Chapter 6

CONCLUSION
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Man as a rational animal is distinguished from all other living beings through thinking and reasoning power. All of us stay in this world, more or less in touch with nature. When considered the question of theory and practice; a hard and fast distinction between it cannot be made, for even purely theoretical knowledge can have an impact on one’s action, can even be wholly intended to action and highly applicable to one’s day to day life. World-man relationship has been and even continues to be a very difficult problem. It is reasonable for us to think whether man's first thinking was practical or theoretical. Life has to be secure before it can be improved. Food, warmth and shelter from the weather and refuge from danger are the goals of mind. The world does not always adjust itself to man's needs. For example - The hunting grounds turn out to be a bare of game, the weather destroys crops, loved or needed people fall and die. In such circumstances it is natural for a man to think, hope, that what we cannot do for ourselves, nor can do for us. The west has been strongly influenced by a conception of the intellectual way of life. The fondness of scientific clarity has, at least to some extent, overshadowed the sense for the 'mystery', for the unknown, for the unexpected supra-rational enlightenment - the sense, which is so characteristic of eastern philosophies and religion. Truth cannot be reached by mere reason or by mere intellectual contemplation but through a supernatural 'Revelation'.

Today from a commonsense point of view we all find that in the matters of art and moral opinions, and even judgments vary not only from society to society but also from man to man. On the practical side it is acknowledged that man behaves rationally if he faces his present problems in the light of knowledge that he possesses. The present, which has learnt from life, acts as rationally; for example the Gardner acts rationally in sowing seeds in spring and not in autumn. As our pursuit of objects is always related to and influenced by subjectivity we can never grasp the objects as such. Whenever human consciousness returns to the extreme end of subjectivity its understanding of objects-factual and evaluational-become blurred and questionable. There is a persistent ambiguity and opacity in pure subjectivity. Within these limitations scientist tries to understand and
explain the objects of nature from a spectator's point of view. The generality of scientific objects are affected and corrected by observations of individual cases falling under the concerned general object. From the other side the very probability of identification of historical object and passing judgments there upon indicates the general character of historical objects. Briefly speaking, naturality or physicality and historicity of objects are not exclusive and cannot be separated from one another in thought.

The thinker is free to experiment afresh and think out new possibilities; his procedure is adjudged rational to the extent to which it accords with what is known. Man is a spirit, on an integral whole, consisting of his body, mind, intellect, passion, and will; his reason alone can no more exhaust him than his animality can encompass his reason. Reason or rational thought is only a part of being. Purely rational knowledge, therefore, militates against and contradicts the formations of the rest of man's being and receives acceptance only by a corner of self.

Abstract thought about the ultimate nature of the world and of human life began to appear in man since long back, as an urge to move beyond superstition. We focus here on its embodiment among the ancient Greeks, whose active and tumultuous social life provided ample opportunities for the expression of philosophical thinking of three sorts:

- Speculative thinking expresses human curiosity about the world, striving to understand in natural (rather than super-natural) terms how things really are, what they are made of, and how they function.
- Practical thinking emphasizes the desire to guide conduct by comprehending the nature of life and the place of human beings and human behavior in the greater scheme of reality.
- Critical thinking (the hallmark of philosophy itself) involves a careful examination of the foundations upon which thinking of any sort must rely, trying to achieve an effective method for assessing the reliability of positions adopted on the significant issues.

The pre-Socratic philosophers either seek for the stable basis of things - which is water, for Thales of Miletus; air, for Anaximenes of Miletus, air endowed with intelligence, for Diogenes of Apollonia; number for Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.);
abstract and immovable being, for the Eleatics - or they study that which changes: while Parmenides and the Eleatics assert that everything is, and nothing changes or becomes. Heraclitus (about 535-475) holds that everything becomes, and nothing is unchangeable. Democritus (fifth century) reduces all beings to groups of atoms in motion, and this movement, according to Anaxagoras, has for its cause an intelligent being. The Pre-Socratics based their answers at least as much on epistemic grounds i.e., on what type of account would be genuinely intelligible as ontological or empirical ones i.e., on what sorts of enduring entities could possibly have, or be found in experience to have, the required kind of existence. Their answers ranged from the total Realism of Parmenides, foremost philosopher of Eleaticism - a school of southern Italy according to which all changes are transitory appearances concealing the mutual relations of deeper, unchanging realities to the critical skepticism of Heraclitus - the Ephesian philosopher according to whom nothing in nature as man knows it can ever have this Parmenidean reality, and everything empirical is in flux.

