CHAPTER II

SATKĀRYAVĀDA
In Indian Philosophy, *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and *asatkārya-vāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may be considered as the two principal theories with reference to which other Indian theories of causation may be conveniently formulated. The relation between the material cause and the effect is the point of dispute between these two theories of causation.

In Western Philosophy, the treatment of causation mainly centres round the efficient cause and the material cause is either by and large neglected or assigned only a secondary importance. But the situation is entirely different in the Indian treatment of causation. In Indian thought, though the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) is accepted as one of the causes, it does not form the subject-matter for any serious discussion. On the other hand, it is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and its relation to the effect that constitutes
an important issue for consideration in Indian Philosophy. The principal questions raised are: Where does the effect derive its essence from? Does the material cause impart its essence to its effect or is it external to the effect so far as the essence is concerned? Is the essence of the effect then, something derived from a void? i.e., Is the effect created out of nothing? What happens to the cause when the effect comes into existence? Is it annihilated altogether or does it continue to exist alongside of the effect? Does the material cause itself actually get transformed into its effect or does it remain the same constituting a substratum for the effect to originate and inhere in or does it present itself as an effect which is only an appearance? We propose to discuss these issues in this chapter.

There are only two possibilities with regard to the essence of an effect: either it derives its essence from its cause or it does not. If it derives its essence from its cause, it means that it is non-different from its cause. If the essence of an effect is not derived from its cause, it means that the effect is different from its cause. This is the basis for the division of the Indian theories of causation into two broad kinds — satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda. Satkāryavāda maintains that the effect is existent in the cause in a latent or potential form and it becomes patent or manifest in the course of causal operation. Asatkāryavāda, on the other hand, maintains
that the effect is completely non-existent before the causal process, and that it is completely a new entity not only with regard to its form but also in respect of its content. It does not derive its essence from its cause.

The main exponents of satkāryavāda are the Sāmkhya-Yoga, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, and of asatkāryavāda are the Nyāya-Valśeṣika and Buddhism. Each of these two principal theories of causation lends itself to two different interpretations in respect of the production of effect. On the basis of this difference, satkāryavāda is further divided into the pariṇānavāda of Sāmkhya-Yoga, and the vivartavāda of Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta. Similarly asatkāryavāda is divided into ārāmbhavāda, which is advocated by the Nyāya-Valśeṣika and pratīya-samutpāda-vāda which is subscribed to by Buddhism. There is a middle course between the two chief theories, which can be called sadasatkāryavāda, and it is advocated by Jainism and the Madhva school of Vedānta.

The Nāsadiya-Sūkta of Rg Veda indicates the pre-existence of effect in its cause. The production of 'sat' from 'asat' suggests a causal connection between vyakta and 'avyakta'. The idea that the effect is non-different from its cause is suggested in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. The same idea is found in the Bhagavad Gītā when it says: "of the non-existent there is no coming to be; of the existent there is no ceasing to be". Thus, we can trace the
germs of satkāryavāda in the ancient speculations which may have been brought together and elaborated into a coherent theory by the different schools of Indian Philosophy.

2.1. SĀMKIHYA ARGUMENTS FOR SATKĀRYAVĀDA

According to Kapila⁵, there cannot be production of something out of nothing; that which is not, cannot be developed into that which is. The production of what does not already exist (potentially) is impossible like the horn of a man; because there must of necessity be a material out of which a product is developed, and because everything cannot occur everywhere and at all times; and because anything possible must be produced from something competent to produce it. Kapila supports satkāryavāda in several of his aphorisms⁶.

All these views of the Sāṁkhya are succinctly brought under five conceptual schemes by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in his Sāṁkhya Kārikā. The Sāṁkhya reasons for its theory of pre-existent effects are embodied in kārikā IX⁷. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa observes that the effect must be supposed to exist in its material cause even before its production, because:

1) that which is non-existent cannot be brought into existence (asad-akaraṇāti),
2) every production requires an appropriate material cause (upādāna-grahaṇā),

3) everything is not possible everywhere and always (sarvasaṁbhavā-ḥāvāt),

4) the potent cause can produce only that for which it is potent (saktasya sākya-karaṇā),

5) cause and effect are identical (kāraṇa-bhāvāt),

These five reasons of Iśvara Kṛṣṇa may be considered in detail.

1) The first argument in favour of satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga is that if the effect were really non-existent, no agency whatsoever could bring into existence. Gauḍapāda, commenting on this says that we do not see the production of a non-existent object, as oil cannot be produced from sand (wherein oil is non-existent). Since, only an existent object can be produced, the effect does exist even before its production. Vācaspati Miśra asserts that even a thousand artists cannot turn blue into yellow. Effectuation is nothing but manifestation of the unmanifest effect. The manifestation of something existent is compatible with experience also, e.g., by compression of the seeds of sesamum there is the manifestation of oil, by pounding paddy there is the manifestation of rice and by milking the cow there is
the manifestation of milk. These instances clearly show that the effect exists prior to the operation of the cause. It is existent in the cause in a latent or unmanifest condition. On the other hand, there is no instance where we find that something non-existent is produced. In fact, what is non-existent is never seen to be produced. There is no production of what is non-existent like the horn of a man.\(^\text{11}\)

2) It is also seen that one who wishes to produce a particular effect seeks the appropriate material cause for it, e.g., one who wants curds seeks milk and not water. This restriction in search for certain causes alone for certain effects clearly shows that the effect sought in that material cause is already pre-figured in it. This is the sense in which Gaudāpāda understands upādāna-grahaṇāt. Vācaspati Miśra\(^\text{12}\), prefers to interpret it as meaning "because of relatedness to the material cause". It is thought that a particular effect which is related to a certain material cause alone is seen to be produced from that material cause. For instance, oil is related to oil-seeds and hence oil is produced from oil-seeds alone; oil is not related to water and hence it is not produced from water. If the effect is non-existent prior to causal operation, the relation of certain effects to certain material causes as stated above cannot be established, and hence we cannot explain why we search for certain material causes alone when we want to produce certain effects.
The fact that we search for certain material causes for certain effects is enough to show that certain effects are related to certain causes even before their production, which means the pre-existence of effects in their respective material causes, since a non-existent effect cannot be related to its material cause.

