of poetry. Jordan Poems make out a case for religious poetry and we use the term 'religious poetry' in the typical sense in which Eliot uses it. Although cast in the same mould as Herbert, Eliot's philosophy, his poetics, makes him different from Herbert. For, when Eliot examines the relationship between religion and literature, he says he neither meant 'religious' in the biblical sense, nor did he mean 'devotional' in the same way as hymns are, nor even 'propagandist'. Eliot opines that Herbert belongs to the second category of 'religious poets' in whom 'the religious or devotional genius represents the special and limited awareness' (Eliot's emphasis). And he is not a great religious poet in the sense in which Dante is for, unlike Dante, he is seen as dealing with 'a confined part' of the whole subject matter of poetry. Having said that, let us get on with Herbert's Jordan Poems. Herbert demonstrates how a religious experience can shape a creative work with a finesse which only a profound sense of tradition, though
confined in his case to religion, brings to bear upon a work of art.

In the first of the two Jordan Poems, "Jordan I", Herbert says that there is 'beautie' in truth; not all good structure is in 'a winding stair' and the 'dutie' of the lines is not to 'a painted chair' but to a 'true' one. For him, much in the same fashion, verse extends beyond 'enchanted groves', 'sudden arbours', and 'purpling streams' because if only these are 'kept unvail'd' (added emphasis), there are no chances of the readers 'catching the sense at two removes'. And again, the 'losse of rime' is not the end of it all but that the real poetry lay in the words, 'My God, My King!' thus ending in the reaffirmation of faith. In "Jordan II", Herbert takes up the process of creation. His lines, he argues, are to him 'lines of heav'ny joyes' which make his thoughts 'burnish, sprout and swell' in 'curling with metaphors'. The beauty of a poet's creation lies in the process of rejection and elimination and Herbert notes that he has had to blot out many ideas that 'did runne' in his brain but the process of rejection and elimination is 'not quick enough'. His conscience implores upon him to let go 'this long pretence', and chides him by affirming that

There is in love a sweetnesse readie penn'd:
Copie out onely that, and save expense.

It is to be noted that by merely saying 'My God, My King', Herbert reaffirms his faith and embraces the tradition, the
Christian tradition, with redoubled vigour. In the realisation of the futility of it all, his experience finds itself reoriented and burnishing with new metaphors.

'Secular' imagination is free compared to what we have called 'received' imagination. The latter is governed by religious sensibility, for as James (1960: 250) argues

The act of belief is inextricably associated with the practice of religious observance, which regularly carried out invests the whole life with a sacramental character. The acceptance of dogma without traditional observances is not a Christianity...

Assured in a similar belief, the secular is dead in Herbert and the religious, though Eliot calls it special and limited awareness in Herbert, is born and born in a flourish, as it were, in this burnishing of new metaphors. This, then, is the essence of a religious aesthetics as well as an example of 'received imagination' which involves an 'autotelic' suggestion. In other words, 'imagination' may be said to be of a 'received' variety only if it can percolate down to the base through the process of rejection and elimination and, in using the 'religious experience' steeped in tradition, reorient and channelize it into 'art experience.' This is the basis of Eliot's new poetics. This is his new poetics which will form the subject of discussion in Chapter 7.
The arguments in the preceding sections were aimed at showing how religion and literature are related and how a literature steeped in tradition, of which religion is a vital component, yields real literature, neither of a pure nor a religious variety both of which are minor literatures. We shall take up these two for discussion in the following chapter. We had quoted D G Jones in the preceding paragraph. We would like now to take a close look at the question of the function of criticism. Such an investigation becomes necessary because it holds the key to the understanding of Eliot's new poetics.

In seeking a viable relationship between religion and literature, Eliot is pleading for a literature that can withstand the pressures of modern life. This, according to him, seems to be possible only if the purpose of literature is to help develop a healthy and vibrant Moral Value System, in upholding the tradition at the same time. Obviously, Eliot is not pleading for any commitment. Far from it. Eliot does not want a committed literature. What he wants is that the literature that takes shape organically must bear the stamp of our ethos. This would hardly be possible if the literature were to be a committed one. Eliot's main contentions appear to draw heavily upon his well-known religious standpoints. His arguments, though they do not have the sharp edge of a fundamentalist religious writing — liberal humanism which he rejected
later had a positive influence on him — are protracted towards making literature project the deep religiosity that he pro­fessed.