Greek philosophy seemed to circulate around the Greek colonial periphery, from Ionia (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Xenophanes), to Italy (Pythagoras, Parmenides, Zeno), Sicily (Empedocles), and the northern Aegean (Democritus, Protagoras), to Ionia again (Melissos). Looking back at the whole course of early Greek thought, presenting as it does a gradual development and an organic unity, which proves it to be truly a native growth, a spontaneous product of the Greek mind. Greek reflection at first followed the order of time; it turned by preference not to present or future, but to past time.

Two percepts stand out before all others, which, trivial as they may seem, are uttered from the very soul of Greek experience, 'Be moderates' and 'know thyself'. Their joint observance constitutes the characteristic virtue of Sophrosyne, which means that we understand by temperance a great deal more. Let us suppose that each individual has a sphere of activity-marked for him by his own nature and his special environment; then to discern clearly the limits of that sphere and to keep within them would be sophrosyne, while the discernment, taken alone would be wisdom. The same self-restraint operating as a check on interference with other spheres would be justice; while the expansive force by which man fills up his entire sphere and guards it against aggressions may be called courage. Hence, we are enabled to comprehend, the many-sided
significance, to see how it could stand both for a particular virtue and for all virtuous
whatever. Concluding, it can be said, that the earlier type was far more than sheer
fantasy; it was animated by a desire to find explanations, even though its criteria for what
constituted adequate explanations were very crude. There is much in the later type of
thought that remained automorphic and mythic.

Socrates did not by any means profess the sweeping skepticism attributed to him by
Plato. So far from believing that ignorance was the common and necessary lot of all
mankind, himself included, he held that action should, so far as possible, be entirely be
guided by knowledge, that the man who did not always know what he was about
resembled a slave; that the various virtues were only different forms of knowledge; that
he himself passed this knowledge and was perfectly competent to share it with his
friends. Socrates thought that there were certain secrets, which would remain forever
inaccessible to the human intellect, facts connected with the structure of the universe,
which the Gods had recovered for their own exclusive cognizance. This, according to
Socrates, was a kind of knowledge, which, even if it could be obtained, would not be
particularly worth having, and the search after which would leave no leisure for more
useful acqutions.

Socrates accepts the Sophistic skepticism so far as it applies to the existing state of
science, but does not push it to the same fatal conclusion. Socrates grants that current
beliefs should be thoroughly shifted and, if necessary, discarded, but only that more solid
convictions may be substituted for them. Here a place is found for his method of self-
examination, and for self-conscious ignorance attributed to him by Plato. Socrates
attempts to come at real knowledge, that is to say, the construction of definitions, by
employing inductive method with the invention of which he is credited by Aristotle. This
method consists in bringing together a number of simple and familiar examples from
common experience; generalizing from them and correcting the generalization by
comparison with negative instances.

Socrates first brought out the ideas of mind in its full significance. He at first studied
the whole circle of human interests as affected by the mind; that, in creating dialectics he
gave his method the only subject-matter on which it could be profitably exercised,
finally, that but these immortal achievements, philosophy was constituted, that received a
threefold verification- (i) from the life of its founder; (ii) from the success with which his spirit was communicated to a hand of followers; (iii) from the whole subsequent theory of thought.

To Socrates the strongest reason for believing in the identity of conviction and practice was, perhaps that he made it a living reality. With Socrates to know the right and to do it were the same; in this sense his life was verification of his philosophy. With Protagoras—or at least with his Cyrenaic successors—mind meant on ever-changing stream of feeling; with Gorgias it was a principle of hopeless isolation, the interchange of thoughts between one consciousness and another by means of signs, being an illusion Socrates; on the contrary, attributed to it a steadfast control over passion, and a unifying function in society through its essentially synthetic activity, its need of cooperation and responsive assurance. Socrates saw that the reason that overcomes artificial desire tends to draw men together just as sensuality tends to drive them into hostile collision.

The Socratic dialogue has a double aspect; it is like all philosophy, a perpetual carrying of life into ideas and of ideas into life. Life is raised to a higher level by thought, thought when brought into contact with life, gains movement and growth, assimilative and reproductive power. If action is to be harmonized, we must regulate it by universal principles; if our principles are to be efficacious, they must be adopted; if they are to be adopted we must demonstrate them to the satisfaction of our contemporaries. Language consisting as it does almost entirely of abstract terms, furnishes the materials out of which alone such an ideal union can be framed. But men do not always use the same words, least of all if they are abstract words, in the same sense, and therefore a preliminary agreement must be arrived at in this respect, a fact which Socrates was the first to recognize. The Socratic method of analogical reasoning gave a retrospective justification to early Greek thought of which Socrates was not himself aware.

