The scale and intensity of the violent internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have escalated dramatically in recent decades. Long-running conflicts have become more and more deeply entrenched and newer ones appear to be taking on the intractability of their predecessor. The rising degree, multiplying varieties and the brutal expressions of hatred have hardened positions and hearts throughout the region. And while there have been peaks and lulls in the violence, the underlying causes stubbornly persist. Identity crisis within the Sub-Saharan African states and the meaningful recognition of identity have been central to violent internal conflicts. Politically, these assertions have surfaced in demands ranging through degrees of greater autonomy, to federalism, to self-determination. Claims are being articulated as group rights, rather than in terms of individual rights. The final outcome of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bloody disintegration of federal Republic of Yugoslavia has yet to be played out, but the implications of the shattering of the Soviet empire will reverberate throughout the world for decades to come, and not least in the colonially constituted, ethnically diverse states of sub-Saharan Africa.

Many of the current sub-Saharan Africa conflicts share common characteristics, including fundamental questioning of the impact of creating or sustaining national states as the most effective framework for development when they include plural and socially differentiated societies. Rapid economic development and the incorporation of more and more people into the market economy, once seen as a process which would weaken more rigid traditional societies and dissipate the friction generated by the clash of the
traditional with the modern, has also been brought into question. At the same time, the assumption that security and equality for minorities would be a natural outcome of integration into national societies has been shown to be seriously proved wrong.

Throughout the region, the process of popular participation, particularly in electoral politics, have been abused and misused, widening existing fissures and creating new ones. While there is no doubt that electoral politics is indispensable instrument for effective and equitable social organization, and in the short term can defuse potentially volatile social and political situations in the sub-Saharan Africa context, where genuine democratization and decentralization of power have not taken root, elections have been consistently manipulated to consolidate the hegemony of dominant sectors within each country.

Other potential defenders of civil society, the military and the police - have been prime actors in the partisan and brutal repression of internal conflicts, which has been legitimized by the promulgation of numerous laws that restrict individuals and group rights and exacerbate tensions. State-controlled media have also played a role in the legitimization of repression. It is a sad irony that the growth of military and police establishments supported by high proportions of national budgets has not been able to check the erosion of the monopoly on violence of national governments. In fact, lawlessness, particularly in most African countries, has combined with state-sanctioned violence and criminality to create cultures of violence and insecurity, with an upsurge in para-military groups, good as, thugs, death squads and private armies.

The behaviour of governments, which were conceived as essentially secular and non-partisan mediators between various sectors of society has degenerated to the point where state actions have increasingly contributed to social strife by bolstering dominant sectors of society directly and indirectly, and repressing minority, ethnic, religious or
Adding to the already enormous tensions in the region is the rapid growth of various forms of religious fundamentalism, in some cases state-sponsored as a means of co-opting segments of the population or nurturing a counterfoil to opponents of the state. In Sudan, Egypt and Algeria, religion is at the center of some of those societies, of most severe conflicts - holding the promise of ongoing widespread sectarian violence, but it also has the potential for mobilizing the faithful along avenues of peace, reconciliation and healing. This outlines several possible options for mitigating or resolving conflicts in the region, after describing general trends in the region, role of the OAU and the states, the evolving concept of sovereignty and general typology of conflicts, including, inter-state conflicts, governance and authority conflicts, ideological conflicts, identity conflicts and resource-based conflicts.

In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, broad suggestions for transforming conflicts have included greater degrees of autonomy for minorities, fundamental social reforms, political democracy or constitutional democracy. However, the research has indicated that a "rationalist formula" may not be suitable for dealing with all the phases of conflict. Further the research points to the potential of the Muslim countries or African countries as mediator of anti-Muslim violence, only when the Muslim community develops their own role in the peace process and their own approach to reconciliation.

The desire for peace and equitable development has been a concern for mankind since time immemorial. From time to time there has been a quest for new directions to promote peace in the context of emulating successful designs in other areas. Needless to mention, in the past, the issues of security and equity seemed to be purveyed disjointedly. In addition, the balance of power was considered as the ordering principle for the security of the sovereign state to promote equity. These conceptions played meaningful roles for...
three hundred years following the peace of Westphalia in 1648, as was evidenced in Europe and later extended to America.

But with the advent of this century there has been a popular doubt relating to the possibility of saturation of the creative potential of this scheme. That is the efficacy of the sovereign nation-state and balance of power framework to maintain a stable and peaceful domestic and international order. It should be noted that it was Europe again that provided the impetus to transcend the sovereign state and to promote the project of regionalism as an alternative ordering principle to achieve peace, stability and equitable development. The models postulated by this project no longer desired to have disjointment between individual equity and the sovereign state. The thrust of the regionalist scheme begun with the League of Nations experiment but it failed to stimulate popular exponents. However, the European Coal and Steel Company (ECSC) proved the efficacy of the regionalist project. The EECs success story indicates the efficacy of regionalism as an alternative to war and instability. In short, regionalism's conceptions as well as its potentials are many. Consequently, there has been popular emulation of this project in the Third World settings such as Asia, Africa and Latin America, where attempts to create models to promote regionalism have been undertaken. It is on the basis of the social historical context that the organization of African Unity (OAU) was an attempt to bring together all sub-Saharan Africa states under one common and unifying forum. But the success of OAU has been limited in this direction and it has not demonstrated the unstained marching in history to redraw the political map of sub-Saharan Africa as it is found in the case of the EECs.

An attempt was made in this thesis to conduct a systematic assessment of the role of OAU in managing conflicts and as a regional organization. In this regard it examined five inter-related questions viz.
1. What factors and forces motivated the creation of the OAU? Did these factors and forces compliment one another or did they reflect both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies? If so, what has been their roles?

