Gerard Manley Hopkins and James Joyce are two of the important writers who have won the approval of Eliot as the upholders of faith. It is interesting indeed to see how Eliot brings the two together: One (i.e., the former) is an 'English nature poet'\(^1\) with devotional bent of mind, and the other is 'the most ethically orthodox of the more eminent writers'\(^2\) of Eliot's time. According to the classification he has made, they fall in the category of those who have been able to maintain orthodoxy in their writings. Eliot defines orthodoxy as something that represents 'a consensus between the living and the dead'\(^3\) or the 'past' (the dead) and the 'present' '(the living) getting together 'to give us a reconciliation of thought and feeling'.\(^4\) (Added emphasis). Moreover 'orthodoxy' implies to Eliot 'a Christian orthodoxy'. We had quoted Eliot, in the earlier chapter, on the question of heresy, or heterodoxy, which is to him the opposite of orthodoxy. To recapitulate that argument very briefly, heresy was defined as 'an insistence upon half of the truth' or 'an
attempt to simplify the truth by reducing it to the limits of our ordinary understanding. What it is not thought to be doing is to enlarge 'our reason to the apprehension of truth'. The word, 'apprehension', has two important meanings among others: (1) grasping the meaning of something, and (2) anticipating something with fear and anxiety.

Given the fact that Eliot chooses his words very carefully, it would not be wrong to find in his use of the word, 'apprehension', a finer combination of both the meanings cited above. It is the grasping of the meaning of something that puts us in the state of anticipation of (the results of a given action through the feelings of) fear and anxiety out of a sense of the wrong and the sinful that it might involve. To maintain a semblance of unity, a certain equipoise, it is necessary to bring together the past and the present in order to work out or ensure 'a reconciliation of thought and feeling'. Thought and understanding go together. We are said to have understood something only when we have grasped its meaning. Once we have understood the meaning, we experience both fear and anxiety in anticipation of something by way of a natural reaction and it is in this sense that Eliot looks at 'the maintenance of orthodoxy' as 'a matter which calls for conscious intelligence'. At the literal level, 'intelligence' involves the ability to understand, reason and learn to adapt to newer situations as well.
'Conscious' means both awake in terms of the faculty of senses and deliberate. If, as Eliot holds, orthodoxy 'is realised in one's thought', then it follows that it is the outcome of one's awareness and a deliberate effort at reasoning, understanding and adapting. 'Thought' (as a noun) refers to (1) the act or process of thinking, (ii) the result of thinking, (iii) intention, (iv) expectation, (v) care, (vi) concern, (vii) the ideas or ways of thinking of a particular time, place, group etc.

In other words, 'thought' seems to have multiple layers of meaning. To be an act or process of thinking is its functional aspect as much as its meaning is said to be the result of thinking. On the other hand, it is a reference to intention, expectation, care, and concern which gives it its contextual aspect. And the contextual aspect has an underlying volitional principle which makes it very similar to 'belief'. Lastly in referring to the ideas or the ways of thinking, within the context of time, place, group etc, it brings it within the purview of a culture and also what is broadly defined as tradition. One would not fail to see in this the interrelationship inherent in the terms 'thought', 'culture' and 'tradition', with each reaching out to and merging into the other. Eliot's definition of culture as 'a way of life' and his definition of tradition as 'a way of feeling and acting' that he finds to be characterising
'a group throughout generations' can be seen as the vital clues pointing in this direction. Moreover, his comment that orthodoxy calls for 'conscious intelligence' goes well with his other comment that 'A tradition without intelligence is not worth having'. Thus, the common factor, 'intelligence', present in both, is crucial to Eliot's poetics. Now, if intelligence does involve the ability to understand, reason and learn to adapt, it obviously implies a conscious process. And what is conscious is also what is the result of awareness and deliberation. It follows from this that 'thought' shares the same kind of connotation which Eliot sees in culture and tradition. Feelings generated due to such a process are thus both the kind that are recent and similar to the ones aroused in identical situations in the past. This is the meaning, we believe, of the phrases: 'the historical sense' and 'a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its present' used by Eliot in "Tradition and the Individual Talent". Absence of such a sense and such a perception exposes an artist to the 'diabolic influence' of the Evil which leads him/her to blaspheme. Particularly so, because blasphemy is impossible unless the artist 'profoundly believes in that which he profanes'. The consequences of such a development are disastrous in that they harm the artist morally by making him feeble or even a pervert.

G M Hopkins and James Joyce hardly demonstrate lack of tradition in their writings and Eliot, therefore, appears
to see them as the upholders of faith. The element of Christian orthodoxy in them wins Eliot's approval. Not that Eliot considers it as some kind of 'a narrow path laid down for every writer to follow'. Far from it. He states very categorically in After Strange Gods that 'Perfect orthodoxy in the individual artist is not always necessary, or even desirable.' (Added emphases). Perfection is the attribute of the Divine in Thomistic cosmology. No man can attain complete perfection because that was lost to Original Sin. What an individual artist can do is work towards whatever degree of perfection he can. The task is not easy. It needs a conscious effort and calls for a rigorous training which alone would help him absorb the essential elements of a tradition — in this case a Christian tradition. Nothing short of that is acceptable. The evidence of the artist's rearing in a tradition lies in his rejection of spiritual corruption. That is the demand of faith too.