Plato has done his best to stress that understanding comes from breaking away from, waking up from, absorption in the world of our experience. Plato has emphasized mathematical and other abstract thinking, and the distance between grasp of reality and the way that most of us live. His eyes are turned to contemplate fixed and immutable realities, a realm where there is no injustice done or suffered, but all is reason and order,
and which is the model which he imitates and to which he assimilates himself as far as he can. Plato simply asserts that knowledge based on abstract thinking, which takes one way from interest in the world of experience, is not just compatible with effective dealing in that world, but actually enables one to do it best. Plato's faith in Republic—that theoretical understanding leads to practical ability is, inspiring but unrealistic about human nature. At the very least Plato needs to make a great many more distinctions than he does to clarify his contrast between the world of thought and the world of experience. We are less likely to think that years of highly mathematical society will make us the best people to run society.

Today, there would be criticisms arising from our view that there can be no knowledge without a mind and no mind without a brain. So that there can be no knowledge without at least part of a corporeal body. How, therefore, could an immaterial entity acquire knowledge, knowledge which could be later recollected in a material brain? Even if the possibility of the existence of an immaterial soul is admitted, Plato's account of knowledge by recollection seems far fetched to us. Yet it remains true that Plato did bring our problems of knowledge, and the problem of relationship between sense-perception and reasoning, which are still with us today; we may not agree with Plato's conclusion, but we should study them sympathetically. Aristotle in his early thought was very much influenced by Plato. It is very important to emphasize the Platonic period in Aristotle's development. Though Aristotle rejected the apartness of the forms, he was fundamentally and acknowledgedly a Platonist, and his work can be understood only as an effort to reformulate the insights of Plato.

In Aristotle's view, mathematical entities and relations were too completely general and too remote from actual experience to explain the qualitative details of empirical entities. So the ultimate elements of nature must be not Plato's abstract mathematical forms that supposedly existed apart from actual phenomena but rather certain more specific entities, recognizable within the familiar sequences of empirical experience. Having recognized the natural destinations toward which natural processes of different kinds were directed, it was then possible to construct a comprehensive classification of essences in terms of which the whole natural world would, in principle, be intelligible. Explanations within such an all-embracing natural history might not be self-evidently general and immutable, as were those of Plato's geometry, but the theoretical inferences
involved would be no less deductive or necessary. It would also account directly for the specific qualitative characters of different observed objects and processes.

The revolution affected by Aristotle, that he found Greek thought in the form of a solid, and unrolled it into, a surface of the utmost possible tenacity, transparency, and extension. In so doing, he completed what Socrates and Plato had begun, he offered the first example of what since then has more than once recurred in the history of philosophy. It was thus the residual substance of Locke and Berkeley was resolved into phenomenal suggestion by Hume. Neither Plato nor Aristotle considered the possibility that knowledge about different kinds of objects (mathematical entities as opposed to empirical facts) might be justified in different ways for them; all knowledge had to be logically necessary and indubitable. To Plato, the objects of knowledge were universals, intuitively apprehended by mental contemplation but according to Aristotle there could be knowledge of existent entities in so far as their species attributes, i.e., their universal attributes were concerned; knowledge depended upon mental intuition which gave the cause and deduction, but it also required sense-experience. The view that knowledge had to be logically necessary and analogous to mathematical knowledge persisted for centuries—but there were different opinions to how could it be obtained and whether it could be obtained.

