'Poetics' has been defined in recent times as "an objective and systematic, or indeed, even a 'scientific' study of literature."¹ It owes a great deal to the influence of 'semantic' poetics that followed quick on the heels of the New Criticism. The analysis of the definition reveals the stress on the 'objective', 'systematic', and 'scientific' aspects of the study of literature.

Firstly, what does it mean to make an objective study of literature? Making an objective study of literature means making the use of a form of literary analysis and evaluation which takes into account factors other than the age to which the work belongs, the life of its author, and other pragmatic considerations.² These provide the bases for the judgement of a work. In other words, the biographical details of an author, or his place in the literary history of his own times are thought irrelevant.

Secondly, 'poetics' is a 'systematic' study of literature. A study is said to be systematic when it is carried out in accordance with a system which is taken to mean an
organized group of ideas, principles, beliefs etc. We can sum up all this in layman terms as follows: A systematic study of literature involves the study of organized group of ideas, principles, beliefs etc in literature. And these change from age to age.

Finally, 'poetics' is even considered to be a 'scientific' study of literature. We use the term 'study' to refer to the process of acquiring knowledge through reading, investigation or thinking. Thus a study can be called 'scientific' only if it is based on the principles and methods used in a science which is a body of knowledge obtained by systematic observation and testing. Clearly, then, a scientific study of literature would seem to involve systematic observation and testing of ideas or knowledge using scientific principles or methods to acquire newer insights into any given problem through reading, investigation or thinking.

Clubbing these various parts of the definition of 'poetics', we arrive at its real meaning. 'Poetics', in being an objective and systematic, or even a scientific study of literature, involves the process of gaining newer insights into problems of life through reading, investigation or thinking. But these newer insights are gained only if the processes identified do not involve details about the artist or the literary period to which he or she belongs. At this point in our discussion on poetics, we would like to pause.
for a brief while and survey very quickly the changes that have come about in poetics in the last twenty-seven centuries, beginning in 750 B.C. when 'classical poetics' was formulated. It is believed that 'classical poetics' held its sway between 750 B.C. and 200 A.D. but the fact remains that it continued to influence art criticism up to the end of 18th century A.D. Classical poetics is easily classified into the Platonic and the Aristotelian versions. The Platonic variety of classical poetics seeks to apply the values of a work of art in relation to its usefulness to life. It is more subjective in nature and uses a criteria based on a moral system to evaluate the worth of a work of art. The Aristotelian variety seeks to unearth the values of a work of art without any reference to its relationship to the other activities in life. It is logical and formal in nature and very objective in its application chronologically, the Aristotelian variety of classical poetics was developed in reaction to the Platonic formulation. And it is the Aristotelian poetics that has provided the basis for the other poetics.

Some modifications that were brought about in the classical poetics, or were seen as necessary led to a new form of classicism. It was recognized as the neo-classical poetics. Europe witnessed the revival of interest in the Greek and Latin classics, especially with regard to their stylistic qualities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Neo-classicism laid heavy emphasis on the fact that poetry should, as a matter
of fact, focus on 'social' man. And this led to the insistence on strict forms and what was called 'aesthetic distance' in order to instruct and delight. In other words, verse forms that were patterned metrically with a regular rhyme scheme were thought to be ideal. 'Aesthetic distance' is referred to as 'physical' or 'psychic' distance as well. It is a term used to describe the effect produced when an experience is objectified in a work of art without any bearing on the personal experience of its creator. Obviously, it involves a high degree of detachment and objectivity maintained by a critical reader in his or her evaluation of the worth of the work of art. It ensures the separation of art from reality. One finds Eliot choosing to use a high degree of 'aesthetic distance' in the composition of his poems.

Neo-classical literature led to the Romantic movement. Romanticism, as a philosophy, contributed to the evolution of a new poetics, the 'Romantic' poetics. The Romantic poetics came into existence in reaction to the neo-classical poetics. It took the stand that man was basically good and it was actually the society which corrupted him. Also, it was based on the premise that the inner man's spirit and emotions were proper vehicles for poetry. Finally, in a sharp movement away from the classicist standpoint, it considered the evolution of a spiritual change that could be ensured by exalting nature over civilization. The interest in nature and not the society led to the involvement of the supernatural in the works of art.
For example, Coleridge's "Christabel" or "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner". The Romantic poetics continued to dominate discussions on works of art beginning the last few years of the eighteenth century and going well into the twentieth century up to 1914. Two terms were specifically thought to be central to the Romantic philosophy: 'fancy' and 'imagination'.

A lot of confusion prevailed in the second half of the nineteenth century with the philosophy of 'aestheticism' gaining ground. Aestheticism or the theory of "art for art's sake" insisted upon the autonomy of art and was based on the premise that a work of art must be judged as a piece of art regardless of any other consideration. We have dealt with it at length in Chapter 4. 'Therefore, to avoid any repetition and replication of our arguments, we would like to go straight to examine the influences. Of course, it was the French symbolists who went a step further. They not only applied the poetics of aestheticism to the work of art but also to its creator. Due to their interest in objectivity and technical superiority in the composition of poetry, Ezra Pound and T S Eliot built their aesthetics on that of the symbolists: Rimbaud, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Verlaine etc. to name some of the prominent figures. One should not forget that the symbolist movement came into existence in reaction to realism as a philosophy. A symbolist is a poet who seeks to express a primordial idea through concrete phenomena. Symbolists rejected sentimentality and ornament and incorporated suggestiveness,
'a medley of metaphors', and music that has a magical incantation, into their poems. Along with Yeats, Pound and Wallace Stevens, Eliot showed ample evidence of the influence of the French symbolists in his poetical works.

World War I changed all this. What is now called new criticism is really the manifestation of a new form of the classical poetics inasmuch as its insistence on the aesthetic evaluation and interpretation of poetry is concerned. This is to be based on a closer reading of the text and its surface complication. It was thought to begin with World War I in 1914. The 'new' poetics of Eliot needs to be seen as an objective, critical view of art. A work of art ought to be evaluated without any reference to the factors related to it. The principle of autonomy being an important feature, it led to the evolution of a loosely-organized set of criteria by I A Richards and others. We shall discuss Eliot's 'new' poetics in the light of these arguments in the following sections.

II

Eliot is the 'Poetics of Faith' if only because Faith, born out of belief, is at the centre of his philosophy. This ought to have become fairly clear to us by now, for the preceding chapters have attempted to show how it is so. We had discussed how the structure of religion in Eliot's critical works lead very gradually to the structuring of his poetics.
We had identified in Chapter 3 the main postulates in this emerging structure. Returning to the argument about Eliot's poetics being the 'poetics of Faith', one finds that this seems to have provided grist to the rumour mills that churned out opinions based on wrong assumptions. It did provide enough support to the views of those who suspected, or perhaps even believed, that Eliot's writings had their roots in religion or theology. In their enthusiasm to look at the works of Eliot's as the product of his religious beliefs, these critics apparently seem to have overlooked the fact that Eliot did not see religion as a separate entity. Religion is for him an important constituent that makes the work acceptable.

The awesome gap of more than twenty-five centuries between Aristotle's Poetics and Coleridge's 'Romantic Poetics' seems to be indicative of how the West remained for a very long time under the spell of the Greek masters. While the present work does not take within its purview Aristotle's Poetics simply because it does not help in reconstructing the 'Poetics of Faith', it can ill-afford to ignore the Coleridgean thesis of esemplastic imagination. It is really this theory that provides the ground work on which the new poetics was built. And Coleridge's theory is seen as an important contribution to the Romantic poetics which allowed freedom in creativity, spontaneity and what is called 'sincerity' It viewed obscurity as a necessary by-product of myth, symbol
Romantic poetics saw a sort of mystic union of the mind with a transcendent reality as the aim of artistic creation. This worked both ways transforming dreams into reality and reality into dreams. Romantic poetics stressed the superiority of creative imagination over intelligence as a spontaneous intuition of truth. Intuition is the key-word here. But this intuition is of an ordinary kind. With regard to 'intuition' in the theory of poetry, one would like to note that it does not equate poetry with the creative act of God because poetry is only the highest form of that creative experience. It differs from ordinary intuition in that it is seen as rising from sensation and is, therefore, active. It is reflected in the oneness of the artist with the world that he or she shapes. Thus, in its poetic variety, intuition is the ability to know directly or learn of something without conscious reasoning. The individual and the universal are identical. One must hurry to add that poetic intuition is radically distinct from perception which bases itself upon empirical knowledge. And it is poetic intuition that creates the world and our living space and time with it.
We have said that poetic intuition is distinct from perception and what Eliot means by his use of the word 'feeling' is, like intuition, not based on conscious reasoning. Therefore, if tradition is a way of 'feeling' and 'acting', then it is clear that behaviour is contingent upon 'feeling' which is not seen as based on reasoning. This is an important point where Eliot's philosophy differs sharply from that of the Romantic poetics.

To return to our observation about the difference between the 'classical poetics' of Aristotle's and the 'Romantic poetics' of Coleridge's is indeed useful. It might appear as if there were a point of similarity between these two poetics. While Aristotle's Poetics is notable for its singular detachment from a religious standpoint, Coleridge's 'Romantic poetics' cannot be said to be based on strictly religious tenets either. However, there is a difference in that although Coleridge's use of 'imagination' is not religious, it imitates the act of creation, the vision of which is religious. In spite of his faith, Coleridge's poetics goes contrary to religious beliefs, for it is not given to Man to attempt, much less successfully replicate, the eternal act of creation. Thus, his is not a 'Christian poetics' although it is a distinctly determined break from the 'classical poetics' of Aristotle's which seeks to unearth the values of a work of art without any reference to its relationship to the other activities of life.
The distinctly determined break of the 'Romantic poetics' from the 'classical poetics' formulated by Coleridge characterised the thrust in subsequent critical systems in the Western thought. And Coleridge's theorising of the distinction between Fancy and Imagination constitutes an important landmark in the history of the Western Critical Thought. It laid the foundation for Eliot's new poetics which differs from it largely on the question of reason. The finer points of distinction that Coleridge makes between primary and secondary imagination, which he identified as the two types that were logical in their relationship, provided the trigger for the new poetics.

