Chapter—2

THE ERA OF

FAITH AND

REASON
2.1 Leading Problem Of Man

Man's leading problem is the achievement of well being in this world. It is believed men have the intellectual and moral capacities to solve this problem and to fashion a good life for themselves by their own efforts. The middle Ages were a period during which other worldly interests dominated philosophy. The problem not of this life but of the next seemed of primary importance. Now there was a supernatural ideal; Ethics and politics as the leading sciences gave way to science of theology, which, for the Greeks, had been merely an appendix to physics. Science itself (conceived of as rational inquiry) declined in importance in an age in which man's natural powers were regarded as severely limited. The medieval mind, acutely conscious of its inability to achieve the supernatural good for which it now hoped, but its trust in an Infinite Being held to be supremely good.

"You must know that the world has grown old, and does not remain in its former vigour. It bears witness to its own decline. The rainfall and the sun's warmth are both diminishing; the metals are nearly exhausted; the husbandman is failing in the fields, the sailor on the sea, the soldier in the camp, honesty in the market, justice in the courts, concord in the friendships, skill in the arts, discipline in the morals. This is the sentence passed upon the world, that everything which has a beginning should perish, that things which have reached maturity should grow old, the strong weak, the great small, and that after weakness and shrinkage should come dissolution."

Plato and Aristotle form the two great pillars of Greek philosophy the master spirits of the ancient world. In their union and contrasts they constitute the two poles of thought around which all human search for truth must revolve with them. Greek speculation comes forth from its isolation and enters as a factor into the more general stream of civilization, which was created under the Roman power by the contract and fusion of the people who dwell around the Mediterranean. After Plato and Aristotle,
knowledge took various phases and was grabbed with different concepts in the succeeding years. The concept of knowledge bent more towards politics. The Scholastic thinkers put many doctrines of knowledge. They gave the doctrine of real existence of Universe the name Realism. The mediaeval thinkers distinguished sharply between the realism of Plato and the Realism of Aristotle. Till the 12th century, Platonism even in its neo-Platonic glues, found few supporters, but in the 13th century of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, Aristotelialism was wisely represented. In 14th century 'Conceptualism' in opposition to Realism developed according to which the only existent realities are individual entities while Universal is simply an abstract of individual concept of ideas. Before the scholastic period scepticism exhibited itself under two new aspects [Socrates and Plato] as an accompaniment of religious belief, and as an element of constructive thought. The method, by which Plato found his way out of the skeptical difficulty, was to transform it from a subjective law of thought into an objective law of things. Adopting the Heracletean physics as sufficient explanation of the material world, he conceived, at a comparatively early of his mental evolution, that the fallaciousness of sense-impressions is due, not to the senses themselves, but to instability of the phenomena with which they deal; and afterwards on, discovering that the interpretation of ideal relations was subject to similar perplexities, he assumed that, in their case also, the contradiction arises from a combination of the same the other determining whatever differences prevail among the ultimate elements of things. Finally, Plato solved the problem of cognition by establishing a parallel between the human soul and the universe as a whole; the circles of the same and the other beings united in the celestial orbits and also in the mechanism of the brain.

Skepticism among the ancients was cultivated in connection with some positive doctrine, which is directly served to recommend. The skeptical contention is that we cannot go beyond appearances, the empirical contention is, that all knowledge comes to us from experience, and that this only shows us how phenomena are related to one another, not how they are related to their underlying causes, whether efficient or final. These alluded points of view have been brought into still more intimate association by modern thought, which has sprung from a modified form of the ancient skepticism, powerfully sided by a simultaneous development of physical science. At the
same time the new school have succeeded in shaking off the narrowness and
timidity of their predecessors, who were still on far under the influence of the
old dogmatics as to believe that there was an inherent opposition between
observation and reasoning in the methods of discovery, between facts and
explanations in the truth of science, and between antecedence and causation in the
realities of nature. In this respect, astronomy has done more for the right
adjustment of our conceptions than any other branch of knowledge; and it is
remarkable that Sextus Empiricus, the last eminent representative of ancient
skepticism and the only one whose writings are still extent, should expressly
except astronomy from the destructive criticism to which he subjects the whole
range of studies included of what we should call the university curriculum of his
time.³

What influence scepticism exercised on the subsequent course of Greek thought
is different to determine The right analogy will be found not by looking forward
but by looking back It will then be seen that Neo-Platonists were that their
traditional name implies, disciples of Plato and of Aristotle. They stood in the
same relation to the systems which they opposed as that in which the two great
founders of spiritualism had stood to the naturalistic and humanistic schools of
their times of course with whatever modifications of a common standpoint were
necessitated by the substitution of declining for a progressive civilization.

Greek thought did not come to end with Aristotle. The Plato-Aristotle
antithesis dominant the western thought for a long time, in as much as it
illustrates the opposition between theory conceived as a practical path; because it
assumes religious tradition of bliss and salvation and a metaphysics, which is a
speculation of the intelligent man who remains on his human level At the end of
Greek period, Platonism was reinforced by Neoplatonism, which inherited most of
the earlier doctrinal trends, and taught a theory which was one with practice to
know the primordial source of the universe is to know what we truly are and to
become that; further-more, outwards action, depending on contemplation, is, is, as
it were, its shadow.
The tone of religiosity in Stoicism appeared more strongly in an important school of philosophy developed in the 3rd century called Neoplatonism. This school was concerned with epistemological and metaphysical problems; for example: The Neoplatonists were aware of the ambiguities in Plato's theory of forms; they made a genuine effort to deal with these difficulties. In the process of attempting to solve the technical philosophical problems on which Platonism broke and to which Aristotle had proved at best only a partial answer. The Neoplatonic version of Platonism proved to be one of the chief modes of Plato's continuing influence on philosophical thought. The two aspects of Platonism that chiefly appealed to the Neoplatonists were 1) Its tendency towards transcendence; and 2) Its antirationalism—its insistence that none of the really important truths can be communicated by conceptual means. In both of these respects the Neoplatonists simply emphasized those passages in Plato's writing that suited their own biases and ignored those in which Plato himself had sought to correct his more extreme statements. Hence, the Neoplatonic reworking of Platonism plainly showed the mood of the new age. As regards transcendence, Plato's insistence on the inferior status of the sense world on the superior reality of the transcendent forms complemented the otherworldliness and world-weariness of the third century. The antirationalist side of Plato's thought had already been taken up in the last centuries of the old era by the academic sceptics, who had concentrated on those passages in which Plato had argued that physics can never be more than a "likely story." The latter had been content to remain sceptical about metaphysics and to fall back for guidance in the affairs of daily life upon an essentially pragmatic attitude. Since we can never know the absolute truth about anything, we should, they held, operate on the basis of probability. This has a very modern sound.

Today we like to think that we do not lust after certainty. If a theory or a line of action "works," that is, produces satisfactory results, most people do not worry about whether it is "true." This pragmatic attitude seems to have satisfied the Academic skeptics. But by the 3rd century the conditions of life had changed. Men now sought certainty—through the mysteries of the Great Mother, through the worship of Isis, through faith in Jesus of Nazareth. The same overwhelming desire for certainty affected the Neoplatonists, and since, "like the skeptics, they had abandoned the old Greek conviction that truth can be rejected by reason, they
tried to find it by some suprarational method. The trend toward otherworldliness reinforced this desire to find a new and better mode of knowledge. As the conditions of their life worsened, as men saw the world around them collapsing, they naturally turned away from it and found solace in the vision of another and better world-perfect. The better world, about which experience can tell us nothing whatever, is experienced in the inner certainty of suprarational vision. The central problem of philosophy for the Neoplatonism, was how to achieve this vision, how to reach that better world.

Plato and Aristotelianism are found in the West in the Christian era. The doctrine of the Greek fathers and even that of St. Augustine are analogous to Plato's, while the thought of St. Thomas is in one respect reminiscent of Aristotle's. The trend derived from Platonism and the Greek Fathers persisted after the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. Modern philosophy has often stressed the rationalistic tendency which is a feature of Aristotelianism. Modern philosophy may be explained also to a large extent by the elimination of the spiritual and the mystical aspect of Platonism and by reduction of the latter to some doctrinal structures emptied of their original contents. Behind the difference and disagreements of life, behind its difficulties and unsolved conflicts, we all feel that there is a basic, vital unity; a sense of comradeship in a common spiritual endeavor. We all feel and believe, that life is more than appears on the surface, that its values are deeper than a shallow empiricism can reach. The adoption of such a view, even though we do not hope to see, the visions which extreme mystics describe for us, is helpful and self-validating; and it is in to this same and mitigated mysticism that Plotinus initiates us.

Neoplatonism was a philosophy of religion—"of religion" because of its emphasis on getting into a right relation with a suprarational reality; "philosophy" because it based this program on a reinterpretation of Plato's metaphysics. One of the key passages for this reinterpretation was Plato's account of the Form of the Good. In the Republic, he likened it to the sun, which renders physical things visible and is at the same time the cause of their generation and growth. Hence the Form operates in the realm of the forms: It "not only infuses the power of being known into all things known, but also bestows upon them their being and existence, but lies far beyond in the dignity and in power." So, this suggestion
that reality is beyond being was not earned any further by Plato but on the contrary, it was immediately followed by the claim that reality is not beyond being, that we can attain a knowledge of the most real world, even of the form of the Good, by dialectic— that is, by logical and rational methods.

2.2 Plotinus

Aristotle opted for the world of ordinary experience, whereas Plotinus opted for the suprarational. Acting on the hint given in the Republic and on the similar suggestions in other dialogues (in the Symposium, for instance), Plotinus developed the notion of a reality that is beyond being and beyond knowledge:

"The All-Transcendent, utterly void of multiplicity, is unity's self, independent of all else. That form which all the rest take their degree of unity in their standing, near or far, towards It. It is the great Beginning and the Beginning must be a really Existent One, wholly and truly One. All life belong to it, life brilliant and perfect. It is therefore more than self-sufficing. Author at once of Being and self-sufficiency. The First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit. It can be described only as transcending all things produced, transcending Being. To seek to throw a line about that illimitable Nature would be folly, and anyone thinking to do so cuts himself off from the most momentary approach to its least vestige.... As one wishing to contemplate the Intellectual Nature will lay aside all representations of the senses and so may see what transcends the realm of sense, so one wishing to contemplate what transcends the intellectual attains by putting away all that is of the intellect, no doubt, that the Transcendent exists, but never seeking to define it. Its definition could only be "the Indefinable," for This is a principle not to be conveyed by any sound; It cannot be known to any hearing, but if at all, by vision. We must not run after It, but we must fit ourselves for the vision and then wait tranquilly for it as the eye waits on the rising of the sun which in its own time appears above the horizon and gives itself to our sight. The Source having no prior, cannot be contained by sun other form."

Plotinus thinks of matter, as the last and worse failure of form to be its true self, as the stage at which the validity of form fades out, and exhausts itself in producing an image which is powerless to create. As quoted by Plotinus 75
"Matter is expelled from being, utterly separate from being. Incapable of transforming itself, matter remains for all eternity what it was originally, viz non-being. Originally it was no actual thing; but fell outside all that is; and it has never become actual. Wishing to clothe itself in forms, it has failed to catch even their colouring, and remains what it was; potential existence, a phantom, feeble, and without outline, never form. It is illusion, falsity; and its negative character sets its poles apart from positive reality".\(^5\)

Plotinus' attack on rational thinking was part and parcel of his affirmation of an extrarational vision. He wanted reason to be incompetent, for its incompetence would emphasize the value and significance of mystical experience. Plotinus had a mystical experience and that it gave him an inner conviction of certainty about the nature and the meaning of the universe throws a great deal of light on why he held such-and-such metaphysical and epistemological views. But mystical experience, however real and vivid they may be to the person who experiences them, are hardly a very satisfactory basis for a philosophical theory. To begin with, such experience are essentially private and are limited to a relatively few people.\(^6\) Those who have not had this experience can hardly form any clear idea of what Neoplatonism is about. Finally, Plotinus wants to give a theory about the universe as it is revealed in his mystical experience; but a theory is a rational account, and the experience is ineffable. Hence the experience inevitably transcends the conceptual scheme that must be employed if it is a theory that is being presented.\(^7\)

2.3 Stoics

The Stoics in their theory of cognition chiefly followed Aristotle; only with them the doctrine of empiricism is enunciated so distinctly as to be placed beyond the reach of misinterpretation. The mind is first a tabula rasa, and all our ideas are derived exclusively from the senses.\(^8\) But while knowledge as a whole rests on senses, the validity of each particular sense-perception must be determined by an appeal to reason, in other words, to the totality of our acquired experience.\(^9\) So also the first principles of reasoning, are not to be postulated, with Aristotle; as immediately and unconditionally as certain, they are to be assumed as
hypothetically true and gradually tested by consequences deducible from them.  
Both principles well illustrate the synthetic method of the Stoics their habit of 
bringing into close connection whatever Aristotle had studiously held apart. And it 
must be held in opposition to the German critics, that their method marks a real 
advance on his. It ought at any rate to find more favour with the experimental 
school of modern science, with those who hold that the highest mathematical and 
physical laws are proved, not by impossibility of conceiving their contradictories, 
but by their close agreement with all the facts accessible to our observation.  

The philosophical thought of medieval period mirrors the spirit of the times 
in assigning to tradition and authority a leading role; scholars swear by the 
church, by Augustine, Plato or Aristotle by their monastic orders or their schools. 
Accepting on faith the truth of the church doctrines, and yet feeling a strong 
urge for philosophical speculation, they endeavour to harmonize the two by 
reading the Christian faith into their philosophies or their philosophies into the 
Christian faith. Faith is the beginning and the end of their labors theology, the 
crown of all knowledge, the royal science even when knowledge is dumb, when 
reason stumbles, the truths of religion are still believed—all the more firmly by 
because of their mystery.  

2.4 Scholasticism  

Scholasticism means the philosophy which was dominant in the schools 
during the greatest part of transition. It is not a doctrine but a movement. The instructions were oral due to the absence of press, an art of disputation naturally arose. Philosophy became secular and passed from the priests to the public, but when the means of addressing audiences was from professional chairs, students passed over the seas and over the Alps to catch the words which fall from the lips of some renowned teachers. During the Middle Ages, the words authority, obedience, and subordination form important terms in the vocabulary of life. In every sphere of human activity— the influence of organized Christianity is supreme. As the representative of God in earth and the source of revealed truth, the Church becomes the guardian of education, the censor of morals, the court of last resort in intellectual and spiritual affairs. The chief concern of the scholasticism is
the transcendent world, the world of God, the angels, and the saints his thought
is fixed not so much on the phenomenal world as on the invisible realm of
spirits. There are no empirical means of finding the best way to life; since it is
bestowed by divine grace on those who do the will of God. The scholastic
thinkers did not address themselves to the problem concerning the possibility and
the limits of knowledge, they cherished an abiding dogmatic confidence in the
ability of reason to attain truth. A critical approach to the problem of the theory
of knowledge; which was a major preoccupation of the Greek thinkers, is largely
in abeyance during the scholastic period.

1000 A.D. To 15th century is the medieval age called as the scholastic
period. Medieval Christian philosophy tried to prove that the absolute Christian
truth was revealed in scripture and developed as a catholic doctrine by church
fathers, and that it could be ascertained in human mind by philosophical thinking.
The universe for scholastic realism is as it was for Plato and Aristotle, an ideal
universe, a system of ideas or forms, which are somehow mirrored in the
phenomenal world as the essential qualities of things. The real world is a rational,
logical world, and its nature can, therefore, be thought out by reason alone; and
relational structure of the world is transparent to the reason of the human mind.
The forms which constitute the essential nature of classes of objects, are reflected
in the thoughts or universal concepts. Now, if such ideas were merely thoughts in
our minds, if there were nothing real corresponding to them, either in things or
apart from things, then we could have no knowledge through them of things, no
rational knowledge of universe and of universals. Confidence in the power of
reason to reach truth is seriously undermined by the nominalistic doctrine. With
the advent of nominalism in the 14th century, the philosophy of the middle
ages, departs from the scholastic principles and was intimately conjoined with
realism and rationalism. Likewise with the decline of Scholasticism, the union
between reason and faith, philosophy and religion, which was one of the greatest
accomplishment of the scholastic synthesis, became less firm.

Scholasticism can be distinguished into three phases:

1) The Formative Period
This period begins with the 9th century. It is largely influenced by Platonic conceptions Platonism, Neo-Platonism, and Augustinianism are the dominant philosophical tendencies of this phase. Ideas are universals, conceived, in Platonic terms, as the real essence of things and as prior to things [universalia sunt realia ante res]. This is the theory of platonic realism of which Anslem is the leading exponent.

2] Culmination Of Scholasticism

13th century witnesses the dominance of Aristotle's philosophy. Christianity allies itself with the great Greek thinkers; universals are conceived as real, not however, as prior to things but in them [universalia sunt realia in rebus]. This teaching is called Aristotelialism. Thomas Aquinas is the leading thinker of this period.

3] The Period Of Decline

The decline of Scholasticism followed in the 14th century. Universals are now regarded as mere concepts in the mind or as mere words or name; particular things are alone real only in the mind and are hence after the things Universalia sunt realia post res] John Duns Scotus is the leading exponent.

Mediaeval philosophy was born when Christians discovered that simple piety no longer satisfied them, and when the desire to understand revived. Philosophical speculation during the latter part of the Middle Ages was chiefly concentrated on ascertaining the status of universals [a problem that had theological as well as epistemological implications] and on defining and delimiting the respective spheres of faith and reason. In course of these investigations, the instruments of logical analysis were greatly refined and the Scholastic method was devised. All this prepared the way for Aquinas' synthesis of classical learning with Christian insights. Aquinas reinterpreted the traditional Christian view of the divine nature in terms of the basic Aristotelian concepts of form and matter, actuality and potentiality. After Aquinas, philosophers turned from large-scale synthesis to analysis of relatively small-scale, "technical" problems. Whereas Roger Bacon was an empirically oriented, and even pragmatic, thinker, Duns Scotus and William of Occam were subtle logicians who undertook to refine and correct...
Aquinas' theory of knowledge. However rational and acute philosophical analysis might have become, it still had to operate within the strict limits set for it by transcendental truths, truths that were above reason and immune to analysis. The ultimate criterion for all knowledge and the ultimate sanction for all conduct was not the concurrence of human minds guided by the light of reason but the authority of a divinely inspired text and a divinely established institution.

What distinguishes the modern mind so sharply from the medieval mind is that modern men have largely lost that outlook and now share the basically secular point of view of the Greeks. To say that medieval men looked on this world as a sacrament means that they conceived this world to be but the visible sign of an invisible reality, a world thoroughly impregnated with the energy, purpose, and love of its Creator, who dwells in the bread and wine on the altar. It means that medieval men conceived of this world as a sacrifice to be freely and greatfully dedicated to the all-good, all-true Giver. But, whereas for us (and for the Greeks) the world by and large means just what it seems to be, for men of the Middle Ages it meant something beyond itself and immeasurably better. Whereas for us (and for the Greeks) life on earth is its own end, for medieval men life's true end was beyond this world.

2.5 St. Anselm

St. Anselm belonged to the Augustinian tradition. He devoted his chief intellectual effort to the understanding if the doctrine of the Christian faith and the statement of his attitude which is contained in the Proslogium bears the unmistakable stamp of the Augustinian spirit. 'I do not attempt, O Lord, to penetrate Thy profundity, for I deem my intellect in no way sufficient there unto, but I desire to understand in some degree Thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand, in order that I may believe; but I believe, that I may understand. For I believe this too, that unless I believed, it should not understand.' This Credo, ut intelligam attitude is common to both Augustine and Anselm.

St. Anselm is in full accord with Augustine when he remarks in the Cur Deus Homo that it is negligence if we make no attempt to understand what we
believe. In practice, for Anselm, this means an application of dialectic or reasoning to the dogmas of faith, in order to penetrate them, to develop them and discern their implications, so far as this is possible to the human mind, and the results of this process, for example his book on the Incarnation and Redemption (Cur Deus Homo), make Anselm of importance in the history of theological development and speculation. St. Anselm made no clear distinction between the provinces of theology and philosophy. His implied attitude of mind may be illustrated as follows. The Christian should try to understand and to apprehend rationally all that he believes, so far as this is possible to the human mind. Now, we believe in God's existence and in the doctrine of Blessed Trinity. We should therefore, apply our understanding to the understanding of both truths: 1) To the first truth, God's existence, will fall within the province of philosophy, while 2) The application of reasoning to the second truth, the Trinity will fall within the province of theology.

St. Anselm speaks of demonstrating the Trinity of Persons by 'necessary reasons' and of showing in the same way that it is impossible for a man to be saved without Christ. If one wishes to call this 'rationalism', one should first of all be quite clear as to what one means by rationalism. If by rationalism one means an attitude of mind which denies revelation and faith, St. Anselm was certainly no rationalist, since he accepted the primacy of faith and the fact of authority and only then went on to attempt to understand the data of faith. However, if one is going to extend the term 'rationalism' to cover the attitude the mind which leads to the attempt to prove mysteries, because one desires to understand all that one believes, without having first clearly defined the ways in which different truth are accessible to us, then, one might, of course, call the thought of St. Anselm 'rationalism' or an approximation to rationalism. But it would show an entire misunderstanding of Anselm's attitude, were one to suppose that he was prepared to reject the doctrine of the Trinity, for e.g., if he was unable to find rationes necessarie for it: he believed the doctrine first of all, and only then he attempt to understand it. The dispute about Anselm's rationalism or non-rationalism is quite beside the point, unless one first grasps quite clearly the fact that he had no intention of impairing the integrity of Christian faith. If we insist on interpreting St. Anselm as though he lived after St. Thomas and had
clearly distinguished the separate provinces of theology and philosophy, we shall only be guilty of an anachronism and of a misinterpretation.

St. Anselm develops in *Monologium* the proof of God's existence from the degrees of perfection which are found in creatures. Anselm proceeds, to give reasons for the Trinity of Persons in one Nature, without giving any clear indication that he is conscious of leaving the province of one science to enter that of another. The Platonic element is conspicuous and, apart from remarks here and there, there are no considered treatment of analogy; but he gives *a posteriori* arguments for God's existence which are of a much more systematic character than those of St. Augustine and he also deals carefully with the divine attributes, God's immutability, eternity, etc.

In first chapter Anselm applies the argument to goodness, while the second chapter to 'greatness', as he tells us, not quantitative greatness, but a quality like wisdom, the more of which a subject posses, the better, for greater quantitative size does not prove qualitative superiority. Such qualities are found in varying degrees in the objects of experience, so that the argument proceeds from the empirical observation of degrees of, for example, goodness, and is therefore an *a posteriori* argument. but the judgment about different degrees of perfection (St. Anselm assumes, of course, that the judgment is objectively grounded) implies a reference to a standard of perfection, while the fact that things participate objectively in goodness in different degrees shows that the standard is itself objective, that there is, for example, an absolute goodness in which all things participate to which they approximate more or less nearly, as the case may be.

This type of argument is Platonic in character (though Aristotle also argued, in his Platonic phase that where there is a better, there must be best) and it reappears in the *Via quarta* of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is an *a posteriori* argument: it proceeds from observed degrees of goodness to the existence of absolute goodness and from degrees of wisdom to the existence of absolute wisdom, the absolute goodness and wisdom being then identified as God. The developed form of the argument would necessitate, of course, a demonstration both of the objectivity of the judgment concerning the differing degrees of goodness and also of principle
on which St. Anselm rests the argument, the principle, namely that if objects possess goodness in a limited degree, they must have their goodness from absolute goodness itself, which is good *per se* and not *per alud*. It is also to be noted that the argument can be applied only to those perfections which do not *of themselves* involve limitation and fitness: it could not be applied to quantitative size.