The mixed reception of Aristotle that continues to our day comes of the extraordinary comprehensiveness and order in his philosophy combined with a repugnance to uniformity and simplicity. It is not a philosophy systematic in Kant’s geometric sense of deducing all truths from one or a few universal propositions. Instead Aristotle shows that, orderly thinking is complete with and indeed requires recognizing a great variety of fine distinctions, not to divide and separate but in order to appreciate both the complexity and the connections of things; to make sense of human experience as a whole. Hence, we are all born Platonists or Aristotelians; it is meant that we are like Plato in his earlier, or Aristotle in his latter, period. Either we are idealists who make our home in the transcendental realm of the spirit, or we are realists who make our home in the actual world around us, accepting it what it is. The greatness of Plato and Aristotle consists in their giving classic form to these fundamental differences of human outlook. Both help us to realize ourselves, and to take in a life a stand, which conforms to and expresses the kind of self which intercourse with them reveals as our own.
In the fourteenth century Scholastic philosophy betrays the first symptoms of decadence. In place of individualities we have schools, the chief being the Thomist, the Scotist, and the Terminist School of William of Occam, which soon attracted numerous partisans. The Renaissance was a troublous period for philosophy. Ancient systems were revived: the Dialectic of the Humanistic philologists Platonism, Aristotelianism. The Scholastic philosophers grew weaker and weaker, and, excepting for the brilliant Spanish Scholasticism of the sixteenth century it may be said that ignorance of the fundamental doctrine became general. In the seventeenth century there was no one to support Scholasticism: it fell, not for lack of ideas, but for lack of defenders. Roger Bacon expressed the views on the necessity of linking the sciences with philosophy and preached it by example. So that, both antiquity and the Middle Ages, knew and appreciated scientific philosophy. In the seventeenth century the question of the relation between the two enters upon a new phase: from this period modern science takes shape and begins that triumphal march which it is destined to continue through the twentieth century, and of which the human mind is justly proud. Modern scientific knowledge differs from that of antiquity and the Middle Ages in three important respects: the multiplication of sciences; their independent value; the divergence between common knowledge and scientific knowledge.

The philosophical-theological movement has its aim in the rational interpretation of the Christian universe—of the universe as the orthodox churchman conceives it. The presupposition is that the purpose, nature and operation of God can be made intelligible to reason, and that a system can be constructed on the basis of Christian articles of faith. Here we have a dogmatic rationalism or intellectualism, regulated by the official doctrine of the Church. Scholasticism as a completely rationalized theology, however, never gained undisputed possession of the Christian world; alongside of it, and often within it, we discover an anti theological current, a reaction against the over rationalization of faith, a yearning for a more practical expression of the religious life.

The philosophic thought of this period mirrors the spirit of the times in assigning to tradition and authority a leading role; Scholars swear by the church, by Augustine Plato or Aristotle by their monastic orders or their schools Accepting on faith the truth of the church doctrines, and yet feeling a strong urge for philosophical speculation, they
endeavour to harmonize the two by reading Christian faith into their philosophies, or their philosophies into Christian faith. Faith is the beginning and the end of their labours theology, the crown of all knowledge, the royal science. Even when knowledge is dumb, when reason stumbles, the truths of religion are still believed—all the more firmly by because of their mystery. The Scholastic philosophers did not address themselves to the problem concerning the possibility and limits of knowledge since, they cherished an abiding, dogmatic confidence in the ability of reason to attain truth. A critical approach to the problem of the theory of knowledge; which was a major preoccupation of the Greek thinkers, is largely in abeyance during the scholastic period.

Medieval philosophy had culminated in the cumulative achievements of scholasticism, a grand system of thought developed by generations of patient scholars employing neoplatonic and Aristotelean philosophy in the service of traditional Christian theology. But by the end of the fifteenth century, confidence in the success of this enterprise had eroded, and many thinkers tried to make a fresh start by rejecting such extensive reliance on the authority of earlier scholars. Just as religious reformers challenged ecclesiastical authority and made individual believers responsible for their own relation to God, prominent Renaissance thinkers proposed an analogous elimination of all appeals to authority in education and science.

Educational practice was revolutionized by the recovery of ancient documents, the rejection of institutional authority, and renewed emphasis on individual freedom. The humanists expressed an enormous confidence in the power of reason as a source of profound understanding of human nature and of our place in the natural order humanism offered an opportunity to incorporate modern developments along with classical elements in entirely new systems of metaphysical knowledge. The rise of the new science also offered a significant change in the prospects for human knowledge of the natural world. By abandoning explanation in terms of final causes, by emphasizing the importance of observation, and by trying to develop quantified accounts of all, renaissance scientists began to develop the foundations of a thoroughly empirical view of the world.

This emerging emphasis on empirical methods permanently transformed study of the natural world. Making extensive use of sensory observations made possible by the development of new instrumentation fostered an urge to seek quantification of every
phenomenon. There were exceptions who hoped that the natural light of common notions imprinted innately in every human being would provide perfect certainty as a foundation for Christianity. But most of the moderns gladly embraced the methods, style, and content of the new science

The People of 18th century Enlightenment believed in the almighty of human knowledge and defied the tradition and the pre-established thoughts of the past. This is the period in which the humans became overconfident in the human Reason and rationality. Philosophers and Scientists committed the fallacy of *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. Anything, which cannot be understood by rational knowledge and the current status of sciences, was defined as meaningless or superstitious. Philosophy became very popular among the intellectuals and people read philosophical opera. However, the general concerns were about the practical use of our knowledge. In other words, The Two Fundamental Characteristics of the Philosophy of Enlightenment are:

1) Faith in the European Reason and human rationality to reject the tradition and the pre-established institutions and thoughts.
2) Search for the practical, useful knowledge as the power to control nature.

