CHAPTER 2

Strategies for Conflict Management (Resolution):
The case of Sub-Saharan African
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STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (RESOLUTION) : THE CASE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.

In the final stages of the 20th century it is indeed pertinent to discuss future directions in conflicts and their management (resolution). This is a time when profound changes are taking place in the global order, with specific historical conjunctures and a major political move away from bipolarity towards multipolarity. In the long-run, these changes will have far-ranging effects on the politics of sub-Saharan Africa as well.

The first part of this chapter seeks to evaluate the terminology of conflict management (resolution) and its relevance to protracted social conflict in the region. In the second part, some of these concepts are applied to the violent social conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. The researcher argues that conflict management (resolution) must be seen within a wider framework of analysis which can take into account the ideological and political conditions under which conflicts unfold.

An understanding of conflicts and their management or resolution in sub-Saharan Africa is of particular significance in a region which has experienced bloodshed and turmoil in truly epic proportions. More conventional disciplines have not managed to provide adequate explanations or predictions for the seemingly unending spiral of violence that has gripped societies of most sub-Saharan African countries. There have, however, been some important scholarly interventions regarding conflicts, as well as comparative investigations into the cultural sources of conflict. These efforts have focused on the comparative experience from scholars within the region, interpreting modern conflicts and identity, and making important generalization.

The concept of 'conflict' as it has been defined within the conflict theory itself. Conflict is normally identified as a situation where different actors are pursuing
incompatible goals. This assumes that the goals or interests are recognized by the parties to the conflict. Interests so defined are objective - are either a conflict over a pay claim between workers and entrepreneurs, or a matter between tenants and landlords, or family disputes between husband and wives. A further definition holds that conflicts, involve apparently incompatible values, where the task of a third party may be to help the parties to specify their values more explicitly so as to facilitate management (resolution) of the conflict.

There are within these conventional paradigms certain assumptions which are largely unstated but which need to be deconstructed. Otherwise, we will be at a loss as to why conflict theory has not been more useful in resolving the violent conflicts we are witnessing today, or we will be faced with rhetorical questions as to the endemic violence of third world societies, their undemocratic character and the futility of attempts by these societies to resolve their conflicts in a more humane and peaceful manner. Some of the unstated assumptions behind such an approach to conflict management (resolution) are presented below.

Rationality and Conflict Management (Resolution).

A very large and growing literature on conflicts and conflict management (resolution) has largely been in the form of theoretical reflection coming from the United States of America and Europe. This approach generally presupposes a domain of ‘rationality’ where all parties more or less share certain central values based on rational argument. It is assumed that the problem is to get the parties to the table and that, through negotiations, it will be possible to find a win-win solution agreeable to both sides. In this view the environment within which these conflicts occur is generally founded on a strong ideological imperatives of equality and recognition of the rule of
law. The modern division of labour in the society assumes that members are tied to multiple roles and are attached to a variety of interests which result in conflict. Recognizing this complexity, society develops institutions and mechanism to resolve conflicts in a specified way. Generally a culture of negotiations emerges, and a complex network of arbitration and dispute resolution becomes increasingly professionalized. Conflicts take place amongst like-muddled actors who speak a common language, which may be English. But this concept goes further to denote a shared universe of meaning. Normally disputes are defined within a fairly developed regime of law - mostly individual rights, - with its specific historical evolution in the west. In modern states, domestic conflicts tend to be symmetric ones in which the state normally assumes the role of a mediator or sometimes plays the role of a third party. However, in the conflicts confronting the sub-Saharan Africa today, we find that the state is involved as a party to the conflict.

Conflict Theory As Applied To Protected Conflict:

How relevant, then, are these approaches to the protracted violent conflict which we are experiencing in the region? These conflicts are not merely based on interest, but involve many dimensions which concern identity and security. Conflicts which involve a core sense of identity between or among parties tend to be intractable, the intractability is generated by the very dynamics of the conflict rather than by a reasoning process of rationality. Conflict management (resolution) here means identifying the conditions to locale of intractability. These are not single-issue conflicts, but are better characterized as multiple conflicts which are being waged simultaneously. During the summer of 1994, Wallensteen and Axell, identified 32 contemporary armed conflicts, with armed conflict defined as a situation with over 1,000 casualties. The total number of armed
conflicts seem to be on the increase, especially if we also consider armed conflicts with less than 1,000 casualties. According to Wallensteen and Axell, the total number of conflicts between 1989 and 1993 was 90 in 61 locations around the world. In 1993 there were still 47 continuing conflicts. However, the incidence of direct violence as measured by casualty rates cannot provide a full picture. Is it necessary of social violence? Most of the armed conflicts take place in Third World countries. Moreover, in the overwhelming majority, the basic issues in the armed conflicts of 1993 were related to internal matters. On the basis of these observations, several generalizations can be made which we can contrast with the conflict environment based on the paradigm of rationality.

In all cases, the conflicts are between the state and particular social groups, frequently between ethnic group and the state. Although these are frequently characterized as conflicts between two parties, i.e., the state and a particular ethnic group, there are a range of multiple conflicts involving violence with many parties and many issues involved. In these sense it can be difficult to identify the so-called actors, as the more articulate ones with command over resources and communications have a better chance to make known their claims. The southern Sudanese, for instance, have been able to advertise their conflicts more successfully than many others. Generally, the conflicts involve non-negotiable and intangible demands such as identity, security, and social justice. In some cases, the demand is for a separate state or for some form of regional autonomy.

The environment, within which conflicts occur are highly non-egalitarian, without any all-pervasive rationalist discourse. Often it is multi-lingual and multi-cultural environment where different meaning are attached to the discourse and where communication may be not only between the parties but also within the parties themselves. The objective seems to be to consolidate political power within one's own
community. The discourse of conflict then is fragmented and disjointed, as well as multifaceted. The state, ill-equipped to deal with the violent conflict claims made upon it, tries to resolve the crisis through military means. At no point are non-military means excluded from the range of available options. There is also no solid tradition of governance and little respect for law and order. Here the research exaggerated the differences, to delineate the specificity of conflict environment that we are dealing with, whether it is within the so-called Third World, the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. What is obvious is that protracted social conflicts today are about power and politics.

**Redefinition Of Concept Of Conflict**

Earlier on the research referred to definitions of conflict which have emerged largely from the discourse of rationality. In the most general terms, conflict should be seen as collisions between projects. Projects are sequences of actions directed towards a goal; conflicts occur when the projects of different actors start impinging on each other. We may take missions as an example. Missions are projects of the largest historical scale. Their space is the world, their time measured in millennia. Among the world religions, two stand out as missionary creeds: Christianity and Islam, or take ideologies. If there is anything distinctive of this century it is the great battle of ideologies—whether they be capitalism, communism, fascism, democracy or the ideal of progress. Such missions and ideologies tend to be universal and look to the future, where as ethnicity, caste and tribalism all tend to be inclusive and restricted, looking more to the past. It is a truism which bears repeating that all conflicts have a beginning and an end. We can speak of conflict process, conflict formations, conflict escalation, and conflict termination.
Modern Concepts :-

In retrospect, it is easier to demarcate the termination of a conflict rather than its origins. Although historians may differ over details, one may think that there is a fair amount of consensus regarding the great historical conflicts of the past. Only with the French Revolution do we see the emergence of social history being made from below, and the beginnings of the great social revolutions. With the French Revolution surely came a redefinition of sovereignty. The great ideological debates over freedom, equality, democracy and much of what is happening today may be traced to this period in history.

