In this chapter an attempt has been made to explain the relation between 'virtue' and other ethical concepts such as vice, duty, law, right, and value. Ethics has been interpreted variously in terms of duty, right, value and so on. The present treatise, however, interprets Ethics as a theory of 'virtue'. 'Virtue' is the fundamental concept in Ethics. Ethics is essentially a theory of virtues. All other matters, though of theoretical and academic interests, are only of subsidiary value from the point of view of the subject-matter of the greatest practical importance, which treats virtues as its central theme.

(i) Virtue and Vice

(a) Just as Logic may be treated as explaining the nature of a valid as well as invalid arguments or argument-forms, or just as it deals with the Laws of Thought as well as with Fallacies, so also it can be maintained that Ethics, as a science, deals with the nature of virtues and the nature of vices. Of course, our primary interest is not in 'vices' but in explaining the nature of virtues in all their details. Positively it has been said in the introductory chapter that it is 'character' that we approve...
when we approve morally. Throughout the history of Ethics it can be inferred without reservation that the whole field of moral science is covered with the idea of cultivation of such qualities as honesty, kindness, conscientiousness and so on. These are the 'qualities' embodied in character, which are acquired through teaching and practice.

"The good traits of character are called the virtues, the bad traits are called vices." Virtues are those qualities of human character which men admire and value. Virtue-words are universally commendable, and vice-words are universally condemnable. The former are the praiseworthy qualities of character, while the latter are the blameworthy qualities of character. Virtues make for the survival and the moral welfare of a group and are, therefore, to be deliberately cultivated. The latter hinder the moral welfare of the individual and of the group, and therefore, are to be deliberately avoided. A vice is some quality of human character that runs counter to the welfare of the individual or the group. Vices, like other habits, may develop unconsciously and so establish themselves that the individual later finds them difficult to control. Hence, Ethics, as a theory of virtues, must give a more explicit formulation of those qualities that go to make up morally well-developed personality.

From the logical point of view, virtue and vice are opposite terms. One implies the privation of the other.
Even in Hindu Ethics it is maintained that virtue and vice evince the innate inclinations of men. Virtues spring up from good inclinations, and vices from evil inclinations. It is said that vice is a moral evil but are all evils to be treated as vices? Certainly not. Evils can be of various types—such as Physical, Natural, Political, etc. Earthquakes, epidemics, diseases and floods, are the evils over which man has no control. These are not moral evils but natural evils. Only those evils which are morally undesirable and which are destructive for moral progress are moral evils. Natural, religious, political evils are non-moral in character. Moral evils are anti-morals in character. These act as a menace in man's moral perfection. Vices are evils in the sense that vices are immoral suggesting bad traits of character, while virtues being moral can necessarily be called good traits of character.

Again, sometimes it is maintained that every particular virtue has a corresponding vice. For instance, kindness and cruelty, charity and stealing, veracity and mendacity are opposites of each other.

Vatsyayana classifies virtues according to the faculties of body, speech and thought. Under each there are virtues and corresponding vices which are as following:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dharma</th>
<th>Adharma</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Relating to the body</td>
<td>1) Paritṛana</td>
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<td>2) Dēna</td>
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<td>3) Paricarana</td>
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b) Relating to the speech

<table>
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<th>Dharma</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Satya</td>
<td>1) Mithyā</td>
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<td>2) Prīyavacana</td>
<td>2) Paruṣa</td>
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<td>3) Hītavacana</td>
<td>3) Sucaṇā</td>
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c) Relating to thought

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<th>Dharma</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Dayā</td>
<td>1) Paradroha</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Asprāhā</td>
<td>2) Paradravyābhisā</td>
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<td>3) Śraddhā</td>
<td>3) Nāstikya</td>
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In this classification, however, it is very difficult to see how 'pratisiddha maithuna' (sexual indulgence) can be the opposite of the virtue of 'paricaranā' (social service). Again, this classification suffers from overlapping, that is to say, one or the other of virtues or vices under one particular head may be easily transferred under another without serious difficulty.

Again, vices, like virtues, may become mechanical, in some cases, involving no deliberation and consent. The vicious men do evil things as if by second nature. Some men are naturally bad and have vested interests in society. These are the men of evil inclinations. They are a menace to the well-being and happiness of society. They have no intentions to be good at all. On the other hand, there are men who do good, and are prepared to return good to evil. These are the persons who have a firm faith in the essential goodness of every person. They respect and value the dignity and worth of human personality unconditionally. It is their firm faith that the continuous and the spontaneous pouring of goodness on the evil will melt the outward
covering and the inner goodness in such men will be made to shine. Mahātma Gāndhi often advised to shake off this demoniac nature. "Even the great sinners if they turn to God, can achieve freedom."

Again, every religion of the world has put an emphasis on moral preparations as a prerequisite for God-realization. And this moral preparation involves the development of the good traits of characters, and abstention from vices. For example, in the Ethics of Buddhism, the common virtues are stressed, especially those which tend to the direction of Nirvāṇa. The inner attitudes, the desires and the motives of the person, are all important. Envy, malice and uncharitableness are condemned; self-control and self-purification are stressed, as these lead to the supreme good in Buddhism, Nirvāṇa. Of course, the nature of the virtues will differ in relation to the ethical ideal implicit in a specific religion.

In the Ethics of Confucius, who was considered to be a great systematizer, an able teacher, an administrator and a transmitter of the ethical heritage of his people, the idea of the 'gentle man' was supreme. Kindness, benevolence, piety, loyalty, renunciation of worldly lusts, integrity of mind, honesty, sincerity in speech and in action, righteousness, finding enjoyments in speaking of the goodness of others, in art, and in worthy friends, constituted in aggregate the salient characteristics of a Gentleman.
Against this, enjoyment in idleness, feasting, extravagant pleasures, avarice, quarrelsomeness, covetousness are the vices, and a 'superior man' must be on his guard against these.

There is a Confucian doctrine of 'moderation' which reminds us of Aristotle's doctrine of the 'golden mean'. Confucius speaks of it as the "just medium". It is expressed in the statements like the following; 'To go beyond is as wrong as to fall short'. Hence, the superior man is upright in his personal conduct and is devoted to the service of humanity. Hence, the Ethics of Confucius emphasizes humanistic Ethics, and hence all the social virtues, as stated above, are primarily emphasized for the cultivation of social solidarity.

Islām is the latest of the great religions and ethical systems to appear. 'Islām', the term, denotes both a creed and an ethical system or a way of life. It is an ethico-religious system. From a modern Western point of view, Moslem Ethics appears to be a mixture of primitive and more modern standards as well. It encourages almsgiving, hospitality, truthfulness, humanity to slaves, justice for orphans, and abstinence from the use of alcoholic beverages; Islām condemns suicide, inhumanity, robbery, gambling, slander, perjury, usury, and the sale and consumption of intoxicating drink.
Coming to Hinduism again, we come across, more often than not, an adequate list of virtues and vices, in Hindu literature. The ideal in Hinduism is self-salvation. According to the Laws of Manu, there are ten great virtues. From the failure to live up to these ten virtues, crop up all the vices in man. The ten virtues are contentment, truthfulness, purity, self-control, suppression of sensual appetite, respect for the property of others (asteya), wisdom, knowledge of the supreme soul, avoidance of anger and forgiveness, or returning good for evil. The moral code of Hinduism contains elements common to human race. For example, it condemns lying, stealing, murder, injury, adultery, slander, gambling and drunkenness.