2. What is the nature and character of OAU? and to what extent did it reflect its operational environment to resolve or transcend it?

3. What has been the role of the OAU international politics? What has been the OAU's role in the regional context? what has been its major concerns and how successful has it been in tackling them?

4. What has impeded the OAU to make rapid progress in the directions of the actualization of its envisaged goal of African regionalism? to what extent have the impediments hindered the OAU in fastening regionalism in Africa?

The analysis of information presented chapterise mentioned in Chapter I reveals some significant findings which have been presented here under five different chapters and conclusion has been drawn.

Chapter -1., provide normative and analytical rationale for the present study including highlighting its focus and defining its analytical scope. It also provides a conceptual and contextual backdrop by examining the important and significant theoretical perspectives to conflict management (resolution) in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War era.

It place each conflict into its context by combining the pertinent historical background material on the evolution of the OAU and its role in managing conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War era. It also deals with theoretical approaches, concepts, issues and provides review of literature and debates on interaction and intervention between the OAU and issues raised in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter has examine why some of these theories are not applicable in the post-Cold War era. This
explanation leads us to evolve a framework to the impact of conflict in the conflict theory. These has enable us to identify the impediments and obstacles that preclude the OAU from attaining the intensity and quality of success, which is characteristic of its counter parts. This formulation of policies would be appropriate for the OAU in realizing its envisage objectives.

The theoretical perspective in this research has attempted to appraise the contending perspective in sub-Saharan Africa, and the role OAU played in managing such conflicts in the continent. Before analyzing the contending perspective, efforts have been made to discuss and clarify the various denotations and connotations of the principles analytical categories in the study of conflict management (resolution). The contending perspective have been examined in the background of some of the central problematique of international relations theory. The research in this chapter has examine the types of conflicts, characteristic of conflict, the domain of the study of international conflicts management (resolution), and current procedures for managing conflicts, in sub-Saharan Africa in particular and in international politics in general, as well as future and present state of conflict research in international relations. In terms of analysis, the new decade coincides with a milestone in the development of indigenous scholarship on sub-Saharan Africa states foreign relations and international politics.

**Chapte-2.** This chapter, entitled as strategies for conflict management (resolution), the case of sub-Saharan Africa, The first part evaluate the terminology of conflict management and its relevance to protracted social conflict in the region. In the second part, explain how some of these concepts are applied to the violent social conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.

The concept of conflict as it has been defined within the context of conflict theory, it focuses on another significant reason why conflicts of such kind mentioned are
becoming increasingly unmanageable. It is important to place negotiation for the management and resolution of conflict within this ripening context, because it brings in a number of crucial elements for which there is no ready place in the other approaches to conflict. The research suggest that, conflicts are not resolved if they do not take into account the power relations among the parties, and they are unlikely to be durable if they stand as unique or exceptional settlements isolated from general routines, rules, and behaviors associated with category of conflict.

Chapter - 3. examines the factors and forces that motivated the establishment of the OAU, as a pan-African organization charged with bringing together all African states under one common and unifying forum. The need for such a study of the OAU stems from the fact that to understand sub-Saharan Africa regionalism one must have an adequate understanding of its historical origins. Needless to mention, some socio-political tendencies and progresses which influence the formation of the OAU have been alluded in the previous chapters. Hence these issues will be dealt more rigorously as well as the structure, origin, activities of the OAU has been discussed systematically. This will facilitate in comprehending the nature and character of the roles played by the OAU in international relations both regionally and trans-regionally.

It analytically also examines the factors and forces that went into the establishment of OAU, situates the socio-historical origin of the OAU in the context of the Black Diaspora? educational and ideological revolution and colonialism which influenced the torch bearers of African nationalism who were also responsible for the establishment of the OAU. Moreover, it discusses organizational structure of the OAU, its various institutions and practices such as its charter, its executive and policy making organs and their powers and functions, and its funding arrangement. The chapter in the
end has examines the various roles played by the OAU in fulfilling the pan-African dreams of continent unification.

The focuses on the OAU’s role in international politics, discusses the nature of sub-Saharan Africa states support of the United Nations system in the context of the relationship between commitment to global international organization and commitment to other forms of international cooperation such as African participation in the non-aligned movement calling for New International Economic Order (NIEO), and disarmament. Moreover, since sub-Saharan Africa organizations have not been notably successful in achieving their political and economic goals, although their United Nations experience is hardly that of overwhelming success, the global cooperative arrangement with its relatively large economic resources and channels of communications to major powers and most other countries of the world, is partial alternative to dependency on former colonial powers. Consequently, the African states find the financial and political rewards accruing from United Nations membership attractive and tend to support the world body to a much greater extent.

Chapter - 4., attempts an analysis of interaction and intervention between the OAU and issues raised in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter assessed the OAU’s role in promoting socio-economic and political change in sub-Saharan Africa. The main thrust is on the various attempts at sub-regional cooperation leading to regional cooperation. A balance sheet of the OAU with regard to conflict management was also presented in the chapter.

Chapter - 5., having answered this questions, the research moves on to a related aspect of analyzing OAU’s role in conflict management (resolution) in sub-Saharan Africa at the present international scenario. To analyze and situate this problem in appraisal covering two aspects general as well as particular. And finally, in the context
of its hypothesis, it ends with the concluding observations on the future prospects of conflict management (resolution) in sub-Saharan Africa. As stated earlier there is no dearth of literature on conflict management but as Africa remained a dark continent in the true sense of the term - its dark shadow did fall on certain unexplored areas - as has been pointed out in this modest research work. It may not provide answers to what afflicts the region - it will generate interest among scholars to take lead in order to address the unresolved conflicts of Africa.

