T S Eliot's observation that 'the problem of belief is very complicated and probably quite insoluble'\(^1\) echoes in several of his other writings (added emphases). Related to the problem of truth, it is what Shipley (1970: 29) sees as dealing with questions concerning the connection between (a) the aesthetic value of a given literary work, and (b) the acceptability of the doctrine(s) it preaches.\(^2\) In other words, this relation revolves around the criterion of suitability which might be said to bring within its purview attributes like sincerity, plausibility and maturity. For Eliot, plausibility and maturity as doctrines are important. What this might mean in concrete terms is not difficult to judge.

The questions that apparently need an answer at this point in the discussion are: (i) What makes the problem of belief very complicated? and (ii) How might it be, in all probability, quite insoluble? There are no easy and straight answers to these questions in Eliot's work. Most of them become clear on a closer reading. The difficulty lies in the
fact that allowances have to be made for the emotional quality of belief to be different to people both in terms of the occupation of the person dealing with it and the periods of time involved. Smidt (1961: 63-64) analyzes Eliot's views on the relation between poetry (or, by analogy, any other literary form) and belief to find it falling under at least three heads: (a) 'the poetic use of philosophical ideas' as a part of a game-plan, (b) 'there is the emotional rendering of the poet's philosophy' which, in effect, is a reference to the fusion between the philosophy used and 'his natural feelings', and (c) 'the poetic illustration of a philosophy which is already existent' and 'accepted' in a way 'as to need no rational presentation or justification.'

What happens as a result of this three-way relationship between the work and the belief makes an interesting reading. The first kind of relationship does not, in any way, lead us to the question of sincerity as a doctrine because the literary artist concerned borrows ideas and, using them as his or her own, patterns them into a newer design. The second kind of relationship, though it allows for a fusion of philosophy and feelings, the objective of the writer/poet is not to persuade the readers to accept his or her point of view. Rather, it is to convey an equivalent of the ideas in terms of the emotion(s) it expresses. The last of these three possible relationships takes care of the beliefs of the age in which the poet lives and which are
poetically exploited. We are more concerned with the truth (of the belief) or the point of view of the poet. It is this that makes the problem of belief complicated so much so that, however hard we might try, we would not be able to solve it. The problem of belief is related to the problem of truth and it is indeed difficult to prove that Truth ultimately prevails.

One might say that the aesthetic value of a given literary work is linked with the acceptability of the doctrine(s) it preaches in a manner which Eliot prefers to call deliberate and 'a conscious relating.'\textsuperscript{4} Suitability obviously depends upon 'plausibility' and 'maturity'. The first of these two doctrines, i.e., plausibility, is something concerning judgements about the success or failure of the process involving the translation of the ideals into actuality. Or, the process of belief turning into actual experience. The aesthetic value of a literary work thus depends, to a very large extent, on the acceptability of the doctrine(s) it preaches which gives rise to questions of vital importance like (1) Is the process of the ideals turning into actuality convincing as it is? and (2) How far is the process of belief turning into actual experience and this, in turn, leading to belief, plausible? We shall take up these questions at a later point in this chapter.

Plausibility is, however, not the only doctrine we need to take into account. Eliot also believes in the other
doctrine which is that of 'maturity', for he appears to hold that what is mature is also plausible and vice-versa. It is this close relation between plausibility and maturity which apparently forms an inseparable part of the criterion of suitability. To be plausible, a point of view or a belief needs to be mature and only what is mature is also what is suitable. By the same token, by the same logic of the argument, it might be safe to conclude that suitability, as a criterion, subsumes maturity and is context-dependent on the doctrine of plausibility.

Having said that, we need to pause for a while and consider very carefully the following questions: (i) How do we decide what is suitable and what is not suitable? (ii) What makes a point of view or points of view plausible? and (iii) What does it mean to be mature with regard to a literary work? Questions regarding suitability have been considered very briefly in the preceding paragraph and we shall take them at length once we have considered the other two related questions. Let us turn our attention to the doctrine of plausibility in the first instance. In his introduction to Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, Eliot explains that we might need to define a doctrine after the appearance of a heresy. His warning in The Idea of a Christian Society that If you will not have God (and He is a jealous God) you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin
seems to suggest that a heresy has made its appearance. And
the heresy in question appears to be not in the plausibility
of the existence of God and His creation which is the problem
of faith and, therefore, belief but in its selective rejection. The dictionary meaning of the adjectival, plausible,
as given in *Webster's New World Dictionary*, is (a) seemingly
true, acceptable, etc: often implying disbelief, (b) seemingly
honest, trustworthy, etc. often implying distrust. For
Eliot even 'doubt and uncertainty' represent 'a variety of
belief', although doubt and uncertainty are the gifts of a
shaken faith in the middle of a spiritual wasteland. For fear
of carrying this too far, we may as well leave this reference
to Eliot to rest here for some time.

Fei-Pai Lu (1966: 35) argues that in Eliot's scheme
of things, 'True belief is "acceptable" to the audience,
"livable" for the poet, and "realizable" in art.' Thus Lu
concludes that the problem of belief is 'a matter of the
quality of belief.' The fact that true belief is necessarily
one that is 'acceptable' to the audience and for a belief
(which is the material of art as well as the poet's point of
view) to be acceptable, it needs to be understood by the
readers. And understanding involves a perception of the
poet's (read: a creative writer's) point of view which is
essentially his or her belief. Moreover, understanding calls
for both sympathy and the use of intellect in comprehending the writer's thought. The reason for such a view stems from the fact that belief is connected with thought, and emotions that help give expression to that thought. Now, when we look into the nature of belief as Eliot conceives of it, we learn that 'belief itself has been in constant mutation from the beginning of civilization.'¹⁰ (added emphasis). At a time like that of ours, Eliot finds a majority of people living below the level of belief or doubt, and he avers that belief in anything might become more difficult in the due course of time (Eliot's emphasis). To believe is also to apply our minds to what we would like to believe in. It needs 'a genius to believe in anything.'¹¹ It would be wrong, then, to suggest that Eliot is wary of intellectual assent or acceptance of any classical creed.

Schneider (1975: 211) finds Eliot quite unlike a Herbert or a Hopkins, whose love of God and Christ in personal and intimate terms, gave a religious colouring to their poetry to the extent that their poems are devotional verses.¹² What Eliot strives for is a belief in a Christian way of life and we should like to think that by 'Christian', Eliot merely meant an undiluted religion. Thus, in striving 'to remould thought, feeling' and 'speech into those of the church', he was merely giving them an institutional base because he 'conceives Christian Love in abstract impersonal terms.'¹³
Had it not been so, his idea of Christian Love would have taken a concrete personalized form. The dialectical structure of Eliot's discourse and his development of a new poetics, thus far need to be seen in non-institutional terms. Therefore, whatever goes contrary to such a thesis leads us to the worship of strange gods in clear violation of the covenant.

That is not all. Ideas for their own sake and for their emotional value are in a constant clash with the truth of ideas born out of a deep conviction. Feelings generated through the mulling of these ideas are only a 'by-product'. To return to the doctrine of plausibility, one might as well argue that a belief which is divorced from the norms of applicability (for, one can only believe in something that can be applied to a situation, yielding the results that might be expected) makes such an application suspect if it does not involve the processes of experimentation, modification and/or rejection. It involves the intellect using what we can affirm and accept or reject what offers itself to us. Although it might need a genius to believe in anything, it is the genius in the collective consciousness of a people, in which it abides, that becomes the point of reference. Hence, the plea for an institutional framework of a tradition within a composite culture. No belief that is strictly personal would thus be plausible, and a point of view, at mere personal level, leads to the growth of an unregenerate 'self' which Eliot considers a 'strange' god.
This takes us to the doctrine of maturity. The question of maturity is taken up for consideration at length in *What is a Classic?* A classic is possible only in a mature civilisation and a mature civilisation is one whose language and literature are mature, for they are clearly produced and used respectively by mature minds. Therefore, the value of maturity is dependent upon the value of whatever attribute(s) that helps it mature. However, the maturity of individual writers is not to be confused with the relative maturity of the literary period concerned. The maturity of a given literature is, therefore, a symbol of the mature society that has produced it. And maturity in a society is seen when the language, its people use, has developed from a point where the predecessors of the literary artists have left it. Eliot argues that

A mature literature...has a history behind it: a history, that is not merely a chronicle...but an ordered though unconscious progress of a language to realise its own potentialities within its own limitations. (added emphasis).\(^{14}\)

What is disorderly is usually the product of an immature mind or a set-up. Similarly, if the progress is a conscious one, then the fruits of the same are of little worth and a literary work produced as a result is, to quite a large extent, contrived.
The maturity of a society finds reflection in 'a greater maturity of manners'. Maturity involves 'a critical sense of the past, a confidence in the present, and no conscious doubt of the future.'\textsuperscript{15} A mature writer is one who uses what his predecessors might not have been able to do as a stimulus for a response through an attempt at doing it and, although he might even revolt against them, he holds the standard of their traditions high. What is thus the product of maturity is also a classic in that there is greater complexity to be marked in the style, in his or her use of language if only because the development of language to its highest pinnacle is the aim a classic must attain.\textsuperscript{16} Also, such a mature style makes allowances for 'precise expression of finer shades of feeling and thought' as well as 'the introduction of greater refinement and variety of music.'\textsuperscript{17} An extremely greater development of this refinement and the perfection of art in music is what 'pure' literature aims at. But that is a point better reserved for Chapter 4.

To be able to be considered a worthy ideal, which a classic might be, a certain amplitude and a certain catholicity is expected to be exhibited in it. \textbf{Maturity of mind} is a state reached when the writer concerned develops a consciousness of history which is not only that of his own people but also that of at least the highly civilised people.
Eliot cites the Romans and the Greeks as those having this kind of consciousness. Among the European writers, he names Virgil as one who strained himself the maximum to reach such a consciousness. Maturity of the art is reflected in its relatedness to a minimum of two cultures. Maturity of style calls for 'a greater command of the complex structure, both of sense and sound, without losing the resource of direct, brief and startling simplicity,' should the need arise. This way, a perfect classic is one 'in which the whole genius of a people will be latent' because a classic exhibits comprehensiveness, universality and a sense of destiny. Eliot quotes Dante's farewell speech at the end of his essay, What is a Classic?

