CHAPTER 1

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

This chapter provides a framework of analysis on which the subsequent chapters are structured. In this chapter the basic theoretical question whether there is an international society? In response to this query, three coherent patterns of thought have emerged in the discipline of international relations studies. The three categories are identified are realism, rationalism, revolutionism. They are associated respectively with the thought of Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant. They agree on the answer that there is an international society but disagree on the nature and functioning of that society. The main distinguishing feature among them is the position adopted on 'international society.' The realist (or Hobbesian and machiavellian) conception forms one extreme and denies the existence of an effective international society. This school emphasises that 'society' can only be established by contract, and maintains that international relations is in a pre-contractual state of nature.

Revolutionism or Kantianism lies at the other extreme and posits that the existing community of states is 'unreal' - a complex of legal fictions and obsolescent diplomatic forms which conceals, obstructs and oppresses the real society of individual men and women. Thus this school of thought identifies 'individual' and not 'states' as true members of international
society. This tradition conceives the present order composed of sovereign states, as illegitimate and will inevitably be replaced by order composed of mankind. Thus the Kantian tradition (the revolutionist) acknowledges society, but considers it to be illegitimate and temporary in nature.

Between these two categories lies the third, rationalism or Grotianism. This tradition rejects both the realist's claim that international society is a fiction and the revolutionist's assessment of the illegitimate and transitory nature of the states system. This tradition (Grotian) maintains that international politics is taking place within an international society composed of sovereign states. They are bound by natural laws. Hence international society is not anarchical as the natural law forms the basis of international society and the foundation for individual rights and responsibilities. Hence Grotius rejected the replacement of the present system of sovereign states with world government on the ground that it would be too large, inefficient and ungovernable. Grotius maintained that there is an international society in operation composed of sovereign states.

This work does not presume that any of them has right perception of international society than others. It takes note that the three competing patterns (traditions of thought) had been coexisting through out time 'dynamically interweaving, but always distinct,' in mutual tension and conflict. It further notes that all three patterns are simultaneously present in international thought and practice. Hence no one formulation is
able to account from an empirical point of view, for the totality of international relations. But the three of them reflect the totality of international relations. It is, therefore, detail discussion is appropriate to related views of Gandhi, Nehru and Lohia with them.

HOBESIAN CONCEPTION : THE REALIST DIMENSION

The Nature and Functioning of the International Society:
Organizing and Operational Principles

Thomas Hobbes provides the principal impetus of what may loosely be called the realist position which interprets the world politics as essentially struggle of states for power in international relations. The tradition of power politics (reason of states) dates back to the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. His tradition is reflected in the writings of E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, Herbert Butterfield, Bacon, Spinoza, Pufendorf and others.

Hobbes provides a systematic account of the rigorous logic of relations among independent powers that find themselves in a situation of anarchy in the sense of absence of government. Hobbes's account of anarchy tells us, with ruthless candor, not only how and why these powers do and must confront one another under the imperatives of international anarchy, but also what they should and sometimes can do to provide a modicum of security even while they remain in this condition.
The starting point of Hobbes's account of relations among states is the proposition that these relations are shaped in state of nature which is basically a war instinct. In such a state of nature, the states, like individual men find themselves in such a condition of war if they are not in awe of a common power i.e. Leviathan. While referring to the state of nature, Hobbes describes the life of an individual before the contract came into existence, "But though there had never been anytime, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealou...
Sovereign states do not recognize any higher authority than themselves in the system. They, therefore, live in a state of nature. The "people" who live in the state of nature solve their problems of insecurity by instituting a sovereign Leviathan by means of a social contract. But the "states" thus created by contract have not yet created a 'global Leviathan,' hence they live in a state of nature. Hobbes explains why people living in the state of nature create a sovereign authority (state) and create a domestic society (civil society) and that he does not care however, to advocate the creation of a global society by a social contract among the states.

Sovereign states, thus emerged by international social contract, simply (confine) locked themselves into international system, and do not constitute what we call an international society. Each state, thus, it encompassed in, what is called, the hide of a Leviathan and internally each Leviathan is politically independent of others. Under the garb of Leviathan, each state in its external environment maintains its independence and right to exist and assert. For the realist school of thought, the formation of sovereign states does not terminate the state of nature per se. It simply transcends it to a higher plane of commonwealth i.e. at the level of international relations. Thus, a social contract creates a civil society of several sovereign states and puts an end to the
problematique of insecurity. But the same contract may create international anarchy and the problematique of "state security" at the international level. Hence, the problematique of international insecurity remains unattended and unresolved for sovereign states.

The sovereign states do not recognize any higher authority than themselves and find themselves in perpetual state of nature. The international state of nature gives birth to classic security dilemma and force them to live in a condition of mutual competition and conflict.

The Hobbesian tradition, thus, regards states as essential actors or units of analysis in international relations. In short, Hobbesian image of the world is a system of sovereign states, characterized by international anarchy, i.e. the absence of the centralized authority. Realism, therefore, denies the existence of an effective international society. For them international relations is a pre-contractual state of nature and no meaningful society can be contemplated out of it. In other words, what preceded the formation of state i.e. the state of nature was brought to an end through social contract resulting in 'civil society.' However, the state of nature which is characterized by confrontation, conflict and competition still continues for all sovereign states and that is the reality which constitutes the main theme of international relations, i.e. insecurity and anarchy - and therefore search for an order.
Principle of Self-Help

According to Hobbesian conception, in an international state of nature, there exists separate 'states' among whom there prevails no natural tendency to live in a society. Every state is endowed with an equal natural right to self-preservation. It includes the right to do what is necessary to preserve the life i.e. the survival of state. The state is the sole arbiter of what, in fact, is necessary to expand one's liberty. For Hobbes, states are, with respect to each other, in a condition analogous to that prevails among individuals in a state of nature. Each state has the same right in protecting the safety of its own body. The Realists school considers the state as a self-sufficient, non-moral entity. The sovereign authority and the unity of government are the essence of the state. Hence in international relations, each sovereign state submits to no higher law than the safety of its own realm. Each state has an equal right to look after itself.

The Hobbesian school does not subscribe to the assumption that some common values, rules, interests and institutions bind states together in a society. The dominant characteristic of a nation-state system is "conflict" and not consensus. Actually, 'consensus' can be the basis of any society. There must be a 'unity of purpose' and 'unity of action' in a consensual society. While the state system can be characterized as a system of competing alliances which are occasionally interrupted by bloody wars. Hobbes is the first theorist who describes the relations among states explicitly in terms of the anarchic state of nature.
On War

According to Hobbes the causes of war are three: (a) competition for material possessions, which leads to wars fought for gain; (b) diffidence or mistrust, the source of wars fought for defense or security; and (c) glory, the pursuit of which leads to wars to prevent others from undervaluing us and also from ignoring our opinions on faith. Hobbes's doctrine of the three great motives of war—gain, fear, and glory—is reinterpretation of the doctrine of war propounded by Thucydides, great philosopher historian of ancient Greek. According to him, states generally resort to war mainly for three reasons, "chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit."

Hobbes views 'fear' in the sense of the rational apprehension of future insecurity, as the prime motive that affects, not some states at some time, but all states at all times. It is a concern to secure what we already have, rather than to aspire for what we do not have. This inclines all human beings toward "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death." It is the motive of fear, leading to search for security through superior power. It works more significantly than competition for material goods or clashes of ideology, to put states into conflict with one another. For neither or none of contending states seeking security in this way can be superior.

Hobbes's argument rather points to the conclusion that the dangers cannot be averted. The incompatibility of interests between two or more
states, each of which is seeking security through superior power, does not rest on mistaken perceptions but is quite genuine.

States are in a condition of war, not in the sense that they are always fighting but in the sense that over a period of time, they have a known disposition to fight. War in this sense is inherent in the condition of states that are not in awe of a common power; and peace, in a sense of a time in which there is no disposition to fight, is beyond their reach. There is a war of every state against every other state. At any point in time there might be relations of alliance or indifference between particular states as well as those of hostility. But over a long stretch of time every state will display its disposition to fight every other. There are no "security communities," or groups of states that have overcome the disposition to fight with one another.