It is difficult to choose between the two modes of understanding upadāna-grahaṇāt. Gauḍapāda's argument has the merit of being the simpler and more lucid of the two; but it has the disadvantage that the same idea is repeated in śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt (4th argument).

3) It is also a matter of our experience that everything is not produced from anything. Only certain causes such as milk and yarn are seen to produce such effects as curds and cloth respectively. This restriction in production suggests that the causes from which the effects are seen to be produced contain the effects even before their production and they cannot be produced from things such as clay and wood in which they are not contained.

Although, the second and the third arguments of Īśvara Kiṣṇa look identical, in fact they are not. Both are designed to establish the pre-existence of effect but on different grounds. The second argument establishes the pre-existence of an effect on the basis of restriction in our search for certain
effects in certain causes, whereas the third argument proves it on the basis of restriction in production of certain effects from certain causes.

4) Particular effects are produced only from particular causes, because of the varying potencies of the latter. The effect exists in its cause prior to its production because the production of what is possible, can be only from what is competent to cause such possibilities manifest. That power or potentiality is nothing but the not yet come to our view or undeveloped state of the effect. Hence, because that which is competent can produce the effect that is capable of being produced by it; production of a non-entity cannot take place.

So material causality is nothing but possession of the power to become the effect. But does this potency belong to that which has potency? Or that which is devoid of this potency? If the potency belongs to that which is devoid of this potency, then there would be the production of a water pot from yarn leading to the absurdity of anything being produced from anything. If it belongs to that which has potency i.e., residing in the potent cause, is it operative on all effects or upon that effect only for which it has potency i.e., residing in the potent cause, operative on all effects or upon that effect only for which it is potent? If it is operative on all effects, the same state of non-restriction will arise; but if this is operative
only upon that for which it is potent, then it is to be explained as to how it can operate upon a non-existent effect. If it is said that the particular potency is itself of the sort that it produces only certain effects, not all, then it may be asked: "Is this particular potency related to the effect or not?" In the former case, the relation cannot be with a non-existent effect and thus, the existence of effect shall have to be admitted. In the latter, the same restriction will come in. Hence, the effect shall have to be admitted as existent. In other words, the cause cannot have the potency for the effect unless the effect is already present in the cause in the form of potency (śakti).

5) The existence of the effect prior to the operation of the cause, is established by the fact that the effect is non-different from the cause (kāraṇa-bhāvā)\(^1\). The effect being identical with its cause, the existence of the cause implies the existence of the effect and there can be no identity between an entity and a non-entity.

Production is manifestation (āvirbhāva). Destruction is disappearance (utrobhāva). Production is evolution. Destruction is involution. For example, gold is transformed into ornaments and ornaments are melted back into gold. Similarly, clay is transformed into jars and jars are powdered into clay. There is neither creation of the non-existent nor destruction of the existent.\(^2\)
This view is supported by the Gīḍā which says, "There is no creation of the non-existent, there is no destruction of the existent."\(^{18}\) So, production is not creation of a non-existent entity, but manifestation of a pre-existent latent effect. The maxim, 'something can never come out of nothing' sums up the Sāmkhya-Yoga theory of causation.

Gauḍapāda\(^ {19}\) says that the effect is of the same nature as of its cause e.g., rice (is produced) from paddy. If the effect were not existent in the cause, then rice could be produced from kodravas\(^ {20}\); and since it is not so, the effect must be considered to be existent even before its production.

Vācaspati Miśra\(^ {21}\), following the Yukti Dīpikā\(^ {22}\), goes a step further and adduces the following reasons to establish the identity of cause and effect:

1) The effect is not different from its material cause, since it is a property (dharma) of the cause which belongs to it. A piece of cloth is not different from the yarn it is made of, because it is the property of the yarn. An object different in essence from another object can never be its property or attribute. A cow being different from a horse, it can never be the property of the horse. The cloth belongs to the yarn as its property (dharma).
2) There is a causal relation between the yarn and the cloth. They are not different objects because the yarn is the material cause of the cloth and there is a relation of the constituent and the constituted between them. Causal relation cannot subsist between entities which are essentially different, such as clay and cow.

3) Two objects which are different in their very essence can be conjoined as a pool and a tree, and disjoined like the Himalayas and the Vindhyas. The yarn and cloth are not different so as to be in the relation of 'conjunction' (saññiyoga) and 'disjunction' (viññyoga). Since, there is neither 'conjunction' nor 'disjunction' between them; they are not two different objects.

4) The material cause and the effect are non-different, since they are quantitatively identical. Yarn and cloth are not different, since the cloth does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of threads constituting it. An object different from another object always has a weight different from the weight of the other. For example, the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing ten grams is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing two grams. But we find quantitative equivalence between yarn and cloth. This proves that the effect, cloth, is not different from its cause, the yarn.

In view of the reasons adduced above, cause and effect are accepted.
as non-different. The identity of cause and effect having been admitted, the existence of the cause implies the existence of the effect, which means that the effect is already existent before the causal operation.