We have a very limited purpose in including this chapter in the thesis, the same as we had in Chapter 5. What we would like to do in the next three sections is to examine Eliot's evaluation of (i) Hopkins' work, and (ii) Joyce's work, and then to apply Eliot's criteria, developed in Chapter 1, to see if his assessment of these writers is justified in view of his poetics.
Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) is brought into the discussion in *After Strange Gods* immediately after Eliot's discussion of Ezra Pound and W B Yeats who, he thinks, faced difficulties in their writing which were not of their own making. He tries to set Hopkins in a proper perspective by noting that he does not propose to discuss Hopkins as an orthodox and traditional poet. The reason given by Eliot is that he cannot share altogether the enthusiasm with which many critics have discussed Hopkins' work. Eliot makes the following points about Hopkins as a poet:

1. The fact that he was a Jesuit priest, and the author of some very beautiful devotional verse, is only partially relevant.

2. His ancestry and his country for some generations have failed to help him in any way and this cannot be made good by the fact of his conversion.

3. Hopkins is a fine poet but not nearly so much a poet of our (Eliot's) time as we have felt inclined to suppose.

4. His innovations, although they were good, operate only within a narrow range like his mind, and are easily imitated.

5. His innovations lack inevitability in that they come near to being purely verbal and a whole poem will give us more of an accumulation rather than a development
(6) There is a good deal more to devotional poetry than just the purity and strength of the author's devotional passion. To be a 'devotional poet' is a limitation.

(7) Hopkins is not a religious poet in the more important sense in which Baudelaire or Villon are.

(8) His work is not penetrated with Christian feelings the way Joyce's work is. (How this is so will need to be discussed).

(9) He is not to be compared with our (Eliot's) contemporaries but, in comparison to his own contemporaries, he seems to have an advantage over them. (George Meredith is the one Eliot compares Hopkins with).

(10) Hopkins is much more agile than Meredith although both are nature poets who have similar technical tricks.

(11) Hopkins is not cheap and shallow in his 'philosophy of life' unlike Meredith. (This is by implication).

(12) He has the dignity of the Church behind him and is in closer contact with reality.

(13) Hopkins has very little aid to offer us in our struggle to renew our association with traditional wisdom; to re-establish a vital connexion between the individual and the race or against Liberalism.
It is only too understandable that Eliot finds the biographical details about Hopkins only partially relevant. Eliot is against biographical criticism and that seems to explain his dismissal of the fact that Hopkins was a Jesuit priest and wrote some very good devotional verses. And Eliot shows his disapproval of such verses in "Religion and Literature".

The second point made by Eliot about how Hopkins' ancestry and his country have failed to help him in any way seems to us to be important because these are the factors that shape the creative element in a poet. Even his conversion, notes Eliot, fails to have any impact in making him mature (?) as a poet. Talking about (Eliot's) conversion, we have noted elsewhere that it creates disturbances in the mind of the convert and causes a trauma. For, it involves changes in one's beliefs, system of values and all that goes with it. This finds support in the fact that Eliot's own views did register changes in the aftermath of his conversion in 1927 and his career as a creative artist and a critic passed through a very critical phase before finally stabilising for good.

We shall take the next three observations together because they deal with identical issues: (i) Hopkins is a fine but overvalued poet, (ii) His innovations have a narrow range and are imitable, and (iii) They lack inevitability and have very little to offer in terms of the development of
thought or feeling. It is strange to find Eliot arguing differently in the same breath. If 'Hopkins is a fine poet', then why is he 'not nearly so much a poet of our time as the accidents of his publication and inventions of his metric have led us to suppose'? The answer to this question is simple. He is seen by Eliot as a poet before his time because 'his publication and inventions of his metric', which did not fit into the framework of the poetry of 'Nature', catapulted him into the ranks of the modernists. Eliot assures us that he does not wish to depreciate him but what he intends to do is to affirm limitations and distinctions. The negative element stays, however.

Coming back to the question of why in spite of 'the accidents of his publication and invention of his metric', Hopkins is not a poet of Eliot's time, we feel it useful to turn to someone who actually looks into this aspect of thought. Noting how "The Wreck of the Deutschland" contains 'the serenity of Dante's "Our peace in His will" or of that prayed in "Ash Wednesday": 'Teach us to care and not to care', Elisabeth Schneider (1968: 21) argues that it is 'symbolized in images that reconcile stillness and motion — stillness in the willing renunciation of individual's will, and motion, readiness to act in willing response to God's will — with the profound peace of this reconciliation.' In continuation of this discussion, Schneider talks of 'two criteria'
or 'fetishes' that mark today's criticism and poetry, which she identifies, as

(1) Modern readers being 'accustomed to the imagery for structural purposes', the use of which 'by older writers was sporadic, usually unsystematic, and when present often slight', and

(2) 'The other modern principle ... that (is) now commonly referred to as the need for a "persona".'

It is on applying the latter criterion, she says, that all of the mature works of Hopkins, like "The Wreck" will be found most unmodern and most "Romantic". She refers then to Eliot's observation that the 'major weakness of all but the greatest Romantic poetry' is that the poet takes 'a stand slightly elsewhere than where' he is, but often fails to stay there. This failure is responsible for 'the uncertainty, and the unreliability of tone that so often breaks the charm of that poetry'.