Amoral Society

According to the realist school international politics is essentially amoral. Its proponents argue that such concepts as morality, justice, equality, law do not exist in international relations. The highest morality of a nation-state is self-preservation and reason-d'etat - the national interest. This means the statesman's obligations are basically to his state, its government and its citizens and that the highest duty of all is to preserve and enhance national power. This school does not see any duty towards the mankind. Thus the sovereign states are the amoral actors of international relations.
The question of morality refers to the expression of "good" and "bad." Nothing is "good" or "bad" for a state. It is a subjective matter for a state. In fact, "good" and "bad" refer to some objects of desire, and reveals only the pleasure and aversions of the human subject. Besides there is no consensus on "common good" among sovereign states. Hence, the problem of the so-called international morality does not arise in the Hobbesian conception of international society.

Morality refers to a common conduct of states. But in international relations, one's own safety and happiness are the ultimate measures of conduct.

**International Law**

In the state of nature, according to Hobbes, there is no positive law, "no property, no dominion, no mine and thine instinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it." For Hobbes, law is a command of the sovereign and can come into being only as a consequence of the establishment of government. Princes and Commonwealth, being subject to no common government, can not be subject to law. What is called the law of nations, in Hobbes views, is not law or international law, in quite the same sense in which municipal law is. The law of nations, Hobbes maintains, is the same as the law of nature, that is to say, the prudential rules of survival.
In Hobbesian view, states are free to pursue their goals in relations to other states without moral or legal restriction of any kind. As ideas of morality and law are valid only in the context of a society, international politics is beyond society. If any moral or legal goals are to be pursued in international politics, these goals will be only of a state and not of a society. States conducts its foreign policy in a kind of moral or legal vacuum. The moral behaviour for the state in foreign policy lies in its own self-assertion. The states are not guided nor their behaviour is restricted by any rules. If they are at all guided by any rules, they are rules of prudence and expediency.

The Realist school later agrees that there is 'international law' but it is not, like municipal law, meant to observe it compulsorily. International law is voluntary in nature. The states may or may not observe it. And only states can be the subject of international law and not the people who live within the sovereign states. In fact the so-called international law is only a set of 'rules and principles' and it may or may not be observed. There is no higher or competent authority to implement the international law.

It, therefore, logically follows that the "subjects" of international law can be independent states only. The international persons are only those collective persons on whom it is postulated that they have a moral nature analogous with that of individuals, making them capable of enjoying rights and assuming obligations. Thus, the international law recognizes only society of sovereign states and denies the existence of an effective international society.
The word "law" denotes a system of rules which is created and modified by a legislature, interpreted and applied by a judiciary, and enforced by the executive. These organs (legislature, executive and judiciary) are either non-existent or appear rudimentary in a nation-state system. Hence the urgent need in international relations is to establish a rule of law.

Even in this century, some states do not even take into account the existence of those international laws. For them, these laws are either defective or unjust or even if they observe them, they do so as a matter of expediency, not as a part of legal obligations.

The Concept of Justice

National interest is the sole guiding principle in Hobbesian society and in that light low premium has been attached to principles of rationality, morality and justice. In order to pursue justice in international society, operationalization of perfect rational action is required. Perfect rational action requires perception of the tie between one's own state and other states and that all the states must be conscious of the nature of this tie. But in international anarchy no tie exists between states. Thus justice is an irrational ideal. What is rational in this context is pursuance of national interest.

Moreover, relations among nation-states are not influenced by any consideration of justice. They are chiefly guided by 'power' consideration.
The consideration of 'good will,' 'general good,' 'justice' do not influence the consciousness of the state nor do they provoke shape action in the international arena. All states behave with excessive consideration of their "vital national interest" which shatters the edifice of social obligations and cooperation. Hence the conflict is resolved by resorting to force. The entire system legitimatizes the use of force in international system. To use force, or threat to use force are the sharp (ultimate, inevitable) ends of power politics in an anarchical society. Thus, recourse to violence is regarded as just.

The state is a solitary 'actor' in absence of dependable order. It is always threatened by the fear of invasion of other states, in the neighbourhood. In Hobbesian sense, the state is, thus, trapped into an inevitable competitive system for its survival. The dilemma it faces at this stage is whether to 'survive' or to seek 'justice' at the cost of its survival. Hence all of them succumb to the logic of power politics. In such a situation, the words like 'good will,' 'amity,' and 'friendship' acquire the status of rhetoric with least or no weightage. The utility attached to them is just to disguise the national interest of the state with a view to safeguarding and promoting it.

Whenever peace and order are disturbed in the international society, they are restored not by any consideration of justice, but by countervailing actions of states. At present the state-system is stratified in a hierarchy of 'great power,' 'middle power' and 'small power.' Whenever a state or a group of states are threatened by any form of
hegemony, the states resort to the technique of alliances and counter alliances without any consideration of justice, goodwill, etc. And, thus, order (stability) is maintained in the system at the cost of justice.

Power Politics

The nation-state system functions in a legal vacuum hence the realist paradigm views international politics as a state of war by all against all. Hence, international politics is a politics of power. It is a struggle for power in which each state is pitted against the other. International politics is nothing but pure conflict between states. For realists, politics is a zero-sum game. The interest of the state excludes interest of any other. That is why wars break out periodically between nations of the world. Peace may be understood as a period between two wars. It is in fact a time to prepare for the next war.

The nation-state system which operates in a state of nature considers wars as natural phenomena as there is no order between states. The Commonwealth are enemies by nature. If one state wishes to attack another nation, it may do so. It can wage war by right. All that is necessary is to have a will to do so. Later, Realists agree that states need not be in a permanent state of hostilities. Agreements to act in concert for the benefit of each may be entered into. But they remain in force as long as the fear of loss or hope of gain remains among the beneficiaries. Each state as a party to the alliance has the right to breach the treaty
whenever it wishes. It can not be accused of violation of any covenant. Thus in a state of nature, each state may give a promise which is meant for breaking. Each one as an equal is subject to the universal urge to self-preservation.

According to Hobbes, by nature man is not rational, but selfish. He is subject to passions. His actions are determined by desires and passions. They are not constrained by inward moral sense. His supreme goal is to fulfill his desire irrespective of moral choice. On the international level, the 'states' behave like "individuals" with a psychology of the state of nature. Individual states having no common political superior exist in the same relation to each other as men that of in the state of nature.

Spinoza assumes that the state of mutual conflict between individuals in the state of nature, which is resolved by the establishment of sovereign states, is then transferred to the relations between sovereign states. Pufendorf, another thinker in the line of Hobbes, is aware of bad conduct of the state, but for it he blames not the state but to an unorganized international society. He believes that greed and lust for power motivate the behaviour of the state. In an international state of nature, there is "war," "preparation of war" or "unsettled peace." Pufendorf maintains that 'peace' without precautions does not guarantee security of the state. If peace is desired, Pufendorf counsels, the best may is to be prepared for war. The evil oppression and treachery can shatter the fabric of human order.
The Hobbesian school upholds the doctrine of deterrence, and considers it just, legal and moral. The absence of a common superior enhances the dignity of each sovereign. If peace is broken the affected state can use force against the aggressor to any degree, it thinks, desirable. It is a natural right of the state to defend itself. If the injury is slight, the sovereign may use whatever degree of violence necessary to ensure security against future aggression.

Spinoza sees natural condition of man as that of endless conflict. He also agrees that "to avoid war of all against all" it is necessary for an individual (in a state of nature) to vest sole power coercion in one or a group superior to him. Thus, the sovereign becomes powerful. Spinoza, thus, sees power, rather than some moral ideal, as the fundamental concept in the nation-state system. Hence it is natural and essential for the state to acquire more and more power.

The nation-state system of today is, in fact, born out of religious wars went on for thirty years in Europe. The emerging society of independent sovereign states, sanctified by the treaty of Westphalia, was to be governed by power relations. The constant tensions and conflicts were a part of the system. Thus, states which were born out of religious conflict, survive by conflict. In this way the war is in built into the system. The institution of war is an inevitable part of the international life. Likewise, the phenomena of wars form an inevitable aspect of international relations.
Each state in the sovereign-state system believes that other states always try to destroy them and, therefore, they must also be always ready to destroy others, whenever the need be, in order to protect themselves. Even the modern realists such as George Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger etc. believe that international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Thus, the basic assumption of the existence of conflict among nations remains the same among the classical and the neo-classical thinkers. Each nation seeks national interest which can be viewed only in terms of power.

