CHAPTER IV

PARIṆĀMĀVĀDA AND VIVARTAVĀDA
4.1. Śaṅkara in Defence of Satkāryavāda

Though the followers of Sāṃkhya-Yoga and also of the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta do subscribe to satkāryavāda, they differ in their explanation of the production of effects. While the Sāṃkhya-Yoga believes that production involves real change (pariṇāma) of the cause into effect, the followers of Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta hold the view that production on ultimate analysis is only illusory (vivāra) and does not involve real change (pariṇāma).

Śaṅkara is as eloquent in his support of satkāryavāda and in his opposition to asatkāryavāda as the followers of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. He is in total agreement with the reasons offered by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga in defence of the doctrine of pre-existent effects and its attack against the asatkāryavāda of Nyāya.
Sankara advances the following arguments in support of satkāryavāda\(^1\) in addition to the arguments of Sāmkhya which we have presented already in chapter II.

1. Sāṅkara seeks to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of asatkāryavāda by attacking its category of inherence (samavāya). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits a kind of relation called inherence (samavāya-samīdanda) in which the related entities cannot be separated and this obtains between cause and effect, substance and qualities, etc.

Since the difference between cause and effect according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is based on the inseparable relation called samavāya, Sāṅkara attacks the concept of samavāya itself. Sāṅkara asks: "what is the nature of the samavāya relation?" It cannot be identical with the terms it relates, since it is introduced on the principle that the two terms are really different. If A and B are different but bound together by a relation of inherence, which we propose to designate as C, then we cannot logically predicate C's identity with both A and B. If C is identical with A, it follows that it is non-identical with B. If C is identical with B, it follows that it is non-identical with A, since A is non-identical with B. Therefore, the possibility of inherence being identical with the terms it relates is ruled out.

This confronts us with the problem of determining the connection
between the relation of inherence to the things which it relates. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treats cause, effect and the relation of inherence by which they are related as independent reals. It should therefore, posit an infinite series of inferences to relate cause and effect to each other. This infinite regress (anavastha) can be avoided, if essential identity (tādāmya) of the effect with its cause is admitted. If it were not admitted, cause and effect would be isolated from each other, and could not be related to each other. If it is argued that the relation of inherence does not lead to such a regress, by the provision that inherence itself has no relation with two terms of the relation, we are worse off, since the latter becomes disconnected and talk of relationship becomes meaningless.

If it be held that samavāya being itself of the nature of a relation between cause and effect, it does not require any other term to relate itself to cause and effect, then conjunction (saṁyoga) also being of the form of a relation can be related to the two terms related by it without the help of samavāya relation. But, this goes against the Nyāya view according to which conjunction (saṁyoga) being a quality, resides in the two terms related by it by the samavāya relation. Moreover, says Śaṅkara, the assumption of the samavāya relation is unwarranted, since substance, qualities, etc., are understood to be identical.
Śaṅkara adduces another argument to refute the *samavāya* relation. He asks: "How does the effect-substance, which is a 'whole' (*avayavina*) abide in the causal-substance which is in the form of parts (*avayavas*)? Does it reside in all the parts taken together or in each part separately? If it be the former, we shall not be able to see the 'whole' because our visual organs are not in contact with all the parts. Manyness, residing in the substrates taken together cannot indeed be apprehended by apprehending the parts individually. If the 'whole' resides in the parts through a part to part relation, even then we shall have to assume some parts of the 'whole' different from the original constituent parts, through which the 'whole' resides in the original constituent parts, in a part to part relation, as indeed, a sword pervades its sheath through parts which are different from the parts of the sheath. Śaṅkara, observes that when a thing abides in another which is regarded as different from the first, the other thing has different parts in which it abides in the parts of the first. A whole is regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a totally different entity over and above its parts. According to this logic, the whole must have parts of its own different from those of its parts. Now, again, in order to abide in these parts different from the original parts, the 'whole' will require other parts different from them and so on which will lead to an infinite regress. If it is said that the whole
abides in each particular part, that too will be inadmissible because, when
the 'whole' is present in one part, it cannot be present in another, just as
Devadatta, present in Srughna, cannot be present in Pataliputra on that very
day. If, at all, a 'whole' has to abide in many parts at the same time,
there will be many 'wholes' not one, like two different persons Devadatta
and Yājñadatta residing in Srughna and Pataliputra. If it is said that the
'whole' can fully reside in each part, just as the universal 'cowness' (gotva)
is fully present in each individual cow, that too is not admissible, says
Śaṅkara, because the 'whole' is not seen as abiding in each part like the
universal 'cowness' seen residing in each individual cow. Further, if the
whole is fully present in each part, we will be confronted with another
difficulty. As the 'whole' is one, it should produce effects in all the parts
in which it abides. Thus, the cow should be able to perform the function
of its udders by its horns and the function of its back by its chest. But,
it is not seen so. Thus, the whole theory of the asatkāryavādin, that the
effect, in the form of the whole abides in causal parts through samavāya
relation, falls to the ground. Cause and effect must therefore, be accepted
as non-different because they are seen to be so.