Coleridge views Imagination to be at the heart of the creative process. One should like to think that Coleridge's use of the term 'imagination' subsumes among other meanings, the act or power of forming mental images of what is not actually present\(^ \text{12} \) as well as creating mental images of what has never been actually experienced or creating new mental images by combining the previous experiences. By implication, as it were, it brings within its purview a certain resourcefulness in dealing with new or unusual experiences.\(^ \text{13} \) Coleridge identifies two types of Imagination: primary and secondary. He defines 'primary' Imagination as 'the living power and the prime Agent of all human perception' which is also the 'repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation
in the infinite I AM.' (Added emphases). In other words, the aham brahmāsmi of the Hindu Scriptures. 'Secondary' Imagination, according to him, draws sustenance from the former in becoming its echo.1

What this means is quite clear. If Imagination is the act or power of forming and creating mental images of what is not actually present, or what has never been experienced, or what results from the combination of the previous experiences, then it should be apparent that the living power is seen not only as the capacity or ability to act or produce but also as a specific faculty that energizes the whole process. The energy so released becomes the 'prime' — the original, the primitive or the first in terms of time and importance — Agent or a force that produces an effect of all 'human' perception. The phrase, 'human perception' is important. One of the meanings of perception is awareness or the ability to perceive something. To perceive is to become aware of something through the senses. In other words, this might also mean to gain insight into something that one has been thinking about. And because it is 'human' perception, it is a perception typical to mankind or a quality that is characteristic of people in general. To put it simply, then, primary imagination is the act or special faculty of forming something new or creating newer mental images using the original or primitive forces or energy which is typical to mankind through its grasping of the meaning of something that may or
may not be present, or that might or might never have been experienced. It is both an imitative and a repetitive act of the finite mind celebrating the eternal act of creation.

'Secondary' Imagination is more parasitic in nature, for it draws its sustenance from primary Imagination. Obviously, it has no independent existence of its own. It is merely an echo of the former. But it co-exists with 'the conscious will' and, though it is 'identical' to the 'primary' Imagination in the 'kind of its agency', it differs only 'in degree and in the mode of its operation.' (Added emphases). It 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate' as it struggles all along 'to idealize and unify'. (Added emphases). It is to be noted that its vitality lies in its dynamism and vibrance unlike the static quality of what is objectified. The juxtaposition of these ideas leads the reader clearly to the conclusion that the echoing quality is what makes the creation a deliberate and conscious act. An 'echo', by its very nature, has the property of resonance which grows weaker than its original sound before dying down. One feels quite uneasy about this analogy.

Coleridge notes that both types of Imagination are identical in the kind of agency involved, that is, the primitive and the original force that produces the effect. They differ, however, in degree (that is intensity) and mode (i.e., the manner or way of acting, doing, or being) of their operation. 'Secondary' Imagination 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates
in order to recreate' and 'struggles at all times to idealize and unify'. Surely, Coleridge did not have in mind the idea of 'wasting away' when he used the verbs, 'to dissolve' and 'to dissipate' because that is not what is conveyed through his usage of those words. 'To dissolve', in this context, does not seem to mean 'to bring to or come to an end' much in the same way as it does not seem to mean 'to disappear gradually.' 'To overlap' is what the word really seems to suggest or, better still, 'to trace'. One substance dissolves into another, leaving no trace, in order to give a finer blend. Also, one can trace the outline of a form in order to partially recreate it. Since the idea of overlap involves simultaneity of existence of both the object and its image, it appears to be a contradistinction that negates the idea of unity involved in creation through replication. So 'to trace' is what it means in the final analysis.

'To diffuse' means 'to spread out or scatter' a ray of light, and it also means 'a mixing of molecules'. When a plain ray of light is thrown on a prism, it gives out the seven colours of the rainbow much in the same way as a multi-coloured disc, when rotated very fast, gives out only one colour — white. This is both spreading out or scattering as well as mixing of the molecules. In other words, when something is diffused in order to be recreated, the process leads to a better understanding of the original. The verb, 'to dissipate' means 'to disperse' or 'to fritter away'. And
dissipation, as a word used by Coleridge, can only be taken to mean 'to disperse' which also means 'to send away or go away into different directions' — a reaction similar to the prismatic diffusion of the shaft of plain light thrown on it. 'To fritter away' is in the same synonymic range as 'to waste away'. Hence, quite unacceptable.

Considered in the light of this discussion, Coleridge's definition, especially the latter part, of secondary Imagination, gets a new meaning. Coleridge has worded it in such a way as to read: it 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate' while struggling all the time 'to idealize and unify'. When something dissolves into something else, the substance so dissolved leaves no traces but becomes a part of that something into which it dissolves. We have said the act of diffusion may be taken to be bidirectional, as explained above, in that it means both spreading out or scattering and the mixing of the molecules so as to make a cogent whole. Lastly, to dissipate is to send away into different directions as it happens when a shaft of light is thrown on a diamond. It glitters and sends its sheen in different directions. Now, all these processes are seen as taking place simultaneously. 'Secondary' Imagination involves its fusion with the primary Imagination. Since 'Imagination' is the act or power of forming or creating mental images of whatever nature they be, the process is identical to that of filming. The verb, 'to dissolve', when used to talk about filming, means the act of
making two scenes overlap by darkening one picture slowly as another is lightened and becomes invisible. Diffusion involves a process that is bidirectional with the ray of light scattering as well as a mixing of molecules to give a concrete whole. Taken as a single instance of a three-pronged process, these lead the secondary Imagination to overlap the primary variety in such a way that the two become unified. This is how we reach a point of idealization and unification which helps the individual imagination to merge into its universal counterpart. The universal is, of course, the Absolute, reflecting in the collective consciousness of a race.

Coleridge also makes a distinction between Fancy and Imagination. He opines that Fancy has 'no other counters to play with'. It has 'fixities and definites', for it is no other than 'a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space... blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE.' (Added emphasis). Moreover, 'equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials readymade from the law of association.' Fancy has a negative connotation in that, although it means a mental image the same way as 'Imagination' does, it is seen as being 'arbitrary' in nature. And, since it has no other counters to play with, it is seen as having 'fixities and definites'. In other words, if it is fixed, it has a certain permanence about it. When we take this permanence that seems to characterize it with definites, it
tends to become more powerful. For, 'definites' are so-called due to the very fact that definites have exact limits. They are precise and clear in meaning and quite explicit, certain and even positive in their very nature. Again, it is only 'a mode of Memory' freed from all the restraints or influences that the order of time and the space puts/has on them. Such a liberated memory is blended and modified by choice. Since we can choose and pick, we blend and modify the mental images out of the order of time and space through what Coleridge calls 'the empirical phenomenon of the will'. Will is seen as an empirical phenomenon here—something observable or proved through experimentation.

'Will' is the power of making a reasoned choice or decision, even the power of controlling one's own action. It refers also to a strong and fixed purpose — a determination — which subsumes energy and enthusiasm. And, when it is seen as an empirical phenomenon, it is seen as relying or being based solely on experimentation and observation rather than something seeking refuge behind a theory. Also, it is seen as relying or being based on practical experience without any reference to scientific principles. Since experimentation, observation and practical experience provide its occurrence with its very bases, choice plays a prominent part in it. So the will blends and modifies the memory once it is free from the order of time and space. The fixed images, through the selectional process made possible by choice, are shaped. In
other words, if Imagination which is the act or power of creating or forming mental images provides the bulwark of the creative process, then Fancy shapes it and makes it a unique experience. We should like to think that another statement of Coleridge's, which is reproduced here, sheds more light on this phenomenon:

Good sense is the Body of Poetic genius,
Fancy its Drapery, Motion its Life, and
Imagination the Soul that is everywhere,
and in each, and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole.23

There could not have been a clearer affirmation of the central thesis of the 'Romantic poetics'. 'Imagination is 'the Soul that is everywhere; and in each' at the same time which only seems to suggest that the individual and the universal are interrelated. The use of the word 'Soul' definitely gives it a religious connotation. We had pointed out earlier in this chapter that although Coleridge's use of imagination is not religious, it imitates the act of creation, the vision of which is religious.

