CHAPTER VI

PROMINENT THEORIES OF 'VIRTUE'

In this chapter an attempt has been made to state and examine the main theories of 'virtue' in Western Ethics with adequate elucidation. For convenience, I have divided the chapter into three sections: (i) Greek Ethics, (ii) Medieval Ethics, and (iii) Modern Ethics. Under each section there are various moral philosophers who have tried to determine the nature of virtue and its place in Ethics.

(i) Theories of Virtue during the Greek Period

(a) Stoic Theory of Virtue :- It is possible to trace many of the elements of Stoic ethics back to earlier philosophers. They argued, like Plato and Aristotle, that reason is the differentia of man, and that in the exercise of reason, lay man's peculiar function and his virtue. The life of 'reason' is the highest virtue of man. Reason sets man apart from animals. This led on to the notion of Stoic sage, a self-sufficient being resembling, in some ways, Aristotle's Godlike man of contemplation and in some ways the self-sufficient cynic like Diogenes. Stoic Ethics gives utmost importance to the intellectual virtues of man's life. Stoic morality gives an uncompromising statement
that only virtue is good and only vice is bad, and regards these as having an intrinsic value, compared to Epicureans who treated virtues as having an extrinsic value.

All these ideas of virtue and vice are derived from Socrates, and it is impossible to imagine what Greek ethical thinking would have been like, if Socrates had never existed.

(b). Epicurian Theory of Virtue:-- Epicurus was an Athenian citizen, and in 306 set up a school of his own in Athens. Epicurus observed that from the time of birth all living creatures seek pleasures and avoid pains. It appears, therefore, that his theory of virtue and vice is based on the principle of understanding human nature. He concluded that pleasure was the good for man, and whatever is conducive to pleasure is right (virtuous), and whatever is detrimental to it is bad (vicious).

To the question 'what is the worth of virtues?' Epicurus said that virtues have an instrumental value rather than an intrinsic one. Virtues are 'preyas' and not 'śreyas'. Virtues are not to be sought for virtues' sake. Pleasure, according to him, is the chief good. The various virtues are the pleasurebringing activities and the vices are the painbringing activities; hence, the virtues are to be developed and the vices are to be shunned. Although all pleasures are good, not all are to be chosen, because some have painful consequences; on the other hand, we should
accept some pains, because they bring great pleasures in future. From this we can see the ambiguity of the word 'pleasure'. Epicurus tries to show that man should try to live a frugal life in which necessary desires are satisfied, and vain desires are outlawed. Such a life would naturally, be virtuous. Wisdom will be found in a 'knowledge' of Epicurean theory, temperance in the restraining of desires and courage in attaining freedom from fear, but justice is on a different footing. Justice is defended in a sophistic way as being based on mutual agreement of sensible people not to harm each other or to suffer harm in return.

Epicurianism is a form of hedonism, closely resembling the hedonism of the Utilitarians, but one major modification being Epicurus' obsession with pain. His view resembles psychological hedonism for he contends that 'we avoid pain by instinct'. From this, a charge is made against Epicurus that his Ethics is negatively oriented. But the charge appears to be unjustifiable. He was a hedonist, but differed from other ancient hedonists such as Aristipus and the Cyrenaics whose prime objective was to seek and enjoy pleasures of the moment. They lived by the code: "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die". The Ethics of Aristipus and Cyrenaics resembles the Ethics of Čārvākās in Indian Philosophy. Epicurus concluded that pleasure was the good, but instead of the active pleasures, he recommended the calm middle state, which he called ataraxia,
which may be translated 'tranquillity'. Hence, he gave utmost importance to those virtues which give pleasures of the mind or soul. Man is by nature a pleasure seeking being, but it is folly for one to select every pleasure indiscriminately. Although all pleasures are good, not every pleasure is worthy of choice. All pain is evil, but not all pain ought to be avoided. Pleasures and pains must be weighed against each other. Vices serving a good purpose are, instrumentally, valuable; consequently, they ought to be accepted and endured. "The good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as the good." Hence, virtues on certain occasions, if followed, become vices, and vice versa. Occasionally it is better to forgo the virtue of truth-speaking, if it is disadvantageous. Similarly, sacrifice, continence and temperance etc. are virtues, only if these produce pleasurable feelings; otherwise, are to be treated as vices and hence ought to be shunned.

According to Epicurus, prudence is the greatest virtue because from it ensues every virtue. "The greatest good is prudence ... for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice without living pleasantly."
ethical and his interest in other studies seems to have been small. Even his interest in Physics is purely subsidiary to the ethical end. With reference to the concept of virtue, its worth or value, his declaration that "beauty, virtue and the like are to be valued if they produce pleasure; if not, we must bid them farewell" makes him instrumentalist. But such a declaration is not so hedonistic as it sounds.

Socrates' Theory of 'Virtue':

Socrates' theory of virtue is sometimes represented by three propositions which ultimately determine his ethical thought. These propositions are as following:

(i) Virtue is knowledge
(ii) Virtue is one
(iii) Virtue is teachable.

All these propositions, though stated separately, are intimately connected. These are interlinked. In fact, the second and the third may be said to be the corollaries of the first which embodies in itself the whole of his theory of virtue.

Socrates said that ignorance is the root cause of evils in society. According to the message of the Delphian Oracle, Socrates had discovered by his inductive method that the sophistic knowledge was not 'knowledge' in the true sense of the term. "You had admitted that men err
in their choice of good and evil from their defect of knowledge ... and you are also aware that an erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance.\(^4\)

In brief, evil, sin or vice are looked upon as a kind of disease which fastens on the soul of the sinner, confounding his intelligence so that it can no longer discriminate between right and wrong. According to Socrates, man by nature is not evil; a sinner or wicked, becomes so, due to ignorance. Evil tendencies spring from the lack of sufficient knowledge. No man voluntarily pursues evil because to prefer evil to good is not ingrained in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of the two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less.

If conduct is wrong, it means only that knowledge and ideas have gone wrong. The man of true knowledge has a dynamism capable of exerting the energy to drive or motivate the man to the performance of right action; and hence the Socratic theory that "virtue is knowledge". Virtue as a moral fact involves experience, insight and complete knowledge of all the elements of the situation. Men may be just by accident, pious by custom. All just and pious actions performed by accident or custom are not, therefore, virtuous. To such, just and pious actions, he would deny the name of virtue.

For that you must do the just or the pious action because you know it to be so. It then becomes, in a real sense, not merely an action, but your action for you know exactly what you are doing and why you are doing.
But Socrates goes further than all this, and means more in his dictum that virtue is knowledge. Not only a man must know rightly in order to act rightly, but if he knows rightly he will act rightly. Given the right knowledge, man cannot act otherwise. And here we arrive at the storm centre of Socratic theory of virtue. He believed implicitly that no man errs or sins voluntarily. 'Why men do the wrong things?' To this Socrates would answer that "because they do not know what they are doing, they do not see aright, fully, accurately and completely. This want of insight is the one and only source of moral shortcoming".\(^5\) Nobody is involuntarily good or voluntarily bad. Virtues and vices are not innate dispositions. The roots of virtue and vice are to be found in knowledge and ignorance respectively. The bad man does not know that it is immoral on his part to act the way he likes. Had he known the reality better, he would have made a better man. Lack of knowledge and not voluntary sinfulness, that issues in a bad conduct. The need is of right education. Virtue, being knowledge, therefore, could be taught. The spread of evil tendencies in society is due to want of proper training and lack of right education.

But the rejection of Socrates' theory of virtue is very popular in the various books on Ethics. The theory is rejected by the critics on so-called psychological grounds. It does not require, the critics maintain, a
psychologist to falsify the Socratic theory. Experience bears unlimited testimony to the fact that not all who know what the good is do what is good. Most of the sinners are the persons who know what 'goodness' is rather than persons who are ignorant of 'badness'. Knowledge and practice of virtue may not go hand in hand. This tendency of human nature is well exhibited by Śūradāsa and Virgil. Śūradāsa says in a pitiful mood: "I have seen, I have heard, I have known, and yet I have not been able to extricate myself from evil." "I see the better, but follow the worse", says Virgil. Even in the present century in the political fields we find that some nations are constantly engaged in preparations for the nuclear war, even having the knowledge of its disastrous consequences which are irreparable. Why do nations involve themselves in these test explosions when they know that these explosions will have injurious effects on unborn generations? The paradox of the Socratic theory is well brought out in Mahābhārata when Duryodhana says, "I know the right, but I cannot adopt it; I know the wrong, but I cannot abstain from it". Similarly, when Arjuna, in the Bhagavadgītā, raises a fundamental moral problem: "But by what is man compelled to commit a sin, as if by force, even against his will, Oh Kṛṣṇa?" This is the duality of human nature. Double-think and double-talk are human frailties. Again, according to Huxley, theory and practice seldom go hand-in-hand.
People, according to him, are righteous in church and exactly the opposite when out. They believe in one thing and act in another way, they temper spirituality with fleshiness, virtue with vice and rationality with superstition. Even Aristotle maintained the Socratic paradox. Even Sidgwick in his celebrated 'Methods of Ethics' said, "the positive pronouncement of Socrates are all involved in or derived from his exalted estimate of the efficacy of this knowledge that was so hard to find, his profound conviction that men's ignorance of their true good was the source of their wrong doing"; and further, 'to us it seems an extravagant paradox to treat men's ignorance of justice as the sole cause of their unjust act'.

According to the Bhagavadgītā, hyperpassion is the cause of an immoral action. First of all, the soul, in the grip of passion, tends to become distracted from the proper act of will, and hence to the loose sight, as it were, of the rule of reason. Secondly, passions may influence the judgements of reason by emphasizing some sensory goal or evil to the detriment or exclusion of a rational motive. Thus the will is not offered a proper object of choice, and hence there appears to be, according to critics, no place to 'the freedom of the will' in the Ethics of Socrates.

But was Socrates, a matchless philosopher in the whole history of Western philosophy, ignorant regarding
the whole psychology of human nature? Was he living in the ivory towers, having no connection with the masses? Did he not know persons who knew that they were ignorant of certain things, but who still pretended as if they knew everything? Did he really believe that to teach mankind 'virtue' nothing more was required than merely telling it what virtue is? Certainly not. Socrates was not a dreamer, but was a seer. If the path towards 'virtue' were simple and straight, Socrates would simply have got his system of virtue carved in stone and would have exposed it to the public gaze in some corner stone of the streets of Athens, so that whoever caught sight of it might straight practice it at once. But the path is not a bed of roses, easy and straight, as well it is steep and full of obstacles, and Socrates was one of the few who trod the path. The dust of passions lay beneath his feet and he always looked through the transparent medium of thought. For him, reason was the supreme authority, and when it whispered 'thou must', he at once used to reply 'I will'. It was naked reason without flesh-tints and rose-mists. For him, to know was to act and not let slip. The vision was steady, circumstances made no difference to him.

But what cogent reasons can be advanced to defend the Socratic theory of virtue? Is his theory justifiable at least on some grounds? It seems to me that the following are the chief grounds on which his theory could be
accepted as quite justifiable.

Critics have altogether missed what Socrates meant by 'knowledge'. Words like Philosophy, Philosopher, Knowledge, Virtue and many others as used by Socrates, had a unique sense from what they have been used by majority of men.

If we could, therefore, understand the Ethics of Socrates, his philosophy and life, then the propositions 'virtue is knowledge', 'virtue is one', and 'virtue is teachable' appear in a new light and will no longer be open to the criticisms ranged against him. When he uses the term 'virtue', it has a different connotation from our commonplace meaning of it. His conception of virtue is not based on the psychology of the masses, it is based on the psychology of those rare persons who will not be satisfied with worldly rewards of goodness. To follow the path shown by him we must be prepared to sacrifice everything else for it - riches, honour, power and earthly goods. This is the perfection of character. The so-called paradox raised by the critics is not a genuine paradox. It is an apparently self-contradictory statement. His theory of 'virtue' is not a genuine contradiction.

The good man's conduct is not determined by the proportion of coin he has in return. Money is not a standard measure of man's conduct. According to Socrates the good
man cannot be harmed. It is not the world which is to
determine what is harmful. On the contrary, harm, for
Socrates, is to be measured by the extent of a man's devia-
tion from the good. Pursuit of 'virtue' is not a condi-
tional policy. Virtue is its own reward. Socrates says
that the man who trains someone in a skill may or may not
be paid. The training and the payment are externally
related to each other, they can be understood independently
of each other. A trainer may teach a man to run so
quickly that he runs away with the fee. But there is no
fear of the good man going unpaid, since the payment is
internally related to the exercise of goodness. He cannot
be at a loss if the regard for goodness remains with him.
It is a regard for goodness, not for himself. Hence, the
truth in saying "virtue for virtue's sake".

Again, the word 'knowledge' as used by Socrates, is
not a theoretical process, but a comprehensive principle
dominating the entire personality. Knowledge, for him, is
a certain over mastering principle or the power that lays
hold primarily indeed of the intellect, but through the
intellect of the whole personality, moulding and disciplin-
ing the will and the emotions, with absolute unison with
itself. This, too, is the Indian philosophical sense of
'knowledge'. It is not merely intellectual approval but
which has been really assimilated by the will and the soul.
Man's real knowledge is not what he orally professes to
have but that which issues in action. Man's beliefs could be inferred from his action, not from his verbal testimony. Socratic knowledge is not a mere verbal testimony, but wisdom as well. It is not only an intellectual apprehension, but also it is an instrument of emotion and demands expression through them, in action. A good man is, one in whom thought, word and action have a consistency or harmony. "A man's knowledge is not a superficial, verbal, intellectual acquisition, an external decoration and an ornamental show. Knowledge must take the possession of man's heart, hold his will, stir his soul and regenerate his whole being."7 Hence, to defend Socrates' concept of 'knowledge' we must take it in its fullest and highest sense, which he contemplated or imply. A comparison may make this clear.