The great conflicts of the 20th century are too well known to require elaboration here. The main historical and ideological movements and projects have been the capitalist project and the socialist project, the right to self-determination and nation-building, and the democratic project. What is significant in such projects is their universal character. What is distinctive about these visions - whether they are projects over self-determination, over capitalism, or democracy - is their common acceptance of modernization, whether it is specific to nation-building socialism or capitalism. They all subscribe to the building of a future. Some of the general aspects of modern conflicts are as follows:

1. The Capitalist Project :-

The most significant historical development has been the capitalist project, a truly universal project which knows no boundaries. Within this project there have of course been major differences as to the content of capitalism, leading to two world wars. Today, however, the debate is not over significance of capitalism as a universal project but an analysis of the various transitions within the trajectory of capitalism. The transition to
capitalism is difficult, and understanding the different trajectories and phases within this transition will require analytical rigour. There are many societies which may never successfully achieve the transition - societies sometimes designated as the fourth world. Transitional situations are fluid, and conflicts are the stuff through which the content of this evolution is determined. The scale of capitalist transformation may extend for several decades into the future with the universalization of capitalism, the latest historical project has assumed its apprehend - there are no alternatives except a new phase which may be characterized as “post-modernity”. With the growth of towns and cities, the development of communications and the ‘information society’, we have a radical rupture with tradition. Post-modernity refers to a particular phase in the development of capitalism where automation and the conflation of time and space lead to greater diversity and atomization. Especially relevant to us here is that decisive conflicts may not be over territory but over other forms of control and regulation. The most significant alternative to the capitalist project was the socialist one. The mammoth Soviet Union - with its hegemony over the states of Eastern Europe - acted as a center for the alternative, so-called non-capitalist road to socialism. This project had its internal dissidents and splits, and is now in the process of disintegration. Basically, this alternative has collapsed.

2. The Right To Self-Determination :-

The project of self-determination began with the French Revolution. Its objective was to redefine sovereignty and to insist that sovereignty did not radiate from God through the monarch, but rested with the people. The principle of self-determination has been widely accepted since the appearance of democratic ideologies in the American and French Revolutions of the late 18th century. In the American declaration of
independence, it was treated as axiomatic that "the laws of nature and of nature's God entitled own people to dissolve the political band which has connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the Earth the separate and equal station" as the fledging united states then claimed. A century and a half later, in 1918, President Woodrow Wilson persuaded the allies to adopt self-determination as a war aim. In his fourteen points, he called for the independence of Poland, the restoration of Belgian sovereignty, the adjustment of Italy’s frontiers among recognizable lines of nationality, the re-establishment of the Balkan states on historical lines of allegiance and nationality, the granting of free opportunities of autonomous development for peoples of Austria-Hungary and the assurance of the same right to peoples under Turkish rule. In an address to the US Congress, he generalized from those particular cases, "National aspirations must be respected, people may now be dominated and governed only by their consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen henceforth ignore at their peril." 

The right to self-determination remains one of the most intractable and difficult issues to be addressed by the international community. Many legal formulas have been explored to define the existence of the right to self-determination, to define who constitutes people, and who has a right to a separate existence. The subject has been the basis for contention and for many a war.

Officially, the United Nations' decolonization project has been wounded down with the independence of Namibia. However, there are some notable exceptions which claim special status, such as the Palestinian question. Recently the Kurdish question has once again highlighted the fate of non-state people and the inadequacy of ad hoc international efforts at protection.
Colonial and alien domination was treated as a phenomenon that applied only where the dominator was European - with two exceptions, South Africa and Palestine. A distinction is drawn in practice between so-called "salt sea" imperialism, where the dominating and dominated are separated by hundreds of miles, and local imperialism, where the two people are immediate neighbours. Until very recently it has been assumed that people locked together within a state must remain so linked indefinitely. This means that many cases of "internal colonialism" do not come under the purview of any international body. Now, after the decolonization process, new groups are claiming sovereignty and the right to self-determination. It is here that there is a proper concern as to whether the project should be extended at infinitum. The project on self-determination is still not complete, and, if adequate protection is not found for national minorities, this is likely to be a source of violent conflicts in the future. It is my contention that adequate safeguards for the protection of minorities are not provided, and that the international system is still bound to a concept of state sovereignty which paralyses it in action - particularly when it comes to ensuring the adequate protection of minorities. Unless these questions of adequate guarantees of security, reasonable autonomy and linguistic rights can be resolved we will experience large-scale violent conflicts within the next few years. Whether in the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, in certain parts of Asia or in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the future looks bleak.

The Role Of The State:

The modernization project has been accompanied by a highly centralized and standardized bureaucratic system whose apotheosis has been the development and articulation of a centralized state. The evolution of this centralized state was the project which captured the imagination as the best vehicle for the evolution of human
civilization. It became the vehicle upon which violence was to mediate between itself and the people, through the evolution of a technocratic bureaucratic structure which has taken upon itself a monopoly on violence. The evolution of the state and the process of standardization meant that cultures and languages were either absorbed, eliminated or incorporated into the modern project, and this continues. The state-building project is not yet completed, and there are many new nations which are demanding state sovereignty. The project "one nation, one state" continues to evoke passions and mobilize people.

What is new is that the process of centralization and state-building is increasingly challenged by a variety of social and ethnic movements. The consolidation of state power in the future is problematic, for several reasons:

a. The concept of sovereignty is being gradually eroded.

b. The unitary state as a powerful centralizing agency is under challenge from sub-national forces.

c. Violent conflict is no longer the monopoly of the state alone; various transitional and sub-national forces are able to arm and equip armies and deliver lethal weapons.

1. The Concept Of Sovereignty:

The modern state system has European origins. From a small number of states, it today expanded to a proliferation of state - which itself constitutes a major global project of universal dimensions. The state-building project has assumed new vigour after the cold war, with a number of new states emerging. However, under conditions of modernity there has also been an erosion of the concept of sovereignty such as non-interference in internal affairs, and prerogatives of the state have been challenged by many individual and institutions. The metaphors of the "global village" and modern communications have helped to serve this purpose. Furthermore, international
institutions, which began as complementary to state-building projects, have assumed an autonomy of their own, sometimes imposing their will on individual states. In the domain of human rights and humanitarian intervention, norms are being developed and states scrutinized for their human rights performance.

2. The Unitary State:

The process of state building has been characterized by strong centralization and bureaucratic management. Often, unitary state structures have been controlled by hegemonic elites who may marginalize those on the periphery and other identities. This process of unitary state-building has often imposed the principle of one language and one nation.

State formations are now in different phases of evolution. Some formations have achieved a high degree of integration, as we see with today's European Union, where border controls for those within the EU have been abolished. Most states, however, are in different phases of evolution. Often states are dominated not only by bureaucratic centralized but by hegemonic elites with wide patron-client networks which exclude other nationalities. Some of these states evolve into truly multi-ethnic societies, although the idea of the "melting pot" as a paradigm for social integration may not be relevant to all segmented and deeply divided societies. The uneven development of state formation means that there are highly developed states (often called the democratic zone), and states formation, and states yet to be born. Reform of the international system means that we shall have to recognize this fact. Whilst some developed states may transfer sovereignty to higher bodies, others may cling to a more narrow definition of sovereignty.

Most of the emerging conflicts concern the nature of the state and its formation. Whether the conflicts are over the devolution of power, federalism, governance or how
resources are distributed, they generally concern the way in which the state manages its business. Several states are themselves a result of violence and bloodshed; some states are hegemonic states, based on communal/ethnic, or religious loyalties, where patterns of recruitment's are based on ethnic affiliations. Some states can be called defective states, in that they continue to preside over their own retardation. But in general all states are confronted with the same basic challenges. The most significant one is the requirement for modernizing their economies within a globalization process which is acceleration and frenetic. One internal threat comes from the military, and another from ethnic and religious fundamentalist forces. These two movements therefore constitute the twin challenges to the democratic development. A further observation is that, in dealing with these issues, the state has become an agent of arbitrary violence, perpetuating violence and militarism as a way of resolving conflict.

There is yet another significant reason why conflicts of the kind we mention are becoming increasingly unmanageable: the proliferation of weapons and the diffusion of weapons technology today, new actors are determining the new direction of conflicts. There is a growth in transnational networks that trade especially in small weapons and are often linked to the drug trade.