As seen from the analysis, the major areas of interest of the sub-Saharan Africa states mostly lie either within their own boundaries or within the continent. Internally the main concerns are the desire to maintain their territoriality, promote political stability, enhance cooperation to combat neo-colonialism and to bring about their accelerated economic development. However, concerted efforts toward achieving these concerns has been slow as African states do not espouse identical attitudes. Further more they evince considerable differences among them, particularly with regard to the manner in which they should be solved. This is because each state sees its national interests in different light in addition to having different solutions for its national problems. As a result sub-Saharan Africa states have been predisposed to the bilateral ties with their former colonial monitors (this has been true especially with the Francophone and Anglophone states), rather than multi-lateral ties to regional or sub-regional organizations. Hence, states see their interests better served by distancing themselves from sub-Saharan Africa’s co-operative arrangements. However, as we saw the harsh realities of the late 1980’s, sub-Saharan Africa states started realizing the imperatives of economic integration. In this regard the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos set forth road towards signing of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community in Abuja, Nigeria in 1991.
In the analysis of OAU’s role with regard to conflict management (resolution) this thesis will consider cases that involved activity by or within the organization. In this regard a scheme involving three variables has been adopted viz., conflict variables, organizational variables and outcome variables.

Conflict variables include the following: intensity as a measure of conflict behaviors in terms of number of deaths, whether the conflict was primarily internal or international in nature; if international, the issues at state-territory, subversion, seizure of diplomats; the role of other African states and sub-regional organizations; the actual role, if any of extra-regional states; and the possibility of intervention by one or both superpowers. Organizational variables are those concerned with how the OAU became involved in the dispute? What party or parties brought it? How did the OAU establish its jurisdiction? And what activities did sponsor or undertake in efforts to end fighting, isolate the conflict, and assist settlement? Finally, outcome variable describe the general status of the conflict, that is whether its ongoing, unsettled but quiescent settled, and the effectiveness and success of the organization’s efforts at pacification, isolation, and settlement.

In the first decade of its establishment the OAU’s activity was concerned with territorial disputes between its member-states. For instance, it was active in highly intense disputes between Algeria and Morocco, and Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Further, the OAU also directed its activity on disputes of low intensity between its member states such as Ghana and upper Volta, and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.

From the analysis of OAU’s role in conflict management (resolution), we find that there are three types of conflicts in Africa viz. inter-state, intra-state, and a combination of both. Since most of Africa became independent in 1960s the OAU’s role has been only to mediate border dispute with no clear mandate to intervene militarily.
Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa stem from a plethora of factors viz ethnic, tribal or clan feuds.

1. Intra-State Conflict:

Committed to the preservation of the status quo and principle of the territorial integrity of member states, the OAU has not generally been effective either in regulating or bringing to a peaceful solution to conflicts within member states, particularly those concerning secessionist claims. As we have seen, in the Nigerian Civil War, the OAU was extremely cautious in its involvement and as a result it was not able in bringing about a peaceful settlement. Similarly, the OAU has had no involvement in the long running and highly intense Sudanese civil war or in the continued problem in Rwanda and Burundi. Further, the organization had very little to do with the civil war in Angola which was terminated not by negotiation but by the forces of external intervention. Other conflicts, like Chad and Western Sahara have also exposed the virtual importance of the OAU.

2. Inter-State Conflict:

Although to a large extent the OAU has been effective in dealing with inter-state disputes, particularly during its first decade (1963-1973), its role has been somewhat peripheral. However, most of these conflicts were settled through the mediation of heads of state, who acted as agents of dissuasion, inhabitation, or pacification. Hence from the discussion presented on conflicts, the Morocco-Algerian border conflict was settled through mediatory efforts by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and president Modibo Keita of Mali in Oct 1963. Ethiopia and Somalia were offered the service of president Ibrahim Abbud of Sudan in February 1964 and Kenya and Somalia received services of
As David Meyers has rightly observed, this pattern of conflict management can best be characterized as that of "settlement within the organization rather than by the organization." It should be noted however, that this pattern of handling crisis situation, has been less effective during the second decade of the OAU. Since 1973 onwards the organization has not been in a position to prevent inter-state disputes breaking out into war, as evidenced in the 1977 Ethiopia-Sudan conflict, the protracted Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, Ugandan-Tanzania war of 1978-79, or the Malian-Burkina Faso border conflict of 1985.

A more disturbing factor has been OAU's impotence in preventing foreign intervention in sub-Saharan Africa conflicts. For instance Angolan civil war, Congo crisis and the Ethiopia-Somali conflict, where the superpowers used proxies to fight these wars. This really destabilized the OAU in terms of achieving a peaceful settlement. A clear case in point was the frustration and embarrassment which attended the OAU joint peace-keeping effort in Chad. The organization seriously compromised its autonomy image by appearing to be a tool of western imperialist states, as its peace-keeping force relied on the US and the UK for the logistical as well as financial support.

The analysis presented in this chapter dealt broadly on two types of issues: e development and conflict management (resolution). In both the issue-areas, the OAU has attempted to promote cooperation and integration of the continent. The issue of development did not receive adequate attention of the OAU during the first two decades of its existence because of its preoccupation in struggles to eradicate colonialism, and imperialism, and also to minimize the adverse impact of the cold war on sub-Saharan Africa states. But since the 1970s, the OAU has increasingly focused its attention in promoting cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa. In this context it has adopted various
measures of varying magnitude to facilitate the actualization of its long term goal of African unity.

