We should know first what Ethics is. This point takes us naturally to the Nature of Ethics. Ethics is not without its metaphysical implications so we shall deal with the metaphysical implications and the personal immorality. Some say that Indian ethics is non-activistic, so, we shall see whether it is so or not. After the study of the nature of ethics and the metaphysical implications, we shall know whether the Moral Judgment is passed merely on motive or whether there are other factors, though subordinate to motive, to be looked at. Then we shall develop the Moral Law and the Moral Ideal. Lastly we shall know whether Gandhi is the product of the age or not. We shall now deal with the above points one by one.

1. What Ethics Is

The word Ethics is derived from the Greek word 'Ethos' which means character. It is also connected with Ethos which means custom or habit also. Thus, Ethics may be defined as the study of what is right or good in conduct. The word 'right'
primarily means that which is according to rule. It is directly applicable to actions of man and not to the character. Rules however have reference to some results to be achieved by them and it is this fact that is embodied by the term 'good.' The term 'good' is used in two different senses. A thing is said to be good when it is valuable for some end. This is the first meaning of the word 'good' where it is in the sense of means to an end. In the second sense, the term 'good' is used to signify not something which is a means to an end but something which is an end in itself. Thus supreme good means supreme end at which we aim. In Ethics, we are concerned with this second sense of the term 'good' rather than the first one.

Thus, we can say that the main problem of Ethics is to find out what is the chief end or ends in the life of man. And in order to obtain this end or ideal, the science of Ethics deals with the conduct of man as a whole. Thus, incidentally it involves also the analysis of the conduct of man as well as the institutions of which man is a member. But since conduct is the whole of life, it should not be thought that Ethics is concerned with the whole of life of man. It is concerned with the life only in so far as it involves the moral ideal. Thus, the point of view which Ethics takes, is one which distinguishes its problem from those of other coordinate sciences. Swami Sivanand gives the nature and importance of ethics from the point of God realization or spiritual progress. He observes: 'Ethics is right conduct or sadacarya. Without ethics you cannot have
progress in the spiritual path. Ethics is the foundation of Yoga. Ethics is the strong pillar on which the edifice of Bhakti Yoga rests. Ethics is the gateway to Good realization.  

To put it briefly, the problem of Ethics is to find out what is right or good in conduct. This also involves the discussion of man's character and its rightness or wrongness. It is however concerned with all the activities of man with reference to good or evil.

2. The Nature of Ethics

A majority of thinkers on Ethics consider Ethics not as an art but as a science. But in the opposite camp, there is a school of philosophers who consider Ethics as an art. Similarly, the opinion is divided as to whether Ethics is a normative science or a positive science like psychology. Gandhi considers Ethics as a Normative science. He observes: 'While the ordinary sciences concern themselves with the world as it is, the science of Ethics deals with the world as it ought to be.' But it seems to me that he does not believe that Ethics should be cut off from psychology and thus be a mere Normative science. It seems to me that he desires that psychology should be at least in the background to Ethics. He again observes: 'It is the duty of every human being to look carefully within, and see himself as he is, and spare no pains to improve himself in body, mind and soul.' Now let us see what opinions the renowned thinkers on Ethics hold. J. Muirhead insists that Ethics should
be linked on one side with psychology and on the other side with sociology. He observes that as a matter of fact, a complete system of ethics would require to exhibit the forms of good under both aspects, as related on the one side to the system of instincts and desires known as human nature, and on the other to the objective moral order, as that is embodied in social institutions. In the other case we should be supplementing our exposition of the principles of ethics by a more or less elaborate psychological account of the springs of action. In the other case we should be adding to the science of ethics in the stricter sense a sociological account of the principal forms which man, in his efforts after a fuller expression of his true nature, has devised to be the repositories of his moral acquisitions. J. Seth lays stress on the convergence of faith, in the moral order, into rational insight. He states: 'Ethics is the effort to convert into rational insight that faith in a moral ideal or absolute human good which is at the root of all moral life.'5 Aristotle's views on Ethics, expressed by J. Seth and W.D. Ross (the notable student of Aristotle's works) are notable and thus they require our due consideration. J. Seth says: 'Aristotle says that the task of ethics is the investigation of the peculiar and characteristic function of man— the activity, with its corresponding excellence, of man as man.'6 W.D. Ross observes on Aristotle's idea of Ethics: 'Aristotle's ethics, no doubt, are social, and his politics are ethical, he does not forget in the Ethics that the individual man is essentially a member of society, nor in the Politics that the good life of the state exists only in the
in the good lives of its citizens. It seems to me that G.E. Moore, with reference to ethics, insists that it is the business of Ethics, not only to obtain true results, but also to find valid reasons for them. The direct object of Ethics is knowledge and not practice, and any one who uses the naturalistic fallacy has certainly not fulfilled this first object, however correct his practical principles may be. I think G.E. Moore considers ethics as the game of reason and primarily takes satisfaction in observing the rules of reason as we observe the rules of game. Bradley contrasts philosophy with Moral Philosophy in the following way. "All philosophy has to do is to understand what is, and moral philosophy has to understand morals which exist, not to make them or give directions for making them." He gives the role of ethics thus, "ethics has not to make the world moral, but to reduce to theory the morality current in the world." Sidgwick's idea about ethics is notable as he means different trends of ethics in his idea of ethics and thus helps one to coordinate the different trends of ethics into one. He observes: 'It is important to note that there is a school of philosophers which would refuse to recognize the distinction between what is and what ought to be. Regarding Ethics, etc. as a descriptive, not a normative science, they consider it the business of Ethics to study actual conduct as determined in the social organism." He adds: 'But I do not think it clear that a thinker of this type will regard Ethics as a positive Science; but rather, perhaps, as an Art based on Biology, Psychology, and Sociology.' Thus Sidgwick gives something unusual
with reference to Ethics. Many thinkers on Ethics consider Ethics as a normative science but Sidgwick mentioned that there is a school of philosophers who consider Ethics as an art. S.K. Mittra observes: "The Ethics of the Hindus' is based on a three-fold scheme of the spiritual life comprising the stages of sociality, subjective morality and the life absolute and transcendental. Hindu Ethics is thus social ethics and psychological ethics and culminates in the philosophy of the Absolute which is the consummation of the spiritual life.' Thus the Hindu Ethics contains the important element, psychology.