Trueblood (1957: 6) notes that 'careful religious argument does not produce commitment, but it often, as in the case of T.S. Eliot, opens the road to commitment.'\(^{114}\) (Trueblood's emphases). But this commitment is not of the kind that Eliot decries because Trueblood himself notes later that 'fundamental to all religion is the experience of commitment or dedication. In its fullest and most mature form this is commitment to the will of God.'\(^{115}\) In other words, this is what Eliot calls 'the perfection of will'. To him, this 'perfection' of will is possible only if one allows one's will to merge into the will of God. Trueblood goes on to explain that 'though it (that is, the experience of commitment) may be buttressed by intellectual considerations, it is more than intellectual assent.'\(^{116}\) (Parenthesis supplied). Maybe, Eliot's thesis that emotion must have primacy over intellectual response in poetry, though the latter is equally important, fits in here. Trueblood finds in it 'faith'. He says, 'it is faith, not in the sense of mere belief but in the sense of courageous involve­ment.'\(^{117}\) And courageous involvement is possible only when the artist concerned has convictions to fortify himself from the onslaught of the demonic forces illustrated by Eliot through the experiences undergone by Becket in *Murder in the Cathedral*. 
Becket's martyrdom is the victory of convictions, of faith over temporal gains, including power. This is what is contained in the word "Datta" in *The Waste Land* (See section V: "What the Thunder Said"),

The awful daring of a moment's surrender
Which an age of prudence can never retract...

A newer string of argumentation running in this very direction becomes evident when Eliot argues that creativity involves an internal and unconscious ability to criticise. He holds that a good literary artist, who creates, is one who is his own worst critic. It is only a result of this unconscious and continuous process of criticism that he would never move away from his own convictions.

In "The Function of Criticism", written in 1923, Eliot speaks of the function of criticism which seems to him to be essentially a problem of order much in the same way as the artist and the sense of tradition which he should have. Eliot deals with the latter part in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" published earlier in 1919. Thus the problem of order which revolves round the artistic creation and the sense of tradition that is brought to bear upon it by the artist is a vital factor. This is the primary function of criticism. The tradition highlighted by the critical evaluation of a literary work is not a part of 'the collection of writings' of the artists but what he calls 'organic wholes'. In other
words, a work steeped in tradition would prove to be metonymic when evaluated. Nevertheless, Eliot does not look upon criticism as an autotelic activity. (added emphasis). The term is quite a pregnant one in that it is used in philosophy to mean 'having a subconscious, unreasoning instinct for existence' — a point taken up and discussed at length in the beginning of the chapter. If we stick to the use of the word as in philosophy, then criticism is not an autotelic activity. Rather, it is one which adopts a conscious and rational approach towards art which it seeks to evaluate. Eliot is clearly seen as one pleading for criticism to have the role of an activity whose professed end is 'the elucidation of works of art and the correction of taste'. (added emphases). But that is not all.

Eliot frowns upon criticism that is limited to the critic's hearing of and becoming a prisoner to the so-called 'inner voice' which, he believes, 'breathes the eternal message of vanity, fear and lust'. He finds the observation of Middleton Murry that 'if they (that is, the English writers) dig deep enough in their pursuit of self-knowledge' with the whole man, 'they will come upon a self that is universal', a wilful misrepresentation. (Parenthesis supplied; Eliot's emphasis). Eliot reminds us that the aim is not literary perfection because the search for it is a sign of pettiness on the part of the writer. The critical and the creative activities must not be viewed as two different activities as Matthew
Arnold seems to him to be doing. Arnold, he suggests, was wrong in overlooking 'the capital importance of criticism in the work of creation itself.' Notes Eliot, 'the criticism employed by a trained and skilled writer on his own work is the most vital, the highest kind of criticism.' The superiority of one creative writer over the other is dependent on the relative superiority of his critical faculty in comparison with that of the other(s). In relation to the idea that criticism and creativity are two different ideas, Eliot asserts that it is the question of the primacy of the fusion of the one with the other. Creation cannot be fused with criticism in the same way as criticism can be fused with creation. Thus, it is the latter which makes for self-sufficiency of a writer, even if it be, in a limited way.

At this point in the development of this thesis of his, he injects the idea of what he calls the sense of fact as the most important qualification of a critic. He goes on to explain that, though it is very slow in its development, when it develops completely, it is believed to be a sign suggesting that the pinnacle of civilisation has been reached. But he also seems to imply thereafter that such a stage of development is difficult to reach because he finds that the confirmation of interpretation may be difficult by mere external evidence. It must be noted that Eliot uses the term, 'interpretation' in the sense it is generally taken, to refer to a partial understanding reached by the critic of a
creative writing as being the whole. He would like it restored in its complete sense, for that alone is 'interpretation' proper. But being partial, as it is here, it becomes 'metonymic'—something that Eliot would not approve of. It is this 'metonymic' relationship which rings the death-knell of real critical evaluation because such an interpretation is no interpretation at all but merely the highlighting of some facts which a reader would have missed. It is to comparison and analysis that a critic must turn by using them carefully as the chief tools in the evaluation of a literary work. But comparison and analysis must be carried out within the framework of a tradition. Eliot does not derive any satisfaction from this kind of argument of the case for the function of criticism. As was his work, he goes on to reconsider the arguments in a subsequent essay he wrote in 1956—well beyond the time-frame that this thesis focuses on—called "The Frontiers of Criticism".