St Anselm in third chapter of *Monologium* applies the argument of being. Whatever exists, exists either through something or through nothing. The latter supposition is absurd; so whatever exists, must exist through something. This means that all existing things exist either through one another or through themselves or through one cause of existence. But that X should exist through Y, and Y through X, is unthinkable: the choice lies between a plurality of uncaused causes or one such cause. From causality point of view the argument is simple, but St. Anselm introduces a Platonic element when he argues that if there is a plurality of existent things which have been of themselves, i.e. are self-dependent and uncaused, there is a form of being-of-itself in which all participate. Here at this point the argument becomes similar to the argument already outlined, the implication being that, when several beings possess the same form, there must be a unitary being external to them which is of that form. Therefore there can be one self-existent or ultimate Being, and this must be the best and the highest and greatest of all that is.

St. Anselm considers the relation of cause and effect in seventh and eighth chapters of *Monologium*. All finite objects are made out of nothing, *ex nihilo*, not out of a preceding matter nor out of the Cause as matter. St. Anselm explains that a thing is made *ex nihilo* is not to say that it is made out of nothing as its material: it means that something is created *non ex aliqua*, that, whereas before it had no existence outside the divine mind, it now has existence. It has sometimes been maintained that to say that a creature is made *ex nihilo* is either to make nothing something or to lay oneself open to the observation that *ex nihilo nihil fit*, whereas St. Anselm makes it clear that *ex nihilo* does not mean *ex nihilo tantum materia* but simply *non ex aliqua*. To the attributes of the *Eans a Se*, we can predicate of it only those qualities, which is absolutely better than not to possess them.16 To
illustrate, to be gold is better for gold than to be lead, but for man it would not
be better to be made of gold. To be corporeal is better than to be nothing at all,
but it would not be better for a spirit to be corporeal rather than incorporeal.
Only relatively to be gold is better rather than not to be, and to be corporeal rather
than not to be. But it is absolutely better to be wise, rather than not to be wise,
living than non-living, just than non-just. We must, then, predicate wisdom, life,
justice, of the supreme Being, but we cannot predicate corporeity or gold of the
supreme Being. Moreover, as the supreme Being does not possess His attributes
through participation but through His own essence, He is Wisdom, Justice, Life,
etc., and furthermore, since the supreme Being cannot be composed of elements
(which would then be logically anterior, so that He would not be supreme Being),
these attributes are identical with the divine essence, which is simple. Again,
God must necessarily transcend space, in virtue of His simplicity and spirituality,
and time, in virtue of His eternity. He is wholly present in everything but not
locally or determinate, and all things are present in his eternity, which is not to be
conceived as endless time but as interminables vita simul perfecte total existens. We
may call Him substance, if we refer to the divine essence, but not if we refer to
the category of substance, since He is incapable of change or of sustaining
accidents. In fine, if we apply to Him any name that we also apply to creatures,
valde procul dubio intelligenda est diversa signification.

St. Anselm develops, the 'ontological argument', in the Proslogium, which
proceeds from the idea of God to God as reality, as existent. He tells is that the
requests if his brethren and consideration of the complex and various arguments
of the Monologium led him to inquire whether he could not find an argument
which would be sufficient, by itself alone, to prove all that we believe concerning
the Divine Substance, so that one argument would fulfill the function of the many
complementary arguments of his former opusculum. Anselm developed the argument
in syllogistic form, under the form of an address to God. He starts the proof
from the idea of God as that than which no greater can be conceived, i.e., as
absolutely perfect: that is what is meaning by God. Anselm's argument is as follows:

"God is that than which no greater can be thought:
But that which no greater can be thought must exist, not only
mentally, in idea, but also extramentally. √

Therefore God exists, not only in idea, mentally, but also extramentally.

The Major Premiss simply gives the idea of God, the idea which a man has of God, even if he denies his existence.

The Minor Premiss is clear, since if that than which no greater can be thought existed only in the mind, it would not be that than which no greater can be thought A greater could be thought, i.e. a being that existed in extramental reality as well as in idea’.

Now, if such a being had only ideal reality, existed only in our subjective idea, we could still conceive a greater being, namely a being which did not exist simply in our idea but in objective reality, It follows, then, that the idea of God as absolute perfection is necessarily the idea of an existent Being, St. Anselm argues that in this case no one at the same time have the idea of God and yet deny His existence. For example, if a man thought of God as a superman, he would be quite right to deny 'God's' existence in that sense, but he would not really be denying the objectivity of the idea of God. If, however, a man had the right idea of God, conceived the meaning of the term 'God', he could indeed deny his existence, but if he realizes what the denial involves (i.e. saying that the Being which must exist of the essence, the necessary Being, does not exist) and yet asserts the denial, he is guilty of a plain contradiction: it is only the fool, the insipiens, who has said in his heart, 'there is no God.' The absolutely perfect Being is a Being the essence of which is to exist or which necessarily involves existence, since otherwise a more perfect being could be conceived; it is the necessary Being; and a necessary being which did not exist would be a contradiction in terms.

2 5.1 Objections

1) St. Anselm wanted his argument to be a demonstration of all that we believe concerning the divine Nature, and, since the argument concerns the perfect Being, the attributes of God are contained implicitly in the conclusion of the argument. We have only to ask ourselves what is implied by the idea of a Being than which no greater can be thought, in order to see that God must be
omnipotent, omniscient, supremely just and so on. St. Anselm in *Proslogium*, while deducing these elements gives some attention to the clarification of the notions in question. For example, God cannot lie: is not this a sign of lack of omnipotence? No, he answers, to be able to lie should be called impotence rather than power, imperfection rather than perfection. If God could act in a manner inconsistent with His essence, that would be a lack of power on His part. It might be objected that this presupposes that we already know what God's essence is, but Anselm would presumably reply that he has already established that God is all-perfect and so that he is both omnipotent and truthful: it is merely a question of showing what the omnipotence of perfection really means and of exposing the falsity of a wrong idea of omnipotence.

2) Argument of St. Anselm in the *Proslogium* was attacked by the monk Gaunilo in his *Liber pro Insioiente adversus Anselm in Prosglogo ratiocmationem*, observed that the idea we have of a thing is no guarantee of its extramental existence and that St. Anselm was guilty of an illicit transition from the logical to the real order. The Saint, in his *Liber Apologeticus contra Gaumilonem respondentem pro Insipiente*, denied the parity, and denied it with justice, since, if the idea of God is the idea of an all-perfect Being and if absolute perfection involves existence, this idea is of an existent, and necessarily existent Being God must exist, since it would be absurd to speak of a merely possible necessary Being, whereas there is no contradiction in speaking of merely beautiful things.

3) The main objection to St. Anselm's proof, was raised against Descartes and which Leibnitz tried to answer, is that we do not know a priori that the idea of God, the idea of infinite and absolute Perfection, is the idea of a possible Being. No contradiction in the idea may be seen, but, according to the objectors, 'negative' possibility is not the same as 'positive' possibility; it does not show that there is really no contradiction in the idea.; it is only clear when we have shown a posteriori that God exists.

4) In the 13th century the argument of the *Proslogium* was employed by St. Bonaventure, with a less logical and more psychological emphasis, while it was rejected by Thomas, Duns Scotus used it as an incidental aid. In the 'modern' era
it was adopted adapted by Descartes, Leibnitz defended it in a careful manner, Kant attacked it. In schools it is generally rejected, though some individual thinkers have maintained its validity.

2.5.2 Concluding Remarks

Augustunian characteristics can be seen in Anselm's philosophy; say, in his theory of truth. When Anselm is treating of truth in the judgement, he follows the Aristotelian view in making it consist in this, that the judgment or proposition actually states what actually exists or denies what does not exist, the thing signified being the cause of the truth, the truth itself residing in the judgment (correspondence-theory); but when after treating of truth (rectitude) in the will, he goes on to speak of the truth of being or essence and makes the truth of things to consist in being what they 'ought' to be, i.e., in their embodiment of or correspondence to their idea in God, the supreme Truth and the standard of truth, and when he concludes from the eternal truth of the judgment to the eternity of the cause of truth, God, he is treading the footsteps of Augustine. Hence, God, is the eternal and subsistent Truth, which is cause of the ontological truth of all creatures. The eternal truth is only cause and the truth of the judgment is only effect, while the ontological truth of things is at once effect (of eternal Truth) and cause (of truth in the judgment). This Augustinian conception of ontological truth, with the exemplarism it presupposes, was retained by St.Thomas in the 13th century, he laid more emphasis on the truth of the judgment. Thus, St.Thomas's characteristic definition of truth is *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, whereas that of St.Anselm is *rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*.

Anselm follows the Platonic-Augustinian tradition, in his general way of speaking of the relation of the soul and body and in the absence of a theory of hylomorphic composition of the two, though like Augustine Anselm was well aware that soul and body form one man, and he affirms the fact. Again Anselm's words on divine light in the *Proslogon* recall the illumination theory of Augustine: *Quanta manqué est lux illa, de qua nunc omne verum, quod rationali mente lucet*. Hence, Anselm stands in the Augustinian tradition, it is more systematically

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elaborated than the elements of Augustine's thought, his natural theology, and in
the methodic application of dialectic application it shows the mark of a later age.

2.6 St. Augustine

St. Augustine in his early life was dominated by a search for rational truth
and by a profound and disturbing sense of sin and guilt Augustine felt that he
had committed the sin of "intellectual arrogance". By this he meant that he had
once believed he could fathom the mysteries of the universe and discover for
himself the nature of reality. As quoted by Augustine:

"For I was ignorant as to that which really is, and was, as it were,
violemtly moved to give my support to foolish deceivers, when they asked me.
"Whence is evil?"...and "Is God limited by a bodily shape, and has He hairs
and nails?"...and "Are they to be esteemed righteous who had many wives at
once, and did kill men, and sacrificed living creatures?"...and, "Are they to be
esteemed righteous who had many wives at once, and did not kill men, and
sacrificed living creatures?" I, unfortunate one, imagined there was I know not
what substance of irrational life. And I used to ask Thy faithful little ones,
my fellow-citizens, from whom I unconsciously stood exiled, to ask, "Why,
then, doth the soul which God created err?"

Man feels his insufficiency, he reaches out to an object greater than
himself, an object which can bring peace and happiness, and knowledge of that
object is an essential condition of its attainment, but he sees knowledge in
function of an end beatitude. Only the wise man can be happy and wisdom
postulates knowledge of the truth. If Spinoza, according to his own words, aimed at developing the philosophy of God or Substance because it is only
contemplation of an infinite and eternal Object which can fully satisfy mind and
heart and bring happiness to the soul, far more could an analogous statement be
made of Augustine, who emphasized the fact that knowledge of the truth is to be
sought, not for purely academic purposes, but as bringing true happiness, true
beatitude. In the Contra Academicos, Licentius maintains that wisdom consists in
seeking for the truth and declares, that happiness is to be found rather in the
pursuit of truth than in the actual attainment and possession of truth Augustine
retorts that it is absurd to predicate wisdom of a man who has no knowledge of

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truth. In the *De Beata Vita* he says that no one is happy who does not possess what he strives to possess, so that the man who is seeking for truth but has not yet found it, cannot be said to be truly happy. Augustine himself sought for truth because he felt a need for it, he interprets this as a search for Christ and Christian wisdom, as the attraction of the divine beauty, and this experience he universalized. This universalisation of his own experience, however, does not earn that his ideas were purely subjective: his psychological introspection enabled him to lay bare the dynamism of the human soul.

Augustine's view of man and of man's place in the universal scheme was determined by his conception of God, which was formed of diverse factors, and, his own life and experience. Reason has its part to play in bringing a man to faith, and, once a man has the faith, reason has its part to play in penetrating the data of faith; but it is the total relation of the soul to God which interests Augustine. Augustine thought of man as he is in the concrete, fallen and redeemed mankind, man who is able indeed to attain truth but who is constantly solicited by God's grace and who requires grace in order to appropriate the truth that saves. Reason, had its part to play in the intellectual stage of his own conversion and reason has its part to play after his conversion: generalizing his own experience, then, he would consider the fullness of wisdom to consist in a penetration of what is believed, though in the approach to wisdom reason helps to prepare a man for faith. Augustinian attitude contemplates always man as he is, man in the concrete, for *de facto* man has only one final end. a supernatural end, and, as far as actual existence is concerned, there is but man fallen and redeemed: there never has been, is not, and never will be a purely 'natural man' without a supernatural vocation and end.

In Neoplatonism Augustine found a notion of the deity as a creative force, or energy, rather than as a crudely anthropomorphic architect or handi-craft worker. Neoplatonism seemed to him to provide a solution for the problem of evil; although the Neoplatonists were clear about the status of matter. Augustine, from the Neoplatonic writings concluded that, if the whole world is a product of the Father's creativity, none of it can be bad. What we call evil is simply an incompleteness and a finitude resulting from the creature's inevitable separation
from its maker. Hence the great stumbling block to his acceptance of orthodoxy was removed and his intellectual doubts were set at rest. He had found the truth. As quoted by Augustine:

"I no longer doubted that there was an incorruptible substance, from which was derived all other substance; nor did I now desire to be more certain of Thee, but more steadfast in Thee. As for my temporal life, all things were uncertain, and my heart had to be purged from the old leaven. . . . "32

2.6.1 Knowledge

Augustine's reading of 'Platonic works' suggested him to the problem, how is it that we are able not only to know with certainty eternal and necessary truths, but also to know them as eternal and necessary truths. Plato explained this fact by the theory of reminiscence. The knowledge of eternal truth should thus bring the soul, by reflection on that knowledge, to knowledge of God Himself and God's activity.

Augustine in the Contra academicos is primarily concerned to show that wisdom pertains to happiness, and knowledge of truth to wisdom; he also makes it clear that even the Sceptics are certain of some truths, for example, of two disjunctive propositions one is true and the other is false. 'I am certain that there is either one world or more than one world, and, if more than one, then that there is either a finite or an infinite number of worlds.' Similarly I know that the world either has no beginning or end or has a beginning but no end or had no beginning but will have an end or has both a beginning and an end. In other words, I am at least certain of the principle of contradiction.33 Again, even if I am sometimes deceived in thinking that appearance and reality always corresponds, I am at least certain of my subjective impression.

2.6.1.1 Appearance And Reality

'I have no complaint to make of the senses, for it is unjust to demand of them more than they can give. Whatever the eyes can see they see truly. Then is that true which they see in the case of the oar in the water? Quite
true. For, granted the cause why it appears in that way (i.e. bent), if the oar, when plunged into the water appeared straight, I should rather accuse my eyes of playing me false. For they would not see what, granted the circumstances, they ought to see. . . . But I am deceived, if I give my assent, someone will say. Then don’t give assent to more than the fact of appearance, and you won’t be deceived. For I do not see how the skeptic can refute the man who says, "I know that this object seems white to me, I know that this sound gives me pleasure, I know this smell is pleasant to me, I know that this tastes sweet to me, I know that this feels cold to my touch."  

In this above passage St. Augustine refers to Epicureans. What Augustine means is that the senses as such never deceive or lie us, even if we may deceive ourselves in judging that things exist objectively in the same way that they appear. The mere appearance of the bent oar is not deception, for there would be something wrong with my eyes were it to appear straight. If I go on to judge that the oar is really bent in itself, I am wrong, but as long as I simply say, 'It appears to me bent', I am speaking the truth and I know that I am speaking the truth. I am saying something the truth of which I am certain of, and no skeptic can refute me.

2.6.1.2 Truth And Certainty

We are certain of mathematical truths; for example, when anyone says seven and three make ten, he does not say that they ought to make ten, but knows that they do make ten. 35 Again, everyone who doubts knows that he is certain of this truth at least, namely the fact that he doubts. Thus everyone who doubts whether there is such a thing as truth, knows at least one truth, so this very capacity to doubt should convince him that there is such a thing as truth. 36 But what of real existences? Are we certain of the existence of any real object or are we confined to certain knowledge of abstract principles and mathematical truths? Augustine answers that a man is at least certain of his existence. Even supposing that he doubts of the existence of other created objects of God, the very fact of his doubt shows that he exists, for he could not doubt, did he not exist. Nor is it of any use to suggest that one might be deceived into thinking
that one exists, for 'if you did not exist, you could not be deceived in anything.' In this way St. Augustine anticipates Descartes: *Si fallor, sum.*

Augustine couples life and understanding with existence. In *De libero arbitrio* he points out that it is clear to a man that he exists, and that this fact would not and could not be clear, unless he were alive. It is clear to him that he understands birth, the fact of his existence and the fact that he is living. Accordingly he is certain of three things, that he exists, that he lives and that he understands. In the *De Trinitate,* similarly, Augustine observes that it is unless for the sceptic to insinuate that the man is asleep and sees these things in his dreams, for the man is affirming not that he is awake but that he lives: 'Whether he be asleep or awake he lives.' Sceptical philosophers may babble about the bodily senses and the way in which they deceive us, but they cannot invalidate that certain knowledge which the mind has by itself, without the intervention of the sense.

'We exist and we know that we exist and we love that fact and our knowledge of it; in these three things which I have enumerated no fear of deception disturbs us; for we do not attain them by any bodily sense, as we do external objects.'

Thus, Augustine claims certainty for what we know by inner experience, by self-consciousness: what does he think of our knowledge of external objects, the things we know by the senses? Have we certainty in their regard? That we can deceive ourselves in our judgements concerning the objects of the senses Augustine was well aware; some of his remarks show that he was conscious of the relativity of the sense-impressions. Moreover, he did not consider that the objects apprehensible by the senses constitute the proper object of the intellect. Being chiefly interested in the soul's orientation to God, corporeal objects appeared to him as a starting-point in the mind's ascent to God, though even in this respect the soul itself is a more adequate starting-point: we should return within ourselves, where truth abides, and use the soul, the image of God, as a stepping-stone to Him.

We are dependent on the senses for a great deal of our knowledge and Augustine had no intention of maintaining a purely sceptical attitude in regard to the objects of senses. It is one thing to admit the possibility of the error in sense-knowledge and quite another to refuse any credence at all to the senses. At once Augustine goes on to say, 'far be it from
us to doubt the truth of what we have learned by the bodily senses; since by
them we have learned to know the heaven and the earth.' We learn much on
the testimony of others, and the fact that we are sometimes deceived is no
warrant for disbelieving all testimony: so the fact that we are sometimes
deceived in regard to the objects of our senses is no warrant for complete
scepticism. 'We must acknowledge that not only our own senses, but those of
other persons too, have added very much to our knowledge.' For practical life
it is necessary to give credence to the senses,' and the man who thinks that
we should never believe the senses falls into a worse error than any error he
may fall into through believe in them. Augustine thus says that we 'believe' the
senses, we give credence to them, as we give credence to the testimony of
others, but he often uses the word 'believe' in opposition to direct inner
knowledge, without meaning to imply that such belief is void of adequate
motive. Hence, when someone tells me a fact about his own mental state, for
example, that he understands or wishes this or that, I 'believe' when he says
something that is true of the human mind itself, not simply of his own mind in
particular, 'I recognize and give my assent, for I know by self-consciousness and introspection
that what he says is true.' Augustine may have anticipated Descartes by his 'Si
fallor, sum', but he was not occupied with the question whether the external
world really exists or not. Augustine felt no doubt, though he saw clearly
enough that we sometimes make erroneous judgements about it and that
testimony is not reliable, whether it be testimony of our own senses or of other
people. As he was specially interested in the knowledge of eternal truths and in
the relation of that knowledge to God, it would hardly occur to him to devote
very much time to a consideration of our knowledge of the mutable things of
sense

2.6.1.3 Sense-Knowledge

Augustine's attitude to sense-knowledge is much more Platonic than
Cartesian. The fact of the matter is that his 'Platonism', coupled with his
spiritual interest and outlook, led him to look on corporeal objects as not being
the proper object of knowledge, owing to their mutability and to the fact that
our knowledge of them is dependent on bodily organs of the sense which are
no more always in the same state than the objects themselves. If we have not got 'true knowledge' of sense-objects, that is due, not merely to any deficiency in the subject but also to a radical deficiency in the object. Therefore, the lowest level of knowledge is, that of sense-knowledge, dependent on sensation, being regarded by Augustine, in accordance with his Platonic psychology, as an act of the soul using the organs of sense as its instruments. *Sentire non est corporis sed animae per corpus.* The soul animates the whole body, but when it increases or intensifies its activity in a particular part, i.e. in a particular sense-organ, it exercises the power of sensation.\textsuperscript{47} From this theory it would seem to follow that any deficiency in sense-knowledge must proceed from the mutability both of the instrument of sensation, the sense-organ, and of the object of sensation, and indeed this is what of Augustine thought:

The rational soul of man exercises true knowledge and attains true certainty when it contemplates eternal truths in and through itself; when it turns towards the material world and uses corporeal instruments it cannot attain true knowledge. Augustine assumed with Plato, that the objects of true knowledge are unchanging, from which it necessarily follows that knowledge of changing objects is not true knowledge. It is a grade of knowledge which is indispensable for practical life; but the man who concentrates on the sphere of the mutable thereby neglects the sphere of the immutable, which is the correlative object of the human soul in regard to knowledge in the full sense. In a strict sense sensation is of course, common, to men and brutes; but men can have and do have a rational knowledge of corporeal things. In the *De Trinitate*\textsuperscript{48} St. Augustine points out that the beasts are able to sense corporeal thing, remember them and to seek after what is helpful, avoiding what is harmful, but that they cannot commit things to memory deliberately not recall them at will nor perform any other operation which involves the use of reason; so that in regard to knowledge of sense-objects, human knowledge is essentially superior to that of the brute.

Moreover, man is able to make rational judgements concerning corporeal things and to perceive them as approximations to eternal standards. Say, for example, if a man judges that one object is more beautiful than another, his
comparative judgement (granted the objective character of the beautiful) implies a reference to an eternal standard of beauty, while a judgement that this or that line is more or less straight, that this figure is a well-drawn circle, implies a reference to ideal straightness and the perfect geometrical circle. In other words, such comparative judgements involve a reference to 'ideas' (not to be understood as purely subjective). 'It is the part of the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal considerations, which, if they were not above the human mind, would certainly not be immutable. And yet, unless something of our own are subjected to them, we should not be able to employ them as standards by which to judge of corporeal things . . . But that faculty of our own which is thus concerned with the treatment of corporeal and temporal things, is indeed rational, in that it is not common to us and beasts, but is drawn, as it were, out of the rational substance of our mind, by which we depend upon and adhere to the intelligible and immutable truth and which is deputed to handle and direct the inferior things.'

Lowest level of knowledge, sensation, according to Augustine, is common to men and brutes; while the highest level of knowledge, peculiar to man, is the contemplation of the eternal things (wisdom) by mind alone, without the intervention of sensation; but between these two levels is a half-way house, in which mind judges of corporeal objects according to eternal and incorporeal standards. This level of knowledge is a rational level, so that it is peculiar to man and is not shared by brutes; but it involves the use of the senses and concerns sensible objects, so that it is a lower level than of direct contemplation of eternal and incorporeal objects.

The lower use of reason is directed towards action, whereas wisdom is contemplative not practical. The action by which we make good use of temporal things differs from the contemplation of eternal things, and the former is classed as knowledge. The latter as wisdom . . . In this distinction it must be understood that wisdom pertains to contemplation, knowledge to action. The ideal is that contemplative wisdom should increase, but at the same time our reason has to be partly directed to the good use of mutable and corporeal things, 'without which this life does not go on', provided that our attention to temporal things we make it subserve the attainment of eternal things, 'passing
lightly over the former, but cleaving to the latter. This attitude of Augustine is Platonic in character. There is the same depreciation of sense-objects in comparison with eternal and immaterial realities, the same almost grudging admission of practical knowledge as a necessity of life. The same insistence on 'theoretic' contemplation, the same insistence on increasing purification of soul and liberation from the slavery of the senses to accompany the epistemological ascent.