To conclude, Ethics is not a mere normative science and takes into consideration the positive science, psychology. The 'Ought to be' has a close relation with 'What is'. We must have a clear and deep conception of 'What is' and this cannot be unless we have a deep knowledge of modern psychology. Without having the knowledge of 'what is' in depth, people sometimes are carried away with the 'gust' of feeling and enthusiasm for 'Ought to be' and thus sometimes they join monasteries and become recluses, monks and nuns, not only in the European countries but in India too and become repentant for the remaining life for the step taken and then become heavily loaded mentally and their fountains of smile are dried up. They are loathsome to live. Their faces are melancholy-stricken. They are too much serious and live a dejected life. They do not know the importance of this systole-and-diastole motion of retreat with reference to the moral evolution and progress. Aristotle considers Ethics primarily as dealing with character and conduct. So to
form character, the knowledge of the depth of psychology is indeed momentous. So we may regard that character has two moments, the one is psychology and the other is ethics as related with the spiritual life. As ethics deals indirectly with institutions, it has also the social side, besides being individualistic. And it is related with politics, Aristotle used to consider man as primarily the political animal.

My submission is that Gandhi, though he does not discard psychology, has not vested ethics with psychology and he owns that he has not studied psychology. So his observations on character and conduct, without the depth of psychology, will be such as they will remain for the students of Gandhian philosophy as more a matter of faith than reason. I humbly suggest that the students of Gandhian Philosophy will note this and supplement their own observations fraught with psychology with those of Gandhi. (I shall later on deal with this at length in my chapter on 'Brahmaceriya and other vows'). Suffice it to say, that if ethics is not fraught with psychology, through and through, it will not help the masses, who are in a pressing need of psychology, to have a balanced view as to develop one's character.

3. Metaphysical Implications of Ethics

As there is a relation of religion with metaphysics, so there is a relation of ethics with metaphysics. The relation of religion with metaphysics is helpful to know the relation of ethics to metaphysics as religion and ethics are interrelated.
Rashdall observes, with reference to the relation of religion with
metaphysics: 'Popular religion's beliefs, positive or negative,
represent an implicit Metaphysics............. All religion is, always
has been and always must be essentially metaphysical. 13 It is
said that no man is without metaphysics, he may either have right or
wrong notions. We know that religion and metaphysics deal with
the ultimate reality. Their roots are one but their set out or
method is different. Religion lays stress on experience while
metaphysics, on rational activity. Now let us see the relation of
ethics with metaphysics. Radhakrishnan observes: 'Any ethical
theory must be grounded in metaphysics, in a philosophical concep-
tion of the relation between human conduct and ultimate reality.
As we think ultimate reality to be, so we behave. Vision and
action go together.' 14 Before we study ethics, some idea of
metaphysics is indeed necessary: some preliminary notions about
metaphysics are needed. And, if we go deeper into the problems of
ethics, particularly the moral
judgment and the realization of the moral ideal, we will enter
into the field of metaphysics. The conclusions of metaphysics
are the postulates of ethics. Without these postulates, we can-
not start thinking and cannot have progressive thinking in ethics.
The outstanding postulates or J. Seth calls them problems- are
the following:

(i) The existence of a self-
(ii) The postulate (or problem) of freedom
(iii) The postulate of God, and
(iv) The postulate of Immortality.
(i) The Existence of a Self

Without the postulate of the existence of a self, one cannot think about ethical problems, so it is the primary postulate. Rashdall observes: (a) that the self is a permanent reality, (b) that reality is spiritual, in so far as it has a permanent life of its own not identical with the changes of the material organism with which it is (in whatever way) connected; (c) that the acts of the man really proceed from and express the nature or character of the self. I call the existence of such a self a primary postulate of Ethics. And he adds: 'It is the postulate without which we cannot even set out on our ethical journey.'

(ii) The Postulate of Freedom

There are two schools of thought with reference to this postulate (i) the school of libertarianism and (ii) the school of determinism. The extreme positions are false. If man is exclusively at liberty to do and undo, he is not checked by the Infinite Power i.e. Good. If he is wholly determined by God in each and every case and that wholly, and thus he is perfectly determined, man ceases to be moral. To be moral he must not be determined externally but he should be determined internally. Thus, the extreme positions are false. So the man is partly at liberty and partly determined i.e., partly conditioned by his past deeds. The man has to struggle hard against nature in him. If nature overpowers him, he then cannot evolve and make his own efforts to be free from the effect of his past deeds. On the merit of the constitution of mind as stated by Hegel, though, in a sense, mind and
nature are the two sides of one life, the mind can overcome nature. But nature will not be easily won, it will engage the mind in a strong battle and ultimately the nature will be overcome. Degree by degree, the will of the man covers the field of nature in a systole-and-diastole motion of retreat and ultimately it will win.