Looking back on his earlier work, Eliot qualifies the statements he had made in them. He notes that in pointing out that every generation must provide its own literary criticism, he meant a good deal more than the changes of taste and fashion. He also notes that he had meant the way in which attitudes were affected when the whole gamut of issues is seen in the perspective of the masterpieces of the past. What he did not have in mind then was the fact that "an important work of literary criticism can alter and expand the content of the
term 'literary criticism' itself."¹²⁵ (Eliot's emphasis). Eliot raises several important questions about criticism. He is not sure whether the practitioners today know what criticism is for. Or, how it may be useful. Or, whom it may benefit. He voices his disapproval of what he calls 'Workshop Criticism' or criticism of poetry by a practising poet, who has failed as a poet, because what is absent from his own work is outside his competence. Similarly he is not sure if the 'explanation of poetry by examination of its sources',¹²⁶ as he calls it, may be considered as criticism proper. For him, a literary critic is one whose primary interest is in helping his readers to understand and to enjoy. Understanding and enjoyment are actually interrelated, each drawing upon and contributing to the other. Eliot does not think of them as being distinct activities.

The kind of critic Eliot is ready to accept as a literary critic is one who not only is a technical expert knowing the rules of the game but also a man with convictions and principles as well as knowledge and experience of life. He must be able to make his readers look at portions or aspects of any given literary work that they have never looked at before. Something missed by the readers is not the same as something they had not looked for. What is missed may be present but may not be emphasised but what they had never looked for might not be present in explicit terms but be a part of its essence. Thus, one finds Eliot pleading for a perspective broadened as a result
of a deeper understanding of the social complexities as well as the role a critical and creative work has in unravelling these complexities. We find another essay titled "The Social Function of Poetry", published in 1945, also well beyond the timeframe chosen as the focus of this thesis, written in a similar vein. Since its genesis lay in the religious rites for which it was used, maybe much in the same way as it is done today, the Greek drama got a religious bent. But the primary function of poetry as an institution of high social value lies in its ability 'to give ... the kind of pleasure that poetry gives'\textsuperscript{127} through the expression of emotions and feelings. Since the two activities of criticism and creation are a part of a single whole, the social function of criticism is to help in the attainment of pleasure through understanding and enjoyment.

Again, poetry has the signal privilege of helping \underline{preserve, extend and improve} the language in use. This is the second important social function poetry must perform. The social function of criticism must, therefore, lie in the preservation of the linguistic heritage and the setting of very sound linguistic traditions too, to match as it were with the tradition and the cultural ethos of a people. In this way it would be on par with poetry in affecting the sensibility of the whole nation. We must keep in mind all the time that these are questions related to the problems of orthodoxy and heresy. Eliot's treatment of these problems is one continuous bit
beginning with "Tradition and the Individual Talent" in 1919.

Moving to *After Strange Gods*, published in 1934, one finds him arguing that 'the maintenance of orthodoxy is a matter which calls for the exercise of our conscious intelligence'.\(^{128}\) If this be so, then our *conscious intelligence* is the result of the past and the present getting together, amalgamating in such a way as to give us a reconciliation of *thought* and *feeling* and, thus, give us a reconciliation of understanding and enjoyment. But is this possible in an individual artist at the present time? Eliot seems to think it quite impossible. Therefore, we have a whole range of heresies, which are synonymous with what he calls 'heterodoxy'.

Noting how most of us are heretical in one sense or the other, Eliot remarks that this is so because of the nature of heresy. A heresy is not simply wrong but it is 'partially right' because it is, as he says, 'often defined as an insistence upon half of the truth'.\(^{129}\) Secondly, it is seductively simple and, therefore, appeals directly to our 'intellect and emotions'. In an attempt at simplifying truth, a heresy reduces itself 'to the limits of our ordinary understanding instead of enlarging our reason to the apprehension of truth'.\(^{130}\) In this way, it is found to be 'more plausible than the truth'.