The objects of sense, corporeal things, are inferior to the human intellect, which judges of them in relation to a standard in reference to which they feel short; but there are other objects of knowledge which are above the human mind, in the sense that they are discovered by the mind, which necessarily assents to them and does not think of amending them or judging that they should be otherwise than they are. For e.g., To see some work of art and judge it to be more or less beautiful, a judgement which implies not only the existence of a standard of beauty, an objective standard, but also my knowledge of the standard, for how could I judge that this arch or that picture is imperfect, deficient in beauty, unless I had some knowledge of the standard of beauty, of beauty itself, the idea of beauty? How could my supposedly objective judgement be justified unless there were an objective standard, not mutable and imperfect, like beautiful things, but immutable, constant, perfect and eternal? Again, we may add seven apples and three apples and make ten apples, the apples which we count are sensible and mutable objects, are temporal and pass away; but the number seven and three considered in themselves and apart from things are discerned by the arithmetician to make ten by addition, a truth which he discovers to be necessary and eternal, not dependent on the sensible world or on the human mind. These eternal truths are common to all. Whereas sensations are private in the sense that, e.g., what seems cold to one man does not necessarily seem to another, mathematical truths are common to all and the individual mind has to accept them and recognize their possession of an absolute truth and validity which is independent of its own reactions. The same question which could be raised in Platonic theory recurs in regard to the Augustinian theory, namely, 'Where are these ideas'? Neo-Platonists, seeing the difficulty in accepting a sphere of impersonal immaterial essences, i.e. the
condition apparently at least assigned to the essences in Plato's published works, interpreted the Platonic ideas as thoughts of God and 'placed' them in *Nous*, the divine mind, which emanates from the One as the first proceeding hypothesis. We may say that Augustine accepted this position, if we allow for the fact that he did not accept the emanation theory of neo-Platonism. The exemplar ideas and eternal truths are in God. The ideas are certain archetypal forms or stable and immutable essence of things, which have not themselves been formed but, existing eternally and without change, are contained in the divine intelligence. This theory must be accepted if one wishes to avoid having to say that God created the world unintelligently.

2.6.2 Problem

A difficulty arises, that, if the human mind beholds the exemplar ideas and eternal truths, and if these ideas and truths are in the mind of God, does it follow that the human mind beholds the essence of God, since the divine mind, with all that it contains, is ontologically identical with the divine essence? Some writers have believed that Augustine actually meant this. Malebranche claimed the support to Augustine for this theory that the mind beholds the eternal ideas in God, and he tried to escape from the seemingly logical conclusion that in this case the human mind beholds the essence of God, by saying that the mind sees, not divine essence as it is in itself (the supernatural vision of the blessed) but the divine essence as participable *ad extra*, as exemplar of creation. The ontologists too claim the support of Augustine for their theory of soul's immediate intuition of God.

Augustine in a famous passage of the *Confessions* exclaims: 'Too late am I come to love Thee, O Thou Beauty, so ancient and withal so new; too late am I come to love Thee... in a deformed manner I cast myself upon the things of Thy creation, which yet Thou hadst made fair.' Similarly, in the *De quantitate animae* he clearly affirms that the contemplation of Beauty comes at the end of the soul's ascent. It does not seem possible to state how exactly Augustine conceived of the status of the eternal truths as apprehended by the human mind (the ontological side of the question be probably never worked out); but, rather than accept a purely neo-
Platonic or an ontological interpretation, it seems to me preferable to suppose
that the eternal truths and ideas, as they are in God, perform an ideologistic
function, that it is rather that the 'light' which comes from God to the human
mind enables the mind to see the characteristics of changelessness and necessity
in the eternal truths.

2.6.3 Divine - Illumination

Augustine says, we cannot perceive the immutable truth of things unless
they are illuminated as by a sun.58 This divine light, which illumines the mind,
comes from God, who is the 'intelligible light', in *su generis*, just as the
corporeal eye sees adjacent objects in the corporeal light. whom and by whom
and through whom all those things which are luminous to the intellect become
luminous.59 In this doctrine of light, common to Augustinian School, Augustine
makes use of a neo-Platonic theme which goes back to Plato's comparison of
the Idea of the Good with the sun,60 the Idea of the Good irradiating the
subordinate intelligible objects or Ideas. For Plotinus the One God is the sun,
the transcendent light. The use of light - metaphor, however, does not by itself
tell us very clearly what Augustine meant. Augustine in *De Trinitate*61 says that
'the nature of mind is such that, when directed to intelligible things in the
natural order, according to the disposition of the Creator, it sees in them a
certain incorporeal light which is *su generis*, just as the corporeal eye sees
adjacent objects in the corporeal light'. These words seem to show that the
illumination in question is a spiritual illumination which performs the same
function for the objects of the mind as the sun's light performs for the objects
of the eye: in other words, as the sunlight makes corporeal things visible to the
eye, so the divine illumination makes the eternal truths visible to the mind.
From this it would appear to follow that it is not the illumination itself which
is seen by the mind, nor the intelligible Sun, God, but the characteristics of
necessity and eternity in the necessary and eternal truths are made visible to the
mind by the activity of God. But why did St. Augustine postulate such an
illumination; why did he think it necessary? Because the human mind is
changeable and temporal, so that what is unchangeable and eternal transcends it
seems to be beyond its capacity. "When the human mind knows and loves
itself, it does not know and love anything immutable", and if truth 'were equal to our minds, it also would be mutable', for our minds see the truth, now more now less, and by this very fact show themselves to be mutable. In fact, truth is neither inferior nor equal to our minds, but 'superior and more excellent'. We need, therefore, a divine illumination, in order to enable us to apprehend what transcends our minds, 'for no creature, howsoever rational and intellectual, is lightened of itself, but is lighted by participation of eternal Truth'. 'God hath created man's mind rational and intellectual, whereby he may take his light... and He so enlightened it of Himself, that not only that things which are displayed by the truth, but even truth itself may be perceived by the mind's eye.' This light shines upon the truths and renders visible to the mutable and temporal human mind their characteristics of changelessness and eternity. Hence, it is seen that, the divine illumination is something imparted and sui generis is explicitly stated by St.Augustine. Therefore, it seems hardly possible, to reduce the illumination - theory to nothing more than a statement of the truth that God conserves and creates the human intellect and that the natural light of the intellect is a participated light. St.Augustine most emphatically did not mean by 'light' the intellect itself or its activity, even with the ordinary concurrence of God, since it is precisely because of the deficiencies of the human intellect that he postulated the existence and activity of divine illumination.

2.6.3.1 Conclusion

According to St.Augustine, in this theory, the activity of divine illumination in regard to the mind is analogous to the function of the sun's light in regard to vision, and though the sunlight renders corporeal objects visible, Augustine certainly did not think of it as creating images of the objects in the human subject. Again, although the divine illumination takes the place in Augustine's thought of reminiscence in the Platonic philosophy, so that the illumination would seem to fulfill some ideogenetic function, it must be remembered that Augustine's problem is one concerning certitude, not one concerning the content of or concepts or ideas: it concerns far more the form of the certain judgement and the form of the normative idea than the actual content of the judgement or the idea
In *De Trinitate* Augustine remarks that the mind 'gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body', and, so far as he deals at all with the formation of the concept, he would seem to consider that the human mind discerns the intelligible in the sensible, performing what is at least in some way equivalent to abstraction. But when it comes to discerning a corporeal thing, the mind judges under the light of the regulative action of the eternal Idea, which is not itself visible to mind. For example, beauty itself illuminates the mind's activity in such a way that it can discern the greater or less approximation of the object to the standard, though the mind does not behold Beauty itself directly. It is in this sense that the illumination of Augustine supplies the function of Plato's reminiscence. Again, even though Augustine does not clearly indicate how we obtain the notions of seven, three and ten, the function of illumination is not to infuse the notions of these numbers but to illuminate the judgment that seven and three make ten that we discern the necessity and eternity of the judgment.

If the illumination has an ideological function, as in Augustine's view, then this function has reference not to the content of the concept, but to the quality of our judgement concerning the concept or to discernment of a character in the object, its relation to the norm or standard, which is not contained in the bare notion of the thing.

One can understand how the divine illumination theory of St. Augustine regarded the qualities of necessity and unchangeability in the eternal truths as constituting a proof of God's existence, whereas it would be inexplicable on the ontological interpretation, since, if the mind perceives God or the divine ideas directly, it can need no proof of God's existence. Augustine did not explain in detail how the content of concept is formed, may be regrettable, but it is none the less understandable, since he was interested from spiritual and religious motives: it was the soul's relation to God which concerned him primarily and, while the necessity and unchangeability of the eternal truths (as contrasted with the contingency and changeability of the human mind) and the doctrine of illumination helped to set this relation in a clear light and to stimulate the soul.
Augustine belongs to the same tradition as Plato, Aristotle and Democritus, but the important difference is that their interest in the nature of reality was secular, his was primarily religious. It was not a desire to solve the problem of knowledge which led him to investigate the nature of reality, nor was it the hope of providing a firm basis for social ethics. His motive was the will to find a satisfactory object of religious faith. Therefore, what he found, was naturally a different kind of reality from theirs. Whereas Plato or Democritus employed either a relatively neutral term, like "form" or "atom," or an ethically coloured term, like "the Good," to designate what they held to be ultimate reality, Augustine used a purely religious term, "God." Many philosophers have held that at their furthest bounds religion and metaphysics touch. As F.H. Bradley wrote:

"All of us, I presume, more or less, are led beyond the region of ordinary facts. Some in one way and some in others, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible world. In various manners we find something higher, which both supports and humbles, both chastens and transports us. And, with certain persons, the intellectual effort to understand the universal is a principal way of thus experiencing the Deity. No one, probably, who has not felt this, however differently he might describe it, has ever cared much for metaphysics. And, wherever it has been felt strongly, it has been its own justification." 67

Plato would certainly have agreed with Bradley that "the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of experiencing the Deity," for Plato held that the ultimate reality we finally come to experience by means of dialectic is not an abstract "truth," remote from human aspirations. Because its nature is such that it satisfies our deepest desires, he argued it is beautiful and good. Since this was also Augustine's conviction, and since, as it happens,
Augustine's deepest aspirations were very much like Platonism there are a marked similarities between their two metaphysical theories.

Professor Gilson, in his *Introduction l'étoile de Saint Augustin*, remarks that in the thought of St. Augustine there is really one long proof of God's existence, a proof which consists of various stages. Thus from the stage of initial doubt and its refutation through the *Si fallor, sum*, which is a kind of methodical preliminary to search for truth, assuring the mind of the attainability of truth, the soul proceeds to consider the world of sense. In this world, however, it does not discover the truth which it seeks and so it turns inwards, where, after considering its own fallibility and changeableness, it discovers immutable truth which transcends the soul. It is thus led to the apprehension of God as the ground of all truth.

God-reality is immutable, creative, eternal, and all-good. Augustine, as a mystic, wrote about God in a language of fervent piety. Augustine and Plato profoundly disliked change and both of them held that, whatever other properties ultimate reality may have, it must be immutable and impervious to change and decay. Since one of the most striking features of the sense world is the fact that it changes, both concluded that this world cannot be wholly real. The notion that ultimate reality is unchanging fitted in well with the conception of God as the perfect going. If God is perfect, there is no reason for Him to want to change, for in a perfect being change would result in loss of perfection. As pointed out by Plato in the *Republic*, since nothing can become more than perfect, a perfect being that changed could only become less than perfect. Augustine could entirely agree with this line of argument; but the status of the changing world and its relation to unchanging reality were to cause him a great deal of trouble. These had been problems for Plato, too, but for different reason. Since Plato was not willing to write the sense world off as wholly unreal, he had to try to explain its relation to immutable reality. This he was never able to do satisfactorily; his theory of forms foundered at this point. Augustine did not much solve Plato's problem as substitute another and a more difficult one for it. Instead of old puzzle of appearance and reality we have a new one about the relation of creature and creator; this is further complicated
by the dogmatic requirement that God produced this world "out of nothing." This follows not only from the authority of the Genesis but also from the consideration that if God, like Plato's demiurge, had created the world by fashioning an already existing material, the nature of this material would have been a limitation on God's free act. Plato could accept this consequence; indeed, in the *Timaeus* he used it to account for evil and the other deficiencies we find in the world: They result from the intractability of the materials on which the demiurge worked. But Augustine's God, unlike Plato's demiurge, was omnipotent. Hence Plato's solution was not possible for Augustine, He had to hold that the world was created out of nothing by a divine fiat. But is such an act intelligible? Augustine wrestled long with this problem.

It is not possible to explain creation by extrapolating from human experience, that is, by arguing that God does on a larger scale the same sort of thing man does. We cannot hope to understand divine creativity by merely multiplying human creativity by infinity (whatever that may be!) Even when men are at their most "creative," they never do more than rearrange already existing materials. But creation out of nothing is not rearrangement, on however massive scale. Because they are utterly different, not merely different in degree, God's creativity and man's have nothing but the name. From the religious point of view, perhaps it is best simply to confess that creation is a mystery the human mind cannot fashion but must take on faith.

Augustine insists that the world of creatures reflects and manifests God, even if it does so in a very inadequate manner and that ‘if anything worthy of praise is noticed in the nature of things, whether it be judged worthy of slight praise or of great, it must be applied to the most excellent and ineffable praise of the Creator. ‘Creatures tend indeed to not-being, but as long as they are, they possess some form, and this is a reflection of the Form which can neither decline nor pass away. Thus the order and unity of Nature proclaims the unity of the Creator, just as the goodness of creatures, their positive reality, reveals the goodness of God and the order and stability of the universe manifest the wisdom of God. On the other hand, God, as the self-existent, eternal and immutable Being, is infinite, and, as infinite, incomprehensible. God is His own

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Perfection, is 'simple', so that His wisdom and knowledge, His goodness and power, are His own essence, which is without accidents. God, therefore, transcends space in virtue of His eternity: 'God is Himself in no interval nor extension of place, but in His immutable and pre-eminent might is both interior to everything because all things are in Him and exterior to everything because He is above all things. So too He is in no interval nor extension life time, but in His immutable eternity is older than all things because He is before all things and younger than all things because the same He is after all things.' From all eternity God knew all things which He was to make. Augustine's account of the divine nature, God is eternal. The passage quoted is as follows:

"Who shall... catch the glory of that ever-standing eternity, and compare it with the times which never stand, and see that it is incomparable, and that a long time cannot become long, save from the many motions that pass by, which cannot at the same instant be prolonged; but that in the Eternal nothing passeth away, but that the whole is present... Since... Thou art creator of all times, if any time was before Thou madest heaven and earth, why is it said that This didst refrain from working? For that very time Thou madest, nor could times pass before Thou madest times. But if before heaven and earth there was no time, why is it asked, What didst Thou then? For there was no "then" when time was not... what now is manifest and clear is, neither are there future nor past things. Nor is it fitly said, "There are three times past, present and future", but perchance it might be fitly said, "There are three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future." For these three do somehow exist in the soul, and otherwise I see them not: present of things past, memory, present of things present, sight, present of things future, expectation...... Before I begin, my attention is extended to the whole; but when I have begun, as much of it as becomes past by my saying it is extended in my memory; and the life of this action of mine is divided between my memory, on account of what I have repeated and my expectation, on account of what I am about to repeat; yet my consideration is present with me, through which that which was future may be carried over so that it may become past........Surely, if there be a mind, so greatly abounding in knowledge and foreknowledge, to which all things past and future are so known as one psalm is well known to me, that mind is exceedingly wonderful, and very astonishing:
because whatever is so past, and whatever is to come of other ages, is no more concealed from Him than was it hidden from me when saying that psalm, what and how much of it had been sung from the beginning, what and how much remained unto the end. But far be it that Thou, the Creator of the universe, the Creator of the souls and bodies, - far be it that Thou shouldst know all things future and past. Far, far more wonderfully, and far more mysteriously, Thou knowest them. For it is not as the feelings of one singing known things, or hearing a known song, are-through expectation of future words, and in remembrance of those that are past-varied, and his senses divided, that anything happeneth unto Thee, unchangeably eternal, that is, the truly eternal Creator of minds. As, then, Thou in the Beginning knewest the heaven and the earth without any change of Thy knowledge, so in the Beginning didst Thou make heaven and earth without any distraction of Thy action.\textsuperscript{76}

Here the main steps of Augustine's argument are fairly straightforward. First of all, time flows then; time is a continuum, it is divided into parts that are earlier (past) and that are later (yet to come), in the third place, in a sense past and future both are in my mind no, together with the present. Augustine could find nothing in human experience remotely like God's creative act. From all eternity God knew all things which he was to make: He does not know them because He has made them, but rather the other way round. God knew first things of creation thou they came into being only in time. The species of created things have their ideas or \textit{rationes} in God, and God from all eternity saw in Himself, as possible reflections of Himself, the things which He could create. He knew them before creation as they are in Him, as Exemplar, but He made them as they exist, i.e. as external and finite reflections of His divine essence.\textsuperscript{77} God did nothing without knowledge, He foresaw all that He would make, but His knowledge is not distinct acts of knowledge, but 'one eternal immutable and ineffable vision'.\textsuperscript{78} It is in virtue of this eternal act of knowledge, of vision, to which nothing is past or future, that god sees, 'foresees', even the free acts of men, knowing 'beforehand', for example, 'what we should ask of Him and when, and to whom He would listen or not listen. and on what subjects'.\textsuperscript{79} Contemplating His own essence from eternity God sees in Himself all possible limited essences, the finite reflection of His infinite perfection, so that the
lessences or *ratiomes* of things are present in the divine mind from all eternity as the divine ideas

Augustine could find nothing in human experience remotely like God's creative act, for all human production consists in the manipulation of previously existing material, whereas God's creativity is a fiat out of nothing. Here however, he found something remotely analogous to the divine in human experience—the well-known phenomenon of "span." With God this human capacity to span a flow is supposedly carried to infinity, for in His eternity "nothing passes away; the whole is present"—the whole universe... The question that arises is, whether our minds can form any notion of the *infinite expansion of a finite power*; or rather, *what sort of notion of infinity* is going to satisfy us? Are we content to feel something—something at once exalting and humbling—when we think about infinity? Or do we want to be able to make a rational analysis of the concept? Because people differ so much about what constitutes a satisfactory criterion of explanation, take for example two men who have roughly the same experience when "infinity" is mentioned may yet differ widely as to whether the word is meaningful, the one insisting that he undertakes it and the other maintaining that he hasn't the remotest idea of what it means. For Augustine and minds like his, the infinite is deeply moving; our inability to grasp it fully is precisely what appeals. In contrast Aristotle disliked infinity and rejected the concept just because it seemed to him to elude analysis. It is true that Augustine insisted that God's knowledge of past and future is "far more wonderful, far more mysterious" than anything we can grasp. But he would have maintained that there is nevertheless empirical evidence of what infinity is like. There are, he would have said, many poets and mystics who not only experience those finite spans known to all of us but claim actually to have shared in God's eternity—or at least in something enough like it to have enabled them to know what God's experience itself must be. 

Here we face a difficult question about which there will be many opinions; it would seem, however, that though such experiences are in some sense actual (not just extrapolations from the actual), they are not, as it were, in the public domain. Finally, according to Augustine, God is all-good. That to exist is good, and that the most real thing of all will be most good, seemed to Augustine self-evident.
In the *Confessions* Augustine exclaims that the eternal 'reasons' of created things remain unchangeably in God, and in the *De Ideis* he explains that the divine ideas are 'certain arche-typal forms or stable and unchangeable reasons of things, which were not themselves formed but are contained in the divine mind eternally and are always the same. They neither arise or pass away, but whatever arises and passes away is formed according to them.' The corollary of this is that creatures have ontological truth in so far as they embody or exemplify the model in the divine mind, and that God Himself is the standard of truth. This exemplarist doctrine was influenced by neo-Platonic theory, according to which the Platonic exemplary ideas are contained in *Nous*, though for Augustine the ideas are contained in the Word, who is not a subordinate hypostasis, like the neo-Platonic *Nous*, but the second Person of the Blessed Trinity, consubstantial with the Father. From Augustine the doctrine of exemplarism passed to the Middle Ages. St. Thomas Aquinas did not deny it, though he was careful to state it in such a way as not to imply that there are ontologically separate ideas in God, a doctrine which would impair the divine simplicity, for in God there is no real distinction save that between the three divine Persons. Aquinas was a follower of Augustine, it was Bonaventure who most insisted in the 13th century on the doctrine of exemplarism and on the presence of the divine Ideas in the Word of God, an insistence which contributed to his hostile attitude to Aristotle the metaphysician, who threw overboard the ideas of Plato.

2.6.5 The World

Augustine holds the creation of the world out of nothing by God's free act. In the Platonism emanation-theory the world is depicted as proceeding in some way from God without God becoming altered thereby, but for Plotinus God does not act freely (since such activity would, he thought, postulate change in God) but rather *necessitate naturae*, the Good necessarily diffusing itself. The doctrine of free-creation is not found in neo-Platonsism. Augustine states that the doctrine of free creation is out of nothing and the world entirely depends on God, All things owe their being to God.  

'That out of which God has created all things is what possesses neither species nor form; and this is nothing other than nothing.' Wherefore, if the universe was created out of some formless matter, this
very matter was created from something which was wholly nothing. In the *Confessions* Augustine identifies the matter with the mutability of the bodies (which is equivalent to saying that it is the potential element) and observes that if he could call it 'nothing', but it cannot be called absolutely nothing. In the *De vera religione* Augustine states that not only the possession of form but even the capacity to receive form is a good and what is a good cannot be absolute nothing. Yet this matter, which is not absolutely nothing, is itself the creation of God, not proceeding formed things in time but concreted with form, and he identified the unformed matter which God made out of 'nothing' with heaven and earth as the primary creation of God. Augustine is stating in a rudimentary form the Scholastic doctrine that God created out of nothing not absolutely formless 'prime matter', apart from all form, but form and matter together.

Man consists of body and soul is considered the peak of the material creation. Augustine is quite clear that man does consist of soul and body when he says that 'a soul in possession of a body does not constitute two persons but one man.' Augustine speaks of the soul as a substance in its own right (substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo accommodata) and even defines man as 'a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body.' This Platonic attitude towards the soul has its repercussions, in Augustine's doctrine of sensation, which he represents as an activity of the soul using the body as an instrument, rather than as an activity of the total psycho-physical organism; it is in fact, a temporary increase of intensity in the action by which the soul animates a certain part of the body. The soul, being superior to the body, it cannot be acted on by the body, but it perceives the changes in the body due to an external stimulus. Augustine clearly held that soul is created by God, but does not seem to have made up his mind as to the precise time and mode of its origin. He seems to have toyed with some form of the Platonic pre-existence theory while refusing to allow that the soul was put into the body as a punishment for faults committed in a pre-earthly condition. The chief question for him was whether God creates each individual soul separately or created all other souls in Adam's, so that the soul is 'handed on' by the parents (Traducianism). This opinion would appear logically to involve a materialistic view of the soul, in fact Augustine certainly did not hold any such view and insisted that soul is not present in the body by local diffusion, but it was for
theological, not philosophical, reasons that he inclined towards reductionism, as he thought in this way original sin could be explained as a transmitted stain on the soul.