(iii) The Postulate of God-

Ethics without the postulate of God is a cipher. Gandhi observes: "All the dry ethics of the world turn to dust because apart from God they are lifeless. Coming from God, they come with life in them. They become part of us-and ennoble us." Man, as an imperfect being logically involves that he is the part of God as God is perfect. God is not merely transcendent but he is also immanent. If God is merely transcendent, man will not be helped in breaking his shackles of imperfection. So the theistic view of the universe helps the man in the struggles against evil and makes the morality objective. Rashdall observes: "the idea of an objective Morality logically involves the theistic view of the universe, and is most effectively taught in connection with that view." If God is conceived as the end of the highest moral ideal, the love of God will certainly augment the love of duty and the execution of duty becomes natural.

(iv) The Postulate of Immortality -

The fourth postulate of ethics is the postulate of immortality. From the postulate of God, one can logically come to the
postulate of immortality, when one wants to perfect oneself ethically. The affirmation of immortality depends on the idealistic and transcendental interpretation of morality while the denial of immortality depends on the naturalistic and empirical interpretation of morality. If man can attain perfection, he cannot attain it in this life alone, so he will require other lives also. So he will have to take many births. The ward of sensibility cannot be removed at a stroke from the man's life in this life alone. It will require many other lives. This proves that there is immortality as the implication of morality. The man, in relation to his immanent God, knows that whatever little achievement he has had, will not go in vain, for he knows that he is immortal to finish his task of achieving his moral ideal. J. Seth observes: 'He (the man) trusts that what he has done will not be undone by the Universal Power, since he believes it to be a Power that makes his righteousness. Were it not so, human life would lose its meaning, and, with the discovery of the hollowness of its make-believe, all earnestness of moral purpose would be exchanged, in an earnest nature, for cynicism and despair.' The Bhagavad Gita gives assurance to the Yogi that his little efforts for achieving his goal of perfection will not go in vain for he gets other lives to continue his achievement effected in his past life (Cf. VI, 43 to 45). Rashdall says that the postulate of immortality is a corollary of belief in God. He states: 'The belief in a future life I regard as of the highest value both as a postulate or a corollary of belief in God, and for its own sake.' He again states: 'Belief in another life enhances the value of the life that now
is and the importance of the moral struggle of which it is the

e same. If a man does not believe in immortality, this life
with its mundane pleasures will be all in all and to such a man,
character is secondary. Rashdall says that the postulate of
immortality is believed in, by almost all modern thinkers on ethics.
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immortality is believed in, by almost all modern thinkers on ethics.
'It is at bottom the basis of that faith in Immortality which, in
greater or less intensity, is to be found in nearly all modern
thinkers in whom ethical convictions have been profound and para-

mount.'

4. The Personal Immortality

There are some thinkers who believe in the personal immortality
while there are some other thinkers who do not believe in the personal
immortality. Those who do not believe in the personal immortality
hold that the individual man is immortal, and that mankind as a
group is immortal. They advise us that the individual man should
sacrifice in the interest of the community as the community is
immortal. 'This changed view of immortality, it is insisted,
lends life a new meaning.' Here J. Seth quotes C.M. Williams:
"The good we strive for lives no longer in a world of dreams on
the other side of the grave; it is brought down to earth and waits
to be realised by human hands, through human labour. We are
called on to forsake the finer egoism that centred all its care on
self-salvation, for a love of our own kind that shall triumph over death,
and leave its impress on the joy of generations to come.'

J. Seth protests C.M. William and counters his argument in a very
effective way. J. Seth observes that in answer to that he remarks,


that such an argument is strictly irrelevant to the question at issue. Can a life which, throughout its course, is personal, and by becoming impersonal, or by passing over to other persons? The question is whether the individual has, in these brief earthly years, lived out his life, and realised his total good. Moral progress is progress in character and personal character cannot be transferred to the life of the community. If, at death, the self ceases to exist, the task of its life is ended and undone.

(2) The good of ethics is, like my own, a personal and individual good; and, if there is no permanent good for me, neither is there for them. Thus the good of others to which we had wedded our souls is, like our own, destined to disintegration.

Gandhi does not believe in personal immortality at the final salvation. He says that at the time of salvation (or 'Nirvana'), the man merges into the infinite just as the drop of the sea merges into the sea and thus loses its identity. Such a position is challenged by the modern thinkers on ethics. They have opined that if the man merges into the infinite and loses his personality, it is an unethical position. This cuts at the very root of morality. Who can doubt the morality of Gandhi? With his characteristic view, Gandhi is a highly moral man. Still, it is a paradox! Thus, it becomes a polemical question, as the opposite view has some truth in it. So this question requires a good deal of nice thrashing, in order to arrive at the truth of the question, looking to both the sides of it. James Seth expounds this situation in a remarkable manner. The idealistic objection to the immortality of the individual seems to me to rest upon two misunderstandings: (1) that misinterpretation of individuality,
and of finitude in general.\(2\) The objection rests upon a confusion of moral with intellectual unity and identity. The ethical unity, which consists in harmony of will, implies... a real independence of will; apart from such independence, there could be no surrender of the finite will to the infinite. The maintenance of the ethical relation between God and man implies, therefore, the persistence of the human will or self, in the future as in the present. The dissolution of this would mean the dissolution of the ethical life itself.\(^{25}\)

And he continues that our origin and our destiny are one, it is because we come from God that we must go to Him, and can only rest in fellowship with Him who is the Father of our spirits. That fellowship—the fellowship of will with Will—in the present is our best pledge of its continuance in the future. The fellowship with the Eternal cannot but be eternal, and such fellowship is of the very essence of the moral life.\(^{26}\)

Evelyn Underhill supports the view of J. Seth as she observes:

'God, said St. Augustine, is the country of the soul; its Home, says Rihwbroek. The mystic in the unitive state is living in and of his native land, no exploring alien, but a returned exile, now wholly identified with it, part of it, yet retaining his personality intact... the great mystics are anxious above all things to establish and force on us the truth that by deification they intend no arrogant claim to identification with God, but as it were a transfusion of their selves by His self.... Over and over again they assure us that personality is not lost, but made more real.'\(^{27}\)