The global strategy and economic climate have had much bearing on the role of the OAU in this regard. The post-cold war era has proved impetus to the OAU to pursue the policy of collective self-reliance and sufficiency in Africa. This impetus has risen negatively in the sense of western power’s indifference towards sub-Saharan Africa. In the conflict management (resolution) sphere, the OAU has had successes and stalemates if not failure. Perhaps it is right to argue that a positive role in this sphere has not been played by the OAU but has been carried out within it. Nonetheless, the credit should go to the OAU because it provided a forum for such interactions. However, on the whole it was evident that the OAU as a regional organization has been hindered from graduating towards, regionalism because of impediments prevalent in the sub-Saharan African state system which also facilitates intrusion of dysfunctional external pulls and pressures.

The OAU has been active in a wide array of issues and problems in the international system. It has been particularly united and strong willed on issues pertaining to Apartheid and Neo-colonialism as well as support for the UN. It has tried to relate the security challenges to sub-Saharan Africa to its stand on disarmament. In this context it is worth knowing that the OAU has voiced not only against the superpowers arms race but also demanded the declaration of Africa and its surrounding areas as zones of peace. It has likewise played a leading role to initiate the restructuring of the international economic order and in this context it has tried to bring to center the agenda of the North-South dialogue, those unfavorable practices and traditions which are of imminent consequences to the beginning of the African conflicts.

Conflict theory can be seen as a development that took place, at least in part, in reaction to structural functionalism and as a result of many of the criticisms discussed.
earlier However, it should be noted that conflict theory has various other roots, such as Marxian theory and Simmel's work on social conflict. In the 1950s and 1960s, conflict theory provided an alternative to structural functionalism, but it has been superseded in recent years by a variety of new-Marxian theories. Indeed, one of the major contributions of conflict theory was the way it laid the ground work for theories more faithful to Marx's work, theories that came to attract a wide audience in sociology. The basic problem with conflict theory is that it never succeeded in divorcing itself sufficiently from its structural-functional roots. It was more a kind of structural functionalism turned on its head than a truly critical theory of society.

Like functionalism, conflict theorists are oriented towards the study of social structures and institutions. This theory is little more than a series of contentions that one often the direct opposites of functionalist positions. This antithesis is best exemplified by the work of Ralf Dahrendorf, (1958-59), in which the tenets of conflict and functional theory as juxtaposed. To the functionalists, society is static or, at best in a state of moving equilibrium, but to Dahrendorf and the conflict theorists, every society at every point is subject to a process of change. Where functionalists emphasize the orderliness of society, Conflict theorists see dissension and conflict at every point in the social system. Functionalists (or at least early functionalists) argue that every element in society contributes to stability, the exponents of conflict theory see many societal elements contributing to disintegration and change. Functionalists tend to see society as being held together informally by norms, values, and a common morality. Conflict theorists see whatever order there is in society as stemming from the coercion of some members by those at the top. Where functionalists focus on the cohesion created by shared societal values, conflict theorist emphasize the role OAU played in maintaining order in sub-Saharan African society.
The resolution and management of conflict is being forced on the well-off, who would prefer to push it aside, in lieu of the fact that there has been a democratization of decision making process. This has come about by a wide access to means of violence, and self-determination, in all its forms i.e. minority rebellion, military coups - are all instruments commonly applied. The monopoly of conflict of the state no longer exists. Furthermore, those who now have access to the instruments of effective coercion have nothing to lose. Paternalism, feudalism, minority rights means little any more. The second best or palliative is no longer sufficient. The choice for so many in all countries is now between a full life and no life. Deterrent strategies and the sanctions backing low and order cannot cope with the condition. It applies at the individual level, at the inter-communal and at the international levels.

It is not enough to know that conflict solving can work since its success may be due to good fortune. A proper conceptual frame work needs to be elaborated which will act as a guide for future policy in dealing with conflict management (resolution) in all social contexts and at all organizational levels. In short, conflict solving is part of a coherent philosophy whose value lies in its empirical verification - It is not a question of what ought to be but what is practical. There are ways in which this can be done - which we call conflict management (resolution). Only an adequate theoretical conceptualization and explanation can make it work effectively and reduce the likelihood of failure.

The conflict management approach acknowledges the hard reality of conflict, as did Machiaveli and Hobbes, but it is found upon different premises which revolutionize the approach to conflict in many areas of social interaction including inter-state and inter-communal conflict. A conflict management is far from being yet another plea for good will, for peace-at-any-price or for peace-if-only-people-were-reasonable, rationale and fair-minded.
Three broad approaches to the handling of conflicts and change can be identified, as the legal-moral or normative approach, the coercive negotiative or bargaining approach and the conflict management (resolution) approach. Briefly, the legal or moral approach seeks to handle conflict by applying to it a set of legal or moral norms. It is a useful way of approaching conflict when there is a basic consensus among the parties about those norms: the rules of the game are accepted by all and what is at stake is merely their applicability in a particular case. Such a method of managing conflicts is often used when the conflict itself is functional to all parties.

However, when there is dissent rather than consensus over the rules of the game, then the normative approach is of little value. Either the norms are rejected as inappropriate by one or all of the parties or they have to be imposed. The convenant of the league of Nations set out a method for managing disputes which it was assumed was self-evidently reasonable to all rational men. Those who thought otherwise were deemed to be willfully deviant and could, therefore, rightfully be dragged through collective security into following the rules. Unfortunately, what was reasonable and rational to the victors at Versailles was not self-evidently so to the vanquished or the revolutionary. Thus, as the inter-war period evolved, the normative method of approaching conflict was eclipsed by coercive negotiation and bargaining. Dissensus reigned and those who were best able to manipulate a variety of means of coercion struggled to impose their will despite the expense of the wishes of the weaker.