Son, the temporal fire and the eternal, hast thou seen, and art come to a place where I, of myself, discern no further.

And that is the kind of a saturating point that must be reached before any work might make claims to be called a classic. The surest defence of freedom against, what is in Eliot's words chaos, is the price we need to pay in order to be free as well as to maintain the standard.

The doctrines of plausibility and maturity are inter-related in this way and do provide the basis of the criterion of suitability. No belief would be suitable if it is in any way
implausible and immature both in its content and expression. Again, the dissatisfaction against the tampering with 'the ideal' of creative writers writing as they 'do feel' only to replace it with a writing demonstrating what they 'want to feel' apparently seems to suggest that 'actuality' might lie beyond reach. If this be the case, it is indeed a strenuous job to attempt the translation of ideals into actuality.

This dichotomous relationship between the ideals and the actuality gives birth to a moral crisis leading to the enunciation of the well known thesis of Eliot's: 'le monde moderne avilit.' Translated loosely into English, the utterance in French would mean 'The modern world is disparaging and degrading.' That is precisely why lack of faith is the bane of life in modern times.

Faith springs from belief proper and this must be tempered through the behavioural component of belief. For, belief is a response of varying threshold, it must lead to action, the nature of such action must be obviously dictated by the content of the belief. Belief leads to trust whose basis The Bible reiterates in the following words:

Happy are those who trust the LORD,
who do not turn to idols
or join those who worship false gods.22

The false gods of modern man are to be seen as the gods whom Eliot calls 'strange'. The whys and wherefores are better
left for discussion in the definitive sections that follow hereafter. It is this chasing after strange gods and their subsequent worship that both secularises and makes contemporary literature 'provincial.'

The modern world is disparaging and the modern man, surveying the ruins of this spiritual wasteland, as it were, cannot but only watch helplessly. And life seems to him to be a never-ending business as it does to Alexis Zorba, the hero of Nikos Kazantzakis's novel, Zorba the Greek. This only seems to lend credence to the fact that lifetime, as we see it, is merely mitthya and māyā, the unreal and the illusory, the phantasmal, may be, even make-believe. This is so because when religions lose 'their creative sparks, the gods eventually become no more than poetic motifs... for decorating human solitude.'^23 The assurance in The Bible that 'thy eternal God is thy refuge' but it is made clear that 'thou shalt have no other gods before me' implying that there would be none after him either. The Bhagavadgītā is an eloquent testimony to the fact that God is the source of all and to know Him is to know all and Sri Krishna says as much to Arjuna in X. 32:

sargānāṁ ādīr antas ca
madhyam cai'vā'ham arjuna
adhītmavidyā vidyānām
vādah pravadatām aham.
The breaking of the covenant has brought man close to his doom making him both selfish and prone to damning doubts. By the same analogy, one may argue that in making a clear break from tradition, the literary tradition, the modern man of letters has fallen a prey to blasphemy and heresy. Eliot finds modern literature to be neither 'immoral' nor 'amoral' but only repudiating, or worst still, being wholly ignorant of the most fundamental and the most important of our beliefs. It may be, he feels, conveniently divided into (a) one that only attempts to do 'what has already been done perfectly', or (b) one that 'aims at exaggerated novelty usually of a trifling kind concealing a fundamental common placeness.' This way, it attracts the charge of going after 'strange' gods in being both perfidious and profane.

Man's selfishness knows no bounds. It has made him unjust, for he has gone against the Word which became flesh in him. This in spite of the biblical proclamation that 'the just shall live by faith'. Nor is that all. He is in dire straits due to the absence of faith, for 'we walk (read progress) by faith, not by sight.' If this is so, then belief
proper must precede both intellectual and emotional beliefs. But The Bible also states that 'faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' Hope is the sheet anchor of man's existence and the source of his sustenance. Loss of hope implies loss of faith and it is the loss of hope that has driven man in his desperation towards strange and false gods.

Living up to faith is difficult, for it is the harshest test of the continuing bond between God and Man. Trust is what we need. Trust leads to faith and, in turn, to belief though it is true that belief and trust are the prerequisites of faith. Wilbur Scott's observation on Eliot's forceful criticism of both Irving Babbitt, one of the front-ranking Humanists, who had been his teacher at Harvard and whose influence on Eliot is notable 1909 onward, and Norman Foerster, a Neo-Humanist, for what he called 'the central weakness' in their works, is a very crucial one. The central weakness, as Eliot saw it, lay in their belief that 'a morality that has no vindication outside of itself cannot compel reasonable belief.' Given these facts, it should be pretty obvious by now that Eliot had in mind the inherent relationship between art and morality both of which draw their material from life.
Evidence for this is available in Eliot's essay, "Religion and Literature" where he maintains that 'moral judgements of literary works are made only according to the moral code accepted by each generation.' And our morality, ethics, judgements and criticism of ourselves and even 'our behaviour towards our fellow men' is imposed on us by religion. All art imitates life and, therefore, an artifact (eg literary work) compels 'reasonable belief' only when it conforms to the moral and ethical norms that govern life. Our society, which is 'worm-eaten with liberalism', has widened the chasm between God and man. Eliot's complaint that modern literature either ends up simply repudiating, or is completely ignorant of, the most fundamental and important of the beliefs leading to provinciality may be seen as a virulent attack against the perfidious and the profane. Eliot identifies the strange gods in his collection of essays called After Strange Gods. We shall see what he has to say about them in the following section.

II

After Strange Gods is to be seen as an attempt 'to state a point of view' and to leave it to posterity to draw whatever conclusions it might want from it. That is what Eliot considers to be the duty of 'a person with strong conviction' and, in all modesty, Eliot appears to lay claims
to being such a person. And, moreover, it is also to be seen as an attempt 'to encourage such institutions' as the University of Virginia where the three lectures, put under the title were delivered, 'to maintain their communications with the past.' For, these seem to him to have 'some vestiges of a traditional education' still surviving in them. Maintenance of such communications with the past seem to him to relate necessarily to 'any future worth communicating with.' One cannot afford to miss the stress on communication, in the present with the past and the future, giving it a deliberate linearity. Also, the note of dejection rings clear when he talks of the communication with the future.

After Strange Gods has a very large scaffolding and may be considered very easily to provide the bulwark for the new poetics he developed through a gradual but a firm encouragement of a maturity of taste rooted in tradition and faith. A close reading of the total critical output of Eliot's, taken as a unified whole, should make this quite clear to us. Seen in this perspective, it would not be wrong to claim that it represents the bedrock of Eliot's philosophy in the immediate aftermath of his conversion to the Anglican faith. Religious conversion has a tendency to bring about disturbances that are the result of a changed and, maybe, a modified perception. However, since After Strange Gods continues with the theme Eliot had inaugurated in "Tradition
and the Individual Talent", one is bound to think that such disturbances were minimal or even negligible in Eliot.

After Strange Gods projects Eliot's thoughts on the manifestation of individualism - the unregenerate growth of 'self' - which is unChristian in its content. But as Eliot argues, 'direct knowledge of life is knowledge directly in relation to ourselves' and yet, at the same time, 'it can be a knowledge of other people's knowledge of life, not life itself.' In other words, knowledge has its relevance only in terms of the collective consciousness of the society. The unregenerate growth of 'self', however, negates this truth. In relating the works of the great writers of the past to those of his contemporaries, he finds in them the projection of a spiritually sick mind. Spiritual sickness is a symptom of an experience of alienation from God and His creation. To Eliot, contemporaneity in literature seems to be synonymous with the severance of the link between God and Man. Modern man is a recluse. Lacking in the hope generated by an unshaken faith, he is lonely even amidst a crowd in line with the multitudinous troops of others like him crying for the moon. This, then, is the result of his chasing after strange gods.

Eliot's identification and an unconscious classification of these strange gods makes a very interesting reading. These 'gods' may, for our limited purpose, be divided into six categories depending upon their nature and
fitting into different points of view, viz, (1) Philosophical, (2) Psychological, (3) Political, (4) Economical, (5) Religious, and (6) Social. There is a lot of interlapping of the concepts to be brought within the purview of these categories and it would not be useful if such concepts are put under one head even when they fall under others. So we are aware that such a classification can only be tentative, as it might be arbitrary and, therefore, the need to begin at some point has been the sole criterion.

Santayana found romanticism, ritualism, aestheticism, symbolism to be the names of diseases which have a tendency to degrade art from its useful function. Eliot apparently shares Santayana's belief about romanticism, symbolism, and aestheticism being the signs of a diseased society but prefers to call them strange gods. The last two as a logical extension of the first one. Eliot's poetics clearly took shape out of a strong reaction to romanticism as a philosophy. And romanticism was a reaction to dreary rationalism. Freedom in creativity, spontaneity of feelings and emotions, sincerity both in experience and expression, and an intense emotional engagement on the part of the poet was what was thought missing. Creation, for romanticists, was aimed at a certain kind of mystic union of the mind with a reality that is transcendent. This way, reality turns into dream and dream into reality. Romanticists' acceptance of functional imagery and
the use of rhythms of prose in poetry is to be seen as an effort to break away from the rigid principles of neoclassicism. To them, obscurity is a by-product of myth, symbol and intuitions.

Whereas classical literature was interested in the perfection of being, the romantics swore by the dialectics of becoming. The poetics of Eliot rejects both these positions. Only God is perfect; man has attained partial perfection, say the Thomists. Insofar as becoming is concerned, man does not have in him the power to become what he may not have been created for. Any effort in this direction leads to alienation and the growth of individuality. Two of its important front-rankers, Wordsworth and Coleridge, made attempts at poetic reform. The questions debated included the process of turning the natural into the supernatural (as in Wordsworth) vs the supernatural into the natural (as in Coleridge). Both Wordsworth and Coleridge insisted upon the relative superiority of creative imagination over intelligence.