While the maintenance of orthodoxy is to be applauded, we must guard against heresies. This can come about only when one is familiar with the tradition which is the fusion of attitudes and beliefs. Such fusion results in the refinement of taste through understanding and enjoyment.
However, the problem is not as simple as it appears to be. Faith originates in emotion, not intellect. And, in trying to seek an intellectual interpretation of the Articles of faith, a literary work moves towards blasphemy. It, then becomes the work of a heretic. The problem is compounded because of 'our inability to feel towards God and man'. (added emphasis). Orthodoxy is reflected in the relationship between religion and literature which holds the ideal of the propagation of faith, not propaganda. If 'heresy' is the wilful denial of a dogma, our acceptance and use of it as the shaping principle is the most important part of faith. Faith is affirmed through belief. A truly rich literature, one which is steeped in tradition and strengthened by religious sensibility, must be based on all those emotions and feelings that a dogma generates. The importance of dogma in a great literary piece is underscored by Wimsatt Jr (1970: 100) who argues that 'Christian dogma will aid the artist... by defining for him a perspective from which full light can be had on all subject matters.'¹3¹ (Wimsatt's emphasis) It is noteworthy that 'a dogma is a truth contained in the Word ... as having been divinely revealed.'¹3² And Catholicism stresses the need to believe 'explicitly' everything known to have been revealed and to believe 'implicitly' everything that the Church teaches.¹3³ While the most important of the dogmas are those of 'the Holy Trinity', the dual nature unique of Chris Incarnation, the mystery and miracle of Christmas, Ressurection, Eucharist, confession and the like, they are vital to faith.
Their propagation must be the aim of all literature; but if what is sought to be propagated becomes too apparent to the readership, it might rob it of all the sympathy and appreciation by the readers.

One of the main functions of literature is the reaffirmation of belief and it is the duty of the literary critics to be on guard so as to draw the attention of their readers to the good and the beautiful in any given literary work and to caution them about what is of dubious value. This is crucial to the development of taste. The most significant of the social functions of criticism is to provide the prospective readers of a literary work, its various possible interpretations and leave it to their good sense to decide what is in match with their beliefs, their tradition, and what is not. But this can be done only after the critic has taken pains to help develop their taste and this necessarily makes his responsibility greater in that he has to steer clear of the pitfalls of literary criticism. A critic must, therefore, have a sound historical perspective, be aware of the main currents in critical practices, and must show maturity in his evaluation.

Secondly, it is the social function of criticism not to give its readers the feeling that the interpretation given by it provides incontrovertible proof of what the literary artist, whose work is under consideration, was consciously or unconsciously trying to do. A good critic is also one who is
mature in terms of taste, style, values, and comprehensiveness of the literary art being judged so that he can help bring out the distinction between the real worth of, and what is frivolous in, the literary work he has set out to evaluate. Lastly, it is the social function of criticism also to provide the readers with a clear idea of how they might stand to benefit in their understanding of the work after 'perusing the analysis' that he provides. This would only mean that a good degree of fairness is expected of him in this task. The primary duty of a critic is thus to help the readers understand and enjoy the work through a concerted and systematic effort at the development of taste brought about by an objective evaluation and analysis of the literary work he has been examining. Poetry is said to be a 'spiritual communication' between various generations of people as well as between the various categories of people within any given age so as to bring about a synthesis of the traditional, (not in its negative sense, but as Eliot uses the word) and the work of the individual artist. That also means making a systematic effort at judging the individual talent within the content of a tradition. And this necessitates the continuity of the tradition. No artist and no art has its relevance outside the bonds of a tradition. This crucial argument is central to Eliot's new poetics.

We had stated in the Introduction to this thesis that treating the critical work of Eliot's as a 'theological evaluation of literature' is imprudent, for it does not stand the
test of evaluation and application. We would like to draw attention, in particular to the discussion of what theology might do to poetry, as stated in D G James (1960: 254). James argues that in order to express the sense of overwhelming reality of the supernatural order, there is no means conceivably more effective than revelation and miracle, the disruption of the natural.\textsuperscript{135}

And what are the effective means but revelation and miracle, the dogmas. James also argues that 'we may endeavour to extract from these dogmas volumes of theology, but they will be, from the point of view of religion, pitiable in comparison with the simple story' highlighting 'Christ's despair, sacrifice, dereliction, and resurrection' because they go far beyond in exceeding 'anything which has ever been thought or imagined.'\textsuperscript{136} Of particular interest is James's characterization of the endeavour to extract from these dogmas volumes of theology. He asserts that it would be pitiable from the point of view of religion to compare theology based on these dogmas with the 'simple story' of Christ's experience ending in resurrection after his 'trial'(? and crucifixion.