Socrates' theory resembles with St. Paul's saying, "Love is the fulfilment of law". Now, is it a fact of experience that love always leads to a right action? It depends on the meaning of love. Love, in the true sense of the term is that which is perfect and unfailing, fully alive and consistently active; that alone is the fulfilment of the law of love. This is true about Socrates' law of 'knowledge'. When it becomes short and ornamental, then it becomes superficial, and ultimately may or may not issue
forth in conduct. The acquisition of knowledge in the Socrates' sense of the term involves absolute sincerity and singleness of purpose, the honest humility that is always ready to acknowledge mistakes, the losing of self in the love of what is greater. If man gets such a kind of knowledge, then one must admit a close connection between knowledge and action. When knowledge does not issue in action it means only that the person has no vision before him of the truth of human life but he has false, and confused thoughts about man's purpose in life, or he has not really worked to gain knowledge. Real knowledge springs from the deeper levels of man's being. It is acquired by raising of one's mind, the growth of one's consciousness. The deeper a man is rooted in spirit, the more he knows directly. To one of ethical sensitiveness, the path of virtue is as clear as any knowledge we possess. Thus, interpreted in this sense, the Socratic paradox disappears, and his theory that 'virtue is knowledge' becomes justifiable.

Socrates had a firm conviction and his ethical thought had a basic assumption that all men, if they could, would do what was right; and the sole reason for their not doing so was some kind of ignorance. 'Vice is ignorance'.

Ignorance, of course, manifests itself in different ways, and it is easy to show that some wrong acts are
consummations of the facts misrepresented and truth perverted. But Socrates was more concerned with the kind of ignorance, that is, ignorance of good and evil. A man might know all the relevant facts, but still do wrong because he was ignorance of what was truly good.

A comparison of Socrates' theory of virtue and the Bhagavadgītā's interpretation of knowledge:

Both in the Ethics of the Bhagavadgītā and of Socrates, a prime importance is put on the role of knowledge in human life. However, Socrates defined virtue in terms of knowledge, and Bhagavadgītā defined knowledge in terms of virtue. 'Virtue is knowledge' was the view of Socrates; and knowledge consists of various virtues, this was the view of Bhagavadgītā. Similarly one Sanskrit stanza gives us various marks of knowledge in terms of virtues:

अज्ञात वर्तमान जितेंद्रियोऽभास्माः द्वारा सांति जनप्रियवतं
निग्रहेऽनात्र महाशोकश्रीन ज्ञानस्य विका द्वाधक्षणानि ॥

Again, knowledge, for Socrates, was a sufficient pre-condition for a virtuous action. Similarly, to the question, "why does a man commit sin even against his will?" we find that Socrates and Bhagavadgītā give similar explanations. Both maintain the view that ignorance is the cause of wrong-doings. But compared to Socrates' view, Bhagavadgītā gives a detail psychological analysis about the origin of wrong-doing. "As the fire is covered by smoke, mirror by dust,
an embryo is enveloped by the womb, so is knowledge covered by those (passions)." Hence, a constant check over the passions is necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. And this is possible only through practice (Abhyāsa) and control of passions (Vairāgya).

The acceptance of the Socratic theory of virtue is found in almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy, except the Cārvāka. Our speech and our action cannot always follow our intellectual conviction because of the contrary impulses deeply rooted in our character owing to past misconceptions and miscalculations about things and their values.

Lastly, sometimes a charge is made against the Socratic theory that it is antagonistic to one of the postulates of morality, 'the freedom of the will'. According to Socrates, if one has knowledge, one cannot act contrary to facts of that knowledge. If knowledge compels one to act in a particular way, then where is the 'Freedom of the will'? And if this is true, then morality would be an illusion.

But it appears again that the critics here too have not followed the psychological implication of Socratic theory. Knowledge alone could make men free morally. Only a good conduct is truly voluntary, a bad man is always constrained by ignorance to do what is contrary to his
real wish which always drives him to his greatest good. Only knowledge can set him free to realize his real wish. Hence, Socrates' theory is not antagonistic to 'Freedom of the will', but rather is compatible with moral freedom.

If this meaning of virtue and knowledge is understood, the propositions, 'virtue is one', 'virtue is teachable' and 'virtue is knowledge', will hardly be open to criticism. It is open to modern positivism and it makes linguistic philosophers say that they neither know such knowledge or virtue, nor any way of realizing them. But they should no longer urge that such a conception of virtue is based on faulty psychology. All that they may say is that the psychology implied by Socratic theory of virtue is unknown to them. But if they should be able to judge it, they must have tested it. Unless they are themselves prepared to try, their claim to testing it becomes futile.

(d) Plato's Theory of Virtue: - Plato was intellectually the greatest of Socrates' followers, and resembled his master in his enthusiasm for propounding the theory of virtue.

The Ethics of Plato cannot be treated as a finished product but rather as a continuous movement from the position of Socrates towards the more fully developed system of Aristotle. Socrates had initiated the search for definitions. Plato held that if this search succeeded we should
know what justice and courage etc. really were. Since the word 'know' implies that what is known is independent of the individual mind of the knower, he held that there must be such independent realities just as justice and courage etc. Accepting the Herakleitos' theory of flux and the theory of subjectivism and relativism of the Eleatics, Plato held that such realities as justice, courage and all such other virtues are permanent and unchanging realities existing independently of particular things and actions. Virtues could not be apprehended by perception or empirical observation, these must be pursued by pure reason, by the special activity which he called 'philosophy', whose goal was certain, final and infallible knowledge. It is 'wisdom' in the true sense of the term. Reason must be trained and directed to achieve such 'wisdom'.

But the above conclusions appear to be paradoxical. If the forms alone are real, then the practice of moral virtues such as courage, justice etc. would seem to be inferior to the practice of thought and philosophy of virtues. Mere 'knowledge' of virtues would become inferior to the 'practice' of virtues. To avoid this deficiency, the Socratic maxim that 'virtue is knowledge' takes in Plato a new esoteric significance.

Like 'The Nicomachean Ethics' of Aristotle, Plato's Republic stands for a unique place in the history of Greek
Ethics. The "classification of the virtues" dates from Greek times. The Greeks named four virtues - wisdom, temperance, courage and justice - as fundamental. Plato in whose Republic they first definitely appeared, implies that they were traditional in his day. Though not invented by Plato it was his rare insight that singled out these qualities already current in popular thought, as constituting the central core of morality. The 'cardinal' (Cardo = Hinge) virtues are the virtues upon which the moral life of a human being primarily depend... and which especially cause the good of human life. To extend the metaphor a little, one might say that a man enters into a good life through the gateway of virtue, and his moral career turns on these cardinal virtues. These four virtues are the four fundamental pillars upon which the superstructure of man's ethical life stands. Plato tries to interpret these cardinal virtues corresponding to the natural constitution of the soul, and therefore, these form the four sides of a symmetrical character. As the soul is composed of three powers—knowing, feeling and willing—so corresponding to these three are the virtues of wisdom, temperance and courage. These three qualities, however, have a reference more particularly to the individual life. They are said to be primarily Individual virtues. But a man is also a part of a social organism; hence 'Justice' is also considered as the Social virtue—the virtue which regulates other virtues.
Hence, to the question, 'how many excellences determine the wholeness of character, the goodness or righteousness of a human being?' Plato answered that these excellences are many but mainly four; they are merely different aspects of character, they are only the major parts of the whole character. The actual phrase, "the cardinal virtues" seems to derive from St. Ambrose, the doctrine emerged in Greece during the fifth and fourth centuries, and is presented with an outstanding exposition for the first time by Plato in his Republic.

Character is one of the complex Ethical conceptions, and infinite excellences are certainly required for its attainment and perfection. Because of the psycho-physical limitations of human beings, all the excellences of good character, cannot be realized in one life. Hence to avoid this difficulty of classification of the various virtues, one may try to understand the general significance of a particular virtue as the habit of acting in a suitable way in situations of a particular kind, and then to have a complete view of the kind of situations that arise in common unities at different stages of development, e.g., Aristotelian virtues are nothing but a collection of specimens of some of the important types to be found in his own age and country. Similarly, Plato's conception of virtue is nothing but a reaction against the extreme relativity and scepticism of the sophists. In brief, I may suggest that
there is no specific virtue which is paramount and to which all others can be reduced. Sound ethical reflection must recognize the complexity of its exploration, in its analysis of the moral person. Its task is to select the decisive qualities of moral character, and contrariwise the most serious defects. These would be the cardinal virtues and vices. Montaigne says:

"Nothing in the world varies so greatly as law and custom. That which is virtue on one side of the Pyrenees is vice on the other." Against this, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle maintained a permanent character of virtues, which are recognized universally as the valuable qualities of men. It is true that Greek life is not our life, but there is after all what Chesterson has called as something like the Everlasting man, and both Plato and Aristotle have caught something of this everlasting character of man. "The precise conditions of their exercise change but the habit of mind remains intrinsically the same. The Greek virtue of courage has little correspondence in modern life, yet the temper of mind is the same even today as ever." And these qualities of the everlasting man are the Platonic cardinal virtues; namely, Wisdom, Temperance, Courage and Justice.

Let us try to state and reinterpret Platonic theory of virtues.

(1) Wisdom: A fundamental mark of moral activity
is its deliberate voluntary character. Intelligence is the basic need of the moral life. The good man must be intellectually alert. Wisdom is thus rightly considered as a cardinal virtue. Many moralists have considered it as the foundation and also the crown of the moral life. So the Hebrew sage in the Book of Proverbs ranked it: "Wisdom is the principle thing, therefore get wisdom; yea, with all thy getting, get understanding". The first sentence of moral philosophy in Western civilization is the Socratic principle: 'Virtue is knowledge'. Be it noted that by knowledge Socrates did not mean merely learning, or superficial informations, but life-directing conviction. If man truly recognizes his chief and real purpose of life, he would be sure to choose and pursue it. Vice is due to ignorance, the bad man is primarily a man of bad judgment. He is mistaken in his choice of values; his gold is a fool's gold. He lacks both knowledge and the right spirit of inquiry. Wisdom, in the form of virtue, was recognized and emphasized first by Plato in the history of Greek Ethics. In Indian Ethics, in praise of wisdom Bhartrhari says: "Wisdom is the most beautiful ornament that a man can possess. It is a thing of value, and the man who lacks wisdom is but an animal." Further he says, "it is better to wander in the company of wild beasts than to live in the palaces of fools'. To lead a moral life, wisdom is essential for two reasons:
(i) Freedom of the will is one of the postulates of Ethics, and hence while making the right use of the freedom of the will, it requires that we should be conscious and discriminative, and should have refinement of moral capacities and an insight into the values of human personality. This requires *Wisdom*, and hence the wise man is receptive of and open-minded towards new approaches and insights. He has to look facts, squarely, in the face, but does not permit them to obscure his appreciation of ideal possibilities or to dull his sense of wonder at the richness of life. The really good man is the man whose acts do not spring from some sweeping impulse nor from blind passion. They are conscious expressions of his balanced judgment, of his clean conscience and his courage of convictions.

(ii) Secondly, wisdom is essential for righteousness, because of the fact that virtue consists in right action. We have already seen that virtue is an abstract into concrete actuality. Without *wisdom*, i.e. in the absence of discriminative knowledge, one would be courageous in the wrong place, and timid in the right place. Without it, one would condemn offences in others that should not be condemned and commend something repugnant to virtue. Without it, one may act with good motive but, may produce bad results and this might be in some cases because of his failure to determine the right mean. Well, I do not mean by this that stupid or ignorant people have no inherent
goodness. But their goodness is not as good, not so comprehensive and effective as the goodness which is based upon discrimination or consciousness, intelligence and refinement of moral capacities. Unthinking goodness may produce bad results. When Socrates said *Virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance*, he meant by *knowledge*, something like insight or wisdom which consists of full and clear insight into the meanings and consequences of human motives.

Hence, to determine the rightness or wrongness, the goodness or badness, to approve or disapprove, in brief, to have a discriminative attitude (Sadasadvivekabudhi) wisdom is the most useful instrument. Without it, courage cannot be a right response to reality, temperance a right attitude, and justice a right conduct in regard to human relationship. Hence, wisdom holds a unique place in Plato's *Republic*.

But is wisdom synonymous with knowledge? Ordinarily, we do make a distinction between knowledge and wisdom; and this was well-recognized by Zenophane in Greek Ethics; and even some thinkers say that Plato himself also appears to have made a distinction between *knowledge* and *wisdom*. Ordinarily, we do make a distinction between *knowledge* and *wisdom*, and say that a man may have knowledge or technical skill, and still lack wisdom. He may be unable to perceive the true end and the meaning of life. He may be a "walking encyclopaedia" yet a moral fool. Hence, wisdom means
something more than knowledge. It is knowledge objectified. It is the practical application of knowledge. We need knowledge, but more we need wisdom. The great discoveries of science and technology are admirable as the human achievement no doubt, but we must utilize these fruits of knowledge in the right end. Hence, mere knowledge may destroy the whole world, wisdom alone can save it. Hence, wisdom and knowledge are different. Knowledge is precursor to wisdom, and not identical with it. Knowledge is the only beginning of wisdom in the active experience. Knowledge is a subjective wisdom, but wisdom is objective knowledge. Knowledge becomes wisdom through the corporate activities of individuals. For instance, knowledge of politics is attained through the efforts of individuals by private study. But this knowledge will remain without effect so long as it is buried in the science of politics, in books and in the minds of men. It is only when this knowledge is embodied in the instruments of politics and government that it gives effect to the purposes of men in any practical way, since it is only through such instrumentation that knowledge becomes a concrete good. Political knowledge therefore becomes political wisdom when it is practically made effective in and through the forms of political and civil organizations. So long as such knowledge is mere science classified and organized knowledge it is the product of the abstract intellect, and is yet to be given in terms of experience
by actual application. What is true of political knowledge and political wisdom, is true of all types of knowledge. We see in the above example what is meant by wisdom. That knowledge is wisdom which completely and permanently objectifies and embodies itself in the instruments of life and then co-ordinates these instruments in such a way that each expresses a final relation to the whole, so that all of them in their unity constitute the whole. Hence, wisdom is objective and realized experience.