The Romantics held that formal beauty was an attribute that was conducive to the creation of vision beatific and, hence, the notion that man is essentially good, although he is corrupted very easily by the environment. Eliot seems to take a view to the contrary. Man is essentially imperfect and, upbringing in a strong tradition, could help him improve step-by-step in attaining civility. It was this divergence in views that led Eliot to dub romanticism a strange god.
Romanticism made an instant revolution possible. The theoretical input came from the teachings of Rousseau, and those who swore by romanticism believed that the individual offers infinite possibilities. Only in reformation of society, which was brought about through the destruction of an order that looked oppressive, these possibilities would enable him to progress. Rationalism, which forced suppression, also made man an agnostic. When Eliot says, for example, that if man will not have God — a God, who is jealous and very protective of His creation and His own position as a creator, He would allow non to be put on par with — the choice left to man is between the creator and the worldly power. He is actually echoing the words of T E Hulme (1960: 118) who says:

The instincts that find their right and proper outlet in religion must come out in some other way. You don't believe in a God, so you begin to believe that man is a god. You don't believe in Heaven, so you begin to believe in a heaven on earth.

Of course, Hulme does not talk of Hitler or Stalin, but man. This is what romanticism is all about and Hulme defines it as 'spilt religion' (added emphasis). Spilt if only because it is not contained and is no more bound but free to play all
counters, and, in the process, we move toward the autonomy of the individual. The insistence on such autonomy and rejection of everything that binds it leads to Protestant Angst which connects the extreme isolation of the individual to the introspection and self-scrutiny he subjects himself to. This is the point where the ideas of self-analysis become approximates for inspiration. The deep subjectivity isolates relevance and experience. What we get to finally are the bases of Protestantism which is also a strange god. But we shall come to that a little later.

Reference was made to Eliot's forceful rejection of Humanism as a philosophy in the beginning of this chapter. Humanism pleads for restraint and discipline in contrast with liberalism which supports openness both in religion and politics. What has fallen out of disuse or has become obsolete must be discarded. Eliot's leaning, albeit of a selective kind, towards humanism seems to be only too apparent. This seems to help explain Eliot's plea for the maintenance of a tradition, catholicity in views and behaviour and, therefore, the acceptance of conservatism and a deep-seated suspicion of protestantism. Neo-humanism, which was widely accepted by the Americans in the USA between 1915 and 1933, was quite unrelated to any other form of humanism. The only points of meeting appear to be its emphasis on human dignity, moral strenuoussness and exercise both of will and reason. It defended conservative, ethical, political and aesthetic stands
against the romantics, liberals and empiricists in the 19th century. Both Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, who were the leading lights, were known to Eliot: Babbitt was his teacher and More, a friend.

Their emphasis on reason notwithstanding, the neo-humanists felt that intuition was both the source of Truth and a way of casting an inward glance. These philosophers repudiated all formal philosophies, nature-worship and 'condemned a negative approach to nature like that of Hardy.' They felt that intuition was both the source of Truth and a way of casting an inward glance. These philosophers repudiated all formal philosophies, nature-worship and 'condemned a negative approach to nature like that of Hardy.' The ethical substance is involved in the use of ethical criteria in pronouncements on literature. Eliot's objection to the neo-humanistic standpoint rests on the fact that these used Christian moral tradition but opposed Christian dogma and theology. He picks chinks in the dialectical armour of Norman Foerster, a disciple of Babbitt's, to note that

If an individual humanist hesitates or cannot bring himself (as Foerster seems to suggest according to Eliot), that is perfectly natural human attitude, with which one has sympathy; but if the humanist affirms that Humanism hesitates and cannot bring itself, then he is making the hesitation, and the inability to bring itself, into a dogma: the humanist Credo is then a Dubito.
He is asserting that there is a 'pure Humanism' which is incompatible with religious faith. (All emphases are those of Eliot's but what is in the parenthesis has been added). 34

Added to this is the fact that Paul Elmer More accepted the need for the additional sanction of revealed religion for the absolute nature of values he had stressed, although this was a development preceding his death. This realization of Paul Elmer More's makes him more acceptable to Eliot than Irving Babbitt whose insistence on 'human reason' against the revelation of the supernatural led him to reject humanism as a strange god. For, Eliot discovered that Babbitt's brand of humanism was 'alarmingly like very liberal Protestant theology of the nineteenth century... in fact, a product - a by-product - of Protestant theology in its last agonies.' 35 Interestingly, "The Humanism of Irving Babbitt" was published in 1928, a year after Eliot's conversion to the Anglican faith. Although Eliot had his doubts about humanism, the strongest rejection came ten years after his conversion. The reasons are too obvious to need any further explication.

Eliot's discomfiture at the events that followed his initial rejection of humanism is equally obvious. He records how shocked his 'old teacher and master' was to learn that he
he had so 'turned his coat' alongside Babbitt's advice to him to 'come out into the open.' It seems to have stung him to the quick, for he confesses that it 'swung into the orbit and has been circling' his little world 'ever since.' In defence, as it were, Eliot reacts in stating that his religious beliefs had remained unchanged and that he continued to be still as strongly in favour of 'the maintenance of monarchy' in those countries where it existed. In other words, Eliot tries to brush off this charge of Babbitt's by apparently suggesting that his basic beliefs had remained intact, although he was rejecting a philosophy for its sheer incompatibility with these including religious faith. His assertion in For Lancelot Andrewes as well as in "Second Thoughts about Humanism" that their incompatibility with Christian Orthodoxy was the reason is evidence that this is so.

It would have been disastrous if Eliot had continued to embrace humanism while pleading all the time in favour of an orthodoxy which holds that perfection being the attribute only of the divine, man is imperfect. Babbitt's brand of humanism seemed to him 'like very liberal Protestant theology,' maybe, because protestantism went the liberal way and pleaded the cause of the individual believer against the ecclesiastical authority of the Church.
Protestantism is a strange god too. The schism in the Church came when the idea of Original Sin, which is a dogma, was thought to have been extended to ridiculous heights by it. Hulme believes such dogmas to be the closest expressions of the categories of the religious attitude. Eliot suggests that with 'the disappearance of the idea of Original Sin...the human beings presented to us both in poetry and in prose fiction to-day...tend to become less and less real.' It was the protestant movement that was responsible for the bifurcation of the Church into the conformists (called Roman Catholics) and the reformists (called Protestants). Those belonging to the Church of England adopted a separate stand on all issues on which the Protestants had parted company with the Church of Rome. Known as Anglicans, they were closer to the Roman Catholic faith. The idea of a vengeful God that Eliot repeats with a great deal of emphasis had perhaps resulted out of the Christian teachings about the Love of God. Faith necessitates obedience and thus also provides for punishment of the errants. In the earlier centuries, the Church wielded a stout stick to beat its opponents with, excommunicating those who refused to fall in line with the diktats of the Church. Eliot agrees with Christopher Dawson whom he quotes in The Idea of a Christian Society. He notes how Dawson bemoans the tendency of the English-speaking Protestants 'to treat religion as a kind of a social tonic' that could be 'used in times of a
national emergency.* The purpose being their desire 'to extract a further degree of moral effort from the people.'

Protestantism aimed at liberating Christians through: (a) the elimination of the belief in the Scriptures, the Creeds, the Atonement and the worship of Christ; (b) the admission of Unitarians as fellow followers; and (c) the evisceration of the prayer-book to reduce the Articles to a deistic formulary with a view to abolishing all subscriptions or adherences to formularies and thus (in the opinion of the conformists) reducing religion to a state of anarchy and dissolution. The conservative tradition, in which Eliot was reared, made him consider Protestantism a strange god. The 'decay of Protestantism' is 'more marked upon American authors than upon English. These signs are decay of morals, especially sexual morals as in case of D. H. Lawrence', according to Eliot. In other words, Catholicism helped affirm morality.

Max Weber (1958:36) finds in Protestants a certain degree of emancipation from traditionalism which also meant subsequent emancipation from economic traditionalism evident as a logical extension. Notes Weber,

The emancipation from economic traditionalism appears, no doubt, to be a
factor which would greatly strengthen
the tendency to doubt the sanctity of
the religious tradition, as of all tradi-
tional authorities.42

Arguing how the Protestants have shown what he calls 'a special tendency to develop economic rationalism',43 draws our attention to the Catholic assertion that material advancement is the direct result of the secularization of all lofty ideals through Protestantism. Despite Eliot's overt abhorrence of Protestantism and his expressed general disillusionment, one would agree with Smidt (1961:224) that 'his later acceptance of suffering and askesis...is in agreement both with Protestant and Catholic Christianity and with the religions of the East.'44 This, in his view, is a perfect synthesis of 'logically inconsistent elements'. One might see in this Eliot's readiness to accept what he had originally thought to be unacceptable on its own. Although Eliot does not exclude Atonement which, in Christian theology, is the reconciliation between God and man by means of Incarnation and death of Christ, he is not ready to take it to the most dangerous extent as is the wont of Protestants to do. But the Protestant movement has largely been liberal both in philosophical and political terms because Eliot states quite clearly that ours is a society worm-eaten with liberalism. Hence liberalism, like Protestantism, is a strange god.
Tracing the origin of liberalism in Calvinism and
Lutherianism, Eliot notes that it aims at 'removing factual
untruth' and fallacious inferences'. He recounts how
William Palmer wanted to eliminate the belief in the Scrip­
tures, the Creeds, the Atonement, the worship of Christ among
other things. With The Bible (the Word), the reports of the
apostles, the act of reconciliation between God and man out
of the way, he seems to be asking: what would be left of
faith? Liberalism is what the whole of the West has stood
for and, in pleading for the discarding of many elements in
historical Christianity, it found these incompatible with the
modern times. Necessity guides the dilution of the principles
which are relevant because they are a part of faith. More­
over, it has its own limited reference. Negative condition
of society is evident after reaching a position which records
the decline. Alternatively, a positive condition is, in
all possibility, also effectively secular. A negative liberal
society does not afford to apply particularized knowledge to
a particular stage. Wisdom is yielded by 'sporadic and un-
related experimentation'.