She quotes Augustine: 'When,' says St. Augustine, 'I shall cleave to Thee with all my being, then shall I in nothing have pain and
labour; and my life shal be a real life, being wholly full of Thee.\textsuperscript{28} Evelyn Underhill has given in her book, Mysticism, numerous quotations with reference to our present contention. For the want of space, I shall quote only one more here. (Those who are interesting in this point of contention may refer to her book and read the pages 420-423). She adds: "Hecchthild of Magdeburg, and after her Dante, saw Deity as a flame or river of fire that filled the Universe; and the "deified" souls of the saints as ardent sparks therein, ablaze with that fire, one thing with it, yet distinct (Par. XXX, 64).\textsuperscript{29} But E. Underhill's one quotation is very near to Gandhi's idea the self-loss of the individual in God. She observes: "Other contemplatives say that the deified soul is transfigured by the inundations of the Uncreated Light: that it is like a brand blazing in the furnace, transformed to the likeness of the fire. "These souls," say the Divine voice to St. Catherine of Siena, "thrown into the furnace of My charity, no part of their will remaining outside but the whole of them being inflamed in Me, are like a brand, wholly consumed in the furnace, so that no one can take hold of it to extinguish it, because it has become fire. In the same way no one can seize these souls, or draw them outside of Me, because they are made one thing with Me through grace, and I never withdraw Myself from them by sentiment, as in the case of those whom I am leading on to the perfection."\textsuperscript{30}

We have seen in the above discussion that the opinion is divided among the two schools of thoughts, the one maintains, e.g. Gandhi, that there is the self-loss in God, while the other one opposes this view and maintains that the self retains its selfhood.
in God. We cannot say either of the schools false, favour one and discard the other. As a student of philosophy one should not have any prejudiced brain. I should remark that Gandhi does not represent the view of all the Hindu sections as the Jains, whom Gandhi includes in the Hindus (in the liberal form of the term), are pluralists and maintain the selfhood of the individuals. Even in the Hindus, in the narrow sense of the term, I am of opinion that some maintain that individuals are co-equal in their final salvation (Nirvana) with God, though they do not be God and have not been raised to the status of God, e.g. the "Garud" of Lord Vishnu and the 'Bansari' of Lord Vishnu are co-equal of Lord Vishnu, one of the Avatars (incarnations) of God. This difference of opinion should not be pressed too much as Rashdall comes to our help that the metaphysical implications should not be stressed too much. He observes: 'It is for the rational interpretation of the moral consciousness that metaphysical or theological beliefs are required.' He adds: 'that the moral consciousness itself contains no explicit or immediate reference to any theological (I add here as well as metaphysical) belief whatever.'

After discussing the metaphysical implications of morality and particularly the personal Immortality, we come to a basic question whether Indian Ethics is non-activistic or not.

5. Is Indian Ethics Non-activistic?

European thinkers, in general, are of opinion that Hindu Ethics is non-activistic. Schweiitzer opines that as Hindu ethics treat inner perfection and inward calm as of more importance than outer activity, it is non-activistic. He contrasts the
inactive ethic of perfecting the self alone with the intensified love of one's neighbour. Bishop Creighton beautifully expresses Indian Ethics as good as gold and fit for heaven but of no earthly use. Hindu ethics will plead guilty to this charge level-led against it by the European thinkers in general. 'To be good' always precedes 'to do good,' for, if the one is not good, the one is not able to do good in a healthy way. So one must for a while abandon the society, seek solitude and be master of the senses which drag the man to the worldly objects. In solitude by meditation and concentration the man will be the lord over the senses. Then he is able 'to do good' and enters the world to exercise the greater control over his mind. Sir Radhakrishnan observes: 'The perfecting of self is to pass from the narrow, constricted, individual life to the free, creative, spiritual life. It is to get our tangled lives into harmony with the great movement of reality. It is not to be unsocial, or to despise the natural relationship of life or end in a type of self-centred spiritual megalomania.' Indian ethics i.e. Hindu ethics is neither narrow, nor individualistic. It is not self-centred, but it has the social side, beside the transcendental life. I restate with excuse S.K. Maitra's view, given in his book, The Ethics of the Hindus: "The Ethics of the Hindus' is based on a three-fold scheme of the spiritual life comprising the stages of sociality, subjective morality and the life absolute and transcendental. Hindu Ethics is thus social ethics and psychological ethics and culminates in the philosophy of the Absolute which is the consummation of the Spiritual life."
6. Is Moral Judgment passed merely on motive?

(Gandhi's conception fully discussed)

Gandhi observes: 'in judging of the morality or otherwise of an action, we have to take into account the motive of the doer.... Hence no action can be called moral, unless it is prompted by a moral intention.' The above quotation shows that Gandhi lays stress on 'the motive of the doer' in the moral judgment and it seems that he obliterates the difference between motive and intention as he uses in the same paragraph, the word 'intention' for 'motive.' He further adds: 'We have simply to assure ourselves that our motive is pure, and that the action itself is good and leave the rest to God.' This shows that he lays stress solely on 'motive' and adds that 'the action is itself good.' When he says that 'the action is itself good,' it means that he does not leave the action out of his consideration. It may play a subordinate part in our moral judgment. He says that the action is itself 'good.' Now the term 'good' should be understood in reference to the term 'right.' So there is the difference between these two statements, 'The action is itself good' and 'the action is itself right.' I mean to say when 'the action is itself right' it means that it is compared with some standard and then one can pronounce that it is right. When Gandhi says that the action is itself 'good,' there are two possible alternatives, as 'good' implies here—(1) 'the action is good in consequence' and (2) 'good in the mind of the doer.' These two alternatives either may cancel one or the other, or at least may put the one in subordination to the other.
The above discussion crops up a number of queries namely:

Is there no difference between motive and intention? The other queries are: How far the doer of the action plays his part in the moral judgment? How far the consequences play their part in the moral judgment? Or is the total of all these to be considered in the moral judgment? There are moral thinkers siding one point or another. So this polemical problem requires a good threshing in order to arrive at the right understanding of it. Let us first see what we mean by motive and intention. These concepts should be made clear in our understanding.