2.2. ASATRĀRYAVĀDA OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

According to the Nyāya, an effect is a new creation (āraṅbhā). It is non-existent in its material cause and is produced anew out of its material cause. The effect is defined as the counter-entity of its antecedent non-existence (prāgābhava-pratiyoga). It means that the effect leaps into existence by putting an end to its previous non-existence. To illustrate, the effect table does not exist in any form in the wood before it is produced. It emerges from a state of non-existence into a state of existence. Antecedent non-existence (prāgābhava) has no beginning but has an end. When the effect comes into being, it does so by putting an end to its antecedent non-existence. Again, the effect is essentially different from its material cause. A pot, for example, has a character which its constituent parts, the two halves, do not have. The whole (effect) has a character of its own, though it is related to its parts (cause) in an inseparable way. The pot can be used to fetch water but the two pot-halves by themselves do not have that function. It is true that apart from the pot-halves the pot has no existence but it is also true that it is something over and above them. Curds is non-existent in milk, but it is
produced from milk owing to the dis-integration of parts and a fresh collocation of its parts. The particles of milk endowed with a particular smell and a particular taste produce curds with a particular smell and taste due to the peculiarity produced by heating (pākaja-viśeṣa). Likewise, a sprout is produced from a seed owing to the rearrangement of its atoms due to heat. They produce first a peculiarity (ātiśaya) in the shape of the first swollen condition, then an intermediate swelling and then the last peculiarity in the shape of germination.

2.3. NYĀYA CRITICISM AND ŚĀMKHYA DEFENCE OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA

The Śāmkhya-Yoga has met with scathing criticism at the hands of the followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The earliest text of the Vaiśeṣika's, namely, the Śūtras of Kaṇāda, does not refer to the Śāmkhya-Yoga. Praśastapāda primarily aims at explaining the philosophical thought contained in the Śūtras of Kaṇāda and his interest does not extend to the examination of the other systems. Commentators of the Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, like Udayana and Śrīdhara undertake the task of refuting the Śāmkhya-Yoga doctrines which are opposed to their system. The Śūtras of Gautama provide only hints for a criticism of the Śāmkhya-Yoga theory of the existence of effect in its cause prior to its production. Vātsyāyana received much doctrinal background from his predecessors. Hence, he has ample scope to refute the theories of other
Let us turn to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refutation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of pre-existent effects. Śrīdhara, in his Nyāya Kandali, poses the question: if even before the operation of the cause the cloth is existent in the yarn, why is it not perceived even though all the conditions required for perception (i.e., its material cause, the organs of vision and light etc.,) are present and there is also the desire to see it? Entities such as tables and chairs, pots and cloth are perceptible when they exist, and become imperceptible once they are destroyed. When such perceptible objects are not perceived it is reasonable to conclude that they are non-existent. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends that the cloth being a perceptible phenomenon, does not exist in the yarn, since it is not perceived (in the yarn) prior to its production even though our visual senses are in good condition and other conditions also are satisfied. But the Sāṁkhya-Yoga contends that the existence of the effect can be ascertained through anumāna, though it is not amenable to perception and there is no reason to deny the existence of an object, if it can be ascertained by inference. But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa counters this argument and asks, if the effect (cloth) exists in the cause (yarn), in what form does it exist? Does it exist on the loom in the form of the cloth fit enough to be worn by a person? If the cloth exists in that form, then the causal
operation expected to be undertaken to produce it from the yarn becomes superfluous. If it be argued that the causal operation is necessary despite the presence of the effect in the cause in the same form in which it is present at the end of causal operation, then where is the end for such a causal operation? The fact that an object exists implies that there is no need of causal operation to bring it into existence, and if one still persists on the need for a causal operation to bring an entity that already exists into existence, it is bound to land us in the anomaly of endless causal operations. The only way to overcome this difficulty is to admit the non-existence of the effect. However, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga sticks to its doctrine of pre-existent effects, with necessary modifications. It argues that the cloth does exist in the yarn not in the form in which it is fit enough to be worn by an individual but in the form of the yarn, thereby causal operation does not become superfluous as it is necessary to transform the yarn into the cloth. However, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is not convinced of the merits of this new attempt on the part of Sāṁkhya-Yoga to sustain its doctrine of pre-existent effects. He considers that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga attempt is in fact vindicative of the spirit of asatkāryavāda. To say that the cloth as such is not existent in the yarn but is existent in the form of a hank of yarn, amounts to admitting that the cloth produced after the causal operation is not the same as the cloth present in the form of a hank of yarn. And this position is in no
way different from that of asatkāryavāda\textsuperscript{33}.

The \textit{Vaiśeṣika Śūtra} (ix.1.1) lays down that an effect, in consequence of the non-assertion of actions and attributes to it, is non-existent prior to its production. Śaṅkara Miṣra in his \textit{Upaskāra} on the above śūtra, adds: if the effects, the jar etc., were existent before their production, they would be affirmed to possess actions and qualities; in the case of a jar already produced, such affirmations are made as that the jar is at rest, or in motion, or seems to be coloured. There is no such assertion, antecedent to its production. It is therefore, inferred that it is non-existent before production\textsuperscript{34}.

Gautama, the author of \textit{Nyāya Śūtras}, refers to three views prevailing during his period on the relation between cause and effect. They are: 1) before its production the effect cannot be said to be either non-existent, or 2) existent, or 3) both existent and non-existent. In his commentary on the above, Vāisyāyana\textsuperscript{35} elucidates the opponent's position as follows: an object is not non-existent before its production, because there is a specific rule concerning the material cause (of every effect). The specific rule is: for the production of each particular effect some particular material only is to be obtained, and not anything and everything. If the effect be non-existent (prior to its production), such a specific rule cannot be justified. An effect cannot be existent (before its production), because it is illogical to speak
of the production of an effect that exists already. Nor can an effect be both existent and non-existent because, existence and non-existence being absolutely dissimilar in nature contradict each other. After mentioning the views of the opponent, Gautama and Vātsyāyana go to establish their own view that the effect is non-existent (asaṅ) prior to its production. To the objection as to why we should accept the non-existence of an effect before its production, Gautama answers by saying that because the production and destruction (of an effect) are actually observed. Origination (utpāda) of the non-existent and destruction (vyaya) of the existent are a matter of our experience. The words ‘origination’ and ‘destruction’ go against the ‘transformation’ (parināma) view, for, ‘origination’ actually means coming into existence of that which was non-existent and ‘destruction’ means the going out of existence of that which was existent. It means that the effect is non-existent (asaṅ) before its production.