But, I do not think that Plato had made a distinction between wisdom and knowledge. Socrates also used the word knowledge in the sense of wisdom, and hence his maxim, 'virtue is knowledge'. It all depends upon the interpretation of the term knowledge. Socrates uses the word knowledge in the peculiar sense of the term—as personal conviction, insight. Critics have misinterpreted the Socratic conception of knowledge. In order to convey the real significance of the word knowledge, Plato simply uses the word wisdom. I have elaborately discussed this idea in the previous chapter while considering Socratic conception of knowledge and its wrong interpretations given by various critics.

Now, the question before us is, regarding the way through which we acquire this wisdom. For this, I think that the way suggested by Indian saints and sages in the past might be useful. They maintain that knowledge can
be taught, but wisdom cannot be gained by taking a course or reading a book. One cannot get it instantly. The cultivation of wisdom may be aided by 'meditation'. The wise men of different ages, from Socrates to those of present age, have testified to the value of spending some time every day in taking account of moral failures and personal moral attainments. With the poise gained through meditation, we must act on the basis of these higher moral insights, so that moral discrimination becomes our second nature.

(2) Temperance: Temperance seems to be the most misunderstood virtue of all. The scope of temperance is so unlimited in our day-to-day life that some equate temperance with all virtues. It is to be practised in small as well as great things. Men have to bear as well as forbear. This appears to be the view of Frederick Perthes when he regarded temperance as the source of all virtues. For many persons to be virtuous means to be temperate, and hence all virtue is temperance, and consequently all vice is intemperance. It is in virtue of this quality of character that Shakespeare describes man as a being "looking before and after". The various virtues are the various forms of temperance. Virtue is temperance. "For what is self-control but the feature of character which helps a man never to lose his head, be it for fear of pain or for lust after pleasure, and let his action be
guided by a dispassionate judgement as to that which is the right thing for him to do." The Greek word Sophrosyne, which was translated as the master virtue may have connoted something similar to this all-embracing virtue of self-control.

Like wisdom, temperance forms the chief point of distinction between man and the lower animals, and indeed there can be no true manness without it. The instincts, the various passions and emotions are the materials of a moral life. They are not to be destroyed, we have simply to control them; and this can only be done by the exercise of temperance in an intelligent way. Such a view is found even in the Bible in which praise is given, not to the strong man who taketh a city, but to the stronger man who rules his own spirit. This stronger man is he who controls his desires, passions, impulses and inclinations. In praise of temperance, Herbert Spencer says, "in the value of Temperance consists one of the perfections of the ideal man". It is by temperance alone that the truly heroic character (Mahāvīr) grows at its quintessence. A stronger temper is not necessarily a bad temper. But strong the temper, the greater is the need of self-discipline and self-control. Hence, we do find in the history of humanity some great characters having a stronger temper, but of equally strong determination to hold their power under strict regulation and control. Wordsworth, the great poet,
had in his childhood "a stiff, moody and violent temper" but regulation of life disciplined his temper, and he learned to exercise greater self-control. Similarly, Faraday has been described by Prof. Tyndall, as a man of strong will and original mind with fiery temper and yet showed extreme tenderness of emotion and sensibility of character. 'Under his sweetness and gentleness was the heat of a volcano.'

Even in ordinary human life, the importance of temperance can easily be shown. Generally, people like to live a happy life, the only thing perhaps may be, that some people do not know how to live a happy life. The knowledge of temperance may help them. It is necessary to one's personal happiness to exercise temperance or self-control over one's words and actions as well; for there are words that strike even harder than actual physical blows. Men may "speak daggers" though use none. Hence, the wise man will restrain his desires to say a smart or severe thing at the expense of another's feelings; while the fool blurts out what he thinks. "The mouth of a wise man," said Solomon, "is in his heart, the heart of a fool is in his mouth." "Be silent or say something better than silence." "Speak fitly", said George Herbert, "or be silently wise." It is better to remain silent than to speak the truth ill-humoured, and so spoil an excellent dish by covering it by bad sauce. This might have been
the idea of Aristotle long ago when he stated the efficacy of temperance in the form of Relative Mean between the two extremes. Now, let us try to explain the nature and the various sub-forms of temperance.

In a quite literal sense, temperance appears to be a negative concept, and hence is regarded by some people to be a negative virtue, rather than a positive one. It asks us to refrain from the two extremes. Some even regard it, though wrongly, as rejection of instincts and desires, passions and inclinations, as if, these irrational aspects of the soul are evil in themselves.

But 'temperance' need not be regarded as a negative virtue having nothing to do with the positive aspect of morality. It does not mean destruction of instincts and passions. There is no doubt that virtuous life is a struggle between feelings and reason, between impulses and conscience. "When I would do good, evil is presented with me," is a widespread human experience. But temperance has also a positive aspect in which it demands a rational and harmonious control of all the impulses and desires in the interests of the whole self and of society. A considerable degree of self-control alone is the very basis of a true virtuous life, because a wise self-control alone can avoid extremism, extreme hedonism and extreme asceticism.

Secondly, temperance, taken to be a purely negative
virtue in the sense of destruction of passions, leads us to two difficulties.

(I) The first is the **psychological** difficulty.

If we take temperance as destruction of passions, then this would be an absolutely **unpsychological**, because emotions are the roots of our spiritual strength. They are the substance of the inner content of life, the very basis of its fullness. With its eradication, the spiritual life itself would be non-existent. Even the Ethics of Buddhism and Jainism did not emphasize the complete eradication of passions. Hence, the ascetic ideal is basically unpsychological and hence wrong. No one in the past or present had destroyed passions. Asceticism overlooks the fact that the higher form of life does not exclude, but only surpasses or transcends, the lower portion of nature. The **Mahāvīra** of the Jainas, the **Arhat** of Buddhist or the **Sthitaprajña** of the Bhagavadgītā does not eradicate the passions or aesthetic joys of this beautiful world, but only transcends them. Such men are **in** the world, but are not **of** the world. **The passions** are, in fact, the **matter** of temperance, **reason** supplies the **form**. And the mistake of asceticism is that it tries to destroy the **matter** and supposes that the **form** can subsists by itself. Plato and Aristotle never laid emphasis on the ascetic view of life, only the Stoics did hold the view steadfastly. Hence,
Stoic asceticism is unpsychological, because it demands complete exterpation of passions, which is a psychological impossibility.

(II) Secondly, the view that temperance means eradication of passions is ethically untenable. Every genuine Ethical ought is positive. True morality asks 'What ought I to do?' rather than 'what I ought not to do'. Morality demands, not destruction, but construction, the creation of the higher out of the lower order of things in human nature. Out of nothing, nothing can be actualized. The world of desires and passions, emotions and feelings, is the material for the realization of a spiritual life. If they are destroyed to nothing, no formation will be possible.

Hence, psychologically and ethically as well, destruction of passions appears to be an impossible attitude. If this is true, then one must maintain the view that temperance does not mean deformation, in the form of destruction, but it means self-realization; unfolding of a full-blossomed life, its completion, its organic transformation, its advancement into harmony, the fostering and perfection of its bloom. Of course, the psycho-physico character of the impulses and instincts is tyrannical. They are unstable like the wind. But the more they are unstable, the more is the skill exercised and the strong will required to control the various temptations which instinctively
human nature is prone to. Of course, the negative side of temperance is directed exclusively against excess, lack of balance. But the more important is the positive aspect which means the possession of power over affective impulses, the virtue of inward right proportion of positive transformation of the emotional life.

In gaining control over passions, we should avail ourselves of the help which social conventions, psychological necessities and Religious bindings can give us. After reviewing in our minds the dangers of the old ways, we should centre our attention upon the new habits to be established. We must control, wherever possible as well as desirable, any stimuli which led to the old temptation and then make a beginning in the line of conduct we wish to cultivate. For many, prayer, faith, comradeship and the loyalty to a great cause which religion is able to instill, will be effective. Hence, the function and nature of temperance is not restrictive or prohibitive or negative. It does not assume that there is in the agent something that is essentially bad that is to be got rid of; it is the positive effort to provide the agent with the means and instruments by which his acts may be made significant and help maintain a balance and equilibrium between two excesses.

Now, in order to arrive at a precise and comprehensive notion of the cardinal virtue of Temperance, let us contrast it with Fortitude.
Temperance is related to the concupiscent appetite as Fortitude is to the irascible appetite, emotions of fear and boldness. The concupiscent attitude is the division of the sense appetite concerned with desiring what is sensibly pleasant. Temperance, hence, is concerned with keeping in order the sense-pleasure, the pleasures connected with the desire of food, drink and sex. And the mean of perfection, found in temperance, soars above the two defective conditions of a brutish and excessive seeking of sense enjoyment, on the one hand, and an excessive sorrow when sense enjoyment is absent, on the other. The first extreme is indulgence, the other extreme is insensibility.

Temperance, then, is a virtue which consists in moderating the emotions of enjoyment and sorrow and especially the pleasures of touch and taste in order to achieve the good of reason in the concupiscent appetite.

The Virtues under Temperance: By the phrase "virtues under temperance" we mean those virtues which are species or forms of the cardinal virtue of temperance.

Abstinence: Abstinence is a virtue moderating the enjoyment of the taste of food in order to realize the good of reason. But this meaning of Abstinence does not mean "total denial of food". There can be a total abstinence from one kind of food, if there is some ordering to the good of reason, or for some religious motive. A vegetarian,
however, is not necessarily practising the virtue of abstinence, he may simply dislike meat. If such is the motive, he is no more virtuous in this regard than one who abstains from spinach because of dislike of it. The virtue of abstinence, as a specific kind of temperance, must moderate the sense desire for something, and if there is no desire for some particular object there can be no moderation in this respect, and without such moderation there is no virtuous activity. Nor does it follow that the vegetarian is virtuous because he thinks that meat is bad for human health; he would simply be in a speculative error. The vegetarian can be virtuous in his total abstinence from meat if he would enjoy the taste of meat but is totally abstaining from it for some proportionate good of Reason realizable in his case.

**Fasting** is not the same as abstinence. Fasting can be a special act of the virtue of abstinence if it is practised for some good of reason or for some religious motive and is not carried to the extreme of seriously affecting one's health. Fasting is a special act of virtue, provided it is done with genuine reason.

The vice opposed to abstinence is **Gluttony**, the inordinate desire for the taste of food sought only for pleasure and not for the good of reason. 'One should eat to live, not live to eat' expresses the situation very well.
Sobriety is a virtue observing the rule of moderation in the enjoyment and use of intoxicating drink. Sobriety is the good habit of desiring intoxicating drinks in reasonable moderation. Excessive use of intoxicants disturbs the reasoning processes and is morally bad. But I think it is wrong to take intoxicants even moderately. Certain people, at the different stages of their life, have a particular obligation to remain sober, for instance, children or teenagers, obviously. St. Thomas thought that women, teachers, bishops and priests and rulers of state, in brief, people whose work requires clear thinking should stay away from wine.

Opposed to sobriety is the vice of Drunkenness. It is the habit or act of inordinately desiring intoxicating drinks.

Chastity is the virtue of having a good habit of moderation in desiring the use of the faculty of sexual reproduction. Chastity does not mean complete abstinence from the reproductive act; this function is good when rationally regulated.

Opposed to Chastity is the vice of Luxury, the habit of unreasonable sexual indulgence. Subordinate vices growing out of luxury are: loss of mental activity, inconsideration, precipitation, inconsistency, selfishness, hatred of God, concern for this life and horror of the future life.
It is to be remembered that all these sub-forms under Temperance signify a moderation in the psychic movement of the appetite in relation to its object. The temperate person is one who feels the attraction of sensible goods and the repulsion of sensible evils, in moderation.

(3) **Courage** :- In the ethical vocabulary the etymology of the term virtue reveals some interesting strains of early moral thought. Virtue comes to us from the Latin **Virtus**, derived from **Vir** (man); it meant originally manliness, valour and courage. The Greek term **arete** which implies human perfection in its broadest sense, had originally the same martial connotation. At any rate courage has a long settled high rank among the perfections of character.