The Democratic Project:

The democratic project evolved concurrently with capitalism. Where the early phase of democracy was specific to Europe, it soon expanded to North America and is - in its current phase - expanding as a global project. There are different variants within the concept, but as a metaphor it emphasizes the sovereignty of the people, equality and freedom expressed through periodic elections, and respect for constitutions. There are also different explicit variants, ranging from the ideological one - that liberalism...
identified with the free market - while other variants include forms of social democracy. Paradoxically, democratization also creates space for ethnic revivalism and for religious fundamentalist movements. The resurgence of ethnic and nationality claims may expand the basis for democracy by providing for adequate representation and devolution, but it seems that centralized unitary states are not prepared to yield at all except through contention and violent conflicts. In this sense a major challenge to the global expansion of democracy is the resurgence of ethnicity and religious fundamentalism. Both these vision still have a capability to challenge democracy from below through the articulation of deeply rooted metaphors and needs; in some instances these forces may capture state power. But these assertions may be counter-balanced by other factors, such as a sufficiently large middle class or a diffused professional cadre committed to stability and secularism. Still, we should be cautious with regard to the general enthusiasm for democracy. Democratic institutions themselves can become co-opted and used by anti-democratic forces. All too often, elections are held, but with tremendous undue influence, corruption and violence. Sub-Saharan African governments are very adept at such maneuvers. This point is highlighted by Rajni Kothari, as follows, “Even less clearly recognized is the fact that the very structures that had been conceived for promoting the democratic process and providing liberation from traditional constraints - political parties, representative institutions, the judiciary - are becoming vulnerable to the influence of anti-democratic forces and are in any case proving incapable of dealing with them. Perhaps the least recognized of all are deeper forces of erosion, uncertainty and anemic that are taking hold of the mass mind at a time when growing vacuums created by the undermining of institution and the decline of the democratic temper and being filled by specialists in violence, corruption, private arms trade and Ganges warfare. The sharper decline in the role of the state as mediator in social conflict and growing loss of
faith in the political process among both the "operators of the system" and the people at large are producing conditions of not just political instability but incipient breakdown of the social order. The result is large social violence, the rise of negativist identities (communal and otherwise) and doctrines of exclusion and dispensability according to which entire populations are looked upon as undesirable and unwanted.

The Crises Of Social Conflicts :-

The consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Socialist Utopia, as officially defined, also necessitates reformulating the goals of secular movements and the forms in which these conflicts will develop in the future. The working class has lost its anchor and vanguard role, and this has led to a crisis within social conflicts. And it is this crisis in social conflicts and this lack of cohesion which has enable fundamentalist and ethno-populist movements to capture the space for politics and transformation. The counter to the anemic conditions of modernity - the fragmentation of visions, and the revolution in time which modernity has created through the contraction of global space - is to seek solace and refuge in ethnicity and religion. Modern consumerism as one instrument of modernism may not only create heightened expectations but also lead to a greater sense of deprivation. On the other hand, there is enormous scope for popular movements, emergent networks and coalitions, which have shown a great capability to transform regimes. Many popular movements for democracy, with local and international networks forming part of a visible coalition, hold much promise.

This necessarily brief survey of modern conflicts has been intended to provide a backdrop against which we can seek meaning and conceptual clarity with regard to the violent conflicts of today. The fundamental issue is whether space exists or can be created for democratic development within many of the regions in focus here.
Sub-Saharan Africa Situation :

Sub-Saharan Africa is a specific category with some common features. These common features, however, should not tempt us to make facile generalizations. The region—geographically vast, with over one and half billion people, and a multiplicity of religions, nations, linguistic and ethnic groups—has no parallel in any other part of the world. There is futility in attempting any form of forecasting. This mosaic of ethnic and linguistic formations has inspired several regions and has been a home for many others. Islam and Christianity as religious missions compete with animist religious. But there are also features which are distinctive to the religious. One of them is the size and location of sub-Saharan Africa within the continent. Its sheer expanse and proximity to ethnic groups amongst its neighbours necessitate not only a high degree of sensitivity to conflicts outside its borders but a dual-track policy of managing and containing them.

Types Of Conflicts :

The structure of conflict refers to the sources of differences among individuals or groups. There are different types of conflict have been the subject of experimental research: Decolonialization, governance and authority, domestic, identity, ideologies or beliefs, interests, border, inter-state, understanding and ethnic conflicts. Each source has been a focus of studies designed to investigates the effects of the size of conflict on attempt, by disputants to resolve their differences, while size or intensity of conflict is the primary independent variable in the studies, it is defined differently for each source due largely to differences in experimental paradigms used in the investigations.

Within this overall conceptual framework, let us now proceed to the salience of violent conflicts within the region. It is through delimiting the specificity of these
conflicts that we can discuss their management or resolution. The research would suggest that within the framework of renewed struggle for self-determination, it is likely that we will witness several types of conflicts over the next years. This typology is proposed as a point of departure. A typology is a way of grouping instances of conflict so that common characteristics and systematic differences are revealed. But this is only a statement of purpose. Similarity and differences are cultural constructs. Typologies derive from theories - they are tools rather than varieties. To choose a conflict typology is to choose one way of looking at the world of conflict, but it need not exclude other ways. The value of a typology will only appear in its working. To ask whether it is "true" is a semantic mismatch. You might as well ask for the true type of conflict.

With these difference and overlapping notions of conflict and conflict management in mind, it is possible to return to their application to different types of conflict. Regional conflicts fall roughly into different categories, each appears to follow its own dynamic and to respond to its own types of formula, stalemate, and regime. This is not to say that there is a single appropriate dynamic of or solution to regional conflicts according to their type, but only to acknowledge that there tend to be certain regularities in negotiated conflict management and resolution that invite attention.

Conflict Related With Decolonialization:

Decolonialization problems are typical of the postwar period, as in Algeria, Rhodesia, Namibia, Morocco, and Kenya, and many earlier cases of decolonialization have never been studied as negotiations or even as regional conflict settlements. However, there are also unusual cases that have some resemblance to decolonialization but involve non-European and even regional powers, such as the Western Sahara, Ogaden, the Panama Cannel, South Africa, and Kampuchea, decolonialization from...
European role operates under a very strong presumption of standard regime, where by colonial order gives place to sovereign, juridically equal, and politically unequal status, there is no similar regime for cases of non-European colonization, nor is there even agreement on that status. Statement in the anti-colonial struggle is attained when the politically organized nationalist movement is regarded by the metropolis as posing unacceptable long-term costs, despite any temporary military advantage of the latter group. As does the ethnic protest, the struggle also involves issues of recognition for the nationalist movement, since the metropolis seeks to weaken it by denying its legitimacy and representatives. Although these considerations may suggest a situation of victory and defeat rather than a positive sum of outcomes, the decolonization formula involves trade-off of privileges in exchange for sovereignty, with earlier granting of sovereignty usually resulting in greater residual privileges for the departing metropole. Thus, in decolonization, formula, stalemate, and regime refer to different values, giving maximum flexibility and feasibility for negotiations. 10

Governance And Authority Conflicts:
Governance and authority conflicts are concerned with the distribution of power and authority in society. They have to do with the expansion of civil society and democratization. Conflicts over governance revolve on popular demands for democracy and political participation. The process and struggle for democracy can be varied and highly complex. In some instances, such as in Eastern Europe, new popular movements with a non-violent project have expanded the space for civil governance. In other instances, there may be no popular forces or any significant non-governmental sector which can take over. In some cases, there may be no tradition of governance, despite the political will to introduce democracy. In others, there may not be alternatives to the
existing state and government In the sub-Saharan Africa region we find a complex range of issues which may be sub-summed under this heading. Primarily, they have to do with due process in holding regular elections, in ensuring efficient administration the devolution of power to municipalities or regions, and proper and orderly procedures for regime changes Institutions and capabilities to deal with violence conflicts are also needed.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a striking example of the erection of a facade of formal democratic theory and democracy's blatant abuse in practice. At one point, the wave of democratic change was indeed all-embracing as in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, where for the first time popular political movements were able to wrest power from authoritarian regimes. Sudan, however, has always boasted a formal civil government. The first causality of the democratic process was Pakistan, where the administration of Mrs. Bhutto was ousted by presidential order. Bangladesh experienced the overthrow of a long-standing military regime by active civil demonstration and protest. Similarly, Nepal was able to sustain a campaign for democracy which culminated in elections and the drafting of a new constitution. Kenya, on the other hand has gone through the fiction of elections, and democracy, whilst encouraging extra legal remedies to protest and dissent such as extra-judicial killings, disappearances, torture and detention.