Śaṅkara does not recognise samavāya as a reality but considers it as
an artificial construction of the intellect. He criticises it, since it has pluralistic
and realistic implications. Inherence is a necessity in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to uphold its philosophy of pluralism and realism and it stands as a hurdle to philosophy of non-dualism for which Śaṅkara’s system stands. Naturally, Śaṅkara is prone to attack it.

2. Śaṅkara raises another objection against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of non-existent effects on the basis of the relation between cause and effect. A relation is possible only between two existing entities, and not between an existing and a non-existing entity, or between two non-existing entities. Asatkāryavāda involves the notion of the origination of the effect without a referent i.e. without a basis. Action presupposes something which is active, just as the action of walking refers to an agent who walks. All activity necessarily involves some referent or other. We cannot conceive the notion of action without an agent. Śaṅkara alleges that asatkāryavāda warrants such an impossible situation. If we reject the doctrine of pre-existent effects, we cannot offer an intelligible explanation of the production of an effect such as a jar, for, since the jar itself does not exist at the moment prior to origination, something else must serve as the substratum of the originative act. This substratum cannot be the potter or his materials, since these are already existent prior to the origination of the jar. When we speak of the origination of the jar, we do not mean by this expression the origination
of the potter or his materials. If the asatkāryavādin were to recognise the necessity of a referent which is a requirement for an intelligible explanation of production, he has to concede the pre-existence of the jar in the form of its material cause, e.g., clay. By origination is meant (in this case) the modification of clay into the form of a jar.

3. The contention of the asatkāryavādin that the effect is non-existent before origination, suggests a limit to the effect. But, it is absurd to assign a limit to the non-existent entity. The notion of a limit has meaning only with reference to real existing things such as fields and houses. Non-existence is destitute of features, which would serve to distinguish it from other things. Being literally nothing, it is an unreality and such an unreality cannot be spoken of as a limit.

4. If the effect were non-existent in its cause, the activity of the agent would be objectless, since a non-entity cannot be its object. Even the hundred strokes of a sword cannot cut the ether. The agent’s action cannot be said to act on the material cause, since action on one thing cannot produce another thing. A potter cannot make a gold pot out of clay with a staff and a wheel. If the effect is said to be the specific power of the material cause itself, then it pre-exists in the cause before its production in this form.
The _asatkāryavādin_ may seek to explain the specification of causes in a manner consistent with his theory, by saying that although the effects do not exist at all in their causes prior to their production, each such cause possesses a potency or power to produce its specific effect. Although effects as such on the _asatkāryavāda_ view are equally non-existent everywhere before such production (e.g., the jar before its production no more exists in a lump of clay than in, say, a fruit), because such causes possess this potency to produce effects peculiar to themselves, we get certain effects from certain causes and not otherwise, e.g., curds from milk and not from clay, etc.