Courage in the epic tradition refers to the attitude of steadfastness with which the individual meets situations involving uncertainty and danger. Its typical instance is the soldier who stands firm in the midst of fire or the person who performs some feat at the risk of his life. Hence Froude considered courage as an essence of high character. But courage should not be considered as a merely aggressive attitude to danger. According to Whitehead true courage is not the bruteful force of vulgar heroes, but the firm resolve of virtue and reason. That is, it is the middle course between foolhardness, where an individual places himself in danger merely because of the aggressive attitude, cowardice or ignoble timidity. But
the form in which danger confronts us has changed greatly in the past, i.e. during Greek period, the dangerous situation that the Greek soldiers faced required some physical courage. But courage can be moral also. Physical courage is the willingness to endure physical pains or risks in the service of some noble and worthy cause. It is, hence, illustrated by the daring of the soldier, the firemen and explorers. Moral courage is the readiness to endure ridicule, abuse, and unpopularity for the sake of one's courage of moral convictions. In the history of humanity, we find some outstanding men who for their moral convictions gladly embraced even death. These men, with moral courage stood for what they believed to be right, even if it meant personal loss. These mighty men of the world who set forth new ideas or who supported unpopular causes did not ordinarily gained praise and ordinary admiration from men who lived in their own life-time. But their action, however, points out a greater strength of character than enlistment for battles. Such loyalty to worthy causes demands real daring and moral earnestness. Christ of Nazareth, Socrates, Bruno, Gāndhiji and in modern period Martin Luther, and a host of others have exemplified such moral leadership.

In brief, the power to endure, to suffer pain and loss, as well as the power to perform a dangerous and disagreeable duty, to face unpopularity are the important
aspects of moral courage. It also manifests itself in outward bravery, the ability to stake one's life, the spontaneous facing of extreme danger and the standing at one post. It inheres in all decisive efforts, in all steadfast preservance, in all quietly persistent tenacity, i.e. whenever there is an element of adventure in a situation, which requires personal commitment and demands sacrifice. Hence, here we use the word courage in the wide sense, rather than merely the physical sense of the term.

But now the question before us is how we come to know the possession of this virtue. The courage of a man is tested in the given conflict. Like other virtues, courage reveals itself in activity. It is tested in the given conflict. Many men honestly believe themselves to be brave in the highest degree, and yet fail under the first stress of circumstance. Many people are timid, but at the critical moment prove themselves to be strong and steadfast. What, then, comes to light is a sort of individual sterling quality that was hidden, and it is this which constitutes the virtue of courage.

Moral life is a venture and requires courage at every turn. Along with the courageous deed must be classed the courageous word, conviction and opinion.

Courage and Intelligence:- Courage is best described as presence of mind. And we must have an intelligent
perception of the nature, of the present situation. A genuine intelligent mind knows the nature of the situation and the corresponding duty in a given case. It is for this reason that Plato's definition of Courage is perhaps the best—a knowledge of things that are to be feared and of things that are not to be feared. This means that if a situation which calls for action is understood in all its complex implications, some type of worthy action will be indicated in the nature of the situation, and the degree of worth of our act will depend upon the quality of our interpretation and the extent of our knowledge of this situation. When our knowledge is imperfect, our action will be hesitant (either in the form of foolhardness or timidity) and awkward, or possibly impulsive and disastrous, but in any case, inappropriate to the end which would be indicated to us if we saw more clearly. Hence, cowardice is due to ignorance, and courage is due to knowledge.

Some of the sensible objects and situations which man must face in the course of his life present special difficulties, which create moral disturbance in the life of man. What is recognized in modern psychology and psychiatry as a maladjustment of personality is frequently a distortion of the natural passions of the irascible appetite. Excessive and ill-founded fears, an unreasonable daring and uncontrolled anger, all these give rise not only to psychological problems but also to moral dilemmas. Actually,
fortitude is a mean between the tendency to excessive fear (which implies a defect of daring) and excessive daring (which implies a defect of fear).

Fortitude may be defined as the good habit of the irascible appetite enabling its possessor to suffer and to attack physical danger, firmly and reasonably. It is to be emphasized that firmness is the essence of fortitude, which means strength, literally. A man must be prepared to remain reasonable at all times, even in a situation in which his life appears to be in danger. The life stories of Socrates, Christ, Bhakta Pralhad, Mahatma Gandhi are worthy instances.

Two acts of the virtue of fortitude are possible. All persons experience fear and daring. Only the morally developed perform the acts of fortitude. The first act is to suffer danger reasonably. Even in undergoing physical sufferings and physical threats, he must be a man. He must use his rational powers to stand up firmly in the face of danger. The second act is to attack such dangers reasonably. Passive resistance is not always enough and reasonable. The good moral agent is required to use all reasonable means at his disposal to avoid and overcome dangers. Hence, passive resistance is not the only real bravery, this is against the Gandhian notion of fortitude which was to him non-violece under any circumstances. It is reasonable and virtuous to use force in many cases of actual danger. This
is not to deny that it may be a mark of superior virtue to refrain from violence under certain conditions where it is possible to use it.

Nor should one state that the brave man suffers no fear. It is excessive, unreasonable fear which is opposed to the virtue of fortitude. We shall see that it is a vice to feel no fear in a situation which actually threatens one's life.

There are six virtues connected with fortitude.

(1) **Magnanimity** means greatmindedness (*Mahāmāṃsva*). It is good to desire and hope for honours which are reasonably possible. This virtue strengthens the irascible power in its aspiration for important honours. Magnanimity is a sort of strength in facing the obstacles and difficulties associated with the quest for reasonable esteem from others. Presumption, over-ambitiousness, vainglory, small-mindedness are vices opposite to Magnanimity.

(2) **Magnificence** is literally the capacity 'to make something great'. It develops hope and firm confidence in the moral agent. Parsimony, miserliness, extravagance are the opposite of Magnificence.

(3) **Perseverance** is a virtue enabling one to persist in a reasonable way, where the difficulty is the length of time which must be endured before the desired end is attained. Spinelessness is the vice of Perseverance,
which consists in the habit of giving up too easily in the face of difficulties. Stubbornness is the second vice which means the habit of persisting in the face of difficulties which the reasonable person would not try to overcome.

(4) **Patience** is the virtue enabling the agent to bear up under the impact of evils other than that of death. The loss of a job, of one’s money, of personal beauty, or strength and other such things require much forbearance. Defect of sorrow, excess of sorrow are the vices opposite to the virtue of **Patience**.

(5) **Longanimity** is literally 'long-mindedness'. Through it, one is able to keep one's intention fixed on some distant objective.

(6) **Constancy** is the last of these virtues connected with **fortitude**. It enables one to persist in the face of external obstacles to a good work. It implies firmness of feeling in regard to circumstantial difficulties.

(4) **Justice** :- Every one is familiar to some extent with the virtue of justice, but this very familiarity easily conceals a certain ambiguity in the significance of the name. In the history of Ethics, we find that justice has been used in a variety of senses. We speak of a just price, a just wage, a just war and sometimes even of a just man. And while all of these uses are closely related, nevertheless they are wholly the same. The last is perhaps
the moral sense, all the former being used in a non-moral context. The closeness of the different meanings, in fact, may be the very reason that we fail to discern the differences, which are important to note if we wish to understand Justice ethically and the other virtues related to it.

Before we explain the meaning of Justice, it would be advantageous to take as our starting point as to what do we mean by an unjust man. Hence, by noticing what a just man is not, we can arrive at what a just man is.

The two important characteristics of an unjust man are:

(a) Refusal to obey laws. Here the man regularly and intentionally violates laws. Laws are meant to advance the common good. A man who deliberately seeks to go against the common good by violating the laws—in a word, by being lawless—is certainly an unjust man. Lawlessness is thus one characteristic of the unjust man.

(b) The other characteristic of an unjust man is the desire to attain more than what he already has. He seeks to gain for himself something at the expense of others in all possible ways. He grasps what is beneficial to himself and is quick to leave whatever is disadvantageous for the other fellow. He is simply unfair. Hence, the lawless man and the unfair man both would be considered by everyone
claims, and an attitude of respect for the rights of human personality as an end in itself. This might be the basis of Categorical Imperative of Kant when he said in one of the maxims of his famous Categorical Imperative, 'Treat humanity as an end, and never as a means only'.

All these cardinal virtues are the chief aspects of good character. Thus, virtue, as a moral excellence is one, one with the moral ideal, namely the strength of character. 'The only name for this one virtue, if I am asked to pick out is wholeness or integrity or harmony of character', says Leighton in his The Individual and Social Order. This is what Plato meant by righteousness or goodness of the various capacities of human nature. This is what Jesus meant when he said, "if Thine eye is single, the whole body shall be full of lights". The person who has acquired the moral virtues of wisdom, Temperance, Courage and Justice is the good man. He is recognizable by the fact that in all situations he promptly, uniformly and pleasurably does what is reasonable. It is the effect of good habit to do the right thing promptly, uniformly, because virtue is permanent; pleasurably because what we do well and skilfully we do with pleasure.

There is a mutual relationship between the moral virtues and their perfect state. The person who is perfectly just is also truly prudent, temperate and courageous. The reason is that no real virtue can be had without prudence;
and prudence is impossible without justice, temperance and fortitude. The presence of prudence implies that one's appetites are in proper order. Since man's moral judgments reflect the order or disorder in his appetites, no one can constantly make prudent judgements if his appetites are not in order. However, it is generally true that any serious attempt to develop one virtue is accompanied by growth in the other virtues. Likewise, serious collapse of a virtue often brings with it a breakdown of the other virtues. A woman who surrenders to unchastity will often become unjust and intemperate. A drunken man will satisfy his cravings, forget his family and his obligations.

So far, I have only restated the Platonic theory of virtue which he regarded to be the foundation of a moral character. But I want to consider the Platonic virtues from a different point of view without distorting the "unity of virtues". I believe that the Platonic theory of virtue can be considered from three points of view: (i) as a virtue, (ii) as a rule of action, and (iii) as the condition of certain good.

Temperance has the dignity of virtue only when it refers to shameful states or actions. Virtue does not require that we should be temperate in general or in everything, but only that we should abstain from that which is below human dignity and from the things in which it would
be a shame on our part to indulge in unchecked. But, if a person is moderate in seeking after truth, or abstains from showing good-will to his neighbours, no one would call him a virtuous man. It follows from this that there is nothing in Temperance as virtue in itself, but it takes the form of virtue according to its right or wrong application to objective reality.

Similarly, courage is also a virtue in so far as it expresses the right relation of the rational human being to his lower material nature, the relation, namely, of mastery and power, the supremacy of the spirit over the animal instinct of self-preservation. Praiseworthy courage is shown by the man who does not tremble at the accidental misfortunes, who keeps his self-control in the midst of external dangers and bravely risks his life and material goods for the sake of things that are higher and more worthy for sacrifice. But the bravest unruliness, the most daring aggressiveness and the most fearless blaspheming are not praised as virtues, nor is the horror of sins or the fear of God reckoned, with shameful cowardice. In this case, then, the quality of being virtuous or vicious, depends upon a certain relation to the object and not on the psychological nature of the emotional and volitional states.

Wisdom, the knowledge of the best ways and means, for attaining the purpose before us, and the capacity to
apply these means aright, owes its significance as a virtue not to this formal capacity for the most expedient action as such, but necessarily depends upon the moral worth of the purpose itself. Wisdom as a virtue is the faculty of attaining the best purposes in the best possible way, or the knowledge of applying, in the most expedient way, one's intellectual forces, to objects of the greatest worth. There may be wisdom apart from this condition, but such wisdom would not be a virtue. The Biblical 'serpent' had certainly justified its reputation as the wisest of earthly creatures by the understanding he showed of human nature and the skill with which he showed and used his understanding for the attainment of this purpose. Since, however, the purpose was an evil one, the serpent's admirable wisdom was not recognized as a virtue and was cursed as a source of evil, and the wisest creature has remained the symbol of an immoral mind, absorbed in what is low and unworthy.

Hence, these Platonic virtues are dependent upon each other. The same principle can be applied to the theological virtues of Christianity, faith, hope and charity. (We shall explain this view while discussing section (ii) Theory of Virtue in Medieval Ethics.)

Merits of Plato's List of Virtue: Compared to Aristotle's list of virtues, Plato's list has the merit
of simplicity. Aristotle sometimes appears to be unnecessarily lengthening the list of virtues. Again, like Socrates, Plato ultimately believes in the unity of virtues. According to Plato, virtues are interdependent, these are internally connected, and believes that good life is equivalent to the integration of the Cardinal virtues. Again, man, being a social animal, does not aspire after merely self-regarding virtues, like wisdom, temperance or courage. It is because of this feature that these virtues are oriented in the virtue of justice, the highest of all the social virtues. It is because of this feature that justice makes good life not only self-consistent with the individual concerned, but it establishes a social harmony not only with a particular society but with the whole world.

(e) Aristotle's Theory of 'Virtue' :- Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, was grappled with the Socratic paradox that no man can know what is right and is inclined to do the wrong. He rejected even Plato's solution of it, namely, that when this seems to occur, it is opinion and not 'knowledge' of the good which is conquered by desire.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is known in the history of Greek Philosophy as the first systematic and mature product of Aristotle's thought, and is a valuable treasure-house for the explorer of virtues. Sometimes his
treatment of virtue may appear to be too artificial, his list of virtues may not be complete, his doctrine of 'Mean' may not be treated as absolute or as universally applicable to all the forms of virtues, still moral philosophers should not forget it, because of the wealth of its contents. In spite of its limitations, his theory of virtue gives us a unique insight into Greek moral sentiments.