To return to Coleridge's main argument in his observation quoted above, let us analyse his wording which is important. He says 'Good sense is the Body of Poetic genius'. 'Sense', as a lexeme, is used to refer to the ability to receive and react to stimuli as light, sound etc as well as
feeling, impression, or perception through the senses. 24 'Body' refers to flesh rather than to the spirit, and, figu­ratively speaking, 'flesh' is a reference to human body as dis­tinguished from the soul. And good sense is seen as the body of poetic genius. In other words, good ability to receive and react to stimuli is the physical aspect of poetic genius (ie, one having great mental and inventive ability). Once this is understood, we are told that Fancy is the Drapery of this poetic genius. 'Drapery' is a word that refers to the fabric or textile. In other words, it is the decoration identified by Aristotle, of which music is a part. 25 There is more to come. Motion is the Life of poetic genius or what we call progression, movement, or even dynamism, which is its life-force. The all­pervading Imagination forms all this into one graceful and intelligent whole. If we see imagination as a catalyst, which is what Coleridge seems to be suggesting here, then this catalyst fuses the various constituents of a poetic genius, viz, good sense, fancy and motion to make the substance of what is imagined into one graceful and intelligent whole. It is obvious that the constituent elements by themselves, that is, as separate parts, are quite unintelligible. It needs the cementing force of Imagination — the act or power of creating or forming mental images of what has never been actually experienced or what is not actually present — to unify them. This is the meaning of Coleridge's theory of esemplastic imagination.
T S Eliot seems to differ much insofar as the substance of Coleridge's theory of esemplastic imagination is concerned. The point of difference lies in Eliot's shifting of focus from the esemplastic imagination to what he calls 'auditory imagination' and the primacy he gives to emotion as the structuring principle of poetry. The reason for this can be traced to the fact that imagination is the result of an intense emotion that shapes the floating feelings. This has been the main interest of Eliot's throughout his critical works, and Allen Austin takes a note of it in his essay, "T.S. Eliot's objective Correlative". 26

Coleridge argues that secondary Imagination 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate' as it struggles all along 'to idealize and unify'. Eliot does not talk of any such imagination but his critical writings do contain 'unity' and 'unification' as the key terms which are to be found even in his 'poetics'. 27 The question one would like to examine is whether this similarity in the use of certain key terms has anything to offer. Secondary Imagination idealizes and unifies in Coleridge's poetics but the unification in the finite mind of the infinite I AM is governed by choice. The kind of unification that Eliot has in mind is that of the present with the past. What binds the two in Eliot's poetics is the tradition which subsumes religious beliefs and is seen as governed essentially by religious thought.
We had noted earlier that Eliot's poetics is the 'Poetics of Faith' and Eliot, who tied up faith with tradition, because he saw an abiding faith in a tradition as forming the basis of aesthetics, offered a regimen of rigorous discipline: insistence on the development of thought and feeling as a precursor to the development of taste.

'Emotion' is central to any form of faith and especially so in case of its links with a tradition. Thus emotions and feelings become the points of reference crucial to the understanding and enjoyment of a literary work. This is possible only through 'objective correlative' according to Eliot. And Matthiessen calls objective correlative Eliot's 'locus classicus' of criticism. Eliot's theory of 'objective correlative' is both empirical and the result of a free choice. Unlike Coleridge's 'fancy', which is a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space, it is a concept which is neither temporal nor spatial in nature but is out of the time-and-space continuum. All this in spite of the fact that it has its roots in a tradition and is governed by a set of common beliefs and experiences. Eliot would not quarrel with Coleridge when he calls 'good sense' (born out of taste) 'the Body of Poetic genius'. He might only want it extended to the readership too because they are co-sharers of this genius. Ultimately, it is this common sharing that leads to the formation of taste and the universalisation of the partially personal experience that the poetic genius recreates.
Never the less, Eliot would reject the Coleridgean thesis that Fancy is the Drapery of the poetic genius. This is, of course, the major point of difference in their respective poetics. Eliot would replace the word 'Fancy' by the phrase, 'auditory imagination'. But even that falls short of what Eliot seems to have in mind, and we have identified this as 'received imagination' in Chapter 3. And that is precisely the sense required. Eliot appears to have limited 'good sense' to 'auditory imagination' as well as 'visual imagination' but Coleridge, when he calls Imagination the Soul of the Poetic genius, implies a far greater process. 'Soul' is the non-physical, spiritual or emotional centre true of a person which also means that these are the nobler feelings or instincts. Soul survives even after a person's death. What stirs the soul causes a spiritual or emotional flux as well.

Auditory imagination, based on the feeling for rhythm and meaning, sets the process of a search for 'objective correlative' as soon as one listens to or reads a poem or any literary work that has a musical quality about it. This becomes necessary in order to allow the right kind of response pattern to emerge immediately upon imagining auditorily. This process is a marked one. A chain of feelings and emotions, released by a symbol, acts as an emotional equivalent or correlative of that symbol. Eliot explains it thus:

The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of
objects, 'a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.\(^3\) (Eliot's emphasis)

The last, that is, the third part of the definition seems to cause intrigue. The emotion is immediately evoked when the 'external' facts are given, and these are the ones which have no life beyond 'sensory experience'.

What this apparently implies is that what is 'external' — facts included — cannot go beyond 'sensory experience'. Sensory experiences are, by their very virtue, pleasurable and momentary. They are not long-lasting. 'Sensory' is an adjective that means something relating to the senses or sensation. Sensation is any kind of perception through the senses — the five senses, viz, of vision, audition; and olfactory, gustatory and tactile senses. It is an awareness of a physical experience without any element derived from previous experiences.\(^3\) It is to be noted that this way 'sensation' and 'imagination' are the manifestations of the awareness of some experience: physical in case of sensation and mental, or even spiritual, in case of imagination, both of which involve feelings. We had noted earlier how 'Imagination' refers to the act or power of creating mental images of what has never been actually experienced. If the awareness of the
physical experience does not include what has been previously experienced, and if the deliberate process of culling and creating mental images out of what has never been actually experienced are taken as concomitant or attendant conditions, then it does seem to follow that these are intuited out of the creative unconscious of a people sharing a common tradition. And, quite obviously, they seem to provide the basis for the creative process.

What this apparently seems to imply is that although imagination is the all-pervasive soul, it may not be an intelligent whole. The question of an intellectual response is a tricky one and, in spite of the fact that the need for coherence, cohesion and a certain logicality\(^3\) is not to be denied, an intellectual response may fail to draw upon tradition. Again, one has to contend with another complex question dealing with the difference between a creation and a making. What is made lacks the organic relationship it must have with the maker, whereas creation involves inheritance. The logic of the argument leads us to conclude that what is inherited is the capacity to create something worthwhile by drawing upon a tradition. In other words, this might mean that tradition can be inherited — a point that forces Eliot to lodge a protest. Eliot believes that tradition cannot be inherited but can only be acquired (like language) through conscious effort and great labour.
The observations clearly suggest that the minds of these men worked towards seeking a solution to the problems of creation. Eliot's disapproval of Arnold must be seen largely in the context of Arnold's suggestion of taking poetry as a substitute for religion.

Somewhere in this chapter, we had made a point about the Western Critical Thought and this digression was necessary in order to put Eliot in a proper perspective within the broader parameters of this Thought. One may be tempted to ask what it is that makes Eliot different from his illustrious predecessors. What is new in Eliot is what Brian Lee calls Eliot's 'four brief theories'. He identifies these at various points in his scholarly exposition as 'tradition', impersonality', 'dissociation of sensibility' and 'objective correlative'. We have dealt with three of these, viz, 'tradition', 'impersonality' and 'objective correlative' at least partially in some of the earlier chapters in this work. We shall have more to say about them later. However, it is the theory of 'dissociation of sensibility' that has been left out. In a very well-argued thesis that goes into the writing of his book, Theory and Personality, he writes:

A thorough reading of Eliot's criticism cannot leave one without any doubt that he did suspect — but 'suspect' is even too definite a word — that scientific enquiry and its consequences were the chief source of that 'dissociation of sensibility' he saw his own age... as suffering from.
But this provides some explanation about the factors that went into its making. Eliot claims that the 'dissociation of sensibility' was 'aggravated' by the influence of Milton and Dryden. We shall return to a discussion on this in the following section as soon as we have finished looking into the likely definition of the theory.

Maxwell (1952: 35), although he does not use the term 'dissociation of sensibility', has a very telling passage which seems to shed some light on what Eliot obviously had in mind. 'Dissociation of Sensibility' as well as the other theories we have mentioned, draw their legitimacy from Eliot's theory of 'tradition' which is the focal point in his examination of 'the problem of belief' in aesthetics. And here is the passage quoted in full:

Tradition is the poetic authority because it contains the nature of poetic truth — order and design. By believing otherwise one pretends to see in the heterogeneous experiences which must be composed into order the starting point of the process. The true starting point is an understanding of the nature of the already existing pattern, and a willingness to find a community on the basis of that understanding. In this way poetry finds part of its material in
what is apprehended through two senses only — sight and hearing. These he identifies as 'higher' senses, commenting how touch, taste, and smell are considered to be inferior or 'lower' senses — 'a belief that goes back to Greek Thought'. He observes that Plato closely related the 'higher' senses 'to the workings of the intellect' and this view perpetuated itself in Aristotle, Plotinus, and Thomas Aquinas. He goes on to note how the 'lower' senses were so-called in Platonic-Christian tradition due to their connoting something 'morally ignoble, perhaps shameful' and finds 'the association of touch with sexual activity' as the likely reason. The 'higher' senses being 'distance receptors' permit 'physical distance'. They are more discriminating and sensitive than the 'lower' senses. They have 'intelligible structure' and an 'apparently ... discoverable order in variation'. The 'higher' — sense stimuli abound in 'symbolical' and spiritual significance.

What Stolnitz has to say about 'form' is very revealing. Notes he, 'form is found only when matter, subject matter, emotion, and imagery have been molded by an artist into an ordered and self-contained subject of inherent importance.' At the functional level, form clarifies, enriches and unifies and gives to the work of art 'that wholeness and self-completeness which makes it stand out from the rest of the experience'. Form 'controls and directs' our perception as spectators or readers; 'guides' us in such a way that the
work becomes 'clear, understandable, and unified' to us. It 'arranges the elements of the work so as to point up and vivify their sensory and excessive value.' Its organization possesses 'intrinsic aesthetic value'. Thus, he finds that form is essential because it 'calls attention to certain selected elements' in the work which are vital to our understanding of it. To ensure this, it guides and regulates 'our perception' which is central to our appreciation of the work of art.