Internal (Domestic) Conflicts:–

Much less can be said about internal political power struggles, such as found in Sudan, Somalia, Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo at present), Angola, where the conflict is so idiosyncratic and the negotiations are a challenge of power and interventiveness. At least it can be noted that attempts at standard formulas such as power sharing are based on such restrictive assumptions that their application is very
limited However, an additional category may be noted negotiations simply to end hostilities that may have broken out for any type of combination of causes, as in Eritrea, Morocco-Algeria, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Nigeria. It is here that the ingredients of overescalation and requirement are so important in setting up a stalemate. But cease-fire and decisions to end fighting are ultimately only conflict management measures leaving other problems - to the extent that they have not been overshadowed by the war itself and its consequences - to be worked out on their own.

A final characteristic of negotiations in regional conflict is that they often involve such basic values in frequently fragile states that mediation becomes necessary to enable the parties to overcome their inhibitions to reconciliation. New states become so involved in decolonization that ethnic, domestic, and border conflicts become necessary to their self-identity and political being. States learn to live with their conflicts or at least to find them useful, and it becomes difficult for them to think reconciliation, to accept stalemate, and to subordinate their conflict to cooperative efforts. At times, the mediator must move from a mere communicator's role to that of a formulator of creative solutions, on occasion, he or she must even function as a manipulator, to maintain the statement and induce conciliation.

Identity Conflicts:

Identity conflicts are the most pervasive and also the most evident. Identity has been defined as an abiding sense of selfhood the core of which makes life predictable to an individual. To have no ability to anticipate events is essentially to experience terror. Identity is conceived of as more than a psychological sense of self, it encompasses a sense that one is safe in the world physically, psychologically, socially, even spiritually. Events which threaten to invalidate the core sense of identity will elicit defensive
responses aimed at avoiding psychic and/or physical annihilation. Identity is postulated to operate in this way not only in relation to interpersonal conflict but also in conflict between groups. 13

Ethnicity is obviously an important source of legitimization, and we need not summarize the vast literature which has emerged on the subject, what is interesting here is that modernity recreate ethnicity, and certain conditions make it a dynamic category within which ethnic boundaries can be continuously redefined, allowing for political pluralism. Politicization of ethnicity is a long historical process, and polarization does not seem to take place until a certain point has been passed. Up to this point, there will normally be opportunities for conflict management through compromise and accommodation. Typically, however, governments provide solutions too late, and the solutions offered are inadequate to inspire confidence.

Most ethnic or minority conflicts today have a substantial international or transnational component which is a primary source of conflict. This may be due to cross-border affections or the existence of diasporas which provide support for these movements. Or, members of the minority community in one state may form part of majority community in neighbouring state, such as Tutsis in Rwanda, or a minority ethnic community may straddle borders, the involving more than one state. Although trans-border conflicts may seem benign at a particular moment, they have a tendency to flare up and escalate rapidly. The Iraq-Kuwait conflict is only one amongst many others.

Ethnic conflicts, such as those in Rwanda, Burundi, Southern Sudan and Biafra, are characterized by ethnic minorities who feel that, by neglect or discrimination, they are not receiving their rightful portion of the state benefits and that their cultural identity is being neglected or repressed. Although such conflict, are by nature internal to the state, they tend not to remain so far long if they are not assuaged early. Beginning at a stage of
rejected petitioners, such move to a second stage, consolidation, where they attempt to unite their reference group into a support group and struggle to attract government attention; in the process, the protest tends to turn to the outside for support, and the conflict becomes trilateralized. Stalemate tend to come into being at the beginning and the end of this evolution, when the conflict is still in the hierarchical petition stage but not yet at the point of consolidation, and when the trilateralized conflict has become painful to the neighbour host, who when has an incentive to mediate. At either point, the trade-off formula involves peace in exchange for redress, and the most likely is some form of regional (internal) autonomy. Much of such conflict, however, represents a struggle for recognition and standing on the part of the protesting minority, adding a special twist of issues and asymmetry to negotiations.

The precise conditions for ethnic conflicts will depend on many factors, and the way they can be managed will depend on ethnic stratification systems. It may be that in stratification systems where there is a larger single minority with cross-border links - as the Hutus in Burundi and Rwanda and Congo (DRC at present) - the conflicts may come more intractable. However rising population pressures, poverty and the widening gap between the elites and the poor will tend to become more urgent and more clearly articulated. The search for identity often intensifies when a people's language, culture and religion are seem as the final focus of identity in a rapidly modernizing world in which they feel alienated.

Ideological Conflicts:-

By ideological conflicts the research specifically refer to class-based conflicts with an anti-capitalist program and an expressed manifesto intended to transform society through social revolution. These movements have recently experienced a tremendous
setback, one from which they may have recover The disintegration or stagnation of these movements occurred even before the collapse of Soviet hegemony. Today the new ideological offensive comes from the right, with its prescription of the freemarket. This does not mean that ideological movements will not return to the stage to capture the social space or that new forms of organizations or new types of weapons will not emerge.

Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA), or Srilanka’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (SJVP), the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or the Sendero Luminoso of Peru (SLP), have not vanished with the end of cold war. These organizations share specific characteristics, particularly in their mode of organization, tactics adopted, age a composition, the basis of recruitment and in how they define armed conflict. A distinctive feature of such movements is their use different methods to eliminate the existing regimes. 16

There is little doubt that contrasting ideological perspectives are unresolvable through bargaining. A long tradition of work on the sociology of conflict makes evident the intractable features of ideological conflict. A more interesting research issue is the way that differences in ideology interact with interests and understanding in the process of conflict management (resolution). 17 Coser’s elaboration of Simmel’s proposition concerning the objectifying influence of ideological commitment on conflict of interest was the basis for a program of research on the interplay between ideologies (or values) and interest. Hammond’s caution about the dangers of a hardening of cognitive differences called attention to another type of interplay, between cognitive and ideological differences. Each of these themes is summarized in turn.

Results from several experiments, provide evidence for the propositions that, (a) conflict of interest linked to differences in ideology are difficult to resolve than conflicts that do not derive from contrasting ideological orientations, and (b) the more polarized
the parties in ideological orientation, the more difficult it is to resolve a related conflict of interest. These effects are quite robust across a variety of subject populations and conditions, although the interests are more difficult to negotiate when representatives are strongly committed to the underlying ideologies and when monetary incentives for resolving the conflict are not part of the task. Of interest, then, is the question of how to facilitate the management (resolution) of ideological differences. Another issue concerns the differences in values or ideologies in prenegotiation workshop sessions. Both strategies have been shown to be effective, both led to more agreements than a condition where interests derived explicit from ideologies without a prenegotiation workshop.

A number of issues have been suggested for further research in this paradigm. One set of issues concerns the strength of the link between the interests and ideologies, the relative intensity of the sources of conflict and their relative impact on future interactions between the parties. Another issue concerns the conditions that produce cooperative versus competitive bargaining processes and the implications of these processes for the long-term relationship between the parties. A third issue deals with the relative importance of the two sources of conflict in the resolution process.