We shall now turn to a consideration of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refutation of the five arguments of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa which form the philosophical basis of satkāravyādha.

1. The first argument of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in support of the pre-existence of the effect in its material cause is that, since what is non-existent cannot be produced; what is produced must be accepted to be existing even before
its production. The Naiyāyikas contend that the Sāmkhya criticism is based on a wrong interpretation of asatkāryavāda. There are things of different natures. A sky-flower is absolutely non-existent. Jars and the like are non-existent before they are produced and existent after their production. Hence, there is no absurdity in the doctrine of the production of non-existent effects (asatkāryavāda). The followers of satkāryavāda allege that the Naiyāyikas court the absurdity of self-contradiction by ascribing the contradictory features, namely, non-existence and existence to one and the same thing. However, Śrīdhara observes that there is no self-contradiction in it, for they are non-existent at one time and existent at another time.

The most obvious objection to the Sāmkhya argument, according to the Naiyāyikas, is that it makes no distinction between what is an absolute non-entity (ātyantābhāva) and what is non-existent before its production (prāgābhāva). An absolute non-entity like the hare’s horn is, by its very nature, non-existent at all times and is therefore unproducible. An effect, such as the jar produced by a potter is, on the contrary, non-existent only as long as it is not produced. So, it is characterised by both ‘non-existence’ and ‘existence’—‘non-existence’ before the causal operation, and ‘existence’ after causal operation. Hence, no contradiction is involved, since the contradictory properties (non-existence and existence) characterise the effect successively.
and not simultaneously\textsuperscript{38}.

The Sāṁkhyā makes much of the impossibility of the non-existent. A fictitious entity like the hare’s horn, it is argued, can never be produced. But the Naiyāyika replies that a fictitious entity is not produced not because it is non-existent, but because there is no cause for it. That alone is produced which has a cause, and whatever is produced, is found to be non-existent before its production. It is however, not suggested that anything that is non-existent can be produced, or that non-existence by itself is a condition of production. There is in fact, no logical criterion to ascertain why only some and not all, non-existent facts become subsequently existent. Therefore, the question why the hare’s horn is not produced is absolutely futile.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s\textsuperscript{39} reply to this argument of non-production of non-existent entity is different. He says that the Sāṁkhyā interpretation of this argument is based upon a wrong understanding of the theory of asatkārya. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa observes that asatkāryavāda does not suggest that anything non-existent including the absolute non-existents such as the sky-lotus (atyantābhāva) is produced, but it only means that which is produced is non-existent (prāgābhāva).

2. The second argument of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in support of the prior existence of the effect is based on our dependence on particular material causes for
certain effects. Only a particular material is taken for a certain effect to be brought about. Whoever wants to produce oil, thinks of oil seeds. He who wants cloth, searches for yarn and so on. Without the effect being pre-figured in its material cause, the seeking or taking recourse to an appropriate material cause for a certain effect to bring about cannot be explained. This appropriate recourse to certain material causes for certain effects cannot be meaningfully accounted, for unless it be on the assumption that the effects are already pre-figured in their material causes.40

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa,41 states the above view of Śaṁkhya thus: If we do not accept the prior existence of the effect in its material cause, causal operation will be without substratum. Our search for a particular cause when we expect a particular effect will be an aimless endeavour, if the prior-existence of the effect in its material cause is not accepted. Thus, our recourse to certain material causes such as milk when we want curds, implies the prior existence of curds in milk, for otherwise we would be engaged in a wild-goose chase.42

The Naiyāyikas accept that they too would think of milk and not water when they want to produce curds. But they do not accept the pre-existence of the effect in its material cause. They contend that restriction in our search for certain effects in certain material causes alone could be meaningfully
explained without taking recourse to the doctrine of pre-existent effects (satkāryavāda) that defies all our efforts to determine the material causes for effects. According to the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the specification of a particular cause for a particular effect is not conclusive to prove the existence of the effect in the cause. Our knowledge that cloth is produced from yarn, for example, does not arise before the production of cloth from yarn. The agent selects a particular cause for a specific effect because he knows its capacity to produce the specific effect through his experience.

While criticising the argument that causal operation will be without substratum, if the effect is not supposed to be existent in the cause, it is said that an agent proceeds to activity only when he knows the causal relation between a particular cause and effect. Knowledge regarding this causal relation is attained through our observation of the activities of elderly persons. Moreover, says Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, according to satkāryavāda, the rule of taking a particular material for a particular effect (upādāna-niyama) will not be tenable because, according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, everything is everywhere. ‘There is everything in everything’ because, everything is only a particular mixture of three guṇas and if obstruction is removed by proper efficient causes, everything can be produced from everything. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that, according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga all effects being transformations
of sativa, rajus and tamas, there can be no particular cause for particular effect. Any effect can be expected from any cause. Thus, it is satkāryavāda that defies all our efforts to determine material cause for effect. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa⁴⁷, further remarks in a sarcastic manner: "It will be very difficult for the poor fellow (the satkāryavādu) to perform difficult penance for penitence, because the food he takes becomes dung. Thus (the dung being already existent in food), he will have to go for penitence (again and again) because of eating dung. The fellow, therefore, will be caught up in great difficulty."

The Naiyāyikas contend that it is ascertained by positive (anvayā) and negative (vyatireka) invariable concomitance that a particular cause is capable of producing a particular effect. That is why a particular cause is selected to get a particular effect⁴⁸. Viśvanātha⁴⁹ argues that the weaver undertakes his operation on yarn with the idea that ‘cloth shall be produced from yarn’ and not that the cloth is pre-figured in the yarn. The Naiyāyikas, therefore, contend that we can reasonably explain the practice of people with regard to their search for particular effects in particular causes without accepting the view of the pre-existence of the effects.