It is in this context then that we would like to see Eliot's remarks about the innovations, made by Hopkins in his creative work as a poet, being good but lacking inevitability due to their operating within a narrow range. The narrow range, so Eliot seems to suggest, is for two reasons: (a) the innovations are easily imitated, and (b) they are purely verbal in the sense that a whole poem will give us more of an accumulation of thought or feeling rather than any idea about the
development of such thought or feeling. We use the word 'inevitable' to refer to something that is 'certain' to happen, and to something that cannot be avoided. 'Verbal' is an adjective referring to something conveyed through the means of words, or something that is concerned merely with words rather than facts, or something that is in oral rather than in written form. When Eliot used the word 'verbal', he used it to mean something conveyed through the means of words and, maybe partially, so one suspects, something that is concerned merely with words rather than facts. The lingering doubt about the logic of the second interpretation comes in way of comprehending the real meaning Eliot had in mind. While it might appear to be an assumption really, we do not think it far-fetched to conclude that Eliot did suspect Hopkins' real intention. Hopkins' imagery being what it is, his concern is apparently to use it to transform his 'spiritual' experience into an 'aesthetic' experience. Facts, as we take them to be, are not what we would look for in a work of art. It is foolhardy to do so. Eliot, with all the training he had had, cannot be expected to suggest that the 'facts' implicit in the meaning of the word 'verbal' are facts as we see them. What Eliot does seem to suggest, however, is that innovation in the use of words tried out by Hopkins made the work lack inevitability because there was only accumulation of thought or feeling in them in place of a progression and development of thought or feeling.
We use words like verbal snapshot meaning 'a brief description of a character, scene, or event', for 'the term takes its name from that quality of Image captured in a photographs; and verbal texture which means qualities of Diction, Phrasing, Sentence Sounds, Sound System, Rhetoric, and Rhythm in a poem'. (added emphasis) Obviously, then, Eliot's use of the term 'verbal' includes both 'the quality of Image' and the 'texture' built into the poems. What makes the remarks intriguing is the fact that Eliot does not discuss even a single poem of Hopkins's. We have, therefore, felt it necessary to take a look at two main poems of Hopkins: "The Wreck of the Deutchland" and "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Ressurection". We do not propose to offer complete analyses of these poems but to comment on their 'verbal' aspects. However, before we embark upon that task, it would be fruitful to spend some time in trying to understand the meaning of terms like 'Instress', 'Inscape', 'Nature', 'Pitch', 'Will' and Echoing memory' which are central to the philosophy of Hopkins. A good amount of discussion on these terms is available in Alan Heuser's book, The Shaping Vision of Gerard Manley Hopkins, which is by far one of the most standard books on him.

Tracing the development of the terms, 'Instress' and 'Inscape', Heuser (1958: 23) notes three standards in them: (i) 'the aesthetic recording of types in nature', (ii) 'the philosophical theory of ideas', and (iii) 'the linguistic sharpening of the word-codes and idea-images'. He goes on
to note how Hopkins, in a book on the Pre-Socratics entitled Notes on Greek Philosophy, wrote, on 9 February 1868, a careful passage on words identifying three moments of a word: (1) power of connotation, called 'prepossession of feeling'; (2) definition, vocal or mental utterance; and (3) application, extension to the concrete thing or things designated.  This is quite important in understanding the developing etymology of 'instress' and 'inscape'. Quoting from The Note-Books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, Heuser explains that 'instress' feels deep and 'inscape' holds fast in being. Thus, instress 'gropes downward to unity of being in feeling', while inscape 'upholds unity of being in fixed position, in fixed shape'. And, more importantly, he comments that

**Inscape has been variously defined, most frequently as**

(1) internal form, 'inshape', soul, idea;

(2) ideal structure, excellence of form moulded from within, beauty;

(3) natural pattern, unitive glimpse of natural scenery as design of the whole. It is agreed that inscape indicates form of some kind, internal, ideal, natural.

On the other hand, relation and comparison, he says, have been used to indicate the three terms of stress and instress:
(a) in the object, depth of feeling as spring of its unity; (b) between object and subject, identity of being through a flash of intuition; (c) in the subject, depth of feeling in response to the intuition of being.26

Further on, he notes how stress becomes instress 'when it is linked inwards to depth, origin, and when it gathers to an intensification or response' what happens in case of instress is that

the feeling in object or subject is drawn to an interior oneness, energy collected to a simple moment of emotion (fervour) or of will (choice).27

In other words, 'inscape is the one-shape or stem-form, instress the shaping force or stemmed feeling, within creatures of nature and art.' In psychological terms, this depends on levels of mind and soul below consciousness. One cannot think of any apparent reason why certain occurrences take us to depths of sorrow or raise us to some height of joy. Hopkins discovered that neither was possible in the absence of reception which was entirely unconscious so much so that the reason was not aware of it. The Spirit of God (the Pneuma) acting upon the soul in a man (the psyche) gathered to a oneness below consciousness and produced a knot of energy. This is a potential intress, he argues which got released in the soul by the activity of an incoming stress from God.
Heuser explains that instress was 'a feeling stored in the unconscious, in the well of memory below understanding, in the depths of being' activated through 'either an uncontrolled emotional release or a voluntary choice controlled by reason' depending entirely on what level it acted upon. Hopkins was encouraged by the Franciscan philosopher Duns Scotus to treat memory understanding and will as levels of consciousness and 'to put trust in the primitive levels of feeling, sensation, innate memory, unconscious knowing'.