Coercive bargaining and negotiation is the currency in which the dynamics of social relations are reckoned in the realistic approach. Conflict is seen as ubiquitous since it results from an inherent drive to dominate in man or in man-in-society. Since not all can dominate, social relations are an exercise in coercion between the dominators and dominated. Conflict, therefore, can only be settled and resolved. Conflict management
means a situation in which the victor or a third party is able to impose a settlement on the 
vanquished or the contending parties respectively by coercion or the threat of coercion

The conflict management approach reflects a very different conception of peace 
We use the phrase conflict resolution to distinguish it from the conception of the realist 
which has been termed conflict settlement. By conflict management (resolution) it means 
a situation in which all those concerned - no matter how respectable or deviant - establish 
acceptable relationships. Thus, there is no need for coercion because when a conflict is 
resolved the situation is self-sustaining through the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

A ‘Zero Sum’ conflict is one in which the gains of one are necessarily the losses 
of the other Parties in conflict often see their relationship in these terms. They look 
upon it as a situation of ‘them or us’ in which if ‘they’ get the whole or part, ‘we’ will get 
what is left What is more, this diagnosis of the situation quickly gives rise to behaviour 
based on these premises Thus the perception of conflict as being Zero sum leads to 
behavioural patterns on that premises so that the conflict becomes zero sum in its effects.
But is this the ‘reality’?

Even those who espouse the ‘realist’ approach would accept that behaviour is not 
an entirely predetermined scarcity and may set a premium on certain values or 
possessions It does not dictate the particular means of achieving goals, nor the specific 
detailed characteristic of goals Not only can means to particular ends change, but so can 
the ends themselves

The conflict solver argues that the nature of social relations is such that there is, in 
theory if not always immediately evident in practice, an infinite range of possible goals 
and possible means from which an actor can select In practice of course, the scales, lack 
of knowledge, excremental factors, systemic factors and the nature of the environment, 
limit perceptions of choice of possible goals and means to attain them There is always
an element of scarcity, since doing one thing implies not being able to do the other. It is necessary to choose, but any choice involves opportunity cost, that is, if it is decided to pursue one value, the effort, time and resources necessary for the pursuit of this value may not be available for the pursuit of other values. The particular choice that is made reflects basic values, it reflects the information that is available and it is affected by all the factors, both objective and subjective, that go into the OAU decision making process. However, most social actors try to maximize or at least satisfy a large range of values. They also try to minimize the opportunity cost of the pursuit of one set of values, goals or material possessions in terms of other sets which are important to them. Quite clearly then variables dealing with information, with roles and with structure are important.

Because there is an infinite possible choice of means and ends it seems likely that there is a choice available which should be non-conflicting. In other onwards, each actor or groups in a social system could in theory, given time and perfect knowledge, light upon a particular selection which does not involve any incompatibilities in the particular system. However, why should a particular group, having already invested a variety of resources in the pursuit of certain goals, gives these up in order to arrive at this compatible position? Why should they turn the other check? Why should they adjust when other groups do not adjust, merely to avoid incompatibilities created as much by the choice of others as by their own?  

The determinants of the emerging international security agenda may be identified with three new factors. There are no clear external threats but, at the same time, there are menacing domestic conflicts, around the world. The political significance of the military dimensions has diminished while the role of the economic dimension is growing in the search for a new security system on both global and regional levels. The significance of transnational structures is stronger and in various parts of the world states, control over
developments on their territories has become weak. The paradox is that in parallel with advancing globalization the emerging international security agenda is more focused on domestic, local and regional issues than was the case under the bipolar system. This leads to the following concluding remarks:

1. Institutional forms and instruments of cooperation in the sphere of security should be adequate to the new realities of a pluralistic world multipolar, multicultural and multi-civilizational.

2. The existing security structures were formed to respond to the threats which are the least prevalent today, they are meant to ensure the inviolability of borders that are no longer disputed. The initiated reforms aim at readjusting the security institutions to new tasks, domestic conflict prevention, crisis situation settlement, peacemaking and developing the concept of post-conflict peace building. In addition, the exceptions with regard to security that are addressed to regional and sub-regional organizations as a rule extend beyond the territories to their member states.

3. Shaping a new security system, both globally and regionally, is part of the broader historical process in which neither the powers nor the security organizations have exclusive rights. If the regime of global and international security that is emerging as a result of trial-and-error processes and new experiences is to adhere to the declaration democratic values - the rule of law, pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights and market economy - it cannot be based on the hegemony of one or several powers. Such a system should give expression to the interdependence of states, where mutual relations are governed by generally accepted principles of international law.

Direct problem solving interventions are an important part of the role of OAU. Such interventions are well understood in relation to small groups and counseling practices. The application of these processes in the international field is more recent and
not as well known. It is the role that the United Nations could have been expected to enact, but primarily because of the lack of relevant skills the UN has failed to perform this function. There are few cases of a direct third party role being enacted by a state or by an agency sponsored by a state. So that the state should not be directly involved. There is at any one time a large number of internal and international lethal conflicts afflicting the world. There is a tendency for them to become mixed and to give rise to even more widespread violence and destruction. The potentiality for inter-community conflict has increased because of the existence, following decolonisation of a large number of countries whose national unity is fragile and whose populations are divided by major social cleavages based upon languages, religion, ethnicity, and tribal loyalty or a combination of these.