The neo-realists maintain that the struggle for power is the hallmark of today's politics and the game of power-politics is neither controlled, nor regulated by the international law or by the world government. In the absence of overarching global authority, the international anarchy is (mis)managed by the devices and doctrines of balance of power; balance of terror; the collective security system; the alliance system; and by the (mis)use of international institutions by regime formations, nuclear deterrence, crisis management, detente, arms control and transfer of arms and technology etc. Thus, the threat system preserves order in international society.

The realist or Machiavellian conception denies the existence of an effective international society, as they maintain that society can only be established by contract. Hence for the realists the current international relations is in a precontractual state of nature. The sovereign state
system is just a provisional/tentative arrangement and no meaningful society can be contemplated out of it.

According to Hobbes, the 'domestic society' came into being by social contract, hence the domestic system connotes to the 'civil society.' The international system, being pre-contractual, refers to 'the state of nature.' The basic pursuance of the domestic society is to achieve good life. In international system, the basic problem is the survival of a state. The government is the principal source of domestic order, but as the (world) government is absent in international society hence it is an anarchical society. The sovereign state system is vulnerable, defective and fragile. Then how can international order be maintained in the absence of world government? For Hobbes, there is no order, there is chaos.

To sum up, for the Realists, the sovereign states do not compose international society as they operate on the principle of self-help. The war is therefore natural in that society. The idea of justice as well as of morality does not have any place in that society. It does not have any agency to create or maintain order, hence the reality of naked power politics becomes the operational principle of international chaos.
Kant, like Hobbes, in his famous pamphlet, 'Perpetual Peace' conceives the world as a system of sovereign states, characterized by international anarchy or having absence of centralized authority. Kant conceives that at the present stage of history international society is composed of independent states. They have their sovereignty. They are autonomous in relations to each other. However, they feel insecure against each other, as they are not bound by either a common authority or a common law. Hence they live in anarchy and are all the time in search of perpetual peace. Perpetual peace can't be established until the real society composed of human beings is organized. For Kant, the existing community of states is 'unreal' - a complex of legal fictions and obsolescent diplomatic form which conceals, obstructs and oppresses the real society of individual men and women, the civitas maxima. According to Kant, the community of mankind exists potentially even if it does not exist actually. Kant believes that the dominant theme of international politics seems to be the relationship among states, but it should be the relationship among all men in the community of mankind. He further maintains that when the community of mankind comes into being, it puts the system of states in limbo. Thus Kant identifies an individual, and not state, as the true members of the international society. However, Kant does not want to reject the present
Kant agrees with Hobbes regarding the anarchical nature of international society. But he believes that the individual (decision-makers) within the state operate in international society on behalf of the state. Thus, the individuals manage the affairs of the state. The individuals are more important than the sovereign state per se. Hence Kant presumes that behind the legal facade of the fictitious Society of Nations rests the true international society composed of men.

The problem is how to create a 'society of men' out of the 'society of states?' For this, we need to escape international anarchy. But before we enter into the discussion of how to escape international anarchy, let us discuss the other features of Kantian conception of anarchy.

**Insecurity**

Like Hobbes, Kant depicts the bleak picture of the state of nature. It is full of chronic and unmitigated insecurity. Kant compares international insecurity with that of individual men living in a state of nature before the 'state' came into existence by social contract.

Peoples who have grouped themselves into states may be judged in the same way as individual men living in the state of nature, independent of
Kant, however, does not relate insecurity to actual fighting between the states, or even to the frequency of war. He presumes that insecurity is a fundamental characteristic of the state of nature. Kant writes, "But man (or an individual people) in a mere state of nature robs me of any security and injures me by virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me." He further writes, that there is a "lawlessness" in international society and it is a 'permanent threat to peace.'

Kant in his book, 'Metaphysics of Morals' describes international anarchy: "In their external relationship with one another, states, like lawless savages, exist in a condition devoid of right... this condition is one of war (the right of the stronger), even if there is no actual war or continuous active fighting."

Like Hobbes, Kant also believes that international society is composed of sovereign states and the dominant theme of international society is anarchy. But Kant's perception of international anarchy is somewhat different from Hobbes. For him, international anarchy is managed by the existing international law and by the system of the balance of power. These are inadequate devices to create a perpetual peace on the globe. Now let us examine Kant's views on international law and, balance of power.
The sovereign-state system, Kant believes, creates fractions in the mankind and also helps in keeping the fractions intact. The present form of state-system does not have capacity to achieve a permanent peace because the institution of war is inbuilt into the system. War itself is corruptible in nature. It is a source of evil and moral corruption. The institution of 'war' is built into the society of states does not allow to establish "rule of law" between the states. As a result, men cannot enjoy freedom. The global society is organized by mankind which is regulated by a genuine international law.

Kant, like Hobbes, believes that international law can be conditionally valid only until the state of nature is abandoned. He further believes that the existing international law is inadequate and on that grounds no progress towards peace can be achieved. The existing international law does not have slightest legal force, since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint.

In the final phase, Kant believes that the achievement of a more satisfactory 'law governed external relationship' is a long term goal that can only be reached gradually and with much difficulty. He maintain, that in the meantime the existing international law draws its force from common interest and reciprocity. He advocates to abide by them untill a true international law emerges out of the agreements between all sovereign states.
For Kant, war is a complicated phenomenon. It can't be prevented at one stroke. In order to prevent war, we have to understand its complexity.

According to Kant, war breaks out between nations as a result of three factors operating at the three levels. At one level, it is the product of human nature. Kant shares with Hobbes a pessimistic view of human nature. He speaks of depravity of human nature and 'man's selfish and criminal instinct. Kant interprets that war does not seem to require any kind of motivation for it is very much ingrained in human nature. At the second level, frequency of war is clearly influenced by the character of domestic governments. He blames despots who have war like inclination. The ruler has a glory to maintain. In order to be more and more glorified, he wills to 'order thousands of people to immolate themselves for a cause which does not truly concern them.' At the third level, he argues, war is a fundamental and intrinsic characteristic of international anarchy that exists between states. He refers to here the security dilemma a nation-state faces while dealing with each other.

Kant is convinced that in order to solve the problem of war, we must come to terms with each of these three sets of problems. Indeed, the real significance of a republican government is that it provides a link to relate these three levels. According to Kant, the republican form of government restrains human nature and helps in reforming the domestic society. He further assumes that the reformed domestic society will
ultimately bring improvement to the international anarchy. By the term 'republic,' Kant means a constitutional state with a separation of powers.

Like Hobbes, Kant believes that the social contract creates a domestic society (civil society), but simultaneously the same contract also creates international anarchy. The international "state of war" comes into existence with the disappearance of "internal state of war." He, however, disagrees that social life is possible without first tackling international state of war (international anarchy). This anarchy seems to be managed: (i) by the existing international law, and (ii) by the device of the balance of power. If they are inadequate principles they need to be perfected. Nevertheless they help in surviving the nation-state system and helps men to survive even after being totally slaughtered in case of sweeping war. Kant relates the existing international law and the device of balance of power to the condition of war.

Kant maintains that the state of nature permits states to wage war. He states, "In the state of nature, the right to make war (i.e., to enter into hostilities) is the permitted means by which one state prosecutes its rights against another. Thus if a state believes that it has been injured by another state, it is entitled to use violence, for it cannot in the state of nature gain satisfaction through legal proceedings."

In absence of 'legal proceedings,' Kant maintains, the existing international law and the balance of power "restrain" the conduct of war.
Thus, the law helps in restraining the states who wage war. The existing international law derives its effect and strength from sovereign states as it is in their mutual interest to obey it. What is it in the 'mutual interest' which forces states to obey the law?

It is in the mutual interest because the existing law will not, "allow"... "the attached state" to use "any means of defense" that would "render its subjects unfit to be citizens." Besides, the existing international law also takes care of that, "No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace."