It is only after having said so that James launches into the whys and wherefores of his assertion. To avoid any misgivings about the possibility of any misinterpretation on our part of James's contention, we quote from the relevant
portion in full:

Theology, is in a sense, a desecration of the superb poetry of religion; it destroys its magical power and gives us the dry dust of abstraction. That is not to say that theology can or ought to be done away with, any more than criticism and interpretation of great poetry ought to be prohibited because it is not itself poetry. Theology no doubt is a necessity doomed to end in failure, which we cannot avoid. Yet whatever value the effort to explicate dogma into theology may be, it is the contemplation of the dogma itself which is central to the Christian life. Theology may very well enrich that contemplation, and therein lies its sole justification; as the study of criticism is justified only in so far as it enriches the later contemplation of the poetry itself. But considered in itself, theology is for religion a pernicious substitute, as reading about a poet is a pernicious substitute for reading the poet.137

What theology does to poetry is what it can do to criticism also. If theology is a desecration of the superb poetry of religion (not religious poetry) because it destroys its magical power and gives us the dry dust of abstraction, it might as well do that to criticism by destroying its thrust which is
appreciation based on understanding and enjoyment. And the true test of appreciation, even critical appreciation, is understanding and enjoyment — something that is possible only in case we share the beliefs and points of view of the poet, the literary artist. To avoid becoming 'dry dust of abstraction' and to retain the taste it was aimed at creating, literary criticism must base itself on 'the overwhelming reality of the supernatural order' present in the work under evaluation by searching for the dogmas and not depending on 'the natural.' It is the contemplation of the dogma which is central to Christian life and theology has its sole justification in the fact that it may enrich such contemplation. Moreover, theology is a pernicious substitute for religion. The way in which James draws the analogy between 'theology' or reading about God and reading about a poet is illuminating. Eliot tried to bring into the discussion of poetry and criticism 'the theory of impersonality' or 'depersonalisation' and it is indeed mystifying that James should show his abhorrence of the 'reading about a poet' in place of 'reading the poet', thus appearing to be on the same wavelength as Eliot. The analogy of reading about God, as we do when we read theology, can be carried to its logical end by replacing it with reading what is pulsating with belief.

In his convocation address at the University of Leeds in July 1961 under the title "To Criticize the Critic", Eliot takes stock of two of the theories that he popularised. It
was as if he were taking a close look at the genesis of these concepts. He notes that

The 'objective correlative' in the essay on Hamlet may stand for my bias towards the more mature plays of Shakespeare... And the 'dissociation of sensibility' may represent my devotion to Donne and the metaphysical poets, and my reaction against Milton.¹³⁸

Eliot uses the word 'may' which could only suggest 'possibility' and not certainty. Eliot is apparently thinking aloud about what could have possibly guided him in theorizing this way. True enough, the theory of 'objective correlative' was developed using the more mature plays of Shakespeare like Hamlet and Macbeth. But such a mature theory as this could have only been discussed in the light of these mature plays both of which are tragedies. Let us take a brief look at the examples from the two plays used by Eliot. He says,

You will find that the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been communicated to you by a skilful accumulation of imagined sensory impressions; the words of Macbeth on hearing of his wife's death strike us as if, given the sequence of events, these words were automatically released by the last event in the series.¹³⁹
That is about Macbeth and here is what Eliot says about Hamlet in comparing it with the other play:

The artistic 'inevitability' lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in Hamlet. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they appear. (Eliot's emphasis).

Comparing the two plays, Eliot finds the complete adequacy of the external, the words of Macbeth on hearing of Lady Macbeth's death and the sleep-walking of the Lady, to the emotion of deep loss. But Macbeth's reaction betrays his realization that nemesis is soon going to overtake him. We may find it easier to accept Eliot's comment that 'dissociation of sensibility' may represent his devotion to Donne and the metaphysical poets and his reaction against Milton. Dissociation of sensibility of thought from feeling because a key theory soon after it was propounded in Eliot's essay "The Metaphysical Poets" published in 1921. But the controversy it kicked up in the wake has never died down.

VI

It has been our endeavour all through this chapter to show how in Eliot's smooth passage from the structure of religion to the structure of poetics, we find the quality of the 'dark embryo'. C K Stead (1964: 137) takes a hard look
at the merger of morals and aesthetics which he calls "Eliot's 'Dark Embryo'". After establishing the basis of this embryo, Stead notes,

the quality of the 'dark embryo' has been established by what the poet has made of himself, and what his society has made of him.\textsuperscript{141}

He ties up this with, and explains it in the context of, Eliot's observation that at the moment of writing, a literary artist is what he is, maybe, quite unschooled in tradition which makes it difficult for the artist to control his urges in the same way as he would otherwise have, had he the benefit of being reared up in a tradition. This is seen by Stead as something that makes for the importance of Eliot's concern, which is, "the saturation of the poet's sensibility in the vats of tradition and orthodoxy" that ensures a healthy 'embryo' and a healthy poem.\textsuperscript{142}