We shall now move on to the other three terms: Nature, Pitch, and Will. The three stages in the act of creation involved (i) the idea of nature was in God's mind and summed up in the Word, (ii) God equipped nature with individuality in His will and summed up in the Humanity of Christ, and (iii) Nature and individuality combined in execution, embodying the idea of God's idea of nature and the grace of the Humanity of Christ. This is Scotus' concept of the moments in the act of creation. In Hopkins' metaphysics, nature consisted of shapes, species and inscapes, whereas pitches and selves were a part of individuality, and will was the existential instress. 'Pitch' has been described as the oneness or unity that made each creature fixed as a singular, an individual, which Hopkins later called 'Selfbeing' because he saw in the creation of distinctive selves in the world of nature the work of the Self of Being, God. It was pitch
that was said to be giving a unified direction of intensity to an idea. 'Will' was considered to be 'the soul's energy all the way from root feelings and desires to higher powers and intentions.' There are two states of will: arbitrium, the will at pitch, which decided the action; and voluntas, the will at 'splay' (meaning something sloping spreading, or turning outward), which was by its very nature elective or affective. The former was, free and independent of the nature in comparison with the latter which was relaxed and determined by nature. The higher will, as pitch on its own, made free moral choices possible. Of course, Hopkins found that the choice of will depended upon the subject and the object and it was the object which supplied the field of choice.

Hopkins considered memory to be a store-house of unconscious material which was collective, racial, and spiritual in its constitution while at the same time containing pagan myth as mirror imagery in a primitive world. It was in this world that the mothering forms in God's mind really dwelt. And all levels of creation reached out to Christ there where echoed God's order of intention with divine harmonies. These harmonies were broken by dissonance only to be resolved upon the keynote of sacrifice. This was to be the meaning of what Hopkins calls the 'echoing memory'. It would perhaps not be very far-fetched to think of this being the shaping principle of 'received imagination' which we have dealt with in one of the earlier chapters. This tends to get
support when we read it in the light of Hopkins' discovery that the 'underthought' in the Greek choruses was an 'echo' or 'shadow' of the 'overthought'.\textsuperscript{33} One might like to see in this kind of an interplay of thoughts what Ferdinand de Saussure termed 'langue' and 'parole'. This is not to suggest that Saussure gave the two terms a spiritual meaning but the fact remains that the source of their inception is the same. Hopkins thought this 'overthought' to be something like canons and repetitions in music and he built this into his concept of verse being an inscape of the spoken sound.

We shall stop here in our discussion of 'echoing memory' and take up the 'verbal' innovations of Hopkins' in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" and "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of Resurrection". We intend to limit our discussion of these innovations to mean 'the quality of innovations', for that is what Eliot seems intent to focus on. In a brilliantly argued thesis, Geoffrey Hartman, who has edited a collection of critical essays on Hopkins, writes in his "Introduction: Poetry and Justification", making the following points about Hopkins' innovations:

(1) 'Hopkins' poetry is an uneasy blend of natural and learned elements, and that its vivid surface leads on occasion not to clarity but to darkness.'\textsuperscript{34}

(2) The 'residue of obscurity' in many poems may be blamed on 'Hopkins' desire for an impersonal and esoteric
discipline', for 'his urge towards a sacrifice of intellect and a true religious anonymity was strong.' \(^{35}\)

(3) "In Hopkins, precariousness is a religious quality that becomes a poetic quality." \(^{36}\) (He is modern in the kind of religious scruple he shows).

(4) 'The first peculiarity, and justifying characteristic, of Hopkins' poetry is that it mimes what it represents. Not all miming is overtly religious'... \(^{37}\)

(5) 'His transcendence' of what Hopkins calls nature 'barbarous in beauty' is, in Hartman's opinion, 'a trick; but it acts out a Christian doctrine without intellectual sleight or theological complication. The justifying end of such poetry' (as in the second part of "Hurrahing in Harvest") is for the poet to become Christ, to act Christ... and the justifying doctrine is that of the Incarnation harmonized with Romans 1:20 and 8:17 ff.' \(^{38}\)

(6) 'Hopkins' style is as vocative as possible. This holds for sound, grammar, figures of speech, and actual performance.' \(^{39}\)

(7) 'Contentio' (or strain of address) is aligned to the reading of it not with the eyes but ears, for 'Stress is the life of it' and Hartman notes that it is 'by such stress and strain of address, maintained until all parts
of speech, all figures seem to partake in the vocative, Hopkins revolutionized poetic style."  

(8) 'Language is shown to be contentio' ('a term from rhetoric designating an antithetical or pointed repetition', says Hartman, which Hopkins fused with the Jobean contentio, with a raising of the voice to God, with a like insistence of address') in essence. Its function is 'to move, persuade and possess'. With this 'Hopkins leads us back to an aural situation... where meaning and invocation coincide.'  

(9) Substitution, semantic rhymes 'evoke the tendency of semantic distinctions of fall back into a phonemic ground of identity' or giving it 'a linguistic indifference against which language contends, and contends successfully by diacritical or differential means.'  

(10) 'The point about Hopkins' description is not the homophones or internal rhymes but the creatively tenuous process of disjunction.... The elements that give meaning to the line are essentially vocalic: elision, juncture, stress.'  

(11) 'The diacritical method might also be applied to the thorny problem of Hopkins' sprung rhythm... (his) presumed innovation'. Noting how 'the essential feature of sprung rhythm' is the 'counterpoint' of what Hopkins defines as the 'mounting of a new rhythm upon
the old', Hartman suggests that it 'is structurally analogous to his linear mounting or juxtaposition of phonemically similar phrases differentiated by juncture or stress.' In his paper, "Hopkins' pattern of transcendence is not uniform...",

These are some of the points on which critics have shown general agreement insofar as Hopkins' work is concerned.