Above is the sum and the substance of the ethical background of the major religions of the world. All these great religions of the world put forth different virtues for the realization of their specific ethical ideals, but all are unanimous on one point: the importance of 'good character' leading to the highest ideal. How enduring can be the result of a single man's virtue is seen among the founders of religious orders. Even evil and careless men, in general, are desirous of virtues. This is the influence of virtuous men over the vicious men. This is the strength of virtue and the weakness of vice.

Again, the relation between virtue and vice is that of concomitant variation. As a particular virtue increases,
there is an inverse variation in the corresponding vice; e.g., as the person becomes more and more non-violent, he becomes less and less cruel. Hence, man should make more and more ceaseless efforts for the removal of the vices which naturally implies the establishment of the virtues in him. Vice is a departure from virtue; and virtue, a departure from vice. But how to remove the vices? According to Bhagavadgītā, devotion to God is the surest means for making men free from the influence of vices. The devotee at the initial stages has at least to make conscious and deliberate efforts for the eradication of the vices. However, in the course of time, virtues are expressed as spontaneously and naturally as fragrance is spread by the rose. It becomes his svabhāva, says Tukārām.

A virtuous man has not to make deliberate efforts for the expression of inner goodness. He is not conscious of it at all. It becomes his inner law.

We have said that every virtue has a corresponding vice, but I think every virtue has two corresponding vices, "excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue". Virtue is a 'mean' between two vices.

A list of Aristotelian virtues and vices is an outstanding one which justifies the above point of view.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Vice of Deficiency</th>
<th>Virtue of Mean</th>
<th>Vice of Excess</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Cowardice</td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Foolhardiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Insensibility</td>
<td>Temperance</td>
<td>Licentiousness</td>
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</table>
Vice of Deficiency | Vice of Mean | Vice of Excess
---|---|---
3. Illiberality | Liberality | Prodigality
4. Meanness | Magnificence | Vulgarity
5. Humility | Magnanimity | Vanity
6. Lack of ambition | Unnamed | Ambitiousness
7. Unirascibility | Gentleness | Irascibility
8. Self-depreciation | Truthfulness | Boastfulness
9. Mock-modesty, irony or boorishness | Wittiness | Buffoonery
10. Contentiousness | Friendliness | Obsequiousness
11. Shamelessness | Modesty | Bashfulness
12. Maliciousness | Righteous Indignation | Envy

In conclusion, though good character is made of virtues, and bad character by vices, we are primarily interested in understanding the nature of virtue and it is only by negative implication that we come to know of vices. Our interest in vices is only negative, virtues being of the positive interest to us.

(b) Determination of Virtues and Vices (various approaches) :- Herein, I have examined and explained virtues and vices in terms of rightness or wrongness of actions. This is the objective determination of virtues and vices.

(l) Virtue and Happiness :- In the history of Western Philosophy, Kant maintains the view that virtue
and happiness are related. If we find that the person who performs virtuous actions invariably enjoys happiness and the person who commits vicious actions invariably suffers pains, and that the doer of good acts does not suffer pain nor does the doer of bad acts enjoy happiness, then only can we establish the cause-effect relation between virtuous deeds and happiness and that between vice and sorrow. But this we do not always experience. Virtuous persons are often found to suffer and wicked persons are often found to enjoy. Besides, the law of Karma demands also that the result accruing from any action should be enjoyed or suffered by the very same person who performs it. But we do not find it always to be the case. Often we experience that many virtuous persons suffer miseries on account of the wicked deeds of one or a few vicious men or on account of natural calamities for which they are in no way responsible. Similarly vicious men are found to enjoy the benefits of the good actions of good men. Hence, the law of Karma cannot logically establish the necessary relation between virtue and happiness, vice and sorrow. Of course, Kant tries to answer this discrepancy between virtue and happiness by saying that if virtue is not rewarded in this world, then in the next world at least it will be rewarded. But this appears only to be a consolation having no logical grounds.

The advocates of the law of karma may say that the
absence of harmony that we observe between the virtuous and vicious actions performed by the individuals in this life and their present enjoyments and sufferings cannot be put forward as a contradiction to the law of karma, because the life of an individual does not begin with the birth of the present gross body nor does it end with the destruction of this gross body. Many actions of the past states of existence may bear fruits in this life, and many actions performed in the present life may be incapable of producing their respective consequences within the life-time of this gross body on account of the stronger powers of the effects of the actions performed in the various phases of existence. With regard to cases of enjoyments or sufferings of men on account of the actions of others, it is to be known that the persons beneficially or injuriously affected in this way, deserve them on account of their past deeds. Thus the apparent discrepancy between virtue and happiness, or vice and sorrow, may be easily accounted for, if the life before the birth and that after the end of the present mortal frame of human body is taken into consideration.

This argument marshalled by the exponents of the theory is based on the validity of the law taken for granted. Even the validity of virtue and vice is taken for a real state of human condition. But the question may be raised, whether there is any rational ground for maintaining the validity of the distinction between virtue and vice, and
whether it is possible to form a definite conception around this distinction.

(2) Again many pious men hold that whatever actions approved of by the scriptures, should be accepted as virtuous and those condemned as vicious. But this claim on authority does not stand on a better solid foundation. Different religious sects have different scriptures, and it is, therefore, difficult to determine which of them has a higher authority. The different scriptures enjoin duties in accordance with the nature of the ideals they set up as the *Summum Bonum* of life. These ideals being conflicting, the ideas about virtues and vices also become conflicting. Hence, the claim of any kind of action enjoined by any scripture as virtuous cannot be logically justified.

(3) Some think that 'moral consciousness' is an essential factor in man. This principle is *a priori* and fundamental and determines virtue and vice. Accordingly, virtue and vice should be ascertained with reference to this fundamental nature of man. But this definition is, too, not sound. It assumes that moral consciousness is present universally in every individual, and that it lays down positive rules of virtue and vice which every man must accept on account of that common moral character. But is such a view satisfactory? In actual experience we find no justification for this assumption. Though the notions of *ought* and *ought not* may be found to be common to human
nature in general, we find no general rules with regard to 'what ought to be done' and 'what ought not to be done'. If, like the fundamental principles of Logic, we could discover fundamental principles of morality readily admitted by all rational beings, then only the determination of virtue and vice by such a uniform moral consciousness could be established. Again, one may have a moral consciousness about some actions to be virtuous but actually he may not practice them. This discrepancy between 'virtue' and 'knowledge' is often stated by the critics in the Socratic doctrine of virtue which enunciates 'virtue is knowledge'. Hence, the appeal to such moral consciousness can be of no use in determining the character of virtue and vice.