He further writes in "Perpetual Peace" that it helps in preventing "dishonourable stratagems" during and after the war. He specifies to such acts as "the employment of assassins" or 'poisoners,' breach of 'agreements,' the instigation of treason within "the enemy state, and the like." The existing international law prevents 'war' to turn into a war of extermination.

Balance of Power

According to Kant, so long as a 'civil society' is not established at the international level, it is necessary to 'regulate' hostility prevailing between sovereign states. And this hostility can be regulated by law of equilibrium i.e. balance of power.
Kant justifies even instinct to wage war in the interest of maintaining balance of power. Speaking of "alarming increase in the power of another state." Kant argues, "This is an injury to the less powerful state by the mere fact that the other state, even without offering any active offence, is more powerful... On this is based the right to maintain a balance of power among all states which have active contact with one another."

In his another work, "The idea for a Universal History" Kant seems to accept the necessity for a law of equilibrium while referring the idea of equality of sovereign states within an anarchical society. He writes about "a principle of equality governing the actions and counter actions of these energies, lest they should destroy one another," although he never believes that the principles of international law and balance of power can ever bring perpetual peace. To emphasize his point he explains: For a permanent universal peace by means of a so-called European balance of power is a pure illusion, like Swift's story of the house which the builder has constructed in such perfect harmony with all the laws of equilibrium and yet it collapses as soon as a sparrow alights on it.

Thus, Kant understands the utility of international law and the balance of power as fragile operating principles of the functioning of international anarchy.
Transforming Strategy

For Kant, neither existing international law, nor the balance of power provides an adequate answer to the problem of war. He is very clear in arguing that peace must be formally established: "Peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general agreement between nations." What kind of general agreement does he suggest? The most logical way to end a lawless state of nature, would be to form an international state through a universal union of states (Volkerstaat) (in allgemeiner statenuerein). "There is only one rational way in which states can emerge from a lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like individual men, they must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adopt themselves to public coercive laws and, thus, form an international state (civitas gentium) which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraces all the peoples of the earth."

Thus Kant suggests to establish the universal union of states as a part of his transforming strategy in order to have perpetual peace.

Confederation in Place of Universal Leviathan for Moral Improvement

But before examining transforming strategy of Kant of "world republic" (pacific union) for transforming the nation-state system, it is necessary to understand why he does not suggest creation of an international Leviathan or a single world government or (international state) at one stroke?
In his view a civil society cannot be created overnight by a single contract as a society of states (nation-state system) is too rigid to give a way immediately. Secondly, 'states' are the "units" of the international society, and not the individuals, (as they were in the state of nature). They are different from individuals. They are so much used to their internal liberty, equality, rights and sovereignty, that they will not be ready to "subject" themselves to a "wider constitution" (Leviathan). In the third place, Kant argues that states are totally different in terms of languages used and religion followed by their peoples. These factors separate them and prevent them from intermingling. The fourth and the most powerful argument is against the idea of an international state is that it is both impractical and contrary to the idea of freedom. He writes it in "Perpetual Peace": "For the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range and a soulless despotism, after crushing the last germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy." While emphasizing the same idea in his another work, "Metaphysics of Morals," he writes: "But if such an international state of this kind extends over too wide an area of land, it will eventually become impossible to govern and hence to protect each of its members and the multitude of corporations this would require must again lead to a state of war."

Kant, in his book In "Theory and Practice" (1793) at first rejects the idea of cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single head (in weltbürgerliches gemeinses Wesen unter cinem oborhaupt) because of the danger of such a state leading to "the most fearful despotism." This idea of Kant is graphically highlighted in, "The Philosophy of Kant" edited by Carl Friedrich, "Each
separate state, so long as it has a neighbouring state which it does hope to conquer, strives to aggrandize itself through such a conquest, and thus to attain a world empire, a polity wherein all freedom and, as a consequence, virtue, taste, and learning, would necessarily expire. Yet this monster in which laws gradually lose their force, after it has swallowed all its neighbours, finally dissolves of itself, and through rebellion and disunion breaks into many smaller states. These, instead of striving toward a league of nations, a republic of federated free nations, begin the same game again, each for itself, so that war, the scourge of humanity, may not be allowed to cease."

Thus Kant views war not so incurable an evil as the resulting universal autocracy (out of straight forward international social contract). Kant, in this way, does not see any viability or desirability for an international state (Leviathan). Instead he advocates creation of a federation of separate states. He favours a 'lawful condition of federation, with a commonly agreed international law (in rechtlicher zustand der Foderation nach einem gemeinschöftlich verabredeten Volkerrecht).

As argued above, Kant is against creating a social contract amongst sovereign states at once because he is convinced that this type of social contract can not create a "social life." He firmly believes that social life is not possibly created at international level until the problem of war is tackled.
The problematique of war can not be solved by legal contract between states. The contract creates only union of states, and not a civil union of mankind. The civil union of mankind from within the states gradually leads to a civil society of mankind. Republican states create an awareness of universal civil values among the people which furthers the creation of a civil society.

A Scheme to Abolish War

Kant does not want to abolish the state system at a stroke. But he wants to improve it. He wants to subject international anarchy to law and to find a solution to the problem of war. But he wants it in such a way that the essential autonomy and independence of states may not be sacrificed. Thus, Kant's primary concern is with order at the level of inter-state relations. He does not see the solution to the problem of war in terms of a merger of states: "It was no more logical to hope to solve the international problem by the super session of the states than it would have been to try to end the civil strife by the abolition of individuals." By federation of states, Kant means only a loose league of republican state, that have come together for the sole purpose of abolishing war.

Broadly, Kant suggests three dimensional strategies to create a civil society of mankind out of the society of states. These three dimensions are not separate or hierarchical in character. They must function
simultaneously at the same time. These strategic dimensions are:

1. The creation of a loose-federation out of the existing nation-state system: in another words. The rearrangement of existing units within the existing international anarchical system in such a way to help to create a civil society amongst the peoples of the states;

2. Moral improvement of domestic system; and

3. The moral improvement of individuals.

Kant advocates a federation of free peoples, a kind of league, which might be called a pacific federation. This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of the state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself along with that of all the other confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them as men do in the state of nature.

Thus, Kant advocates law governed external relationship, but never under the tutelage of a single power. Kant, as a gradualist, hopes that his ideal federation will not come into existence overnight, but gradually each nation will realize its necessity and will come forward to form it. One day it will become a truly universal federation. He also knows well that if such a federation is not able to become truly universal, its effect would merely be to rearrange the units within the international anarchy, rather than to overcome that anarchy. Such a federation appears to Kant as the limit of what is possible, given the constraints of state sovereignty.
and the importance of state autonomy on one hand, and the need for a lawful framework for international relations on the other.

This federation creates conditions for the existence of international right to exist and prosper. There can be no public right without this type of federation. And any right which can be conceived outside the federation is considered within the state of nature and these rights are then termed as private rights, and not public rights.

On advocating this type of federation, Kant is aware of its weaknesses and its limitations on playing its role on international scene. He knows that whatever he is advocating is not revolutionary. It is just to make the federating units (states) more effective by rearranging them within international anarchy. Kant thinks that such a limited federation will serve two purposes:

1. that it will shift one's attitude to war by reinforcing normative constraints on the use of force in international relations;
2. that it may not abolish the institution of war, but at least it will regulate and curb underlying causes of war.

Hence, for Kant the civil union of states is a one step ahead in the direction of creation of a civil society. The global civil society can not be created until the loose federation of separate states is created from above and a perfect civil union of mankind from below. Thus, Kant advocates, not legal contract between states outright, but civil union for a creation of global civil society.
The Main Characteristics of Federation

Kant outright rejects a positive idea of a world republic in favour of a negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war. He wants a federation of free peoples, a kind of league, or a 'pacific federation.'

Kant does not want that states should give up their sovereignty altogether. He advocates, in fact, total independence of states and wants to uphold a strict principle of non-intervention. He never wants that any other state or any outside authority should interfere in the internal affairs of the states. He desires only law-governed external relations among states and not the 'amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power.'