The structure of religion referred to here is in the sense of the structure of beliefs in a superhuman power obeyed and worshipped as the creator and ruler of the universe as well as the organised expression of this belief in conduct and rituals. We had made efforts to separate religion from theology and to establish the primacy of the contemplation of dogmas because the contemplation of dogmas is central to Christian life. Having said that, there remains very little to be
said especially in view of what has been made clear so far. It will be seen that the leap from the structure of religion to poetics is an easy one for Eliot because it involves an 'inscape' of things as Hopkins puts it. Faith is central to religion and its vehicle for propagation is literature which is suggestive of a conscious but limited relationship between the two. Eliot's quarrel is with those who violate this relationship in their adultation and worship of strange gods. The maintenance of this relationship, however, is the celebration of incarnate thought which is the very basis of the puritan art. This is the sum and substance of what may be called 'Eliot's Poetics.'

While it is true that Eliot never claimed to have any theory of poetry, it would not be difficult to see the development of thought (as it is discernible in his creative and critical writings) a certain systematicity that is never lost upon an intelligent reader. It is in this systematicity that one may easily discover the development of poetics though one must confess of the so-called 'stray thoughts' being spread over a variety of his writings. It is also in the logical presentation of these 'stray thoughts' that one finds the development of a philosophy which may give a false feeling of being wholly theological in nature while it is not.
The main postulates of the structure of Eliot's poetics seem to be contained in the following propositions:

01. Literary criticism is an exercise in the evaluation of a literary work which is the product of the collective unconscious of a people reflected through the work of the creative artist reared in a tradition. (Eliot was in a tradition of Puritan art which is never unconscious but vigilant, critical and aiming at a sort of superhuman perfection.)

02. The primary concern of criticism is really the problem of order — of the unity of the self of the artist with the collective consciousness of the society to which he belongs. This is actually the kind of unity which results out of the fusion of the self in time and the collective consciousness out of time which leads to the birth of a classic.

03. Form and content constitute essential parts of a creative work and both of these must celebrate the creativity of the uncreated God through the medium of poetry and drama.

04. Formal relations in a literary work are not allowed to be detrimental to the aesthetic values since both of them derive from a common source. (For example, the aesthetic principles of European poetry are derived from their Greek and Latin counterparts. The principles of
moral or even religious poetry are essentially Christian. The Greek models were those that reflected faith on non-existent objects.)

05. Metaphors and symbols, as aesthetic devices, as in Hopkins' theory of 'inscape' help represent the creativity of the uncreated God and are thus the vehicles through which the celebration of such a creativity is made possible.

06. Language is meaning and it is language which occupies an important place in the structure of the form used. Logos is meaning.

07. The general and the universal being on the outer periphery and at the still centre of the wheel respectively are got through the peripheral placement of values all moving towards the centre simultaneously. The Incarnate thought is one such universal because Christ is both Son of God and man at the same time. Christ is viewed by the Thomists as a bridge between 'pure act' and 'intellectual act' which represents two positions. One would like to think of these as being at the centre and on the periphery respectively. God is the centre. (This is an important swing away from the 'heresies of Defication' practised by the Romantic poets.)

08. Literature is in no way a surrogate to morality or religion. Rather, it is the medium which helps channelize these two components of a tradition (and it is a
part of the social ethos), for the two components are complementary to each other.

09. The subject matter of puritan literature is always the uncreated God and, if this is so, it cannot but reflect the unity of God who is the centre of both morality and religion at the same time. It is only a literature that is not steeped in a tradition which may be 'immoral' or 'amoral' in the same way as contemporary literature is. (It is interesting indeed to note the reaction of critics in recent times to an important work like James Sphuler's book *The Evolution of Man's Capacity for Culture* published in 1959.)

10. The principles of literary criticism not only define the areas relevant to literary criticism but also suggest a criteria for evaluating a literary work within the broad parameters of the Incarnate thought.

We shall not end our discussion here but carry it to its logical conclusion.

To sum up our arguments in this chapter so far, we would like to invite attention once more to that seminal essay of Eliot's, "Tradition and the Individual Talent", to which we have referred time and again. T S Eliot talks about the static emotion and floating feelings which seem to derive from Sanskrit poetics based on *Bharata's Natyashastra* which Abhinava gupta has analysed for us. This is not to suggest that Eliot
had read Bharata and used his poetics in a big way. There are other sources like the work of Patanjali which Eliot must have read as a part of his reading of two years for the course on Patanjali's Metaphysics under James Wood.