(i) **Motive and Intention**

Motive can be defined in the following way. Motive is that which moves us to action. It is that which induces us or impels us to activity. Motive is the efficient or dynamic cause of all our actions. It is also at the same time final cause of our actions. As the final cause, it is the desired end or aim or ideal. The motive that which induces us to act is the thought of a desirable end.

J. Mirkhead's deep analysis of motive is noteworthy. While feeling as an element in desire may be said to be the efficient cause of action, a motive is generally admitted to imply a reference to a final cause.

"A fortiori in voluntary action proper, what gives motive power to an idea is not its mere presence in the mind, but its congruence with some preformed disposition or "universe of desire." As this congruence manifests itself in feeling, we may sum up by defining a motive as the idea which, through felt congruence with some
element in the self, has taken possession of the will and been realized in action."  

Intention can be defined as any aim that is adopted as an object of will. It also includes means for anything we purpose or desire to bring out.

(ii) Relation between Intention and Motive

Mackenzie has given in his book, A Manual of Ethics, a notable illustration giving the relation of Intention with Motive. The apothecary, in selling poison to a man, says his motive is his want of money while his intention is that he does not wish to sell it. In the apothecary, his motive overpowers his intention.

Intention is a wider term than motive, motive is a species to which intention is a genus. Intention usually includes motive but not vice versa. What includes us to act (namely motive) is generally what we want to achieve (namely intention) but we want to achieve more than what simply induces us to act. The word 'motive' represents the dynamical aspect of willing, while the intention represents the teleological aspect of willing. The motive designates the sentient 'spring' or source of actions, the intention designates, its aim, object or end, e.g. the motive of a reformer may be partly improving the state of mankind and partly that of acquiring fame for himself. These ends form part of his intention but in the latter is included the fact of his awareness that his idea will be, for a time, not to send peace on earth but a sword. But these evil consequences do not form part of his motive. Thus, motive of an act is the part of the intention in the broadest sense of that term.
After knowing the difference between motive and intention and the relation between them, we can discuss the Nature of Moral Judgment.

(iii) Nature of Moral Judgment -

Moral Judgment is not of the same kind as that of Logic. It is not merely like a logical judgment, a judgment about something but it is a judgment upon something. It does not simply attribute something to the subject but compares it with a standard. Hence it is said that moral point of view is not of facts or existence, but it is normative. The thing or object, on which moral judgment is passed, is voluntary acting. Whatever is not willed, has no moral quality. This has led Kant to say, "There is nothing in the world or even out of it, that can be called good except a good will; good will is the only jewel that shines by its own light."

(iv) Is Moral Judgment passed on Motive or Intention?

Intuitonists believe that moral judgment is concerned only with the motive of an act. Our actions are to be pronounced good or bad in proportion to goodness or badness of motives. On the other hand, utilitarians say that morality of an act depends entirely on intention i.e. upon what agent wills to do. The motive of an action had nothing to do with the morality of an action, though much with the worth of an agent. This view of utilitarians seems at first to be reasonable but if we think a little, we find it to be erroneous. Utilitarians think that moral judgment is passed on things done but really speaking it is passed upon a person doing and hence it does
include the motive also. Thus if we judge the man doing it, what
induces him to do it namely motive, is not irrelevant to this
judgment. Similarly intuitionists are also wrong when they say
that we are concerned only with motives when we pass a moral judg­
ment.

Thus we cannot say that moral judgment is passed on either
motive or intention separately. The fully developed moral judg­
ment is always passed on the character of the agent, it is not
passed on things done, but a person doing it. Even in judging
the acts of men we do not think them as isolated events but as
parts of the system of life.

Hence it is misleading to say simply that we pass judgment
either on intention or motive.

(v) Do we judge an act by its motives or by its consequences?

There are some moral thinkers that believe that moral
judgment should pass on the consequences of an act and not on
motives. There are others who oppose this view, so the controversy
has become historic. Bentham says that it is only on account of
these effects, that the motives are considered either good or bad.
J.S. Mill maintains that the motive has nothing to do with the
morality of the act. Butler opposes them and maintains that
the rightness or wrongness of an act depends very much upon the
motive for which it is done. Kant emphatically maintains that the
effect of our actions cannot give them moral worth.

If the motive is the ultimate consequent desired, it is in-
indifferent to say whether the moral judgment is either passed on to the motive or consequent. But one should bear in one's mind that here motive is not merely the feeling which accompanies the motive but the will with which one should identify oneself while putting the will into action. Similarly in case of consequences, all consequences are not looked at, but only those which are pre-conceived and for which the act is done and the idea of which becomes the final cause of the act. J. Muirhead briefly states: 'Only when we have taken into account the act as a whole, and answered the questions (1) whether the consequences as a whole are good or bad (2) whether these consequences were the end aimed at, have we a right to find our moral judgments upon them.'

In this case, Ross' view is worth to be considered.