First and the foremost will be our duty to understand what did he actually mean by 'virtue' when he said that virtue consists in a "Mean between the two extremes". He defines virtue as "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, that is, the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it."13

It is generally said that this doctrine conforms to the common man's point of view. 'Nothing too much' is an idea which is quite popular everywhere in the 5th century B.C., it is so with the younger Ionian physical theorists in Prodicus, who introduced it into rhetoric; the Pythagoreans, who in turn introduced it into Mathematics extended it further, and is from Medicine that it passes, through Democritus, into moral Philosophy. Coming to Indian standpoints, Śukrācārya said, "do not subject your senses too much to severity nor you do become a slave".
One should neither be a Stoic nor an epicurian. Similarly, Rāmdās said, "अति सक्रम बनि बनावे। प्रसंग पाहैन चालावे। हट निग्रही ज पढावे। निषेडी पुनः॥"

Again in Bhagavadgītā it is said that "Yoga is not possible for him who eats too much, nor for him who eats too little; to him whose food and recreation are moderate whose exertion is moderate, whose sleep and waking are moderate, to him yoga is possible." (6/17)

From the above passages and many others like these, one can form an impression that Aristotle has not been up to a new theory of virtue, he does not state any original or revolutionary theory about the nature of virtue.

But there are some unique features of his theory of 'virtue'. Aristotle approached the problem of virtue perhaps for the first of time in Greek Ethics, from purely quantitative point of view. In order that the notion of mean may be applicable, the object of virtue has to be a continuous quantity. In every divisible quantity, one can take a greater part, a smaller part or an equal part. While taking the equal part, one will determine the mean with regard to the thing. But there can also be a part smaller than what we need and finally a part equal to what we need. In this case, in taking an equal part, one will determine the mean with regard to our conduct. This suggests that the mean of virtue is not for Aristotle an objective mean only but also a subjective one. One must
take care, however, not to be deceived by these words: subjective and objective. Aristotle does not wish to say that the mean of virtue is left to arbitrary appraisal of the subject. Still, virtue has two aspects: objective and subjective. The things which virtue ought to deal are measured things; the mean is the distinctive quality of the object of virtue. The state of mind in which virtue ought to do them are, on the contrary, qualities of the subject. This is the habitual state which makes it perform what virtue requires in a stable and unerring fashion with a correct intention. It is a habit of will, determined by a rational principle. The validity of the above principle can be illustrated with reference to particular cases of action and wherein the relative mean suggests the virtue; e.g.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>excess</th>
<th>deficiency</th>
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<tr>
<td>Facing death</td>
<td>Too much fear</td>
<td>Right Attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving money</td>
<td>Prodigality</td>
<td>Liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>Vanity</td>
<td>Self-respect</td>
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From the above schemata it is clear that Aristotle's contribution consists in the fact that his relative mean is an illustration of a quantitative and progressive analysis, each of the terms adding something new, and giving it further depth and precision, which features are not present.
in earlier passages similar to Aristotle's doctrine. For example, one can feel fear, courage, desire, anger, pity and so on, as well as pleasure and pain generally, either too much or too little, and in ethical case wrongly. But to have the feelings at the right time on the right occasion and towards the right person, and with a right aim in view and in a right manner, is the middle way and this is the mark of a 'virtue'.

The Nature of the Mean: What is meant by acting in moderation? What is the nature of this mean? Aristotle warns against being misled by the analogy of the mathematical mean which can be computed simply. The Golden mean of Aristotle is not to be thought of as midway between the two extremes. It is not a mathematical mean which is always equi-distance from opposite points. Aristotle's mean is an ethical mean which is relative. Its position in relation to the extremes will vary according to circumstances, time, person and so on. For illustration, courage is a virtue but more courage is required of a soldier than a shop-keeper, the courage of the soldier will bear more resemblance to rashness than that of the shop-keeper. Similarly, the temperance of a priest ought to be somewhat closer to insensibility, while that of an artist might lean a little more to the side of licentiousness.

The statement that virtue lies somewhere between two vices is a figure of speech. Its meaning without the
use of metaphor is: if we compare a virtue with two vices, the virtue is neither the one nor the other vice. If somebody is virtuous, it means that he is not an extremist. Therefore, Aristotle's concept of virtue can be described in two ways—Positively and Negatively. Positively, virtue is that which exists between the two extremes of vices; Negatively, it amounts to saying that virtue is that which is not an extreme (i.e. that which is not too much and too little).

The existence of the vices or virtues, Aristotle presupposes as self-evident. He does not prove that the two extremes, as for instance, rashness and cowardice, are vices; his Ethics takes them for granted, just as geometrists presuppose two extreme points of a line as given in order to determine the point by which the line is divided into two equal parts. The two extreme points being given, the bisecting point is automatically implied. The centre is determined by the given circle, or the middle point of a line by the two given extremes, so also a virtue is determined by the two extremes which are the vices; and the vices too are implied by the given 'relative mean'.

The Knowledge of the Mean:—After explaining the nature of the 'mean', the next question is about the 'knowledge' of this Mean. How do we know this Relative Mean? The mean, not being a mathematical mean, how, can we know it? In general, it is said that the knowledge of
this Golden Mean has no any golden rule or rule of thumb by virtue of which we can tell where the proper mean is. The mean being relative, subjective, or situational, no absolute formula is there with the help of which we can have knowledge of the mean. The mean is not one and the same for all. The knowledge of the mean does not consist in finding simply the splitting difference between opposing over- and under-estimates. The mean is to be understood by prudence. It is the person who is to decide the Mean. The virtuous man will be neither super-normal nor sub-normal, but justly and wisely be normal. Therefore, prudence itself gives us the knowledge of the mean. We often say, wisdom consists in knowing where to stop; enough is as good as feast, and so on.

The mean can never be treated as an absolute one, applying universally to all the moral virtues. Its range of application is limited. Aristotle believed that the mean is applicable to all moral virtues: courage, temperance etc. But it appears that there are some moral virtues to which the mean cannot be applied, e.g., the principle of moderation cannot be applied to the concept of devotion in Hindu Ethics; and there are some activities in which a mean can never be determined; e.g., when it comes to cruelty, violence, lying, shamelessness, envy, adultery, theft and malevolence. Well these are wrong, not because these are extreme states of emotions but because these are bad in
themselves. In these cases the question of Mean does not arise. Envy is never right and proper because it conveys that it is intrinsically wrong and improper. What is true of envy is also true of other vices too. These vices are always wrong and have no place in a perfect ethical life.

Similarly, the doctrine of moderation cannot be applied to some theological virtues, such as bhakti, tapas, dhyāna and samādhi. How can there be a mean in devotion? In devotion when we establish direct communion with God, there cannot be a measure to decide the mean. The reason is simple. When virtue observes the mean, it is possible to sin by excess or by deficiency; but there is no sinning by excess against God, for it is written in Ecclus:

"Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can, for He is above all praise." It is said that God created man in order that the latter may become or realize God. But, according to deism, howsoever one tries to become God, the distinction between the devotee and God will permanently remain.

But I think that the above limitations of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean are unacceptable, since Aristotle never claimed the universal applicability of his theory of the Relative Mean. He wanted to make Ethics social rather than other-worldly in character. Aristotle's attitude towards the world of humanity is that of a great master-builder.
Here he sees a definite station for a man. Here one has to work so hard as to reach the humanity as a whole to its virtuous perfection. His Ethics was purely a humanistic scheme of virtues without any metaphysical reorientation. He looks upon virtue as a necessity of human life. He was, like Confucious and Lord Buddha, in search of a gentleman or virtuous man rather than a superman.

Are Virtues Acquired or Innate? :- Aristotle rejects the innateness of virtues and regards them as acquired dispositions to be put into practice, which become a settled habit, a permanent condition of the soul. The 'habit of will', therefore, is to be acquired. But how? Here, Aristotle can give only the rule that this 'habit of will' is to be determined by reason according to the judgement of the man of practical intelligence.

The virtues are to be stabilized by faith and practice alone. The good activities are to be practised without any break. Nirantara (निरंतर) and bhadukarma (भद्रकर्मा) are the essential factors for the stability of virtues, according to Tulsidas. Right faith also is necessary. Patanjali, the founder of the Yoga system, appears to have held the view when he said that our minds gather a force when we concentrate upon virtues such as sympathy, compassion, contentment and detachment. William James also said that even though we may not believe that God, Freedom and Immortality are real, let us act from
Critics of Aristotle often point out that his list of virtues is unnecessarily widened. It also suffers from incompleteness. His doctrine of moderation refers to manners and not to virtues of man's life. The inclusion of things such as magnificence, loftymindedness, wit and many others in a treatise like Nicomachean Ethics suggests that Aristotle does not keep in mind the distinction between manners and morals, problems of taste and the problems of character as such.

Again, Aristotle defined some virtues in terms of his celebrated doctrine of the Relative Mean. But in such an attempt at defining virtues, the pertinent question crops up in a curious mind as to which virtues were uppermost in his mind. It appears, Aristotle kept before himself the model of the Greek moral ideals. Greek moral ideals mean the moral ideals of the higher class of people of Athens. People of higher class accepted some ideals which Aristotle accepted as moral virtues. The special moral ideals in the form of virtues is interesting to note. For example, magnificence, greatness of soul, gentleness, being agreeable in the company, modesty, courage, temperance, liberality and many others. Liberality and Magnificance consist in reasonable attitude with regard to money. The ideal of the greatness of soul is expressed in conduct in
relation to people belonging to the lower class. Gentleness, modesty, etc. may discipline man’s life. But can these be raised to the status of virtue? This is the main question which appears to be answered unsatisfactorily by Aristotle’s interpretation of virtues.

Again, benevolence is the chief virtue in the Ethics of Christianity, Buddhism and Jainism. These religions had a firm conviction that there is no sense in coming to this world, if one is devoid of benevolence and the propensity to charity. In modern times Butler in his 'Analogy of Religion' advocates the importance of Benevolence as the cream of all human virtues. But, it is surprising that Aristotle's list of virtues does not mention Benevolence. Sidgwick says that "Benevolence is not recognized, except obscurely."\(^{15}\)

Moreover, Aristotle’s theory appears to be mediocre, because it lacks the spirit of adventure that is required for progress and reform in society. It is true that if nothing is ventured, nothing is gained, and the policy to follow the middle path may sometimes exhibit a fear toward an authority, lack of spirit of independent thinking rather than courage of conviction born out of reason. Jawāharlāl Nehru used to say success comes to those who dare and act, it seldom goes to the timid.

Even though Aristotle’s doctrine suffers from the
above drawbacks, it has some merits also. The inclusion of Friendship in Nichomachean Ethics is certainly a novel experiment which no other thinker prior to Aristotle had thought over. Some of his standpoints may be objectionable, still it must be granted that his theory has some applica-
tion to a wide range of virtues. In brief, Aristotle's Ethics can be pictured as an attempt to answer two questions: (1) What is the good life for man? (2) How ought men, in so far as they are moral, to act? The meta-
physical and the political doctrines are deeply involved in his answer to the first question and the celebrated doctrine of the mean in his answer to the second. His answer to the second question is that men ought to live moderately, in accordance with the dictates of practical reason for the attainment of happiness. The doctrine of the mean is thus developed by him to explain how men ought to behave in order to achieve happiness.

It is important for a full comprehension of this doctrine that "mean" is not to be identified with "average". There are at least two important implications for his Ethics in this doctrine.

(1) There are a number of different, but proper ways of living for people. What is proper for one individual may not be proper for another, since people differ in so many fundamental ways; and

(2) the correct way of living for any given person
cannot be determined through the use of reason alone. It can be established by empirical investigations how much food a man should eat in order to be properly nourished. This will depend on all sorts of empirical factors. It will depend on the nature of the person, on the work he does, on whether he is sick or healthy, and so forth. A professional athlete will, in general, require more nourishment than a man who is a clerk in an office. These two implications can be summarized in the technical parlance of philosophy, by saying that Aristotle is both a relativist and an empiricist in Ethics.

The man who follows the 'mean' will be virtuous, and in being so, will achieve happiness. Virtuous behaviour is moderate behaviour. A man who is rash is foolish because he exposes himself to danger; a coward is foolish because he has fears which he need not have. To act courageously is to be reasonably cautious, without exhibiting cowardice. It is thus proper behaviour for any one. But in saying this, Aristotle must be understood as if implying that courageous behaviour for one person may not be courageous behaviour for another. What would be a courageous conduct for a professional boxer facing another one would be dubbed as rashness in case of a man with no pugilistic experience. Hence, courage is a virtue which lies between rashness and
cowardice, liberality between prodigality and frugality, pride between vanity and humility. Each of the virtues will thus denote different sorts of behaviour for different people, depending upon the kind of people they are and upon the circumstances in which they find themselves.

From the above passages, it appears to be that behind the 'Golden Mean' Aristotle had in his mind the ideal state of the soul, an ideal personality that is neither coward nor rash, neither vain nor humble, neither intemperate nor unduly abstemious. He commits neither injustice nor suffers without protest, neither shirks the burdens of life nor makes unnecessary sacrifices, neither seeks more than the due shares of rewards nor is content with less. It is a personality that exercises wisdom in all things and cherishes above all the opportunity to cultivate the life of intellect. This is the picture of highminded and great-souled man. It is an idealized picture of the ideal man in every highly developed civilization. It emphasizes the need of social integration in its insistence on the common virtues and an orderly society supporting its fine gentlemen at the top. These are the merits of Aristotle's theory of virtue as the Relative Mean between the two extremes (the vices).

(ii) Theories of Virtue in Medieval Ethical
(Religious) Thought

Ethical thinkers of the Medieval period have emphasized,
for an ethical life, the cultivation of certain qualities of character, called virtues. There have been innumerable exhortations either to do certain things or to refrain from certain others. The present discussion of the concept of virtue in Medieval Ethics is based on Christian Ethics, Pauline Ethics, Augustinian Ethics, and Scholastic Ethics.