We shall rest content by suggesting that Eliot's admission that three years of a close study of Sanskrit and Patanjali's metaphysics had left him in a state of what he calls 'enlightened mystification', when posited with his subsequent confession that his decision not to penetrate into the heart of the mystery by forgetting to think and feel as an American or a European was for practical and sentimental reasons appears to give a clue. It must have led him to club incarnate thought with static emotion as a practical solution to the vexed problem of applying what he thought was useful to European literatures. We believe that such a clubbing might have been attempted because only that seems to offer an explanation to the reference he makes to static emotion and floating feelings.

The floating feelings draw upon the static emotion of the incarnate thought and have no independent meaning outside the bonds of the incarnate thought. All subsequent emotions and feelings generated as a result of this are merely the by-products of the central configuration and draw strength from the main static emotion of the incarnate thought. One would not be far off the mark to see in this new and emergent relationship, the sheet anchor of Eliot's aesthetic philosophy and his poetics.
It has always been a human reaction whether a strength or a failing is immaterial, to fear the most what can be comprehended but cannot be seen. The same may be said to be true insofar as his thoughts about God are concerned. If it is true that human existence is itself a symbolic representation of the Divine Will and an act of Divine Grace, then the emotions that this symbolic representation gives rise to in thanks-giving, alongside the expression of its various other shades, is only natural and along expected lines. The nature of fear cannot be understood in the absence of any knowledge about 'fearlessness' which faith and conformity to it affords. Similarly, if there were no understanding about the nature of human state of 'helplessness', then there can hardly be any understanding of hope and grace.

Finally, some observations about 'pure' and 'religious' literatures. We begin with what Eliot has to say about the factors determining the greatness of literature:

The 'greatness' of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards; though we must remember that whether it is literature or not can be determined only by literary standards. 146

Taking the second part of the statement first, we find that the question of what is literature and what is not can be determined only by literary standards. Its greatness — the level to which it rises towards perfection — is best judged
by standards including the literary ones. And these standards include those from the ethical and theological stand-
points; although in the latter case, it must only be limited to the contemplation of the dogma itself. Not theology as a whole because it tends to destroy the magical power of the work by leading us to an abstraction. Eliot asserts that he is not concerned with religious literature which is a minor variety because a religious poet is dealing with a confined part of the subject matter of poetry in a religious spirit and not the whole of it. Similarly, a small artist is content only with art unlike his better and greater counterpart who is not content with only a part but the whole of the subject matter of life. Eliot's quarrel with Arnold was the result of the latter's opinion that poetry is not religion but a capital substitute for it. His remark that

The doctrine of Arnold was extended, if also somewhat travestied, in the doctrine of 'art for art's sake' (added emphasis) 147

is representative of his disapproval of the extension of the doctrine of Arnold's because he saw it as 'somewhat travestied' or a somewhat crude or ridiculous representation of it. His use of the noun 'somewhat', to modify the verb 'travestied', suggests that even if it was done partially, it was bad enough. Perhaps, even worse.
The parting of ways between real literature and pure literature lay in the argument of the practitioners of the latter variety that there was no such thing as moral and immoral in art. Eliot rejected this on the ground that even the purest literature has non-literary consequences because it is alimented from non-literary sources. If it has non-literary sources at the back of it and if it has non-literary consequences, then it only means that there is nothing literary in it or that it is non-literary in both form and content. How could it, then, be called literature? This is a question we would like to take up in Chapter 4.
References and Notes:


5. T S Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), p. 122. This title will be referred to hereafter as NDC.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid., p. 138.

9. Ibid., p. 139.

10. Ibid., p. 141.


12. Ibid., p. 25. Belief without feeling is meaningless as he might seem to be suggesting.
13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


17. Ibid.


19. We have done this only because his theorizing enjoys simultaneity with and evolves from his creative and critical works — a point highlighted in "Introduction" to this thesis. Creative in Eliot is both poetic and dramatic while the critical is prosaic, though the rhythm is maintained.


23. Ibid., p. 92. Please refer to "Appendix".


27. Ibid., p. 208.


29. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 52.


37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 289.
40. Ibid., p. 291.
41. Ibid., p. 301.
42. Ibid., p. 302.
45. Ibid., p. 187.
47. T S Eliot, OPP, p. 17.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 393.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.


61. The implication is clear when he talks about the behaviour of the characters in a work of art as being arranged by the artist. It thus reflects his or her beliefs because the artist projects himself or herself through a character or characters that he or she creates.


64. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 59.