Ideological differences add a competitive dimension to conflicts caused by differences of understanding. Results obtained from a cognitive conflict experiment showed that when the differences were viewed in ideological terms—such as differences between social change and system maintenance perspectives—the conflict was more difficult to resolve than when the differences were only matters of understanding.

A conflict of interest is a discrepancy in preferred outcomes to self and other and often manifests in a competition for tangible resources or rewards. The extreme case of conflict is when one person's gains are directly proportionate to another's losses, referred
to as zero-sum outcomes and illustrated by the game of poker. The opposite situation is when one's gains are equal to those of another, referred to as positive-sum outcomes and illustrated by the game of charades. Most situations can, however, be depicted to lie between these extremes where there are elements of both competition and cooperation referred to as mixed-motive and illustrated by the well-known matrix game of prisoner's dilemma. By varying the amount of conflict present in a situation, it is possible to explore the effects of size of conflict on behaviour intended to resolve the differences. This relationship has been explored in a number of experiments.

Results obtained from these studies indicate clearly that the larger the potential discrepancy in outcomes, the more the conflicts is viewed as being intense or competitive, and the more difficult it is to resolve through bargaining. People respond to situations in expected ways, larger conflicts, defined in terms of the structure of the situation, are more difficult to resolve than smaller conflicts. Less is known, however, about the precise relationship between these variables. How much change in the amount of conflict is needed to alter perceptions and behaviour? Are there threshold effects such that a certain minimum change in the situation is needed to produce corresponding changes in perceptions and behaviour? Little is also known about the possible counterveiling effects of shared interest in other areas. Do shared or cross-cutting interests facilitate the resolution of conflict on other issue? How many shared interests are needed to offset the intensifying effects of conflicts on other issues? The variable of shared interests suggests the importance of broader relationships between parties in conflict. Do positive long-term relationship facilitate the resolution of conflicts on particular issues? And, are similar results obtained in studies of other types of conflicts? Disagreements between self and other over the best way out accomplish a shared goal is a conflict of understanding or of alternative cognition's. Unlike conflicts of interest, the
parties agree on the goal or desire the same outcome. Rather than arguing over who should get more, the parties argue about how both can get more. The question of interest is how to produce the cognitive change needed to reach agreements. Among the suggestions that derive from the research completed to date are that thinking intuitively, rather than analytically, about the problem and adopting a problem-solving (rather than a competitive) approach to the discussion of differences results in more compromise and cognitive change. Larger changes have been shown to occur with various technological aids based on computer graphics.

The challenge for further research on this topic is to understand the conditions under which cognitive differences translate into differences of ideology or belief. The translation from one type of conflict to another highlights the problem of effects on conflict management (resolution) of interacting of conflict. Such connections have been explored in recent research.

Inter-State Conflicts:-

In the sub-Saharan Africa region, inter-state conflicts can stem from many sources. Cross-border issues, including resources competition over minerals, the control of water and rivers may be significant factors in the future. Defense expenditures of all the countries in the region have increased phenomenally in recent years. At least two of the states have acquired nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities. Whilst there may not be open warfare between the states, there are many low-intensity operations and considerable war-preparedness. The successes of the high technology war conducted against Iraq in 1991 whetted appetites for new weapons.

The best example, India and Pakistan have been in a state of war over Kashmir ever since 1947. Pakistan, controlling one-third of Kashmir, claims the entire region on
presence of UN observers in Kashmir does not prevent fighting, it merely ensures that it gets reported. Tensions at other points along the Indian-Pakistan border, as well as political problems, manifest themselves in Kashmir. It is as if the two countries express their resentment towards each other in the lofty mountains of Karakoram Range and on the Saichen Glacier. No compromise seems to be possible between the intransigent national leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad.

The distinction between internal and interstate conflicts becomes blurred when we consider the ongoing internal struggle for self-determination by the people of Southern Sudan. This struggle takes place in the south, whilst Christian Southern Sudanese demonstrate and fight for south to be wholly governed by the people of South themselves. The struggle for the right of self-determination of the Southern Sudan People remains a great catalyst for war and conflagration between Khartoum and its neighbours, and with other regional actors such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda etc. The atrocities and human rights violations by the Sudanese Army have been horrendous, and Khartoum has been universally criticized for its reign of terror against the people of the South.

The solution to the southern Sudan question surely lies in the people having the right to choose their destiny by plebiscite or referendum. Although the conflicts seem intractable today, there are signs that in the post-cold war world order this issue will need to be addressed once again.

Border conflict, such as those between, Somalia and Ethiopia, Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Chad etc., often have much to do with ethnic conflict, but because of their primarily inter-state nature they have their own dynamic and characteristics. Since border conflicts take place between neighbours with many other items on their agendas, they generally involve both border claims and border grievances and relations.
means of pressure on behalf of the first most reality comes from the second border conflicts provide a ready subject for conflict management (resolution) - the normalization of interstate border relations - that gives respite for reconciliation but that also removes that pressure for resolution. The conflict generally revolves around these two issues. With border conflicts there are a number of ready formulas on which to base a resolution - pacta servand sunt, referendum, human or physical geography - but it is over the choice among these referents that the conflict wages. It is the competition among equally salient formulas that makes boundary problems so obdurate. Similarly, there are many types of border regimes covering security and other relations generally deferring only in details or at most in the degree of permeability or of side benefit, that they permit, but there is no particular border regime; that is, any standard basis for determining boundary lines. While referendum (self-determination) is a frequently recognized basis for determining territorial boundaries have generally been settled on the basis of bargaining power, involving power relations and side payments from many unrelated sources.

Religion and Fundamentalism:

Religion in all its manifestations continue to provide a source of identity and meaning in a turbulent and modernizing world. Religion is deeply involved with internal conflicts. Despite predictions religion would disappear with continuing modernization, it still provides a primary source of meaning and identity to many people whether they are Christians, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, or Hindus. This religious resurgence is of significance, and many have applied the loose concept “religious fundamentalism” to it. Too often the label has been used to denote something unlike-minded, something dark and malevolent. Often ‘fundamentalists’ are defined as those who do not share in one’s own concept of rationality. Judaism, Christianity and Islam and Buddhism have strong
on to logical components of exclusion and claims for exclusivity, and have, as such also been strong forces of mobilization. The Christian and Islamic projects, especially, are in conflict because their goals are so similar. Spreading the Gospel to the heathen, and gathering the unbelievers to the one True Faith - these are commands from the highest. Judaism also lays claim to exclusivity with its concept of the chosen people. The faithful constitute distinct, exclusive communities that comfort each other as competitors for the souls of humanity. It is this exclusiveness and the claims inherent in such concept that are potentially conflictual.

Among the most interesting sociological explanations advanced on the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or Puritanism is Ernest Geelner's view of Islamic fundamentalism in terms of world civilizations, as the transformation of the central "great tradition" of Islam into the majoritarian folk tradition. "It allows it to assume a triple role in affirming a continuous old identity, in reduplicating a humiliating past and poverty, and in rejecting the foreigner. And yet it also provides a character for purification and self-discipline." 22

Another approach is provided by Lustick, in his major comparative study of ten fundamentalist movements. 23 He understands fundamentalism as involving a view of the universe and a discourse about the nature of truth that encompasses and transcends the religious domain. Thus every movement or cause becomes potentially fundamentalist. The point about these definitions is that fundamentalist movements are seen as political movements, which may eventually involve the control or exercise of state power. They are visions which provide for an egalitarian or equally society for mankind.

Recent anthropological studies have also contributed to our understanding of the role of culture in legitimizing violence. An interesting thesis relevant to cultural sources of violence is the observation that some cultures may attribute demonic significance to
other cultures and religions. It is suggested that in many ethnic or identity conflicts, ritual and religion tend to reproduce the demonic element and stigmatization of the other. Other cultures have emphasized the role of scapegoating mechanisms can be used to restore societal equilibrium. Scholarly attention is also being focused on the role of self-fulfilling prophesies in engendering and reproducing violence. Scapegoating can be reproduced in massive collective violence against other communities.