The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā also supports satkāryavāda. Pārthaśārathī Miśra in his Śāstra Dīpikā⁵⁰ observes that a pot is not an object of perception either when it is in the state of clay-lump or in the
state of two pot-halves, for otherwise it would contradict the anupalabdhi.

The Naiyāyikas seem to rely on experience coupled with their observation of the practice of elders to account for restriction in our search for certain causes for certain effects. But experience being limited, we cannot conclusively argue from the observed particulars to the unobserved all. It is only on the assumption that the effects are pre-figured in their respective material causes that we can offer a satisfactory explanation for restriction in our search for certain material causes for certain effects.

3. Another argument advanced by the Sānikhya-Yoga in support of satkāryavāda is that there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. To deny this relation is to court an absurdity that anything may produce anything, i.e., every effect would arise from every cause, which is contrary to our experience. In the absence of a determinate relation between the material cause and the effect, there can be no ground for restricting the causal operation (kāraṇa-vyāpāra) to the production of a particular effect. When all effects are equally non-existent and unrelated to the cause, there is no reason why one particular effect rather than another should occur, whatever the cause may be. But this is a flat contradiction of the law of causation. Thus, it must be admitted that a certain cause produces a certain effect because of a necessary relation between the two. And because, any
relation is impossible in the absence of either of the relata, the things related as cause and effect must ‘exist together’. An existent cause cannot be thought of as having a real relation with a non-existent effect. Hence, the effect must be supposed to be pre-figured in its material cause even before its production.

Adverting to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga contention that if you do not accept pre-existence of the effects in their respective material causes, the restriction in production being absent, anything can be produced from everything; Śrīdhara\(^5\) observes that there is no scope for such an anomaly if we understand the causal relation in its proper perspective. We need not have to assume the pre-existence of the effect in order to explain restriction in production. Śrīdhara observes that the competence of cause, ‘yarn’, is restricted to the effect namely ‘cloth’ alone. Our experience clearly shows us that the competence of certain class of things such as milk is restricted to the production of certain other class of things such as curds. Causal relation must be understood with reference to the specific universals characterising the particulars. Thus, curds cannot be produced from anything and everything, but from a thing characterised by the specific universal (jāti) ‘milkiness’ (kṣīrātva) alone. That is to say kṣīrātva limits the causality of milk (kṣīra) to the production of entities characterised by ‘curdness’ (dadhiya). Hence, there is no scope for
production of anything from everything even if we do not subscribe to the doctrine of pre-existent effects.

But this argument of The Naiyāyikas with reference to universals also is not of any avail to explain the restriction in production of certain effects from certain causes. That entities characterised by dādhiṭva are produced by entities characterised by kṣīraṭva is also ascertained by empirical experience. Experience being limited, it cannot ensure the uniformity and universality of causality. Further, the universal kṣīraṭva is not a potentiality or power of the kṣīra (milk) that limits its production to dādhi (curds) but only an epistemic mark or indicator of the fact that things characterised by the universal kṣīraṭva are seen to produce things characterised by dādhiṭva. It must therefore be stated here that however much the Naiyāyikas might try, it is not possible to explain the restriction in production without reference to the pre-existence of certain effects in certain material causes.

4. The fourth argument of Ṛṣabha Kṛṣṇa in defence of satkāryavāda is that 'the potent cause can produce only that for which it has power or potency'. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa questions: what does the Sāṁkhya-Yoga mean by power (śakti)? Is it different from the object manifested (i.e., the effect)? Or identical with it (effect)? If it is different, it means that the effect is different from the power and it leads to the establishment of uṣṭkāryavāda.
If it is identical with the effect, it leads to the futility of causal operation. But, this is not supported by experience.

The real nature of power is explained by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa himself. Power, according to him, is the nature (of the effect) characterised by its ability (yogyata) and accompanied by the auxiliaries. This power is two-fold: one is existent (avasthiṣṭa) and the other is accidental (āganiṣṭha). We always see that an effect is produced by these two powers and thus, one who wants an effect, takes up these two. The ‘ability’ (yogyata) too is not something different from the object. Power itself should not be said to be the effect, since it is established through apprehension that the nature of the effect is different from that of power. Moreover, if we take power itself to be the effect, we have to accept that the effect is produced from the effect, which is absurd. A jar is not produced from a jar.

5. The fifth argument of Ṣvāra Kṛṣṇa in support of the prior existence of effect in its material cause is based upon the non-difference of the cause and the effect53.

The Naiyāyikas raise a series of objections against the above doctrine of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. They contend that the difference between cause and effect is directly perceived. Moreover, if cause and effect are supposed to be identical, the whole world will be identical with its cause, i.e. Pradhāna
and consequently imperceptible. Satkāryavāda, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa cannot be maintained because, the distinct natures of cause and effect are proved by perception. Asatkāryavādins argue that no one disputes the fact that curds comes out of milk. We can say that it is milk which produces curds and yet at the same time maintain that curds is not basically the same as milk, but something new and different. Curds is not present in milk prior to its origination. At least the differences between curds and milk indicate that curds is surely a different and new thing.