Liberalism takes us to individualism which may be
considered to be an off-shoot of humanism and, later on,
industrial expansionism. The latter tore the social fabric
by fragmenting joint families into manageable and self-
contained nuclear units through a mass exodus to the cities
disturbing the agrarian way of life. This has had a devas-
tating effect, for it uprooted man from his moorings and set
him head-on towards the nurturing of the 'self' much to the
detriment of the society in which he lived. It was thus
that life was seen as having been lost in living and wisdom
in man's thirsting after knowledge which was wholly confused
with information. Man was created, so The Bible says, to
mark the glory of God and he was expected to celebrate God's
grandeur. Yeats has given words to the predicament of man
in "The Choice", where he says:

The intellect of man is forced to choose
Perfection of the life, or of the work,
And if it take the second must refuse
A heavenly mansion, raging in the dark. 49

The Church of Christ accepted the use of the intellect in
matters of faith long ago but placed it secondary to belief
proper. Perfection of the life is made possible only within
the parameters of faith. The divine design involved in
creation must be fulfilled and the covenant between God and
man maintained.

The tricky choice before man lies in his confusion
between the perfection of the life and of the work and he
holds that the one means the other and vice-versa. We know
that this is not so but our partial cognition of the truth,
which is only partly knowledge, is the direct result of our ignorance of the Truth. The closer we are to such knowledge, the closer we are also to ignorance. God alone has the wisdom and man can strive towards it but the substitution of wisdom by information is a heresy. Even otherwise, knowledge confused with information is devoid of wisdom and the right application of the intellect lies in using the wisdom of God to choose between the right and the wrong. Perfection of life is possible only this way. On the other hand, the choice of perfection of the work, confused for perfection of life, leads to the unregenerate growth of self. Ignorance of this kind brings man closer to his death, his spiritual death rather than its physical manifestation, and even such a death does not bring him closer to God. How could it do so? Logically speaking, this is not possible. Spiritual death is the result of the snapping of the links between God and man.

Thus, wisdom substituted by information and knowledge that brings us closer to the eclipse of life is the logical destiny of an unregenerate individuality which is only a reference to itself. The Thomistic view of creation upheld that man was one who had inherited partly the qualities of his creator and His other creation, the angels. There ought not to have been any scope for ignorance, much less pure ignorance. But seemed impossible has happened and 'a good deal of waste' has taken place in the wake of pure ignorance,
according to Eliot. The result is what Yeats spells out. In choosing the perfection of the work, Man has refused 'A heavenly mansion, raging in the dark' and it is the darkness of ignorance, which he confused with knowledge, that has led him to refuse that heavenly mansion. The eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge in flagrant disobedience of the divine diktat forced man out of Paradise.

Of all the 'isms', strangely enough, Eliot missed existentialism. One possible reason for this might be that he thought it implied, for he mentions the strain of cruelty in literature and the Marxist streak in the writings of certain authors as falling under the category: the strange gods. This would seem to imply that anything that negates a tradition is a strange god. We need to find out why this might be so. For a Catholic mind, the existence of God is the basic presupposition upon which depends the Catholic view of the world. Contingent upon this view is that of Nature 'as an ordered hierarchy with man at its summit' and 'God is both the origin and the end of this planned and purposeful world.'\(^50\) The key concepts within such a view are those of order, continuity and simultaneity.

For Sartre, the existence of God is an impossibility and, hence, the rejection of the idea of such an objective world order governed by universal laws. Moreover, the natural law in Sartre's philosophy seems to raise man himself
to become God. A Catholic also assigns a permanent and universal essence to man such as the one that would be discoverable by rational intuition. His is a striving to be God and this striving becomes meaningful only when action is in accordance with nature. Also, the realization of his fullest potential is possible only within the framework of a society. The existentialists do not talk of a self in the manner of libertarians but they do talk of a Self. The awareness of the self is a flow out of the realization that we are not, in any way, omnipotent, not even as potent as our desires would have us be. The realization of the Self is contingent upon the satisfaction of our desires. Since man is not the sum of his desires, he starts suspecting his desires as likely deceivers. It is suspicion that leads to doubt and indecision, when the individual separates himself from his desires in order to scrutinize them. His subsequent choice of one against the other leads him to the notion of a Self.

Also, the Self has desires and it makes decision and choices involving suffering, thinking and acting upon these. Moreover, the Self is both immaterial and immortal. It is what our mind envisions as our possibilities, with the past being projected into a future possibility and out of the actual present. Since the Self is its own freedom, the thought of an external agency shaping and controlling one's
life is revolting, for one has no control over it. Thus the desire of the Self to be free because being free, it can grow and this growth is reflected in some kind of continuity of human experience. The Bergsonian thesis that all of our previous experience is present somehow in the present, is important, especially because it saw the Self as being caught only in an act of intuition. Eliot picked up this strain with certain minor modifications using the religious philosophies of the East.

The style of a being's existence, the Self's existence, is substantial because the Self is both what it has done already and what it proposes to do. In other words, it is simultaneously both the accomplished action as well as the intent of a future action. The unity inherent in this pattern shapes for the Self a pattern of living. The proximity of Eliot's idea of history and that of the existentialists is evident in the latter's belief that the Self is at any moment of time the result of its total history. One need not be an Eliot expert to see in this the similarity with regard to what Eliot calls simultaneity of experience which is, for him, an essential part of a vibrant tradition. The existentialist belief that the Self is not merely our present life at any given moment of time but its projection as a possibility of choice, of freedom. If the Self has desires and makes decisions and choices, a choice (in this sense) is both a
desire to do and to have what it desires, involving the selection following thought, indecision and deliberation. Such a choice is to our knowledge the best under the circumstances. This is the meaning of the freedom of will: not the ability or desire but the freedom to decide, to choose and to put it into operation. Any obstruction of this freedom is the first evil. \(^{51}\) Eliot differs from the existentialists insofar as the concept of self and the problem of evil are concerned. This makes existentialism a strange god.

A serious fall-out of the new-found liberalism is the corruption of modern literature by what Eliot calls 'secularism'. A literature that shows no awareness or understanding of the meaning of 'the primacy of the supernatural over the natural life' \(^{52}\) is said to be secular. Eliot believes that economic changes contain the seeds of secularism when the 'Christian Faith is taken for granted' 'doubted' and 'contested' only to be spoken of as 'anything but an anachronism'. \(^{53}\) All this leads the modern man to further alienation from God. The result is the shift in his loyalties and belief to something temporal like Hitler or Stalin, which may be seen as a form of idolatry. Art and, therefore, literature, in mirroring life, becomes the physical manifestation of man's constant endeavour to make life more humane by affecting us entirely as human beings.
And, in so doing, it affects our morality and religious sensibility which draw upon our faith. We need to keep in mind the fact that the subject-matter of art is the moral life of man.

The depiction of moral life subsumes a certain morality, the equivalent of morals that art and literature must project, and this morality in art is bound to be affected on two counts: (i) the medium and (ii) the artist. Oscar Wilde, in his preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, notes that the artist makes 'perfect use' of 'an imperfect medium.'\(^{54}\) Eliot implies at many places in his essay that both the use of the medium and the medium itself are imperfect. An artist cannot afford to impoverish himself by divorcing his artistic sensibility from his religious sensibility. If such a synthesis of the two sensibilities, that Eliot has in mind, are to come into full play, we reach the ideal which has on it the stamp of a tradition. He believes that unless the 'spiritual perception' born out of a healthy religious sensibility is extended into 'aesthetic sensibility' (and it must do that), what we get is only a bolus and not an example of 'disciplined taste'.\(^{55}\) And this is what is apparently found lacking in modern literature. Art implies the universality of its application in mirroring life and no artist can afford to give it a regional colouring. Should he try to do that, he must ensure that the unity is kept intact.
because all art, being a true representation of life (if it is to find acceptability as such) must lead to integration. The reverse is not true because in that case it would also become 'provincial'. Both of these are, therefore, strange gods.

Eliot deals with 'provincialism' in his essay, What is a Classic? Elaborating on the problem, he says, it is 'a distortion of values, the exclusion of some, the exaggeration of others.' Such a definition, by the very virtue of its wording, brings into sharp focus the question of ethics. Values get distorted when they are seen not as universal wholes within the framework of social sanction but through tainted glasses. A partial perception can hardly be accepted as perception proper which brings to bear upon the problems under scrutiny a wholesome view. Our treatment of the value system cannot be an act of individual response. Moreover, by excluding some and exaggerating some other values, an artist, falls a prey to the temptation of being or sounding 'original' but only at the cost of losing relevance with the passage of time. Eliot notes that provincialism 'springs not from lack of geographical perambulation, but from applying standards acquired within a limited area, to the whole of human experience.' (added emphasis). Standards applicable to the whole of human experience would entail and be contingent upon a wider area of experience. 'Geographical perambulation',
as a phrase, means a close survey through the area in question. So, it is not familiarity with the landscape or the area from which it springs. Rather, it is the application of standards fixed on the basis of partial cognition that makes literature provincial.

There is a rider to this. Eliot argues that all this is such that it 'confounds the contingent with the essential, the ephemeral with the permanent.' What is contingent is always dependent on something else. Also, it is liable to happen but is not certain. Thus, it is accidental. One of the meanings of the word 'essential' is that it is 'relating to' something. It is similarly 'indispensable or important in the highest degree'. Thus, the confounding of the contingent and the essential is, after all, the intermingling of the dependent and, therefore, dispensable with the indispensable so much so that one telescopes into the other in such a way as to make any distinction impossible. The same happens in the case of the ephemeral or the temporal posited with the permanent or one that is out of time. Hence, man's proneness to confuse wisdom with knowledge and knowledge with information. Therefore, also his proneness to confuse wisdom with information. Wisdom comes with age and experience but knowledge is subject to the time and space continuum.
Confusion between wisdom and knowledge, on the one hand, and knowledge and information, on the other, in an attempt to solve problems of life gives rise to a new kind of provincialism related to time, not to space. Spatial provincialism is thus not what Eliot has in mind. He gives it a new name, and this is provincialism of time. Explicating on this further, he holds that such a kind of provincialism is one which treats 'history' merely as 'the chronicle of human devices which have served their turn and been scrapped.'