Dr Bridges called "The Wreck of the Deutschland" 'a great metrical experiment' and it was in this poem Hopkins used 'sprung rhythm' for the first time. And the term was, of course, his invention. Writing about what she calls 'The most striking and characteristic feature of sprung rhythm', Elisabeth Schneider (1968: 51) notes that it 'is its provision for the juxtaposing of stressed syllables anywhere in the line and as often as is wanted, without loss of force or length in these syllables.' (Schneider's emphasis). Hopkins' 'new rhythm' in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is seen as a blend of a predominant conventional rhythm and sprung rhythm and this makes the lines quite conventional in terms of metrical composition. Only fewer than one out of five lines of the first twenty stanzas cannot be scanned conventionally and yet the rhythm continues to have its effect. Notes Schneider that 'The poem is written in a fixed stanza form, with a fixed number of feet in each line' and these add 'up to 1,145 feet in the poem'. Giving a break up or count of these, she says there are
168 monosyllabic, 363 iambic, 542 anapestic, 50 paeonic and 22 longer feet... (with the possibility of) a few probable errors due to the uncertainty of an accent and hence a foot, scanned according to Hopkins's principles of sprung rhythm throughout.48
(Parenthesis supplied)

On the bases of such analyses, Schneider concludes that the new rhythm was created by Hopkins by means of very modest departures from what we find in conventional verses.49

About "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of Resurrection", Schneider notes that 'Hopkins called it a sonnet with two codas'.50 She finds the first part of the poem to have been written 'in language full of movement' conveying the quick changes after a storm. The final section registers a quick and abrupt reversal of the mood of mourning individual mortality. The poem has its forward movement in the progression of meaning vividified through verbs and verbal elements. These are thematic in their character leading to the reaffirmation of the permanence of being. The movement from one state to another cannot be explained for sure in terms of the Christian doctrine. But the codas, notes Hartman, suggest two different things: the first one a radical disunity and the second one that Christ is 'put on' by man by means of purification which
coincides individuation, not utter change. Self is purified and redeemed through the immitation of Christ. We would like to quote Hopkins from the "Oxford Sermons" (6 July 1879) wherein he says

Religion is the highest of the moral virtues and sacrifice the highest act of religion. Also self sacrifice is the purest charity. Christ was the most religious of men, to offer sacrifice was the chief purpose of his life and that the sacrifice of himself.51

If Hopkins appears to use these ideas in "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of Resurrection", Eliot had this objective in mind and fulfilled it in writing Murder in the Cathedral. In other words, it is the religious participation or imitatio Christi which was also the aim of Ignatian meditation. We need to understand that the art of Eliot and Hopkins is meditative.

We shall now proceed to address ourselves to the other observations of Eliot's on Hopkins. While Eliot's comment on devotional poetry must be read in terms of what he says in "Religion and Literature", the purity and strength of the author's devotional passion in such a kind of poetry is a prerequisite. Obviously, Eliot saw Hopkins as a religious poet and that may be why he considers him a minor poet.
It is in "Religion and Literature" that Eliot notes how 'religious poetry' is a variety of minor poetry. The reason he gave was that a religious poet was one 'who is dealing with a confined part' of the whole 'subject matter of poetry' leaving out our major passions. But one finds his attempt to bracket Hopkins with such poets as those considered 'religious' by him to be a mistake in a way because the same could be said about him too. Nor does Eliot seem to be fair to Hopkins when he compares him with Joyce and finds him wanting in terms of his work not 'being penetrated' by Christian feeling. The reason for this apparently 'unfair' valuation of Hopkins, one might suspect, is the result of Hopkins' second conversion to Jesuit order in 1868. This conversion (from the Church of England to the Jesuit order) seems then to hold the key. Eliot states earlier on that the fact of Hopkins' conversion was not going to do for him 'what his ancestry and his country for some generations have failed to do.' The failure of ancestry and the country, it appears, is seen by him as tied to what he might have thought to be religious vacillations of Hopkins. The rest of the observations, have either been discussed in one way or another so far, or are too clear to need any illustration.
III

James Joyce is one of those fortunate few whom Eliot saw as the ones responsible for the maintenance of the orthodoxy of belief which made them the upholders of faith. He has the following points to make about Joyce:

(a) That Joyce is the most ethically orthodox of the more eminent writers of his time.  
(b) Mr. Joyce's work is penetrated with Christian feelings. 
(c) A trained mind like that of Mr. Joyce is always aware what master it is serving.