We propose to state here-under the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments against the Sāṁkhya doctrine of non-difference of cause and effect and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.

a) The Naiyāyikas contend that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga argument that the effect is produced in the cause and the effect is destroyed in the cause, involves self-contradiction. The same cause cannot be the abode of two contradictory actions, namely, production and destruction. For example, when a piece of cloth is torn threadbare, it involves the action of being destroyed on the part of the cloth and that of being produced on the part of the yarn. The identity of cloth and yarn would thus mean that the same thing is being destroyed and produced at the same time. Vācaspāti Miśra explains away the first objection with the example of tortoise. Just as the tortoise
puts out its limbs and draws them in, but does not create or destroy them, so the cause is unfolded into the effect, and the effect is dissolved into the cause. The tortoise is not different in its states of contracting and expanding limbs. Similarly, particular modifications like jars and crowns, etc., coming out of the same clay and gold etc., are said to appear or be produced from the latter, and when they lapse into their causal state they are supposed to be destroyed. As a matter of fact there is no ‘production’ of what is non-existent, nor destruction of what is existent, as declared by Lord Kṛṣṇa. 56.

b) Cause and effect are objects of different cognitions. We have cognition of a cloth in the form ‘This is a cloth’. But we have cognition of the constituent yarn in the form ‘this is yarn’. Hence, cause and effect are different.

The followers of Sāṃkhya do not consider that differences in ‘cognition’ would necessarily lead to difference in the ontological status of an object. For instance, our cognition of ‘Rāma’ as the son of Daśaratha is different from our cognition of ‘Rāma’ as the husband of Sītā. But this does not mean that there are two different Rāmas.

c) Since cause and effect are objects referred to by different words such as ‘clay’ and ‘pot’, the Naiyāyikas contend that they are different.
This objection of the Naiyāyikas is answered by the Sāmkhya-Yoga with the help of the example of a forest consisting of 'Tilaka trees. Just as we speak of 'Tilaka trees in the forest' though they are not essentially different from each other, so we speak of 'the cloth in the yarn', though they are not essentially different from each other. Though, these are differently called or spoken of by different words, they are not different from each other.

d) The fourth objection of the Naiyāyikas against the non-difference of cause and effect is as follows: The function or the purpose served (arthakriya) by cause is different from that served by effect. For instance, yarn cannot cover a body whereas cloth can. Being different in function, cause and effect are different from each other.

The Sāmkhya-Yoga contends that the difference in function does not prove difference in essence, since a single entity can have different functions. The same fire, for example, can burn, cook food and give light. Each individual bearer performs the function of seeing the path, not that of carrying the palanquin, which he does collectively, i.e., in co-operation with other bearers he can carry it. Similarly, the yarn by itself does not serve the purpose of covering, but can do so on combining and taking the form of a cloth.

Vācaspati Miśra urges that the arguments of the Naiyāyikas cannot
prove the essential difference between cause and effect. There is an essential
identity between them; their difference is accidental due to manifestation and
non-manifestation in one and the same thing.

2.4. EVALUATION OF THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA AND
NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA THEORIES OF CAUSATION

The followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are so much convinced about the
essential difference between material cause and effect that, they believe that
the effect originating from its material cause resides in it by the relation
of inheritance (samavāya). When the effect, cloth, is produced from the yarn,
the cloth (effect) is supposed to reside in its material cause, namely, yarn
by the relation of inheritance. It is for this reason that what is usually regarded
as the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) by the other systems of Indian Philosophy,
is regarded as the inherent cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa) by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.59
Accordingly, the yarn constitutes the samavāyi-kāraṇa for the effect cloth;
the pot-halves constitute the inherent cause for the effect pot. Hence, even
after the emergence of the effect the inherent cause continues to exist, for
in its absence the effect lacks a substratum to abide in. Thus when an
effect such as cloth is produced, there is not only the cloth but also the
yarn wherein the cloth resides by the relation of inheritance. The opponent
raises an objection. Two things that are essentially different are either conjoined
like table and the table-cloth spread on it or disjoined like the Vindhyas and the Himalayas. Since, the cloth and the yarn are neither conjoined nor disjoined, they cannot be considered different\(^6\). But the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reply that the rule of conjunction and disjunction does no hold good in respect of entities in the relation of inherence (sanātana). The cloth and the yarn being linked by the relation of inherence, they are neither conjoined nor disjoined. The relation of inherence is so subtle that it is not possible to see things so related as different.

This difference between the material cause and the effect is so fundamental to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that it believes that right from the ultimate material causes, namely, atoms to the final product (antyayavānovin) continue to reside by the relation of inherence without any loss to their identity. When for example, a cloth is to be produced, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains the process as follows: two atoms conjoin and produce the effect dyad (dvēṣu). Three dyads conjoin and give rise to an effect called trīd (treṣu). Four triads combine and give rise to a quartrad (chaturāṇuṣu). Several quartrads combine and produce a filament (aṁśu) of cotton. Several filaments of cotton combine and produce a fine fibre. Several fibres combine and constitute a thread. Several threads join together and give rise to a cloth. Here, the atoms constitute the ultimate material cause and the cloth constitutes the final produc
(antiyayavavin). The important point to be noticed here is that the cloth (antiyayavavin) is not really one but a complex of many intermediary causes and effects bound together by the relation of inherence. An intelligent man, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, discerns the dyads inhering in the atoms; the triads inhering in the dyads, the quartrads inhering in the triads; the filaments of cotton inhering in the quartrads; the fine fibres inhering in the filaments of cotton; the yarn residing in the fine fibres by the relation of inherence and finally the cloth residing in the yarn by inherence—all intact without any loss to their identity. This is the miracle performed by the relation of inherence. When two things are related by inherence, the relata do not lose their identity. It is on the basis of this logic that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends that when an effect such as cloth is produced from yarn, it remains metaphysically a distinct entity over and above its inherent cause, namely, yarn. Hence, the material cause and the effect are considered different by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The inherent cause (yarn) and the effect (cloth) are objects of distinct cognitions (jñāna-bheda). My awareness of ‘yarn’ is different from my awareness of ‘cloth’. They are characterised by distinct universals (jāti-bheda), namely, ‘yarnness’(tattvā) and ‘clothness’ (paññātva). They serve distinct functions (kārya-bheda), since the effect ‘cloth’ serves the function of covering our body whereas the cause ‘yarn’ does not. They are referred to by distinct names (nāma-bheda), namely, ‘yarn’ and ‘cloth’.
With all these differences, the material cause and the effect are bound to be essentially different. The fact that they do not look different is only due to the peculiar relation, namely, inherence (samavāya) that binds them.