The persistent dualism already encountered in Augustine's conception of God appears a division of creation into two "cities": 1) The city of God, the community of saints; and 2) The earthly city, the community of lost souls. The one is predestined to reign eternally with God, and the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil. On until the last judgement comes, citizens of the two cities are intermixed and entangled in a life that is neither wholly good nor wholly bad. Augustine's view of man and its place in the universal scheme was determined by his conception of God, which was formed of the diverse factors, and, reflection on his own life and experience.

2.6.6 Critical Evaluation

1) St. Augustine asks himself the question, How is it that we attain knowledge of truths which are necessary, immutable and eternal? We do attain such knowledge is clear to him from experience. We cannot gain such knowledge simply from sense-experience, since corporeal objects are contingent, changeable and temporal, nor can we produce the truths from our minds, which are also contingent and changeable. Moreover, such truths rule and dominate our minds, impose themselves upon our minds, and they would not do this if they depended on us. It follows that we are enabled to perceive such truths under the action of the Being who alone is necessary, changeless and eternal, God.

2) God is like a sun which illumines our minds or a matter who teaches us. The regulative influence of divine ideas (which means the influence of God) enables man to see the relation of created things to eternal super sensible realities, of which there is no direct vision in this life, that God's light enables the mind to discern the elements of necessity, immutability and eternity in that relation between concepts which is expressed in the necessary judgement. Owing, however, to St Augustine's use of metaphor and to the fact that he was not primarily interested in giving a systematic and carefully defined 'scholastic' a
account of the process of knowledge, it does not seem possible to obtain a definitive interpretation of his thought which would adequately explain all the statements he made.

3) Augustine's difficulties with the idea of divine providence is an example of the basic conflict to his account of God's nature and of his inability to reconcile the conflicting strains that were competing in his mind. Augustine had a metaphysical outlook basically similar to Plato's that, however diluted by mysticism and by his version of Neoplatonism, remained in some major respects rational and Greek. From this point of view it was natural for him to talk of "reality," not of "God," and the properties of this reality were immutably, perfection, goodness, truth. While on the other hand there was a religious strain in Augustine's thought, derived from the canonical writings, and above all, from his great experience; from this point of view it was natural for him to talk of "god" rather than of "reality".

4) What is an infinite personality? For example, all the persons we know anything about interact socially with other persons, and social interaction entails the idea of some sort of restriction or limitation occasioned for each interacting person by the existence of those with whom he interacts. But an infinite person would act, not interact. Here we see the difficulty of trying to ascertain what God is like by extrapolating from some finite and limited property of which we have experience to the infinite version of this property. Unfortunately, since, the "infinite version" of a finite property would not be a version of that property but something utterly different from it, this does not help us to understand God's nature. Augustine struggled hard to free himself from naive anthropomorphism, but to just the extent that he succeeded, his idea of God lost its specifically Christian content. It is necessary to conclude, then, that his attempt to connect the personal God of primitive Christianity with the ultimate reality of Greek metaphysics failed.

5) Augustine lacked the natural curiosity of the old Greek scientists and their modern counterparts. Curiosity in his case was replaced by the fear of falling into intellectual pride by prying into secrets that God does not wish us to
understand. Augustine did not have the incentive shared by the Greeks and modern men the conviction that the key to happiness and well-being lies in this world. For Augustine, this world was at best a vale of tears, and happiness lay beyond it, in God's city. The otherworldliness that made him, relatively speaking, indifferent to ethics and politics and the other aspects of man's social environment made him, even more indifferent to man's physical environment.

6) All Augustine's ingenuity, which was considerable, was directed, not toward modifying his initial presuppositions in the light of the facts, but toward bringing Scripture and his personal point of view into agreement. What Augustine achieved was correspondence between two conceptual systems, not correspondence between a conceptual system and the world that is to be "explained." Augustine assumed that the awareness of scientific attempts to discover are either on the surface, easily ascertained, and available to all, or so deeply buried that no one can discover them. In either case, there is no occasion for serious scientific study of nature. Whatever information God intended us to have about the physical world, He wrote in plain language; whatever is not immediately obvious, God does not intend us to know. It is therefore impious as well as useless, to try to discover it. The Greeks:

"... made efforts to discover the hidden laws of nature... And some of them, by God's help, made great discoveries, but when left to themselves they were betrayed by human infirmity, and fell into mistakes... With their understanding and the capacity which Thou hast bestowed upon them... they found out... the eclipses of those luminaries, the sun and moon... and they exulted and were exalted... and by an impious pride (they forgot) whence they have the ability wherewith they seek out these things"

So, according to Augustine, the Greeks were dames for their pains. So that by their example we might see that only the truly humble are likely to escape damnation. It is much safer to be ignorant than to be wise and fall into pride.

In the first place, we must not slip into the anachronism of supposing that there existed in Augustine's time a fully developed scientific method that he willfully ignored. From the point of view of natural science, Augustine's
otherworldliness was doubtless a decline from the naturalism of the Greeks, just
as his anthropocentric teleology was more naive than Aristotle's and less capable
of methodological fruition. But the Greek mind, too, was for the most part
foreign to empirical science in the modern sense. Greek apriority compares in a
way with medieval dogmatism; Greek rationalism was in some respects as
antagonistic to the scientific point of view as medieval theology.

Finally, many people today regard Augustine's point of view as hopelessly
unbalanced - a neurotic exaggeration of guilt and sin and an unhealthy
otherworldliness that result in almost total neglect of the really serious social
and political problems that it is the business of the philosopher to discuss. Quite
apart from the value Augustine might have as a corrective to certain tendencies
to modern life, he is a figure of great importance in the history of the Western
mind. We can learn from Augustine, his psychological interpretation of the
redemption, when separated from the providential play-within-a-play in which he
embedded it, is very suggestive to modern minds accustomed to thinking in
naturalistic, rather than in supernaturalistic terms.

2.7 St. Bonaventure

St. Bonaventure accepted the doctrine of hylomorphic composition of all
creatures; it means that all creatures are composed of matter and form.

2.7.1 Matter And Form

St. Bonaventure in the widest sense, by 'matter', meant the principle of
potentiality. 'Matter considered in itself is neither spiritual nor corporeal,' so in
itself it is indifferent to the reception either of a spiritual or of a corporeal
form; but as matter never exists on its own, apart from a definite form, and so,
once united with a corporeal or a spiritual form, it always remains corporeal or
spiritual as the case may be, it follows that the matter actually present in a
corporeal substance is different in kind from that in a spiritual substance. Matter may be regarded in more than one way.
1) If one considers matter from the point of view of 'privation' (*per privationem*), abstracting from all forms, whether substantial or accidental, one must admit that it is essentially the same in all creatures, 'for if either kind of matter is separated from all forms and accidents, no difference at all will be seen.'

2) If matter is looked 'analogically' (*secundum analogam*), that is, as potentially, as a foundation for form, one must make a distinction.

3) In so far as matter is looked on as providing a foundation for form in regard simply to being (*in ratione entis*), it is essentially the same in both spiritual and material creatures, since both spiritual and material creatures exist and subsist, and one can consider their existence by itself, without going in to consider the precise way in which they exist or the kind of thing they are. So in the eyes of metaphysicians matter is similar in the spiritual and in the material creation.

4) If, however, matter is simply looked on in its relation to motion in the wide sense, understood, that is, as change, then it is not the same in creatures which cannot undergo substantial change or receive corporeal forms and in creatures which can undergo substantial change and receive corporeal forms, though it can be considered as analogically similar. It is the natural philosopher or *physicus* who considers matter in this light.

5) The hylomorphic composition of all creatures is this, that matter is the principle of potentiality as such. Both spiritual and material creatures are dependent beings, and not self-existent beings. If one considers potentiality in abstraction from all form looking on it as a co-principle of being, and can say with the metaphysician that it is essentially the same in both.

2.7.1 Is Matter The Principle Of Individuation

According to St. Bonaventure, some thinkers have held this, relying on words of Aristotle, but it is very difficult to see how that which is common to all can be the principal cause of distinction, of individuality. On the other hand, to say that form is the principle of individuation and to postulate an individual...
form, following on that of the species, is to go to the opposite extreme and forget that every created form is capable of having another like it. It is better to hold that individuation arises from the actual union of matter and form. For example, seals made by different impressions in wax, without wax there would be no plurality of seals, and without the different impressions the wax would not become many. Similarly, matter is necessary if there is to be distinction and multiplicity, number, but form is also necessary, for distinction and multiplication presuppose the constitution of a substance through the elements composing it. An individual substance is something definite, of a definite kind, it owes to the form; that it is *this* something, it owes principally to matter, by which the form accquires position in place and time. Principally individuation denotes something substantial, a substance composed of matter and form, but it also denotes something which can be considered an accident, namely number. Individuality (*discretio individualis*) denotes two things: 1) Individuation, which arises from the union of two principles, matter and form; 2) Distinction from other things, which is the origin of number.

When the form united with matter is a rational form personality (*discretio personalis*) arises, to individuality it adds the dignity of rational nature, which holds the highest place among created natures and is not in potency to a higher substantial form. in personality, within the *suppostum* there should be no other of a greater eminence and dignity, that within the *suppostum* rational nature should possess *actualem emmentiam*. We must say, then, just as individuality arises from the existence of a natural form in matter, so personality arises from the existence of a noble and superintend nature in the substance. As St.Bonaventure attributes matter, i.e., a spiritual matter, to the angels, he is able to admit a plurality of individual angels within the same species without being compelled.

2.7.2 Light

In the corporeal creation there is one substantial form which all bodies possess, and that is the form of light. Light was created on the first day, three days before the production of the sun, and it is corporeal in Bonaventure's
opinion, although St Augustine interpreted it as meaning the angelic creation. Properly speaking, light is the form of a body, the first substantial form, common to all bodies and the principle of their activity, and the different kinds of body form a graded hierarchy according as they participate more or less in the form of light. In this way the light-theme, so clear to the Augustinian School and going back to Plato's comparison of the Idea of the Good with the sun, finds a prominent place in the philosophy of St Bonaventure.

Obviously if Bonaventure holds that light is a substantial form, possessed by all bodies, he must also hold that there can be a plurality of substantial forms in one substance. For him there was no difficulty in holding this, since he looked on form as that which prepares the body for the reception of other and higher perfections. In the *Hexaemeron* Bonaventure went so far as to say that it is mad (*insanum*) to say that the final form is added to prime matter without there being something which is a disposition for it or in potency to it, without there being any intermediate form. One form disposes for a higher form and the latter, when received, does not expel the former but crowns it. Bonaventure maintained a certain *latitatio formarum* of things in matter; but he refused to accept the view that the forms of things which appear in time were originally in matter in an *actual*, like a picture covered with a cloth, so that the particular agent only uncovers them, like the man who takes away the cloth from the picture and lets the painting appear. On this view contrary forms, exclude one another, would have been together at the same time in the same subject which is impossible. Nor will he accept the view that God is the only efficient cause in the education of forms, for this would mean that God creates all forms in the way in which he creates the rational human soul and that the secondary agent really does nothing at all, whereas it is clear that its activity really does contribute something to the effect. Bonaventure prefers the view 'which seems to have been that of Aristotle, and which is now commonly held by the doctors of philosophy and theology' that 'almost all the natural forms, corporeal forms at least, such as the forms of the elements and the forms of mixtures, are contained in the potency of matter and are reduced to act (*educuntur in action*) through the action of a particular agent.' This may be understood in two ways. It may mean that matter has both the potency to
receive the form and the inclination to co-operate in the production of the form and that the form to be produced is in the particular agent as in its effective and original principle, so that the education of the form takes place by the multiplication of the form of the agent, as one bringing candle may light a multitude of candles, or it may mean that matter contains the form to be educated not only as that in which and, to a certain extent, by which the form is produced, but also as that form which it is produced, though in the sense that it is concreated with matter and in matter, not as an actual, but as a virtual form.

Therefore, the forms which were educated were originally in virtual state. These virtual forms are the *rationes seminales*. A *ratio seminalis* is an active power, existing in matter, the active power being the essence of the form to be educated, standing to the latter in the relation of *esse incompletum* to *esse completum* or of *esse in potentia* to *esse in actu*.103 Bonaventure steers a middle path between attributing too little or nothing to the created agent and attributing what seemed to him too much, his general principle being that while God produces things out of nothing, a created agent can only produce something which already existed in potency, by which he means a virtual state.104

2.7.3 The Human Soul

St. Bonaventure argues that since the human soul is immortal, incorruptible, its production can be effected only by that principle which has life and perpetuity of itself. What is it that God creates? It is the entire human soul, not the rational faculty alone. There is one soul in man, endowed with rational and sensitive faculties, and it is this soul which God creates, St. Bonaventure is careful to maintain the continuity of life and the reality of parentage while avoiding any splitting of the human soul into two.105 The human soul is the form of the body. St. Bonaventure uses the Aristotelian doctrine against those who hold that the souls of all men are one substance. The rational soul is the act and entelechy of the human body: therefore since human bodies are distinct, the rational souls which perfect those bodies will also be distinct.106 The soul is an existent, living, intelligent form, endowed with liberty.107 It is present wholly
in every part of the body, according to the judgement of St. Augustine, which Bonaventure approves as preferable to the theory that the soul is primarily present in a determinate part of the body. 'Because it is the form of the whole body, it is present in the whole body, because it is simple, it is not present partly here and partly there; because it is the sufficient moving principle (motor sufficient) of the body, it has no particular situation, is not present at one point or in a determinate part.' 108 Thou Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body, his general tendency is Platonic and Augustinian in character, in as much as he insists that the human soul is a spiritual substance, composed of spiritual form and spiritual matter. It is not sufficient to say that there is in the soul composition of ex quo est and quod est, since the soul can act and be acted upon, move and be moved, and this argues the presence of 'matter', the principle of passivity and mutability, though this matter transcends extension and corruptibility, being spiritual and not corporeal matter.109 This doctrine may seem contradict the admitted simplicity of the human soul, but Bonaventure points out110 that 'simplicity' has various meanings and degrees. However, the main point, is that the soul, though form of the body, is also much more than this, and can subsist by itself, being hoc aliquid, thou as a hoc aliquid, which is partly passive and mutable it must have in it spiritual matter

If the soul is composed of form and spiritual matter, it follows that it is individuated by its own principles.111 Soul, even though a spiritual substance, is so constituted that it not only can inform a body but also has a natural inclination to do so. Conversely, the body, though also composed of matter and form, has an appetitus for being informed by the soul. Thus the union of the two is for the perfection of each and is not to the detriment of either soul or body.112 The soul does not exist simply, or even primarily, to move the body but to enjoy God; yet it exercises its power and potentialities fully only in informing the body and it will at one day, at the resurrection, be reunited with the body. Aristotle was ignorant of this.

The doctrine of the hylomorphic composition of the human soul naturally facilitates the proof of its immortality, since Bonaventure does not link
the soul so closely to the body as does the Aristotelian doctrine; but his 
favourite proof is drawn from the consideration of the ultimate purpose of the 
soul (ex consideratione finis). The soul seeks for perfect happiness (a fact which no 
one doubts, 'unless his reason is entirely perverted'). But no one can be perfectly 
happy if he is afraid of losing what he possesses; on the contrary, it is this 
very fear which makes him miserable. Therefore, as the soul has a natural 
desire for perfect happiness, it must be naturally immortal. This proof 
presupposes the existence of God, of course, and the possibility of attaining 
perfect happiness, as also the existence of a natural desire for human happiness, 
but it was Bonaventure's favourite proof because of its spiritual character, 
because of its connection with the movement of the soul towards God: it is for 
him the ratio principles, the principle argument.114

2.7.4 Knowledge

Soul's knowledge of sensible objects is dependent on sense-perception. 
St. Bonaventure agrees with Aristotle that the soul does not of itself have either 
knowledge or species of sensible objects: the human intellect is created in a 
state of 'nudity' and is dependent on the senses and imagination.115 The sensible 
object acts upon the sense organ and produces therein a sensible species, which 
in turn acts upon the faculty of sensation, and then perception takes place. In 
admitting a passive element in sensation Bonaventure departs from the teaching 
of St. Augustine; but at the same time he holds that the faculty of sensation or 
sensitive power of the soul judges the content of sensation, for example, that 
this is white, the passive reception of the species being attributed primarily to 
the organ, the activity of the judgment to the faculty.116 This judgment is a 
spontaneous awareness; it is possible because the faculty of sensation is the 
sensitive faculty of a rational soul, for it is the soul which communicates to the 
body the act of sensation.117 For example, the separate sensation of colour and 
touch, are united by the 'common sense' and preserved in the imagination, which 
is not the same as 'memory' if the latter is taken as meaning recordatio or 
recalling at will.118 Finally, the active and passive intellects, working in co-
operation, abstract the species from the imagination. The active and passive 
intellects are not two powers, but are two 'differences' of the same intellectual
faculty of the soul. We can say that the active intellect abstracts and passive intellect receives; Bonaventure qualifies this statement by affirming that the passive intellect has the power of abstracting the species and judging it, though only with the help of the active intellect, while the active intellect is dependent for its activity of knowing on the information of the passive intellect by the species. There is, in fact, only one complete act of intellection and the active passive intellects co-operate inseparably in that act.  

2.7.4 1 Innate Ideas

Bonaventure's view of the way in which we acquire our knowledge of sensible objects approximates more or less closely to the Aristotelian theory. He admits that the soul, in regard to knowledge of such objects, is originally a tabula rasa, and he has no place for innate ideas. This rejection of innate ideas applies also to our knowledge of first principles. Some people have said that these principles are innate in the active intellect, though acquired as far as possible intellect is concerned, but such a theory agrees neither with the words of Aristotle nor with the truth. A modified version of innatism is that the principles are innate in their most general form while the conclusions or particular applications are acquired, but it would be difficult on such a view to show why a child does not know the first principles in their general form. Even this modified innatism contradicts both Aristotle and Augustine. Bonaventure doubtless considered that a theory which united against it both Aristotle and Augustine could not possibly be true. It remains then to say that the principles are innate only in the sense that the intellect is endowed with a natural light which enables it to apprehend the principles in their universality when it has acquired knowledge of the relevant species or ideas. For example, no one knows what a whole is or a part until he has acquired the species or idea in dependence on sense-perception; but once he has accepted the idea, the light of the intellect enables him to apprehend the principle that the whole is greater than the part.  

Though we have no innate knowledge of sensible objects or of their essence or of the first principles, logical or mathematical it does not follow that our knowledge of purely spiritual realities is acquired through sense-perception.
2.7.4.2 God

'God is not knowledge by means of a likeness drawn from senses', but rather by the soul's reflection on itself. It has no intuitive vision of God, of the divine Essence, in this life, but it is made in the image of God and is oriented towards God in desire and will, so that reflection on its own nature and on the direction of the will enables the soul to form the idea of God without recourse to the external sensible world. In this sense the idea of God is 'innate', though not in the sense that every man has from the beginning a clear, explicit and accurate knowledge of God. The knowledge of this truth (God's existence) is innate in the rational mind, inasmuch as the mind is an image of God, by reason of which it has a natural appetite and knowledge and memory of Him in whose image it has been made and towards whom it naturally tends, that it may find its beatitude in 'Him'. The knowledge of God is of various kinds: God has a comprehensive knowledge of Himself, the Blessed know Him clearly (clare et perspicue), we know Him partly and in a hidden way ex parte et in aenigmate), this last knowledge being contained implicitly in or implied by the knowledge which each soul has that it did not always exist and must have had a beginning.

2.7.4.3 The Knowledge Of Virtue

The knowledge of the virtues too must be 'innate' in the sense that it is not derived from sense-perception. A man cannot know justice by its effects, since he would not recognize the effects of justice unless he previously knew what justice is, just as one cannot recognize the effects of a man's activity as the effects of a man's activity unless one previously knows what a man is. There is no innate idea (species innata) in the sense of a clear idea or intellectual likened of the virtue in the mind form its beginning; but there is present in soul a natural light by which it can recognize truth and rectitude, and there is present also an affection or inclination of the will. The soul knows therefore, what rectitude is and what an affection or inclination of the will is, and in this way it recognises what rectitudo affectionis is. Hence, the knowledge of virtue is
innate in much the same sense as knowledge of God is innate, in the sense that soul has in itself all the material needed to form the explicit idea, without its being necessary for it to have recourse to the sensible world. If anyone quotes in opposition the Philosopher's dictum *nihil est in intellectu, quod primum non fuerit in sensu*, the answer is that the dictum must be understood as having reference only to our knowledge of sensible objects or the acquisition of ideas which are capable of being formed by abstraction from sensible species.\[^{126}\]

Truth is the *aequatio rei et intellectus*,\[^{127}\] involving the object known and the knowing intellect. In order that truth in this sense, truth apprehended, may exist, conditions are required on the part of both subject and object, immutability on the part of the latter and infallibility on the part of the former.\[^{128}\] The human mind is subject to change, doubt, error while the phenomena which we experience and know are also changeable. It is an indubitable fact that human the mind does possess certainties and knows that it does so and that we apprehend unchanging essences and principles. It is only God, who is unchanging; this means that the human mind is aided by God and the object of certain knowledge is seen rooted in someway as rooted in God, as existing in the *rationes aeternae* or divine ideas. But we do not apprehend these divine ideas directly, in themselves, and Bonaventure with Augustine points out to follow the Platonic doctrine is to open the door to scepticism, since if the only certain knowledge attainable is direct knowledge of the eternal archetypes or exemplars and if we have no direct knowledge of these archetypes, the necessary conclusion is that true certainty is unattainable by human mind.\[^{129}\] On the other hand it is not sufficient to say that the *ratio aeterna* influences the mind in this sense only, that the knowing mind attains not the eternal principle itself but only its influence, as a *habitus mentis*, for the latter would be itself created and subject to the same conditions as the mind of which it is a disposition.\[^{130}\] The *rationes aeternae*, then must have a direct regulative action on the human mind, though remaining themselves unseen. It is they which move the mind and rule the mind in its certain judgements, enabling it to apprehend the certain and eternal truths in the speculative and moral orders and to make certain and true judgements even concerning sensible objects. It is their action (which is the divine illumination) which enables the mind to apprehend the
unchanging and stable essences in the fleeting and changing objects of experience.

St. Bonaventure in the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*\(^\text{131}\) describes how the exterior sensible objects produce a likeness of themselves (*similitudo*) first in the medium and then through the medium on the sense organ, and so on the interior sense. The particular sense, or the faculty of sensation acting through the particular sense, judges the object whatever it is; the intellectual faculty the certain characteristics represented through the object for example beautiful. Beautiful because it possesses certain characteristics. But this judgement implies a reference to an idea of beauty which is stable and unchanging, not bound to place or time. This is where the divine illumination comes in, to explain the judgement in its unchanging and super temporal aspect by reference to the directing and regulating *ratio aeterna*, not to supersede or annul the work of the senses or the activity of abstraction. All sensible objects which are known enter the mind through the three psychical operations of *apprehensio*, *oblectatio* and *distinguatio*, but the latter operation to be true and certain, must be judgement made in the light of the *rationes aeternae*.