(4) According to Formalism actions which are done with good motives are virtuous actions, and those done with bad motives are vicious actions. But this definition involves the fallacy of petitio principii. Without ascertaining the rightness of actions, the goodness of man's motives cannot be determined. Moreover, it cannot be laid down that the nature of actions will be according to the respective attitude of mind.

(5) According to Intuitionism those actions are virtuous which are consistent with the dictates of conscience (inner voice). But this view also appears to be not reliable, for the alleged voice is not constant. It is merely a state of mind, which gets transformed
according to education and the environment. What is deemed virtuous by one's conscience is considered the otherwise by another's. Thus, it is altogether unsafe to rely upon the voice of our conscience as the last word in the determination of virtue and vice. In fact, no section of the human society leaves the question of virtues and vices to the uncertain dictates of individual conscience. Hence, this intuitionistic approach also does not appear to be flawless.

(6) Again, according to Utilitarianism, virtuous and vicious actions are known by their beneficial or injurious results. But this utilitarianistic view also is not proper. What gives joy to some persons may or may not give joy to others. The notion of benefit and injury vary according to place, temperament, age, mood, mental development and the like. Owing to different attitudes of mind, the same thing may be regarded by the same man as beneficial on certain occasions and injurious on others. Thus the variable subjective feelings like pleasure and pain and changing ideas of benefit and injury cannot be the standard of virtuous and vicious actions. So virtue and vice cannot be determined by the standard measure of benefit and injury or by joy and sorrow. Moreover, we have no capacity to determine how, where, why, when and how much our actions will bear fruits. So, from the results of actions, we cannot determine the nature of virtuous or
vicious actions. Hence, utilitarianism is, also, not a convincing standard for determining virtue and vice.

(7) Some thinkers consider actions done without any self-interest as virtuous. But this simply is absurd. An action has its roots in desire, and the satisfaction of the desire is always the object of every voluntary action. Thus self-interest is the motive of all conscious efforts. Moreover, no conscious and active individual self can ever be completely free from desire. The desire for self-preservation, self-development and self-enjoyment is inherent in the very nature of human existence. Without this desire, struggle for existence would be impossible. So it follows that an absolutely disinterested action is not possible. Hence, the action without self-interest is an unthinkable proposition.

Thus we find that all possible attempts to define the nature of virtue and vice are beset with logical as well as practical difficulties. Radical defect in all these views is the fact that no reference to character is made in any theory. Virtue is explained in terms of rightness of conduct rather than goodness of character. All these approaches determine the instrumentalistic and external nature of virtues rather than their intrinsic and inner worth. These theories engage themselves with conduct which is mainly an external expression of a person. These theories interpret 'virtue' in terms of the rightness of
an action and not in terms of the goodness of a person. To be virtuous in character requires an inner sanction, while to be right in social actions is determined by external sanctions. Virtue alone determines internally the real ethical worth of a man's character. Hence, virtues could be interpreted in terms of character-values. No reference to virtues in terms of man's inner worth is made in any of the above theories.

(ii) Virtue and Duty

Traditionally, ethical thinkers held virtue and duty as two distinct ethical concepts, and their distinction is based on the following grounds.

(1) Virtue is more or less an unconscious disposition and duty does imply a conscious thought. Virtues exist and operate almost spontaneously without our rational thinking about them, while, actions based on duties are performed with a knowledge that we ought to perform them. Here Mackenzie rightly said that man does his duty, while he possesses virtue. Virtue is habitual goodness.

(2) Secondly, virtue is a habit of the desires, affections and will, duty involves an operation of the reason by which desires, affections and will are directed and governed. By the frequent performance of such acts of direction, they become habitual, easy and familiar and finally cease to be objects of conscious reasoning, and that is how duty becomes a virtue.
(3) Thirdly, we carry the notion of virtue further than the notion of duty. We speak of heroic virtues, but never of heroic duties. The former transcend the latter. "Duties imply rules of duty, while virtues soar above rules."  

(4) Fourthly, in the history of Ethics, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations throws much light on the distinction between duty and virtue. Perfect duties are usually understood to be those which can be enforced by external law, imperfect duties are such as cannot be so enforced. The former are also sometimes described as Determinate and the latter as Indeterminate duties. Virtues imply indeterminate duties. Artificial, special, determinate obligations arise from the social, legal and contractual relations of men living in the society. The idea of 'Varnasrama dharma' in Hindu Ethics corresponds with the determinate duties in Kant's moral Philosophy; and the idea of the 'Sadharaṇa dharma' with indeterminate duties. The 'Varnasrama dharma' are obligatory on the individual in consequence of his social position; e.g. the Brahmin, the Ksatriya, Vaiśya and the Śūdra have their own specific, determinate or perfect duties; while in the 'Sadharaṇa dharma', there is a code of duties which are universal in appeal and import. Hence, it is in this sense that Hindu Ethics, because of its emphasis on the 'Sadharaṇa dharma', is rightly described to be a science of universal
virtues which are to be practised by every person in the world irrespective of his caste, colour or creed.

But the main question in Ethics is: are there any good actions which add and reveal the moral worth of the person concerned? In other words, can one do more than one's duties? Can duties be surpassed? Is it enough to do one's duties? Is 'to be dutiful' sufficient for the highest ethical ideal? It appears that Ethics is ultimately concerned with the question 'what I ought to be?' and not with 'what I ought to do?' 'What I ought to do?' may be answered by saying that I ought to do my duties. Man, being a part and parcel of society, has to perform some specific duties. Every man must have this sense of social responsibility. Yet, there are some actions which are not due from, say X, nevertheless, if he performs it, it reveals his real goodness, it has an internal sanction, the spring of which is within, rather than without. For example, there are some actions which are performed spontaneously, say an act of outstanding self-sacrifice. Such an action reveals the inner goodness, an inner quality of character. A man who pays his due taxes is merely doing his duty, such an action is good, but it does not reveal his goodness, a quality of his character. Duty refers to conduct, virtue refers to character. Theological thinkers have made a similar distinction and have called those good actions which are more than duty 'works of superogation'. In the case
of the virtuous activities, the sense of duty in the agent's mind is absent; he does not act so much from the sense of duty as from an appreciation of the value of the act to which he gladly commits himself.⁶

From the above discussion, it is, therefore, clear that it might be possible to do something more than one's duty. 'Virtue' has no regard for the past, nor hope of reward for the future. Virtue itself is its own reward. It alone expresses man's real goodness. "The distinctive mark of virtue seems to lie in what is beyond duty."⁷ In the concept of duty, we have at least an obligation to satisfy a claim made upon us by the society, community, State or the nation; and we have to perform these obligations because these are due from us. It would certainly be bad on our part if we fail in our duties; but the performance of these activities does not reveal man's inner character. Hence, from the ethical point of view, 'virtue' signifies the essence of morality.