(vi) The Relation of Motive with the Moral or Right Action (Ross' view)

Ross says that a certain action is right and knowledge and pleasure as good. So he brings the discussion of the categories of 'Right' and 'Good' (Here we cannot enter into the explanations of those categories propounded by Ross and G.E. Moore, respectively.) Ross lays stress on the consideration of situation and this is characteristic of Ross. Ross says that a moral action is right, or more right looking to the particular situation than without it, from the view of its whole character. It seems that Ross lays stress, in Moral Judgment, both on motives and the results produced by the action. A morally right action is that which proceeds from good motives and produces results which are of maximum advantage to the agent. Going to the depth of his arguments, one can see that
that he lays stress neither on motive nor on results of the action as he argues that the agent does not choose the immediate motive and he also cannot choose to produce the results of his actions but satisfies only in exerting himself to do an action. Briefly, I state Ross' view: (1) Actions are supported by motive and motive constitutes an action, so it is not the motive but the action itself which is the object of moral judgment; (2) this does not mean that motive is dismissed from our consideration, because the right actions are always well motivated. This means that motive is one of the constituents and not the whole and sole of the right action, nevertheless a 'good' motive is a necessary adjunct of the right action and it is the action which is the object of moral judgment. He also lays stress that action as the object of moral judgment is to be judged as a whole, i.e. as a unit, covering within it motive, consequences and circumstances. If it is not judged in this way and only judged from motive, it would be a partial judgment and not a comprehensive one.

Hugh A Reyburn expounding the Ethical Theory of Hegel asserts: 'We are not justified in picking out special contents as the essence of action, to proclaim them either good or bad and the philosophic judgment must consider THE TOTAL ACT IN ALL ITS BEARINGS'.

We come to the last query whether moral judgment depends on the character or conduct.

(vii) Is Moral Judgment passed on Character or Conduct?

Motive through will is related to character. J. Muirhead puts this thing nicely. 'The mind and will of a man are already expressed in his motives, so that in being determined by them he is determined by himself. Hence we may pass from judgment on a
man's motive to judgment upon his character. In judging a man's motive to be bad, we pass condemnation on the character or habit of will for being such that this could be a motive to it. 40

We have seen that moral judgment is neither passed on motive nor on intention. A fully developed moral judgment is always pronounced on the character of agent doing it. It is never simply on an act or thing done, but always upon a person doing, that we pass a moral judgment.

It is not desired that we pass judgment on isolated actions of men. What is said is that when we judge an action, we cannot judge it as an isolated event, but as a part of a system of life. Bradley asserts: 'these judgements (moral) are not mere isolated impressions, but stand in an intimate and vital relation to a certain system which is their basis.' 41 Thus, character is the proper object of moral judgment.

Conduct, so far it is the manifestation of character, also becomes a true object of moral judgment. We know the character of a person only from his conduct or external acts. Hence we are almost compelled to pass a moral judgment upon the conduct. Character by itself remains in concealment.

Thus, we can say that moral judgment is not passed either on character or conduct separately but it is passed on conduct as expressing the character or character as expressed in the conduct.

To sum up, in following the comparative method in the Moral Judgment, we have seen that some moral thinkers laid stress on one
thing while others on other things, e.g. the Intuitionists on motive, the Utilitarians on intention, J. Muirhead on consequences, Ross on circumstances, Bradley on a system, Hegel on 'the total act in all its bearings.' This comparative method brings out the essence of the moral judgment propounded by Gandhi. He lays stress on two things—(1) motive and (2) 'the action itself is good'.

One can say that these two points are the moments of Gandhi's idea of Moral Judgment. The heart of motive given by J. Muirhead is indeed notable, as it enriches the idea of motive given by Gandhi. It is not the feeling in motive, but will eager to burst into action is laid stress on. The second point given by Gandhi, 'the action itself is good', though apparently trivial forebodes a multitude of things. The action cannot be truly good unless the doer is good. The doer cannot be good unless he is habitually good, i.e. he must be a man of character. The character is not seen isolated but as expressed in conduct. The motive is circumstance.

So it contains circumstances. No true moral judgment is either formed or pronounced unless circumstances are taken into consideration. Gandhi's idea of moral judgment, though these, is not trivial. The other moral thinkers have propounded the heart of Gandhi's idea of moral judgment. Their elucidation is not beside the mark but play the important role in bringing out the worth of Gandhi's idea of moral judgment.

One cannot know whether the particular action is either right or good, unless it is learnt in connection with the Moral Law.

7. The Moral Law:

Gandhi considers the Moral Law as the law that is above all
laws. He does not state that there is one moral law but he believes in many moral laws. He has not scrutinized the moral laws and thus did not find out that the particular one is the best one. He states: 'The laws of the moral world, then, are absolutely independent of our opinions and our feelings. They are not temporary like the man made laws, but eternally valid and hence we are bound to obey them even more strictly than the laws of the state.' The above quotation shows that Gandhi refers to moral laws and not one moral law. They are above our personal likes and dislikes. And second, they are eternally valid and are thus not manmade laws as the laws of the state. With reference to the existence of the Moral Law or the moral ideal, Rastadall observes: 'The Moral Law has a real existence that there is such a thing as an absolute Morality, that there is something absolutely true or false in ethical judgments, whether we or any number of human beings at any given time actually think so or not. Such a belief is distinctively implied in what we mean by Morality. The idea of such an unconditional, objectively valid, Moral Law or ideal undoubtedly exists as a psychological fact.' These laws are based on truth and truth is based more on heart than on brain. If our hearts are pure, we can cognize the truth and can thus clearly understand these laws. Sometimes Gandhi talks of the moral law as one. He observes: 'so long as we are blind by ignorance, we cannot realize the moral law.' This shows that he has not clearly stated that there is one law or many laws. To go into the depth of the Moral Law, one should know the ground of the Moral Law and the law of institutions and the part played by Gandhi therein. Let us now deal with them, one by one.
(i) The Ground of the Moral Law -

As to the ground of the moral law, Gandhi considers truth as the ground of the moral law. Truth is not identical with reason as truth is rather cognized in the heart than in the brain. Truth is wider than reason, it envelops reason and not vice versa. Otto Pfleiderer considers the universal reason or divine will as the ground of the Moral Law. "The moral law will only be able to assert its absolute validity if it springs not out of the thinking of individual men, whether it be my thinking as that of others, but is the revelation of the willing of the universal reason, which stands above all individual wills as their ground, and is at the same time active in them as the common bond of their community. This is just the divine will." Truth and Universal reason or Divine Will are identical with each other, so Gandhi's statement is endorsed by Otto Pfleiderer.