The followers of Śāṅkhya-Yoga, however, legitimately raise the objection as to how there can be causal relation between things that are essentially different. The objections raised by the Parmanides against change are relevant in this connection. Parmanides holds that if a thing is to change, it has to change into its own self or into something other than itself. If a thing changes into its own self, then the change is not real, for, a thing cannot change into its own self. It cannot change into a thing other than itself. Parmanides, therefore, concludes that change is unreal. The objections raised by Parmanides against change can be raised against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the production of non-existent effects (asatkāryavāda). According to asatkāryavāda, the effect being non-existent in its material cause, it must be considered to be essentially different from it. But, then, how can a thing produce something which is essentially different from itself?

The followers of asatkāryavāda are not unaware of such difficulties. Referring to the Śāṅkhya-Yoga objection that if effects are not pre-figured in their respective material causes, why should people think of certain material causes such as milk when they want to produce curds or yarn when they
want to produce cloth, Viśvanātha, the follower of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school observes that one who is interested in curds will not take to milk by seeing curds in milk but by knowing from his own past experience and also the practice of the elders that curds is produced from milk and not from water, and cloth from yarn and not from sand.

It is true that it has been the practice of people to resort to yarn for cloth, milk for curds, clay for pots. It is also true that this restriction in our search for certain things in certain things alone is not based on our perception of the effects in their respective material causes. But one cannot offer an intelligible explanation for this restriction in our search for certain effects in certain material causes alone and restriction in production such as curds from milk alone and not from water and so on unless we accept some necessary connection between cause and effect. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga attempt to solve this problem by accepting the pre-existence of the effects in their respective material causes is rather crude and recondite in spite of the fact that it seems to offer an intelligible explanation for the relation between the material cause and the effect. But, if we can construe the Sāṁkhya-Yoga position as a suggestion for necessary connection or the relation of entailment between cause and effect, we do not have any objection to accept its standpoint. A.C.Ewing's remarks are very appropriate here. He observes: "The view that
causation involves logical entailment has often been stated in a radically wrong way. It is often said that the effect must be contained in the cause, or that there must be identity between cause and effect. These statements taken strictly, are preposterous. The effect cannot be simultaneous; and it cannot be identical with the cause in the proper sense of the word, for otherwise it would not be a different event. Both views would do away with change and so with causation itself.\textsuperscript{61}

To put it in the language of modern epistemology, the relation between cause and effect is \textit{analytic} according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, whereas it is \textit{synthetic} according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The \textit{satkāravyāda} of Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not permit anything new in the effect which is not contained in its cause. The effect cannot contain anything more than its cause. Causation is nothing but a transition from the unmanifest to the manifest, implicit to the explicit, potential to the actual. If an effect is understood as a complex of substance and attributes, both of them are to be traced to its material cause. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga illustrates its conception of the relation between the material cause and the effect by means of the example of the tortoise stretching its limbs out and then withdrawing them into its shell. When the tortoise stretches its limbs out, we do not say that they have emerged from their state of antecedent non-existence. The limbs were already there withdrawn into its
shell and are simply made manifest or brought into our view. Similarly, when the tortoise withdraws its limbs into its shell, we do not say that they are annihilated. On the other hand, they have simply disappeared from our view; they are made unmanifest. Hence, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga is firmly committed to the Gīḍā's view that there is no production for the non-existent and destruction for the existent.

It is true that the followers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga dispense with the notion of novelty in causation, but they have no option, if they are to uphold the notion of necessity between cause and effect. Though the asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika satisfies the requirements of novelty of the effect, it is at the cost of necessary connection between the cause and the effect. The followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do not accept the pre-existence of the effect in its material cause. They also do not accept the power (sakti) for a particular cause to give rise to a particular effect. In the absence of these two conditions they have to simply rely on experience alone to account for the universality of causation. Confronted with the question as to why people always search for certain effects in certain causes alone such as milk for curds and clay for pots, if the latter are not contained in the former, the followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, have to find justification by simply appealing to experience. It has been the experience of the elders to take to certain material causes
when they wanted certain effects. On the basis of this tradition (vyavahāra) and on the basis of their own experience, they also think of certain material causes alone for certain effects. But mere experience does not guarantee the universality of causality. The criticism that Hume levels against the causal necessity also holds good against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the relation between the material cause and the effect (asaṅkāryavāda), for there is no guarantee that the present will be repeated in the future. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with its commitment to the doctrine of prior non-existent effects (asaṅkāryavāda) can never offer a convincing explanation for the universality of causation.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga explains necessity but it cannot account for novelty in the effect. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains novelty but it cannot account for necessity between the cause and the effect. The point is that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga has no obligation to explain the novelty of the effect, for its commitment to saṅkāryavāda does not permit any novelty and it does not regret it. The fact is that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga offers the most convincing explanation for the universality of causal relation.

The theory of causation of any given system is based on its conception of the relation between properties (dharma) and substance (dharmi). The basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is the theory of dharma-dharmi-bheda i.e., the essential difference between the substrate and its properties.
The cloth (dharma) in order to be real must have an essence different from that of the yarn (dharmi). This is the reason why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopts the theory of asatkāryavāda. On the other hand, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga builds its philosophy on the conception that the properties (dharmas) are not different from their substance (dharmi). The effect cloth (dharma) has no being apart from the being of its cause, yarn (dharmi). It is only an aspect or form which is non-different from its cause. Hence, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga subscribes to the theory of non-difference between the cause (dharmi) and the effect (dharma).