McPherson points out that 'there is no single Biblical source for a list of the Christian virtues'. But it seems that the Christian virtues are seven in number—the three theological virtues, faith, hope and love, together with the four cardinal virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice. However, let us make clear at the outset, that these seven virtues are not the only virtues mentioned by Christian theologians. Christian Ethics has a religious orientation and a host of virtues are reducible to these seven. Faith, hope and love refer to God, and hence are the religious virtues, while cardinal virtues are meant for the development of character in this world, hence these are called secular virtues.

Again, the virtues of Christianity, in general, are the qualities of the "fruits of the spirit" as opposed to the "works of the flesh". These qualities are love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. Well, this does not form a complete list of all the possible Christian virtues; it tells us
only the kind of people that Christians ought to be. This may be taken as a brief sketch of what Jesus Christ was like. The model is Jesus Christ, and a Christian is expected to cultivate all the virtues that Christ demonstrated in his life.

The above virtues are classified in 'three types of relation':

(i) in relation to God: love, joy and peace;
(ii) in relation to other men: patience, kindness, and goodness;
(iii) in relation to ourselves: faithfulness, gentleness and self-control.

Such is the classification of virtues according to St. Paul. In Pauline Ethics, 'love' is the greatest virtue. "And now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love", says St. Paul. St. Paul's Ethics is based on human dignity and the brotherhood of man. Love is an innate and inalienable debt which one man owes to another by virtue of the fact that they are human beings, which means brothers of a human family under the fatherhood of God. Love is the source of all virtues in man. "Owe no man anything, but to love one-another: for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly
comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour.
Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.\textsuperscript{17}

With regard to the classification of virtues, it
can be said that it is not satisfactory, as one may not be
sure of what 'in relation to' means. It appears that 'in
relation to' signifies only the direction of the virtues;
directed towards God, towards other men and towards
ourselves.

Now, if this is what is meant, then love, joy and
peace would be the virtues that we are to practise in rela-
tion to God. And on this assumption it can be said that
the classification is not very scientific. It appears
that some of the qualities listed under one head could,
with equal justification, if not more, be placed under
another head; e.g. the virtue of faithfulness could be
placed under either of the first two heads instead of the
third. For this is a kind of virtue which could be demon-
strated in relation to either God or our neighbour. Faith-
fulness is not, therefore, necessarily a self-regarding
virtue. The primary meaning of faithfulness also covers
the field of our relationship with some one else. Hence,
the classification of virtues based on the criterion of
'in relation to' is not satisfactory.

Yet, another principle adopted is according to the
various faculties which are primarily involved in the exercise of these virtues. Griffith Thomas in his 'The Catholic Faith' adopts this principle of classification. After broadly dividing the Ten Commandments into two equal parts, viz., duty to God, and duty to our neighbour, he goes on to suggest that the first two Commandments are to be observed in thought, the third in word and speech, the fourth and the fifth in deeds as also the sixth, seventh and the eighth, while the ninth and the tenth are to be observed in both words and thoughts. But even a casual observation and examination of this kind of classification of virtues reveals the many overlappings in it. Hence, even the second principle of classification is unsatisfactory.

Christian Ethics, in general, believes that vices are the obstacles to the good life; one major deterrent is the flesh with its intense desires of lust and evil. The flesh, that is to say, one's sensual nature, is the cause of considerable immoral action on the part of man. This is analogous to the view expressed in the Bhagavadgita that the real enemy of man is desire and anger: "This is craving, this is wrath, born of the mode of passion, all devouring and most sinful. Know this to be the enemy here." The various vices which flow from lust and desire are these: "adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envy, murders, drunkenness,
revellings and such like. These are the vices of the flesh; but the fruits of the spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance: against such there is no law.\textsuperscript{19} These latter are the spiritual virtues which one inculcates them into the personality by constantly meditating upon them and similar qualities. "Exercise thyself unto Godliness: for bodily exercise is profitable for little, but Godliness is profitable for all things."\textsuperscript{20}

The good life consists of a multiplicity of virtues, but the one which excels all is love: 'Put on therefore ... a heart of compassion, kindness, lowliness, meekness; forbearing one another, and forgiving each other, ... and above all these things put on love, which is the bond of perfectness," is the essence of Pauline Ethics.

Augustinian Ethics also makes love the central concept. The greatest virtue is the 'love of God'. "I hold virtue to be nothing else than perfect love of God."\textsuperscript{21} The peculiarity of St. Augustine consists in interpreting the cardinal virtues of Plato in terms of the love. Temperance, courage, wisdom, justice are interpreted as the four forms of love. Temperance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved; fortitude (courage) is love readily bearing all things for the sake of loved object; justice is love serving only the loved object and therefore ruling
tightly; prudence is love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders it and what helps it. The chief object of this love is not anything, but only God, the good, the highest wisdom, the perfect harmony. The four virtues are, in a sense, four aspects of one and the same virtue, viz. love.

Lastly, we can compare in brief the Christian and Hindu virtues. The last five of the Commandments in the Decalogue, which are almost identical with the five Hindu injunctions that we come across not only in the orthodox Hindu systems but also in the heterodox systems such as Jainism and Buddhism. The correspondence of these five with the last five of the Ten Commandments may be shown by the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thou shalt not kill</td>
<td>Ahiśāsā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Though shalt not commit adultery</td>
<td>Brahmacharya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thou shalt not steal</td>
<td>Asteya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thou shalt not bear false witness</td>
<td>Satya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thou shalt not covet</td>
<td>Aparigraha</td>
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</table>

The Christian virtues of kindness, goodness, gentleness and faithfulness are comprehended by the two Hindu virtues, viz., dayā and śrādhā. Temperance, signifying avoidance of extremes is amply covered by the injunction of self-control. The five yamas are literally 'forms of self-restraint'. Fortitude has its counterpart in dama.
or even in the yogic prescription of *tapas*. Wisdom (*dhi*), as distinct from mere learning (*vidyā*) is included in the Ten Commandments of Manu and is highly praised by every Hindu. The virtue of *justice* is replaced by the ideal of *Bhūtahītātva* or good of all creatures.

Again, the Christian virtue of love is covered by the three virtues of *Vātsyāyana*; viz., *paritrāṇa*, *paricāraṇa*, and *dāna*. Faith, love and hope form the very basis of Rāmanuja's derivation of the virtues from God's character and are the main theme of the devotional schools of Hinduism. Hence, an ethical model of Christianity and Hinduism is one in which mind is untroubled in the midst of sorrows and is free from desires and worldly pleasures; he, from whom passion, fear and rage have passed away, is called a *Sthitaprajña*, i.e., a sage of settled intelligence. The second adhyāya of the *Bhagavadgītā* is a sacred hymn replete with the virtues of a *Sthitaprajña*.22

While dealing with Platonic virtues we had observed that these have no unconditional moral worth in themselves, but are dependent on other circumstances. The same principle can be urged and applied to the theological virtues of Christianity. Faith, hope and Charity are the co-ordinating and the primary elements of Christian character. St. Augustine was the first to recognize the truth that it is man's relations to God that gives cohesion
and unity to moral life. According to him and the later moralists, these qualities were not merely additions to the Platonic list of virtues, but were so fused, with them, as to create spiritual disposition which penetrates the entire personality. "God is the one object of love; therefore, He is man's chief good, nothing is better than God." Similarly, according to St. Augustine virtue is nothing else than perfect love of God. Augustine appears to interpret the four cardinal virtues of Plato in a Christian light; i.e. as the four forms of love. "Temperance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved, courage is love readily bearing all things for the sake of the loved object; Justice is love serving only the loved object, and Wisdom is love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders it and helps it. The object of this love is nothing else, but only God, the chief good, the highest wisdom." This stresses the fact that in any system of religious Ethics religious piety ultimately tends to take precedence over ethical values, and Christianity is no exception to this rule.

But the theological virtues can also be considered in the same way as we considered Platonic virtues. Even for Theologians, not every kind of faith is a virtue. The character of virtue does not attach to faith which has for its object something non-existent or unworthy. Thus
if a person strongly believes in the philosopher's stone, such faith is an object which does not exist in the nature of things and is not regarded as a virtue but a self-deceit. Similarly, if a person takes power of evil as an object of faith, forms a compact with it, sells his soul to the devil, then such faith is a terrible moral fall, for its object, though actual, is evil and unworthy. On that count faith in the higher being may be regarded as a virtue which regards it in a worthy manner, namely with a free filial piety. And such faith entirely coincides with religious feeling which could be treated to be as one of the ultimate foundations of morality.

The second theological virtue, 'hope', comes really to the same thing. There can be no question of virtue when someone trusts in his own strength or wisdom or indeed in God, if in the sole expectation of material gain from him. **Hope** is a virtue which looks to God as the source of true blessings; and this is, again, the same fundamental religious relation, to which is added an idea of the future and a feeling of expectation.

Finally, the moral significance of the third and the greatest theological virtue—love—entirely depends upon the given objective determinations. "Love" in itself or 'love' in general is not a virtue; if it were, all being would alike be virtuous, for they all without exception
love one or the other thing. But undue selfish love for oneself and one's property, passionate love for drink or for horse-racing, is not a virtue. Such love has been expressly rejected by the apostle of Love; "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world."

The negative aspect of 'love' is the expression of the fundamental principle of asceticism, to guard ourselves against the formidable lower nature and to struggle against its domination.

By 'the world' the apostle means neither mankind as a whole nor the totality of the creation which proclaims the glory of God, but precisely the dark and the irrational basis of our nature. This is quite relevant with the thought that in this world, there is the lust of the flesh, which speaks itself in the desire of immoderate sensuality, the lust of the eyes, as indicated by the love or greed of money and the pride of life, mirrored in the vainglory and ambition.

Biblical Ethics adds to the negative 'love not the world' two positive commands: Love God with all the heart and love thy neighbour as thyself. Now these two kinds of love are rightly distinguished—love to our neighbour has its source in pity, and love towards God in reverence. To love one's neighbour as oneself really means to feel for him as one does for oneself. Wholehearted love of God
means entire devotion to Him, surrender of one's own will to His will.

(iii) Theories of Virtue in Modern Ethical Thought

(a) Deontologistic (i.e. Kant's) Theory of Virtue:

Kantian Ethics is deontological or formalistic in character rather than teleological or materialistic in character. The word 'deontology' is derived from the Greek deon (duty or obligation); hence a deontological Ethic is an Ethics of duty. The concept of duty plays a major role in the Kantian system so much so, that all Ethics is reducible to reverence for duty. In Kantian moral theory, duty constitutes the sine qua non of all Ethics.

Virtue is defined as the power behind the will which is its driving force. "Virtue signifies a moral strength of will." The Aristotelian concept of virtue, viz., habitual moderation, is unacceptable to Kant on the grounds that it is solely of legal value; its unsuitability stems from the fact that "it does not require any change of heart, but only a change of morals". Kant contends that virtue is not an acquired habit, as Aristotle taught, but innate strength; "virtue is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to duty". Virtue is innate. Some persons are born with an abundance of it while others are impoverished, to attempt at its generation is an exercise in futility. Virtue cannot be considered a moral mandate,
inasmuch as it cannot be summoned into existence at will. Nevertheless, virtue does have a pertinent role in the ethical life, viz., the duty of perfecting one's own moral life (not others) and the responsibility of promoting the happiness of others (not one's own). (For the details of Kant's theory of virtue, please refer to Chapter V, Section III - Virtue according to Ethical Formalism.)

(b) Naturalistic (i.e. F. Nietzsche's) Theory of Virtue: The system of Ethics which emphasizes nature, might, biological development or adaptation to environment is called the Ethics of naturalism or even the ethics of evolution. In its more extreme form it is the view that 'might makes right'. Though the germs of such a view go back as far as Democritus in ancient Greece, we shall confine our consideration to the view which have been set forth by men as Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer and F. Nietzsche. All these men advocate an Ethics of domination that what is natural is right. The Ethics of Darwin and Spencer influenced the thought and writings of Nietzsche. According to him man's animal nature, the doctrine of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest became the basis for a robust morality in which the strongest succeed and might is defended as right. From Greek thought and culture he gained a sense of the importance of the individual, a notion which became central in his thinking. He was impressed also by the desire of the Greeks to live
life to its fullest and by their physical prowess and courage. From Schopenhauer he learned that the world is a process of striving and exertion. In the hands of Nietzsche the will to live becomes the will to power, life itself is will to power, which is a fundamental principle in nature. Those survive who will to survive. All that proceeds from power is right, and all that proceeds from weakness is wrong.

From this, his theory of virtues originates. Virtues are those traits of character which enable one to survive in the struggle for existence. They reflect the position and the point of view of those individuals and groups that entertain them. Based largely on natural physiological differences in men, there is master-morality and slave-morality. The virtues required for master-morality are courage, self-reliance, mastery and creative leadership, in contrast to these, the vices are cowardice, humility, sympathy and weakness. The latter is a kind of slave-morality.

There are two fairly popular though false impressions about the moral philosophy of Nietzsche. One is that Nietzsche is the enemy of all moral values whatsoever; the other is that Nietzsche's position justifies anyone's doing anything at any time that will make him happy or satisfy some immediate desire.
However, Nietzsche's views appear to be unpsychological. If competition and struggle are the virtues of nature, so also are sympathy and co-operation. In order to have a good human society, however, the latter virtues need to be stressed and cultivated. Real ethical life is an advance on nature. Again, the Nietzschean principle of self-assertion and power stands in sharp contrast to the Greek emphasis on the importance of reason and the Christian emphasis on the primacy of sympathy or love. Sympathy, kindness, love, sense of co-operation appear to be essential conditions for a good human society. Again, how can 'might is right' be the standard of morality? To this the first direct challenge came from the utilitarians who claimed that utility, not might, is the test of morality. Today leaders in the field of social sciences are pretty well agreed that the test of any programme or institution must be its social desirability that will forward the cause of some social end.