Of course, to have an unfailing sense of duty is a virtue, though all virtue is not exhausted in this sense of duty. Virtue is an excess of duty, in the sense that it goes beyond it. Moral goodness may transcend the observance of specific duties. Much of morality depends on prudence and utility, but 'virtue' has no such taint. Moral goodness is more than social duties. And similarly religious goodness excels moral goodness, because the
former is altogether unexpectant of rewards or reciprocal action. Religious moral attitude transcends all rights and duties, it transcends the opposition between ego and non-ego. In this sense truly religious nature of a person is the source of excellent moral virtues.

But can man's real goodness be reconciled to both virtue and duty? This possibility of reconciliation is well founded in the Hindu concept of 'dharma'. To say that 'justice' is a virtue is nothing different from saying that it is our duty to be 'just'; and so is true about other forms of virtues. It is perhaps of this mutual involvement that Hinduism uses 'dharma' which reconciles to the claims of Deontology and Aretology in Western Ethics. Prof. Muirhead in his Elements of Ethics tries to such a reconciliation of virtue and duty by saying that virtue is a quality of character that fits for the discharge of duty.

I have earlier said about the Varnaśrama dharma, and their definite duties. But such a division of work, even though socially desirable, should not be stressed too far. Platonic classification of men and the Varnaśrama order of Hindu society have their own limitations which the social worker need not neglect. Sometimes for the welfare of the society one has to perform an action which is not really due from him. And yet, one performs it. This is his 'virtue'.

In both Greek and Christian Ethics the tendency is to put the emphasis on virtue. In both the good man is the
central concept. To the question 'what I ought to do?' the simple answer is 'I ought to do my duties'; but Ethics is ultimately concerned with 'what I ought to be?' And the answer to this is 'I ought to be virtuous'. In the words of Leslie Stephen, "the direction of the moral development is from doing to being". 'To be or to do', that is the question. Moral development begins from doing duties but should end in being virtuous because the ultimate question for the moral aspirant is what I ought to be. Even if we accept this double-aspect conception of Ethics, we may still agree that Ethics does not and must put a premium on being honest, kind, conscientious, and so forth. 'Duty' refers to extrinsic or non-moral considerations, while virtue refers to an internal sanction, as Mill called it.

Life today may be primarily a life of action, but we cannot achieve or realize anything without inevitably achieving also something that we call character. It follows that we still want to know what that character should be and what the self ought to become. Certainly any theory of Ethics that conceives the end in terms of self-realization must give a fundamental place to character-values i.e. virtues, and for such an Ethics the ideal of the goodness must be central.

The Broader and the Narrower Meanings of Virtue:—
According to the broader meaning virtue means any excellence in human character. Virtue is any quality of human
character that is admired and valued. This is the sense in which Plato and Aristotle spoke of the ethical end as virtue which is the same thing as defining it in terms of perfection or self-realization.

It is only in this broadest sense of the term that virtue may be said to be the highest good and the form in which self-realization is achieved.

But there is a narrower meaning of virtue, according to which virtue is co-related with duty. The virtues are habitual qualities of character that are acquired in the performance of duties.

Virtues, in this sense, have instrumental value and are emphasized from the pragmatic or utilitarianistic point of view. This instrumental character of virtues is brought out clearly in any study of the evolution of morality. The qualities approved and admired by primitive men correspond in the main directly with the kinds of actions favourable to the survival and welfare of the type.

**Virtues, like Duties, are Relative:** If virtues are interpreted in the narrower sense then the fact that follows from this point of view is the relativity of the virtues. In this sense, like rights and duties, virtues are functional and not substantive. From the functional character of the virtues follows their relativity.

Relativism is a complex term which is interpreted
variously by various thinkers. In Ethics, however, relativism is the view that ethical concepts are necessarily equivocal, they have a set of different usages or uses. Relativism has been viewed in its various forms—mainly two; viz., cultural and ethical. Other forms of relativism are derivative, e.g. sociological relativism is deduced from cultural relativism.

Ethical relativism, which is opposed to ethical absolutism, is the view that the truth of the virtues in a given culture can be tested by the standard accepted by it; e.g. honesty can be called right or wrong, obligatory or otherwise in different societies, or by different persons of the same society because of the differing stages of development. Hence, any ethical position which denies that there is a single virtue which is equally applicable and acceptable to all men at all times may fairly be called ethical relativism. What is virtue in one place may be different in another place. As with the age, so with the moral philosophers.

According to ethical relativism, objective morality is an illusion, because objectivity presupposes universality, and in the absence of the universal virtues, how objectivity of them could be established? This logic leads the relativists to reject ethical absolutism and establish their own standpoint. Virtues are infinite and hence cannot be
exactly determined. Such a relativistic standpoint is also found in Mahābhārata. Similarly, "there is no good, there is no bad, these be the whims of moral wills; what works me, will that I call good, what harms and hurts, I hold as ill; they change with space, they shift with the race and in the variest space of time;" "Each vice has worn a virtue's crown" says Richard Burton. What is true of acts is also true of virtues. What is virtue at one time is often vice in another and what is abominable for one class is often praised in another. Hence, the problem of the ethical relativity has troubled thoughtful men in all ages. Its special prominence in the modern world stems from the current assumptions that it is the last word of science on the question regarding the nature of virtues. This view is often recognized as 'ethical nihilism'.

Arguments in support of ethical relativism can be briefly stated as following:

(i) Ethics is a human product. Virtues arise out of the needs of human life. Hence, virtues and human life are connected.

(ii) Everything changes. Virtues under social conditions also change. The Middle Ages stressed humility, the feudal leaders stressed courage and honour, an industrial society stresses initiativeness and economical management. The growing complexity and increasing contacts of the modern world are giving a new sense of social solidarity. If this
is the case, then we need certain qualities of character which have been none too evident in the past. We shall need to emphasise co-operation, tolerance, openmindedness, reliability and a willingness to accept responsibility. And these virtues are rarely appreciated by the earlier thinkers.

(iii) Generalizations found from the findings of Sociology and Psychology also prove relativism. The possibility of ethical relativism rests upon two main factors which are supposed to prove generalizations from the descriptive sciences of Sociology and Psychology respectively. From the findings of Sociology (including Anthropology) it is clear that moral virtues in fact fluctuate widely and from the findings of Psychology it is clear that an individual's ideas about virtues are influenced by psycho-physical conditions. The truth of both these propositions may be obvious to the extent from ordinary reflective observation, and the evidence is extended by sociological and psychological research.

Yet, it appears that neither of the propositions is logically sufficient to prove ethical relativism unless some further assumption is added. It is needful, therefore, to look realistically and yet critically at psychological and sociological data. For it could still be the case that some virtues may be permanent and have a priori validity,
even though men and societies differ in their ability and inclination to realize them, and certain psycho-physical conditions are requisite to their realization in man. For instance, it might be that kindness is better than hatred, and this might still be true even though there were individuals and societies incapable of perceiving it to be so.