Under any circumstances, Kant does not want any type of internal intervention within the federating units. In fact, the principle of non-intervention provides inter-state order. Non-intervention will not only preserve the inter-state order, but also strengthen the tie between states. Kant thus rejects very emphatically both the desirability and the validity of any move towards world government. On the contrary, Kant wants states to be economically, politically and military powerful and self-reliant. According to him self-sufficiency only will provide for genuine cooperation among states. Kant, while referring to a loose federation, writes, "the benefit of federation could be enjoyed without the costs of
continuous struggle and instability' and where stability rests both on the internal strength and cohesiveness of states and on the universal acceptance of each other's independence and legitimacy."

Kant further sees that this type of federation will strengthen international legal order, as it consolidates the existing mutual rights and duties among states.

Kant is not only against external intervention within the state, but also against giving the right to rebellion to the citizens of the state. He fears that right to rebellion will kill the spirit of republican form of government and, ultimately, will affect the structure of the pacific federation. As such international federation has to be a great bulwark against the danger of international anarchy.

Finally, Kant is strongly against abolishing the state as an entity. According to him, it gives its citizens linguistic, historical and cultural identity. Moreover, it organizes people socially and thus provides a social framework for individual freedom.

**Moral Improvement of Domestic System**

In order to establish perpetual peace, Kant emphasizes the process of domestic reform. Some aspects of this reform is related to a domestic form of government. Kant advocates a civil constitution and a republican form of
government for internal functioning of the state. By the term 'republic,' he means a constitutional state with a separation of executive and legislative organs of the government. Thus, eventually he advocates a democratic form of government for establishing perpetual peace. He is convinced that a republican form of government preferably stands for peace. He also presumes that the 'people' are more naturally inclined to peace more than their bellicose rulers. Peace is more likely in a republic because the power to restrain the aggressive tendencies of rulers lies in the hands of the people. He says: "...each state must be organized internally in such a way that the head of the state... must no longer have the deciding vote on whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it must decide..." He, presumes that people know that war causes misery, injury and risk of death to them. This further deters people to declare war against adversary. Kant does not believe that people are always peaceful or virtuous. He does believe that progress towards perpetual peace ultimately depends upon moral upliftment of individuals. Yet such progress in turn, can only come about within a good political constitution as it renders positive climate to such efforts. Kant advocates a republican form of government as it provides a framework within which moral progress is possible.

The second aspect of domestic reform is related to the military of the state. Kant favours militia against than professional armies. He pleads to disband the existing armies as they are expensive, and politically oppressive and encourage arms race. In a republican form of government, people experience consequences of war directly. Moreover, he thinks that
the state will have to keep armies so long as international anarchy remains, and so long army remains, anarchy continues. But Kant gives a solution to this dilemma. He is convinced that abolition or, at least, reduction of domestic army will lead to minimization of international anarchy and, thus, will ultimately be a step ahead in the direction of achieving perpetual peace.

Moral Improvement of Individual

In social science, there is a tension between two paradigms: 'Individual' and 'society.' The dilemma is: which of the two should be privileged for human progress and social justice? Kant does not suffer from this dilemma. He suggests improvement in both simultaneously. Kant's scheme of domestic reform has been discussed. Now it is equally essential to discuss his (moral) philosophy as regards improvement in an individual. His philosophy is solely based on the assumption that human beings are capable of discovering and acting upon moral imperatives which are universally valid/acceptable.

At present, the most powerful of these moral imperative is to find a means to abolish war. While exemplifying, Kant writes, "Now, moral-practical reason within us pronounces the following irresistible veto: There shall be no war... Thus it is no longer a question of whether perpetual peace is really possible or not... we must simply act as if it could come about, and turn our efforts towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose."
Kant firmly believes that forceful and repeated statements on immorality of war serves an essential purpose in helping to shape the normative climate in international relations. Kant argues that what is necessary is to change the attitude of people towards the use of force in settling differences between two states. The changed attitude of the people will affect the behaviour of a state. Thus, Kant insist on evolving a value system for a possible global society.

Secondly, Kant believes that the individual has a moral capacity to learn from experience and to act on that acquired experience. One's ability to learn from experience is a central feature of Kant's moral view. Out of experience the mankind has realized that unless international anarchy is reformed, increasingly destructive conflict will be inevitable. According to Kant, man possesses a great moral capacity and is 'animated by respect for right and duty.'

The third kind of moral improvement concerns gradual process by which an individual becomes increasingly capable to see himself a part of a global community. Man, in future, may not have such realization from the political point of view. He will sure to see himself as a part of interdependent economic spheres, i.e., the phenomenal growth of global trade and commerce. This development will not result into a man denouncing his obligation to the state. But the range of moral obligations he needs to announce will expand beyond his nation. He will feel morally interdependent, such cultures will be enhanced by the need of the time and,
as a result, all men will come closer. This will further lead towards a general agreement on the principle for peace and understanding.'

Yet, Kant can never be satisfied simply with moral improvement of individuals and of domestic society. It is only when international anarchy is reformed through a formal agreement between states that progress towards perpetual peace is possible. Therefore, progress towards perpetual peace is based on moral improvement and self-interest, and on a combination of factors working at levels of individual, domestic society and the international system.

Kant and Perpetual Peace

According to Kant, perpetual peace can't be established immediately by establishing a world government by any form of contract or agreement. The world government can be created only by abolishing a present state system. He is not interested in abolishing the society of states, but he constantly wants improvement and perfection in it. In the beginning, Kant's aim is to achieve, in the words of Barry Buzan, 'mature anarchy.'

In mature anarchy, the benefits of fragmentation can be enjoyed by the state without the costs of continuous struggle and instability. Stability rests on the internal strength and cohesiveness of states and also on the universal acceptance of each others' independence and legitimacy.
Kant is in favour of strengthening the international legal order by his scheme of limited pacific federation in such a way that it can protect the autonomy and independence of states. He wants to treat the existing international law, however inadequate it may be, as a building bloc for his great edifice of perpetual peace.

The components of internal order of the state -- constitutional state with a republican form of government; moral and political rights of citizens; and the principle of intervention -- are not subversive to interstate order, but complementary to means of perfecting its functioning.

Kant suggests some structural reforms to the existing system. But ultimately it is still a 'state system.' Kant does not mind if his limited pacific federation ultimately becomes a working system of peace in which there will be a central government to enforce law and to limit or curb the sovereignty of the states. He does not mind this type of structural reform if it leads to perpetual peace. But cosmopolitanism need not mean that he wants to abolish nations or national frontiers. He wants that "nations" must embody man's (not only states') moral, and to a certain degree, his political rights and duties.

Thus, Kant is primarily concerned with individuals and does view the inter-state system as having derivative significance on them. The impulse for progress towards perpetual peace comes largely from the individual; from the outrage at the destructiveness of war, from the ability to learn from experience, and from the gradual moral improvement of mankind. The
starting point of Kant's moral and political philosophy is individual, his moral freedom. From that base, he is then led to consider the kind of domestic society and international society.

Like any other serious thinker, Kant experiences a great tension while facing a choice between "statism" and 'cosmopolitanism.' On one hand, the existing state system has not outgrown its utility and it is deep rooted. On the other, there is a considerable amount of moral pressure and practical demand for the creation of cosmopolitan authority. But his way of facing the tension is novel and unique. His compromising formula is equally unique. He maintains that 'what is moral within a domestic society, can also be moral between the states as states are composed of men and as states further compose after all, a civil society.

Moreover, Kant believes that the choice is not between 'total anarchy; and total (legal system) civil society. The change and progress should not be viewed as a choice between the continuation of the state of war (Hobbes) and the complete transcendence of the state system and its replacement by some form of universal political organization. The change and progress lies in reforming the existing sovereign state system.

Kant, however, does not provide a single solution to the problem of war. Although he accepts the reality of international anarchy but it is unacceptable to him. It becomes unbearable as the destructiveness of war increases. But he does not want to put an end to anarchy by creating an international leviathan and by abolishing a state system, because it may
degenerate into a condition of universal oppression. Theoretically, optimal solution of creating an 'international super state' would involve a loss of the state's positive functions as a provider of localized order and protector of linguistic and patriotic loyalties. Any ideal solution need be based on a rationale of balance between the reality of state sovereignty and the need to provide a firmer basis for those institutions and obligations that work to curb excesses of that sovereignty.