### 2.7.5 Illumination

The *rationes aeternae* are ontologically identified and are identifies with the Word of God. The Word of God illumines the human mind, that Word which enlightens every man into the world. 'Christ is the interior teacher and no truth is known except through Him, not by His speaking as we speak, but by His enlightening us interiorly. He is intimately present to every soul and by His most clear ideas He shines upon the dark ideas of our minds.'\(^1\) We have no vision of the of the Word of God and though the light is so intimately within us, it is invisible, *inacessibus*; we can only reason to its presence from observation of its effects.\(^2\) Bonaventure's doctrine of illumination and his interpretation of Augustine do not involve ontologism: His doctrine completes his seemingly Aristotelian affirmation and his denial of the properly innate character of even the first principles, giving to his teaching a peculiar and non-Aristotelian, an Augustinian flavour and colour. We abstract, yes, but we could
not seize the intelligible and stable merely through abstraction, we need also the
divine illumination, we can attain knowledge of moral principles by interior
reflection, but we could not apprehend their unchanging and necessary character
without the regulative and guiding action of divine light. Aristotle failed to see
this, he failed to see that as we cannot know creatures fully unless we see
them as *exempla* of the divine *exemplar*, so we cannot form certain judgements
about them without the light of the divine Word, of the *Ratio Aeterna*.
Exemplarism and illumination are closely connected, the true metaphysician
recognises them both: Aristotle recognized neither of them.

Walking in the footsteps of Augustine, Bonaventure traces the ascending
stages of soul's life, stages which correspond to different potentialities in the
soul and lead him from the sphere of nature into that of grace. Starting from
the soul's sensitive powers (*sensualitas*) he shows how the soul may see in
sensible objects the *vestigia Dei*, as it contemplates sensible things first as God's
effects, then as things wherein God is present, and he accompanies it, with
Augustine, as it retires itself and contemplates its natural constitution and powers
as the image of God. The intelligence is then shown contemplating God in the
soul's faculties renewed by grace, being enabled to do so by the Word of God.
In this stage, the soul still contemplates God in His image, which is soul itself,
even if elevated by grace, and it can proceed yet further, to the contemplation
of God *supra nos*, first as Being, then as the Good. Being is good, and
contemplation of God as Being, the perfection of being, leads to the realization
of Being as Good, as *diffusivum sui*, and so to the contemplation of the Blessed
Trinity.

276 Conclusion

To Bonaventure there are three cardinal points of metaphysics - creation,
exemplarism and illumination. His metaphysical system is a unity, in that the
doctrine of creation reveals the world as proceeding from God, created out of
nothing and wholly dependent on Him, while the doctrine of exemplarism
reveals the world of creatures as standing to God in the relation of imitation to
model, of *exemplatum* to *exemplar*, while the doctrine of illumination traces the
stages of soul's return to God by way of contemplation of sensible creatures, of itself and finally of Perfect Being.

Hence, Bonaventure may be termed the philosopher of the Christian life, who makes use of both reason and faith in order to produce his synthesis. This integration of reason and faith, philosophy and theology, is emphasized by the place he accords to Christ, the Word of God. Just as creation and exemplarism cannot be properly understood apart from the realization that it is through the Word of God that all things are created, it is the Word of God, the consubstantial image of Father, whom all creatures mirror, so illumination in its various stages cannot be properly understood apart from the realization that it is the Word of God who illumines every man, the Word of God who is the door through which the soul enters into God above itself, the Word of God who, through the holy Spirit whom He has sent, inflames the soul and leads it beyond the limitations of its clear ideas into the ecstatic union. Finally, it is the Word of God who shows us the Father and opens to us the beatific version of heaven. Christ in fact is the medium omnium scientiarum,\textsuperscript{134} of metaphysics as of theology, for though the metaphysician as such cannot attain to knowledge of the Word through the use of the natural reason, he can form no true and certain judgements without the illumination of the Word, even if he is quite unaware of this, and in addition his science is incomplete and vitiated by its incompleteness unless it is crowned by theology.

2.8 St. Albert

St. Albert was a man of wide intellectual interest and sympathies. He adopted the Aristotelian elements and incorporated them into his philosophy. He retained much of the Augustinian and non-Aristotelian tradition and his philosophy bears the character of a transitional stage on the way to that fuller incorporation of Aristotelianism which was achieved by St. Thomas Aquinas, his great pupil.

The doctrine of St. Albert is a mixture of Aristotelian and neo-Platonic elements. He appeals to Aristotle when giving a proof for God's existence from motion,\textsuperscript{135} and he argues that an infinite chain of \textit{principia} is impossible and
contradictory, since there would in reality be no *principium*. The *primum principium* or the first principle must, by the very fact that it is the first principle, have its existence from itself and not from another its existence (*esse*) must be its substance and essence. It is the necessary Being, without any admixture of contingency or of potency, Albert also shows that it is intelligent, living, omnipotent, free, and so on, in such a way that it is its own intelligence, that in God's knowledge of Himself there is no distinction between subject and object; that His will is not something distinct from His essence, Finally Albert distinguishes God, from the first principle, from the world by observing that none of the names which we ascribe to God can be predicated of Him in their primary sense. For example, if God is called substance, this is not because He falls within the category of substance, but because he is above all substance and the whole category of substance. Similarly, the term 'being' primarily refers to the general abstract idea of being, which cannot be predicated of God. In fine, it is true to say of God that we know what He is not rather than what He is. Albert interprets Aristotle according to the doctrine of the *Perpateuto*, that is to say, according to what are in reality neo-Platonic interpretations. Albert uses the words *fluxus* and *emanatio* (*fluxus est emanatio formae a primo fonte, qui omnium formarum est fons et origo*) and maintains that the first principle, *intellectus universaliter agens*, is the source whence flows the second intelligence, the latter the source whence flows the third intelligence, and so on. from each subordinate intelligence is derived its own proper sphere, until eventually the earth comes into being. This general scheme (Albert gives several particular schemes, called from the 'ancients') might seem to impair the divine transcendence and immutability, as also the creative activity of God; but Albert does not, of course, think of God as becoming less through the process of emanation or as undergoing any change, while he also insists that a subordinate cause works only in dependence on, with the help of, the higher cause, so that the whole process must ultimately be related to God. This process is variously represented as a graded diffusion of goodness or as a graded diffusion of light. However, it is clear that in this picture of creation St. Albert is inspired far more by *Liber de causis*, the neo-Platonsists and the neo-Platonishmg Aristotelians than by the historic Aristotle, while on the other hand he does not appear to have realized that the neo-Platonic notion of emanation, though not strictly pantheistic, since
God remains distinct from all other beings, is yet not fully in tune with the Christian doctrine of free creation out of nothing.

Albert departs from the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition by holding that reason cannot demonstrate with certainty the world's creation in time, that is, that the world was not created from eternity, and also by denying that angels and the human soul are composed of matter and form, in this evidently thinking of matter as related to quantity, but on the other hand he accepts the doctrine of the *rationes seminales* and that of light as the *forma corporeitas*. In general Albert follows the Aristotelian theory of abstraction. Again, Albert by no means always makes his meaning clear; so that it remains doubtful whether or not he considered; that the distinction between essence and existence is real or conceptual.

2.8.1 Soul

Albert was convinced that the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated by reason. Albert in his book on the nature and origin of the soul he gives a number of proofs, arguing, for example, that the soul transcends matter in its intellectual operations, having the principle of such operations in itself, and so cannot depend on the body *secundum esse et essentium*. But he will not allow the arguments for the unicity of the active intellect in all men are valid, arguments which, if probative, would deny personal immortality. He treats of this matter not only in the *De anima*, but also in his special work on the subject, the *Libellus de unitate intellectus contra Averroem*. the rational soul is the form of man, so that it must be multiplied in individual men: but what is multiplied numerically must also be multiplied substantially. If it can be proved, then, as it can be proved, that the rational soul is immortal, it follows that the multiplicity of rational souls survive death. Again, *esse* is the act of the final form of each thing (*formae ultimate*), and the final or ultimate form of man is the rational soul. Now, either individual men have their own separate *esse* or they have not. If you say that they do not possess their own individual *esse*, you must be prepared to admit that they are not individual men, which is patently false, while if you admit
that each man has his own individual esse, then he must have his own individual rational soul.

2.8.2 Evaluation

It is impossible to speak of a completed 'system' of Albert: his thought is really a stage in the adoption of the Aristotelian philosophy as an intellectual instrument for the expression of the Christian outlook. St. Albert's reputation as a man of learning, was that he saw what a treasure for the Christian West was contained in the system of Aristotle and in the writings of the Arabic philosophers. Looking back on the 13th century from a much later date, one is inclined to contemplate the invasion and growing dominance of Aristotelianism in the light of the arid Scholastic Aristotelianism of a later period, which sacrificed the spirit of the letter and entirely misunderstood the inquiring mind of the great Greek philosopher his interest in science and the tentative nature of many of his conclusions; but to regard the 13th century in this light is to be guilty of an anachronism, for the attitude of the decadent Aristotelians of a later period was not the attitude of St. Albert. Albert endeavoured to make Aristotelianism intelligible to the Latins and to show them its value, while pointing out its errors. He realized the general significance and value of Aristotelianism. If one tries to imagine what medieval philosophy would have been without Aristotle, if one thinks away the Thomistic synthesis and the philosophy of Scotus, if one strips the philosophy of St. Bonaventure of all Aristotelian elements, one will hardly look on the invasion of Aristotelianism as an historical misfortune.

2.9 St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas follows Aristotle in speaking of metaphysics as the science of being as being; but the fact that his thought entered round the concrete and the fact that he was a Christian theologian led him to emphasize also the view that 'first philosophy is wholly directed to knowledge of God as the last end' and that 'the knowledge of God is the ultimate end of every human cognition and operation'.142 But actually man was created for a profounder and
a more intimate knowledge of God than he can attain by the exercise of his natural reason in this life, and so revelation was morally necessary in order that his mind might be raised to something higher than his reason can attain to in this life and that he should desire and zealously strive towards something which exceeds the whole state of this life.\textsuperscript{143} Metaphysics has its own object, therefore, and a certain autonomy of its own, but it points upwards and needs to be crowned by theology; otherwise man would not realize the end for which he was created and will not desire and strive towards that end. Moreover, as the primary object of metaphysics, God exceeds the apprehension of the metaphysician and of the natural reason in general, and as the full knowledge or vision of God is not attainable in this life, the conceptual knowledge of God is crowned in this life by mysticism. Mystical theology does not enter the province of philosophy, and St. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy can be considered without reference to it; but one should not forget that for St. Thomas Aquinas philosophical knowledge is neither sufficient nor final.

2.9.1 The Main Problem

Aquinas stands functionally in the Middle Ages as Plato and Aristotle do to the classical world. Aquinas, like them gave a definitive answer to the major intellectual problems of his times The problems of his times were, in part, purely dogmatic; that is, they were problem related to the old task of working out a consistent theology, of systematizing the hodgepodge of seemingly contradictory in the work of Church fathers.

Aquinas was more than a theologian, and the problems of his time were more than purely theological problems. For, during the preceding century, the world had so changed and broadened that any exclusively theological or radically other worldly scheme would have been unsatisfactory in Aquinas' time. the most important of these changes were- the novel art forms, the Crusades and their manifold results, the new interest in natural science, and the rise of the universities. Aquinas' major problem, and that of all thinking men of his day, was to find a way of incorporating the new interest and the new to which they gave rise into the religious orientation that, of course; still dominated the
Western mind. Or, since virtually all of men knowledge about extra religious matters was derived from such writings of the ancients as were then accessible, it may just as well be said that Aquinas' major problem was to reconcile the Christian notion of God and what it implied about man and nature with the old classical world view.

To the classical mind the essential human problem was how to get in right relationship with oneself and with one's fellowmen. Though the classical philosophers often differed exactly where and how to strike the balance they all held the human problem could be solved with human resource and that it was soluble here, on this earth. The problem that they saw, was how to be happy. The solution of this problem requires knowledge of one's natural and social environment. Whether one was an activist as Aristotle or a passivist like Epicurus, both held the ethical problem to be a this worldly one. In contrast to this, the Christian's outlook on life and its problems was determined by his belief in an omnipotent God who was at the same time a loving father. Concern of the early Christian was to get into a right relation with his God-father. He held this right relation to be defined by God not by man. God as omnipotent ruler decrees certain rules that man (as subject) must obey with other punctiliousness. At the same time God (as loving father) wishes not merely strict obedience, buy free and loving service. Though God's commands are duties, the good man performs them in the same spirit as that in which a loving and trustful son obeys his wise and loving human father. The good man, the man who conforms to his divine father's wishes, will doubtless be happy. For happiness, the Christians held, is a by-product of man's goodness, and goodness lies in establishing a proper filial relation to God. Correspondingly, they defined badness as separation from God, as the wrong kind of relationship, which results when men fail to do God's commands or when they do them in a niggardly and unfilial manner. For the early Christian, who expected the end of the world momentarily, nothing mattered except his relation with God. But as the time passed on the world did not end, and the Church drew to power and responsibility, men could no longer disregard the old ethical, social, and political questions with which the classical mind had been concerned. Hence the issue involved in faith and reason controversy reappeared. Just as it was discovered
that reason could not be wholly dispensed with, though no one was able to define its exact relation to faith, so it was discovered that this world and its problems did indeed require attention, though—once again—no one quite knew how the this-worldly questions were related to the transcendentally important other world and its problems. The early Christian view that man commits the sin of intellectual pride if he inquires too much or too carefully about the workings of nature had gradually weakened.

As men slowly emerged from the darkness of the early Middle Ages and as they began to rebuild culture and civilization, they inevitably felt renewed interest in this-worldly things. Consequently, it became necessary to find a place in their scheme of things for the natural man and his natural pursuits. Hence, the central problem for Aquinas and the Middle Ages was to reconcile the Christian and the Classical views of man and his world. It was easy for the earliest Christians to reject the classical conceptions of the world as wicked paganism, but by the 13th century men recognized that despite all its deficiencies, the classical view contained values that could be ignored only at the cost of corresponding deficiencies in their own points. This recognition required considerable intellectual and moral maturity. It is doubtful that a philosophical synthesis of the Classical and Christian insights could have been achieved, but for the series of lucky accidents, the major works of Aristotle have became available to Western scholars at precisely the time when the Western world could best appreciate his thought. This new light was disturbing to settled ways of thought.

Not only was the empirical naturalistic point of view of Aristotle antagonistic to the Neoplatonic mysticism that had so long dominated Christian thinking, but some of the conclusions Aristotle himself had drawn from his basic principles contradicted cherished Christian dogmas, which met with great hostility. Before Aquinas, the authorities of Paris forbade the teaching of Aristotle's natural science; a few years later the *Metaphysics* was also banned, and these interdicts were renewed several times during the century. It took courage as well as acumen to maintain that the Christian insights were one-sided and that they required supplementation—that man is certainly a child of God, but that
he is also a natural animal. It is fashionable today to speak contemptuously of the conservative of Thomism, but in its own day it was progressive and forward looking. Today with the enormous made in the natural sciences, we should not go to Aristotle for information about man, but in Thomas' day where one was to turn but to the Greeks? And among the Greeks, who was wiser than Aristotle? Part of Aquinas' achievement was finding a formula for reconciling the pagan and Christian world views. But he did not stop there. He actually applied this formula to various specific problems in physics, epistemology, ethics, and so on, and thus tied the various special sciences together in a single, all-inclusive science; in this way Aquinas went far beyond any earlier thinker, Christian or pagan.

2.9.2 Reason And Revelation

Thomas Aquinas thought, the first task must be to define and delimit the domain of philosophy and to justify the use of rational method of inquiry. This was necessary because, as he well knew, many important churchman (e.g., St. Bernard) maintained that philosophy should not concern itself in any way with the articles of faith. In opposition to this anti-intellectualism Thomas Aquinas held that it is possible to demonstrate many religious truths by the natural light of reason. By this he did not mean that reason is wholly independent of Christian revelation, on the contrary for him the philosophical undertaking rested on prior acceptance of the great principles of Christian faith, and was true in two respects:

1) The truths known in revelation form the first principles from which we go on to prove other truths by rational argument. Thomas Aquinas was following Aristotle's contention that each science is simply the logical demonstration of the conclusion that follows from principles, that, science accepts as its starting point. As Thomas Aquinas puts it:

"As the other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences, so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it does on to prove something else..... However, it is to be
borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz., metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concedes nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his arguments. Hence Sacred scripture, since it has no science above itself, disputes argumentatively with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation. Thus, we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Scripture, and against those who deny one article of faith we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by argument, but only of answering his objections—if he has any—against faith.  

2) In addition to serving the axioms from the theorems of Christian philosophy are deduced, the truths of revelation serve as guide in the actual process of developing such a philosophy. Just as it is easier to solve the mathematical problems if we can look the answers and then work backwards from them, so the fact we have prior knowledge (in revelation) of the Christian truths we want to prove makes it possible for us to demonstrate many truths that we would otherwise find it impossible to prove.

To summarize Thomas Aquinas' here, it may be said that he made a double distinction.

1) Thomas Aquinas distinguished between philosophy and theology. Philosophy is what can be proved by the natural light of reason; theology is whatever rests on faith.

2) Thomas Aquinas distinguished between revealed and natural theology: The latter is the part of the former that is susceptible of proof. Hence philosophy and theology overlap. Some of the truths that rest on faith (and so belong to the field of theology) are demonstrable (and so belong in the field of philosophy) Thomas Aquinas gave the name natural theology to the set of propositions that constitute the field of knowledge in which faith and reason overlap.
If this is true, then it is clear that philosophy (i.e., of course, physics, ethics, and politics as well as natural theology) and revealed theology cannot possibly conflict. However, Aquinas wanted to maintain that not merely revelation does not contradict reason, but that revelation supplements reason.

"Sacred doctrine also makes use of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merits of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are set forth in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural inclination of the will ministers to charity."

2.9.3 Human Substance

Thomas Aquinas follows Aristotle in stressing the unity of the human substance. It is the one soul in man which confers on him all his determinations as man, is corporeity (by informing prime matter), his vegetative, sensitive and intellectual operations. When death comes the soul is separated from the body, the body disintegrates: it is not merely that rational functions cease, for the sensitive and vegetative functions also cease: the one principle of all these operations no longer informs the matter which it previously informed and instead of the unified human substance there results a multiplicity of substances, the new substantial forms begin educed from the potentiality of matter.

According to him, it is the one individual man who perceives not only that he reasons and understands, but also that he feels, and exercises sensation. But one cannot have sensation without a body, and not the soul only must belong to man. A man is generated when rational soul is infused and a man dies when rational soul departs from the body: there is no other substantial form in man then the rational soul and this soul exercises the functions of inferior forms, itself performing in the case of man that the vegetative soul does in the case of plants and the sensitive soul in the case of irrational animals. From this follows the union of soul with body cannot be something unnatural: it cannot be punishment to the soul for sin in a preceding state. The human soul has the
power of sensation, for e.g., but it cannot exercise this function without body; it has the power of intellecution, but it has no innate ideas and has to form is ideas in dependence on sense-experience, for such it needs a body; the soul, then, is united to a body because it needs it, because it is naturally the form of body. The union of soul and body is not to the detriment, but to the good of the soul, *propter cmmum.* Matter exists for the form and not the other way about, and the soul is united to the body in order that it (the soul) may act according to its nature.\(^\text{148}\)

Though there is the close union of soul and body, Aquinas held that there is a real distinction between the soul and its faculties, and between the faculties themselves. In God alone are the powers of acting and the act itself identical with the substance, since in God alone is there no potentiality: in the human soul there are faculties or powers of acting which are in potentiality to their acts and which are to be distinguished according to their respective acts and objects.\(^\text{149}\) Some of these faculties belong to the soul and are not intrinsically dependent on a bodily organ., while others belong to the *compostum* and cannot be exercised without the body: the former, therefore, remain in the soul even when it is separated from the body, whereas the latter remains in the separated soul only potentially or virtually (*virtue*), in the sense that the soul still has remote power to exercise the faculties, but only if it were reunited with the body: in its separated sense it cannot use them. For illustration, the rational soul or intellectual faculty is not intrinsically dependent on the body, though in the state of union with the body there is a certain dependence in regard to the material of knowledge, but the sensation of power cannot obviously be exercised without the body. On the other hand it cannot be exercised by the body without the soul. Its 'subject', therefore, is neither soul alone nor body alone but the human *compostum.* Sensation cannot be attributed simply to the soul using a body (as Augustine thought), soul and body play their respective role in producing the act of sensation, and power of sensation belongs to both in union rather than in separation.
Thomas Aquinas distinguished among five special senses, each of which is tied to a special organ of sensation and makes us aware of a special type of quality. Lowest of all are those that involve the sense organ's actually acquiring the quality that is sensed. For example, in touch, the hand sense the cold of the water and the back that senses the heat of the sun actually become cold and hot. Whereas in case of sight, the eye that senses green does not become green. Hence, the complicated terminology involved, makes it difficult for modern minds, accustomed to a totally different vocabulary, to understand him. Touch involves a purely natural immutation. Between these lie other senses, which (in various ways) involve both types of immutation. In sensing heat, the organ becomes hot. In its natural being heat is received into the thing heated. This is "natural immutation" because the whole nature of the thing or quality in question is transmitted; in the case of vision the whole nature is not transmitted, the natural quality is not received into the eyes for e.g., green. Then what is transmitted? What is received? The answer to Aquinas seemed obvious. It is Aristotle's sensible form; the eye comes to be filled with the form "green," just as wax takes the form of a signet but not its matter. Aquinas called this process "spiritual immutation." But in addition to being able to touch things or see, we can remember or imagine in having done so. This brings us to a set of powers that are more complex but that still belong to the faculty of sensation.

The sensitive faculty (comprising the exterior senses, of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and the interior senses of sensus communis, phantasia or imagination, vis aestimativa and vis memorativa or memory) has as its object, not simply the body of the sentient subject but rather very sensible body. The rational faculty (comprising the active and passive intellects) has its object, not only sensible bodies but being in general. The higher the power, therefore, the wider and more comprehensive its object. At every lower power is transformed and perfected by its presence in a higher-level soul. At human level, intelligence mediates the "estimative power" that men and animals share; the animal's capacity to react to advantageous and disadvantageous circumstances becomes still more complex in man. Thomas Aquinas says:-
For the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed, being as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intensions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed; and for their preservation, the memorative power, which is a storehouse of such intensions. Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by external sensibles. But there is a difference as to the above intensions: for other animals perceive these intensions only by some sort of natural instinct, while man perceives them also by means of certain comparison.

Hence, it is clear that man does not simply react to the advantageous by seeking it and to the disadvantageous by avoiding it; he can compare one situation with the other. Thus intelligence gives estimation another dimension by presenting it with alternatives that sense alone cannot envisage. Now, for illustration if we consider the aptitude of the external object to be received in the subject through cognition, we find there are two kinds of faculty, sensitive and intellective, the former of which is more restricted in scope than the latter; but if we consider the inclination the tendency of the soul towards the external object, we find that there are two other powers: locomotion by which the subject attains the object through its own motion, and that of appetition, by which the object is desired as an ens of finis. The power of locomotion belongs to the level of sensitive life; but the power of appetition is twofold, comprising desire on the sensitive level, the sensitive appetite, and desire on the intellectual level, volition. But why did Thomas Aquinas assume that sensation, estimation, memory, and imagination are separate powers? Today this would be regarded as an open question, to be settled by empirical investigation. We can speak of intellectual memory; but the intellectual memory is not a power really distinct from the intellect itself, more precisely the passive intellect: it is the intellect itself regarded under one of the aspects of functions. Again, the act of apprehending a truth, of resting in the apprehension of the truth, does not proceed from a power or faculty different from the faculty by which we reason discursively: intellectus and ratio are not distinct faculties; for it is the same mind which apprehends truth and reasons from that truth to another truth. God is the 'higher reason' (ratio superior) concerned with eternal things, a faculty different...
from the *ratio inferior*, by which we attain rational knowledge of temporal things. The two are one and the same faculty, though the faculty receives different names according to the objects of its different acts, as Augustine said. The same applies to the speculative and practical intellects, which are but one faculty. However, Aquinas simply took for granted that every distinct type of behaviour must be attributable to a distinct power of the soul.