Eliot's comment about the setting in of a 'dissociation of sensibility' in the seventeenth century is related to what he calls their possession of 'a mechanism of sensibility which could devour any kind of experience'. This, we submit, must be seen in the context of the discussion above. He makes a statement in the same line of argument: 'They are simple, artificial, difficult, or fantastic'. One should like to think that Eliot is giving us a clue here. The poets of the seventeenth century were not selective in choosing the experience they used in order to write poetry. Their works are examples of 'simplicity' in terms of expression and 'artificiality' in terms of the moulding of their experiences. Their works are, therefore, difficult to understand or fantastic in their overall effect. If they fail to make one experience stand out from the rest, then their work does not seem to demonstrate its
'wholeness and self-completeness' organically. Artificiality is to be understood more in terms of the fact that what is artificial is not a part of a common experience. And both of these together would lead to lack of 'comprehensibility', giving the work of art a certain uniqueness which is dubious in its real value. It may fail to communicate before it is understood.

Eliot notes in his essay on Dante that 'It is a test ... that genuine poetry (like that of Dante's which is extremely easy to read) can communicate before it is understood' because 'Dante is, in a sense to be defined, the most universal of the poets in the modern language.' (Parenthesis supplied; Eliot's emphasis). Uniqueness of expression, then, is clearly a condition that leads a poet away from universality. A strong sensibility, which is not a part of the tradition reflected in the universal, is born and it is this that dissociates the past from the present which is indeed unrealistic. Sean Lucy traces the decline of significance in the history of Europe with the rise of secular humanism, together with the dogmatic and sacramental Christianity in Europe, and remarks that it was to a large extent responsible for the 'dissociation of sensibility'.

His study of history reveals that English poetry gradually lost touch with Christianity and the void that was left by the lost faith was never filled in by any other
Secondly, he observes that a man's beliefs and the beliefs of those around him affect a poet's poetic sensibility. And using the theory on English poetry of those writing from sixteenth century onwards, he concludes that:

(a) The later Jacobean plays show the effect of the decline of morals in society on drama.

(b) Individualists that they were, the Metaphysical poets found their reality in an honest self-analysis and isolated by the very nature of their material.

(c) Milton's artistic vision of Christianity is a feeble nightmare.\textsuperscript{53}

(d) The Age of Reason... has left for scorn the small-mindedness of an age which looked to man's unaided reason to find his salvation.

(e) Man's emotions were next in line for deification once unaided reason failed.

(f) Poetry was then thought to be fit enough to take the place of religion.

(g) The Realists followed seeking a personal artistic integrity after optimistic humanism took over.\textsuperscript{54}

To sum up, by way of a passing remark, then, 'dissociation of sensibility' should, as a theory, be seen as the conceptual manifestation of the growing chasm between the demands of Faith and the changing perception of truth. The result
is a break from tradition and the growth of an unregenerate self both of which are 'strange gods'. Others form a part of our discussion in Chapter 2. Where does all this fit into Eliot's poetics? We shall address ourselves to this question in the following section.

IV

We have called this chapter "Notes towards Eliot's New Poetics". Eliot's poetics forms an important component of the modernist poetics of the early nineties. It has a large scaffolding with 'tradition' at the still centre of the wheel and the other three theories on the periphery, drawing their sustenance from it. There is much in them which has won applause but there have been instances of critics pointing out the contradictions inherent in his pronouncements. Sometimes, the critical opinions have been damaging. Adverse critical comments notwithstanding, Eliot continues to cast his shadow even on the postmodernist poetics. In his essay, "The Resistance to Theory" Paul de Man pays Eliot a very handsome compliment while pointing out that there is indeed 'an ambivalent decorum'. Notes he:

The perfect embodiment of the New Criticism remains, in many respects, the personality and ideology of T.S. Eliot, a combination of original talent, traditional learning, verbal
wit and moral earnestness, an Ango-American blend of intellectual gentility not so repressed as not to afford tantalizing glimpses of darker psychic and political depths, but without breaking the surface of an ambivalent decorum that has its own complacencies and seductions.55

(Added emphases).

The points to be noted are the terms 'ideology', 'original', 'traditional', 'moral' and ambivalent'. Ideology is a reference to the organized system of beliefs or way of thinking of a person or group.

Kenneth Asher, writing on "T.S. Eliot and Ideology", traces Eliot's 'own quest for an Anglo-Saxon classicism' under the influence of Babbitt in 1910-11 by going to Paris and reading first-hand the works of Charles Maurras. It was from these works that he got his first lessons in ideology: the Maurrasian position of 'classique, catholique, monarchique'.56 This became his 'ideological coat-of-arms' dating back to 1913. In 1915-16, he came in contact with TE Hulme from whom he got his second lesson in ideology: 'the irreducible element in the reactionary compound was a belief in original sin'. He learnt that man is innately tainted and anything decent could be got out of him only through tradition and organization. His version of literary history conforms to the contours of political history. There is a submerged connection between the healthy poetic imagination, on
the one hand, and the sustaining tradition of religio-
political hierarchy, on the other. He views the Puritan
tradition from Milton to Lawrence as eccentric, and subver-
sive. Culture and religion become practically coterminus
and distinguishable much like form and content.

Edward Lobb (1981: 142) notes that 'Eliot's real
greatness as a critic lies... in his formulations of moder-
nist aesthetic'. He observes that Eliot's version of
literary history is mythic and, therefore, not open to debate.
But the fact remains that 'the historical myth is in itself...
as much an argumentative technique as it is an idea' and
Eliot had learnt a great deal about the conduct of argument
from the Romantics and those that followed them. The Clark
Lectures, according to Lobb, clarify the relationship of
modernism and Romanticism in Eliot's criticism. He summari-
zes the related ideas in the following words:

1. The value of historical myth as a way of embodying
literary and aesthetic values (cf. Schiller, Keats,
Arnold, Ruskin);

2. The importance of perception by the whole mind rather
than an isolated intellectual faculty (cf. Schiller,
Keats, Wordsworth);

3. The necessity of clear (objective) sight as a means of
avoiding solipsism (cf. Keats, Arnold, Ruskin, Hulme,
Pound);
4. The inadequacy of poetry which reflects primarily the intellect and becomes, as a result, overtly philosophical or 'ruminative' (cf. Keats, Arnold).

The points of similarity of his ideas and methods to those of the Romantics establish for Eliot a place in the Romantic tradition, notes Lobb. But whether consciously or unconsciously used, the mixture of tradition and innovation make Eliot's critical achievement original and profound.

In his work, "To Criticize the Critic", Eliot looks back upon whatever he had been able to achieve so far and that was in 1961. He tries to put his theories in their proper perspective:

... the emphasis on tradition came about, I believe, as a result of my reaction against the poetry, in the English language, of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and my passion for the poetry... of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries... The 'objective correlative'... my bias towards the more mature plays of Shakespeare... 'dissociation of sensibility'... my devotion to Donne and the Metaphysical poets, and my reaction against Milton. (Added emphases).

Only the theory of 'impersonality' has remained unaccounted for in that statement. It might be merely accidental that
three of the four theories were made known to the world in 1919 and the last one came two years later in 1921. In fact, the twin theories of 'tradition' and 'impersonality' became known to us in sections I and II respectively of "Tradition and the Individual Talent". These were followed by the theory of 'objective correlative' in "Hamlet" (later titled as "Hamlet and His Problems") and the theory of 'dissociation of sensibility' in "The Metaphisical Poets".

First things first. We begin by re-capitulating on what we have said in the first three chapters. Eliot's theory of 'tradition' is central to our understanding of his poetics, even if it be so because Eliot takes the overall impact of individual artistic works within the context of tradition. And he proposes this to be a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism. The overall impact of any new work of art created is to be seen in terms of 'the ideal order' formed by 'the existing moments' being 'modified by the introduction of the new'. The only way of accommodation in the tradition is for the whole 'existing order' which is 'complete', to be' altered' and it is only then that 'the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted'. The whole process is seen as the 'conformity between the old and the new' which is ideally and empirically dual in methodology in that if the past is 'altered' by the present, then the present is 'directed' by the past. This, we submit, is 'the historical sense'
involved in the concept of tradition which, in turn, is seen as 'a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but (also) of its present allowing for continuity in the various links in a given tradition. Also, the historical sense makes a writer traditional (meaning, one following a tradition) by bringing about a fusion of the 'timeless' as well as 'the temporal' separately, on the one hand, and of the 'timeless' and the 'temporal' together, on the other.

This might sound as if it were pure polemics but that is something we find only at the surface level.

It is at the level of the deep structure that the real implication becomes clear. The timeless is the mythical time and the temporal is the chronological time consisting of the past and the present. The task of the critic examining this line of argument is to keep that in sharp focus. George Watson finds it odd that the historical sense denies chronology. But does it really (especially the concept of the past being both 'the timeless and the temporal') do so?