2.5. EFFECTS OF SĀMKHYA-YOGA AND NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

COMPAIRED WITH RESULTANTS AND EMERGENTS

It is pertinent to compare and contrast the effects according to satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda with the emergents and resultants of the Emergent Evolution of Lloyd Morgan and Samuel Alexander. Emergent Evolution distinguishes between "resultants" and "emergents" in the evolutionary process. The former stand for the origination of entities that are already existent. Here, the effect is an 'unfolding of what is already enfolded'. The latter refer to the origination of something new, that which is 'unpredictable from the pre-existent events'. Whereas the resultant can be predicted, expected or calculated even before its occurrence, the emergent cannot be predicted,
foreseen or calculated.

The followers of Emergent Evolution accept that the evolutionary process gives rise to both emergents and resultants. When life evolves from matter, life is regarded by them as an emergent. Similarly, mind which evolves from life and consciousness from mind are regarded as emergents. The meaning of emergence is that it is not predictable from the pre-existent events. It does not stand for mere re-grouping of what was already existent, but a new event or an entity. For example, no one can predict that molecules in a state of vapour would give rise to liquid after cooling. Similarly, nobody can predict the origin of life from matter, mind from life and consciousness from mind. Hence, they are characterised as emergents. However, the followers of Emergent Evolution do believe that changes such as wood into various items of furniture or gold into various ornaments stand for the resultants only, since changes here involve merely the re-grouping of the existing entities.

The effects of satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and asatkāryavāda of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika broadly stand for resultants and emergents of Emergent Evolution respectively. But all effects in satkāryavāda stand for resultants only and in asatkāryavāda for emergents only. At no stage of production can we conceive of emergents in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and resultants in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The effects according to the former, accordingly stand for
the 'unfoldment of what is enfolded' and according to the latter for 'unpredictable from pre-existent events'.
REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. Āraṁbhavādh kaṇabhakṣapakṣah sanghītalavādastu bhadantapakṣah |
    sāṁkhyadipakṣah pariṇāmavādāh vedāntapakṣastu vivaravādāh || SS.II.63

2. RV.X.129.1

3. śvetaketor yanna somyedam mahāmanā anūcānāh |
    māni stabdhiḥ śi uta tamādesama prākṣyaḥ ||
    yenāśrutam śrutam bhavati amatam mata navijñātam |
    vijñātamīti katham na bhagavah sa ādeśo bhavatī || CU.VI.1.2.3

4. nā'sato vidyate bhāvo |
    nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ || BG.II.16

5. navastuno vastusiddhiḥ || SPS.1.78

6. Ibid.1.115-118, 121.

7. asad-akaraṇād upādīna-grahaṇāt, |
    sarvasaṁbhavā-bhāvāt ||
    śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt, |
    kāraṇa-bhāvāc ca satkāryam || SK.IX


And also see Anima Sen Gupta, "In Defence of the Sāṁkhyā Kārikā Definition of the Cause", PAS, Vol.IX, July-October, 1974, Nos.3,4, pp.120ff.

8. SK.IX.

9. GB.IX.

10. STK.IX.

11. nāsaduṭpādo nṛṣṇagavat || SPS.1.114

12. STK.IX.

13. sarvatra sarvadā sarvasaṁbhavāt || SPS.1.116
20. Is a kind of grass, the grain of which is eaten by the poor (*Paspalum-scrobiculatum* is its botanical name)

21. STK.IX.

22. YD. See under IX.

23. STK.IX.

24. Ibid.


The Vaiṣeṣika view is the same as that of the Naiyāyikas.


27. NKS. p. 58.

28. NS.IV.i.48-50.

29. NK.p. 144.

30. NM.p. 493.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvādasat | VS.IX.i.1.

35. NB.IV.i.50.

36. NS.IV.i.49.

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37. buddhisiddham tu tadasat | Ibid.IV.i.50.
38. NK.p. 144.
39. svarūpa sahakāryādī hetavō yad vidhayanaḥ | drṣyante janyate taddhi navyomakusumādhikam || NM.p. 494.
40. SPS.I.115, STK.IX.
41. NM.pp. 493,494.
42. asatica kārye niraλambanaḥ kāarakavyāpāro bhavet | NM.p. 493.
43. NB.IV.i.50.
44. NVTT.p. 622.
45. adyatve vyavahāropi naivāpurvāh pravartyate | yathopalabdham vrddhebhhyāh sa tataivānugamyate | NM.p. 494.
46. satkāryavāde ca sūtrām upādānaniyam durghātah | sarvaśya sarvatra bhāvāt sikitātīla sarastiraκkedāra....... | Ibid.p. 495.
47. api ca prāyaścittam yeṣa tapasvī tapta kṛcchram atikāṣṭam kāṭham carīṣyatūḥ mahangatosi kārunyām | annam ca tāvāt asmāti anteca varacōṭiḥ vid bhakṣanāt prāyaś 'cittīyata evāyam........... | Ibid.
48. NK.pp. 342,343.
49. NSV.IV.i.50.
51. NK.p. 144.
52. NM.p. 495.
53. For Sāmkhya position refer pp. 39-41.
54. NK.pp. 342,343.
55. na ca kārya kāraṅayoh abhedāt satkāryamiti vaktavyam | tāyoḥ pratyakṣa siddha bhinnā svarūpātyah | NM.p. 496.
56. BG.II.16.
57. STK.IX.

58. Ibid.

59. ‘Samavāyi-kāraṇa’ according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that cause wherein the effect originates and resides by the relation of inherence.

"yatsamavetam kāryamupadhyate tatsamavāyi kāraṇam" | TS.XL.

60. STK.IX.


For details see Jitendra Mohan Chandra, "Can Cause and Effect be Contemporaneous?", IPQ, Vol.VII, pp.81-89.


66. Ibid.