Eliot uses James Joyce's short story, "The Dead" to show what it takes for an artist 'to be a model of orthodoxy'. He looks at the moral implication of the story. Eliot seems impressed by 'a much more elaborate and interesting method' in Joyce's "The Dead" than in Lawrence's "The Shadow in the Rose Garden". Although both of the stories deal with the other man, who was once important in the life of the wife, Lawrence's concern with the feelings of both husband and wife is brought in sharp contrast with Joyce's treatment of Gabriel's feeling of guilt that he could not do for Gretta, his wife, what Michael Furey, her lover, had done for her—shown love.
Eliot opines in the "Introductory Note" he wrote to a selection of Joyce's prose titled *Introducing James Joyce* that his choice, as the finest of the stories in *Dubliners* would have been "The Dead" but its length did not fit into the norms set up for selection in that collection. Now, to return to Eliot's observations about Joyce, we shall look into each of the three very closely. The first things first. Eliot considers Joyce to be 'the most ethically orthodox' among the writers of eminence of his own (Eliot's) time. Eliot had made it clear in the beginning of 'The Page Barbour Lectures at the University of Virginia' that he had 'ascended the platform of these lectures', from where he spoke about tradition, orthodoxy, blasphemy etc., 'only in the role of a moralist'. Thus a moralist was trying to look at the work of the most ethically orthodox of the writers. And Eliot argues in "Religion and Literature" for ethics to be given a place in our judgement and criticism because it is imposed upon us by 'our religion'. Whatever, we read 'affects us as entire human beings' by affecting 'our moral and religious existence'. By structuring and writing his work as he did, Joyce made sure that 'reconciliation of thought and feeling' was taken care of, especially with regard to the 'much more elaborate and interesting method' he employs to invest into the characters of Gabriel and Gretta an 'awareness of moral obligations'.
Eliot summarizes the story for us simply in the following words:

The wife (Gretta) is saddened by memories associated with a song sung at an evening party which has just been described in minute detail. In response to solicitous questions by her husband (Gabriel), she reveals the fact that the song had been sung by a boy she knew in Galway when she was a girl, and that between them (Gretta and Michael Furey) was an intense romantic and spiritualised love. She had had to go away; the boy had risen from a sick bed to come to say goodbye to her, and he had died in consequence. That is all there was to it; but the husband realises that what this boy had given her was something finer than anything he had to give.61

But that is not where it all ends. Eliot goes on to note that as the wife falls asleep, at last, there is evident in Gabriel Conroy a change:

Generous tears filled Gabriel's eyes. He had never felt like that himself towards any woman, but he knew that such a feeling must be love. The tears
gathered more quickly in his eyes and in the partial darkness he imagined he saw the form of a young man (Michael Furey) standing under a dripping tree. Other forms were near. His soul had approached that region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead. (Added emphases and parenthesis).

William A Johnsen, writing on Joyce's *Dubliners* in a book edited by W J McCormack and Alistair Stead (1982: 17), notes that "The Dead" is probably the finest short story in our language, because, after many false starts, it accepts the gift of the past, and truly unites us with Joyce's countrymen, living and dead. If it is true that *Dubliners* is a chapter on the moral history of Dublin and Ireland, then "The Dead" represents Joyce's renewal of sympathy with Ireland.

The strong bond that seems to tie Eliot to Joyce apparently is their common perception that modernism is a sham. Modernism 'proposes a self-born, self-begotten originality that mocks or vanquishes imitators or rivals, that screens its own imitating, it perverts the Scene of Education, the past, wastes, and hands on only a technique for futility', according to Johnsen. For, as it happens in case of Gabriel Conroy, whose projection of modernity robs him of the basic feeling of love which comes naturally to man, his failure is the failure of the race. He can only assume that the feeling
that Michael Furey demonstrated for young Gretta, which ultimately led to his death, and Gretta's own response after all these years, 'must be love'. This feeling overawes Gabriel and, through his tearful eyes, he sees the form of Michael Furey dissolve, dissipate and move to merge into the vast hosts of the dead. If that is not a kind of nostalgia on the part of Joyce, one does not really know what to call it.

Gabriel's unresentful looking at his wife is powerful enough to release 'the virtue of generosity his wife knows is in him' and he learns what the heart is and what it feels. Johnsen is probably right when he sees in Gabriel's 'positive reciprocity' with Michael Furey as the occasion prompting his 'journey westward'. The burden wears off and the resultant merger of the individual with his race becomes aesthetically quite satisfying. This is the evidence of what Eliot calls the 'orthodoxy of sensibility' and 'the sense of tradition' in a writer. The Christian feeling is clearly reflected in that work of Joyce's.

What appears hereafter will be by way of commentary on Joyce's language and technique because both of these are central to his work in its totality. It sheds light on the theory of art propounded by Joyce. The aim is to use it in order to compare it with the theory of Eliot's.
conversation with Davin in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* about his aesthetics makes interesting reading. 'This race and this country and this life produced me,' he says, adding that 'My ancestors threw off their language and took another.' In a scenario of that kind, with Tone and Parnell being reviled and sold to the enemy everything was falling apart. This led to the loss of the identity of the Irish. What meaning has nationality, language and religion when the soul is in bondage? Stephen's musings continue. He notes that 'Aristotle has not defined pity and terror. I have,' and goes on to provide the definitions:

*Pity* is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and *unites it with the human sufferer*. *Terror* is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and *unites it with a secret cause*. (Added emphases)

The common source, 'the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings' works in two directions: (1) uniting it with the object, and (2) uniting it with a secret cause. The tragic emotion has pity and terror as its two phases. He goes on to say that the tragic emotion or rather the dramatic.
emotion is static and feelings excited by improper art are kinetic. Although Eliot does not talk of 'tragic' emotion, he talks of emotion being static with feelings floating around it. That is the point of similarity too like the one in case of culture.