When we read some of the modern ethical thinkers, relativism, in one or the other form, gets support from Nowell-Smith, A. E. Murphy, Karl Backer and James Burnham and Patternson. Nowell-Smith advocates socio-economic Relativism, Patternson advocates subjective relativism, James Burnham supports primarily sociological relativism. All these thinkers are quite realistic and hold the view that virtues are meant for men and not vice versa. While re-emphasizing some of the older virtues, like justice, temperance and courage etc. we shall need to include co-operation, tolerance, openmindedness, reliability and a willingness to take responsibility.

Co-operation is necessary in the developing world of today. Closely connected with co-operation is competition. The existence of the society is due to the co-operation of the individual members, while its progress is due to competition which is not based on jealousy, hatred and rivalry. The virtuous life always remains aloof from the selfish and unrestrained competition. It should be replaced by non-
competitive co-operation vs. the competitive co-operation. Again, without tolerance, mental and moral progress is not possible. Intolerance indicates intellectual backwardness and intrinsic ignorance of mankind. Openmindedness (Mahā-
manastva) is a willingness to look at a problem squarely and a readiness to accept suggestions from more competent men without offence. The openminded person does not force his convictions upon others, and he readily acknowledges his error of judgement if the facts so reflect.

Reliability and willingness to accept responsibility are specially needed in our interdependent world where our health and welfare depend upon the actions of others. This is the sociological function of the virtues in the modern world of today.

In brief, relativity of virtues takes two forms:

(i) to the stage of development, or states of society; and

(ii) to social function.

The relativity of rights and duties is a necessary consequence of the evolution of society and of the change in environment. New incidents teach new virtues. Primitive virtues, as we call them - physical valour, tribal loyalty, etc. are clearly functional. Physical courage may lose much of its value in the context of modern life and brute, unthinking, loyalty may be a positive detriment.
From this instrumental character of virtues follows also their relativity to the functions of society. Just as men will always admire a good carpenter, a good musician, so in our modern life men will admire the good aviator, the good baseball player, the good businessman etc. rather than the "good man" in general. Men are practical and the essence of practicality is reference to the specific situation. The situation-Ethics is extrinsicalist, the intrinsicalist idea of virtue is the Thomist. No virtuous activity is good or bad in itself. It all depends whether it hurts or helps people. In some situation unmarried love is better and is infinitely more moral than married unlove. In some cases lying could be more Christian than telling the truth.

In its narrow sense, virtues could be related to duty, and if virtue be thought of in its relation to duty, it is scarcely possible that it can escape this specialization any more than duty. The virtues of a physician are not quite those of a farmer, those of a commercial man not those of a man of science and those of a priest not quite those of an artist. Even more, the qualities which we respect and admire in men are not the same in all respects as those which we admire in women.

Nevertheless, virtues are absolute, unconditional and intrinsic in character if we interpret virtues in the broadest sense. Few moralists believe that there are certain
more or less constant human qualities of character that are not only admired everywhere, at all time, and by all men, but which remain in their essence constant, despite their change in form. There are certain absolute character values that are permanent and intrinsic, the fixed stars the light of which guide human conduct quite effectively.

This notion of a permanent ideal of character and of intrinsic virtues was expressed by Plato in his Conception of the Cardinal Virtues. It was, in fact, partly as a reaction against the extreme relativity and scepticism of the sophists, that first Socrates, and then Plato and Aristotle developed their concepts of universal and common virtues—wisdom, temperance, courage and justice. This is synonymous with the concept of 'Sāmānya dharma' in Hindu Ethical thought. The 'Vārṇāśrama dharma' refers to the Ethics of duty, while 'Sāmānya dharma' refers to the Ethics of the virtues. The former gives rise to the relativistic Ethics, latter gives rise to the absolutistic Ethics.

(4) Virtue as intrinsic value: We now come to the most difficult question in connection with the nature of virtue and its place in the moral life—the question, namely, to what extent the virtues have intrinsic value, apart from their value as means to ends, social and individual.

The attempt is often made on a psychological level. Virtues, on a more developed moral levels, have
intrinsic value. Just as we come to admire the skill and technique of an artist for its own sake, so we come to admire manly courage, temperance and self-sacrifice, quite apart from the consideration of its effects. And hence the truth in the saying "virtue for virtue's sake".

Hence to the question, what ought I to be? traditional ethical thought, both Greek and Christian, answers that 'I ought to be virtuous'. The ideal man is one who possesses all the virtues. In thus defining the ethical end in terms of virtue, it is assumed, however, not only that the virtues have intrinsic value in the sense described, but also that virtue is understood in the broad sense of human excellence, and not merely in the narrower sense of obedience to the duties.

We have said earlier that to be or to do is the moral question, and to be virtuous is morally more valuable than to do duties. Of course, I do not propose 'Ethics of duty' and 'Ethics of character' (i.e. virtue), or doing and being as rival kinds of morality between which we must choose, but as two levels of the same morality. This is the idea of 'Dharma' in Hindu Ethics which consists of doing and being. If we accept this, then for every duty there will be a virtue, often going by the same name, and for every morally good trait there will be a principle defining the kind of action in which it is to express itself. To
parody a famous dictum of Kant's: principles without traits are impotent, traits without principles are blind. It is, perhaps, in this sense William Lillie\textsuperscript{14} refers to virtue as a habit of action corresponding to the quality of character. We may refer to the honesty of a man or to the honesty of his dealings equally as virtues.

(iii) Virtue and Right

The concepts of Rightness and goodness lie close to the core of ethical thinking. Can these be defined independently? Are these terms independent or can be defined in terms of each other?

Durant Drake, in his 'Invitation to Philosophy', advocates thirteen prominent theories of the nature of right and wrong. Each of the various theories of right will, consequently, have embodied different conceptions of the nature of virtue. For example,

(1) One of the theories of right states that acts are right because God commands them, and therefore virtue consists in ability to keep God's commands.

(2) Acts are right because they produce the best results for oneself, then whoever has this ability is thereby virtuous. All the self-regarding virtues could be included under this category. Here egoism is right, and altruism is rejected.

(3) Acts are right because they produce good results
for others. Right consists in acting for the benefit of others. Here all the other-regarding virtues could be included under this category. Here altruism is right and egoism is rejected.

(4) Acts are right because they produce good results for the most people. Utilitarianism has been widely accepted as the ethical foundation for the democratic forms of government. The democratic forms of government is considered right because it is supposed to produce the best results for all the people. According to this theory of right, virtue consists in acting for the greatest good of the greatest number and whoever has this ability is thereby virtuous.

These are some of the main theories which have been stated in a streamlined form. But from the ethical point of view all these theories are defective in the sense that all acts, under each theory, are not right. It is said that only voluntary actions can be morally judged to be right or wrong. Acts are right, for example, not because of the fact that they are self-regarding, or other-regarding and etc. Actions, to be right, must be intended to be self-regarding, intended to be other-regarding and so on. Acts are right because they are intended to produce the best results for oneself or for others in the long run.