When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit skepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth. That, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human mind; thus passing, in the directest way, from the method of authority to that of apriority. Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason. But since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of infallibility, that they must be clear. The distinction between an idea *seeming* clear and really being so never occurred to him. Trusting to introspection, as he did, even for a knowledge of external things, why should he question its testimony in respect to the contents of our own minds? But then, I suppose, seeing men, who seemed to be quite clear and positive, holding opposite opinions upon fundamental principles, he was further led to say that clearness of ideas is not sufficient, but that they need also to be distinct, i.e., to have nothing unclear about them. What he probably meant by this (for he did not explain himself with precision) was, that they must sustain the test of dialectical examination,
that they must not only seem clear at the outset, but that discussion must never be able to
bring to light points of obscurity connected with them.

The basic idea of Descartes' compromise followed immediately from his belief that
in proving the existence of self and matter he had proved each to be an independently
existing substance. If mind and body are completely different kinds of things. And if the
truths about each follow from the distinct nature of each, it is impossible for the science
of minds and the science of bodies to contradict each other. The views of leading
Continental Rationalists, a considerable of Descartes' supporters believed that interaction
was the major problem faced. They reasoned as follows: If mind and body interact, they
are not metaphysically distinct substances; if they are metaphysically distinct substances,
they cannot interact. Since all these thinkers agreed with Descartes that the dual
substance theory was essential to preserve the independence of physics and technology,
they set themselves away to explain the interaction. But if mind and body really do not
interact, they certainly seem to do so. Then how can this apparent interaction be
accounted for?

The separation of self-consciousness from existence can only take place per
abstractionem intellectus. The Cogito, ergo sum is shown on analysis to be
fundamentally a movement of thought from implicit to explicit within the single intuitive
whole. Thus intellectual intuition and deduction merge, as it were into one single living
moment of thought. Descartes does not conceive intellectual intuition, or what the Ethics
calls Scientia Intuitiva, as an immediate knowing exclusive of reasoning. 'To see, in
sense, is to reason': the eyes of the mind, with which it sees and observes, are the
demonstrations themselves. 'The key to truth is purely rational intuition. We cannot say
simply that perception is delusive; but it must submit itself to the final judgement of pure
intelligence. The mathematical spirit is paramount in Descartes' thought. Then he goes on
to ask himself if there is more, essentially, to this thinking thing than that it is thinking.
He decides that there is not, since if I do not know with certainty that something is the
case (viz. that I am a bodily as well as a conscious being) then I do know with certainty
that it is not the case. Here the parallel ends.
Spinoza's analysis of knowledge led him to a conclusion about the human mind that corresponded exactly with the conclusion he had already reached, as a result of his analysis of the nature of extension, about the human body. Being exactly parallel aspects, what is true of one must be true of the other. Neither a man's body nor his mind is autonomous, independent entity that it seems to be; each is only a finite mode, the one of the attribute of extension, the other of the attribute of thought. Nevertheless, according to Spinoza, it is a mistake to conclude that because everything is ultimately one, all distinctions fade into nothingness.

In the whole history of Western culture, there have been a great many-a very great many-first-rate minds who have agreed with Spinoza and who have held that what may be disposed to call his "blind spot" for the actual was not blindness at all, but acute vision. Here, then, we come once again to a fundamental parting of ways; whether to take the ideal or the actual as the real is not so much a question to be settled by philosophy as it is a starting point for philosophical systems Starting from the real-is-rational presupposition that Spinoza took over from Descartes, it is possible to avoid the Spinozistic version of God, self, and value. Must the consistent rationalist conclude with Spinoza that the only real value consists in recognizing that values are subjective attitudes and that the only real freedom consists in realizing that everything we do is infallibly determined? Must he admit that self disappears into God that God is merely the rationale that validates our thought? Is religion reconciled with science only by making a religion of science? It is difficult to avoid the impression that Spinoza tried to have it both ways; to maintain a thorough determinism, based on a metaphysical theory, and at the same time to propound an ethics, which makes sense only if determinism is not absolute. Leibnitz held that these are not the inevitable consequences of rationalism. Leibnitz constituted to correct Cartesian dualism from within, and to correct it in a rationalistic spirit.