Regional Frameworks For Conflict Management (Resolution):

Regional conflict refers to conflict in international relations that are not directly between the superpowers. For the most parts, such conflicts are found in the third world, they involve basic values of territorial integrity and political independence as well as domestic political consolidation and international rivalries. As such, they are not trivial, and the stakes are often the world political system and the building of states. Further more, they frequently involve external powers, and sometimes superpowers themselves, called in to lend power to the conflicting participants or inserting themselves because of their own perceived interests in the parties or the outcomes. Regional conflicts are therefore a real challenge to resolution and management and to the students and practitioners of negotiation. Because they involve serious stakes for the parties and carry with them the ever-present danger of transcending the original actors and becoming no longer merely regional, they deserve some sustained attention. There is much to learn about them, there is much to learn from them.

Plenty of good tactical insights emerge from regional conflict negotiations, informed merely by the distinction between conflict management and resolution. For example, management alone is a temporary and unstable halfway house, if not complemented by efforts at resolution, it soon becomes victim to the underlying conflict,
which erupts again. A prenegotiation phase is useful and sometimes necessary to identify the parties and issues susceptible of being involved, productively, in order to move the conflict to management and then, sectorially, to resolution. Mediation in a regional conflict can be enhanced by negotiation of the shape of the outcome before negotiation of the procedure for getting there, by use of one party's agreement to buy the others', and by pacing of the evolving outcome with a threat alternative. Parties to a regional conflict often need a mediator to help them out of their awkward situation; the mediator need not be devoid of ties with one side or another, but backup mediators may be helpful to overcome levels of difficulties. Weaker parties can improve their bargaining position by using an alternative relationship with one or more third parties as a threat or by exploiting a greater sense of commitment as a basis of power. Superpowers are wary escalators in regional conflicts, so particularly obdurate conflicts may be best handled by measures of conflict management (resolution) in the absence of any possibility of conflict resolution.

However, a more theoretical understanding of mechanisms and possibilities can be gained by linking conflict management and resolution back to theories of conflict. There are a number of different ways of conceiving of conflict that are appropriate to regional disputes but not necessarily limited to them. A very basic notion sees conflict as a simple contest of parties trying to impose a unilateral solution to a problem. In the absence of either party's ability to do so, negotiated conflict management and resolution involve finding a multilateral solution to the problem that is agreed to by all parties and that replaces the unilateral attempt of each to impose its will. The second notion of conflict is more refined. In the place of a "flat" field of interaction, it assumes a bumpy one and sees conflict as a conditioning cost-benefit exercise in which parties will do what they want as long as the cost-benefit ratio stays below a certain level. Conflict
management and resolution then become a matter of manipulating costs and benefits and become dependent on the propitiousness of circumstance as viewed from either side. The third notion of conflict is more complex and benign. It sees conflict as the result not of contending wills out of context but of shifts in elements of world order or regimes. As accepted rules and routines break down, their inadequacy has to be certified, the requirements of the new situation identified, and a new order established. This is necessarily a long process, but neither the resolution nor even the management of specific cases within these shifting resolutions has any chance of holding if it does not take place as part of regime testing and formation. Negotiation becomes part of an evolutionary process.

Other ways could be used to organize findings about regional conflict negotiations modes of operation may vary, for example, according to whether the conflict is internal, interstate, or penetrated by external powers. Yet these are merely levels of the same conflict, or stages in its escalation. Similarly, conflict management and resolution may be practiced by the parties to the conflict or by third party mediators. Although conflicting and mediating parties do act differently and for different reasons, they are involved in the same negotiating process (the mediator acting as a catalyst to help the parties do what they should do but cannot do by themselves). All of these distinctions are important and will be taken into account, particularly the topic of mediation, on which a good and growing literature exists.

Unilateral to Multilateral Solutions:

Parties, like people, prefer to accomplish their objectives by themselves, if possible, since cooperation requires compromises with other over goals. The desire to act alone may sound surprising in an interdependent world, but it is basic to the egotistical
nature of rational actors. It is easy enough to see in situations involving the use of force, in Rhodesia, Namibia, Vietnam, Algeria, the Falklands, Palestine, the Iran-Iraq borderlands, the Western Sahara, the Horn of Africa, and many other places, the status-quo party wants to solve the problem by itself, holding the territory and denying the claims or even the existence of the challenging party. The challenging party, in turn, feeling driven to desperation, wants to resolve the problem in its own unilateral fashion and perhaps only secondarily to force itself on the other party so that it can be seen as part of the problem and hence parts of the solution. When the two attempts at unilateral resolution run up against each other, there is conflict, and unless one is can provide, it must be resolved by negotiation.

Conflict management and resolution in these terms becomes not just a search for a multi-lateral solution but an effort to make multilateral outcomes attractive. The usual concept of negotiations as process of exchanging concessions or reduced outcomes does not provide any guidance on ways of rendering multilateral outcomes enticing. It is a wonder that negotiations conducted primarily as a mutual concession process came to naught, as seen in Cyprus and the Falklands. Dealing with conflict is a matter of finding a formula for agreement, conceived either as a common definition of the problem and of the principle of justice that can govern its solution or as the terms of a trade-off. As an adjunct to such positive measures, but insufficient in themselves, there can also be negative methods, to make multilateral solutions more attractive, by lowering parties expectations and security points (outcomes obtained without negotiation).

One set of situations where parties turn to multilateralism includes those where unilateral solutions are impossible, either because of inadequate unilateral resources, because of effective counteraction by another party, or because of the innate impossibility of carrying out the action (such as a handshake) alone. While analytically these
situations are clear, operationally they are all subjects of perception. Handshake situations may be obvious in the abstract, but their reality depends on a perception of the other party's willingness to come to terms or to allow the first party a share in the newly created good. Frequently, an adversary considers it better to forgo the creation of the good if the other party cannot be kept from sharing in it, when the goal of denial to the other is stronger than the goal of obtaining a good for oneself (no handshake when it means recognition), this is a particularly frequent perception when the good is to be newly created and, therefore, one that the party has lived without all along anyway. Unresolved border disputes at a low level of hostilities (Morocco-Algeria, Ethiopia-Sudan, and even Iran-Iraq where the level was not low) are an example, as long as the distant hope of unilateral resolution remains and the present stalemate is not too painful (or is actually useful), multilateral solutions are avoided. The Falklands and Cyprus are excellent examples of continuing conflicts where parties doing to the vain hope of resolving the issue themselves and refuse to do it jointly with the other party that has a veto on its ultimate resolution.

The burden of enticement to negotiations lies with the party that wants to buy into the solution, it must show the unilateralist that it is willing to temper its own goals to arrive at an acceptable multilateral solution to end the problem for the other party, and that it is willing to grant the other side a solution in exchange for recognition of its own place as part of the problem. The examples are not as frequent as one might like. However, some may be cited, for instance, Somalia's management of its conflict with Kenya has come at the price of its renunciation of claims to some territory in exchange for recognition of its role as amicus curiae for Somalis in Kenya, and a similar set of trade-off has been mooted in the 1968-88 conflict management arrangements with Ethiopia. This trade-off has not yet provided the formula for conflict resolution in these
cases, however a number of cases of regional conflict management have been analyzed in a search for a formula that can entice the parties from competing attempts at imposing a unilateral solution. The largest amount of literature comes from the Middle East. The first two decades of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were punctuated by wars and by vain attempts to make division palatable. But the third decade was opened by the articulation of a formula “territory for security” - and its implementation along the Syrian and particularly the Egyptian borders.