We have seen earlier that virtue could be interpreted
in two ways: (i) virtue in terms of **rightness** of human actions; (ii) virtue in terms of the **goodness** of the person; the former refers to the **conduct**, overt actions, the latter refers to the **character**. Hence, virtue in terms of rightness of action, does not necessarily refer to the **character** of the person.

The Kantian distinction between virtue and right is worth noting. According to Kant duty for duty's sake constitutes virtue, while duty by external compulsion, constitutes according to him, right. Here external may mean external of the sense of one's duty, as inclination or external, as being made compulsory by a legal system. Though it is advantageous to have two concepts to denote two distinct ideas, yet if we look at the matter closely we find, that when, what is laid down by one's own sense of duty as law and which is laid down by an **external legal system**, which itself is based on the ideal of perfection as the object of attainment for each and everybody in a society, both are one and the same and hence there is really no distinction between the two. Right must always be supported by 'virtue'. Hence the primacy of 'virtue' over the concept of right. These concepts are not therefore exclusive but overlapping. Most of the duties which law enjoins being as much related to an end as final purpose, fall in the periphery of virtue and of right. The distinction of being made is only an emphasis.
Again, all practical questions of morals have been put under three general heads: What ought we to do? What ought we to have? and what ought we to be? To these three questions correspond the three notions of Ethics, namely, Duty, Right and Virtue. The first can be answered by suggesting fundamental duties of man, second can be answered by suggesting fundamental right i.e. "bill of rights" of man, and answer to the third question would result in some picture of a virtuous man. But the first two are subordinate to the third which is more fundamental. Ethics is ultimately a system of human virtues.

Rights are more connected with duties than with virtues. Rights and duties are reciprocal or correlative. They imply each other. But rights can also be shown to be related with virtues.

Virtue and right both reveal the moral quality. They differ with regard to the 'object' of moral quality. There can be two objects of moral quality. 'Right' refers to conduct, 'virtue' refers to character. The first expresses the rightness of an action, the latter reveals the goodness of character. A distinction is sometimes drawn between formal and material rightness. An act is said to be formally right if it springs from the virtuous motive, while an act is regarded as materially right, if it leads to beneficial results. Such a distinction was originally
drawn by scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages. They hold that an act may be materially right, though not formally; or it may be formally right, but not materially so.

But the above view is ethically untenable. Material rightness is not the moral quality at all, it has no moral excellence. There is no moral quality in a voluntary action per se or its consequences apart from the inner quality. The real seat of the moral quality is the inner worth of character and not the external consequences. Howsoever beneficial results or effects of an act may be, it can never be pronounced as formally right unless 'virtue' is its source. From the point of view of formal and material rightness, we can classify human actions into four kinds, e.g. actions which are:

(1) both formally and materially right;
(2) formally right but materially wrong;
(3) formally wrong, but materially right; and
(4) formally and materially wrong.

Out of these the first is highly preferable to any of the remaining three. The last is highly condemnable. The real problem is about the second and the third kind. And ethically, the second kind of action is more valuable than the third because it reveals man's character. The real object of moral judgement is agent's intention, not the external results. 'Virtue' is central to Ethics, because ethically to be virtuous is more valuable than to be overtly dutiful
or socially right in actions. To be virtuous in character requires an inner sanction, while to be dutiful or to be right in social actions are determined by external sanction. 'Virtue', the inner strength, alone determines the real ethical worth of man's character.

(iv) Virtue and Law

A good deal of discussion has been found in the study of Ethics, as well as in that of some other subjects by a certain ambiguity in the word 'law'. It has been customary to distinguish its distinct senses, such as moral law, divine law, political law, social law, natural law and so on. There are, however, three aspects in which different kinds of law might be distinguished. Some laws are constant, others are variable; some are inviolable, others are violable; some are universal, others have only a limited application. The last of these, again, is scarcely distinguishable from the first, for what is universal is generally also constant and necessary, and vice versa. Hence, before we distinguish between virtue and law, it would be necessary to distinguish different kinds of law, e.g.,

(i) laws which are changeable or unchangeable; and
(ii) laws which are violable or inviolable.

Adopting these two principles, we might evidently have different classes of laws; e.g.,

(a) those that can be changed and violated;
(b) those that can be changed, but cannot be violated;
(c) those that can be violated, but cannot be changed; and lastly,
(d) those that can neither be changed nor violated.

It is generally stated that laws under (c) class are the moral laws, and the (d) class gives us the natural laws. Let us distinguish these two kinds of laws.

**Laws of Nature and Moral Laws**:

'Law' is one of the fundamental notions in science, like space, time, cause etc. Science is very largely engaged in finding out these laws and formulating them, such, for instance, as the laws of chemical valence, or the laws of thermodynamics, or the laws of falling bodies. We speak of things obeying the laws of nature and of the world as being governed by natural laws. In morals and in jurisprudence a law is a command, or a rule, or injunction (vidhi) which some authority imposes upon intelligent beings and which they are supposed to obey.

In science, the word has no such meaning, it means an observed uniformity in the behaviour of things. Strictly a law of nature is a mere formula, or a shorthand expression, for certain observed uniformities of behaviour in natural objects. It is as Pearson says, "the resume or brief expression of the relationships and sequences of certain groups of perceptions and conceptions, and exists only when formulated by man".15
Hence, we see that the laws of nature are not forces nor powers nor commands at all.

Again, moral laws are prescriptive, while laws of nature are descriptive, and being descriptive can be proved to be either true or false. Laws of nature are general statements about what is, moral laws are general statements about what ought to be. A moral law is a law that states something ought to be. It is a statement of an ideal. Natural law, on the contrary, is a statement of fact. The former is a science of an ideal, while latter is a science of an actual. It is generally said that the moral laws are the principles which regulate human actions or conduct, but ultimately they suggest a reference to the development of character. Natural laws are descriptive or fact-stating in the sense that they imply the way in which things of a particular class must necessarily behave in virtue of something in their own essential nature; e.g. the law of gravitation which simply states that bodies tend to move in certain ways relatively to one another.

Political Laws and Moral Laws:— Political laws, like moral laws are regulative principles of man's conduct. A state without some political and moral laws means political anarchy and moral bankruptcy. Hence, both these laws are man-made. They are meant for the welfare of the individual and the society.
Again, both these kinds of laws are changeable and violable. This is quite evident from the histories of the various nations of the world.

However, there is a radical difference between the two. Political laws are expected to be followed by the citizens obligatorily, while moral laws are to be followed voluntarily. Political laws are of the nature of must, while moral laws are of the nature of ought.

All these considerations give rise to the problem of the 'sanction of morality'. An action may be moral from various points of view; e.g., an action is moral or right if it is based on a legal sanction. This involves a legal system as a theory of morality. Morality, according to this point of view, consists in following the laws of the state, and the deviation from them is a crime and hence wrong. In brief, according to the legal system, actions are right or wrong in the sense of being conformable to law. To be moral, action must be based on the prescribed law. An action is right, if it agrees with the law; wrong, if it does not agree with or is in violation of, the prescribed law.