Stephen argues that the 'esthetic' emotion is static and causes the mind to rise above desire and loathing which are feelings excited by improper arts which are pornographical or didactic in nature. The desire and loathing are really not esthetic emotions not only because they are kinetic but also because they are purely physical in their nature. Beauty does not evoke a kinetic emotion or a purely physical sensation but awakens 'an esthetic stasis', to prolong and dissolve it by what Stephen calls 'the rhythm of beauty'. And rhythm is, according to Stephen, the first formal esthetic relation of part to part in any esthetic whole or vice-versa. In this scheme of things, art is described by him as the human disposition of sensible or intelligible matter for an esthetic end. Or art is the result of human endeavour to understand the nature of things, and thereafter, to slowly and constantly express or press out again from sound and shape and colour an image of the beauty such as that we understand. Stephen remarks that Aquinas apparently believes something is beautiful if the apprehension of it pleases us. Using the word *via* to cover
esthetic apprehensions of all kinds, whatever the source of such apprehension, he says that the word is clear enough to keep away good and evil which excite kinetic feelings. And Aquinas had used that word originally. So it is a stasis and not a kinesis, producing also a stasis of the mind.\(^7^4\)

The true and the beautiful are akin in the philosophy that Stephen unfolds. He explains that 'Truth is beheld by the intellect which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible; beauty is beheld by the imagination which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible.' Any attempt to understand the frame and scope of the intellect itself, to comprehend the act itself of intellection, is the first step in the direction of truth. On the other hand, the attempt to understand the frame and scope of the imagination and to comprehend the act itself of esthetic apprehension is the first step towards beauty.\(^7^5\)

A beautiful object is admired when it is found to incorporate certain relations which satisfy coincide with the stages of all esthetic apprehension. These relations of the sensible must therefore have the necessary qualities of beauty.\(^7^6\)

Stephen calls his esthetic theory 'applied Aquinas'. But Aquinas has no terminological support to provide the phenomena of artistic conception, gestation and reproduction, he argues. Beauty is beauty only if the most satisfying relations of the sensible correspond to the necessary phases of
artistic creation. Translating Aquinas' 'Ad pulcritudinem tria requiruntur integritas, consonantia, claritas' as 'Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony, and radiance,' Stephen wonders if these features correspond to the phases of apprehension. In order to see some object, he explains, the mind separates it from the rest of the visible objects. So the first phase of apprehension is this line demarcating the object to be apprehended. Esthetic images are presented to us either in space or in time: the audible in time and the visible in space. It is the temporal or spatial luminous apprehension of it as a whole that is integrias. Then part against part is apprehended and we feel the rhythm of its structure. Thus 'the synthesis of immediate perception' is followed by the analysis of apprehension. This is consonantia.

Stephen explains that 'Claritas is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalization which would make the esthetic image a universal one.' Radiance is the supreme quality and is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in an artist's imagination, he avers. Our concept of beauty, based on form, makes us divide art into three forms: the lyrical, the epical and the dramatic. The lyrical form shows the artist in immediate relation to himself; in the epical form, the image is in mediate relation to the artist and to others; and in the dramatic form, he presents his
image in immediate relation to others. Literature is, in the words of Stephen, 'the highest and most spiritual art' and it combines all these three forms. The lyrical is 'the simplest verbal vesture of an instant emotion, a rhythmical cry'. In the same way, 'the simplest epical form' emerges when the prolonged brooding of an artist himself, as the centre of an epical event, progresses till the centre of emotional gravity is equidistant. The narrative is no longer personal, for 'The personality of the artist, at first a cry or a cadence... finally refines itself out of existence, impersonalizes itself'. Stephen believes that the esthetic image in the dramatic form is like purified in a reprojected form of the human imagination. Stephen's experiences lead him to the conclusion that '0! In the virgin womb of the imagination the word was made flesh.' We see 'received imagination' to be the result of a similar spiritual stirring.

IV

We would like to apply the criteria set up towards the end of Chapter 1 in order to see if Eliot applied fairly the principles of criticism he evolved, to the works of Hopkins and Joyce. It is not our intention really to turn this section into a long, evaluative essay on what Eliot should or should not have done.
The first among the criteria Eliot applies is the impress of a central tradition on the works under evaluation. There is no shred of evidence available to make us believe that Eliot's hesitation in citing the works of Gerard Hopkins as those of 'the orthodox and traditional poet' had anything to do with the absence of the impress of a central tradition. Far from it. True, Eliot classified Hopkins as a 'religious' or 'minor' poet writing 'devotional verses' and confining himself to 'dealing with a confined part of the subject matter of poetry in a religious spirit.' Hopkins, he implies, was gifted with a special kind of awareness. This only means that the originality Eliot thought is to be permitted only within the framework of an established tradition is notable in the works of Hopkins. He shows positive signs of the conservation and maintenance of tradition through conscious intelligence. One does have a lingering suspicion that Eliot's refusal to give Hopkins his real place was Hopkins' conversion to the Society of Jesus — a movement away from the main. Joyce has no problems on this count at all.