Therefore, one agrees with Brian Lee when he comments that this is perhaps only odd to modern historians. An important point that Watson apparently missed is that the 'Idealist—Empiricist Dualism in Methodology',borrow a phrase from Pamela McCallum (1983: 207), which she finds reflected in Eliot's observation about the past getting 'altered' by the present which, in turn, is 'directed' by the past is really problematic. 'To alter' something is to make it different
in details and 'to direct' something means, among other things, to order or command with authority. Now, if the past gets altered by the present, then it only means that the present modifies our perception of the past. But this is not what Eliot has in mind. It is only when we conceive of time as something like a garment that we can apply to this the other meaning of 'altering', which is, to resew, or, as in this case, rearrange in order to get a better fitting. And the present is seen as that which is responsible for it. The present modifies the past in the sense that it only rearranges something that is already there as an ordered whole. Similarly, the present is directed or managed by the past which commands or orders it with authority. In other words, the present modifies the past only to the extent that the unity of the whole is not violated but, even if it is so, the past controls or guides the present. This is the role of tradition. It uses its authority and asserts itself through the present. And that is the meaning Eliot had in mind because he says earlier in the essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent", that if we try not to find isolated instances of a poet's difference from his ancestors, then we shall discover that 'not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously'. 
Eliot asserts in the same essay that 'art never improves, but' also 'that the material of art is never the same.' What is modifiable in the past is not the art because that never improves, and 'the existing monuments form an ideal order' as a whole. What is modifiable is 'the material of art' which is 'never the same'. (Added emphasis). The poet cannot 'form himself wholly upon one preferred period' and his awareness of the fact that, quite clearly, it is not possible to improve art much in the same way as the fact that the material of art is never the same, is the secret of a genuine artist. The ability to go along with the changing mind of a whole people, of a whole civilization which, though it changes, sheds nothing en route, is the meaning of 'individual talent' within the context of a sound and living tradition. Eliot offers us a vital clue here. He holds that 'the poet must develop or procure the consciousness of the past' and 'should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career'. One can find the germs of the concept of a 'unified sensibility' in this argument and this later develops as a criterion in "The Metaphysical Poets" where Eliot talks about the 'dissociation of sensibility' setting in the poetry of the seventeenth century. His insistence on 'auditory' and approval of 'visual' varieties of imagination constitutes the bedrock of his poetics. We have said that Eliot obviously had in mind what we have called 'received imagination' in Chapter 3.
'Received imagination' subsumes both the 'auditory and the 'visual' varieties of imagination and the concept of tradition would seem to give it primacy over everything else. If the search for truth is central to the problem of belief, then it automatically follows that truth would come to mean a particular belief or teaching regarded as the true one. Given this fact, it is quite clear that 'to receive', in the context of this thought, would mean 'to accept as authentic, valid' etc. Eliot uses analogies from the sciences very often and, if we were to use one here, it would tend to give the verb 'to receive' a new connotation. The incoming electromagnetic waves are converted by the receivers in Radio and TV into sound or light, thus reproducing the sounds or images being transmitted. In an analogous situation, as it were, 'received imagination' may be seen as the ability of a poet to receive the incoming revelatory or quite intense spiritual experiences through what are, to Hopkins, the twin processes of 'instress' and 'inscape' into their aesthetic equivalents. This seems to get support (not in the form of the proposition argued here) from Eliot who comments that 'Aesthetic sensibility must be extended into spiritual perception, and spiritual perception must be extended into aesthetic sensibility.' Eliot finds it foolhardy to seek separation of the artistic sensibility from the religious sensibility and vice-versa. This does give the literary tradition, in Eliot's scheme of things, a puritanical streak and, Eliot's is a tradition of puritan art according to Alvarez.
Puritan art celebrates the Divine, for the Thoanistic view holds God to be pure act and believes that in order to seek perfection, man has to rise above (ordinary) act to a state of pure act which is both at once the aim and the product of the Divine Will. Michel Foucault, writing on the 'author-function', looks at discourse (the communication of any experience in any of the two modes: oral and written) as 'an act placed in the bipolar field of the sacred and the profane, the licit and the illicit, the religious and the blasphemous.' Discourse is a form of the logos and it is in this context that Foucault notes earlier how writing (which is a discursal form) 'seems to represent, in transcendental terms, the religious principle of the hidden meaning (which requires interpretation) and the critical principle of implicit significations, silent determinations, and obscured contents (which give rise to commentary).' (Added emphasis). The 'religious principle' in Foucault may be seen as equivalent to 'spiritual perception' in Eliot and the 'critical principle' as equivalent to 'aesthetic sensibility' with the difference being that while Eliot is concerned with the creative, Foucault is concerned with the critical. Now, if discourse is logos as we have argued, then we have it as an act placed in the unified field of the sacred, the licit and the religious, giving us a concrete whole of poetic consciousness.
Working through and within the complex network of meanings, both form and content become constituents essential to a creative work. Both these, getting together, celebrate the eternal act of creation of the uncreated God. The formal relations in a creative (literary) work are not allowed to become detrimental to aesthetic values although both of these, that is the creative and the aesthetic values, are derived from a common source: tradition. It is to be noted that while the aesthetic principles of European poetry derive from the Greek classics, those of the moral or religious writings are essentially Christian. The amalgamation of the opposites, along with the shaping principles of form and content, make possible the creation of metaphors and symbols which are aesthetic devices that help represent the creativity of the uncreated God. All this is a part of tradition. We move on now to the other theories we had mentioned.

The symbols and metaphors are thus the vehicles (as aesthetic devices) through which the creativity of the uncreated God is celebrated. It is this that becomes the 'objective correlative' for a certain experience which, although it has never been undergone by the listener, or the reader, or the spectator prior to that point of time, creates before his mind's eye the images of the Divine. For instance, the suffering of Thomas Becket in Murder in the Cathedral, waiting patiently to be martyred, puts us in mind of the anguished cry of Christ on the cross, moments
before he gave up his body: 'My God, my God, why did you abandon me?'. We shall return to this after some time.

"Tradition and the Individual Talent" is a very important contribution of Eliot's to the study of literature. The essay is in three parts. The first part is devoted to a discussion on 'tradition' and this is used in the second part to develop the theory of 'impersonality' in poetry.

Notes Eliot,

the poet has, not a 'personality' to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. Impressions and experiences which are important for the man may take no place in the poetry, and those which become important in the poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man, the personality. (Added emphases).

This ought to be interpreted in the light of his earlier assertion that

the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material. (Added emphases).
We shall look at the second quotation first. 'Perfection' is an important attribute of an artist, but complete perfection is not given to man. And an artist can try to reach as close to perfection as he can. The degree of perfection he can reach is reflected in the extent to which 'the man who suffers' (i.e., the persona of the artist as an individual) and 'the mind which creates' (i.e., the mind of his own country, the creative consciousness of the race) is one that changes without dropping anything crucial as it goes along. But that is the meaning of 'tradition'. Creativity is not possible if the mind will not digest and transmute what Eliot calls 'the passions', which are its material. Once again, we return to the world of the senses. Audition and vision are 'higher' senses. 'Digestionug involves something that is palatable. For the mind to digest or absorb and comprehend, and only then to change the passion, which is its material, from one form or state into another, a movement of the mind towards perfection is necessary. 'Passions' are emotions which are, by their nature, strong and compelling, like the 'structural emotions'. One should like to think of them as 'structural' emotions that combine with a number of 'floating' feelings that have affinity with the emotion, though quite unevident. And these two combine to give us a new 'art emotion' or what is called 'rasa' in the Sanskrit poetics.
When we conceive of the poet's mind as one that has reached perfection, we shall find that his ability to absorb any emotion, comprehend it, and then change it in form to an art emotion is likely to be imperfect till the time we separate 'the man who suffers' and 'the mind which creates'. That forms the main plank of Eliot's theory of 'impersonality'. There is some degree of transmutation even in Eliot's argument in that the word 'material' (on page 18) changes to 'medium' (on page 20). "Material" is a reference to the substance of which something is made or even to information, whereas 'medium' is the means by which something is done or it is an intermediate thing through which something moves. Two statements call for our attention: (1) The mind (of the artist) will digest and transmute the passions which are its 'material', and (2) The poet has a particular 'medium' to express in which impressions and experiences combine. So transmuted passions are the substance of which art is made and the poet has a medium, an intermediate thing, through which his art, his impressions and experiences, move in a combined form.

The two major points made here are that a poet expresses his impressions and experiences through art in poetry. These may not find any place in his work. An impression is an effect or influence on the mind of someone, maybe, an artist, or feelings and an experience is any event or circumstance which one has lived through, encountered
or observed. An impression is also an image formed in one's mind as a result of something that may have happened. Experiences are not always direct. They may have been lived through or they may have been faced, or they may not have been either 'lived through' or 'faced' but only 'observed'. Impressions are formed as a result of an encounter with or an observation of something. They may be stereotyped or unique depending upon our attitudes.

The Romantics thought of a poet as a creator and the creation in the form of poetry was, to them a medium for the expression of the poet's personality because every poem was thought to be a poet's signature. The classicists, of whom Eliot is a part, take a view to the contrary. The poet, they say, is a maker and one does not expect the qualities of the self in the object of his making. Nor does one expect him to be concerned with morals. And when viewed in the context of this difference, Eliot's idea that the medium of poetry is the result of the poet's transplanting his impressions and experiences, which are never personal, gets additional force. The use of the self makes the poem the poet's signature. It violates the norm and makes the 'impressions and experiences' ordinary. We shall have to keep in mind that the impressions and experiences are a part of the emotions and feelings he gives words to. We shall have to take Eliot's view that the poet expresses emotions, but not personal emotions very seriously. To
I discard it as something unimportant is to turn a blind eye to one of the most important links in Eliot's poetics.