(ii) The Law of Institutions and Gandhi -

The Moral law has passed in the past through various stages and has at last come to the law of the institutions. In the beginning of the moral life formed distinctively, there was the reign of the outer law. The outer law came forth from customs and conventions. It was external. It was observed by coercion either by reward or by punishment. Individuals advanced on the path of morality used to think on the external law and they thought deeply in themselves and had an analysis of the outer law in nicely and were in conflict with the outer law. Then they had the more stringent rule of the inner
law. This state Hegel names as 'MORALITAT'. Now the individuals follow the inner law based on their conscience. This stage has both strength and limitations. They are advanced in relation to those who observe the outer law. But due to their inner search, they are sometimes liable to become the prey of individual or sectarian enthusiasms and fanativisms. Thus there is the conflict between the outer law and the inner law. But this conflict is the sign of progress in the moral life. If the individual following the inner law is not a radical reformer, he thinks still deeper and tries to see the strength or the good points of the custom and the conventions and feels himself aback in exploding the foundations of the institutions based on custom and conventions. Here we feel the strength of Gandhi as he is a check on the too much enthusiasm, bordering on fanaticism, of a radical reformer. Gandhi is not of the opinion that all the institutions based on custom and convention to be levelled to dust but he seeks to reform within. He seeks to reform with internal criticism and not the external accusation. Sometimes the Indian educated public coming in contact with the Western Culture becomes too much enthusiastic in changing the Indian Institutions founded immemorial and lasted for thousands of years. But Gandhi gives the other side of those institutions and warns the too much enthusiastic reformers not to destroy the good elements current in those institutions. Now in this way, when the individuals go deeper into the analysis and see the pros and cons of the problem, they try to seek harmony between the outer and inner laws. And this state of 'ethicslity' is named by the Hegel as 'SITTLICHERESITEN', in which there is the reign of institutions. Thus we
pass from the outer law to the inner law of conscience and still pass from stage to the last stage of the law of institutions.

The various forms of Law show some signs of moral progress and we cannot understand it unless it is supplemented with the moral ideal.

8. The Moral Ideal

There is the ethical supremacy of the moral ideal in our life. The supreme categories of life are Truth, Goodness and Beauty. The supreme category of the moral life is the Good. It includes the other two categories. But neither Truth nor Beauty includes goodness. If it does, it will lead to moral misappreciation. Aestheticism and Intellectualism are both ethically unsatisfactory for the latter former is weak and latter is hard and cold. He who follows the science or philosophy to intellectualise himself or reduces his nature to terms of the true cannot reach the highest truth, for through the stages of morality the degrees of truth are attained. He who follows the art or the culture of the Beautiful and sinks ethics in it, cannot reach the highest vision of Beauty. There are thinkers who advocate art for art's sake. They are liable to embrace rack and ruin in the moral life, for mere art will develop the base instincts in the life of man. J. Seth observes—'These failures teach us that the fundamental term of our life is the Good, in so far as we attain to this ideal, we shall inevitably attain the others also.'
To understand the moral ideal in depth, the ancient and modern conceptions of the moral ideal should be compared; and the ideal and the actual moments of the moral ideal should be taken into consideration. Let us now deal with them, one by one.

(i) Ancient and Modern Conceptions of the Moral Ideal Compared

The ancient or classical moralists used to raise the question, 'What is man's chief end?' Whereas the modern moralists raise the questions, 'What is man's duty, what is the supreme law of his life?' The good' was the favourite category of the ancient or classical moralists whereas 'the right' is the favourite category of the modern moralists. It will be proper if the classical idea of chief Good or End is combined with the modern idea of Law with its antithesis of duty and attainment, of the Ought-to-be and Is, for the classical and the modern conceptions of the moral ideal are defective. They are defective because they are one-sided. The classical conception of the moral ideal is external whereas the modern one is mechanical and formal. The ancient moralists use to think of something to be got or possessed, rather than to be attained within or to be come. The ancient view of the moral ideal tends to emphasize the material side of the ideal or on the content of morality whereas the modern view of the moral ideal tends to lay stress on the ideal or formal side of it. But there were some in the ancients, e.g. Aristotle, and there were some also in the modern moralists, e.g. Kant, who emphasized that man must be his own end. Really speaking the classical view and the modern view of the moral ideal are the two aspects of one and the same thing. They are complementary with each other. Their
limitations are cancelled and their strength is enhanced by becoming the two sides of the Moral Ideal.

In ancient philosophy, we see the trend of the moral philosophers growing to a more adequate view. On going into the depth of the conception of happiness, they have seen that the real happiness does not consist in an outer well-being but in an inner one. They have seen that the real life is not dependence on external goods but in a life of activity. They have seen the real happiness in a settled condition or habit of will.

The modern or Christian view is more spiritual and idealistic. The Christian view suggested the nothingness of the material view by putting such ideas before the public, as, if the whole world is conquered and the soul is lost, what have you profited thereby? 'Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you, and take no thought for the morrow.'