Eliot views history as a continuity whether this be linear or cyclical in its formulation. He feels that if such a stand is taken, as it is actually, then 'the world' is treated as something that belongs and is the 'property solely of the living' and one 'in which the dead hold no shares.'

Eliot's view of a strong culture and tradition would brook no such partial perception. For, it is menace threatening the very basis of a civilized society. A parochial view such as the one that the provincialism of time affords would treat 'all the peoples on the globe' as provincials which is not a healthy development. Eliot complains that the modern world also 'provincialises, and it can also corrupt.'

Eliot's scrutiny of communism, which he tags with humanism, Protestantism, liberalism and what is seen as closely
aligned with secularism, took the shape of essays he contributed to journals. Communism is based on the belief of a social system or its practice which is based on the sharing the input in terms of work and output in terms of production. Also, it is an arrangement whereby public ownership of the means of production is based on friendly co-operation and mutual assistance between workers made free from any exploitation. This is its platform as a philosophy which would only mean, in substance, the discarding of the profit-motive inherent in a capitalist system. Max Weber (1958:17) defines a capitalistic economic action as 'one which rests on the expectation of profit'. (added emphasis). He argues that 'certain religious ideas' influence 'the development of an economic spirit' or what he calls 'the ethos of an economic system.' He ties this up neatly with the Protestant ethic by observing that most of the participants in this enterprise 'are overwhelmingly protestant.' That is not all. He believes that such participation may be understood at least in part to be the 'result of a greater material wealth they have inherited.' What this ultimately boils down to is the apparent unhealthy nexus between Protestantism and Materialism which Catholics hold to be the result of 'the secularization of all ideals.' And Materialism is one of the most important planks of Marxist-Leninist ideology because of the pre-eminence it gives to matter over anything else.
Eliot is clearly convinced that economic changes 'concern themselves only with changes of a temporal, material and external nature; they concern themselves with morals only of a collective nature.' (added emphasis). He sees economic changes as those holding the assumptions of Secularism which is reflected in the denial of 'the primacy of the supernatural over the natural life.' Obviously, he considers this to be a muddle because the stress on materialism in communism draws it away from the primal nature of the supernatural that existed prior to matter. By making such a philosophy a substitute for religion, we are arguing for the creation of a society which subordinates 'everything (else) to political power.' (words in parenthesis supplied). Thus, 'everything mental or spiritual' is seen in Materialism as 'a product of material processes', according to Maurice Cornforth, because 'there is no unknowable sphere of reality which lies outside the material world.' In rejecting totally the existence of a supernatural, Marxist materialism, from which Communism draws its ideological input, also rejects 'disembodied spiritual beings which influence events in the physical world.' Eliot denounced Communism as a 'facile alternative' to democracy that had failed and the alternative was unacceptable because communities embracing communism seemed to him to be 'mechanical rather than spiritual' and, therefore, those worshipping strange gods.
Communism and Protestantism can be seen as reactions that got added strength due to Humanism and Liberalism. These gathered impetus in the wake of industrialization and the subsequent movement towards economic determination. We shall deal with the latter first. Eliot believes that 'all ills are fundamentally economic' because it is the economic imbalances that create tensions. And, these lead to all sorts of reactionary responses resulting in discrimination against the 'neo-agrarians.' Economic determinism affects the neo-agrarians. Eliot explains elsewhere that 'the organisation of society on the principle of private profit, as well as public destruction, is leading both to the deformation of humanity and unregulated industrialism.' All exercises in economic planning are worked out on the principle of private profit which is an important consideration in a capitalist economy. Such is the nature of economic progress we have witnessed in modern times that it appears, or rather is, detrimental to the society at large what with 'the exhaustion of natural resources.' Man has destroyed the ecological system and made our lands barren, perhaps, to match the barrenness of his soul. Our progress is largely material progress that has brought about a complete alienation from God. The result, of course, is 'unregulated industrialism' with the stress being on the individual rather than the society. To quote Eliot,

(The problem of) the hypertrophy of the motive of Profit into a social ideal, the
distinction between the use and their exploitation, the use of labour and its exploitation, the advantages unfairly accruing to the trader in contrast to the primary producer, the misdirection of the financial machine, the iniquity of usury, and other features of commercialised society...

have unchristian aims and are detrimental to a Christian way of life. (added parentheses and emphases). Such imbalances or, perhaps, lacunae in our economic planning have been the launching pad of the Communist philosophy enunciated by Karl Marx.

A comparison between the views of Eliot in this regard with those of Weber's discussed in the last paragraph on communism is of order. The dictionary meaning of hypertrophy is overnourishment; also, abnormal enlargement. The meaning applicable in case of Eliot's use of the word seems to be abnormal enlargement or rather abnormal growth. And Eliot talks of abnormal growth of the motive of Profit and its transformation into a social ideal. Moreover, we had stressed his distinction between 'use' and 'exploitation'. Whereas the use of something available may be good or bad depending upon the context of the situation, exploitation tends to attract a negative connotation on the whole, although it might mean its
successful application. Eliot's wording is important, for his is a very specialized use of language which lends itself more often to misinterpretation. On returning to Eliot's statement about the abnormal growth or extension of the motive of Profit as a social ideal, we find that his intention is to highlight the distinction between the meaningful purposes to which natural resources and labour can be put in sharp contrast, as it were, with their use for selfish purposes. It is this that makes all the difference. Should the intention be selfish, advantages accrue to one group against the other and this seems to happen here because 'the advantages' unfairly accrue to the trader, the businessman, rather than primarily to the producer whose untiring work makes the yield possible. This is the 'misdirection of the financial machine' which serves to become the cause of iniquity of usury. Usury is taking of interest on a loan. But more often than not the trader does not finance the production and the charging of interest in this case is unwarranted.

Max Weber's argument presupposes many things. He holds the view that a capitalist economic action rests on the expectation of profit. If the action is economically non-viable or unprofitable, it is usually not undertaken at all. Even when profit is expected, it is based on the utilisation of opportunities for exchange, that is, something like payment to be made for work done or to be done and thus on 'peaceful' chances of profit. To utilise is to make use of and not
to exploit. Thus, the common ground in these two points of view is the profit motive. Although peaceful chances are involved in making profit, the motive in itself leads to the creation of social consciousness which accepts this as iniquitous and the cause, therefore, of economic disparity. Discussing the metaphysics of a political economy (the Communist system of economy which is based on political power which, in turn, is the Structuring principle of all endeavours) in the philosophy of Proudhon, Marx notes the process of social transformation leading to the establishment of a political economy:

Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people into (industrial) workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against the capital...79(parenthesis supplied).

We are at once put in mind of T S Eliot who also talks about such a transformation. Eliot's suggestion to remediate the imbalance which leads to the creation of a class against the capital is to restore a fair degree of balance, even if it cannot be wholly proper, between (a) the urban and the
However, there are quite a few points of difference without any subsequently relative distinction in their use of their language by the race. Arguing that New England in the South Virginia is more industrialised than the other states within the USA, he notes that it has had also to face cultural invasions by foreign races. Again, there is hardly anything that could lead to its wholesale afforestation. And Eliot is hurt that the soil in the South has lost its opulence because of its largescale deforestation. Deforestation paves the way for the denudation of rich alluvial soil through wind and flood because trees hold the soil in place and are said to be a very important contributing factor deciding the extent of rainfall in the area concerned. Eliot's awareness that Virginia is less industrialised, less invaded by foreign races; has a more opulent soil and not these differences, hold it apart from the other states. Virginia was a natural choice for him because it still allowed some recollection of a 'tradition' wiped out in some parts of the North by the influx of foreigners. And never had the West had it! Thus, by the fact of his argument, Eliot apparently holds that opulence of soil, the right kind of climate are as necessary as the long quest of man to adapt his life according to the environment. In case of the latter, we are bound to get the best in both, with each shaping and modifying the other.
This boon made the 'neo-agrarians' a blessed race who might have to fight hard and long against the whole current of economic determinism, a strange god we worship with all kinds of music.

Economic determinism had led to massive deforestation to make way for industries. Industrial expansionism is at the cost of imbalance brought into play in the ecosystem and it has led to regional imbalances which go hand-in-hand with the cultural ones. The greater economic freedom that economic determinism and industrial expansionism seemed to have made possible, man's awareness of the power of money grew and he started chasing after this glorious and, at the same time, what seemed to him to be concrete and, therefore, real substitute for God, an abstraction for the agnostics. The resultant spiritual degeneration tore him away from the community and made him selfish. Although Hillis Miller (1963:15) sees 'the progressive transformation of the world' in the steady processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, Pitrim Sorokin (1959:495) is concerned with the draining of the country population into the cities. This draining included those belonging to the upper strata and the best elements of the lower classes in the society. Sorokin argues that in socio-economic terms, this constitutes the process of wasting. Eliot's pointed reference is to
the neo-agrarians. Agrarianism, as a philosophy, may be loosely defined as a plea favouring an equitable division of land among those who work on it or, in other words, the land to the tiller. Fekete (1975: 45) finds this position to be characterized by 'rootlessness' — something that 'seeks to present itself as socially and economically programmatic for an aesthetic life as a totality to which art as such is to be subordinated.'