The reason for the stress on the use and expression of emotions by Eliot is simply in keeping with his original argument that the present 'alters' the past and the past 'directs' the present. An 'emotion' is a vital part of one's existence and, to extend the previous sentence to its logical conclusion, we might like to think of an 'emotion' in the present altering the same in its most primitive form which, in turn, directs the present one. Thus, personal emotions are, in a sense, completely private or unique ones as compared to those shared by the community. It is with reference to this that Eliot's argument towards the end of Section I of "Tradition and the Individual Talent" compels attention:

What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.83

(Added emphases).

It is amazing indeed to see how Eliot has been able to give an upward movement to these word, within the higher hierarchy of order. The process is one of continual surrender, self-sacrifice and extinction. 'To surrender' is to deliver
oneself up to the control or powers of someone or something else. This only means that once the process is over, the poet has no control or power over himself. For, he has to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. His present has no meaning of its own. Once the poet surrenders himself, he moves towards self-sacrifice. Simply put, self-sacrifice is a reference to the sacrifice of one's own interests, desires, among other things, for the sake of some other person, principle etc. Interests of our own are primary to us as are the desires. Desires are to be given up for something more valuable because desires are aroused by the 'lower' order of senses: taste, touch and smell. The movement from surrender to self-sacrifice to extinction is what leads finally to the dissolution of the persona of the poet into that of the race of Man and his own race. This way it ceases to exist.

It is illuminating to note that etymologically these three important words lie in the field of epistemology and religious transcendentalism. More so, because poetry is really a matter of images and metaphors which are not merely decorative in nature but are the very essence of intuitive language. And intuitive language is the product
of 'received imagination' which is, in turn, the product of creativity of uncreated God. One should like to think that this is the meaning of Eliot's suggestion that a work of art is to be regarded as an organism, alive with a life of its own. Seen in this context, Pamela McCallum's argument that

Eliot's cultural theory contraposes religious transcendentalism to an empiricised culture which encompasses the whole way of life. But if culture apparently retains its ethical, developmental qualities, the moral impetus now derives from culture's locus as the incarnation of religion.

Seems certainly to make sense. Personal emotions are, in many ways, completely private and unique ones; and an artist's reliance on them, would tend to rob the work of art, created by the artist, of its universality with regard to its experiential component. And, hence, Eliot's insistence that the poet's job is 'not to find new human emotions' to express 'but to use ordinary ones'. It is his business to give expression to what he calls 'significant emotions'. A poet cannot be expected to know what is human and ordinary and yet significant unless he is conscious of the poet. The theoretical basis of 'impersonality' then, lies in the continual surrender, self-sacrifice, and extinction of the personality of the poet to his consciousness of
the past because that alone can give meaning to his work.

The success of an artist lies in his ability to shape his work in such a way that there is definiteness and particularity of language and situation. If the work is dominated by an emotion that is inexpressible and something that the reader finds in comprehensible for reasons like the excess of the facts, then the work may be said to have failed. Since it does not communicate any meaning, its utility as a work of art is nil. But how does one express an emotion that is comprehensible? One should like to suppose that this was the question at the back of Eliot's mind when he developed the theory of 'Objective Correlative'.

The conceptual framework of this theory is to be found in his essay, "Hamlet". To quote from Eliot,

The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative' in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.  

(Added emphases except the emphasis on 'particular')
Eliot uses this framework on Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and finds that Shakespeare has failed to provide Hamlet with any such 'objective correlative' which leads to the failure of the play in artistic terms. It is interesting to see that 'objective correlative' as a theory associates the emotion with 'a set of objects', 'a situation' or 'a chain of events' or, maybe, even all of these together in a cause-effect relationship.

What makes it more interesting is the clause containing details of 'manner' embedded in the phrase 'such that'. If we analyze the clausal patterns: 'When the external facts... are given' and 'which must terminate in sensory experience', we discover that the 'external facts' are linked to 'sensory experience.' We have noted elsewhere that the 'higher' order senses: audition and vision are central to Eliot's theory of imagination and these are seen as linked to the spiritual essence of man. Thus, Imagination is Eternity. Hegel explains:

> Eternity... is not an abstraction... (it is the absolute omnipresence of time, the absolute. Now in all times.\(^8^9\) (Hegel's emphasis).

Eliot says the same thing though, of course, not in the same words: 'All time is eternally present'. Also, 'The Absolute is the Essence',\(^9^0\) according to Hegel, who notes that 'The
Absolute is Idea and due to its nature,

The Absolute determines itself as is determined by nothing outside itself. Its eternal presence is one with its restless creativity.

One might like to add to this another feature. The Absolute is perfect. Man is not. The Thomistic cosmology, which finds its reflection in Eliot's philosophy of art and that of James Joyce's which Joyce calls 'Applied Aquinas', holds man's act to be imperfect. One would not like to labour this point any further because it does not have a wholly direct bearing on the theory of objective correlative.

We had made a point about the spiritual essence of man before our foray into Hegelian philosophy. It is fair enough to talk about the links between the 'external facts' and 'sensory experience'. Similarly, it is educating to reflect upon the 'higher' order of senses that are Eliot's concern. He is particularly interested in 'auditory imagination' which is for him the feeling for syllable and rhythm because it is this that accounts for pleasure. By penetrating below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, it invigorates every word. It sinks to the most primitive and forgotten and brings back with it something hitherto unknown and working through meanings, it brings about the fusion of the old and the new, seeking
both the beginning and the end. This is the internalization and metamorphosis of the 'sensory experience' activated by the 'external facts.' It calls for a commonality of experience, on the part of the reader (or the listener), and the poet, manifesting itself in their shared tradition. And, although a common language might be ideal, it does not come in way of intuition for the simple reason that the rhythm tells it all. Its sheer musical quality ensures pleasure and enjoyment. The meaning of a poem can be intuited in many ways with rhythm acting as the source that resurrects those emotion and feelings which may have already become an inseparable part of the collective unconscious reflected in the creative consciousness of a race, a civilization. Its essence remains peculiar and untranslatable.

Archbishop Thomas Becket recreates in *Murder in the Cathedral* a world of new experience by tracing the passion and suffering of Christ on the cross. This is, of course, the structural or significant emotion in the play and 'the significance of the action' is reflected in the 'emotion' of the Chorus compelled by their sympathy for Becket to suffer and consent to eternal patience. 'The natural fear' of the Chorus 'at Becket's death' is reflected in their nightmare 'Nature is being made to answer an idea... which is... the horror and terror of an existence separated from God', notes Moody (1980: 172), observing that it is
Eliot sums up the whole of the action by commenting that a man comes home with the clear knowledge of his certain death through killing and he is indeed killed. Although we may not have undergone a certain experience as readers, the meaning of the emotion becomes the 'objective correlative' of such an experience, perhaps, through the commonality of a shared tradition. We must check for ourselves to ascertain whether this would fit into the theory. To repeat what we had said in one of the earlier paragraphs,

... when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.

What are the external facts given in *Murder in the Cathedral*? Archbishop Becket returns from a self-imposed exile in France in the full knowledge that he would be killed and he is ultimately killed. The Chorus, consisting of the women of Canterbury, give expression to their natural fear at Becket's death. How do the readers/spectators discover that the same emotion is evoked in them? The facts, we mentioned earlier, terminate, or rather must terminate in sensory experience. What seems happen is that the 'higher' order sensors absorb these facts and convert the incoming verbal images received at the conscious levels of thought and feelings, penetrating to the most primitive and forgotten
before rising up once again and bridging the gap between the past and the present. No reader/spectator will be able to do this unless he has had good training in sensory perception or is steeped in a tradition.

It must be understood that every emotion has its 'objective correlative' and this is really the objective equivalent of the emotion. The objective correlates are objectified elements with the help of which the poet expresses 'emotion in the form of art'. For the poet, these might be symbolic representations made in the form of imagery and metaphors. Says Eliot,

The poet's mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present there.99

The person, who enjoys it, does so as an entirely different experience in comparison to what he had already known. The poet's mind can unite all the particles into a new compound but that is possible only through 'the intensity of the artistic process', which Eliot calls 'the pressure', that the fusion can be brought about. There is another important observation of Eliot's:

Great variety is possible in the **transmutation** of emotion; the murder of Agamemnon... (wherein)
the artistic emotion approximates the emotion of an actual spectator (is an example)...

(Added emphasis and parentheses).

This contains the germs of 'objective correlative' developed later the same year although the observation is made in connection with the theory of impersonality. The transmutation of emotion makes for great variety in emotion but that is really not a question insofar as the objective correlative is concerned. Eliot returns again and again to the point of a commonly shared tradition which would allow the poet's expression of emotion by finding the objective correlative and the evoking of the emotion in the reader/spectator on the basis of external facts. The 'artistic emotion' approximates the 'evocated emotion', to coin a new phrase, because the response evoked represents the 'emotion of an actual spectator'. To 'evoke' is to call up from or awaken in the mind something before drawing it out; whereas to 'evocate' is to call up from the dead. The two are virtually one and the same, for, to 'evocate' also means to 'evoke'.

Logically speaking, 'the intensity of artistic process' is apparently assumed to be a quality placed in the bipolar field of the living and the dead, of the orthodoxy and the heresy, or, of the intersection of time and eternity, and works two ways approximating the 'artistic emotion' with
the 'evoked emotion'. The artistic process of embedding is to be seen at work. In a piece of dramatic discourse, there is

... the structural emotion, provided by the drama. But the whole effect, the dominant tone, is due to the fact that a number of floating feelings, having an affinity to this emotion by no means superficially evident, have combined with it to give us a new art emotion. 102

(Added emphases).