Śaṅkara subjects this notion of potency to some sharp criticism. If by it is actually meant an antecedent form of that which becomes the effect, then the _asatkāryavādin’s_ theory is by virtue of this admission discarded. Potency (_atiśaya_) is assumed by the _asatkāryavādin_ in the present instance in order to avoid the charge that his doctrine leads to a conclusion which is at odds with what is observed in causal processes. But, if this potency is other than both cause and effect, the same problem recurs which it was intended to meet, since if the potentiality which is presumably resident within the cause is other than that which becomes the effect, the charge can still be made that there is no reason why a certain potency and not another should produce a particular effect. Obviously, unless one resorts to some
theory of magical potency on the part of causes, the situation can only be made intelligible by a straightforward admission that such potentialities are in fact nothing other than the effects themselves before emergence.

5. The cause and effect are identical, says Śaṅkara, because only when the cause exists, the effect is observed to exist, not otherwise. This dependence is illustrated by the example of a jar, which cannot exist without its material substratum (i.e., clay) and the cloth, which cannot exist without its material substratum (i.e., yarn). Cause and effect moreover are implicated in each other in a way which exists among entities whose distinctness from each other is not in doubt. A horse, for e.g., is different from a cow and is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists, because in this case, though the relation between the two is that of cause and effect (nimitta-naimittika), they are different. Therefore, the inseparability of cause and effect presents a case for their non-difference.

Śaṅkara also gives an illustration to substantiate his view. So long as a piece of cloth is rolled up, he says, we cannot know whether it is a cloth or something else. But, when the rolled thing is unfolded, we can see that it is nothing else but cloth. Moreover, when the cloth is rolled up, we though, sometimes, know that it is a cloth, do not know of what
length and breadth it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars about it. As the unrolled cloth is only a manifested form of the rolled cloth, similarly, cause and effect are identical; the effect e.g., a cloth is only a manifested form of the cause, namely, the yarn, the manifestation being done by the operation of the instrumental causes such as a shuttle, loom, weaver etc.\textsuperscript{14}

4.2. PARIN\=AMA LEADS TO VIVARTA

Although, Ģaṅkara totally agrees with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga line of thinking in defence of satkāryavāda, he considers that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga is not correct in its interpretation of production as real\textsuperscript{15}. The spirit of satkāryavāda that the effect is non-different from its material cause cannot be sustained on the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine that the production involves real change (parin\=ama). The Sāṁkhya-Yoga is perfectly right in its contention that the effect is non-different from its cause. But, it exhibits a poor understanding of the implications of satkāryavāda, when it claims that production involves real change. The followers of Ģaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta were fully aware of this inconsistency in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga interpretation of satkāryavāda. Interpretation of satkāryavāda as parin\=ama, while explaining the process of production, is defensible from the empirical point of view (vyāvahārīka). But, it is indefensible from the ultimate point of view (pāramārthika) as it
does not cohere with the true purport of \textit{sakāryavāda}. It is for this reason that \textit{Sarva}jñātman, a follower of the \textit{Śaṅkara} school of \textit{Advaita Vedānta}, considers that the \textit{parināmanavāda} of \textit{Sāmkhya} is a prelude (\textit{pūrvabhūmi}) to \textit{vivartavāda}\textsuperscript{16}. The \textit{Sāmkhya} is correct in its contention that the effect is non-different from its material cause, for otherwise, we cannot account for the restriction of certain effects to certain material causes. But, \textit{Sarva}jñātman thinks that the \textit{Sāmkhya} is not aware of the implications of the doctrine of \textit{sakārya} when it claims that production involves a real change (\textit{parināma}). True to the spirit of \textit{sakāryavāda}, the \textit{Sāmkhya} contends that effect is not a different entity over and above its material cause but only a different state or form of its material cause. In conformity with this doctrine, production does not involve the emergence of the new, but the disappearance of one form and the appearance of another in a substance that endures. When gold in the form of a chain is melted and transformed into bangles, there is no change in the gold-substance as such. The gold-substance remaining the same, its earlier form, namely, that of a chain disappears and it acquires another form, namely, that of bangles. The question to be raised at this juncture is: whether the form (chain or bangles) is something different from its substance (gold). The \textit{Sāmkhya}, in tune with the spirit of \textit{sakāryavāda}, contends that the form is non-different from its substance. Neither the chain
nor bangles has a being of their own apart from the being of its substance, namely, gold. The form has no being of its own, it always belongs to its substance. It remains unmanifest before causal operation and becomes manifest after causal operation. On this assumption, production does not involve real change in as much as the effect is existentially identical with its cause. No new entity is produced in as much as the effect which remains in the cause in an unmanifest form becomes manifest under causal operation. As we have stated already, production and destruction in Śaṁkhyā resemble the tortoise stretching its limbs out of its shell and withdrawing the same into its shell respectively. Production is manifestation (āvīrbhāva) and destruction is envelopment (tirobhāva).