69. Ibid. Note Eliot's wording: 'When I say that it is poetry rather than prose that is concerned with the expression of emotion and feeling, I do not mean that poetry need have no intellectual content or meaning...' We would like especially to invite attention to the way in which Eliot seems to link emotional content with intellectual content, on the one hand, and feeling with meaning on the other.

71. Ibid., p. 24.


74. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

75. Ibid., p. 41.

76. T S Eliot, OPP, p. 25.

77. F H Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 22.

78. The word is used by Eliot in SE, p. 30. See New Webster's Dictionary of English Language; Delux, enlarged edition 1981; (USA: The Delair Publishing Company), p. 68.


80. Ibid., p. 404. "The Pensees of Pascal".

81. Ibid., p. 407.

82. Ibid., p. 408.


84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., p. 408.

87. Ibid.


94. Ibid., p. 227


99. This pattern reminds us of the pattern of the encounter of human aspirations and the divine grace discovered by Sri Aurobindo in the symbol of inverted triangles (♀).


106. Ibid., p. 137.


108. Ibid.


112. 'Received imagination' subsumes, so it seems, both inspiration and the result of special and wholesome awareness of the tradition. It is given rise to when the two combine together through fusion thus becoming 'one'.

113. D G James, *Scepticism and Poetry*...


115. Ibid., p. 11.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.


120. One is more than likely to get this feeling as he moves from one essay to another. See *SE*, p. 24.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., p. 30.

124. Ibid.


126. Ibid., p. 112. Eliot comments that such criticism might be called the *lemon-squeezer school* of criticism.


128. One might want to ask: how 'conscicous'? Obviously, because the relation between religion and literature is a conscious one. See *ASG*, p. 29.


130. Ibid.

131. W K Wimsatt, Jr, *The Verbal Icon* (London: Methuen & Co. 1970), p. 100. This is indeed a well-argued work. One of the statements made by Wimsatt appears to be the result of an oversight. He puts Eliot on par with 'Professors Maritain and Adler' to suggest that, like them, he too advanced the view that 'the artist is necessarily autonomous in his own sphere'. This is quite controversial as it were. The artist is not autonomous in his own sphere. Maybe, he enjoys partial
autonomy in that he is free to exploit the material of the experience the way he wants but within the contexts of what freedom tradition allows him. There is 'no text' if there is 'no ethics' asserts Haines (See Note 16 above). This needs to be seen in the light of Wimsatt's other statement where he takes the dictum of the separateness of 'the man who suffers and the mind that creates' as being the evidence of Eliot's repeated assertion of 'the detachment of poetry from life.' We are not sure if this is borne out by facts. A good reading of "Religion and Literature" should make clear that Eliot accepted the fact that literature, being what it is, draws upon religion which is a part of the tradition. His insistence that our ethics imposed by religion on literature is the proof, if at all any were needed. Where is, then, the question of the supposed 'detachment' of poetry from life? The analogy of the 'platinum wire' experiment is merely an assertion that the personality of the poet has no place in his poetry and the dictum has been used to present this argument.

132. Msgr Canon George D Smith (ed), The Teaching of the Catholic Church, p. 32.

133. Ibid., p. 643. The emphases have been added. The repetitive use of 'believe'is particularly striking. It would mean that the nature of belief in the Catholic
faith is such that it must find its expression both explicitly and implicitly. Implicit belief is in the dogmas and explicit belief is a manifestation of both a belief in the dogmas as well as the legislation of the Church because that is also a part of the Articles of faith.

134. See pp. 8-11 of the Introduction to this thesis. Attention is drawn especially to p. 11.

135. D G James, *Scepticism and Poetry*...

136. Ibid.

137. The paragraph appears in Chapter VIII of the book which James has titled "Poetry, Dogma and the Mystical" (pp. 242-274). Thirty-three pages of a rewarding reading!

138. T S Eliot, *To Criticise the Critic*..., pp. 19-20, The other two theories are those of 'tradition' and 'depersonalization'.


140. Ibid.


142. Ibid., p. 138.
143. Puritan art celebrates the Divine, for the Thomistic view holds God to be pure act and believes that in order to seek perfection, man has to rise above act to a state of pure act which is both at once the aim and the product of the Divine will. 'Puritan art' has won a certain notoriety as a term in that it is linked to the Protestant ethic by many philosophers and critics. Our use of the term does not relate to such meaning. We have used this term for want of a better word.


146. T S Eliot, SE, p. 388. "Religion and Literature".
Art that is pure is autonomous because it is for its own sake. Casey Haskins notes, "The autonomy of art" is sometimes used as a slogan for the view that works of art are devoid of any practical function and thus devoid, as works of art, of instrumental value. (p.41) In The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 47: 1. Winter 1989.