But the legal sanction as a theory of morality throws light on the external conduct of man in terms of right and wrong, good or bad. It refers to the rightness or wrongness of observed human conduct, and does not refer
to the character of the person. It does not reveal the virtuous character of man, it does not reveal his real ethical worth as such.

Secondly, the legal theory substitutes self-interest for morality and prudence for virtue. Acts performed out of fear of punishment or out of expectation of reward may be prudent, but not virtuous. It has no positive ethical worth, because it is done on the principle of compulsion rather than from the principle of the "Freedom of the will". A man who does good deeds simply by the force of impulse or from outside pressure, can hardly be regarded as truly virtuous. Compulsory morality is equivalent to no morality at all. 'Moral force' is a self-contradiction. Morality cannot be forced, and whatever is forced cannot be moral as such. Hence, morality presupposes the various postulates, the first among which is the principle of the "Freedom of the will".

Thirdly, according to the legal sanction, moral standard is external and hence arbitrary, but this is far from the truth. The real ethical standard cannot be an external one. It must spring from within, rather than from without.

Sometimes, 'Divine sanction' is supported to be the true sanction of morality. According to this view, Divine command is taken to be the test of human actions, which
determine right or wrong. Ten Commandments of Christianity have a Divine sanction. Actions are right or wrong simply because God has commanded or forbidden them. As Locke says, 'the true ground of morality can only be the will and the law of God.' Descartes, Locke, Gay, Paley and many other Christian moralists support the Divine sanction of morality.

But, the 'Divine sanction' is also open to general criticisms; e.g.,

(i) The existence of God to uphold these sanctions is a matter of faith and not of certainty—and this sanction must be ineffective where this faith is feeble or absent.

(ii) The most obvious objection to this theory is that, according to it, the motive for virtue or avoidance of vice would consist simply in the hope of reward or fear of punishment, and thus virtue would merge in prudence and morality in self-interest.

Sometimes, 'social sanction' is advocated to be the criterion of right and wrong, good or bad. According to this view, morality depends on the social approval. The will of the society is the standard of morality. 'Right' means what society approves, 'wrong' means what the society disapproves. According to this, therefore, the standard of morality is constituted by the opinions, manners or customs (mores) which have been approved by the society. How,
then, are the rules of society enforced? They are enforced by public sentiments of approval or disapproval.

But this view, like the earlier two, appears to be open to general criticisms; e.g.,

(i) Social opinion is variable. The manners and the customs always change from time to time, person to person, or from age to age. How can such changing customs supply any uniform moral standard? Morals cannot be reduced to manners.

(ii) Again, it is well known that what is customary is not necessarily virtuous as such. The accepted customs and manners of a society are not often beyond question. There had been social customs and practices in vogue, throughout the ages of the past about which we speak as good or bad, right or wrong. This very outlook acknowledges the existence of a higher standard by reference to which even these standards are to be judged.

All the above so-called sanctions of morality emphasize the external force of morality, in terms of law, God or society. But true morality must ultimately refer to the inner sanction. Virtue is an inner law of human nature. This inner reference to virtue appears to be lacking in the aforesaid sanctions of morality.

Again, both Law and Morality try to determine and evaluate human conduct, but their methods are different.
Law judges human actions from the point of view of their consequences, while morality determines actions from the point of view of the intentions of the agent. Consequences can either be good or bad, and so also can be the intentions. If we try to classify human actions on these principles, we get four classes of actions as following:

1) A human action having good consequences and a good intention.
2) A human action having good consequences but a bad intention.
3) A human action having bad consequences but with a good intention.
4) A human action having bad consequences and a bad intention.

If we are to compare these classes of actions and put them in a sort of valuational gradation, there would be a general agreement to the effect that the first group of actions are doubly praiseworthy, and the last group of actions are doubly condemnable.

For the same reasons, the first group of actions is preferable to second and the third group of actions.

Similarly, actions belonging to the second and the third are preferable to the last group of actions, for the simple reason that the last group of actions possesses no merit. To have either good consequences or good intentions is better than not to have any one of these.
The real question arises when we want to decide the gradation between the actions belonging to the second and the third group. And here we find enough disagreement. Some would hold fast to the view that consequences should determine the morality of an action, while others would hold the view that, not consequences, but intention should determine the morality of an action. An action with a good intention is always moral, irrespective of its results (Kantian good-will).

Morality considers the motive behind an action while Law considers the consequences of an action.

Political laws, social laws or Divine laws determine human actions from the point of view of their results. It is an instrumentalistic view of morality. It is a kind of utilitarianism or pragmatism. But virtue is an inner law of human nature. The legal theory of law substitutes self-interest for inner goodness. Acts performed out of external sanction may be socially right actions, but not virtuous. If an action is done under the compulsion, threatened punishment or for the sake of positive reward, it can be said to have rightness. It might be politically a right action, but it does not reveal the real ethical worth of man's character. Virtuous character has an inner sanction.

Again, laws themselves presuppose a higher standard; they are means to an end. They are also the objects of
moral judgement. They are themselves judged to be good or bad. Some laws are good, while some are bad. To abide by the laws of the state may be sometimes virtuous, but sometimes the laws of the state may be tyrannical in which obedience to them may be sometimes a virtue and sometimes a vice. On this, of course, opinions are divided. Civil disobedience, for instance, according to Mahātmā Gāndhi is good, while Socrates would not violate laws even if they are unjust. He preferred death rather than escape from prison, which could be praised as the greatest example of a virtuous life. It requires 'strength of will', a higher regard for the virtue, and an uncompromising love for virtuous life.

We have earlier said that to abide by the laws of the state is a virtue. Surely, obedience to the 'just' laws of the state is surely a virtue, but this does not exhaust virtuous life. There is an uncommon virtue in doing more than what the state expects. 'Virtue' may surpass the mere obedience to the laws of the state. Hence, it is rightly maintained, in Hindu Ethics, that between 'rājdanda' and 'dharmadanda', the latter is ethically superior.

Again, in the legal system, crime is defined as the violation of a law. Mahātmā Gāndhi supported civil disobedience, satyagraha, non-violent non-co-operation on ethical grounds. Against the tyrannical laws, the above weapons can be used and ethically justified. He believed
that laws are meant for man, and not man meant for law. Hence, the unjust laws should be violated.

But the sphere of crime (violation of law) is much smaller than moral sin and religious demerit. Sin is wider than crime. Hence, arises the problem of punishment to the criminals and establishment of justice. Justice is established through the social institutions of courts, police, prisons etc. by punishing the criminals. However, moral life may be above punishments. Saints won't punish if their moral principles are not followed by the society. But, the citizens are punished if they disobey the laws of the state.

The new science of criminology would go far towards identifying crime with disease and would deliver many classes of criminals out of the hands of the police into those of the men of psychiatrist. This is based on the reformative view of punishment. Offences are deemed to be committed through influence of motives on character and may be prevented, it is believed, by change of motive or by change of character. Deterrent punishments act in the former way while reformative act in the latter way. It says that we must care for criminals, and not kill them. We must transform our prisons into comfortable workshops.