Attention is drawn to the phrase 'the whole effect' which is the result of 'a number of floating feelings' that have an affinity to the structural emotion. Affinity is a word that refers to the natural or fundamental relationship, especially of common origin. What this affinity really means is that 'the intensity of artistic process' involves a fine blend of the structural emotion and the floating feelings related to it in order to give us a new 'art emotion'.

The Sanskrit equivalent for 'art emotion' is, as we have said, 'rasa'. When Eliot talks about structural emotion and floating feelings, he seems to have something similar to what are called the sthayibhava (ie permanent, basic or latent emotions) and vyabhicaribhava (ie transitory mental states) in the Sanskrit poetics. It is, of course, true that the Western thought differs a lot from the oriental
thought. However, since we know that Eliot had studied Sanskrit and had especially done a lot of reading on Patanjali's metaphysics under Charles Lanman and James Wood, one might argue that he must have read about the theory of rasa. The influence of the Hindu Scriptures on him with reference to *The Waste Land* and some of his other works is too well-known to merit repetition.

We have argued that 'structural emotion' and 'floating feelings' approximate 'sthayibhava' and 'vyabhicaribhava.' According to Raniero Gnoli (1968: XV), the sthayibhava are composed of 'eight fundamental feelings, instincts, emotions or mental states.' Gnoli goes on to explain that

These eight bhavas... do not appear in a pure form... (but each of them) appears in association with other concomitant mental states...

These mental states are transitory in nature and are thirty-six in number. To go with sthayibhavas, there are eight rasas. Similarly, there are vibhavas (ie determinants or the stimuli that activate an emotion) and anubhavas (ie the external manifestations of the emotions evoked by the vibhavas or what may be loosely translated as experiences). One need not be an expert in Sanskrit poetics to be able to see
the parallels between the theory of *rasa* as a part of the larger theory of *bhava* propounded by Bharata in his *Natyasastra* and the theory of 'objective correlative' proposed by Eliot. The *vyabhicaribhavas*, along with the *vibhavas* and *anubhavas*, are given rise to when the *sthayibhava* and the *rasa* 'are not part of real life but are (the) elements of poetic expression'. This comes closer to Eliot's theory of 'objective correlative'.

Howarth (1965: 202) mentions two very specific instances of Eliot's explicit incorporation of his memories of his reading in Sanskrit literature: (1) the final section of *The Waste Land* (*What the Thunder said*): Datta, dayadhvam, damyata; and (2) the middle section of "The Dry Salvages" with its dramatic allusion to Arjuna's dilemma, as examples. Howarth uses these to observe that:

> they bestow on English something no other writer has given: dramatic material from the Sanskrit tradition, and presumably a tincture, at least, of the style and sensibility of the works on which they depend. (Added emphasis):

Need we say more? One more point must however, be made before we move on. Howarth muses that 'The two years devoted to it (the study of Early Sanskrit Literature) probably did
much to foster Eliot's conviction that ritual was the beginning of art and must remain a living power in art.\textsuperscript{110} (Parenthesis supplied; emphasis added). Of course, Eliot's creative and critical writings do stand testimony to this assertion. However, the theory of 'objective correlative' is not only derived from the Sanskrit poetics but also from the French symbolists\textsuperscript{111} — indeed in the reverse order chronologically. And this brings us to his fourth theory, ie 'Dissociation of Sensibility'.

T S Eliot introduced this term along with the other, which he called 'unification of sensibility' into the discussion of English literary history in an essay written in 1921 titled, "The Metaphysical Poets". 'Sensibility', as a concept, refers simply to the artistic faculty found in every poet and Eliot brings it closer to intellect in that he seems to include in it the ability to resist intellectually against generalization.\textsuperscript{112} Hulme's Speculations contains an illuminating analysis of Bergson's general philosophical position. Notes Hulme (1960: 146) that, this is 'the conception of reality as a flux of interpenetrated elements unseizable by the intellect'.\textsuperscript{113} More so, because art is a more direct communication of reality. And Eliot's theory of 'dissociation of sensibility' refers to a 'dissociation' between the intellect and the senses. Eliot opines that the early seventeenth century poets were learned men schooled in the tradition of Dante. They had a 'mechanism
of sensibility*, which may also be called the 'unified sensibility', which allowed them to have 'direct sensuous apprehension of thought' for they saw 'thought' and 'feeling' as being fused. The disassociation of sensibility led to the refinement of language but a crudeness of feeling.

In Eliot's scheme of things, 'To express precise emotion requires as great intellectual power as to express precise thought.'¹¹⁴ Also 'feeling' becomes a synonym for 'sensibility'.¹¹⁵ But that is indeed only a partial meeting of the requirements. For instance, Eliot argues in his work, What is a Classic? What one of the signs of the movement towards a classical style is the complexity of sentence structure. But even that is a half-way house. Complexity is meaningless if it does not lead to 'the precise expression of finer shades of feeling and thought', on the one hand, and 'the introduction of a greater refinement and variety in music.'¹¹⁶ Preciseness of expression calls for a rigorous training and discipline. It is not enough for a poet to be learned.

What is a classic? was published in 1944 and the following year, Eliot published his essay, "The Social Function of Poetry". The first function of poetry in any society, says, Eliot, is that 'it has to give pleasure' through understanding and enjoyment, the communication of something new, or some understanding of the familiar, or the expression
of what has been experienced. Thus it is the communication, understanding, or expression that 'enlarges our consciousness or refines our sensibility'. Eliot argues that 'poetry has primarily to do with the expression of feeling, an emotion' in particular and 'thought' in general. Just as art never changes but the material of art is never the same, 'A thought expressed in a different language may be practically the same thought but a feeling or emotion is not the same'... It is not as if Eliot were pleading that poetry have no content or meaning. Far from it. The most conscious expression of feelings of the people sharing a common language and culture is in the poetry of their own language. This leads one back to the theory of tradition. Now, if poetry is 'the most conscious expression of the feelings of the people', then, through extension and improvement of his language, he helps change the feeling by making it more conscious. It is to be noted that the gradual changes working up into the language and development of sensibility influence others and it is, thus, that 'the dead remain alive' through the living authors a return to the argument in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent'. And Eliot's theorising on tradition led him to conclude in Notes towards the Definition of Culture (1948) that 'there is a common element in European culture, an interrelated history of thought and feeling and behaviour, an interchange of arts and of ideas'.


'Thought' is a part of our consciousness and one arrives at it through reasoning and deliberation. It is related to ideas. 'Feeling' is the consciousness of pleasure or pain. It is expressive of great sensibility or tenderness. Eliot finds in the two important terms an interrelated history of thought and feeling and behaviour as the common element in European culture. One finds it interesting to see how Eliot clubs even behaviour with thought and feeling. He calls this element 'an interchange of arts and ideas'. In other words, an interchange of the application of the practical skill which is guided by principles, and of the image created in the mind of an external object which is the product of intellectual action. The process of the changing of the ideas into the arts is, of course, the process of change of a sensibility of any one kind into aesthetic sensibility. A unified sensibility is the opposite of a dissociated sensibility wherein one finds thought and feeling divorced from each other. It is the unified sensibility which provides the proof of culture and tradition being alive. The problem of belief that we are faced with today is the result of man's alienation from his own people.

To conclude, then, Eliot's conceptualisation of the theory of tradition posits the general and the universal, both of which are at the still centre of the wheel of time, and are got at through the peripheral placement of values,
all moving simultaneously towards the centre. Their merger into the centre is the point of perfection. Donoghue finds this attainment of perfection presumably to be the moment of incarnate thought. Simonson (1971: 128) sees in the simultaneous movement towards the centre or perfection the movement leading to the loss of history into aesthetics. This is the essence of the theory of 'impersonality'. And the merger of the emotive or the affective factor and the cognitive or the objective factor belief is the 'synaesthesia' of thought and feeling — that is the volitional and emotive aspects of faith, which are their equivalents. A unified sensibility alone can ensure this. Only when the reader shares the thought of the artist and finds emotions similar to those that the artist might have had in mind does one understand and enjoy a work of art.
References and Notes:


3. For a principle to become acceptable in a 'scientific' study, a lot of empirical evidence in support of it is required. Such evidence usually comes to light after thorough scrutiny and experimentation. Thus, the process in a study of this kind is seen as one involving 'testing', 'observation', 'testing' and 'confirmation'.


5. The term 'aesthetic distance' appears to be closer to the Keatsian doctrine of 'negative capability' than it does to Eliot's theory of 'objective correlative' which only shares certain features with the term 'aesthetic distance'.

6. Our discussion of this forms a part of what we have evaluated and discussed in chapter 4 of this work titled "Religious Literature and Pure Literature".

7. For example, Wallace Stevens' "The Planet on the table", "The River of Rivers in Connecticut" or Portions from his early poems under "Blanchey McCarthy", all of which
are examples of what is called 'transcendental imagination' through 'synaesthesis'.

8. 'Faith' is used as a broad term and should not be seen as limited to theology alone. Faith is the ultimate destination or the focal point of one's belief in something. Fei-Pai Lu makes a very pertinent remark about 'Belief' in the critical works of T S Eliot which as Lu notes, 'has been discussed as the material of art, as the poet's of view, and as the reader's understanding'. (Added emphases). This is a clear configuration of the material of art, the poet's point of view and the reader's understanding all of which work towards the still point of the wheel and lead to a unified sensibility. For the quote, please see Fei-Pai Lu, T S Eliot: The Dialectical Structure of His Theory of Poetry (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979 rprt), p. 28. The title was originally published in 1966. It is interesting to read Raneiro Gnoli's comments on 'the tenor of two stanza's' from Bhatta Nayaka quoted by Mahimbhatta. Gnoli observes: 'The religious and the aesthetic experience spring from the same source'. See Raneiro Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience according to Abinavagupta (Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, second edition, 1968), p.XXVI. Gnoli's work was originally published by ISMEO, Rome in 1956. The observation of Gnoli's lends weight to what Eliot believed about 'aesthetic experience' and 'belief'.