Unfortunately, the fourth decade was wasted in trying to apply the formula to the Lebanese and Jordanian borders, where it did not fit because of different circumstances. A new formula is needed, one that takes into account not only the elements of territory and security but also population and juridical entity, specifically as they refer to Palestinians. Nonetheless, “territory for security or land for peace” stands as a particularly concise example of a trade-off formula, originally expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 242. More general formula notions, such as normalization around established (1967) boundaries, an over arching definition of a goal designed to make a multilateral solution possible, and more attractive rather than mutually frustrating attempts at imposing a unilateral solution, stand behind it.

Another case of regional conflict that has been analyzed in terms of formulas is the Panama Canal dispute. The prolonged negotiations have been frequently analyzed as a situation where the host country spent a decade, beginning with the flag riots of 1964, impressing on the operating country the fact that the latter country could not simply impose its own solution to the problem, as contained in the 1903 treaty. Once this point - that contested unilateral operation would be so costly as to be impossible - was recognized, the two turned to an effort, beginning with the Tack Principles in 1973, to set up a formula that would trade of elements that were important to each party. The result...
was a formula of "use in exchange for sovereignty, with paired defense" which served as a set of guidelines for the subsequent details of the treaty, or resolving regional conflicts. Formulas abound, potential trade-off are considered and the find resolution package for a dispute is often found in the archives of the early discussions of the problem. "No Independence Before Majority African Rule" (NIBMAR) was launched as an early slogan at the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of Rhodesia and was used to bar subsequent attempts at compromise, when real independence finally came fourteen years later, it was based on the NIBMAR formula. Regional autonomy and a trade-off of economic cooperation in exchange for a confirming referendum were mooted as a fair formula for resolving the Western Sahara conflict involving Morocco and Algeria ever since its beginning in the mid 1970s, but it had not yet been implemented by the end of the 1980s even though progress had been made. Something more than mere enticements to a multilateral track is clearly needed.

A second view of conflict refines the notion of absolute incompatibilities of will and solutions and posits the ideal that policies are chosen from among many desirable goals on the basis of comparative costs and benefits. Since these are fluctuating and manipulable (that is, they can be altered by both the external context and the parties interactions/some times are better than other for managing and resolving conflict). Thus, influences on the conflict can be effective ways of influencing the conflict management (resolution), and evolution of the timing and effects of the familiar carrots and sticks - negative and positive inducements - is important for an assessment of negotiation possibilities. In this approach, it is as much the life cycle of the conflict as the ideas about its outcome that determines the chances of settlement, particularly relevant are the roles of intensification, escalation, and crisis in the conduct of the conflict. To sum up, this notion of conflict moves from the more absolutist approach of the first cut to the
relativist appreciation of different courses of action, and from the nature of the solution alone to the nature of the conflict as well.

A number of discrete components of a ripe moment, have been identified, but even then, they enable but do not ensure a positive outcome. Parties (and mediators) must take advantage of the moment to consummate a process. The initial element is a particular type of deadlock, a stalemate that keeps both parties from achieving their goals in the conflict at acceptable cost levels. But a stalemate is not enough; it must be one that hurts both parties enough to make them uncomfortable and unable to break out by an escalation with acceptable costs. And even a mutually hurting stalemate is not enough; it is generally associated with a recent or looming catastrophe that acts a deadline or remembered warning and threatens to impose additional and unacceptable costs of a higher magnitude. This mutually hurting stalemate with catastrophe constitutes one set of conditions. But even this is not enough, it is not helpful to be pointed into a corner, especially a painful one, if there is no way out. Thus, the formula analyzed in the first cut becomes possible, or at least more appropriate.

There have also been many discussions about the possibilities of reopening the moment, once its characteristics have been identified, through the use of carrots and stick, that make a negotiating resolution more attractive or a statement more costly. It is likely that the two extremes can be excluded, carrots alone will not get you to the bargaining table, nor alone will sticks. Both are required, as the modal for the ripe moment suggests. The stalemate must be tight and hurting, reinforced by additional sticks if necessary, and there must be not only a way out but an indication that parties will choose it if attractive enough and that they will respond positively to the other's move in that direction - a tract that can be called "requitement." Addition work has shown that there is a particular characteristic of the laying on sticks and escalation that produces the beginnings of
movement. One party often seeks to escalate its way out of the stalemate only to be caught in a costly attempt that is unsuccessful and that it can not maintain, on the other side, a party can produce a situation ripe for resolution by conducting an "escalation to raise", pointedly indicating that its goal is merely to produce a stalemate and pointedly repining from measures that would invite counter escalation.

A number of regional conflicts have been analyzed in these terms. The war in the Western Sahara was not only analyzed but also conducted on the basis of cost benefit calculations, with the Polisario fighting on the expectation that the burdens of the war would prove to be the undoing of the Moroccan monarchy. Instead, a stalemate was established, but the possibility of a catastrophe was largely eliminated by repeated Moroccan-Algerian agreements not to fight each other directly. Only when oil prices fell, the European community began closing its commercial doors, and the Moroccan defense wall around the Sahara and international reticence blocked further chances of escalation did the mutually hurting stalemate with new catastrophes evolve, and then, only when the UN Secretary General and Saudi Arabia provided parts of a way out did the possibilities of management towards resolution appear.

The Zimbabwean conflict has given rise to a serious debate over the question of a hurting stalemate, with some claims that the final agreement was snatched from the jaws of victory and defeat rather than from a mutually hurting stalemate. Yet the debate may well be less sharp than would appear, since the case is an example of a hurting stalemate in a more dynamic sense. Zimbabwe is a case where stalemate was born of asymmetry, where the previously stronger side was weakening and the previously weaker side growing - with victory still out of reach of the latter side (even though certain in the long-run) and the capacity to do real short-term damage still available to former side (thus giving it the opportunity to negotiate better conditions of exit than would be possible later.
The dynamic stalemate was dramatically exemplified in the situation after the October war of 1973 in the Middle East, where again the come-uppance to the formerly dominant power and the momentary surge of the reputedly weaker power, coupled with the mutual encirclement of the armies on the banks of the Suez Canal, produced a mutually hurting stalemate in both symmetrical and dynamic terms. Costs and benefits were key to the calculations of the parties and to the tactics of the mediator. Similar work on the Kampuchean conflict has also raised the question of the ripe moment and the hurting stalemate, although events have not yet given full proof to the analysis.

Although full analyses are not yet available on the Gulf war, the events appear to lend themselves to a cost-benefit analysis and study of the rope moment as well. The stalemate grew out of the collapse of Iranian arms sources after both sides had been worn out by nine years of brutal war; the catastrophe was seen in the possibility of an Iraqi chemical missile raid on Teheran. Requitement was shown in Iraq’s earlier acceptance of UN cease fire plans in 1982 and 1987, contingent on Iranian acceptance, and the latter plan was finally obtained through continued Iraqi escalation at the end of 1987 and 1988. Again, the UN process of finding conflict resolution left to direct negotiations between the parties, with no guarantees for success now that the burden of the violent confrontation had been lifted.

The diversity of these cases of regional conflict is obvious, but the similarities for a perceptive analysis are great. The cost benefit notion of conflict is not only that leads to a clearer understanding of the conditions of management and resolution, and of the relation between the two, but also one that reflects the ways of thinking of decision makers. It also raises some important dilemmas of the inquiry. Is conflict the only way to get to resolution? Must relations be pushed to war and costly encounters before obvious formulas that are in the public domain can be recognized by both sides as guide
for policy? And again, does conflict management increase or decrease the chances for resolution? Once the means of carrying out the conflict have been eliminated, what is the incentive for resolution? Analysis and practitioners are still looking for ways through these dilemmas.