There is, however, a contradiction in the Śaṁkhyā position in that though it accepts the identity of the effect with its material cause, it still believes that production involves real change. But, it cannot maintain the non-difference of the effect from its cause, if it insists that production involves real change (pariṇāma). The followers of Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta being aware of this contradiction in the Śaṁkhyā doctrine of pariṇāma involving real change, aimed at correcting this error. Sarvajñātman, in his Saṁśēpa śārūraka17, rightly observes that if production involves real change, it is not possible to avoid the notion of the difference of the effect from its cause.
and hence the reality of the effect independent of its cause, however, negligible it be. But the admission of the difference of the effect from its cause goes against the doctrine of satkārya\textsuperscript{18}, according to which the effect is non-different from its material cause. Thus, consistency with the doctrine of satkārya does not permit the Śāmkhya to accept the doctrine of real change (parināmavāda). In otherwords, parināmavāda does not cohere with satkāryavāda. The followers of the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta, being aware of this contradiction in the Śāmkhya interpretation of satkārya as parināma do not subscribe to the doctrine of real change and interpret satkāryavāda as involving only illusory change (vivarta).

Assuming that the effect is not a different entity over and above its cause, but only a different state or form of its material cause, the Advaitin asks whether the change of form affects the identity of the object. Śaṅkara, contends that causation involves a transition of object (cause) from one state to another. When clay (cause) is transformed into a pot (effect), here the change is only in form and not in the substance, for the clay in its causal state possesses the form of a lump and in its effect state acquires the form of a pot with a bottom and a belly. The pot is not a different substance over and above clay, it is only clay in a different form. The point to be noted here is, whether change in the form affects the identity of an object.
The Advaitin answers that change of form does not affect the identity of an object which undergoes change. If form has an independent existence apart from its substance, then we are justified in upholding the reality of change and hence the reality of the effect. But deep reflection and analysis of the instances of the change of cause into an effect show us that form has no existence of its own independent of its substance. It owes its being to its substance. Thus, the effect being nothing but a particular form or state of the cause-substance, it can be said that when cause changes into an effect, it does not entail any change in its essential nature. The fact that we recognise objects even when they undergo change of state or form, affords ample evidence in support of the identity of an object even after it undergoes change of form. Devadatta, when standing has a particular form; when he sits, he brings his arms and legs close to his body i.e., while sitting he has a different form. But he is recognised as the same Devadatta in spite of change in his forms. If change in form were to involve change in the essential nature of a person or an object, his or its identity would not be possible. In so far as change in form does not lead to change in the essential nature of an object, Śaṅkara argues, causation which involves only change of form does not involve real change in the cause. The point is well illustrated in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad19, when it says that "These
modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification*. Śaṅkara, reiterates the same in his Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya. Śaṅkara illustrates, how the Vaiśeṣika having accepted qualities or forms as independent reals gets into insurmountable difficulties to explain the relation between substance and its qualities. In order to relate two distinct reals such as a substance and its quality, Śaṅkara contends, we require a third entity, namely, inherence (samavāya). But the third entity also being different from the first two, it requires a fourth entity to get itself related to the first two. In this way it lands us in an infinite regress (anavastha-doṣa). Thus, there being no end to our supposition of entities, it will never be possible for us to explain satisfactorily the relation between the quality (form) and its substance (matter). And this absurdity is due to our supposition that qualities or forms have also distinct reality. The only way out of this is to deny distinct reality to qualities (form) and accept the fact that since they are non-different from their substances, change in form or quality does not involve real change in the substance. The effects, thus, being merely different forms of the abiding causal substance, do not stand for real modifications (pariṇāma) of the causes but only appearances (vivarta) of the causes.