Turning back to Sorokin, we find that he holds that the 'permanent sifting of rural migrants' by the urbanite machinery which employs a process of 'social selection' before the final 'distribution of individuals' as the main cause of a constant flux in the nature of diaspora. In a virtual extension of this argument, as it were, Weber views 'the emancipation' of these migrants 'from economic traditionalism' as 'a factor' which undoubtedly greatly strengthens the tendency to doubt the sanctity of the religious tradition, as of all traditional authorities. Although Eliot does not use such arguments explicitly, one can note very easily the conclusion Eliot might want us to arrive at. Given his pointed references to the changed nature of the Southern society, Eliot's other argument is also worth noting. Taking about the unhealthy link between industrialisation (that has led to the revolting feeling of 'rootlessness') and materialistic philosophy, he argues that the more highly industrialised the country, the
more easily a materialistic philosophy will flourish in it. It may be all right to argue that this will help create a healthy group of people drawn from all classes. What we do not seem to realize as a people is that this will be a group or a body of people 'detached from tradition, alienated from religion, and susceptible to mass suggestion.' It might be safe for us to conclude that this process of detachment and alienation would lead to a state where they can be easily affected by inducements to ideas without any question. The result is chaos of the highest order.

Ezra Pound faults Eliot for trying to treat the sickness of the age on the basis of a wrong diagnosis and irrelevant remedy. Pound obviously saw in After Strange Gods an expostulation which was a distraction from the vital problem of justice ranged against economic disparity. He suspected that Eliot was implicitly advocating for more religion while maintaining a stoic silence about its nature. One would not be off the point in seeing in this a misrepresentation because the charge is not borne out by facts. Eliot's plea for a 'return' to tradition, and to Catholicism does not constitute advocacy for more religion. He is only stressing the need for the reaffirmation of belief, the absence of which had led man to grope in the dark and cling to strange gods. Coming back to the crisis point reached as a result of the fragmentation of society, one finds Eliot warning us against the balkanisation of societies like that of England steeped in their conservatism.
Moving against the tide of necessary social reforms is indeed a very narrow view of conservatism. But conservatism, says Eliot, has not only been 'responsible for the maintenance of orthodoxy' but has also been 'associated with the defence of tradition.' Eliot's suspicion that most of the defenders of tradition are 'mere conservatives unable to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary' as well as between 'the essential and the accidental' is too strong to be bypassed. What seems to him to cause concern is the tendency of his age to turn its back upon strong tradition using the need for progress as a ruse. It is this tendency that he derides. Tradition, he believes, does not mean 'standing still', for it involves the acquisition of 'a historical sense' which implies 'a perception not only of the pastness of the past, but (also) of its present. (parenthesis supplied). More importantly, but with reference to the earlier statement, it is the awareness of 'the blood kinship of the same people living in the same place' which is an inseparable part of the tradition alive in the creative unconscious of a people. Creativity is a part of the unconscious, whatever be the status of its existence. C G Jung states that the personal unconscious 'does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn.' The personal unconscious draws upon the collective unconscious and both these kinds are creative in their functional aspect. Since it is inborn, the personal unconscious links the present with
the past and is a very vital factor in the maintenance of tradition and orthodoxy. The fact that the link stands snapped leads us to the perfidious and the profane. One of the manifestations of this unfortunate occurrence is the growth of regionalism and class structure within democratic societies the world over.

On the point of regionalism, Eliot makes the following statement. Regionalism is given rise to when 'two or more distinct cultures' are inextricably involved with each other. This is something that happens in a nation but 'the concept of the nation is by no means fixed and invariable.' The reasons for this fluctuating nature of the nation depend upon the limited historical period that shapes them and within which they are relevant. Changes may be triggered due to 'specific happenings' and 'our theories of society'. Eliot explains that nation is thus a fluctuating circle and its strength and geographical size is dependent upon the comprehensiveness of a way of life. And culture is for him 'a way of life' though it is interrelated with 'religion' and both of these lead to the 'creation of a society as a whole.' The common/shared way of life of a people constitutes the most important prerequisite for the formation of a nation whose comprehensiveness can harmonise parts with distinct local characters of their own. An essential blend of all hues is of paramount importance. It is to be noted that local patriotism (even communal one) takes precedence over national
patriotism when it is tagged to a distinct tradition. Any element or note of disharmony might lead to local sentiments being roused, especially if there is no 'relative sense of well-being'.

Eliot's farsightedness is evident when he identifies 'homogeneity' of population as the structuring principle of a tradition. Citing the example of India, he states in the manner of a prophet, that 'if there are two (sic) cultures... in the same place, they will either be fiercely self-conscious or become adulterate.' A situation like this leads to caste system among the groups based on distinctions of race. After all as Eliot makes it clear that 'social classes hardly co-exist to-day', we have to contend with the social classes engaged in war with each other and the reasons are mainly socio-economic and political exploitation of one class against the others or a group of classes against another group. And most of the time, economic exploitation of the classes and their segregation along racial lines that generates a class war of the dimension we have been witnessing in recent times. Perceived within the context of religious discrimination or domination, even bigotry and fanaticism, born out of a renewed fundamentalism on all sides, contain the horrendous prospects of tearing the nation(s) apart.
Satellite cultures pose the gravest threat to the co-existence of a people making a nation. When two or more strata or satellite cultures, separate in all respects, exist and become distinct cultures on their own within a larger culture, it is only natural that they would ultimately lead to disintegration. Eliot's warning that religious thought and practice, philosophy and art, all tend to become isolated areas cultivated by groups in no communication with each other needs to be taken seriously. Where is the possibility today of communication when its basic requirements: (1) the presence of Speaker/Writer and Listener/Reader, (2) the intention to enter into a dialogue, (3) the spirit of tolerance and accommodation of other points of view, and (4) the readiness to evolve a consensus, are not met? We have reached the stage of What Hillis Miller calls 'historicism' which is the result of the failure of tradition, symbolic language and the intermediaries between Man and God. Consequently, God is transformed into a human creation and finds expression in the form of the 'Self'.

What this means is quite clear and needs no reassertion. If communication has become so important, it is not because it is just one of the elements of human behaviour. It is so because it is the link between the past and the present.
Conservatism has been associated with the defence of tradition according to Eliot. Besides, it has been responsible for the maintenance of orthodoxy representing a consensus between the living and the dead. Eliot remarks that 'the maintenance of orthodoxy... calls for the exercise of all our conscious intelligence.'\textsuperscript{100} However, Eliot quickly distances himself from the conservatism of those of its adherents 'who have anything to lose by social changes.'\textsuperscript{101} Such a conservatism supports impertinence and blasphemy, for it has nihilistic undertones. Blasphemy results from exposure to a 'diaboli influence.' Assuring us that blasphemy is not one of the charges that he wished to prefer against modern literature, he maintains that the effort or eccentricity on the part of contemporary writers is 'to seek for new human emotions to express.'\textsuperscript{102} Search for newer human emotions, only because they are novel, lead them to the wrong place where they discover the perverse. He explains in \textit{After Strange Gods} that blasphemy is 'a notion dealing with a positive power for evil working through human agency',\textsuperscript{103} for it is 'a sign of spiritual corruption', the parallel being the alarming strain of cruelty as that in the works of D H Lawrence. Lawrence's characters exhibit conscious cruelty, in the opinion of Eliot. Similarly, they show absence of any moral or social sense and thereby betray lack of conscience and respect for moral obligations. That, perhaps, explains his view of D H Lawrence as a heretic demonstrating
the way in which the human agency gives expression to what the power of evil can do. An example of this is also to be seen in Thomas Hardy's works, and 'blasphemy' too is a strange god, even if by implication, in the final analysis.

Literature or, for that matter, any art, in recent times blasphemes, for it is the work of heretics. The reason is that it is divorced from reality while, at the same time, being equally divorced from morality. It is 'a bolus' of secularist writing which has turned away from the dignity of the Church and its moral influence. Eliot reminds us of the broken covenant and, thus, the heretic exposition in the writings of the contemporary writers like D H Lawrence and Thomas Hardy. He remarks:

The LORD who created must wish us to create
And employ our creation again in His service

tressing thereby the humanising influence that art has. Modern man is a victim of the distortion of facts and an artist, who falls a victim to this dominance through distortion, limits his relevance to the present. Eliot tells us that the test of true genius lies in the transcendence of time by the artist which would only be possible when the artist is able to bridge the gap between the past and the present, for 'all time is eternally present.' The past telescoped into the present, as it were, must extend into the future as well. Eliot does not lose sight of this all through his work—both
creative and critical. The work of an artist gains credibility only when he is conscious of time: the role of the past in the present and the likely impress of the past and the present on the future. To him, this is a conscious process, for, as he notes: 'To be conscious is not to be in time.' Time can be conquered only through time and this conscious effort of the artist launches his work into the timeless. A classic takes shape as a result.

The problem we face today is that we live only in time, the 'Is-ness' though it is the timeless we confront. Eliot believes that the man of letters faces a situation which is dangerous both for himself and his readers in this age of unsettled beliefs and enfeebled traditions. Heterodoxy (which is the opposite of orthodoxy) is the result of living in such an age. A strong tradition springs from a strong and abiding faith in the timeless, the eternal and, therefore, the divine. It is the negation of the present through which orthodoxy is sought to be maintained. Orthodoxy, in the words of T S Eliot, is a consensus between the living and the dead, for the past and the present, when they harmonise with each other, give us a reconciliation between the two: thought and feeling. Such a reconciliation can be brought about when we are able to exercise all our conscious intelligence. In other words, the reconciliation between thought and feeling is not what happens in a vacuum. Far from
it. What is needed is the conscious intelligence. Conscious intelligence can only be exercised by an artist who is aware of 'the pastness of the past.' It is the awareness of the past and the present, of the heritage that we draw upon and what is current makes the selection of expression of those experiences near perfect. That is how the past communicates with the present and the present with a future, joining them in a chain-like formation.