The end of life is an ideal of character. It is the individual who has to realize it. It is his obligation or duty to realize it. In doing this duty, the individual is doing his duty to others and God.

(ii) Ancient Ideal Political, Modern Individualistic

The notable characteristic difference between the classical ideal of morality and the modern one is that the ancient ideal was social or political, while the modern one is individualistic or personal. The Greeks could never think of the moral ideal as the individualistic one for their interests were summed up in those of
citizenship.

If modern theory and practice are defective, it is due to its being in the opposite extreme. The modern ethical standpoint has been that of the individual life: it has been evolved gradually. Specially, in the Western World, Christianity has contributed the individualistic moral ideal to the ethics. It has given the infinite worth of a person. The battles between the Greeks and the Romans in the past led the moral thinkers to see the worth of the Christian Ideal.

The two spheres of life individual and social are not in reality a clear cut distinction for their claims overlap each other. Both are complementary to each other. Neither the one nor the other in reality is truth. One cannot isolate the individual from it. To do so would be to demoralise him and to annihilate him. The wholesome individual life is truly speaking a net work of relations which connects him to the wider life of his fellows. Thus the shortcomings of the individual life are removed the moment he enters the wider world of the society.

Yet the Good—the only Good is not of the society i.e. impersonal, but the good of the individual. It is personal, a good of moral personal, a good of moral persons. The person and not the society is the ultimate moral unit and reality.

(iii) The Ideal and the Actual Moments of the Moral Ideal

If the ideal part of the moral ideal is not looked to, the individual has then merely the empirical life and then he looks to
the interests of the animal in him. He will then be a 'blond beast'. So the ideal part plays its very important roll in translating the moral ideal into action. Due to the habitual thinking of the ideal part of the moral ideal, the actual is raised from the mire of life. The surd of the irrational part in life, though not removed totally, is at least sublimated, in some degrees. The Hegelian view expounded by Reyburn runs as follows: 'The ideal is the active principle of reality itself. It is not something shining a-far off, and receding when we try to approach it; it is present in every phase of the moral world and is embodied by every good action.'

But the actual part of life should not be waived aside. The actual part contains the raw material of life to be fashioned into the ideal one. The actual part of life is an empirical life. The ideal part is latent in the empirical or the actual part of the life. That latent part should be made patent by the ideal moment of the moral ideal. Cut off the empirical or the actual part of the life, then there is no ideal part of the life. The ideal part of the life takes its strength or passion from the empirical one. Kierkegaard while explaining Existentialism condemns the man who has no passion in him. The man of passion can morally evolve continually. The extinction of empirical life is disastrous. Julian Huxley maintains that there should be no. 'swallowing up of all of partial and undesirable desires in one comprehensive and desirable desire.'

Briefly, just as the ideal part is necessary to the actual or empirical, similarly the actual or empirical life is necessary for
the ideal part. None remains without the other. The one without the other is imaginary. The extremes should be discarded and there should be the happy harmony between the ideal and the actual (or real or empirical) parts of life.

To sum up, there is the ethical supremacy of the moral ideal among Truth, Beauty and Goodness. The ancient and modern conceptions of the moral ideal, the material and the formal are complementary with each other. The ancient ideal is political while the modern one is individualistic. The world in the deeper analysis of the Moral Ideal came to the truth of the importance of the individual part in morals. Christianity in the West, contributed particularly the importance of the person in the Moral Ideal. It is the modern trend of the moral life. Lastly, the ideal and the actual (or the empirical) are complementary with each other and one without the other is only in imagination.

9. Gandhi, The Product of the Age -

The world has produced Gandhi. Gandhi is the representative of the high moral order of the world. Gandhi and the moral order of the world are conditioned by each other. Though he is dead, his influence through his works and institutions is not dead. It may last, at least for fifty years, as fresh as anything. But it may have the waning and waxing stages. It depends on the admirers or the students of Gandhi to strengthen his good influence. His students are all over the world. Gandhi is not restricted to one country or another. He is considered as the light of Asia. It will not be an exaggeration if he is considered as the light of
the world as he loved the whole mankind and made his character a lofty one. So if we, the citizens of the world in some sense, institute his achievements in the philosophy of his life, all over the world, with a ramification of institutions, international and domestic, we will be able to keep the torch of light ever burning very high up in the sky of philosophy so that it may shed light on the path of nations and individuals longing to have evolution in their lives.

In the vicissitudes of the moral progress of the world, Gandhi is the characteristic symbol of the moral progress of the world. A regress, after his death, may follow, but if we, the citizens of the world, become of one mind to enhance the values of life, not merely propounded by Gandhi, but realized in our lives also, the world, for some centuries at least, may enjoy the fruit of Gandhi's philosophy of life.

To Conclude - in this chapter in the beginning we have seen that without knowing what Ethics is or the Nature of Ethics, we cannot know what the moral judgment is. The moral judgment is not passed merely on motive. Other considerations, those of situation, conditions, character are to be looked at. We cannot pass the moral judgment on the motive of the man in VACUUM: the man must be considered with some conditions or situation in which he is naturally placed. Though this does not play the important role in the moral judgment, this does colour the whole thing. One should not be ignorant of these factors. Without the moral ideal, the moral judgment cannot be a true one. The Moral Law should not be learnt only in theory, it must be practised. One
should use here the 'subjective Method', one of the moments of Existentialism, propounded by Kierkegaard. Morality, after all, is fundamentally individual. Without the discovery of the individual, there is no moral progress. One should not forget that morality should spring from love, otherwise it is not easy to put the moral law into practice. As a feature of the moral progress of the world, Gandhi is a product of the Age. To keep his philosophy ever burning, it should be institutionalized by the students of Gandhi and the citizens of the world.