One might contend that the Advaitin is unreasonable in dispensing
with the reality of change and that his position contradicts what we perceive in our experience. But, the Advaitin argues that though the changes are obvious to our senses, they are logically untenable. For instance, we do perceive the movement of the sun, his rising and setting; we perceive the stick immersed in water to be bent; but we do not take them as real, since they are proved otherwise by reason. So is it with our experience of change of cause into an effect. Though they appear to be real to our senses, they are logically untenable. It is pertinent to note that the Parmenides in the west arrived at the unreality of change on similar grounds. Parmenides asks, if a thing changes, it must either remain the same even after change or it must be different. If it remains the same even after change, it means the thing has not really changed and if it is different, he asks, how can anything become different from itself? Since, the notion of change though obvious to our senses is unintelligible to our reason, Parmenides concluded that change is not real\(^2\).

The Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta, dispenses with the doctrine of causation as such from the ultimate point of view, since it is riddled with contradictions. The *parināmavādin* contends that the effect is identical with its cause whereas the *āraṇāmāvādin* maintains that it is a totally different entity over and above its cause. But, if the effect is identical with the
cause, there is no necessity for production i.e., production is not real and hence there is no causation. If the effect is essentially different from its cause, the two being unrelated, there cannot be any production, for how can a thing produce something essentially different from itself. Hence, there is no causation. It is on this logic that Śaṅkara relegates the category of causation to the practical realm (vyāvahārika) and upholds the doctrine of illusory change (vivarta) from the point of view of ultimate reality (pāramārtthika-satya).

Śaṅkara's interpretation of satkārya as vivarta is not only necessitated by logic and analysis of experience but also by the scriptural authority. Before we enquire into the scriptural evidences in defence of vivartavāda, we propose to bring out the distinction between pariṇāma and vivarta. Vidyāraṇya observes, when an object attains a state which is different from its present one, it is known as real change (pariṇāma); but when an object merely appears to be of a different state, it is called transfiguration (vivarta), change which is of the same grade of reality is transformation (pariṇāma), and change which is not of the same grade of reality is transfiguration (vivarta). When milk changes into curds, we have an instance of pariṇāma; but when a rope appears as a snake, we have an example of vivarta. In the transformation of milk (cause) into curds (effect), the cause and the
effect belong to the same order of reality. But in the transfiguration of a rope as a snake, the so-called cause (rope) and the effect (snake) belong to two different orders of reality. When the rope appears like a snake, it does not undergo any change and yet it stands as the substratum for the idea of a snake in the passerby. Despite its necessity for the appearance of the illusory snake, the rope cannot be considered as the cause for the snake, in the sense in which we consider the 'yarn' and the 'weaver' as the causes for the cloth. To be the cause of a snake, the rope must be either a material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) or an efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). The notion of material cause stands for the matter that undergoes change or transformation as when milk changes into curds. But, when the rope appears like a snake, the rope does not undergo any change at all. The rope remaining as rope gives rise to the idea of an illusory snake. Hence, the rope cannot be considered as the material cause. The concept of efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) suggests that principle which exercises effort to bring about changes in the material cause. But the rope cannot be considered as an efficient cause, since it does not exercise any effort to give rise to the illusion of a snake. Hence, the rope is neither a material cause nor an efficient cause. Yet, the fact is that in the absence of the rope we would not fall upon the idea of an illusory
snake. Śaṅkara, constructs that it is more appropriate to consider the rope as the substrate (adhiṣṭhāna) for our experience of an illusory snake and not the cause because, the idea of a cause involves the notion of material causality or efficient causality and the rope is none of them. Yet, if there is no rope, there is no illusory snake-experience. But there would be a rope even in the absence of an illusory experience of a snake.

4.3. BRAHMAN TRANSGENDS CAUSALITY

Śaṅkara, explains the relation between Brahman and the world on the above lines, and his explanation is based on logic and scriptural authority. We have dealt with the former under the heading, how parināma leads to vivarta. We propose to explain the latter here.