His moderate scheme of a limited pacific federation is a short term device to improve upon the functioning of a nation-state system, which hopefully, ultimately might lead to a long term solution. His scheme of pacific federation is a half way compromise between the positive functions of state system and the practical difficulties of trying to reform it.

Kant is convinced that the pacific federation, which will create a transnational ties of many type will generate powerful ties of mutual interest, that would provide an important impulse towards perpetual peace.

To conclude, Kant, like Hobbes, views the present international society of states as anarchical but he differs regarding the nature of anarchy with Hobbes. For Kant, the phenomena of war is the main cause of anarchy as it breeds insecurity and prevents the rule of law to prevail. Moreover, war breakout now and then between the states, as there is no civil union of mankind. In order to create a civil union of mankind, Kant suggests three prong strategy: (a) moral improvement of men; (b) moral improvement of domestic society; and (c) a creation of a confederation of
sovereign states. Kant was convinced that if these type of sovereign states. Kant was convinced that if these type of measures are taken, the real society of mankind can be created out of the fictitious society of sovereign states. If it happens, the perpetual peace can be established. The international law and the device of the balance of power try to create order but they are inadequate hence war breaks out in a society of states.
GROTIAN CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY:
THE RATIONALIST TRADITION

Nature and Functioning of Society: Organizing and Operational Principles

Grotius views the international society as composed of sovereign states. The states and their rulers in their dealings with others are bound by rules and together formed a society. On one hand, princes and peoples have indeed become independent of each another and, as a result, people are relieved from the central authorities (according to Westphalia treaty, all the states and people became free from the Roman Empire). They are the sovereigns in the state. However, on the other hand, Grotius maintains that they are not in a state of nature, but a part of a wider society of all mankind (magna communitas humani generis). Even without central institutions, rulers and peoples may constitute a society among themselves, an anarchical society or a society without government.

Grotius, thus, rejects the formulations of Machiavelli, Hobbes or Bacon that sovereign states and princes in their dealings with each are in a state of nature, unrestrained by bonds of law or society. In absence of societal or lawful restraints, the states are free to conduct policies towards one another according to the dictates of the new idea of reason of state. Grotius also differs from the conception evolved by Kant that the present form of international society characterized by sovereign state is fictitious and transitory in nature. The states and princes can be made subject to a central authority. By this, they can escape from the state of
nature into which they appeared to be drifting. Grotius views that international politics is taking place within an international society in which states are bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency, but also by imperatives of morality and law. Grotius further explains that the threat that holds the international society together is a 'core of common standards and common customs which is embodied in international law. The society of states can be called international society because all the sovereign states are bound by international law. The states, and through them, individuals living in them are bound by international law. Thus, states and individuals are operating themselves within the boundaries of international law.

Grotius identifies 'states' as well as 'individuals' as true members of the international society. In absence of the common global authority, sovereign states will exercise its authority over individuals. Grotius accepts that a sovereign state is a primary actor in the international society, but he also accords a particular status to individual under international law. This is attributable to his theory of essential identity of an individual and the state which in turn reflects a 'patrimonial conception of the state and the influence of natural law theory. Grotius maintains that along with states individuals also hold rights and owe duties under international law. Further, as states are composed of individual human beings they as well as the state are subject to rights and duties under 'international law.' The recognition of the rights of individuals under the law of nations is made possible by the
assumption that natural law, and not positive law, or voluntary law provides the ultimate source of moral and legal obligations.

Thus, according to Grotius, states are composed of individual human beings and, by that credit, an individual becomes the basic unit of law. Grotius rejects the doctrine of the 'reason of state' and denies that individuals and states are subject to different standards of morality. On the basis of the identity of an individual and the state, he posits that both are subject to the same moral and ethical standards and restraints.

**Grotius on Reason of States**

Grotius considers man as moral, social and rational. Therefore, he gives 'man' the centrality of law and rejects any dominant place for 'reason of state' in inter-state relations. He presumes that states wielding great power can afford to pursue their policies without any regards to law and solely in the light of their own advantage. Secondly, no state is so powerful that it can afford to dispense with the help of others. Such is the impact of economic inter-dependence and of military security.

The Grotian tradition takes into account existence of states which exercise valid political authority. Thus, it recognizes the moral claim of the state to be there and to be counted. The claim of the state as a political authority may be accepted relatively, and not absolutely.
Secondly, they do not consider society of states as a sole arbiter of human destiny, but as a part of the greater whole. This school of thought does not see international society as ready or keen to supersede domestic society. It notes that international society actually exercises restraints upon its members.

Grotius on War

Grotius begins his contemplation with the assumption that war is inevitable and, indeed, 'is in perfect accord with first principles of nature, for the aim of war is the preservation of life and limb.' He, however, denies the Hobbesian conception of world in terms of a system of sovereign states, characterized by international anarchy, or the absence of centralized authority. He also rejects the conception of international politics as a 'state of war' in which the absence of effective centralized restraints results in a "war of all against all." By evolving a doctrine of natural law, Grotius provides the normative framework for the newly emerging states system.

The corner stone of the Grotian conception of international society, is 'natural law' which provides a normative framework for the state system. The natural law forms the basis of international society. The 'states' and 'individual' are subject to international law. The same international law permits war for "life and limb." The Grotius theory permits war for the preservation of life and limb and he calls it a 'just war.' He
distinguishes between just and unjust wars and permits just wars within international society. But the theoretical basis of the just war, for Grotius, is the law of nature. Grotius defines the law of nature: "a dictate of right reason.

Grotius asserts that the law of nature is the law that is most in conformity with the social nature of man and the preservation of human society. The law of nature in its primary sense prohibits the taking of what belongs to others, demands restoration to others of what is their property, imposes the duty to fulfil promises and to make reparation for injury, and confers the right to inflict punishment. In other words it fulfills the requirements for 'just war.'

Grotius is convinced of the reality of a society of states just as there is a society of men comprising a state. In default of judicial proceedings, war is the method adopted by states to settle their claims.

From these premises, Grotius advances his key proposition that a war initiated without a basis in strict justice is an 'unjust war.' The just causes of war are based on natural law and the law of nations. They extend to:

1. defence against an injury, actual or threatening, but not anticipatory;
2. a recovery of what is legally due to the aggrieved state; and
3. the infliction of punishment upon the wrong doing of state.
By this scheme of thought, Grotius accepts the reality of war as a phenomenon recognized by the law, but at the same time seeks to eliminate unlicensed and unrestrained resort to war by demanding 'just' and legal grounds for wars.

Grotius is clear about the just cause. He does not allow war to be waged on the grounds of potential threat to the security of a state. As he believes that human life exists under such conditions that complete security is never guaranteed to us. Thus, wars waged without any 'cause' are 'unjust.' A treaty of alliance is not binding in relation to a state waging an unjust war. Moreover, he is very clear about duty of a citizen during the war. Grotius is firm that a subject ordered to take up arms in an 'unjust war' has the duty to refuse. On the question of 'neutrality' during the time of war, Grotius propounds a novel doctrine of 'qualified neutrality.' In fact, international law can, in theory, establish that some wars 'unjust' and criminal and yet demand that neutral states act with absolute impartiality as between the aggressor and the victim state. Such a posture would be, in legal terms be open to doubts and, in moral terms, manifestly wrong. In order to solve this dilemma, Grotius writes: It is the duty of those who keep out of war to do nothing whereby he who supports a wicked cause may be rendered more powerful, or whereby the movements of him who wages a just war may be hampered... This does not imply a duty to assist actively those waging the just war, nor does it debar the right to do so. Grotius asserts that the right of passage ought to be denied to a state waging an unjust war, while it ought to be granted to a state waging a just war.
Reason of state is contrary to Grotius' main theory concerning the 'just war,' namely that there can be no right to resort to war unless there is a just and legal cause for it.

Grotius thinks that the Law of Nations has as its purpose the advantage of all the members of the great society of states and not that of one particular state.

Throughout his writings, Grotius makes his reader aware of his dislike of war although he does accept war as a legal institution. He believes that it is not possible to achieve some legal regulation of the conduct of warfare if war itself is not recognized by law.