Nietzsche's Ethics is essentially a naturalistic Ethics of power which promotes the naturalistic law of the jungle, namely the law of tooth and claw which may prove satisfactory for animals; but for rational human beings, the law of the jungle is highly undesirable and blameworthy. Again, the virtues of the intellect may be more powerful than the sheer brute strength, but the brilliant minds are not in the habit of utilizing their power for their own
selfish ends with a complete disregard of the rights and needs of others. Even the strong need respect, friendship, and other virtues that cannot be arrogated by power, but must be won by noble techniques.

An Ethics of power may have a temporary measure of success in a radically individualistic or anarchistic society akin to the animal kingdom, but in a contemporary collectivistic society, a process of equalization emerges rendering persons to develop certain democratic virtues, the prime among which are equality, liberty and fraternity.

(c) Humanistic Theory of 'Virtue':— Historically, Humanism is the philosophical movement which originated in Italy in the second half of the fourteenth century, and diffused into other countries of Europe, coming to constitute one of the factors of modern culture.

Humanism says that this world is our chief interest and perfection of humanity our one ideal. It is a philosophy of life here and now. The ultimate harmonious inter-relation of all individuals with one another is the aim of humanism. The concept of 'lokasangraha' of the Bhagavadgita well signifies the ideal of humanism. 'Lokasangraha' stands for the unity of the world, or an inter-connectedness of the society. Loyalty to this 'lokasangraha' is the highest duty of man. Humanism is sometimes taken to be a substitute for religion; however, original humanism did
not reject religion as a component of the virtuous life, but it did specifically repudiate monasticism and fanaticism, and to make all attempts to make religious values supreme. Humanism is a kind of attitude of mind which attaches more importance to man and to his faculties, affairs, temporal aspirations and well-being. Humanism is any philosophy which recognizes the value or dignity of human personality, and makes him the measure of all things.

The Ethics of Confucious is a humanistic scheme of virtues based on a proper maintenance of a well balanced system of human relationships. The Ethics of Buddhism gives us a catalogue of humanistic virtues such as mercy to all creations (mahākarunā), unity of the world, equality (samatā) and last but not the least non-violence (ahimsā). Greek Ethics also appears to humanistic in character. Aristotle's Ethics is a humanistic scheme of virtues without any metaphysical orientation, with its insistence on measure, order or harmony. Plato's cardinal virtues have humanistic orientation.

Of course Humanism may take various forms such as Communistic humanism, pragmatic humanism, existentialistic humanism and so on. Because of its ambiguity, the term humanism cannot be properly defined. However, all do have one thing in common: an interest in and focus upon human welfare, in terms of life here and now. Humanistic Ethics,
being an Ethics of this-world, emphasizes self-regarding and other-regarding virtues making a reconciliation between them, as and when necessary. Because of its secular point of view, it rejects all the religious or spiritual virtues. Under humanism, therefore come all atheistic forms of Ethics. Virtues under utilitarianism, virtues under socialism, virtues under communism, virtues under democracy, virtues under rationalism, virtues under relativism, virtues under Buddhism, Vedāntism, Confucianism and Marxism, all have source in Humanistic Ethics which is essentially atheistic in character. All these forms of humanism have some points of difference, but agree in one thing, i.e., human values. This is the central faith of any kind of humanism.

Various interpretations of human nature give rise to many forms of humanism all agreeing in the denial of supernatural or spiritual or transcendental element in human nature, thus not allowing any spiritual values.

Humanism regards virtues to be entirely human. Virtues originate from social life of the individual, their realization is in the social situations and they realize social ends. There is no virtue in a social vacuum. Thus virtue is not a divine command, but a human creation originating to meet the needs arising out of the necessities of community life. It is a result of the deliberate choice
of a style of life. Thus humanistic Ethics draws its virtues from human experience and tests them, too, in human experience. And as the situations change, the virtues under humanistic Ethics too change. From this it follows that according to Humanistic Ethics, no virtue is good in itself, nor is an end in itself (Śreyās). No virtue has intrinsic value. Honesty, justice, benevolence, fidelity, love, courtesy, impartiality, kindness, equality, interconnectedness of the society are some of the cardinal virtues under humanistic Ethics. All these virtues are means to human welfare. They are conducive to man's well-being here and now. These worldly virtues again, require no grace of God or any kind of reference to any supernatural power. Virtues are human products without a divine sanction. They are man-made and not god-made. These virtues are not desirable in themselves, but should be desired and developed for the well-being, both individual and social, here and now. Hence, Humanistic Ethics advocates a kind of instrumentalism and relativism of the virtues in this very world.

Erich Fromm reaffirms the validity of humanistic Ethics and believes that our knowledge of human nature does not lead to ethical relativism but, on the contrary, to the conviction that the sources of virtues for ethical conduct are to be found in man's nature itself, that virtues are based upon man's inherent qualities and their
violation results in ethical disintegration. Character structure of the mature and integrated personality, what may be termed as the productive character, constitutes the source and the basis of virtue, and vice is indifferent to one's own self and self-mutilation. Not self-renunciation nor selfishness, but self-love, not the negation of the individual but the affirmation of his truly human self are the supreme virtues of humanistic Ethics. If man is to have confidence in virtues, he must know himself and the capacity of his nature for goodness and productiveness.

Humanistic Ethics, in contrast to authoritarian Ethics, may be distinguished by formal and material criteria. Formally, it is based on the principle that only man himself can determine the criterion for virtue and not an authority transcending him. Materially, it is based on the principle that good is what is good for man and evil what is detrimental to the good of man; the sole criterion of virtue being man's welfare.

The difference between humanistic and Authoritarian Ethics can be illustrated in the different meanings attached to the word "virtue". Aristotle uses "virtue" to mean excellence—excellence of the activity by which the potentialities peculiar to man are realized. "Virtue" is used by Paracelsus as synonymous with the individual characteristics of each thing, i.e., its peculiarity. Man's virtue is that precise set of qualities which is
characteristic of the human species, while each person's virtue is his unique individuality. He is "virtuous" if he unfolds his "virtue". In contrast, to be virtuous according to authoritarian Ethics, signifies self-denial and obedience, suppression of individuality rather than its fullest realization.

Humanistic Ethics is the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers. Virtue is responsibility towards his own existence. Evil constitutes the crippling of man's powers; vice is irresponsibility towards himself.

Humanistic Ethics emphasizes the outer needs of human life and is only empirical in character, but we are not really human if we do not feel that we are related to something that transcends the finite and the conceivable. Human personality cannot be reduced to either physical manhood or economic well-being, or instructed mind or sensitive conscience. We want, not a mere improvement of the world, but an ideal transfiguration of it. "Be assured that the good of man does not depend upon abundance of possessions but upon the right inner quality. Not even the body is regarded as in a happy condition merely because it is decked out in resplendent robes, but only if, though wanting in finery, it is well developed and is in good health. One should call only that man fortunate whose soul is ethically developed rather than man who is rich in outward possessions and is worth nothing in himself. Even
a horse is judged by its actual virtues. If it is a poor horse, it is not rated higher because it has a gold bit in its mouth and a costly harness on its back. Man is potentially a spiritual animal. The roots of man's being are in the unseen and eternal one, his destiny is not limited to the duration of his life on earth. "We should not give heed to those who bid one thing as a mortal, but so far as we can we should make ourselves immortal and do all with a view to a life in accordance with the best principle in us."

In his *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle lays down the golden mean, a balance between two extremes as the rule of life. And modern humanists adopt a similar view. Aristotle himself admits that it is difficult to hit the mean though easy to miss it. We cannot apply a mere mechanical rule. Aristotle recognizes that it is only the sense of something stable and unitary, beneath the shifting experiences of life that can help us in seeing the right in any context. Enlightened humanism seems to ignore this essentially non-worldly character of a truly spiritual life. No man can fulfil its social functions adequately if he is only social. Those who keep their eyes close to the ground may conform to the code of humanism, but they are not moral heroes. It is all the difference between being a man and being a religious man. It is more easy to be a gentleman than to be a Christian and more so to have
worldly possessions in abundance, than to face hunger and thirst after righteousness. Socrates and Jesus overstepped the boundaries of humanistic Ethics. Though they died for their love of truth and justice, they live for ever. Their achievements are not primarily directed to refashioning this world. Their faith is essentially life-transcending, and as a result life-transforming.

Thus the main opposition is between the spiritual and the non-spiritual view of human nature. The question of importance is whether any intensity in virtuous life could be seen if the spiritual constitution of man is not recognized. When the moral foundations of life are shaken, when the ultimate issues of life face us demanding an answer, humanism alone does not suffice. A merely communistic, pragmatic, democratic, biological, sociological, rational and psychological view of human nature cannot explain the best of selfless virtues in human life. No pragmatist would be prepared to sacrifice his all, including his life. And if any one does, his self-sacrifice is unattainable on merely pragmatic, utilitarian and rationalistic considerations. Hence, religious Ethics should be the foundation of humanistic Ethics. For the unity of the world (Lokasamgraha) or interconnectedness of society, or if the common life is to be ethically decent and dignified, religious or spiritual interpretation of human nature is inevitable.
Humanistic Ethics, under any of its variety, regards human well-being and its prosperity as its final destiny. However, ingeniously we might plan and organize our society and adjust all social virtues, the best of us cannot escape sorrow and suffering. Conflicts and confusions, chaos and frustrations cannot be solved merely on a materialistic interpretation of human nature, man and his destiny in this mundane world. Socialism cannot remove human selfishness and man's miseries as primordial human nature is inventable.

At present in our daily practical life we pay too much attention to the development of mind and body, but we do very little for ethical and spiritual development of our personality. While mental and physical development claim all our energies and efforts, development of the spiritual virtues and faculties of our heart and soul are tragically neglected, or sometimes deliberately pushed aside as antiquated and outdated. This may be regarded as one of the important reasons of social chaos present. At present, youth is educated, his mind and body is developed. But he is not made unaware of the powers and the virtues of his heart and soul by way of right education.

Humanistic Ethics emphasizes 'social welfare' (Abhyudaya), one of the aspects of dharma, but neglects the other aspect, its trans-social spiritual dimension, because, spiritual liberation (Niḥsreyasa) is not anti-humanism, but only it goes beyond it.
Again, humanism believes in 'virtues' as tools invented by man, but this view goes against commonly accepted view that virtue can be objectively permanent, and is not at the mercy of man's changing whim.

Last, but not the least, humanism depicts man in search of worldly pleasures. Worldly pleasures are not to be denied at all. But a life, full of worldly pleasures, cannot be the true ethical ideal of man. Man, I think, is essentially a religious animal. Hence, religious Ethics should be the basis of humanistic Ethics. For the unity of the world, the religious Ethics must control social actions. Hence, the truth in the saying 'dharma preserves, if preserved'. True humanism is essentially religious in character. Dharma is that which preserves, and dharma preserves society, if preserved.

(e) Emotivistic Theory of Virtues: Logical Empiricism is one of the important movements in contemporary philosophy. Of course, just because it is new, does not mean, that it is true. In general, all philosophers who have adopted an antimetaphysical positions are the supporters of logical empiricism. In ancient times, the Sophists and the Epicureans, in the Middle Ages, the Nominalists and for the modern period Otto Neuraths offer three lists of the representatives of Logical Empiricism corresponding to those prevalent in England, France and
Germany. Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', published for the first time in 1921, is the written expression of Logical Empiricism.

Logical Empiricism has many facets, and Emotivism is one of them. Emotivism is one of the psychological approaches in the recent Western Philosophy. This approach is psychological in the sense that it reduces Ethical-statements or virtue-words in terms of man's 'approval'. Hence, it is recognized as 'emotivism' in recent Moral Philosophy. The various practitioners of language analysis have touched upon nearly all the traditional subjects in which historically oriented philosophers have shown interest. 'What is the role played by reason and feeling in our moral judgements?' is the main problem for an emotivist, and he emphasizes the place of feelings, rather than that of reason in the expression of ethical propositions. The main exponents of Emotivism are many in number. Vincent Thomas (Ethical Disagreements and the Emotive Theory of Value, 1951) refers to various versions of the Emotive theory as presented by Broad, Carnap, Russell, Ayer and Stevenson. Out of these, Stevenson's "Ethics and Language" (1945) is generally held to be the only extensive work attempting to present an emotive theory systematically. However, it may be said that even A. J. Iyer has also stated the basic position of Emotivism very closely and Stevenson has only elaborated it with some modifications. But for
our purpose it is sufficient to note the Emotivistic theory of virtue, and our interpretation of it is primarily based on Stevenson's and Ayer's account of it.

One of the views regarding the nature of virtue is that it is subjective in character. This is known as subjectivism, and Emotivists, in general, support ethical subjectivism. This view, however, is not to be confused with the ordinary subjectivist's view. The subjectivist holds that ethical sentences say something about the speaker's feelings and can be verified as true or false according as one has or has not the said feelings. On the other hand, Emotivists claim that in using the moral predicates he is making no assertion about the possession of feelings, but he is simply evincing them. Moore had rightly argued against subjectivism that if ethical statements are simply reports about the speaker's feelings, it would be impossible to argue about the questions of 'virtue'; since there are ethical disputes, subjectivism must be wrong. According to Emotivism, virtue-words express, (according to Nowell Smith) a pro-attitude; and vice-words express an anti-attitude.