It is quoted as follows:

"As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to one and the same principle; they must be assigned to diverse powers, since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul’s operation."

Thomas Aquinas found it intellectually unsatisfactory to end with a large number of completely separate powers, therefore he had to caste some way to bring these powers to unity. He accomplished this by applying the principle of hierarchy, continuity, and system. though the powers are distinct, they fulfill, and are fulfilled by, one another; thus, after all, order and unity are established in diversity.

### 2.9.5 The Rational Faculty

Thomas Aquinas follows the Aristotelian view of the relation if soul to body and adopted the Aristotelian view of the soul as form of the body, emphasizing the closeness of the union between the two. There is no *forma corporeatis*, but there is one substantial form in man, the rational soul, which directly informs prime matter and is the cause of all human activities on the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual levels: sensation is an act not of the soul using a body, but of *compositum*; we have no innate ideas, but mind is dependent on sense-experience for its knowledge. If one starts with the Platonic theory of the soul, immortality is assured, but the union of soul and body is rendered difficult to understands, while if one starts with the Aristotelian view, it might seem that one has to sacrifice immortality, that the soul is so closely bound that it cannot subsist apart from the body.
form "horse" unless our intellects operated actively to extract the form from the individual substance out there in which it is embedded.

Thomas Aquinas argues, that, if Plato was right about 'forms' having an independent existence, there would be no need to presuppose the existence of an active intellective power. Forms would then impress themselves on the passive intellect in the way in which sense objects impress themselves on the sense organs.

"But since Aristotle did not allow that the forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and since forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible, it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act. . . . We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for positing an agent intellect [that is, an active power in the intellect]." 153

According to Aquinas, soul is indeed the form of body, it always retains its aptitude to inform a body, precisely because it is naturally the form of the body; but it is none the less a rational soul had its powers are not exhausted in informing the body. St. Thomas Aquinas argues that the soul is uncorruptible while dealing with the immortality of the soul because it is a subsistent form. A thing which corrupts is corrupted either by itself (per se) or accidentally (per accidens), that is, through the corruption of something else on which it depends for existence. The soul of brute is dependent on the body for all its operation and corrupts when the body corrupts (corruptio per accidens): the rational soul, however, being a subsistent form, cannot be affected by the corruption of the body on which it does not intrinsically depend. 154 If Thomas Aquinas wishes this all that he says, then he would be obviously guilty of a gross petitio principi, since it is presupposed that human soul is a forma subsistens, and this is precisely the point which has to be proved. But, unfortunately for Aquinas, if matter corrupts, it also individualises, hence, as Aristotle seems to have concluded, what is immortal is not the personal soul of each individual man but some sort of general, supra-individual soul. 155 Since personal immortality was
of the first importance to both Christian piety and Christian theology,\textsuperscript{156} it was necessary was Thomas Aquinas to labour mightily to extricate himself from this heresy.

2.9.6 Rational Soul

Thomas Aquinas argues that the rational soul must be spiritual and a subsistent form, because it is capable of knowing the natures of all bodies. If it were material, it would be determined to a specified object, as the organ of vision is determined to the perception of colour. Again, if it depended on a bodily organ, it would be confined to knowledge of some particular kind of bodily object, which is not the case,\textsuperscript{157} while if it were itself a body, material, it could not reflect on itself.\textsuperscript{158} For these and other reasons the human soul, which is a rational soul, must be immaterial i.e. spiritual, from which it follows that it is incorruptible or naturally immortal. Physically speaking, it could, be annihilated by the God who created it; but its immortality follows from its nature and is not simply gratuitous, save in the sense that its very existence, like the existence of any other creature, is gratuitous. From the desire of persistence of being Thomas Aquinas argues, there is a natural desire for immortality and a natural desire, as implanted by God, cannot be in vain.\textsuperscript{159}

'It is impossible for a natural appetite to be in vain. But man has a natural appetite for perpetual persistence in being. This is clear from the fact that existence (esse) is desired by all things, but a man has an intellectual apprehension of esse as such, and not only of esse here and now as the brutes have. Man, therefore attains immortality as regards his soul, by which he apprehends esse as such and without temporal limit'.\textsuperscript{160}

Man, as distinct from the irrational animal, can conceive perpetual existence; divorced from the present moment, and to this apprehension there corresponds a natural desire for immortality. As this desire must have been implanted by the Author of Nature, it cannot be in vain (frustra or inane). Later on Duns Scotus argued that, as far as natural desire (desiderium naturale) is concerned, man and brute are on a level in that both naturally shun death, while in regard to the elicited or conscious desire we have first to show that its
fulfillment is possible before we can argue that it must be fulfilled. Hence, according to Thomas Aquinas, all criteria must themselves be evaluated by other criteria, and these, ultimately, by some absolute criterion. That is to say, since infinite series are impossible, there must be a terminus to every means-end series; since ultimately all (relative) ends must be means to other (higher) ends, there is a single, final, supreme end to which all other ends lead as a means in a single, hierarchical structure. Man has the power, moreover, to grasp in its general outlines (though not to know in detail) the nature of this supreme end. Hence he is capable of tracing himself the position of every good in relation to every other good in this single means-end hierarchy and so of resolving the various specific conflicts between rival goods that occur in his daily life. Putting this in a different manner: Animal appetites have sense particulars for their objects; human appetites have universals of some sort of theirs. Just as animal knows only particulars, so an animal experiences only particular desires. But, as we being men, can pass from particularity of sense knowledge to a knowledge of a universal "man" embedded in this particular "master-feeder-punisher", so we can rise to a knowledge of "good" - the universal embedded in the particular desirables experienced by animals. It may be said, then when what moves us is not merely some particular desirable, but a knowledge of value, the moving force is "will." Everywhere in the universe, Thomas Aquinas held, things are seeking what completes and fulfills them. Will is simply the character that this generic thrust toward completion assumes in a rational creature who knows the good that completes him. Hence, unless a conflict of goods appears, will is as automatic and necessary as appetite. However, because men have extended memories and because they are capable of abstract knowledge, such conflicts almost always occur. The result is that, instead of inclining automatically toward the single desirable particular present now in sensation, we usually have to choose among several goods.

2.9.7 Free Will

Thomas Aquinas held that even in willing God we have the freedom of control. It is true that if we think of God, we cannot fail to will Him, but we can choose not to think of Him. Obviously, what is true of supreme good is
true of all lesser goods. No matter how powerful the seduction of sense, no matter how much pressure the passions put upon us, no matter how bad the habits we have acquired or how long we have let ourselves remain subjected to them, we can always "resist"; the will if it so chooses, remains in control of the situation. As it is said.

"These [natural] inclinations are subject to the judgement of reason, which the lower appetite obeys... Therefore this is in no way prejudicial to free choice. The adventitious qualities are habits and passions... Yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgement of reason... It is our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free choice."163

Here the empirical facts are against Thomas Aquinas. It is not so clear indeed that the unlimited control of freedom does not exist, as he (Aquinas) proceeded, he was forced to admit as much. Hence he allowed that the will has no control over the various acts of the vegetative soul - nutrition and growth, for example, nor over the action of the heart. And further, as Augustine said, "the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold".164 Generally speaking, the will controls the sensitive powers, "it sometimes happens that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination or sense. And then such a movement occurs without the command of reason, although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen it."165 The fact is that the passions connected with the sensitive appetite not only resist the will but on occasion actually master it "The sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue of which it can resist the commands of reason the commands of reason." And again, "it is evident that... according as a man is affected by a passion, some things seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected; and thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm... It is in this way that this sensitive appetite moves the will" 166

All these undeniable facts about human nature show that there are extensive areas of our behaviour over which the will, even if it so chooses,
does not have control. God is the unmoved mover, we have to attribute our choice both to ourself and to God.167

2.9.8 Critical Approach

Many people today would deny that anything like Thomas Aquinas' spiritual act, occurring outside the empirical causal system, does occur. We would interpret the will's apparent lack of relation to its background simply as our own failure to see the connections that are there. From the modern psychological point of view, there is nothing more extranatural about volition than about, say, the activity of mice in a maze— not that all psychologists would "reduce" voluntary behaviour to this level, but that most psychologists, while admitting the presence of all sorts of complicating factors, would claim that whatever happens is part of a causal situation that is (theoretically, at least) capable of analysis. Indeed, instead of holding with Thomas Aquinas that men aim at things because they see them to be good, a modern psychologist is likely to maintain the opposite. Men judge things to be good because they aim at them. The radical differences in value theory that this shift in orientation signifies cannot be gone into here. It is enough to point out that the modern view tends to minimise the role of what Thomas Aquinas called "reason" and to treat it as being more often ex post facto than actually operative in behaviour; it provides us, after we act, with a socially acceptable justification for having behaved as we did. In Thomas Aquinas' sense much of the human behaviour is "natural" rather than "voluntary," most of us would challenge Aquinas contention that there is a sharp dichotomy between "reason" and "passion," between the "deliberate" and the "natural." Reason, we feel, is not simply thoroughly rational, utterly distinct from something else called "passion." A typical modern account, by Gardner Murphy, runs as follows:

"Inner signals of all kinds tend to initiate both inner and outer responses of a high degree of complexity. Sometimes a period of thought ends in a simple verbal summary from which a course of action follows. This overlaps a good deal with what we call the will. A man is said to be "making up his mind," and when a certain symbolic summary is achieved, he is said to have "resolved upon" a course of action, which then follows. . . . A... generally
satisfactory use of this word [will] relates to a symbolic process in which a definable period of hesitation is known to proceed an overt act. The hypothesis is that verbal cues intervene at the decisive point and lead to the initiation of one response pattern rather than another. It appears to be the case that inner verbal cues, as conditioned stimuli, can set the muscular mechanism going.

Hence, Professor Murphy thinks of whole process as will, whereas Thomas Aquinas thought of will as a final stage in the process. Thomas Aquinas's rationalistic method, not only creates an impression that no problems exist (except logical problems involved in making various conceptual spheres mutually consistent); it forestates the possibility of progress, even if problems were to over to us, by throwing us into a realm of timeless acts, spiritual substances, and uncaused activity. It is perhaps well to emphasize that this particular weakness is a result of Thomas Aquinas' rationalism rather than of his theologism. Many generations of thinkers who were not at all bound by Aquinas' dogmatic presuppositions were just as firmly wedded to rationalistic psychology. Psychology, indeed, one of the last of the sciences to break away from this sort of methodological bias, and was not until the middle of the nineteenth century-long after dogmatic considerations had ceased to limit thought-that psychology even began to be empirical.

2.9.9 Knowledge

In case of epistemology; everyone, even the self-styled skeptic, is convinced that knowledge of some sort is attainable was as clear to St. Thomas Aquinas as it was to St. Augustine, and so far as there is a problem of knowledge for Aquinas is rather how to safeguard and justify metaphysics in phase of the Aristotelian psychology than to justify the objectivity of our knowledge of the extramental world in face of a subjective idealism which had not yet arisen or to show the legitimacy of metaphysics in face of a Kantian criticism which still lay far in future. To make the problem clear it is necessary to sketch in brief, according to Aquinas, the way in which we attain our natural ideas and knowledge. Augustine thought, corporeal objects act upon the organs of sense, and sensation is an act of the *compositum*, of soul and body, not of soul alone using a body. The senses are naturally determined to the apprehension of
particulars, they cannot apprehend universals. Brutes have sensation, but they have no grasp of general ideas. The phantasm or image, which arises in the imagination and which represents the particular material object perceived by the senses, is itself particular, the phantasm of a particular object or objects. Human intellect cognition, however, is of the universal: the human being in his intellectual operations apprehends the form of the material object in abstraction; he apprehends a universal. Through sensation we can apprehend only particular men or trees, for example, and the interior images or phantasms of men or trees are always particular. Even if we have a composite image of man, not representing any one actual man distinctly but representing many confusedly, it is still particular, since the images or parts of the images of particular actual men coalesce to form an image which may be 'generic' in respect of actual particular but which is itself none the less particular, the image of a particular imagined man. The mind, however, can and does conceive the general idea of man as such, which includes all men in its extension. An image of man certainly will not apply to all men, but the intellectual idea of man, even though conceived in dependence on the sensitive apprehension of particular men, applies to all men. The image of a man must be either of a man who has or of a man who has not some hair on his head. If the former, does not in that respect represent bald men; if the latter, it does not in that respect represent men who are not bald; but if we form the concept of man as a rational animal, this idea covers all men, whether they are bald or not, white or black, tall or short, because it is the idea of the essence of man.

The question arises, how is the transition from sensitive and particular knowledge to intellectual cognition effected? Though sensation is an activity of soul and body together, the rational spiritual soul cannot be affected directly by a material thing or by the phantasm there is need, therefore, of an activity on the part of the soul, since the concept cannot be formed simply passively. This activity is the activity of the active intellect which 'illumines' the phantasm and abstracts from it the universal or 'intelligible species'. Thomas Aquinas, hence, speaks of illumination, but he does not use the world in full Augustinian sense; he means that the active intellect by its natural power and without any special illumination from God renders visible the intelligible aspect of phantasm, reveals
the formal and potentially universal element contained implicitly in the phantasm. The active intellect then abstracts the universal element by itself, producing in the passive intellect the *species impressa*. The reaction of the passive intellect to this determination by the active intellect is the *verbum mentis* (*species expressa*), the universal concept in full sense.

The function of the active intellect is purely active, to abstract the universal element from the particular elements of the phantasm, to cause in the passive intellect the *species impressa*. The intellect of man contains innate ideas but is in potentiality to the reception of the concepts: it has, therefore, to be reduced to act, and this reduction to act must be differed by a principle itself in act. As this active principle has no ready made ideas of itself to supply, it must draw its materials from what is provided by the senses, and this means that it must abstract the intelligible element from the phantasm. To abstract means to isolate intellectually the universal apart from the particularising notes. Hence the active intellect abstracts the universal essence of man from a particular phantasm by leaving out all particular notes which confine it to a particular man or particular men. The active intellect being particular active cannot impress the universal on itself; it impresses it on the potential element of the human intellect, on the passive intellect, and the reaction of this impression is the concept in the full sense, the *verbum mentis*. It is important for us to realise, that the abstract concept is not the object of cognition, but the means of cognition. If the concept, the modification of the intellect, were itself the object of knowledge, then our knowledge would be a knowledge of ideas, not of things existing extramentally, and the judgements of science would concern things not outside the mind but concepts within the mind. However, in actual fact, the concept is the likeness of the object produced in the mind and is thus the means by which the mind knows the object: in St. Thomas Aquinas's language it is *id quo intelligitur*, not *id quod intelligitur*. The mind, of course, has the power of reflecting on its own modifications and so can turn the concept into an object, but it is only secondarily an object of knowledge, primarily it is the instrument of knowledge. In saying this Aquinas avoids putting himself in a position which would be that of a subjective idealism and which would land him in the difficulties attending that form of idealism.
Thomas Aquinas held that the intellect knows directly the essence, the universal, he drew the logical conclusion that the human mind does not directly know singular material things. The emphasis is on the 'mind' and 'know', since it cannot be denied that the human being apprehends particular material objects sensitively; the object of sense is precisely the sensible particular. However, by abstracting, the intellect comes to know the intelligible species from the individualizing matter, and in this case it can have direct knowledge of universals only. Nevertheless, even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect exercises its activity of knowing only through a 'conversion', a turning of attention to the phantasm in which it apprehends the universals, and in this way it has a reflexive or indirect knowledge of the particular things represented the phantasms. Hence, according to St. Thomas Aquinas it is not true to say that the intellect has no knowledge of corporeal particulars: what he held was that mind has only an indirect knowledge of such particulars, the direct object of knowledge being the universal. But this should not be taken to imply that the primary object of intellectual cognition is the abstract idea as such, the mind apprehends the formal element. In technical language its primary object of knowledge is the direct universal, the universal apprehended in the particular it is only secondarily that it apprehends the universal precisely as universal, the reflexive universal.

1) When Aquinas holds that the mind abstracts the universal from the corporeal particular by abstracting it from the individualizing matter, he means to explain that when the mind abstracts the idea of man, for e.g., it abstracts it from this flesh and these bones, that is, from the particular individualizing matter, not from matter in general, 'intelligible matter' (i.e. substance as subject to quantity). Corporeality enters into the idea of man as such, though particular matter does not enter into the universal idea of man.

2) Thomas Aquinas does not mean to imply that it is the particular thing as such which cannot be the direct object of intellectual cognition, but rather the particular sensible or corporeal object. In other words, the particular corporeal
object is debarred from being the direct object of intellectual cognition not precisely because it is particular but because it is material and the mind knows only by abstracting from matter as principle of individuation, that is, from this or that matter.\textsuperscript{172}

Human mind according to St. Thomas Aquinas has no innate ideas but it is originally in potentiality to knowledge. The ideas are innate in the sense that the mind has a natural capacity for abstracting and forming ideas: as far as actual ideas go, mind is originally a \textit{tabula rasa}. Sense-perception is the source of minds knowledge, since the soul, the form of body, has as its natural object of knowledge the essence of material objects. The rational soul knows itself only by means of its acts, apprehending itself, not directly in its essence but in the act by which it abstracts intelligible species from sensible objects.\textsuperscript{173} The soul's knowledge of itself is not, an exception to the general rule that all our knowledge begins with sense-perception and is dependent on sense-perception. Aquinas expresses this by saying that the intellect when united to a body in the present life, cannot come to know anything \textit{nisi se ad phantasmata}.\textsuperscript{174} The human soul, as Aristotle said, understands nothing without a phantasm, and we can say \textit{nihil intellectu prorsus non fuerit in sensu}. The human mind does not think without the presence of a phantasm, it is dependent on phantasm, the reason for this is that the cognitive power is proportioned to its natural object.\textsuperscript{175} From this it follows that the human mind cannot attain in this life a direct knowledge of immaterial substances, which are not and cannot be the object of senses.\textsuperscript{176} The problem here arises whether there can be metaphysical knowledge at on these premisses, whether the human mind can rise above the things of sense and attain any knowledge of God. If our intellects are dependent on phantasm, how can they know those objects of which there are no phantasms, which do not act on the senses?\textsuperscript{177}

If we consider the human intellect precisely as intellect, then, its primary object is being. \textit{Intellectus respectu sum obiectum secundum communem entis, eo quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri}.\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Primo autem in conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quod secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu... Unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus}.\textsuperscript{179} The first movement of intellect is towards being, not
towards the sensible being in particular, the intellect can know the essence of a material thing only in so far as it is being; in the second place the human intellect is directed towards a particular kind of being. As human intellect it must start from the sense, from material beings, but as human intellect it can proceed beyond sense, not being confined to material essences, though it can do this only in so far as the immaterial objects are manifested in and through the sensible world, in so far as the material things have a relation to immaterial objects. As embodied intellect, as a tabula rasa, the natural object of which is the material essence, the intellect does not and cannot by its own power apprehend God directly; but sensible objects, as finite and contingent, reveal their relation to God, so that the intellect can know that God exists. The necessity of the conversio ad phantasma means that we cannot know God directly, but we can know Him in so far as sensible objects manifest His existence and enable us to attain an anagogical, indirect and imperfect knowledge of His nature; we can know God ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem.180

If the human intellect was merely passive, if the conversio ad phantasma meant that ideas were caused simply passively, there could be no natural knowledge of God, since sensible objects are not God. Our sensible cognition is the materia causae of intellectual cognition: the phantasm is made intelligible by active intellect through its abstractive operation. Inasmuch, then, as sensitive cognition is not the total cause of the intellectual cognition, 'it is nothing to be astonished at if intellectual cognition extends farther than sensitive cognition.' As a united body the human intellect has as its natural object the essences of material things, but by means of these essences it can ascend to 'some sort of knowledge of invisible things.' These immaterial objects we can know only per remotionem, by denying of them the characteristics peculiar to sensible objects, or analogically, but we could not know them at all, were it not for the active power of the intellect.182

The question arises how can there be any positive content to our idea of God, or indeed of any spiritual object? If, however, we simply mean that God is not less than what we know as personal, is there any positive content to our idea of divine personality? Is 'not-less-than-personal' a positive idea? If we state
it in affirmative terms, 'more-than-personal', has it a positive content? If it has not, then we are confined to the *via negativa* and can know God only *per remotum*. Thomas Aquinas does not merely adhere to the *via negativa*: he utilizes also the *via affirmativa*, maintaining that we can know God *per excessum*. Now, if when we ascribe wisdom, for e.g., to God, we say that we are ascribing wisdom *modo emmembre*, it is difficult to see what the content of our idea of divine wisdom actually is. Therefore, the God is wise has a positive content, meaning infinitely more than wise in human sense. The infinity of the object, God, means that the finite human mind can attain no adequate and perfect idea of God's nature, but it does not mean that it cannot attain an imperfect and inadequate notion of God's nature.

Thomas Aquinas constantly affirms *Veritas sequitur esse rerum*. Truth follows the existence of things, and is the adequation of the actual immanence of our thought with what exists outside our thought. A spiritual super existence by which, in a supreme vital act, I become the other, in so far as it is other, a super existence which corresponds to the existence enjoyed by that other in the field of reality which properly belongs to it- this is what in true knowledge consists. This knowledge is bathed in existence. The senses reach the object as actually existing, in so far as it exerts a real and existing action on our sensory organs. The senses actually reach existence, without knowing that it is existence. They give it to the intellect as an intelligible treasure, which they themselves do not know as intelligible, but which the intellect does know and calls by its name-Being. The intellect, seizing upon the intelligibilities, which it extracts by its own strength from sensory experience, reaches, at the core of its own internal vitality, those natures or real essences which it has disengaged by abstraction from their maternal existence at a given point in space and time-to restore them to existence through the act in which intellection is completed and consummated-through judgement. The intelligibility on which judgement bears is more mysterious than that which is given us by ideas or notions; it is not expressed in a concept, but in the very act of affirming or denying-it is the superintelligibility of the very act of existing, either possibly or actually. It is this superintelligibility of existence that St. Thomas Aquinas attaches the whole life of the intellect.
Since Thomas Aquinas' time the notion of an all-embracing world view has remained before philosophy as an ideal. But though many such systems have been proposed, especially in the 19th century, none has come close to winning the acceptance that the Thomistic scheme once attained. If the enormous expansion of knowledge has made the construction of a synoptic world view increasingly difficult, many people would say that the fragmentation of experience accompanying this expansion has made achievement of some sort of synthesis all the more desirable. Thomas Aquinas at the root of metaphysical knowledge places the intellectual intuition of the hidden reality which is concealed in the most common everyday world of our language. Descartes and the whole of rationalist philosophy which stems from the Cartesian revolution have posited an insurmountable enmity between the intellect and mystery, and there you have the deepest origin of fundamental inhumanity of a civilization based on rationalism. At the heart of being, at the heart of existence, Thomas Aquinas reconciles the intellect and mystery: by doing so he frees our intellect and restores it to its nature by restoring it to its object; but at the same time by doing so he appears as the most fundamentally human, the most truly humanistic of thinkers. Aquinas gives us the strength and the courage to accomplish our human task in the midst of strange nature and our strangeness. By making peace between our minds and mysterious universe, he also establishes peace between our minds and the mysterious Creator. Instead of separating philosophy from theology, Descartes was to do, Aquinas places philosophy in continuity with theology, and rationally shapes the eminence of theological wisdom, which is, as he put it, the participation within us of the knowledge of those spirits who see God.