Again, criminals should be treated as insane persons. Criminals should be given a kind and human treatment. Criminals should be treated as psychological cases. Criminals are not bad, but are mad. Hence, criminals should be looked
at from an attitude of forgiveness rather than from that of revenge. The Christian injunctions 'judge not', 'Resist not evil', 'return good to evil' are meaningful in this context.

(v) Virtue and Value

Values constitute a theme in Philosophy, the branch of Philosophy which studies them, Axiology, took its first steps in the second half of the 19th century.

With regard to the nature of the values it can be said that values do not exist for themselves; they need a carrier of value within which to reside. Therefore, they appear to us as more qualities of these value carriers; e.g., beauty of a picture, elegance of a garment, or utility of a tool. If we observe the picture, the garment, or the tool, we shall see, nevertheless, that the valuational quality is different from the other qualities; e.g. length, impenetrability, and weight. None of these objects could exist if any of these qualities were missing. But value does not bestow or add existence, since the stone fully existed before being engraved, before it was transformed into something good. Values are not the primary qualities, nor the secondary qualities. These are designated as 'tertiary qualities'. The designation is found wanting, because values are not a third kind of quality in accord with the criterion of common classification, but rather, a new category, in accordance with a different criterion.
which is also new. It would be more appropriate to assert that values are 'unreal qualities' in the sense that they do not add reality or substance to objects but only value.

Another basic characteristic of values is hierarchy. Values are arranged hierarchically, that is, there are inferior and superior values. Hierarchical classification of values should not be confused with their classification. Classification does not necessarily imply order of importance. One may divide men into fat and thin, tall and short, single and married, without necessarily implying that one group is of greater importance than another. Values, on the other hand, are given in their order of importance. Hierarchy is demonstrated by preference.

There have been axiologists who have proposed a table of values under the various heads; Economic values, Bodily values, Values of Recreation, values of Association, Character values, Aesthetic values, Intellectual values and Religious values; and that they have claimed that this was the table. Also, there had been subsequent criticisms explaining the weakness of such tables. Here we are not primarily concerned with a detailed criticism of this table of values, rather we are particularly interested in understanding character values which are known to be the virtues governing human life.

The term 'character-values' is used to designate the
recognized virtues, temperance, justice, benevolence and the like. These character-values are the moral virtues.

Again, the familiar distinction between the intrinsic and the instrumental aspects of value, finds here, also its application. The virtues are of intrinsic worth; they yield direct satisfaction, not only to the possessor but to others as well. And like every other form of good they radiate through all human activities, giving form and order to what would otherwise be lawless and capricious.

Virtues are sometimes treated as instrumental, as means in the production of further good. This is the telological character of the virtues. Truthfulness, justice, chastity, benevolence, and the other virtues are such, because they serve the true interests of life. For the sake of these they have been called into being, have been slowly developed and strengthened through long centuries of struggle. Truthfulness is prized because there are important truths to speak, because it makes a vast difference in human relations, whether thoughts are represented as they are, or are distorted out of all semblance to the reality. Were it not for this fact, truth-speaking would have been indifferent. Were it not for the significant political, economic and social interests of men, justice would have been meaningless. Justice is important because there are important causes to be adjudicated. So, too,
benevolence is a virtue, because there is daily and hourly suffering which require the ministrations of sympathy. In the same way every single virtue can be shown to draw its strength and sacredness from some primary need of life. They are all teleological, they serve ends of worth.

The utilitarians or the pragmatists regard that virtues have an instrumental value. But the Ethics of utilitarians or pragmatists may satisfy the immediate needs of individual and hence its importance may be 'practical' but is not an 'ethical' in the true sense of the term. It cannot foster the acquisition of an ideal character. Hedonism and utilitarianism have undermined the real ethical nature of man, his inner goodness.

Again, the theories propagating the doctrine of Hedonism or utilitarianism in one form or the other emphasize the value of actions in terms of utility, workability, instrumentality and expediency, etc. But these theories, without reference to man and regardless of his inner goodness, must be regarded as incomplete. Mere instrumentalistic view is not enough. Axiology must refer to the depth of the human personality, wherein character-values must become the criterion of inner worth of man's ethical character.

Again, any definition of value will be unsatisfactory and incomplete. The term value is difficult to define
because the experience of 'value' is always personal, and hence subjective. Values cannot exist apart from experience. Again, with regard to the nature of value, thinkers have held divided opinions. Are values objective or subjective, or are they both subjective and objective? It appears that values could be treated to be both subjective and objective. They are the products of the interaction between person and his environmental situation. Value is objective to the extent that there are qualities in objects which call forth our desires. Value is subjective to the extent that it is a personal judgement with a pronounced emotional tone.

But the view refers to the value of human actions. These do not refer to the worth of human life. Hence, the need of developing primarily character-values which increase the worth of human life; vices are the unethical values because these diminish the worth of human dignity. Virtues are the valuable traits of character, vices are the valueless traits of character.

Again, it is said, the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values should not be over-emphasized. It is said that an intrinsic value is one which has worth in its own right, it is an end-in-itself. An extrinsic value is one which is a means to some other value, it is of instrumental worth only. But intrinsic and extrinsic values are not always either mutually exclusive or fixed.
What is valued by one person for its own sake may be valued by another person merely as a means to an end.

To a certain extent this is true. But it appears that there are some traits of character the value of which is fixed and universally accepted. This is the idea ingrained in the concept of Sāmānṛya dharma in Hindu Ethics. The external form of morality may change, but the inner ethical core must be intact. Examining what are the 'Sāmānṛya dharma' or the universal virtues to be observed by all men in general, Manu Smṛti enumerates Ahimsā, Satya, Asteya, Śauca and Indriyanigraha. These are the five universal virtues vouchsafed to us, believing in the Vedic view of life. The value of these cannot be determined by circumstance. They have to be intrinsically valued, to be ingrained in the human personality as a constant and permanent feature of his life on earth. Ethics should mean to him practice of virtues in an absolute sense, and not only in a relative or pragmatic. Relative or pragmatic Ethics is a misnomer. Real Ethics requires a stricter discipline where self-interest is to be transcended into the well-being of the entire human fraternity. A man who is really virtuous is prepared to make compromise in special contexts, but this compromise should not be based on any kind of self-interest or selfish desires. That is why killing of an ailing calf in Gāndhiji's āśrama was not considered an infringement of the rule of non-violence, because
the motive in this mercy killing was to relieve the poor calf. Similarly, Krsna's exhortation to Arjuna to fight is justified on the ground of the preservation of dharma. Violence was involved in these cases, but it could not be helped. Of course, it is very difficult to follow these virtues absolutely. It needs a Gândhi or a Buddha to incorporate into life all that ahimsā stands for, and it takes a Christ or St. Francis to adhere to the ideal of 'offering the other cheek'.

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