There has been almost total failure of accepted traditional intermediary techniques to find peaceful solutions to more than a relatively small fraction of such lethal conflicts, such as communal and international. This failure has emphasized the theoretical, conceptual and practical shortcomings of conventional approaches to conflict management (resolution) and peacemaking. The record of failure is exemplified by this lack of success of efforts to prevent the short coming, but violent, struggle over the Ogaden that took place in 1978 between Ethiopia and Somalia and which had been foreseen almost from the date of Somali independence in 1960, and by the almost complete absence of even a token effort to find a peaceful solution to the long-standing conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. It is even more obvious in the case of intercommunal and other violent domestic conflicts, where potential peacemaking initiatives are additionally handicapped by difficulties of access to the parties, and by the twin problems of domestic jurisdiction and implying some recognition of a party legally defined as insurgent.
A wider variety of reasons have been advanced to account for the failure of efforts at peacemaking in intractable conflicts. Although these reasons ostensibly defer according to whether peacemaking is by great powers or great statesmen, international or regional organizations, private foundations or private individuals, a pattern, nonetheless emerges in the explanations advanced. First of all cooperation in any peacemaking effort is inevitably perceived by the parties to the conflict to involve dangers, risks and costs which they usually wish to avoid. Even the most powerless intermediary employing the most informal approach represents some pressure to agree or to abandon salient goals. Mere agreement to participate in conflict management (resolution) initiative implies some obligation on the parties who are usually unwilling to jeopardize their free action to preserve salient goals and interests. Hence, parties avoid intermediary initiatives unless these clearly suit their own purposes.

An obvious starting point for OAU reform and innovation is to minimize the perceived risk of intermediary activity and to concentrate upon a type of intermediary that represents low levels of coercive potential and an absence of previous involvement in the conflict and interest in the final outcome. However, OAU’s practical experience seems to show that powerless and disinterested intermediaries suffer from other handicaps. There is a record of activity by this type of intermediary - for example, religious organization, private foundations and private individuals who are mutual friends of parties in conflicts and who attempt to play a role in ending conflicts. Such intermediaries are especially active in intense domestic or transnational conflicts where efforts that are non-official have the advantage of not conferring any form of recognition of non-governmental parties. However, the success rate of such private mediation is far from encouraging. There is frequently an initial failure of private intermediaries even to penetrate the conflict and obtain access to parties. Absence of access to top leaders is
constantly a problem in intercommunal and other intractable inter-national conflicts involving a non-recognized insurgent party. The formal political incumbents in any intra-national conflict are usually reluctant for conflict management (resolution) and peacekeeping approaches to be made to rebel forces, even on humanitarian grounds. Allowing such an approach even by private bodies would imply some form of recognition of status entailing future obligations and the curtailing of the OAU's theoretical freedom of action in dealing with the situation.

Given the present unsatisfactory state of conflict management (resolution) approaches at the level of sub-Saharan Africa and international conflict, one source of helpful innovation undoubtedly lies in developments of peacemaking processes to deal with intense conflicts at other social levels ranging from the individual to the inter-organizational. These approaches share the common features of being both deliberately designed to minimize the perceived threat of OAU activity to the parties in conflict or to their interests, and to enable parties to search for mutually satisfactory resolutions of their conflict. The basis of all the approaches to structured peace-making is essentially non-directive and faultless. Increasingly, the relevant third parties are being referred to as facilitators, consultants or zero-power mediators. In addition third parties of this type are also distinguished by their employment of problem solving approach, to finding a solution to a conflict.

This problem-solving approach stems from a number of assumptions about conflicts which are quite different from those characterizing a bargaining approach. Non-directive problem-solving approaches are now employed frequently in conflicts between individuals, in industrial settings, within and between organizations or departments and occasionally, in potentially explosive confrontations between communal groups in sub-Saharan Africa. No matter at what level problem solving approaches are employed, the
underlying principles and the tactical aspects, such as the means used to initiate fruitful communication between adversaries and the role and functions of the OAU, are the same. The aim is to find a low cost, widely supportable resolution to an existing conflict, whether this is between individuals, groups or organizations. It can thus be regarded as a technique of conflict management rather than conflict avoidance. At all levels OAU is involved in some intermediary role providing a service to the conflicting parties and operating directly between the adversaries by setting up a tripartite structure to assist the peacemaking process. The basic objective is often to change the parties evaluations of their own goals, of the range of realistic alternative means available to achieve those goals and their own attitudes and behaviour towards their adversary. The parties in conflict are helped to search for a resolution as opposed to a settlement of that conflict, although the precise methods by which the exploration is conducted differ from level to level. It should again be emphasized, that the self-supporting outcome is based upon the joint discovery of means whereby the parties can satisfactorily fulfill their goals without making the sacrifices demanded in a compromise settlement. 10

Problem-solving and conflict management (resolution) do not imply the elimination of conflict from society. It is accepted by those who adhere to the world society paradigm that conflict is endemic to the human condition. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage whether change could take place if there was no conflict. The problem is to minimize the destructive potential and maximize the constructive consequences of conflict. What is required is management of change, not its elimination.

Problem-solving is neither a new philosophy nor a new theory of international resolution. It is based on the ideas of the world society paradigm. Which differs from orthodoxy only by stressing different aspects of the same world. The paradigm maintains that healthy political relations are built upon the satisfaction of human needs and
legitimized relationships rather than on the knowledge that coercion will be used to enforce conformity. It is believed that participation and consensus will contribute to a sound polity. Since world society contains many systems, there are many cross-cutting conflicts within world society. These cross-cutting conflicts in some measures serve to consolidate world society. They should therefore prevent any one conflict from getting out of hand. If conflict is subject, there is nothing in principle which makes war necessary, particularly since values like security, a frequent cause of conflict, are not in short supply. Conflict conditions are made by the parties themselves and they can unmake them. It is a matter of policy, not of divine will nor of aggressive human nature. Conflict resolution is not based on wishful thinking or on a restructured view of human nature. It is a matter of enlightened self interest.  