The third cut on conflict analysis is much more benign, and negotiation has a more natural and prominent place in it. This approach covers the previous ones as well in its broader scope. The third cut, then looks at conflict as an earthquake, a shifting of structures and relations that produces strains to the point where specific restructuring is required. The structure can be conceptualized through the current notion of regimes, the rules and routines that govern behavior around specific issues in international relations. Regimes are continually under challenge, and they are reaffirmed by the successful defeat of challenges and the maintenance of their structures and habits. Regimes are not only behaviours, they reflect power structures and regulate them at the same time. But at times, the challenges accumulate and begin to represent growing structural shifts. Forces favoured by the existent regime exert their usual efforts to repel the challenges, but they are less successful. An interregnum appears, where new alternatives are proposed, debated, tried, discarded, and defended. During this process, structural relations continue to shift, until gradually a new regime comes into place, created and accepted by a negotiation process, since there is no authority structure or decisive rule in international relations to create a new order in any other way. 26

In this process of regime change, regional conflicts are eruptions that mark the challenges and changes in regimes. Some regimes are actually structures of world order, such as the colonial system or regional hegemones, others are rules and routines for handling problems within a particular relationship, such as patterns of bipolar competition or systems of regional rank and relation. Regime change goes through four
functional phases, although, they may overlap and are not necessarily sequential periods.

First comes the challenge to all the regime, its defense, and its collapse; this process itself may be spread over the whole interregnum period, as holdout sectors continue to contest the collapse of the regime. Second comes the elimination of alternatives, by various processes, trial and error as well as intellectual, schematically, alternative replacements may be eliminated because they are logically inoperative, structurally unavailable, or comparatively unattractive. Third is the readjustment of power relations, which involves not only the growth of some forces or parties and the weakening of others, but also the realignment of dominant issues and technologies, producing new dimensions or parameters along which relations are conducted. Fourth is the identification and adoption of formulas that put the new regime in place; these formulas may include not only the overarching formula for the replacement regime but also lesser formulas for resolving specific conflicts and transitional formulas for moving from one stage to the next.

It is important to place negotiation for the management and resolution of conflict within this ripening context, because it brings in a number of crucial elements for which there is no ready place in the other approaches to conflict. Conflicts are not resolved, if they do not take into account the power relations among the parties, and they are unlikely to be durable if they stand as unique or exceptional settlements isolated from general routines, rules, and behaviours associated with category of conflicts. Placing negotiations in an evolving context of regime change also helps explain, beyond the conjuncture of the ripe moment, why the search for a negotiated outcome takes so long, even though obvious solutions are often in the public domain. A shift from an old regime to a new one is in itself an evolutionary process involving phases, it is based on changes in reality that themselves take time; and it incorporates necessarily slow, incomplete, debated and resisted changes in perceptions instead of unambiguous realities.
process, new regimes may simply come into existence, without benefit of negotiation. But the management and settlement of regional conflicts often requires explicit negotiation, or at least it does so when the conflict does not simply dissolve within the context of the new regime. ²⁷

Final characteristic of negotiations in regional conflict is that they often involve such basic values in frequently fragile states that mediation becomes necessary to enable the parties to overcome their inhibitions to reconciliation. New states become so involved in decolonization that ethnic, domestic, and border conflict becomes necessary to their self-identity and political being. States to love their conflicts, or at least to find them useful, and it becomes difficult for them to think reconciliation, to accept stalemate, and to subordinate their conflict to cooperative efforts. At times, the mediator must move from a mere communication's role to that of a formulator of creative solutions, on occasion, he or she must even function as a manipulator, to maintain the stalemate and induce conciliation. ²⁸

Great powers have a particular role to play, but so, too, do smaller states with a self-declared vocation in mediation, such as Algeria. Compound mediation is often required to handle diverse aspects of a complex dispute, in such arrangements as layers of mediation or collective mediation of either UN assemblies or diplomatic groups and organizations of functionally complementary mediators. The UN General Assembly is an unwieldy body for mediation, but it constitutes an important backup to bring pressure on parties and contribute formulas, regimes. The UN Secretariat, on the other hand, has important technical capabilities that often complement states political efforts. A continuing search for lessons, insights, and regularities from past cases of conflict management and resolution in regional conflicts is equally relevant when the parties are not able to mend their own torn fences and need help to do so.
In sub-Saharan Africa, as in so many other regions, there is very little recognition of the need for early warning indicators for conflict management or resolution. As yet, there are no agencies which monitor potential conflicts, except for the national intelligence service, and they are notorious for their bias and lack of credibility. There is no public agency which can work towards conflict prevention and no ombudsmen or other governmental institutions which may facilitate preventive action. These observations hold true for the region as a whole. States tend to respond to conflicts as they arise, recognizing political power only if it is sufficiently organized. Non-governmental bodies are mostly concerned with the result of violence and are involved in humanitarian work caring for refugees, displaced people and the causalities of conflict. Whilst there is a very large network of scholars within the region aware of the conflict situations, academic disciplines are not oriented towards action or policy. The challenge, therefore, is for existing scholarly networks now cooperating within the region to create fora for exchanging, finding and views on new conflict dynamics. Such networks will need to develop linkages with non-governmental bodies, so that preventive actions may be placed on the agenda.

Very little is done to intervene when a conflict escalates into bloodshed and violence. In Sub-Saharan Africa, recent riots and programs against minorities have shown clearly that the state itself is partially involved in encouraging these programs, and scant effort is made to halt violence or prevent it. There are no serious attempts to investigate the crimes committed against civilians and to hold law enforcement agencies accountable. Non-governmental organizations, humanitarian organizations and citizen groups do play a role in providing relief to victims, however. Over the years, human rights organizations have developed a competence in monitoring violations by the state and have developed international links with like-minded bodies. But, generally, non-
governmental organizations find themselves rendered passive or paralyzed by state of emergency and violence.\textsuperscript{30} When the conflict has matured sufficiently and both sides has managed to demonstrate their claims, either by violence or through mass pressure, then concessions are made, leading to mediation. Generally, as far as the state is concerned, this takes the form of accords, round-table conferences, facts and agreements. Recent accords, however, do not provide grounds for any optimism. Rather than resolving conflicts, accords can serve to create new conflict. Accords are not an attempt to bring all the parties to a consensus, the mean the exercise of power and the imposition of the will of the state. There are instances when negotiations begin in earnest between protagonists. But even these cease-fires and negotiations tend to break down, for a variety of reasons. In general, there is too much secrecy and a dearth of professional negotiators. Cease-fire simply become interludes used for regrouping armed forces. Conflict transformation is a phase in which popular forces are able to change the balance of power and actually change the regime in power. Transformation can be meaningful only if it is not a more power transfer, but if structural changes are achieved within the society and new effective institutions emerges.

From the overall presentation in this chapter it was analyzed that each of the approaches attempted to explain certain phenomena or trends in the international system. Further, they also proposed to provide an alternative to instability and conflict by suggesting processes to achieve peace and stability either in a regional or global context. The all approaches needless to mention have significant differences in their analytical orientation and differences, not-withstanding their several shared theoretical postulates and normative concerns. Further, a feature common to all is that viability of supra-state political organizations is the prevalence of minimal level of condition having potential
for conflict management (resolution) And, these conditions could also exist in the contextual and structural milieu of Sub-Saharan Africa. The subsequent chapter examines this issue with regard to motivated and factors which led to the establishment of the OAU.

From the foregoing discussion it will not be of a mark to characterized the Sub-Saharan states system to be prismatic in nature and as such it could immense impediments to any social engineering aimed at promoting regionalism in Africa though the notion of region will be promoted by the disadvantageous structural location of Africa in the international syste

**FOOTNOTES & REFERENCE**


4. massage to Congress, 8th Jan, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson.

5. Ibid, 11th, Feb, 1918


I have excluded resource-based conflicts and environmentally induced conflicts. These are sometimes interstate conflicts, but increasingly communities are defining the right to forest and ecologically secure zones as a collective right. These conflicts will assume greater intensity in the future.


24 Kapferer Bruce, Legends of People, Myths of State, Smithsonian Institute Press, London, 1988


28 Ibid, p 314

29 Op Cit 7, p 179

30 Ibid