Grotius' conception of 'just war' is derived from his primary contention that the totality of international relations are subject to the rule of law, including the resort to war and the conduct of warfare.

In his formulation of the distinction between 'just' and 'unjust' war Grotius rejects the doctrine of 'reason of state.' His idea of qualified neutrality of states flows from his doctrine of 'just war.'

Grotius' great moral principles are: (i) resort to war and the conduct of warfare should be subjected to law; and (ii) recourse to war should be based on justice and not 'reason:

1. Grotius defines the problematique in terms of the phenomena of war and conditions of peace and order. He is less concerned with the causes of
war than with the conditions of peace and order, reflecting the belief that war is inevitable.

2. Grotius, thus, does not believe that international society is fiction or illegitimate. He rejects the idea that states will wither away or the society of states is transitory in nature.

Grotius is essentially conservative as he does not advocate the replacement of the existing order with a new order. He is basically concerned with creating a normative and legal framework for the emerging states system by which the relations of sovereign states may be subjected to the rule of law. Hence, he does not suggest any transforming strategy.

Neo-Grotian School of Thought

Martin White and Hedley Bull are chief among neo-Grotians. They have essentially reinterpreted the Grotian doctrine on international relations. The Regime theorists, viz. Krasner, Oran Young, Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins are also called neo-Grotians. Although they define the problematique in terms of the phenomena of war, peace and order. The gist of their arguments is incorporated in this section in order to understand the modern interpretation of Hugo Grotius.
Martin Wight frames the problematic in terms of war and identifies states as the chief participators in international politics. The image of the world advanced is that of anarchy. He maintains that "mutual mistrust is fundamental" in international relations.

- Wight is less concerned with the causes of war. He is interested more in conditions of peace and order. War for him is inevitable.
- Wight rejects the view that the only subjects of international law are states. He wants to encompass the role of individual and non-state actors.
- Wight believes that a 'core of common standards and common customs' which is embodied in international law does not bind the "states" alone, but also "institutions of international society" (and non-state actors).
- Wight, like Grotius, reflects the image of a world as a society of sovereign states as anarchical in a sense that it lacks a central authority. But it is orderly due to the regulating influence of the rules, institutions and practices of international society.
- Wight however agrees that international law is rooted in common standards and practices of international society. But it lasts for such a long time, and survives mainly because of the positive
Institutions and practices of international society - diplomacy, balance of power, and other functional international institutions.

Both believe in the legitimacy of present order and thus, give "states" a primary importance. But both of them, unlike Hobbes, make states subject to the moral and legal restraints embodied in international society. Thus Grotius and neo-Grotius differ from the classical formulation of Hobbes of international society as an anarchical society.

Wight accords membership in international society to both states and individual. Thus he is very near to the natural law tradition. The ultimate source of obligation to Wight comprise consent and custom emerged out of constitutionalism and rationalism. Thus, Wight's international society is constrained by the constitution of a state constitutionalism which limits the exercise of power by the states.

Hedley Bull as Neo-Grotian

- Bull, like Grotius and Wight defines the problematique in terms of the phenomenon of war and the conditions of peace and order. But he is more concerned with the problem of 'order.' He does not offer sustained analysis of the causes of war but prefers to explain the existence of 'order' in anarchy.

- Bull is a classical thinker and firmly believes, unlike Grotius, that the states are the essential actors in international relations and hence primary units of analysis.
Bull is against granting legal personality to individuals. However, he advocates that mankind should be organized as a society of sovereign states. He also grants that the other non-state actors (transnational actors) have not so successfully challenged the primacy of states. Why should he grant their claim to be equal with state and thus legitimatize them to carry 'the seeds of subversion of the society of sovereign states.'

Bull rejects the Grotian notion that natural law forms the basis of international society and foundation for individual rights and responsibilities. He like positivists, claims that the common norms, values and customs are created by states and not by abstract theories about what states should do. The right and duties are created by states and not by international law.

Bull accepts the society of states as a primary thing, but rejects the claim that international relations is a precontractual state of nature devoid of any social elements. He also does not agree that a 'universal empire' or 'world state' is going to replace states system in near future.

Bull maintains that there is no agreement or consensus regarding criteria which should govern state action. The states are capable of agreeing only for some minimum purpose and not for enforcement of law. He further argues that there is no universal consensus as to right and wrong conduct in international relations. Bull rejects the Grotian distinction
between just and unjust wars on the grounds that international society is often divided as to which side embodies the just cause.

Bull recognizes the existence of international society like Grotius (unlike Hobbes) but it is not based upon universal natural principles of right and wrong conduct. Bull's international society consists of the positive rules, practices, and institutions of international society which embody common interests and values of states.

There are international laws, but there are "areas of actual (mutual) agreement between states." For Bull, there are no rules that are valid independently of human will, that are part of "nature."

Bull identifies international law, the balance of power, great power management and war as common institutions of international society. The mutual respect for the territorial integrity and independence of states, belief in the sanctity of promises, and in certain limitations, on the use of force constitute common interests of its members. These common interests in turn reflect the value that state attaches to the goals of preserving the society of independent and sovereign states. For Bull, the society of states is the fundamental reality of world politics today.

Regime Theorists as Neo-Grotian

Krasner identifies Oran Young, Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins as neo-Grotian. They are known as Regime theorists. It is because they
interpret the problematique in much the same terms as does the Grotian tradition. At the most fundamental level, they define the problematique in terms of the conditions of order in international relations. They discuss and study the phenomena of regime creation and transformation. But they are ultimately concerned with accounting for cooperative and rule governed behaviour in an anarchical system.

The idea that a less than a universal a more limited society may exist in pockets or in areas of actual agreement amongst states is reflected in the works of international regimes analysts. Students of international regimes are generally concerned with the issue of governance and, hence, focus upon the formal and informal rules, institutions and practices that regulate international relations. Regimes have been broadly defined as governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organizing aspects of international behaviour in various issue-areas.

The important thing to note is that the common norms and values which are said to characterize regime governed activities originate not in natural law principles, but in the positive actions of states. Thus, regime theory is not a natural-law-based-theory of society or community but an interest-based theory which traces the cooperative elements of international relations to more realist concerns of utility, expediency and power.
Finally, the regime theorists are called neo-Grotian mainly because their theory lacks the natural law origins. It seeks affinity with the classical tradition; it emphasis positivism. It gives concession to power politics as it reflects positive regimes and biased regimes. Their notions of society, regimes and areas of cooperative state relations challenge the classical assumption that a system of sovereign states is necessarily disorderly and incapable of producing cooperative patterns of behaviour of any more than a rudimentary character. There are formal and informal, explicit and implicit rules, and institutions and practices regulating the behaviour of states, despite the structure of anarchy. Bull attempts to combine the notion of society with the realist assumptions of the classical tradition. He also augments the classical tradition by showing that anarchy is not synonymous with disorder and by turning attention towards areas of informal, cooperative and norm governed behaviour in international relations.

Grotius and neo-Grotius presume that the sovereign states form an International Society. They, however, differ regarding the nature of order in that society. Grotius believes that international law provides order in society. While the neo-grotian believe that order is maintained by custom, convention and other international institutions, viz. Alliance System, Balance of Power, War, the Collective Security System etc. Thus, for the Grotians the international society is orderly in nature and it should be maintained. They do not see any need to change, improve or transform the existing society composed of nation-states.
The subsequent chapters on Gandhi, Nehru and Lohia will relate their views with those of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant not in a comparative fashion, but categorically. The next chapter tries to ascertain views of Gandhi on the nature and functioning of international society. What type of order that society prescribes and whether Gandhi is satisfied with it. If no, then what strategy does one need in Gandhi's conception?
NOTES AND REFERENCES

Notes on Hobbes: Realism

1. The term "power politics", (The reason of states) has been defined differently by the different scholars. Thomas Hobbes grants right to every state to ensure its own survival and that links him to the tradition of reason of states. He advocates the ultimate freedom of states from moral fetters so far as the objective of self preservation is concerned. He allows any state to take any measure necessary to achieve this objectives (but Hobbes excludes the use of mere brute force on the pursuit of power for its own sake). The word 'power politics' is a translation of the German word Machtpolitik, which means the politics of force - the conduct of international relations by force or the threat of force, without consideration of right or justice. About the time of the First World War, the concept of power politics developed by the Realist superseded an older and more elegant phase, raison d'etat, which implied that statesmen cannot be bound in public affairs by the morality they would respect in private life, that there is a 'reason of state' justifying unscrupulous action in defense of the public interest.