Spinoza and Leibnitz ingeniously overcame, even if they did not solve, they mind-body problem that puzzled Descartes. Spinoza had no need to consider interaction between mind and body, since he made them two parallel aspects of the same monistic reality. Leibnitz's monad had no interaction, since they existed in a pre-established harmony in the universe, in which all physical and mental events were perfectly synchronized by God.
Leibnitz’s theory does not so much bring opposing views into real agreement as it allows them to go on differing. It is like an ingenious diplomatic formula that everyone can accept because everyone understands it in his own way. Leibnitz’s diplomacy does not even resolve some of the theological dilemmas. Is God a monad? Apparently so. What, then, is His relation to the created monads? Is not the whole universe to be conceived of as God’s body? Yes, it would seem that the universe of created monads are grouped around God as their dominant monad, just as Man’s body monads are grouped around his soul monad. But this comes dangerously close to pantheism. These divergences from orthodoxy are relatively minor points. A more serious problem is connected with Leibnitz’s belief in the existence of other monads. Leibnitz never tried to prove their existence; he just took it for granted. Leibnitz started from the Cartesian assumption that there are minds and bodies; then having worked out the notion of a monad, he concluded that the Cartesian bodies must “really” be monads.

The Leibnitzian actual is in fact a Pickwickian actual—it is actual by decree, and the test of its reality, once it has been decreed into existence, is still rationality. Actually Leibnitz wanted to argue in opposition to Spinoza, that something more is involved in scientific knowledge. But instead in place of empirical element, Leibnitz offered a teleological “fact”. It is this “instead” that causes the trouble. Hence, Leibnitz’s important contribution was towards effecting a synthesis between the traditional view, which was teleological in character, and the new mechanical view; but then also, Leibnitz’s account of scientific knowledge and of the world view it implies is inadequate. With Leibnitz ends the period of rationalism and the new phase of thinking starts empiricism called the empirical period.

In order to be a pure empiricist Locke ought to have confined knowledge to experience alone but he denies the name, to sensitive knowledge based on pure sensations. Instead of basing knowledge on sensation he thinks the real knowledge is based on abstract ideas, derived from concrete setting. Locke’s theory reflects many ideas that belong strictly to the domain of rationalism. Locke accepts the active nature and importance of mind; he admits that mind is responsible for changing simple ideas into complex ones. Even if experience suffices to provide us with the raw materials of knowledge but only the mind can convert it into knowledge. Where the question of those
things is concerned which falls into the limits of man’s knowledge in the sphere of religion and faith, Locke accepts that reason is supreme. The rationalist learning’s in Locke’s epistemology save him from making his empiricism too imbalanced and one sided.

We are aware of the existence of the universe, but such awareness is not acute as our knowledge of our own ideas. By accepting the existence of matter, Locke becomes a materialist. Precisely for this reason did Berkeley later on tried to disprove his materialism and the resultant atheism by basing his arguments on Locke’s own epistemological theories. But far did he succeed in this task? Berkeley remarks that although Locke set out on the right path. Berkeley apparently took up empirical thought where Locke had left.

Berkeley believed, Materialism leads to atheism no less than to skepticism, since its belief that bodies exist outside the mind encourages the notion that the physical realm may always have existed independently of any spiritual influence. Immaterialism, by contrast, restores God to a role of central importance, not only as the chief among active thinking substances but also as the source of all sensible objects strange though Berkeley's immaterialism may seem, it offers many clear advantages. It is a genuinely empiricist philosophy, since it begins with what we actually experience and claims to account for everything without making extravagant suppositions about unknowable entities. God's existence is made evident by everyday instances of perception, according to Berkeley. Since sensible objects are mind-dependent yet exhibit a persistence and regularity that transcends our perception of them, it follows that there must be a master-perceiver, God, in whose mind they always are. All in all, Berkeley developed a philosophical system worthy of no little respect. Immaterialism rests on the simple premise that there are no physical objects. Berkeley defended this notion with many clever arguments and worked out its implications consistently Although counter-intuitive, immaterialism is difficult to refute.