The institutions that seem to be required is one in which there can be an analytical monitoring of world events, bringing to bear the most recent thinking and a high level of objective analysis, with a wide participation of countries representing different cultures and political systems. This immediately suggests breaking down both the separation of small and large states, and separation of official and professional role. The OAU, being an organization that gives pride of place to great regional powers and which is governmental in character, is not in a position to do this. However, one of its bodies, established by resolution of the Ad’hoc committee, does these requirements. It is a body that has not developed a strong profile, but its role has never been seen in this perspective. It could readily fulfill the role of exploring alternative conceptual frameworks (such as zonal system already described) in which particular situations can be discussed and negotiated at an official level. In a real sense such an institution is the modern equivalent of the international court. It is not the application of legal norms...
which we now seek, but the alternative conceptual frameworks that make possible resolution or management of conflicts.

Conflicts for practical purposes, can be divided into two parts: those between states outside the great powers whose conflicts, domestic and international, are likely to involve the great powers, and those directly between the great powers. In respect of the former the following propositions seem to be relevant.

1. Conflicts can be resolved (as distinct from settled) only by the parties concerned and without the external imposition of proposals by any other power, and for this to happen the service of facilitators will be required.

2. In any conflict there are many parties and issues involved, all of which must be taken into account before there can be an acceptable resolution and negotiation.

3. Solutions cannot be discovered and negotiated until each party fully appreciates the concerns and claims of all other parties directly and indirectly concerned, requiring more direct and more analytical communication than has traditionally been the case.

4. Negotiated agreements imply some degree of compromise or accommodation, but any agreements finally negotiated must meet with compromise the security and ethnic needs of all the people concerned. There are some core issues on which there cannot be compromise. Power bargaining has to be excluded at all stages for this reason.

5. Such exploratory interactions do not involve issues of recognition or carry any implications other than those inherent in a mutual willingness to explore relationships. Informal and non-official interactions may sometimes be expedient.

6. Facilitators should form a panel as no one person has the knowledge or skill required to conduct such exploratory discussions.
7 External powers with an interest in a dispute may avoid becoming hostages to their clients by insisting that such processes be undertaken as a prior condition to any assistance.

8 Regional organizations are the appropriate location for conflict management (resolution) facilities and the appropriate bodies to take initiative in bringing parties to disputes together.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

The harsh reality that emerged from the present investigation can no longer be tolerated to continue in sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis of the issues involved in the conflict management (resolution) in sub-Saharan Africa point to the role the OAU has played in managing conflict. In this regard therefore, certain useful suggestions are offered here. Broadly the suggestion will be presented under two categories, (a) regional solutions within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), (b) international solution with regard to the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations.

a. Solutions Within The Framework Of The Organization Of African Unity (OAU):

For more than three decades, Africans have not taken themselves seriously while attempting to resolve their conflicts. Past experiences have taught us not to expect too much when Africans gather together in order to discuss a regional initiative. We have to ask why the international community has not been actively involved in managing the regional conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. For more than three decades the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), has demonstrated its inability to resolve any of Africa's long-standing conflict.
The OAU prefers to protect unpopular governments in the name of territorial integrity, rather than to uphold the basic rights of African people. Through protecting and promoting dictatorship across the continent, the OAU has alienated its popular support base and won for itself a reputation as a taking shop. As a result, people from the most disturbed and troubled parts of the continent gradually lose all their faith in African leaders' ability to resolve their own problems.

Although committed to preservation of the status-quo and the principle of the territorial integrity of member states, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has not generally been effective either in regulating or bringing to a peaceful solution to the conflicts within member states, particularly those confronting secessionist claims. As we have seen, in the Nigerian civil war, the OAU was extremely cautious in its involvement and as a result it was not able to bring about a peaceful settlement. Similarly, the OAU has had no involvement in the long and highly intense Sudanese civil war, or in the continued problem in Rwanda and Burundi. Further, the organisation had very little to do with the civil war in Angola which was terminated not by negotiation, but by the forces of external intervention.

A more disturbing factor is OAU's ineffectiveness in preventing foreign intervention in Africa's disputes state of affairs. For instance, in the Angola civil war, in the Congo's crisis, and in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, superpowers operated through proxies to fight these wars. A clear case in point was the frustration and embarrassment which faced the OAU with its joint peace-keeping efforts in Chad. Foreign intervention weakens the states considerably by diverting problems, consuming their scarce resources of manpower and material, and further, by reinforcing their dependence on foreign countries. All these affect their economic emancipation adversely. The reality of the situation demands that African states take measures to counter factors and forces engineering impediments, to suggest some realistic and pragmatic policies for fostering
African regionalism and social integration and to achieve the success patterns evinced by the regional schemes. For the regional resolutions to success these suggestions are recommended:

1. **Regional Diversification**:  
   
   The existing regional schemes should diversify their external economic relations, trading partners and sources of technology and capital to include not only Western Europe, United States, Canada, Britain, France or Japan, but also industrialized countries of the East. To achieve rapid industrialization the OAU should seek to establish, on the strength of its regional policies, collaboration with separate developed countries and achieve specific objectives in the initial stage of regional adventure, diversification, and not elimination of dependencies would seem to be almost a sine qua non for regionalism in Africa today. A more diversified structure of dependencies will nevertheless improve the manoeuvrability which, in a long-term speaks well for a collective self-reliance and genuine reduction of dependence. Diversification also has a potential for strengthening the bargaining position of a regional organization by enabling it to play off one developed economy against another.

2. **Creation Of Regional Preferential Economic Links**:  
   
   Another policy option still available to African regionalism for transcending dependency is to develop preferential economic links, first among African states and then, with integration schemes in developing countries, in Asia (for example ASEAN) and Latin America (for Andean Pact and LAFTA). Such a joint action would be crucial in enabling African countries to defend the prices of their exports of raw materials and to enhance their sovereignty over their natural resources. It would also encourage the growth of indigenous capacities in science and technology, facilitate
marketing of their products, help to increase their industrial capacity and, above all, strengthen their decision-making power in multi-lateral contexts. By taking full advantage of opportunities of mutual inter-dependence and complementary of their economies, countries in Africa, as well as those in the South will have to seize the opportunity, to take the initiative and assume the leadership in the establishment of the New International Economic order (NIEO).