The Emotivists say that the problem of 'virtue' is a false one because virtue-statements, such as "killing is wrong" or "truthfulness is good" are not addressed to the intellect, they merely evince our feelings of approval or disapproval. Taking the view that truth is confined to
descriptive statements or logico-mathematical generalizations, they hold the view that virtue-statements are non-descriptive and convey no meaning or information. Hence, virtue-words are pseudo-concepts.

The Emotivist's position is as follows: he contends that 'courage is a virtue' and 'the sky is blue' are the statements similar in grammatical form and both are subject-predicate propositions. 'Virtue' and 'blue' are the predicate of 'courage' and the 'sky' respectively in the above statements. But we cannot have a direct experience of the virtuous quality, as we have in case of the 'Blue' sky. Virtue-words, hence, lack empirical verification. When we say, argue the emotivist, 'courage is a virtue', or 'kindness is a virtue' we only express our sense of approval. These statements are neither true nor false, analytical nor empirically verifiable. Hence, these statements are un-scientific and meaningless. If 'virtue' is a quality of character, then this quality is good simply because it is agreeable to the sentiments of an individual. Hence, 'virtue' is founded in sentiment. The excellence of character is not to be perceived by argumentation or by reasoning, but by the frame of the perceiver's mind. Virtue-words are the expressions of one's emotions. The cardinal virtues were approved by the Greeks in ancient times; faith, hope and charity were approved by the Christian ethical thinkers.
Virtue-words have no cognitive meaning, because a statement in which virtue-words are expressed, has no cognitive meaning and hence cannot be factually verified on a sensory level. Virtue-words are pseudo-concepts which merely enable us to express or excite feelings of approval or disapproval. They express emotive and not cognitive meanings. Hence, the emotivists have maintained that in the realm of Moral Philosophy we cannot determine scientifically the nature of virtue, for people express varying emotive judgements about human virtues.

But does Emotivistic theory of Ethics give us an ethically satisfactory analysis of virtue? Emotivism aims at, according to Moore, "clarification of concepts". The logical empiricists are right when they emphasize the need to clarify our language, or our moral judgements or moral concepts. It is true that Philosophy develops through a dialogue. Philosophy will not begin unless one speaks. Hence, clarification of concepts should be the task of even a moral philosopher; and this practice continued right from Socrates. The only point that one has not to forget is that clarification, though necessary, is not sufficient for the development of a good character. Analysis of ethical terms alone should not be the aim of Ethics. Its value of analysis is instrumental, and not intrinsic. Analysis, too, has got its own limitations, beyond which it cannot go.
Though it is true that Philosophy involves linguistic analysis, it is not true that all problems are only the problem of language, a claim put forth by the practitioners of linguistic analysis. If 'virtue' is to be understood through linguistic analysis, then this approach may prove to be, as Blanshard points out, 'inadequate, erroneous and contradictory'. Bearing this merit and the limitation of Logical Positivism, we have to understand the defects of the emotivistic theory of virtue.

Firstly, the Emotivists regard virtue-words as merely subjective, expressing one's sense of approval, and vice-words as one's sense of disapproval. But virtue-words as being the quality of character, cannot depend on anybody's liking or approval. I approve a particular trait of character, or the rightness of an action because it has something in it I approve. I approve because it is worth approving. Hence, truthfulness, kindness and compassion are the good qualities of character, not because we approve them, but because there is something objectively real in them. And this kind of reality of virtues is beyond sensory verification and it requires an extra-sensory perception to apprehend it.

Prof. A. J. Ayer in his "Language, Truth and Logic" declares that virtue-words are pseudo-words, because they lack cognitive meaning; they are meaningless and have no objective reality.
But is this standpoint satisfactory? When I say that 'X is virtuous', am I not saying anything about X? or when I say that 'lying is bad', am I not to say something about lying? When I seek somebody's help in knowing the various virtues, primarily I do not want to be informed about his emotional reactions, rather I am anxious to get rid of the influence of all his emotions in the matter, so that the objective character of the various virtues can be known.

Language may be sometimes emotive, and ethical language may express an attitude, but only secondarily, because there may be some objective reason for that attitude. The mistake of the emotivists lies in where they say that ethical language expresses only an attitude of the speaker. Ethical language differs from purely emotive language in that it does not merely express an attitude, but does imply that there is some reason for that attitude. This is the difference between saying 'I like this particular virtue', and 'I approve of this particular virtue'. In our liking, in non-moral contexts, there may not be any reason at all, but when I approve something, it implies that our point of view is objective for which there is a sufficient sound reason substantiating our approval. Hence, the emotivists should make a distinction between ethical language and the purely emotive language in interpreting the nature of the virtue-words.
From the above analysis it follows that the function of the emotive language is not merely to express one's sense of approval about virtue-words, but must be forceful to persuade others and to sometimes ourselves too to do what is virtuous in conformity with the development of a good character.

Again, Ayer characterizes virtue-words as pseudo-concepts to justify his principle of verification. But he seems to have over-simplified the issue by insisting that nothing can be called true unless it is verified by sense-experience. This principle of verification may be true within certain limits and for certain kinds of facts. Virtues in terms of the qualities of character cannot be empirically verified; however, it is the limitation of the principle of verification that it cannot be universally applied.

Stevenson's treatment also cannot be regarded as an improvement on Ayer's theory. Why, it may be asked, people get persuaded by the virtuous qualities if they do not perceive in qualities anything worth pursuing.

Hence, it must be admitted that there must be something in virtue which is objective, and hence it does not merely depend on the pro-attitude of the agent. And this something which is the ground of objectivity is what we call the goodness, the ideal of human life. We are surely aware of what virtue is. To say, following Moore, that
'virtue' is indefinable, unique, and unanalysable does not mean that we cannot know it. It only indicates that the term virtue, with which we are quite familiar, stands for something ultimate and unique, and that something ultimate and unique is the goodness of man's life. "Whatever the linguistic philosophers or analysts might say 'virtue-concept' has an extra-linguistic reference, it has a trans-empirical reference, and cannot be limited to matters of fact." If Ethics is not to be reduced to the Science of Psychology or Sociology, then the distinction between what is and what ought to be must be taken as fundamental. If emotivism is true in the realm of morality, then Ethics becomes a matter of emotion and attitude more than a reasoned thought. It will undermine the rationality of virtue-words. In brief, while approving an action as virtuous, man is doing more than merely expressing a liking for that action, he is acknowledging it to reach a standard which he considers a standard of excellence or merit. In other words, to approve an action as virtuous is to represent it as being of value, and all those who sincerely approve or praise must agree that it is of real value. "It is perhaps not superfluous to add that the act of praise is not thought of as in anyway creating the value of the object, rather it is taken as an acknowledgement of its already existing value." The logical positivists regard virtue-statements as
value-statements, and hence deny their factual character. They do not accept 'virtue' as a fact. But what is a fact? According to the Common usage, the term fact means something that has a definite and particular nature identifiable as a distinct object, event or quality. But there is no reason why we must use the term fact only in this limited sense. If we examine common usage we shall see that fact is used not only in respect of observable and verifiable objects, events or qualities, but also in respect of anything which demands acceptance and for the rejection of which there is no justifiable ground. Is not 'virtue' a fact in the sense that it is a 'moral quality'? Various virtues are formulated in recognition of the fact that some people do actually live in some characteristic ways in situation of a certain sort. Hence, the various forms of virtues are categorised as 'value-facts' in order to distinguish them from 'non-value facts' (i.e. perceptible or objective facts).

The view that virtues are not objective also is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. There is no doubt that non-value facts are objective, yet there is a sense in which 'value-facts' and 'non-value facts' both, may be called objective. Are 'value-facts' created? We certainly do not create it in the sense in which we create a picture or a statue which comes to exist in space through human activity. But understanding a value fact does
involve a greater element of distinctively human effort or participation than does the perception of an object like a tree. This is the value-experience which cannot be approached through sense-perception. It is to be felt in the heart as it were.

The emotivists say that the problem of 'virtue' is a false one because virtue-statements are not addressed to the intellect and merely evince feelings of approval or disapproval. Taking the view that truth is confined to descriptions of fact or logico-mathematical generalizations some thinkers hold that virtue-statements are non-descriptive and convey no information.

This is false. If I say, "Hitler was not a good man but Pope John was" I am giving my hearer information just as when I say "that beef is spoiled". Although my criteria for making the judgements are different, yet in both instances I describe existent reality. I can go to the public library for a book on how to develop my muscles; I can also get a book on how to develop my character. Both types of books afford information. Hence, the 'knowledge' of virtue, moral knowledge, is just as real and valid as know-how in art, sport, literature or technology; and perhaps more important knowledge. A carpenter tells his apprentice 'that is no way to drive a nail'; a sergeant tells a trainee 'that is no way to fire a bullet'; a father
tells his son who has stolen from the shop, "that is no way to act". In each instance information is given; the remarks are not mere displays of the emotion of disapproval. In all instances, information is sought. In the first it is technical knowledge, in the second it is moral knowledge. When we seek moral knowledge, we want an answer from practical experiences of persons who have actually led a 'practical' virtuous life; and whose information is just as real and valid as any descriptions of fact. Hence, it is illogical to hold that virtue statements merely evince feelings of approval and disapproval.

Lastly, if virtue-words and vice-words are nothing more than a projection of one's psychological reaction in terms of approval and disapproval of the man, a moral chaos would reign in the world, since attitudes vary from person to person. And it is true that complete agreement does not exist with respect to appreciation of works of art, or in the valuation of human behaviour; yet it is no less true that agreement is much greater than disagreement. If virtues are merely 'emotive' in character, the table of virtues would fluctuate, behaviour norms would be reduced to personal caprice, ethical education would be impossible and will not make sense and the evil or corrupt individuals will be worth as much as the honest and virtuous ones.
Again, Emotivism denies that truth exists in the area of Ethics. But that there is a moral knowledge is a human experience. Emotivism fails by its own logic, i.e. by its own basic principle, for when it asserts that truth exists only in logical, mathematical or empirical statements, it condemns itself. Its statement of this doctrine falls into none of these categories. Moreover, virtue-words or virtue-statements are so important, it would be surprising if they were not often accompanied by emotion, but to say that they are wholly emotional is to assert that man in his most important area of choice is irrational.

(e) Existentialistic Theory of 'Virtue': Existentialism is the contemporary philosophy (primarily ethical) which holds that there is no essential human nature common to all men. Instead each individual creates his own essence or character throughout his life-time by his choice of interests and actions. Thus 'existence precedes essence' is the cardinal principle of existentialism.

What is the philosophical outlook peculiar to existentialist movement? Its recent popular presentation claims that it emphasizes human existence and the qualities distinctive of individuals rather than 'man' in the abstract, or nature and world in general. This is a philosophical way of saying that the existentialist is not worried about man's nature or what he is, in terms of virtuous or vicious, as the traditional ethical thinkers
were. Man begins without any kind of nature, virtuous or vicious. For them man—each man—in the beginning is nothing, even ethically nothing; he has capacities which he may or may not actualize. Man is nothing if he is free to become virtuous or vicious. What he makes of himself will be his essence. It is in this sense that existence precedes essence.

Existentialists do not give any general theories of virtue. They want to know what are the specific virtues and vices for the individual man in his concrete situation. No only must we insist on concrete individual's moral living, but this life must be completely self-determined by the individual. Hence, existentialism supports situation-Ethics and attacks the Christian Ethics. Two excellent examples of this are Sartre's *Existentialism* and Madame Simone de Beauvoir's *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. Sartre's existentialism is a kind of humanism based on the negation of the existence of God. Man is alone in a world without God. There is no God to prescribe his essence and virtues of life. There are no virtues until man creates them. Hence virtues come from human freedom. Furthermore, since man creates essence and his virtues as he goes through life, they are never fully made, never completed, but always subject to modification according to the current circumstances of human life—in a word they must be continuously modified in keeping with our present
situation. Hence, the name "Situation Ethics" to describe the morality of Sartrean man.

Man, in a world without god, has to create his own moral character and fit in to his ever-changing situations. All virtue is made by man and for man. Virtuous life is of the man, for the man and by the man. All virtue is human. There are no God-made virtues, nor God-regarding virtues, only man-made virtues exist. This is the "humanism" of Sartre's existentialism.

But if each man decides for himself the virtues required in the specific situation, this will lead to complete relativism and an absolutely unrestrained individualism.

According to Existentialism, those actions which are conducive to our freedom are the virtues and those which hinder our freedom are the vices. These results of our experience will decide what we consider to be virtue or vice. Virtuous or vicious character is the result of our choice, our freedom. We become either of these because of the freedom. Hence, what is useful for the development of human freedom is good; what is not, is evil.

But what is useful for freedom varies so much from person to person and situation to situation that there can be no stable 'objectively useful' and this will give rise to a 'conflict of freedom' everywhere. Hence the
existentialist's ethical position that what is good today may be evil tomorrow, that there is no eternal absolute norm of character, that God is dead, there is no clear-cut programme of virtuous life, that right and wrong are ever ambiguous, appear sometimes giving rise to moral anarchy.

Existentialist situation-Ethics and the Christian natural-law Ethics are built on contradictory bases. The source of Christian morality is God, the source of situation-morality is man. The former has stable, independent moral goods and evils; the latter recognizes only humanly created and humanly changeable values. At this fundamental level, there can be no compromise. The two cannot mix with each other.

Yet, as will happen with conflicting moral theories, this fundamental opposition does not exclude the possibility of large areas of agreement in the two descriptions of moral activity. Both will insist, for instance, on the need for personal integrity. The Christian will say that the individual must form his conscience and follow it, the existentialist will say that the individual must choose his own ends. The integrity is the same, the bases in each case different.
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