9. The 'dialectics of becoming' is associated with the Romantic critics who looked at art as something made by a maker. The classical poetics was concerned with the 'perfection of being' — an ordered whole— because art was seen as an imitation of life.

10. See CF Terrell, The Bone on the Beach: The Meaning of T S Eliot's Symbols. An unpublished Doctoral Thesis (New York University, 1956). In Dissertation Abstracts, 1959, p. 3310: "The heart of mysticism is the timeless moment of illumination in which the total being is bathed in direct experience of God. The mystic moment transcends the time-space continuum and becomes an illumination of Eternity and Infinity: paradoxically it is all at once all-time and no-time, or all-space and no-space.

Exaltation in mystic experience of God, despair in the loss of God, hope in refinding God and the state of spiritual inanition which comes from 'the death of hope and despair', are all fragments of Eliot's own intense experience: an experience which illuminates Western culture as well as the race of man."

11. We have in mind what Coleridge tries to do in "Kubla Khan", a dream fragment, as he put it. The 'I' of the poem would build in the air 'that done' and 'those caves of ice' if only the symphony and song of the Abyssinian maid could he 'revived within' himself. And, in so doing, replicate what the great Mongol emperor had
decreased: the building of 'a stately pleasure-dome'
— 'a sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice'.

12. But that is something which can only be felt according to Eliot.


15. Ibid.

16. One finds in this similarities with what Frederico Garcia Lorca calls 'Duende'. The only difference is that 'duende' is something that is only experienced.


18. Please refer to 11 above. Becket's attempt is also one that involves the tracing in the footsteps of Christ. If 'secondary' imagination is the echo of the 'Primary' imagination, it dies down gradually in a kind of process that replicates 'dissolution' of something into something else. This is quite interesting indeed.

19. For example, like sugar, or salt dissolves in water.

20. An instance of this kind can be seen in T S Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral. Archbishop Thomas Becket goes
through all the paces of Christ before him, leading to his crucifixion. In his own words, then,

I am a priest,
A Christian, saved by the blood of Christ,
Ready to suffer with my blood.
This is the sign of the Church always,
The sign of blood. Blood for blood.
His blood given to buy my life,
My blood given to pay for His death,
My death for His death.

See T S Eliot, CPP, pp. 274-5. And Thomas Becket says towards the end of the first Act:

I shall no longer act or suffer, to the sword's end.
Now my good Angel, whom God appoints
To be my guardian, hover over the swords' points.

Please refer to the same work, CPP, p. 259. The scenes of Christ's suffering, overlap with those of Becket's so much so that the two become almost synonymous, ie one and the same. It gives us a feeling as if all the martyrs assert their immortality from their tombs. Becket is a martyr joining the ranks of the other martyrs. He is one martyr and all the martyrs at the same time.


26. The reference is to Allen Austin's article of that title appearing in the University of Kansas City Review, Winter, 1959, p. 139.


29. T S Eliot, "Dante", *SE*, p. 243. Eliot, however, talks about 'auditory imagination' invigorating every word, working its way through meanings leading to the fusion of the old and obliterated and the trite; the current and the new and surprising. Here is a fine example from "East Coker" (II) of Four Quarters:

    ....... There is, it seems to us, 
At best, only a limited value
In the knowledge derived from experience.
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies,
For the pattern is new in every moment
And Every moment is a new and shocking
Valuation of all we have been. (*CPP*, p. 170).
Another example, also from the *Four Quarters* is in "Little Gidding" (V) (See CPP, p. 197):

The common word exact without vulgarity,
The formal word precise but not pedantic,
The complete consort dancing together...

It must be clearly understood that both auditory imagination propounded by Eliot and the received imagination, which seems to be implied by him, are not free in the sense that Coleridgean Imagination is. They depend upon language and religion which sustains them, instead of being autonomous and spontaneous.


32. See Fei-Pai Lu, *T.S. Eliot: The Dialectical Structure of His Theory of Poetry*, p. 16. Says Lu: 'In Eliot's Critical system, the dialectical principle of Unity appears in turn as principles of Correspondence, Coherence, and Comprehensiveness.' This would obviously include logical structure.


34. Sean Lucy, *TSE & IT*, p. 139. For instance, Eliot's views on the nature and necessity of music or rhythm in poetry have their parallels in Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*.

'intuitive' rather than 'logical' understanding in this case.

36. One gets this uneasy feeling due to Eliot's borrowing', though unconscious, of Coleridge's idea of creativity. However, since the dialectics of becoming is seen as being in the classical poetics, Eliot, perhaps, wanted to strike a balance between the two. A creation that fails to reach perfection in becoming one with the Absolute is clearly unacceptable.

37. Sean Lucy, TSE & IT, pp. 30-1.


39. Ibid., p. 80.


42. Ibid., p. 224.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 225.

45. Ibid., p. 226.

47. James Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism..., p. 227.

48. Ibid., p. 236.


51. Sean Lucy, TSE & IT, p. 90.

52. Ibid., p. 92.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.


57. Ibid., p. 901.

60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 137.
65. Pamela McCallum, Literature and Method: Towards a Critique of I.A. Richards, T.S. Eliot and F.R. Leavis (Goldenbridge, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1983). Also published simultaneously by Atlantic Highlands, NJ. Humanities Press. The relevant section in Chapter 8 is titled 'Problems in Methodology'.
66. One of the meanings of 'to alter' as given in D B Guralnik (Ed), WNWD, p. 21.
68. Ibid., p. 16.
69. Ibid., p. 17.
70. D B Guralnik (Ed), WNWD, p. 802.
71. We can think of the parallels this has with Frederico Garcia Lorca's concept of 'Duende'. Lorca expounded on the "Theory and Function of the Duende" in a lecture he delivered in Havana and Buenos Aires. He says: 'All the Arts are capable of possessing duende, but naturally the field is the widest in music, in dance, and in spoken poetry, because they require a living body as interpreter..." (Lorca's emphasis). Lorca defines it as being a matter of 'creative action'. See pp. 132 and 127 of a Collection of Lorca's poems and his talk on 'Duende' titled Lorca by J L Gili who has selected and translated the Collection for Penguin Books (Harmondsworth, 1965 rprt). The book was originally published in 1960. Also see p. xvi of "Introduction".


73. Quoted by D E Jones. For details see No. 74.

74. Please refer to D E Jones, The Plays of T.S. Eliot (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 75. It is to be noted that the process is never unconscious but vigilant and critical all the time.


See The Bible: Matthew, 27.45 and Mark 15.33. Christ is reported to have cried out: 'Eloi, Eloi lema sabachthani?' which they have translated as 'My God, my God, why did you abandon me?'


The changes, however, make for an interesting study in Eliot's dialectics.

Edward Lobb uses some of the similarities of views and methods of Eliot's which he shared with the Romantic critics in order to suggest that Eliot was the last of the Romantic critics. See Edward Lobb, T.S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition, p. 137.

There is an important observation made by David Morse who says, 'Romantic poetry is incompletely grasped under the rubric of the elevation of feeling over reason,


88. T S Eliot, "Hamlet", *SE*, p. 145


91. Ibid., p. 152.

92. Ibid., p. 153.


100. Ibid.

101. The 'dead' apparently becomes a metaphor for the 'past' in this context. See A M Macdonald (Ed), *CTCD*, p. 453.

103. Raneiro Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta. For details, see 80 above.

104. Ibid., p. xvi.

105. R L Singal, Aristotle and Bharata: A Comparative Study of their Theories of Drama (Hoshiarpur: Vishvesvaranand Vedic Research Institute, 1977), pp.41-42.

106. Raneiro Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta, p. xvi.

107. We would like to support Herbert Howard's suggestion someone with a sound knowledge of Sanskrit poetics should make a close study of the similarities between Eliot's poetics and the Sanskrit poetics. (See pp.201-2 of Herbert Howarth, Notes on Some Figures Behind T.S. Eliot). It would prove to be a unique contribution to Eliot studies.


109. Ibid.

110. Ritual belongs to both structure and texture of Murder in the Cathedral according to C R Visweswara Rao, "Murder in the Cathedral: The Image of the Turning Wheel

111. They had argued that poetry cannot express emotion directly, for emotions can only be evoked. See W K Wimsatt, Jr and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A short History (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1959 rprt), p. 667. In fact, the whole of Chapter 29 of the book is informative.


113. T S Hulme, Speculations, p. 146.


118. Ibid., p. 19.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., p. 20.

121. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

122. T S Eliot, NDC, p. 119.


Also, see "The Dry Salvages" (II) in *Four Quarters* (T S Eliot, CPP, p. 187):

... ... ... ... ... I have said before
That the past experience revived in the meaning
Is not the experience of one life only
But of many generations — not forgetting
Something that is probably quite ineffable:
The backward look behind the assurance
Of recorded history, the backward half-look
Over the shoulder, towards the primitive terror.

125. This term was coined by C K Ogden and James Wood and was used by I A Richards. The word means 'to feel or perceive together' in the context of what is known as 'sense transference'. 'Sense transference' refers to the translation of a physical sensation from one sense into another. It is reflected in the works of Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Keats and Stevens. See Myers and Simms, *The Longman Dictionary of Poetic Terms*, p. 299.