The second criterion is concern with orthodoxy of sensibility and the sense of tradition. Both Hopkins and Joyce were credited by Eliot to be concerned with the orthodoxy of sensibility. It is only where the sense of tradition comes into our discussion that we find Eliot cornering Hopkins. Joyce has a smooth sailing. What does Eliot think about Hopkins? Hopkins, he seems to suggest, lacked the
sense of tradition. Eliot's undiplomatic and acerbic comments on Hopkins' family background leave a very bad taste in one's mouth. And so does his comment on Hopkins' conversion. Let us take a close look at it:

In the first place, the fact that he was a Jesuit priest, and the author of some very beautiful devotional verse, is only partially relevant. To be converted, in any case, while it is sufficient for entertaining the hope of individual salvation, is not going to do for a man, as a writer, what his ancestry and his country for some generations have failed to do.83

One wonders why Eliot put emphasis on the word 'Jesuit'. Obviously, he does not mean that this fact is partially relevant. His emphasis on Hopkins' Jesuit background is not as innocent as it seems to look. Another point he makes is that conversion cannot make up for the deficiencies in a writer who has had nothing to benefit from his ancestors and country. Both ancestry and the country are symbols of culture and tradition. It appears Eliot saw the absence of any influence of the ancestors and country on Hopkins as his main handicap. Joyce has a smooth sailing all the way through.
Authenticity and wholeness both in terms of experience and its expression is the next criterion. Although both Hopkins and Joyce sound sincere and project authentic experiences, Hopkins lags behind in Eliot's opinion, if only because he wrote 'religious' poetry and this means that he dealt with only a small part of the subject matter of poetry in a religious spirit. Thus Hopkins' work lacks wholeness, at least in terms of expression, if not experience. Joyce had no such problems. These features were expected to lead to the negation of individuality and neither can be accused of serving the cause of the self. Their use of authentic experiences and their expression helps in fostering positive attitudes and in controlling moral and intellectual aberrations.

The fourth criterion, acute perception of truth as a whole, is found to have been fulfilled by both Hopkins and Joyce. Their work does not suggest a partial perception of the truth. Nor does it deal with only a part of the truth. When we apply the fifth criterion, i.e., wholesome perception of Good and Evil, we find that both Hopkins and Joyce were keenly aware of the Good as well as the power of Evil. Their vision of life was a spiritual one in that its vitality was reflected in resistance to excitements and abject surrender to passion. Gabriel Conroy checks himself when his wife, Gretta, confesses to him of a boy in her life before their
marriage. The lover is dead now and Gabriel's heart overflows with compassion. He does not develop kinetic emotions of hate and loathing. Joyce gives Gabriel victory over baser feelings. Hopkins has no problems at all. He emerges unscathed.

An artist, bound to tradition, is interested in men's minds rather than their emotions. This is the sixth criterion. Neither Hopkins nor Joyce can be faulted for any violations of this principle. Hopkins' concentration on a purely 'religious' emotion makes his work suspect and, hence, Eliot's opinion of him as a 'minor' poet. The exercise built into Stephen's musings on the esthetic theory or 'applied Aquinas' is really an intellectual response to the more serious problems in art and literature that Joyce addressed.

Joyce's perfect fitting into these criteria and Hopkins' partial fitting makes them both the upholders of faith. It was their kind of writing which went into the making of the 'poetics' of faith which Eliot propounded, used and propagated. The structure of Eliot's new poetics will be discussed in the next chapter.
References and Notes

4. Ibid.
8. T S Eliot, NDC, p. 41.
11. Ibid., p. 52.
13. Ibid., pp. 47-48. Please note that not all of those observations are direct quotes.
14. Cf. Christopher Devlin, SJ (ed). *The Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). Attention is drawn especially to the notes on pages 25 and 261. For instance, Hopkins says in one of the *Oxford Sermons* delivered on 21 September, 1879 (see p. 25) that '.... all converts agree in feeling that they are led by God's particular will... We who are converts have all heard that voice what others cannot or say they cannot hear....' Also, in "Isolated Discourse and Private Notes" (See p. 261), Hopkins affirms, 'I was a Christian from birth or baptism, later I was converted to the Catholic faith, and am enlisted 20 years in the Society of Jesus....' Hopkins maintains that his conversion was on strictly logical grounds.
16. Ibid., p. 48.
18. Ibid., p. 38.
24. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
25. Ibid., p. 25.
26. Ibid., p. 27.
27. Ibid., p. 27.
28. Ibid., p. 32. We would like to draw attention to an important work by Louis Martz. Martz notes that the art of Yeats, Eliot and Hopkins is the art of meditation fundamental to their achievement. He quotes from *Saint Bernard and His Meditations*
the following lines: 'the minde is the Image of God' in which memory, understanding, and will or love are important.


Geffrey Keynes also notes that 'Imagination is eternity', for it is the 'Divine Vision' which makes a poet'. See Geffrey Keynes (Ed), Poetry and Prose of William Blake (London: The Nonesuch Library, 1961), pp. 584 & 821.

29. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
31. Ibid., p. 67.
32. Ibid., p. 76.
33. Ibid., p. 79.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 5.
38. Ibid. This is also the meaning of Archbishop Thomas Becket's decision to embrace martyrdom in Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral.
39. Ibid., p. 6.
40. Ibid., p. 7.
41. Ibid., p. 8.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
44. Ibid., p. 9.
45. Ibid., p. 11.
47. Ibid., p. 74.
48. Ibid., p. 75.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 172.
54. Ibid., p. 48.
55. Ibid., p. 59.
59. Ibid., p. 396.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 19.
65. Ibid., p. 20.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 204.
72. Ibid., p. 206.
73. Ibid., p. 207.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 208.
76. Ibid., p. 209.
77. Ibid., p. 211.
78. Ibid., p. 212.
79. Ibid., p. 213.
80. Ibid., p. 214.
81. Ibid., p. 217.
83. T S Eliot, ASG, p. 47.
84. In fact, Gabriel Conroy learns to respect Gretta's feelings and 'to love his wife by imitating his rival'. See McCormack and Stead, James Joyce and Modern Literature, p. 19.