It is thus the familiarity with and sense of belonging to a tradition that puts the stamp of greatness on a work. Eliot defines tradition variously. To him, it is 'a matter of good habits', 'a way of feeling and acting which characterises a group throughout generations' (added emphases) and something that covers 'habit, breeding and environment' of the artist. If tradition were only a way of feeling and acting, it is natural to ask as to what makes these the important attributes. 'Feeling' means mental or physical awareness. Also, the idea or belief not based on reasoning. Acting means to perform actions, to behave; when we put thought and feeling together alongside feeling and acting, we get a continuity that is important. Feeling here seems to refer to the fact that the idea or belief is not based on reasoning and acting 'to perform actions, behave'. Belief proper can hardly be said to be based on reason and this, when it is to go hand-in-hand with behaviour, becomes an important factor. Belief proper must be reflected in behaviour but
without any question of using reason deliberately. We shall see how this is so in a greater detail in the following Chapter 3.

Tradition develops from a sense of well-being in a majority of the population, according to Eliot. He goes on to add that 'tradition involves the historical sense... a perception not only of the pastness of the past, but (also) of its present,'¹¹⁰ and must, therefore, be obtained through great labour. (added emphasis and parenthesis). Eliot hurries to add that tradition does not 'solely or even primarily' mean 'the maintenance of certain dogmatic beliefs',¹¹¹ for it includes a great deal more than 'traditional religious beliefs.'¹¹² Historical sense is a perception of the past both in terms of its pastness and its present. The pastness of the past structures the present and the present, in turn, relives and thus reinvigorates the past. This is a part of a very unconscious process that uses conscious intelligence, for in the event of their being otherwise, we would not be maintaining a tradition but tearing apart the past and the present from each other. To allow it to remain at its unconscious level is to use training (askesis) and restraint and also familiarity with the history of man. and, within it, the place that a particular tradition occupies. There is no link-up between this and certain dogmatic beliefs and certainly not between tradition and traditional beliefs.
Dogmatism falls within the narrow confines of a religion and some of the traditional beliefs may not stand the scrutiny of conscious intelligence.

An artist, who does not have roots in a tradition, is a fugitive in the manner of neo-agrarians. But if he has intelligence and the ability to innovate, his relevance within the framework of a tradition gets diminished and becomes limited to the present. His art becomes an example of heresy. The works of Thomas Hardy and D H Lawrence are cited by Eliot as those of the heretics. Eliot opines that heresy is 'an attempt to simplify the truth, by reducing it to the limits of our understanding.'\textsuperscript{113} Truth, in Eliot's scheme of things, seems to be something that cannot be simplified. To reduce it to the limits of our understanding through feeling and acting is to reduce it to the here-and-now. In the attempt to simplify the truth and to reduce it to the limits of our understanding 'instead of enlarging our reason to the apprehension of truth', we end up making it 'an insistence upon half the truth.'\textsuperscript{114} This happens when a writer at his best seeks to mix up his 'profounder moral insight and passion... with the dreary rationalism of the epoch.'\textsuperscript{115} Moral insight and passion in all its profundity, going with dreary rationalism of the epoch, makes it limited to the period of its writing. In doing this, a writer merely compartmentalises knowledge by projecting a half-truth to the detriment of the
truth itself. G K Chesterton (1960: 287) remarks in the concluding paragraph on the importance of orthodoxy in the following words:

... the vice of modern notion of mental progress is that it is always something concerned with the breaking of bonds, the effacing of boundaries, the casting away of dogmas. 116 (added emphases).

Eliot tells us that 'tradition' has been affected in being effaced by the steady flow into the country of foreigners. The implication seems to be that he has in mind the effacing of geographical, racial and ethnical boundaries whose purpose it might be eventually to lead us into what Chesterton implies: a chaotic state.

The effacement of boundaries got further accelerated in view of the development of a scientific temper which registered a phenomenal growth in the present century. The process seems to have started with the newer discoveries and inventions. Man has been torn away from the Community, the Church, the State and the larger family units and this has made him a complete alien within his own settings. He finds the resultant reflection of individuality in the works to be the outcome of a 'democratic streak' which Eliot sneers at in his Notes towards the Definition of Culture. What this democratic streak means to Eliot is the unbridled expression of
individuality. He quotes a 'contemporary liberal practi-
tioner' saying that psychoanalysis has aided the writers by
providing them with weapons to dig into the most perverse of
human complexes in the manner of a surgeon using a scalpel. Writers like Virginia Woolf and James Joyce drew upon the
works of Freud, Jung and Adler to develop a new technique
called 'the stream of consciousness.' The idea was to explore
the individual consciousness of the characters with a view to
analysing their behaviour in a literary work, especially a
novel. Psychoanalytic methodology put in the hands of the
creative literary geniuses something that has shown immense
potential for a better understanding of the human psyche, more
of the 'self'.

Eliot's contention is that any evaluation of a work
or the understanding of the human psyche of a literary period
is relevant only in the broader perspective of a strong tradi-
tion. Since the role of a literary artist is more of a philo-
sopher than anything else, his taking on the role of a surgeon,
is not a very happy development. Exercises of this kind
always lead to the exploration of the perverse of the human
complexes. But writers using these theories and methodologies
seem to be guided solely by their intention of unravelling the
mysteries of human behaviour. D H Lawrence tries to carry it
to individuals by exposing the moral degeneration that has
set in and is slowly eating into the vital parts of our social
consciousness. This, to Eliot, is also a strange god, for he
comments that 'much learning deadens or perverts poetic sensibility.' And the writing of a literary genius must be conscious and deliberate and, therefore, impersonal, for 'the emotion of art is impersonal.' Eliot scoffs at the idea of anything being 'creative' also being 'personal' at the same time.

IV

'Lack of Faith' is reflected in the worship of strange gods. Modern man is virtually a heathen whose only religion is the systematic attempt at the growth of the 'Self' with the result that against the tradition of service to the community, we live in times where man serves his own interests. Our cultural ethos has undergone a metamorphosis and this has affected our lives and culture. Culture is defined as a way of life much in the same way as religion is a way of life. Culture and religion are interrelated and this interrelation, in the background of a proper historical perspective, gives shape to a classic which, in other words, means a mark of greatness or permanence and importance. To be qualified to take the title 'classic', a work must be capable of exhibiting a 'catholicity' which is absent in an age or in a people with 'a limited range of sensibility'; more so, in religious feelings. A deeper religious sensibility would add to the greatness and maturity of a classic. A classic must have comprehensiveness evident in the expression of 'the whole
range of feeling' in the character of the people using the language in which it is written. It must also have a certain universality. The peculiar comprehensiveness of an artist's work is the result of his unique position in history conforming to its destiny. The sense of destiny comes to our consciousness in a classic. Religion and the fear of the unknown from which faith may be said to have sprung have, to a very large extent, shaped our literature from time immemorial.

Modern literature is not 'immoral' or even 'amoral' according to Eliot. It has the 'tendency to encourage its readers to get what they can out of life while it lasts.' The readers are also encouraged to miss no 'experience' and to 'sacrifice themselves only for the sake of tangible benefits to others in this world either now or in the future.'\(^{121}\) There is a visible movement towards the exaltation of the 'self' which, according to Eliot, manifests itself in an unhealthy desire to serve un-Christian gods. Modern literature is the outcome of the confusion of wisdom with knowledge and knowledge with information. But the basic fact we have to accept is that mere information does not help impart any knowledge. Moreover, not all knowledge leads to wisdom, for it must all depend upon the nature of knowledge and information. If an artist seeks to solve the problems of life in clear mathematical terms, he would end up doing nothing. Simplification of such a complex problem as presented before us in the form of life makes the work contingent with the ephemeral. The
work is provincial in terms of the time factor involved, especially when the artist does not have a historical perspective. It is this that is crucial in the evaluation of a given work of art.

Modern literature has a historical perspective that is parochial, for it treats the history of mankind as being merely 'the chronicle of human devices which have served their turn and been scrapped.'\(^{122}\) This parochial view, according to Eliot, is what has torn the present from the past breaking the cyclic motion of time. Thus, 'the world' has become 'the property solely of the living' in which 'the dead hold no shares.'\(^{123}\) He explains that modern literature not only 'attempts to do what has already been done perfectly,'\(^{124}\) (giving it the appearance of being 'traditional') but also (and more importantly so) 'aims at exaggerated novelty usually of a trifling kind which conceals from the uncritical reader a fundamental commonplaceness.'\(^{125}\) And it is in this sense that Eliot talks about orthodoxy and heresy as two streams visibly moving in modern literature. Orthodoxy or the conformity of the artist to a tradition is represented in the works of James Joyce and Gerard Manley Hopkins while the heretics identified are Ezra Pound, Thomas Hardy, William Butler Yeats and D H Lawrence. The heretics, who have a very high degree of education, according to Eliot, can only see some part of the truth because their education and beliefs teach them to doubt the whole truth.
Contemporary Anglo-Saxon literature can be understood easily in the light of what Eliot claims to be the chief clue to the understanding of it. Eliot finds this 'in the decay of Protestantism', 126 of individual writers can be understood and classified according to the type of Protestantism which surrounded their infancy. Thus, he goes on to classify some of the prominent writers as the upholders of tradition and the heretics. The former fall under the category of orthodoxy and they are the ones known for the Catholicity of their thought, traditional training and expression, whereas what binds the heretics together is their strong Protestant background or sympathies. To Eliot, Ezra Pound is an 'individualist and still more a libertarian', 127 who had 'a powerful and narrow post-Protestant prejudice'. W B Yeats, belonging to the Irish Protestant stock, is considered by him as a person in search of a tradition like many others. Thomas Hardy, he opines, seems to him 'to have written as nearly for the sake of self-expression as a man well can', 128 (added emphasis), but the 'self' reflected in his works is not wholesome or edifying. Therefore, the sharpest note and the most scathing criticism is reserved for D H Lawrence, whom he dubs as the most perfect example of a heretic whose lust for intellectual independence and hatred of orthodoxy lies deeply embedded in his heart and work.