Berkeley uses axioms of Locke's philosophy to disprove the theory of matter, abstract ideas, and also that he proves the existence of soul, other souls and God, in the form of substratum of ideas. The arguments used by Berkeley to disprove Locke’s theory of matter are used by Hume to refute Berkeley’s conception of soul. By developing
Locke's and Berkeley's arguments to their logical conclusion, Hume refutes Berkeley's theory of soul and God. The truth of matter, as Hume himself has pointed out that the empiricist doctrine cannot be the basis of any philosophical knowledge; if any such knowledge is to result, it is necessary to turn to reason. Hume takes empiricism to its logical conclusion. Just as matter is not the subject of experience, the soul, too, cannot be known to experience and if experience is the soul criterion of knowledge, then the existence of soul is no more certain than the existence of matter. Ideas are only the objects of our experience and we cannot proceed to real knowledge of anything once we step outside the realm of ideas.

Hume shared the belief of his contemporaries and his predecessors that knowledge is something that happens to men, not something that men make happen by what they do. The discovery of knowledge occurs as a result of men's interaction with their environment was not made until much latter. Hume's contribution—and it was an important one—was rather the discovery that criticism does not destroy belief nor render men impotent. Hume mentioned that absolute rational certainty is unattainable except in pure mathematics. The philosophical sceptic, reserves his scepticism for abstract reason, having made his peace with concrete experience. Hume has come to see that action, not certainty-experience, not logic—is the criterion a man ought to accept.

Empiricism was developed to question the nature of human understanding and development through life experiences and observations. Also, the existence of God was questioned (mainly by Hume). "If God can prevent evil, but doesn't, then He isn't all loving" was one of Hume's views that essentially the human mind cannot have experienced a relationship with God through experimentation or observation therefore the existence of God was highly questioned. This is where rationality becomes a question through empiricism questioning the absence of innate ideas. Later, scientific investigations of God's existence took place (after the turn of the 19th century a lot more) as empirical theory and canon began to fade out in Britain.

Hume's philosophy has two extremely significant elements. On the one hand, Hume's viewpoint and consequences of his philosophy are an inevitable radicalization of the philosophy of consciousness. It is indeed the deadened street. On the other hand, by destroying many traditional dogmas, Hume opened up a new possible way of doing
philosophy, i.e., the transcendental philosophy, even though his successor, *Kant*, remained also in the position of the philosophy of consciousness. All philosophers, whether rationalist or empiricist, who, came after Descartes were methodologically imprisoned in self and consciousness. From this perspective, we will be able to understand why these British Empiricists, who intended to secure our knowledge of nature, could not get out from the realm of self and self consciousness (impressions and ideas) and ended up with Humean skepticism.

The center of philosophical inquiry was shifted from substance and causality in reality to the understanding of them purely in consciousness. Although Hume never seriously (practically) doubted our knowledge of the universe as true (however limited sense it might be), he attempted to "explain" psychologically everything including mechanical causality and the laws of nature. This consequence of Hume's radicalization of the philosophy of self and Enlightenment philosophy, ending up with universal skepticism was unacceptable to Kant, who was still in the sprint of the Enlightenment and with the faith of reason as the absolute principle of reality. Kant's grandiose, systematic approach called transcendental philosophy was indeed the last attempt of Enlightenment philosophy to re-establish objectivity, i.e., the universal and necessary validity of the laws of nature as well as mechanical causality as the principles of the universe as such.

Kant, for his solution to Hume's challenge indeed sought that our knowledge in the not trivial, but the most profound sense, must consist of two mutually irreducible elements, that is, the "formal" elements which are to provide the objectivity (necessity and universal validity) of knowledge and the "material" elements which relate our knowledge to the universe. "Knowledge without form is meaningless, while knowledge without matter is empty". These material elements must somehow come from and relate to our senses, while the formal elements come from the rational structure of our mind, which by definition guarantees the university and necessity in validity. Instead of asking whether or not such objective knowledge of the universe is possible, Kant tried to elucidate rather how and under what conditions such knowledge is possible at all, assuming as a fact that objective knowledge of nature is indeed possible. This philosophical approach is called "critical", since unlike British Empiricism, Kant did not try to explain the nature of knowledge by means of its origin (*tabula rasa* and senses), and because unlike Continental Rationalism, he did not attempt to call analytic knowledge the only knowledge with "objectivity" and speculatively develop a philosophical system
consisting of this knowledge. On the contrary, Kant was supposed to open the third way independent of British Empiricism and Continental Rationalism and endeavored to elucidate, although his method was logical inference (from the fact that there is objective knowledge of the universe), the conditions of the possibility of objective knowledge of the universe, as long as they are a priori.