It means that there is a reason of state justifying unscrupulous action in defense of the public interest. The term power politics focus upon a central truth about international relations. According to Martin Wight it suggests the relationship between independent powers
and we take such a state of affairs for granted. It implies two conditions. First, there are independent political units acknowledging no political superior, and claiming to be 'sovereign'; and secondly, there are continuous and organized relations between them. This is the modern system of state. We must note in the conclusion that common usage, power politics means, not only the relations between independent powers, but something more sinister. Schwarzenberger believes that power politics signifies a type of relation between states in which certain pattern of behaviour are preponderant: armaments, isolationism, power diplomacy, hegemony, imperialism, alliances, balance of power, balance of terror and war. He emphasizes these characteristic of international politics. He maintains that under the system of power politics, "each group considers itself not as a means of a common end, but as an end in itself".

Thomas Hobbes lived from 1588 to 1679. Elemental Philosophical Decieve was published in 1642 and republished in 1647. Leviathan was published in 1651. For a summary of Hobbes' influence upon international theory see, E. Dickinson, "The Equality of States in International Law", Chapter III, (1920).


6. H.Bull, Ibid., p.82.


8. Ibid., p.82.

9. Ibid., p.81,82.


11. Ibid., p.82.


15. Cited in Ibid., p.490.

16. Ibid., p.490.

17. Ibid., p.485.

18. The treaty of Westphalia was concluded among the European states in 1648 after the thirty years religious war among them. By this treaty the thirty years war was concluded and the sovereignty of all the princes (both Catholic and Protestant) was recognized within their respective domains. All the states were declared free from all jurisdiction of the Pope or any Catholic authority. Along with this, the Holy Roman emperor's was bound not to interfere with the administration of the independent states. In fact the emperor was stripped of all important public and transnational authority. The text of the Westphalia recently published in F.L.Israel, (edt.), "Major Peace Treaties of Modern History", 1967. As the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor rapidly declined, a 'system of states' emerged in world politics.


Notes on Immanuel Kant (Revolutionism)


25. Ibid.


27. Perpetual Peace, Reiss, p.103.


29. Perpetual Peace, Reiss, p.103.

30. Reiss, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, p.42.

31. Perpetual Peace, Reiss, PP.95 & 103.

32. Ibid., p.104.


36. Ibid., p.92.
38. Ibid., p.107.
39. Ibid., p.113.
41. Kant on the common saying: 'This may be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice, in Reiss, p.90.
43. Reiss, p.47.
45. Perpetual Peace, Reiss, pp.102 & 104.
46. Ibid., p.104. Kant's 'Perpetual peace' has been interpreted differently by the different thinkers. But the main schools of thoughts are prominent: One is called 'Statist' paradigm of Kant's writings and the other is called 'Cosmopolitan' or Universalist school of thought. The Statists argue that Kant is primarily concerned with order at the level of interstate relations. He did not want to transcend the state system but to improve it. He wanted to subject the international anarchy to law and to find a solution to the problem of war but in a way which would not sacrifice the essential autonomy and independence of the states. This view makes a case of Kant's rejection of world government. Kant was not against the idea of the world government but he was the great advocate of the autonomy of states and his insistence on the importance of non-intervention. Kant believed that the progress depend not on any plan for the reform of the state
system but on the internal improvement of states and in particular, the achievement of republican government. This tradition underlines the limited nature of Kant's view of cosmopolitan law and in Kant's view, federation of states means only a "loose league of republican states that have come together for the sole purpose of abolishing war. This view is strongly advocated by F.H. Hinsley, in "Power and the Pursuit of Peace", first published in 1961. Hinsley stresses that Kant did not see the solution to the problem of war in terms of a merger of states.

The other school of thought was originated with the idea of Martin Wight and this idea was subsequently developed by Hedley Bull. According to Bull Kant does hold out a universal republic as an ideal in which the international anarchy would be resolved by the creation of a Civitas Gentium. Bull reluctantly comes to accept the negative substitute of a pacific federation. The advocates of cosmopolitan aspects of Kant put forward these arguments in justification: 1) For Kant, the interstate system is only passing phase and international life should be viewed in terms of a global society of mankind; 2) the conflicts results either out of enlightenment or by the prompting of a vested interest; 3) Kant's advocate international morality and imperatives to move towards a more peaceful world. This work agrees with the views of Bull on plea that Kant never wanted merely to rearrange unit (states) within the Anarchy. He was in search of a solution of Anarchy.
47. Andrew Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations", in Review of International Studies, Great Britain, 1990,16, p.194.


49. Reiss, pp.90-91.  

50. For further reading refer to, Theory and Practice, Reiss, p.90.  


52. Theory and Practice, Reiss, p.92.  

Notes on Hugo Grotius (Rationalist Tradition)


55. Ibid., p.72.

56. Hedley Bull, "The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics", Macmillan, London, 1977, pp.24, 26 & 27. Bull also says: 'The Grotian or solodarist doctrine seeks to achieve a more orderly world by restricting or abolishing resort to war by individual states for political ends, and promoting the idea that force can legitimately be used only to promote the purposes of the international community.


58. Ibid., p.45.

59. Grotius identifies three categories of law: natural, divine and voluntary or positive law comprises both municipal law and the law of nations, both of which derive form the consent of their subjects. However, Grotius roots the obligatory nature of consent in natural law and thus gives positive law a naturalistic base. See Grotius, War and Peace, Prolegomena I, P.16.; Briefly, Basis of Obligation, P.10., and Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, pp.21-22.

60. Grotius perceptions of self-interest are infused with concerns for the common goods. Grotius refuses to concede that every animal is impelled
by nature to seek only its own good and argues that the law of nations has in view the advantage, not of particular states but the great society of states. (For details, see Prolegomena, pp.11-15.) JBW/Prolegomena refers to the Hugo Grotius works translated in English known as Kelsey translation, classics of International Law, edition, 1925.


62. Grotius, War and Peace, Book I, Chp. 2, p. 52. For further reference see Prolegomena 8; Book I, Chp. 2. and Book II and III.

63. By justifying 'War' on the ground of just causes Grotius sought to strike a middle ground between the two contending views on the legitimacy of warfare then prevalent in Europe. On the one extreme, the Pacifists believed that the use of arms could not be reconciled with a Christian conscience. On the other extreme, who maintained that all wars commenced by sovereign will were lawful and the practices of warfare were not subject to moral restraint. Moreover, Grotius was convinced that the justice will not be silenced by the clash of arms. The redress of wrong was a principle of natural law, Grotius being a jurist by professor, he legalized the recourse to arms by the state provided it begins for the just cause. But the war must be fought within the boundaries of a national law. For Grotius if the war undertaken by lawful authority and for proper reasons, warfare constitutes an enforcement of law and right. If conducted according to moral precepts, Grotius' reflected that it will lead to peace as it ultimate goal.
64. According to Grotian tradition, the essential distinction between man and other animals is the faculty of reason. It means power to discern the good rather than the faculty of logical thought. The action of the lower animal are determined by desire and passion. They are not constrained by and inward moral sense. Man's dignity lies in a voluntary conformity to rule.


67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Grotius, War and Peace, Book I & II.

70. Ibid.

71. Draper, p.202. As Grotius denies that individuals and states are subject to different standards of morality.


73. Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations", in Butterfield and Wight, "Diplomatic Investigations", p.93.


75. Ibid., p.152.

76. Ibid., p.153.

77. Ibid., p.35.


80. Ibid., p.67 & 70.


83. Puchala and R. F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: lessons from Inductive Analysis", in Krashner, (edt.), International Regimes, pp.61-90, p.66, and Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes", p.493. criticizes the formulation of Regime theorist for overstating the normative consensus in international politics by assuming that all regularities in behaviour are rule governed, thus 'conflicting' such 'patterns' with 'rules'.