The scripture declares that Brahman the reality is one, that it is immutable and devoid of parts, and that it is unborn, great and firm. It is true that the world of plurality owes its existence to this one reality. If there is no Brahman, there is no world at all. Nevertheless, Brahman cannot be considered the cause of the world. Because as we have seen already, to be a cause, it should be either a material cause or an efficient cause. But we cannot ascribe either material causality or efficient causality to Brahman. Brahman cannot be considered as the material or the transforming cause, for being devoid of parts it cannot transform itself. If Brahman
were to undergo transformation, then either the whole or part of it should undergo transformation into the world. But, if the whole of *Brahman* were to change into the world, then it would lose its transcendence and we need not have to seek for it elsewhere. If a part of *Brahman* is supposed to change into the world, it means that it is divisible into parts. This goes against the scripture which declares that *Brahman* is devoid of parts. Thus, the entire idea strikes one as absurd. Again, change is a sign of imperfection and deficiency. *Brahman* being perfect there is nothing for it to realise by changing. "That which is full and perfect, adequate and independent, absolute and free, cannot undergo any change or transformation".

It follows that *Brahman* cannot be a material cause. It cannot be considered as an efficient cause also. An efficient cause either creates the world out of nothing or produces it out of the existing material. We cannot ascribe creation to *Brahman*, for creation involves a motive or a purpose, and motive and achievement of purpose are incompatible with the ultimacy of *Brahman*, which transcends all such motivation. Again, production of the world out of the existing material such as atoms, *Prakṛti*, souls etc., is also repugnant to the ultimacy of *Brahman*. To posit some other realities like atoms, *Prakṛti*, souls etc., side by side with *Brahman*, is to limit and finitize it and it goes against the scripture which asserts emphatically and
unambiguously that reality is one. Further, the admission of some other reals different from Brahman conflicts with the scriptural assumption that the knowledge of the one results in the knowledge of the many. If there are many reals which are different from one another, how can we justify the scriptural assertion that the knowledge of the one leads to the knowledge of the many. The above analysis leads to the conclusion that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.

But, then, how are we to account for the existence of the world of diversity and change? What is the relation between Brahman, the immutable and the world which is mutable? The world cannot be said to be different from Brahman, for it contradicts the scriptural assertion which upholds the non-difference of the world from Brahman. It cannot be identical with Brahman either, since identity is not possible between the sentient Brahman and the inert world. Nor can the world be said to be both different and non-different from Brahman, since two contradictory features like difference and non-difference cannot reside in one and the same substance. It is in view of such incompatible alternatives, that Sankara upholds the idea of non-difference of the world from Brahman. Non-difference, however, does not mean identity between them. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga also believes in the non-difference of the effect from its cause, and it means thereby identity.
But the vivartavādin’s notion of non-difference of the effect (world) from its cause (Brahman) implies the denial of difference or separate being of the effect from its cause and not identity with the cause.

Vācaspati Miśra observes that the Advaitin merely denies the difference of the effect from its cause, but never affirms identity between them\(^3^7\). The effect has no reality apart from the reality of its cause. The world has only contingent existence and no intrinsic existence. It is only an appearance (vivarta) of Brahman. Brahman appears as the world even as the rope appears as the snake\(^3^8\). This suggests that Brahman and the world belong to two distinct orders of reality. The former is ultimately real (pūramārthika-satta) and the latter is only empirically real (vyāvahārīka-satta). Causal relation is possible between one phenomenon and another or entities belonging to the same order of reality, but not between phenomena and noumena. Since, vivartavāda is the doctrine by which the Advaitin seeks to explain the relation between Brahman and the world which belong to two different orders of reality, it cannot be taken as a causal doctrine. Speaking from the ultimate point of view, the world has to be declared unreal. How can we conceive of any relation between the real and the unreal? Śaṅkara observes that the real can never have any relation with the unreal\(^3^9\).

To explain it in another way: according to the doctrine of the causality
of Brahman, Brahman is the cause and world its effect. So it is expected that Brahman and the world will be similar in nature. But are they actually so? They are not. Brahman, according to all descriptions, is sentient, ever pure, eternal and of the nature of knowledge and bliss, whereas the world is non-sentient, impure, changeable, of the nature of ignorance, and full of misery and sorrow. How can there ever be any cause and effect relation between the two? This, in short, is the problem in respect of Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda.