Kant's position was defensible and meaningful as long as his metaphysics is kept in dualism both epistemology and metaphysics, namely 1) knowledge is a composite of the rational form and the material elements given in the sensibility. This is epistemological dualism. Furthermore, 2) his position must be metaphysically dualistic in that it was Kant who tried to see the possibility of reality both (mechanically) causally determined (in the world of phenomenon) and ethically and teleologically "determined" (in the world of noumenon). In Kant's philosophy, although a solution to Hume's challenge was found, the so-called dichotomy over (mechanical) causal determinism versus freedom of will became very sharpened. Once again, here too, Kant "distributed" (mechanical) causality to the world of phenomenon (the epistemological world of sciences) and freedom to the world of noumenon teleologically "oriented" or the thing itself which is supposed to be behind the phenomenal world. Thus, Kant also took two mutually inconsistent principles (being and ought) as the basis for this solution of the philosophical a priori. The phenomenon (scientific and cognitive world of nature) and the noumenon (non cognitive, moral reality of the thing in itself) are two realities, which, although they are related, are of two different beings. In this sense, he also may be called dualistic here. Thus, Kant's epistemology is the doctrine of cognitive being (ontologia generalis=metaphysics of nature). Kant held that genuine knowledge must be rooted in human reason, and experience does not give any appropriate knowledge of nature. Kant firmly believed that knowledge anything which deserved the name of knowledge must possess objectivity, i.e., be universally and necessarily valid. Analytic a priori knowledge, whose criterion of truth is contradiction, certainly fulfills this criterion for truth without any qualification. Therefore, he had no problem as long as he lived in the tradition of Continental Rationalism.

Kant's philosophical endeavour brings out a synthesis between Rationalism and Empiricism. Kant does not reject any of the metaphysical positions, rather his synthesis establishes a new metaphysics by being critical to both the radical schools of thought. For Kant, Critical enquiry is necessary to set up objectivity of knowledge claims. In this
regard Kant’s thesis began working in a sound footing in the epistemology in general and mathematical and scientific knowledge in particular. Where he sees that *apriori* conditions of knowledge are necessarily connected with empiricists’ parameters of knowledge. If we don’t accept the reality of *apriori* concepts like categories and space and time, then the subjectivity of science sounds to be ridiculous. On the other hand, Kant is also not nullifying the significance of *observation* (sense experience) which has been the basic source of knowledge for the Empiricists.

However, the critical approach of Kant in studying both rationalists and empiricists epistemology, goes beyond the site of observable phenomena to unobservable phenomena. It justifies its position-by providing a sound foundation to both phenomenal and noumenal claims by adopting a new philosophical method called *transcendentalism*. Transcendentalism as a philosophical method establishes the essentialism embedded in rationalism and empiricism in their analysis of the nature of *substance*; in its assertion and its rejection, respectively. Transcendentalism does not divide epistemology into two different branches of knowledge of the reality. Rather, it claims that ‘subject’ as the center of knowledge can logically transcend the phenomenal aspect of the reality to noumenal aspect of the reality. However, it clearly says, noumena as the essence or the constituting factor of phenomena and what has been given to our sense-experience, can only be conceived though not be perceived. Thus, in brief, the constituting principle of both matter and the spirit is established. In other words, the essence of the matter and the self is asserted in the transcendental framework of epistemology of Kant. Furthermore, the irony is that here is an epistemology, which unifies the logical necessity of a *metaphysical position*. Moreover, it could be founded that both metaphysical and empirical go parallel to each other in the overall schema.

On the other hand, observation as a source of knowledge is not been rejected. Interestingly, this epistemological enquiry of Kant gives birth to a metaphysical position-by advocating the necessity of certain postulates. ‘Self’ as one of the postulates of the unity of consciousness becomes the center both to knower as well as to the knowledge of the world. In this regard both, the knower (the self), and the known (this world) expand their logical realm in the process of *knowing*. That is, being-in-the-world or (man-in-the-world) are part and parcel of the reality. The knowledge can be abruptly then compared and their necessary relationship; i.e., Being’s participating within the world. That is to say, not by strict looking at the essences separately which divides them, but by looking at
subtle essential relations of both (man world) in which the underlying principle of their logical relationship is comprehended. Thus, in brief, Kantian transcendental method results holism in studying rationalism and empiricism together. Hence, the mixed reception of Rationalism and Empiricism continues to our day even today with the extraordinary comprehensiveness and order combined with a repugnance to uniformity and simplicity.