Contemporary literature has been corrupted with the task of intense hate instead of love; unkindness and a certain indifference towards strangers (even brethren) instead of a
feeling of amity; the tendency to poke fun at the suffering of others instead of the feeling of piety; contempt for and ridicule of the institutions steeped in tradition like marriage instead of honouring them and strengthening their base; and lastly, the making of the love of money to take precedence over love of God. Could there have ever been a more damning development? The fact that the philosophy of F H Bradley helped shape Eliot's thinking has been fully acknowledged. His thesis on Bradley provides sufficient evidence of this and was discussed in 'Introduction' to the present thesis. Bradleyan philosophy of faith is the result of a fine synthesis between the acts of believing and knowing as those implied in faith. Mere feeling does not constitute faith and, on descending below a certain intellectual level, faith becomes inapplicable. Although knowledge is not excluded from his scheme of thinking, it is seen as falling outside as well as inside the periphery. It is the former kind that is actually brought under purview and is considered to constitute the essence of faith.

As with feeling, so with sense perception. The two, on their own, or separated from each other, do not constitute faith. And perception is not limited to its visual aspect but a totality of all senses involved within the act. Maybe, that is the reason why all knowledge, though grounded in ideas and verifiable in terms of truth and reality, cannot
be said to constitute faith. Bradley makes an important distinction when he notes that 'everything that can be called intellectual perception' (as opposed to sense perception) must be 'external to faith.'\(^{129}\) (parenthesis and emphases supplied). It necessarily proceeds from this that the object of faith is what is innate. When an idea takes shape in our mind, it is not something that happens in a vacuum. Both the innate and the external attributes cohere in order to build the body of faith. The possibility of doubt strengthens it though it is its prevention that may be said to be the positive essence of faith. The doubts must not be resolved on the basis of logical reasoning (feeling?). Their resolution must come from within and this is almost always non-logical in its structure. It is a matter of belief. And the first prerequisite of faith is the identification of one's will with the will of God. One cannot identify with something that one does not trust and hold to be true.

The question of faith is a tricky one. Why does the modern man lack faith? What are the essential features of faith? The Bible promises that since faith depends on belief, one would receive what one asks for in prayer if one believes. Also, having faith means being sure of the things we hope for and being certain of the things we cannot see. Faith is made perfect through actions and means giving up the practice of
doubting God's promise. Trust in God also leads to trust in one's own self and results from the believer's acceptance of God's superiority over His creation. God is pleased when His creation celebrates His superiority as well as does good to others. Love for one another, kindness towards strangers and piety for the suffering is a happy blend of feelings evoked in the believer from time to time, if not always. Faith is affirmed in the honouring of the institution of marriage through a strict adherence to a moral code which forbids adultery and stresses the need for remaining faithful to our mates. We can remain faithful to God by keeping our lives free from the love of money. But in non-conformity with the edicts of our faith, we sin.

Sin is believed, by those who trust, to be the fear of the unknown through incomplete knowledge of the divine. Now, the all-pervading sin in heaven, on earth and in all of man, gets compounded with each violation of the covenant between man and God through violations of His Laws and the bond between man and man. The sin in 'spirit' has made it languish in darkness; the sin in the soul has made man sick; the sin in heart has robbed man of love and the will to do what is right; and the sin in body has made it lose its perfection to disease. Sin results from transgressions and iniquity born of a faith on the wane. Such a phase in life is marked by impatience and intolerance. A faith that is firm is also patient. Faith, according to Eliot, is evident in respect
for (a) religious life, (b) prayers and contemplation, and (c) its practitioners. This is true of all religions. Christianity differs from others in its dogma. The fact of Eliot's acceptance that faith is the same in all religions comes clear in Notes towards the Definition of Culture where he says: 'most of my generalisations are intended to have some applicability to all religion, and not only to Christianity.'

Thus when Eliot talks of an unChristian society, he means one where religious practices have been abandoned and behaviour has ceased to be regulated by reference to Christian principles. Also, one where prosperity has become its sole conscious aim leading to the disintegration of the society.

Every artist needs to strain himself the maximum to acquire the necessary attributes of a tradition. He will need to develop a historical sense which subsumes dynamism -- an intense awareness of the past or a keen sense of history coupled with the understanding of the present. Eliot asserts that no artist has his meaning alone. He will need to be put among his dead predecessors if his real worth as an artist were to be arrived at. Apart from the tradition that his dead predecessors have helped shape, he has to imbue the values that are a part of this tradition. He has to see them both in the context of that tradition as well as in the broader perspective of those of his experiences which reaffirm the content of that acquired tradition which is not an easy task.
A creative artist must have a political philosophy of his own and he must find some kind of a personal affinity with what is existent. Political philosophies, according to Eliot, derive their sanction from ethics. Ethics and the philosophy it approves of, in turn, derive their sanction from 'the truth of religion.' No social organisation can afford to ignore the essential aspects of religion, he avers, and, in thinking this way, he seems to imply that a callous attitude, which disallows such a reality, might lead to the distinct possibility of the destruction of society if not its actual destruction. We need to stick to this eternal source of truth that rests in belief. Fear of God is the corrective element though this fear can be overcome by hope of deliverance that a deeply ingrained faith brings. This is the Truth that we need to accept.

We shall try to relate the structure of religion (not a narrow one) as it emerges in Eliot's work to the structure of his poetics as it evolves out of it in the following chapter. Religion proper is the belief in a superhuman (and, therefore, supernatural) power to be obeyed and worshipped which finds its expression in conduct (based on morality) and ritual (deriving from the canons of faith). It is, in this way, a system (not disorganised or inorganic in its structure) of belief involving a code of ethics. Only when it finds strong projection (neither of the propagandist type nor
scriptural type nor even showing religious devotion of a limited kind) in literature, it turns the aesthetic experience into a universal experience through a process of deliberate and conscious relating. The work or the poetics developed on the basis of this process cannot be called theological, moral, social or, even religious in its content and expression. Being the product of an epistemological inquiry, tied up with an empirical bias, even if it be so in a limited sense, it becomes a poetics of enormous value. For, unlike the Romantic poetics before it, it rejects the idea of fancy and imagination in their very narrow domains as well as the aestheticism of people like Wilde, Pater and Arnold and upholds the truth of the expression of belief in God and His creation. More of this will be discussed in Chapter 3. Eliot's poetics is the affirmation of the place of a strong tradition in the collective consciousness of a people. Hence the rejection of what are the examples of the perfidious and the profane and, therefore, strange gods.
References and Notes:


4. T S Eliot, "Religion and Literature" in his SE, p. 392. Eliot says this while talking about the relation between religion and literature which is 'conscious and limited relating'.


10. T S Eliot, "A Note on Poetry and Belief." In Martin and Furbank. Please see p. 152 of the work listed in Note 8 (above). Eliot explains that he does not mean merely the religious belief.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid.

14. T S Eliot, What is a Classic? (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), p. 11. We shall refer to this as WC hereafter.


16. Ibid., p. 16.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 22.


20. Ibid., p. 32.


30. This seems to us to be what Eliot means. See T S Eliot, *ICS*, p. 63.

31. T E Hulme, *Speculations*: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960). The work was published for the first time in 1924 and was edited by Herbert Read.

32. Ibid.

33. It is in this that Eliot's real interest in Humanism finds reflection.


36. T S Eliot, *To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings* (London: Faber and Faber; Second impression, 1965), p.15. The book, published originally in 1961, will be referred to as *TCTC* hereafter. Eliot says: 'Having myself begun as a disciple of Mr. Babbitt, and feeling, as I do, that I have rejected nothing that seems to me positive in his teaching...' (added emphasis). (*SE*, p. 481). And here is the reason: 'There is no opposition between the religious and the pure humanistic attitude;
they are necessary to each other.' (Ibid., p. 491). Eliot seems to say that Babbitt and not Foerster belonged to this school of thought.


39. T S Eliot, ICS, p. 84.


41. Ibid., p. 38.


43. Ibid., p. 40.

44. Kristian Smidt, Poetry and Belief in the Work of T S Eliot. For other details, please see Note 3 above.

45. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 22.


47. Ibid., p. 25.

48. Ibid., p. 41.


56. The original word is provincial. See T S Eliot, **WC?** p. 30.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.


63. Ibid., p. 35.

64. Ibid., p. 39.

65. Ibid., p. 40.


68. T S Eliot, **ICS**, p. 41.


75. Ibid.


77. See p. 643 of *Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary* (CTCD) 1975, Indian rprt.


79. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*: Answers to The Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon, with Prefaces written by Frederick Engels, Second German edition; (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1892). The copy used is an undated reprint.


84. Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 495. For details, please see entry 82.


87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., p. 62.


94. Ibid., p. 20. Also see Eliot's footnote on Fr V A Demant, whom he quotes to substantiate his point. The two Germanys that lay divided for a long time have merged into one nation. The two Koreas also plan to follow suit.
95. T S Eliot, NDC, pp. 41, 27 and 37 respectively.

96. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 19. Our neighbour, Pakistan, though it has a majority of people belonging to the same faith, has been in the throes of a racial war between the original settlers and the Mohajirs (the migrants who had gone there from India during the partition). Another example is that of South Africa which has a society segregated along racial lines with the Africans of the Dutch origin, who are the rulers, exploit and oppress the natives.

97. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 19. Please see the footnote also.


100. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 29.

101. Ibid., p. 51.


104. T S Eliot, the Ninth Chorus from "The Rock" in CPP, p. 165.


106. T S Eliot, Four Quartets. The reference is to Section II of "Burnt Norton" in CPP, p. 173.


109. See CTCD for the meanings under the appropriate entries.


111. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 17.

112. Ibid., p. 21.


114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., p. 54.


119. Ibid., p. 22.

120. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 27.


123. Ibid.


125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., p. 38.

127. Ibid., p. 42. That would seem to explain the differences of perception between the two as ideological because Pound considered Eliot's effort as a treatment based on a wrong diagnosis, and irrelevant.

128. Ibid., p. 55.


130. T S Eliot, ICS, p. 60.


132. The issue is discussed at length in "Religion and Literature". See SE, pp. 388-401.