The Advaitin offers a logical explanation and not a causal explanation for the appearance of the world besides Brahman. Brahman is not the cause of the world, but the 'because' (logical ground) of the world. The observations of N.K.Brama go a long way in throwing light on this issue. He says that "the cause is that which precedes the effect and effectuates its generation. But in this conception of the perfect and the full, the free and the independent ground, what is called the effect is always contained in the cause; or truly speaking, there is no effectuation, no process of generation, no temporal relation, no antecedence or succession and hence there is neither any cause nor any effect." This is precisely the reason why the Advaitin cannot accept the ultimacy of the causal category. The category of causation, as in Kant, is empirically valid, but transcendentally an appearance. Causation is an instrument of thought, a principle of synthesis and not an ultimate
reality. Though Brahman constitutes the ground of the entire world of causes and effects, it transcends that world and hence the principle of causation does not apply to it at all. Brahman transcends time, cause and every form of empirical characterisation. This is what the Advaitin means when he says that the notion of causation is phenomenal and therefore, has no ultimate significance.

Śaṅkara, however, has no objection to accept the Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrine of real change (pariṇāma) from the point of view of the phenomenal world. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy stands for realism and it does not go as far as Advaita in relegating the world of plurality to the realm of appearance. Hence, it cannot accept vivartavāda.
REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. SBS.II.i.14-20.

2. samavāyah svayam sambandha rūpatvāt anapekṣyaiva aparāṁ sambhandham sambandhyate samyogapi tarhi svayam sambhandhariūpattvāt anapekṣyaiva samavāyaham sambandhyeta | SBS.II.i.18.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. na hi bahutvāṁ samīṭesvāśrayesu vartamānāṁvyastāśraya grahaṇena gṛhyate | Ibid.

6. So that the 'whole' can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers. Ibid. Translated by Thibaut, Vol.1, p.336n.

7. SBS. II.i.18.

8. satorhi dvayoh sambhandhaṁ saṁbhavati, nāsudāsatorasatorvā...... | Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. na hāyaśvo goranyah san gorbhāva evopalabhyate| na ca kulālabhāva eva ghaṭaṁ upalabhyate, sātyapi nimitta naimittika bhāve’nyatvāt | Ibid. II.i.15.

14. Ibid. II.i.19.

15. For details see Frank Podgorski, "Śaṅkara’s Critique of Sāṁkhyan Causality
16. vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmiḥ
evāntavade pariṇāmavādaḥ]
vyaśasthitāmin pariṇāmavāde
svayam samāyati vivartavādaḥ || SS.II.61.

17. vakyaprawṛttimanusṛtya ca sūtrakāraḥ
siddhātātmanānyadatra vivartavādam |
tattvaprakāśanavidhāpahṛtya saktim
āraṁbhanādivacanāvaparaprāmayaḥ || SS.II.56.

18. Ibid.


20. SBS.II.1.4


24. pariṇāmonāma upādānasamattākāryāpatṭih | vivartonāma upādāna-

25. See Max Nalon, "Śaṅkara and the Causal Concept" (part I), PB, Vol.
   LXXII, Nov. 1967, pp.467, 468.

26. CU. VI.I.

27. VPS.p.204.

28. virajah para ākāśādaṇa ātmā mahān dhṛvah | BU.IV.IV.20.

29. See for details Dr. Roma Chaudhuri, "An Objection Against Brahma-

30. For details see Max Nolan, "Śaṅkara and the Causal Concept" (part I),

31. VPS.p.204.
32. niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyāṁ śāntāṁ niravadyāṁ nirāñjanam   |   SU. VI.19.


34. CU.VI.I.4.

35. Ibid.

36. SBS.II.i.20

37. Bhāmatī. II.i.14.

38. SBS.II.i.9


40. It does not mean that the snake as such is (pre-figured) in the rope. It only means that the rope is never devoid of the possibility of giving rise to the snake-illusion.