St. Thomas Aquinas respects human life and the inner depth of man and reaches existence itself through the intellect itself. He has a highly classical conception of science, he is scrupulously attentive to the slightest demands, the finest rules and norms of logic, of reason and of art of formulating ideas. What he knows is the existing universe, resting on first data which must be
acknowledged, not deduced, that universe swept by all the being-producing currents which vitalize and unify it. What was implicit in Aristotle became explicit in Thomas Aquinas. Doubtless Thomas' belief in a universal creative god disposed him to believe in the possibility of a single, universal science. The West had first to access to Aristotle, it had also to experience the intellectual renaissance. The fragmentation of modern culture is symbolized in the modern university, which is an artificial grouping of special schools. Such unity as exists is a matter of buildings and physical "plant", or perhaps, of "school spirit", rather than, as in the medieval university, a matter of intellectual kinship and shares love of God. The problem of modern university is no different from the problem of modern society—how to replace cultural pluralism with some sort of cultural unity. The Middle Ages achieved a level of actual integration that has since eluded the West, and insofar as it is meaningful to attribute any such achievement to a single individual, it can be said that the Middle Ages owed its cultural unity to Thomas Aquinas.

The rationalist philosophers all inevitably posit a fatal divorce between knowledge and love. Thomistic existentialism brings them into agreement and unity, bases love upon intelligence, and strengthens intelligence by love—at the same time showing us that love can be a beneficient and pacifying stream only if it passes through the lake of the Word. Thomistic thought appears humanistic, which not only emancipates the intellect, but reconciles it with the heart and reconciles us with ourselves. Thomas Aquinas wielded hardly any influence on the temporal structures of his age. He showed to his period a supra-temporal pattern when the Middle ages did not know how to use; he lived at critical time, when the high culture of the Middle Age was casting its last rays. His theocentric humanism was too much for his time. But it is permissible to think of Thomas Aquinas as a prophetic saint, reserved for the future; in fact, it is upto men today to avail themselves of his wisdom for the aims of culture and of his humanism for the aims of community life. St. Thomas Aquinas brings a supreme lesson in humanism by showing in his doctrine and by his own example, that there is no despair of man, once our entire hope is placed on God.
The adoption of Aristotelian psychology naturally went hand in hand with the adoption of Aristotelian epistemology and with insistence on the fact that human knowledge is derived from sense experience and reflection thereon. This meant the rejection of innate ideas, even in the virtual form, and the rejection of the theory of divine illumination or rather the interpretation of divine illumination as equivalent to natural light of the intellect with the ordinary and natural concurrence of God. This doctrine raises difficulties in regard to man’s analogical knowledge of God. St Thomas utilizes the position of St. Augustine in regard to the divine ideas, a position which, philosophically speaking was derived from neo-Platonism, which in turn was a development of Platonic philosophy and tradition. Aristotle rejected the exemplary ideas of Plato, as he rejected the Platonic Demiurge; St. Augustine transmuted and rendered philosophically consistent, coupled also with the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, at which the Greeks did not arrive; and St. Thomas’s acceptance of these notions links him to this on this point with Augustine, and so with Plato through Plotinus, rather than with Aristotle. At the beginning of the Christian era we find the theologians utilising this or that element of Greek philosophy to help them in their statement of the data revelation and this process continued during the stages of medieval Scholastic development; but the appearance of a fully-fledged system of philosophy, though an inestimable boon in the creation of the Thomist synthesis, could hardly be anything else but a challenge in the long run. Thomism naturally established itself in the estimation of Christian thinkers owing to its completeness, its lucidity and its depth: it was a closely reasoned synthesis of theology and philosophy which drew on the past and incorporated it into itself, while at the same time it utilized the greatest purely philosophical system of the ancient world.

2.10 John Duns Scotus

Duns Scotus in general accepted the Aristotelian-Thomisitic theory of knowledge: Human knowledge in general begins with the sensing of particulars; by a process of abstractions, men “collect” from several experiences of similar particulars the universal embedded in all those particulars. Duns Scotus introduced in his theory an effort to correct what he regarded as the deficiencies in Thomas’s position. Thomas Aquinas held, man’s mind is limited to knowledge based on and derived from sense experience and is thus fundamentally different from inferior to the divine mind. Duns Scotus
denied that man's mind is naturally limited in this way. Duns Scotus pointed out, if human mind were naturally limited to knowledge derived from sense experience, the science of metaphysics would be impossible. For metaphysics, medieval philosophers universally agreed, is concerned with being in its widest determination, not merely with being at the level of the forms of material things. Nor, so it would seem, would rational knowledge of God be possible, if the human mind were so limited. Duns Scotus reasoned, the whole program of Thomas' *Summa Theologica* was naturally undermined by Thomas's own theory of knowledge; if this theory were correct, men would have to depend entirely on faith and revelation for their knowledge of God.

2.10 1 Knowledge

The primary natural object of our intellect is being as being, from which it follows that every being, every thing which is intelligible, falls into the scope of Intellect. Duns Scotus says, if we are speaking of primary object the intellect, it is only reasonable to assign as its primary object that which is the primary object of the intellect in this or that particular case. We do not say, for example, that the primary object of vision is that which the eye can see in candle light; but we assign as its primary object that which is its object simply as a power or faculty. Therefore, even if man in his present state (*homo viator*) comes first of all to know creatures, this does not mean that primary adequate object of his intellect is not being as being. It may be added that this doctrine does not mean that the human intellect has a natural power of knowing the divine essence in itself or the divine Persons in the Trinity, since the general concept of being does not include *this particular essence as particular*, while creatures are not such perfect imitations of god that they reveal the divine essence as it is in itself. The divine essence as such moves (*movet*) naturally, is the natural object of divine intellect only; it can be known by the human intellect only through God's free choice and activity, not through the human intellect's natural power.

St. Thomas Aquinas maintained that the natural object of the human intellect is the essence of the material thing, which essence becomes intelligible to the intellect when it is abstracted from the individualizing matter. It is natural to the angelic intellect to know natures that do not exist in matter; but the human intellect cannot do this in its present state, when united to the body. To be united to the human
body is the natural state of the human intellect; to be separated from the body is \textit{praeter naturam}. Thomas Aquinas argues that, in as much as the natural object of the human intellect is the form of the material thing and in as much as we know this kind of form by abstracting it from the ‘phantasm’, the human intellect necessarily depends on the ‘phantasm’, and so on sense experience for its knowledge.\footnote{Duns Scotus} St. Thomas Aquinas as teaching that the quiddity or essence, known by way of abstraction from the phantasm, is the primary object of the human intellect considered not simply as being in a certain state, i.e., in the present life, but in its nature as a power or faculty of a certain kind, he replies that this opinion is untenable by a theologian, i.e. by a man who accepts the next life and the doctrine of eternal happiness. In heaven the soul knows immaterial things directly. Now, the intellect remains the same power in heaven as it was on the earth. Therefore, if it can know immaterial things in heaven, we cannot say that its primary object is the essence of the material thing; its primary object, if we cannot consider the intellect as a power, must embrace both immaterial and material things, even if in this life it cannot know immaterial things directly. Its restriction in this life to a certain type of object must be secondary, not primary.

Duns Scotus maintains\footnote{189} that in the human intellect there is a natural desire to know ‘the cause’ distinctly that a natural desire cannot be in vain, since he concludes that the primary object of the intellect cannot, therefore, be material things, which are the effect of the immaterial cause, it might happen that he is contradicting the assertion that we cannot have a natural knowledge of the divine essence. But he does not deny that the human intellect in its present state is limited in range, though he insists that the object of a power in a certain condition must not be confused with the object of the power considered in itself. He did not consider that an analysis of being as being can yield knowledge of the divine essence as it is in itself, for even if the being is the primary and adequate object of human intellect, it does not follow that we form our idea of being by any other way than abstraction. In general, we may say that Duns Scotus accepted the Aristotelian account of abstraction, though he considered that the active passive intellects were not two distinct powers, but are two aspects or functions of one power.\footnote{190}

According to Duns scotus the human intellect in its present state, in this life, depends on the phantasm due to the order established by divine wisdom, either as a
penalty for sin or with a view to the harmonious operation of our various powers, sense and imagination apprehending the individual thing, the intellect apprehending the universal essence of that thing, or else on account of our infirmity. The intellect in its present condition is moved by what is imaginable or sensible, the reason for this may be the punitive justice or it may be natural cause, in as much as the harmony of powers may require it so far as this present state is concerned. 'Nature' in this connection means, nature in a particular condition, not nature absolutely considered: on this point Duns Scotus insists. This is not quite satisfactory explanation; but Scotus is quite clear about the intellect, absolutely considered, is the faculty of being as being, and he decisively rejects what he regards as the Thomist doctrine. Whether Duns Scotus is fair in his interpretation of Thomas Aquinas is another matter. Sometimes Thomas Aquinas explicitly states that the proper object of intellect is being. Thomas Aquinas insists on the natural character of the necessity of the converso ad phantasma, arguing that if this necessity were simply the union with a body and not to the natural soul itself, it could follow that the union of soul and body takes place for the good of the body, not of the soul, since the soul would be hampered in its natural operations through its union with the body. Looking at this Thomistic aspect, Duns Scotus concluded that Thomas Aquinas is unable to justify the possibility of metaphysical science.

According to Thomas Aquinas the intellect cannot know individual material things directly, since the intellect comes to know only by abstracting the universal from matter, the principle of individuation. He admits, that the mind has an indirect knowledge of individual things, since it cannot actually know the abstracted universal except through the 'conversion of the phantasm'. The imagination always plays part, and the image is an image of the individual thing; but the primary and direct object of intellectual knowledge is universal. Thomas's theories of knowledge concern the status of universals; this, too, grew out of Duns Scotus's insistence that the human mind is capable of real objective knowledge of things. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus accepted the basic Aristotelian scheme, but this scheme contained a great ambiguity. Duns believed that this ambiguity had infected Thomism. He was determined to validate these distinctions as objective to do so without lapsing into the extreme position of the medieval realists. He held that Genus must be a real object of knowledge, not merely a way human mind looks at things; yet he also held that genus is not a separate existent-not, that is, a Platonic form. How can this be? According to
Duns Scotus the answer lay in his formal distinction. He asserts that we do not have to choose between asserting that genus is wholly objective and admitting that it is only subjective. There is another possibility, that the distinction particular and genus is “formal,” that there is a real difference between them but that they are not separate entities. Duns Scotus asserts, understanding does not err, although the senses err:

"The understanding does not err, although the senses err"). But will not the understanding err in this knowledge of principles and conclusions, if the senses are deceived of concerning all the terms? I reply, that with respect to this knowledge the understanding does not have the senses for cause, but only for occasion, for the understanding cannot have knowledge of simples unless it has received that knowledge from the senses; still, having received it, it can compound simples with each other by its own power; and if from the of relation of such simples there is a combination which is evidently true, the understanding will assent to that combination by its own power and by the power of the terms, not by the power of the sense by which it receives the terms from without. For example: If the reason of whole and the reason of greater are received from sense, and the understanding compounds the following: every whole is greater than its part, the understanding by its own power and that of these terms assents indubitably to this combination, and not only because it sees the terms conjoined in the thing, as it asserts the following, Socrates is white, because it saw that the terms are united in the things.”

Further the certitude concerning things known by experience is shown by Duns Scotus:

“The certitude concerning things known by experience is shown. Concerning type of knowables, . . . I say that although experience is not had of all singulars, but of a large number, and that although it is not always had, but in a great many cases, still one who knows by experience knows infallibly that it is thus, and that it is always thus, and that it is thus in all, and he knows this by following a proposition reposing in the soul, whatever occurs as in a great many things from some cause which is not free, is the natural effect of that cause, which proposition is known to the understanding, even though it had accepted the terms of it from erring senses; for a cause which is not free cannot produce as in great many things an effect to the opposite of which it is ordered, or to which it is not ordered by its form but a casual case is ordered to the producing of the opposite of the casual effect or to not producing it; therefore, nothing is the casual cause in respect to an effect produced frequently by it, and if it is not free, it is a
natural cause. That, however, this effect occurs by such a cause producing as in great many cases, this must be learned through experience; for to discover such a nature at one time with such an accident, at another with such another accident, it must be discovered that, howsoever great might be the diversity of such accidents, such an effect always followed that nature; therefore, such an effect follows not through some accident accidentally of that nature, but through the very nature in itself. ..."195

Hence, Duns Scotus began by distinguishing various fields in which natural knowledge is possible-various kinds of judgments, that is, that attain to certainty. He assumed general agreement that certainty is possible in these fields. His attention was directed by means of a masterly analysis of the nature of evidence, why such objects are possible. In this respect Duns’s inquiry was in the spirit of Kant’s “critical” method, though, his conclusions differed from Kant’s because the development of modern science after Dun’s time radically altered philosophers’ conception of empirical certainty. Duns Scotus attempts to justify induction in, the certainty of things known by experience. The problem he often saw is that, we often do not have experience of all the singulars of which we want to assert some property. For example we have seen some stones fall, we can assert that these stones have fallen; but we have not seen all stones fall; then how are we justified in asserting that all stones necessarily fall? What is the basis of our inference from observed some to an unobserved all? Duns Scotus bases his answer for such inferences on proposition, “Whatever occurs in great many things from some cause which is not free, is the natural effect of that cause” According to him the proposition is known to the understanding, “A cause which is not free cannot produce as in great many things an effect to the opposite of which it is ordered”, that is, nature is a regular order of uniformity operating secondary causes. The inductive justification proposed by Duns Scotus is inadequate: How do we know that nature is uniform? If our knowledge of the uniformity of nature is derived from one experience of nature, then it rests on an inductive inference and we are caught in a vicious circle. If Duns Scotus did not solve the problem of induction, he at least saw that there was a problem to be solved; his analysis helped to fix the problem with precision.

Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus themselves did not contribute to the development of scientific method because they were not much interested in the order of secondary causes, and in so far as they thought about this order at all, they conceived it to be teleological. Theology is a practical science, according to Duns Scotus. What he
means by this, 196 'even necessary theology', theological knowledge of necessary truths concerning God in Himself, is logically prior to the elicited act of will by which we choose God, and the first principles of salutary conduct are taken from it. Hence, Duns Scotus parts company with Thomas Aquinas, who says 197 that theology is a speculative science, just as he parts company with Thomas Aquinas when the latter declares that theology is a science. 198 According to Thomas Aquinas theology is a science because its principles are derived from those higher science, proper to God and the blessed, so that they are absolutely certain; it is not a science in the same sense in which geometry and arithmetic are sciences, since its principles are not evident to the natural light of reason. 199 Whereas according to Duns Scotus the theology for us is a practical science, mainly because revelation is given as a norm for salutary conduct, that we may attain our last end, while Thomas theology is primarily a speculative science, though not exclusively, because it deals more with divine things than with human acts.

In the *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum* 201 Duns Scotus affirms that the intellect does not, in virtue of its own constitution, possess any natural knowledge, either in simple or in complex notions, 'because all our knowledge arises from sensation'. This applies even to the knowledge of the first principles 'For first the sense is moved by some simple, and not complex object, and through the movement of the sense the intellect is moved and apprehends simple objects: this is the intellect's first act. Secondly, after the apprehension of simple objects there follows the act of bringing together simple objects, and after this composition the intellect is able to assent to the truth of the complex, if it is a first principle.' Hence, natural of the first principle means no more than that when the simple terms have been understood and combined, the intellect immediately assents, in virtue of its own natural light, to the truth of the principle; 'but knowledge of terms is acquired from sensible objects'. Duns Scotus means to say is that we obtain the notions of 'whole' and 'part', for e.g., through sense-experience; but when the intellect brings together the terms, it sees immediately the truth of the proposition that the whole is greater than the part. The knowledge of what a whole is and what a part is comes from sense-experience; but the natural light of the intellect enables it to see immediately the truth of the complex object, the first principle.
Duns Scotus rejects the illumination theory and give the arguments of Henry of Ghent on behalf of the illumination theory and proceeds to criticize them, objecting that Henry's arguments seem to result in the conclusion that all certain and natural knowledge is impossible. Duns Scotus adds, the doctrine that sensible objects are continually changing is the doctrine of Heraclitus and is false. Similarly, if the changing character of the soul and its ideas are an obstacle to certainly, illumination will not remedy the defect. Thus Duns Scotus defends the activity and natural power of the human intellect, and a similar preoccupation shows itself in his rejection of St. Thomas's doctrine that the soul, when separated from the body cannot acquire new ideas from things themselves. He gives the opinion of St. Thomas in more or less the same words the latter uses his commentary on the Sentences and argues that it belongs to the nature of the soul to know, to abstract, to will, so that, since the soul is also of such a nature that it can exist in separation from the body, we may legitimately conclude that it can acquire fresh knowledge by natural means in this state of separation. According to Duns Scotus Thomas Aquinas degrades the opinion of human soul. Duns scotus's opinion is connected with his view that the soul's dependence on the senses in this life is pro statu isto, forte ex peccato. Hence, the soul in separation from the body, is not cut off from the acquisition of new knowledge, nor is it even confined to intuition, it can exercise the power of abstraction too.

2.10.2 Intuitive And Abstractive Knowledge

Intuitive knowledge according to Duns scotus is the knowledge of an object as present in the actual existence and it is against the nature of intuitive knowledge that it should be knowledge of an object which is not actually existent and present. Scotus makes a distinction between perfect intuitive knowledge, which is immediate knowledge of an object as present, and imperfect intuitive knowledge, which is knowledge of an existent object as existing in future, as anticipated, or as existing in the past, as remembered. On the other hand abstractive knowledge is of the essence of the object considered in abstraction from its existence or non-existence. The difference between intuitive and abstractive knowledge is that the former is knowledge of an object as existent and actually present, i.e., in intuition while the latter knowledge is of the essence of an object considered in abstraction from existence, whether the object actually exists or not. There can be abstractive knowledge of a non-existent object as well as of an existent object, but there can be intuitive knowledge of only an existent object as
existent. Accordingly Duns Scotus says that though the blessed could see him in God, i.e., in a beatific vision, as existing and writing, this knowledge would not be intuitive, since, 'I am not actually present in god, whom the blessed behold in heaven.'

We cannot not have experiences of all instances of a particular type of natural event; but experience of number of instances may be sufficient to show the scientist that the event in question proceeds from a natural cause and will always follow the cause. Sometimes we have experience of the effect and are able to reduce the effect to a self-evident causal relation, in which case we can proceed to deduce the effect and so to obtain a still more certain knowledge than we had through experience, in other occasions we may have experience of the cause in such a way that we cannot demonstrate the necessary connection between cause and effect, but only that the effect proceeds from the cause as a natural cause. Hence, Duns Scotus's doctrine of abstractive knowledge, the knowledge of essence in abstraction from existence and non-existence, has led to the comparison of this aspect of his thought with the method of the modern Phenomenological School.

2.10.3 Conclusion

Duns Scotus developed extremely efficient tools of analysis. Modern thinkers with a pragmatic bent are inclined to regret that he expended his obviously fine intellect on abstract metaphysical and theological problems. How much more profitable it would have been, such philosophers feel, had he given the same attention to the numerous social political questions that desperately needed rigorous analysis. But this criticism overlooks the fact that the questions Duns Scotus discussed were important to him and to the society of his time-far more important than the social and political problems that seem so important to Pragmatic philosophers. These questions all centered on the crucial medieval problem of fixing the relation between faith and reason. This was a crucial problem precisely because men of the middle ages found they needed both; until they could show the two to be in thoroughgoing harmony, the medieval worldview lacked stability. To demonstrate the rationality of Christian faith was the task Thomas had set for himself. But though Duns Scotus agreed that Thomas' program for working out this demonstration (Aristotelian metaphysics) was basically correct, he did not believe that Thomas had entirely succeeded. He therefore proposed to do better than Thomas.
intent Scotism was systematic, positive, and rational. The final result of trying to save theology by excluding it from the field of the rational inquiry was, ironically enough, its relation to an increasingly inconsequential role in the coming "Age of Reason".

2.11 Francis Roger Bacon

Bacon’s work serves to indicate the state of knowledge among the most advanced intellects of his time. The Opus Majus, his chief surviving work and the principal document, is a fascinating hodgepodge of information on comparative philology, optics, alchemy, astrology, and many other subjects. Through it all, however, runs a connecting thread. The central theme of the Opus Majus is suggested by the alternative title that appears in the manuscripts: On the Utility of Knowledge. The book is full of proposals to put knowledge to practical use. He was clear that the ultimate utility of science is in the service of the Church and perfection of man’s knowledge of God.

Bacon criticizes the medieval science. “The propositions now in use, have been suggested by a scanty . . . experience and a few particulars of more general occurrence, are made for the most part just large enough to fit and take these in. . . . And if some opposite instance, not observed or not known before, chance to come in the way, the proposition [instead of being abandoned as false] is rescued and preserved by some frivolous distinction”. The main tendency of medieval science had been to start from propositions of the highest order of generality, further assuming their incorrigibility, to deduce propositions of lower generality from them. Bacon saw that a purely deductive science was not a natural science. “The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if notions themselves (which is the root of matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure.” What the new science had to aim was not “propositions established by argumentation [that is, by methods of deductive logic]... but propositions duly and orderly formed from particulars.” Even the Scholastic science according to Bacon was not a completely trivial, everything depended on a major premise; if it did not correspond on facts, and the conclusion also might fail to do so. Hence the crucial question seemed to him to be obtaining a major premise that corresponds to the facts. Scholastic science failed went astray because it failed to make certain of this.
2.11 1 Knowledge

"By the light of knowledge the Church of God is governed, the commonwealth of the faithful is regulated, the conversion of unbelievers is secured, and those who persist in their malice can be held in check by the excellence of knowledge, so that they may be driven off from the borders of the Church in a better way than by shedding of Christian blood. . . There is one wisdom that is perfect and this is contained in the Scriptures. From the root of this wisdom all truth has sprung. I say, therefore, that one science is the mistress of the others, namely, theology, . . . whose nod and authority the rest of the sciences obey. Or better, there is only one perfect wisdom, which is contained wholly in the Scriptures, and is to be unfolded by canon law and philosophy. [Theology] gathers within its own grasp all wisdom; since all wisdom has been given by one God, to one world, for one purpose. . . . The way salvation is single, although there are many steps; but wisdom is the way to salvation." 216

Bacon laid down this general principle and discussed in exhaustive detail with a curious blend of naivété and insight, the ways in which mathematics, "the study of tongues," the various other sciences, and philosophy could be used in interpreting scripture and illuminating the human mind.

2.11.1.1 Knowledge Through Reason And Experience

Reason and experience are the two modes of acquiring knowledge according to Bacon. Reasoning draws a conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that the mind may rest on intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience; since many have arguments relating to what can be known, but because they lack experience they neglect the arguments, and neither avoid what is harmful nor follow what is good. Take for e.g., If a man who has never seen fire should prove by adequate reasoning the fire burns and injures things and destroys them, his mind would not be satisfied thereby, nor would he avoid fire, until he placed his hand on some combustible substance in the fire, so that he might prove by experience that which reasoning taught. But when he has had actual experience of combustion his mind is made

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Experience is of two types 1) Gained through our external senses, in this we gain our experience of those things that are in the heavens by instruments made for this purpose. 2) of those things that are here below by means attested by our vision. Things that do not belong in our part of the world we know through other scientists who have had experience of them.

2 1 1 2 Internal Knowledge

There are seven stages of internal knowledge
1] First is reached through illumination relating purely to the sciences.
2] Second consists in the virtues.
4] Fourth consists in the beatitudes, which the Lord defines in the Gospels.
5] Fifth consists in the spiritual senses.
6] Sixth consists in fruits, of which is the peace of God which passes all understanding.
7] Seventh consists in raptures and their states according to the different ways in which people are caught up to see many things of which it is not lawful for a man to speak. And he who has had diligent training in these experiences or in several of them is able to assure himself and others not only in regard to things spiritual, but also in regard to all human sciences.

Bacon proceeds further by saying that

"All that which our intellect is able to understand and know is small in comparison with those things which in the beginning in its weakness it is bound to believe, such as the divine verities and many secrets of nature and of art completing nature, concerning which no human reason can be given in the beginning; but one must get understanding from God through the experience of the inner light, I mean in the sacred verities of grace and glory, and stirred through the experience of his senses in the secrets of nature and art he must discover their reason."

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2.1.2 Conclusion

In Bacon's conception of philosophy the Neoplatonic ideal appears. Bacon held "philosophy exists through the influence of divine illumination." Since there is one universal truth which is God, and since this truth exists in men's minds only as a result of divine illumination, "it is evident" that the labor of even the pagan philosophers "is not opposed to the wisdom." The whole history of philosophy is, nothing but the unfolding-interrupted by periods of relapse and ignorance- of this divine wisdom.

Bacon prided himself on having 'established forever a true and lawful marriage between the empirical and the rational faculty, the unkind and ill-started divorce and separation of which has thrown in to confusion all the affairs of the human family.' But though Bacon was quite correct in holding human that knowledge would remain in confusion until the two faculties were lawfully married, he did virtually nothing toward effecting their union. He seemed somehow to except to utilize syllogism to sire a rational structure for the generalizations provided by the induction. The rational structure of the new science was to be provided, not by a syllogistic, but by a mathematical, logic. Had Bacon been more alert to the developments, he would have seen that a new method of precisely the type required - a method that was empirical and rational in character was emerging.

2.12 Thomas Hobbes

Hobbes inherited from the Middle Ages a disposition to think systematically and to view the function of the philosophy as the construction of a unified world view, in which all the special sciences are derived from one supreme science, in which all the answers to the questions are statable in terms of a single formula. The traditional metaphysics - with its concept of a perfect, eternal and immutable reality for Hobbes was nonsense. The only reality for him was "body determinate," the concept of reality -as-a-whole became simply the concept of all the bodies that are, and the only possible or meaningful metaphysics was the new mechanics. Man, is nothing but body; each
individual man is simply a certain region of the material plenum, and what distinguishes this region from the other regions is only the motions occurring in there.

2.12.1 Conception Of Reality

According to Hobbes reality consists of body, or "matter" and is defined as "that which having no dependence upon our thought, is co-extended with some part of space." The ordinary notions of material things are impressions produced in us by the action of real bodies. The real bodies have quantity and are capable of motion. Every actual body has some determinate magnitude and is either at rest or in motion at some determinate velocity. Reality—as-a-whole is full. All its parts are "contiguous to one another, in such a manner as not to admit at least empty space between." 

2.12.1.1 Body

"Every object is either a part or the whole world, or an aggregate of parts. The greatest of all bodies, or sensible objects, is the whole world itself; which we behold when we look round about us from this point of the same which we call the earth. . . . The questions concerning the magnitude of the world are whether it be finite or infinite, full or not full; concerning its duration, whether it had a beginning, or be eternal. . . . But the knowledge of what is infinite can never be attained by a finite inquirer. . . ."

According to Hobbes body works, acts in relation to the other body. Causality plays its major role in function of the body. An entire cause is always sufficient for the production of its effect. It follows that in whatsoever instant the cause is entire in the same instant the effect is produced. A necessary cause is defined to be that, which being supposed, the effect cannot but follow, this also may be collected, that whatsoever effect is produced at any time, the same is produced by a necessary cause. All propositions concerning future things, contingent or not contingent, are either necessarily true, or necessarily false, but we call them contingent, because we do not know whether they are true or false; whereas variety depends not on our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes.
Hobbes manifests, all bodies differ from one another in number, namely, as one and another; no two bodies are the same. The same and different in number, are names opposed to one another by contradiction. The same body may at different times be compared with itself. Here it springs a controversy among philosophers about the beginning of individuation, namely, in what sense it may be conceived that a body is at one time the same, at another time not the same it was formerly. For example, whether a man grown old be the same man he was whilst he was young, or another man, he that sins, and he that is punished, should not be the same man, by reason of the perpetual flux and change of man's body... "We must consider by what name anything is called, when we inquire concerning the identity of it... Whensoever the name, by which it is asked whether a thing be the same it was, is given it for the matter only, then, if the matter be the same... man will always be the same, whose actions and thoughts proceed all from the same beginning of the motion..."225

2.12.2 Knowledge

Hobbes maintained that the data of sense are the bases from which "all the knowledge that we have is derived."226 But how can this be? Hobbes's position is that a motion in my brain is experienced as some colour, smell or taste. Experienced by whom? By me? So it would seem that I am only matter in motion. But how it gets experienced at all? Clearly speaking, experience implies consciousness—either as an "accident" of matter or, still less, as the activity of an immaterial reality, mind. According to traditional philosophy, the mind has various powers—it perceives, thinks, imagines, remembers and so on; but for Hobbes, these are simply motions in our bodies. The most elementary of these motions is perception (or "sense"). The rest are derived from that original. Though Hobbes naturally wished to hold, in agreement with commonsense, that the phantasm somehow knows the world and truly reports about the nature, from his basis it follows that what the phantasm thinks it knows is actually only "a tumult of mind, raised by external things that press the original part of man's body."227 Hence perception, far from being knowledge, is sheer delusion to the extent that men are taken in by it: "Whatever accidents or qualities our senses makes make us think there be in the world, they be not there, but are seeming and apparitions only: the things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of sense."228 Hobbes went on to say that the great deception of sense "is by sense
corrected: for as a sense telleth: me; when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that the colour is not in the object." But this is quite unsatisfactory. It is true that isolated deceptions of sense are "by sense corrected" Hobbes was not talking about particular illusions for e.g., the particular illusions, such as mistaking a reflection in mirror for the object reflected there or mistaking a moonbeam on a curtain for a ghost. But he was talking about a generic, universal deception. Since it was supposed to infect all experience, it could never be corrected or detected, by sense experience. To put it differently, it is an empirical fact that sense experiences are deceptive: We discover that they are deceptive by the means of sense experience itself. But it is not an empirical fact that sense experience as such is deceptive, and this fact- if it were a fact- could never be ascertained by means of sense experience. Indeed it is not a fact; it is an inference from another theory-the theory that all reality is matter in motion.

"When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after, is not altogether is not so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. ... But because in sense, no one had the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to pass in time, that in the imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another..."

Hobbes was attempting to observe the behavior of thoughts. Hobbes said in effect, that if the sense experience of A has been followed by the sense experience of B, the thought of A on another occasion tends to be followed by the thought of B. Hobbes total account latter was called "association of ideas" was the beginning of empirical psychology. Hobbes undertook that "the intelligible species" explain nothing, being merely impressive-sounding names for seeing and "understanding"; they only serve to demonstrate the regrettable "frequency of an insignificant speech, at institutions of higher learning. Hobbes's account was deficient in many respects, conscious life is more like a stream than a series of hard, self-enclosed units that have to be compounded or separated, as the case may be. Hobbes was mislead by the mechanistic analogy- a mistake, perpetuated by his followers, that has plagued psychology almost to our own day. Hence, it should be noted that the "law" of association is an empirical generalization, not a theorem deduced in mechanics. The relata are not quantities but
phantasms, and the law of their connection is not formulated in mathematical terms. Causality becomes merely an expectation on man’s part, growing out of the tendency of human thoughts to associate “When a man hath so often observed like antecedents to be followed by like consequents, that whensoever he seeth the antecedent, he looketh again for the consequent . . . then he collets both the antecedent and the consequents, signs one of another . . . .” For example if a man has “always seen the day night to follow one another hitherto,” he will aspect the present day to be followed by night; but this is merely because, as a result of the law of association, the thought of day is followed by the thought of night. We cannot “thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally.”

Hence it is clear that on sensation and on its laws nothing that has been said is uniquely true of man. All bodies “fit for retaining such motions as is made in them” are capable of sensation. And many bodies possess this property of retaining motion, of remembering experiences. The distinguishing mark of thought, on contrast to sensation, is the capacity to give names “or other voluntary signs” to the felt states, and this capacity itself confirms to the law of association.

2.12.3 Conclusion

Hobbes, antirationalism was his extreme nominalism. According to Hobbes there is no reason in the universe, there is only body in motion. Reasoning is merely the manipulation the “marks”, that is, verbal symbols, and any correspondence between the conclusions of such reckoning and the behaviour of the real is a happy coincidence that we accept because of its “advantages”. Hobbes overlooked the part experimentation plays in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. In the actual practice of scientists, the relation between hypothesis and experiment is intimate and organic, Because Hobbes supposed that the scientist first draws up a number of arbitrary definitions and then deduces their consequences in isolation from any knowledge of facts, he exaggerated the possibility of there being other, equally arbitrary definitions that would have done as well. If he had understood that the knowledge of facts by which its consequences of definitions are tested is itself the product of prior definitions and testings, Hobbes would have seen that the scientist’s conclusions, though provisional, are less sheerly arbitrary than supposed. However, Hobbes may have anticipated the views that were
not to win wide acceptance until our own day. Like Hobbes, many people today believe that the certainty of mathematical reasoning results from the fact that it is merely a "computation" of the consequences of definitions: hence they agree with him in denying that there is any "necessary knowledge of facts." But not everyone is as bold as Hobbes in facing up to the ethical, political, and epistemological consequences of this extreme antirationalist.

We conclude that though the medieval attempts to solve the problem of universals were complicated by religious considerations, the problem itself is one that every philosophy must face and try to solve. The faith-reason controversy, on the other hand, is peculiar to Christian philosophy and arises only because the Christian philosopher accepts the authority of revelation. The classical mind, for its part, rested on no special revelation; what it knew it had discovered through its own efforts. This was possible because the things the Greeks were primarily interested in—man, the state, nature—were all possible objects of cognitions. But as soon as men began to long for a supernatural and infinite object, it was clear that there had to be some sort of extra natural access to the desired object. And since extra natural access was not accorded to all men, it was argued that we should have faith in the authority of those who had received a special revelation; but this scheme soon proved insufficient. Where was the frontier between the domain of reason and the domain of faith? It was easy for philosophers to assume the faith and reason do not conflict—that they yield identical conclusions. Since they held that God is the perfection of reality and truth, it seemed evident to them that He must operate in a perfectly rational manner. Moreover, they could not believe that God who endowed men with rational minds did not intend them to use these minds to establish communications with the rational order He had decreed.

Between 1300 and 1500, social economic, and political developments drastically altered almost every phase of European life, and soon afterwards scientific developments and application of technology to production further increased the tempo of change. These changes required more rapid and flexible adjustment than the medieval mind was capable of making. The result was the rapid overthrow of the medieval scheme. One great reason for the age's failure to respond to the need for flexibility was the existence of Church with its ideal of orthodoxy. This brings us to another difference between the closing periods of classical and medieval thought. Late
classical thought was free to develop within the framework of the dominant conceptual scheme, unrestrained by anything except its sense of the intellectual fitness of that scheme. Hence, it was possible to adjust itself to the great shift from the city state to the imperial pattern, and to the other cultural changes that occurred. But as soon as the Middle Ages achieved its philosophical climax, the new conceptual scheme became frozen in a rigid orthodoxy. Since any major change inside the dominant system thus became impossible, development on philosophical thought had to take place outside the medieval worldview. In the 16th century there was a revolution in the way men thought about the universe they lived in. Up to that time the prevailing notions in Europe were a curious patchwork both of theoretical beliefs that had come down from Aristotle and other ancient Greeks and of the doctrinal beliefs that derived from the Bible and the Church. The medieval philosophers were men of formidable intellectual powers, but the problems that exercised their minds were remote from the real world about them.

A scientific revolution occurred when mathematicians, astronomers, and physicists combined philosophy to give men a new and basically mechanical picture of the world. At the same time, philosophy itself was revolutionized. It asserted its independence of theology and the Church, though at first only to provide new reasons for acknowledging God's existence. The religious establishment disliked the new learning, but the philosophers answered persecution by trying to teach the ecclesiastics a nobler religion and a greater tolerance; it was only in the 18th century France that the more popular philosophers turned philosophy against religion, against Christianity, and tried to make reason a religion in its place.

References

2. Timaeus, 37, B, 43, D Sqq.
5. Enn. II, V, 5, Condensed; Cf. III. VI, 10, 11, 16.
6. Plotinus claimed that this intuitive knowledge is "a power which all posses," but he admitted, "few use it." According to Porphyry, Plotinus achieved the mystic state four times in six years.
7. Plotinus occasionally seems to have recognized the ultimate frustration of his position. Thus, "the vision baffles telling... It is not to be told, not to be revealed to any that has not himself had the happiness to see." Enneads (Turnbull), VI, ix, 10-11.

8. Pultarch, De Plocit Phil. iv. II
11. Proslogium, 158, 227
12. Ibid. 158, 362.
13. De fide Trm., 4, Proslogium, 158, 172
14. Cur Deus Homo; Proslogium, 158, 361
15. Monologium-Prosplogium, 158.
16. Monologium, Ch. 15.
17. Ibid. Ch.16
18. Ibid. Ch.17.
19. Ibid Ch 20-4
22. St Anselm Monologium Chapter 2
23. Dialogues de Veritate, 2, Proslogium, 158.
24. Ibid., 4
25. Ibid., 7ff
26. Ibid., 10
27. Ibid.,11
28. Prosplogium Ch.14
30. De Intelectus Emendatine
31. De Beata Vita 2, 10 and 14, 4, 27ff
33. Contra Academicos, 3,10,23
34. Ibid. 3, 11, 26
35. De lib. arbit. 12, 34
36. De Vera relig. 39, 73 (truth)
37. De libero arbitrio 2, 3, 7
38. Ibid.
39. De Trinitate 15, 12, 21
40. Ibid. 15, 12, 21.
41. De Civil Dei 11, 26
42. Cf De Vera relig., 29, 72, Serm., 330, 3, Retract., 1, 8, 3, etc
43. De Trinit., 15, 12, 21
44. Conf., 6, 5, 7.
45 De Trinit., 9, 6, 9.
46. Scotus repeated St Augustine's suggestion that the status of sense-
knowledge may be connected with original sin.
47. Cf De Musica, 6-5, 9, 10; De Trinit., II, 2, 2-5.
48. De Trinitate: 12, 2, 2
49. De Trinitate: 12, 2, 2.
50. De Trinitate: 12, 14, 22
51 Ibid., 12, 13, 21.
52. Cf. De Trinit., 9, 6, 9-11
53. Cf. Ibid., 12, 14, 22-3; 12, 15, 24; De lib. Orbit., 2, 13, 35; 2, 8, 20-4.
54. De Ideas, 2.
57. De Quantitae amnae: 35, 79.
58 Solit. 1, 8, 15
59 Ibid., 1, 1, 3.
62. De Trinitate, 85, 8.
63. De Lib Arbit, 2, 13, 35.
64. In Ps.119; Serm., 23, 1,
65. In Ps 118; Serm. 18, 4.
66. De Trinitate: 9, 3, 3.
68. Prof Gilson: Introduction l'étude de Saint, Augustine, Ch 2.
69. 68. Cf also G Grunwald; Geschichte der Gottesbewesse in Mittelalter, in Beitrage, 6, 3, 6.
70 De Lib Arbit., 2, 17, 46
71. Ibid. 3, 25, 70.
72. De Trinit., 11, 5, 8.
73. De Civit. des., 11, 28
74 De Trinit., 5, 2, 3; 5, 11, 12; 6, 46; 6, 10, 11; 15, 43, 22; In Joann. Evang., 99, 4; etc.
75 De Gen. ad litt., 8, 26, 48.
77 Cf. ibid, 5, 15, 33; Ad Orosium, 8, 9
78 De Trinit. 15, 7, 13.
79. De Trinit. 15, 13, 22.
80. “It is a great and very rare thing for a man, after he has contemplated the whole creation, corporeal and incorporeal, and has discerned its mutability, to pass beyond it, and by the continued soaring of his mind, to attain to the unchangeable substance of God, and, in that
height of contemplation, to learn from God Himself. But since the mind itself, though naturally capable of reason and intelligence, is disabled by besetting and inveterate vices even from tolerating His unchangeable light, until it has been gradually healed, and renewed, and made capable of such facility, ut, had, in the first place, to be impregnated with faith, and so purified " City of God. (Gods), xi, 2

81. Confessions, 1, 6, 9
82. De Ideis 2.
83 De Trint, 4, 1, 3
84. Cf. E.g. Summa Theol. 1a, 15 ,2 and 3
85 De lh, arbit, 3, 15, 42
86 Cf. De Vera relig, 18, 35, 6.
87 Confessions 12, 6, 6
88 De Vera religione Loc. Cit
89 De Gen. ad litt., 1, 15, 29
90. De Gen Contra Manich., 1, 17, 11.
91 De quant animae, 13, 21
92 De quant. animae; 13, 21
93 De moribus eccl 1, 22, 52, In Soann Evang , 19, 5, 15
94 De anima et eius origine, 14, 4.
95 E P., 156
96. City of God, translated by M. Dods (T. & T. Clark Edinburgh, 1872), XV, 1
97 City of God, translated by M Dods (T; & T. Clark Edinburgh, 1872), XV, 1
98 2 ent 3, 1, 1, 2, conclusio ad 3
99 2 Sent, 3, 1, 2, 3, Conclusio
100 2 Sent, 3, 1, 2, 2, Conclusio
101 Cf 2 Sent 13 103
102 Haxaemeron : 6-4; 10
103 2 Sent, 18, 1, 3, resp ,
104. Cf. 2 Sent , 7,2, 2, 2, resp ,
105 2 Sent ,30, 3, 1 and 31, 1, 1
106 Ibid , 18, 2, 1 Contra 1
107 Breviloq 2, 9
108. 1 Sent. 3, 2, art. Un., 3, resp.
109. 2 Sent. 17, 1, 2, resp
110 Ibid , ad 5
111. 2 Sent., 18, 2, 1, ad 1
112 Cf. Ibid., 17, 1, 2, ad 6
113 Ibid , 18, 2, 1., ad 6
114. 2 Sent., 19, 1, 1 resp.
115. 2 Sent., 3, 2, 2, 1, resp. and ad 4
116. Ibid , 8, 1, 3, 2, ad 7.
117. Ibid., 25, 2, art. un., 6, resp.
118. Ibid., 7, 2, 1, 2 resp., where Bonaventure distinguishes memory as habit, retentio, . specie, from the act of remembering or recordation.
119. 2 Sent., 24, 1, 2, 4.
120 Ibid, resp.
121. Ibid., 39, 1, 2, resp
122. 2 Sent., 39, 1, 2, resp.
123 De Myst. Trinit., 1, 1, resp
124. Ibid., 1, 2, ad 14.
125. De Scientia Christi, 4, 23.
126. 2 Sent., 39, 1, 2, resp
127. 1 Sent., resp., ad 1, 2, 3; cf. Breviloq., 6, 8.
128. De Scientia Christi, 4, resp.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Itinerarium Mentis in Deum- 2, 4-6
132 In Hexam., 12, 3.
133. Ibid., 12, 11.
134 In Hexam, 1, 11.
135. Lib 1, de cause et proc. Universitatis, 1, 7.
136. Ibid., 1, 8.
137. Ibid., 3, 6.
138 Comm. In Epist. 9 B Dion. Areop., 1.
139. Lib; 1, de Causis et proc. Universitatis. 4,1.
141 Liber de natura of origine animae, 2, 6, cf. also De anima, 3
142. Contra Gent, 3, 25.
143 Contra Gent., 1, 5.
145. Ibid., Art. 8.
146. S. T, Ia., 76, 1
147 Ibid., Ia., 76, 4.
148. Cf. Ibid., Ia, 76, 5; Ia, 89, 1.
149 Ibid., Ia, 77, 1-3; De Anima, 1, lecto 2.
150 Summa Theologica, edited by A.C. Pegis, in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Random House, New York, 1945), Pt. I, Ques 63, Art. 2
151. Ibid., Pt. I, Ques 78, Art 4, Ans.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid., Pt. I, Ques. 79, Art, 3-ANS
154 S T., Ia, 75, 6; Contra Gen ; 2, 79.

156. Summa Contra Gentiles, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Burns Oates, London, 1924), II, Ixxv-Ixxvi; and Summa Theologica, Pt. I, Ques. 79, Arts. 4 and 5.

157. S.T. Ia, 75, 2.

158. Contra Gent., 2, 49.

159. S.T. Ia, 75, 6.

160. Contra Gen., 2, 79.

161. Opus oxon., 4, 43, 2, nos. 29ff.


164. In explaining the phenomenon, Thomas Aquinas followed Augustine. "It is in the punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason. That is to say, that son is punished for its rebellion against God by the submission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity." — Summa Theologica, Pt. I-II, Ques. 17, Art. 8, Reply Obj. 3.

165. Ibid., Pt. I-II, Ques. 17, Art. 7, Ans.

166. Ibid., Pt. I, Ques. 81, Art. 6, Reply Obj. 2, Pt. I-II, ques-9, Art. 7, Ans.

167. Ibid., Pt. I, Ques. 83, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 3.


169. S. T., Ia, 5, 2.

170. Ibid., Ia, 86, 1.

171. Ibid., Ia, 85, 1.

172. Ibid., Ia, 86, 1, ad 3.

173. Ibid., Ia, 87, 1.

174. Ibid., Ia, 84, 7.

175. Ibid., Ia, 84, 7.

176. Ibid., Ia, 88, 1.

177. Ibid., Ia, 84, 7, ad. 3.


179. Ibid., Ia, 5, 2.

180. S. T., Ia, 84, 7 ad. 3.

181. Ibid., Ia, 84, 6, in Corpore and ad 3.

182. Cf. Ibid., Ia, 84, 7, in Corpore and ad 3.

183. Ox., Prol., q. 81.

184. Ibid., I, 3, 3, no. 24.


186. S. T. Ia, 12. 4.

187. Cf. Ibid., Ia, 85, 1.

188. Ox., I, 3, 3, nos I ff.
189. Ox., 1, 3, 3, no. 3.
192. As in S.T., Ia, 5, 2, for instance S.T., I, 69, 1.
193. S.T., I, 89, 1.
194. Ox., 2, 3, 8, no. 13.
196. Ox., Prol. 4.
197. S.T., Ia, 1, 4.
198. Ibid., Ia, 1, 2.
199. S.T., Ia, 1, 2.
200. Ibid., Ia, 1, 4.
201. Metaphysicorum 2, 1, no. 2.
202. Ox., 1, 3, 4, nos. 2-4.
203. Ibid., 1, 3, 4, no. 5.
204. Ox., 4, 45, 2.
205. 4, 50, 1, 1; and cf. S.T., Ia, 89, 1-4.
206. Ox., 1, 2, 7, no. 42; 2, 9, 2, no. 29.
207. Ibid., 3, 14, 5, no. 6.
208. Ibid., 2, 3, 9, no. 6.
209. Quodlibet, 7, no. 8.
210. Ox., 4, 14, 3, no. 6.
211. Ibid., 1, 3, 4, no. 9.
217. Ibid., vol II, PP. 583-90, 593, 599, and 601.
218. Ibid., vol II, PP. 583-90, 593, 599, and 601.
223 Ibid, Ch 26, Sec 1.
224 Ibid, Ch 9, Secs 1 and 3; Ch. 10, Sec 5
225 Ibid., Ch 11, Secs 1-2 and 7
226 Ibid., Ch 25, Sec 1
229 Leviathan, in Works, edited by Molesworth, Op. Cit., Vol. III (1839), Part I, Ch. 1
230 Ibid, Part I, Ch. 1