3. Regional Fundamental Policy and Institutional Change :-

African leaders should be willing to introduce these two factors. That is to say they should evolve a redefinition of the development objectives at national as well as regional levels to recognize fully regional integration as an effective approach to the issue of dependency and under-development. But a regional development strategy cannot be fully realized unless countries develop a common policy toward the problem of foreign investment and technology dependence through regional regulation and planning. This should be backed by a serious policy directive designed to build a joint industrial and development institute which would also look into the appropriateness of foreign technology, its purchase, acquisition or adaptation for use in joint development projects.

4. Mobilization of Public Support In The Region :-

The OAU is an act of determination on the part of a political leadership of the African states. Yet in order to achieve the most fundamental aims, the OAU leaders will have to enlist active support and co-operation of the masses. Specifically, the success of any regional strategy for collective self-reliance hinges on a common political will of national governments, which, in turn, requires support from their societal leaders and citizens. What appears to be lacking in African integrative movements is a
5. Demilitarisation Of The Region :-

For achieving the above mentioned changes, it is essential to demilitarize the African states. The strength of Africa can be de-escalated in three fundamental ways through effective policies to limit arms flowing into the African states, through a legal framework that challenges a state prerogative to resort to violence and through nurturing a political culture on the basis of a grass-root level movement. All these strongly discourage aspirations for political role and power in the military. The arming of the African states is an increasingly important factor in their conflicts. They are now acquiring the kinds of weapons that may make a war against one another an easy proposition. For most of the states, this competitive militarization is senseless and waste of resources. It deepens their dependence on international arms suppliers. These arm imports surpass the public expenditure and they serve the interests only of the suppliers and not of the African masses. An African summit meeting on disarmament should be convened by the OAU to appeal various countries of Africa to restrict armament and to give practical as well as effective priority to the political mechanism for resolving conflicts in Africa.

Any programme of demilitarisation in Africa must include a clear-cut policy for combating external intervention in African conflicts. In this regard, the following suggestions are recommended here.
a. A network of regional non-aggression and defence pacts should be conceived with specific provisions against external intervention in African conflicts;
b. Any request of bases, military facilities, or military overflying rights should be denied to foreign powers;
c. An agreement should be laid down among the African states, under the auspices of the OAU, to deny, or threaten to deny supplies of strategic raw material to the intervening powers;
d. An OAU supervised dismantling of neo-colonial military agreements should be endeavoured by certain African states, to prevent the overthrow of their regimes,
e. Strict political controls should be exerted over the political activities of the external linkage groups in sub-Saharan Africa such as the foreign companies, through which external intervention is facilitated;
f. Africa and her surrounding oceans should be declared a nuclear-free continent and nuclear-free zones

g. African peace-keeping forces, should be created to intervene quickly in regional conflicts to prevent the genocide witnessed earlier in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia and many other sub-Saharan African States.

6. OAU Charter Revision :-

One useful function that the OAU can perform is to develop a new mechanism to resolve disputes among and within its member states. In this regard, some important revision of the Charter is necessary. For instance, there appears to be a contradiction between the Charter and the principles governing the organization, offering all parties some ground for justifying their conduct. The principle of self-determination is not in conformity with the principle of maintaining inherited colonial boundaries. Consequently, any attempt on the part of an OAU member to support the right of self-
determination for the subjected people may imply interference in the affairs of other
member states. And more over, the prohibition of interference advocated in the Charter
fails to make a clear distinction between legitimate concern for problems within states
that must be countered in the interests of humanitarianism and development.
Therefore the disruptive disputes often ethnically based that exist in most African
countries hamper any effort to evolve a more sophisticated policy to take care of each
other's internal problems.

7. Strengthening Of The OAU Secretary-General’s Authority: *

The need to strengthen the powers of the OAU secretary-general can hardly be
over-emphasized. With an office constitutionally similar to that of the secretary-
general of the Arab League, but weaker than that found in the Organization of American
States (OAS) and the UN, the OAU officer is clearly not intended to play a significant
role in conflict management activities. Such activities are left to the Assembly or the
Council of Ministers. Indeed, with a small budget and staff including senior officers,
who still maintain special links with their own governments, the OAU secretary-general
is greatly handicapped in his efforts to build an effective secretariat.

Significantly therefore, the OAU lacks an executive machinery for handling
problems like peace and security. There is, thus, an urgent need to equip the organization
in terms of mechanisms and organs to have a body which would have the power to react
to various situations before they go out of hand. Thus, some form of institutionalization
is now necessary to conform to the provisions of the OAU Charter.

8. Regional New Domestic Order: *

Internal policy reforms are required for establishing a new domestic order, if
Africa ever hopes to transform itself to a region of beneficial inter-dependence that
can generate within the African society itself a mechanism necessary for sustained economic growth and social development. At the domestic and regional levels the following policy measures are suggested

The Domestic Policy Measures :-

a. The establishment of the right to food in all African States, in the light of the famine and hunger which have been ravaging Africa for some years now, this policy should be given the top priority. A food-first programme is the best way to initiate a struggle for peace, development and security in sub-Saharan Africa.

b. A programme of income redistribution to favour low income groups should be implemented.

c. Distribution of social services and the benefit of development to the pressing needs of African people like education, health, employment, housing and transport of among others.

The Regional Policy Measures :-

a. Member states must submerge their ideological differences beneath the super-incumbent of Pan-Africanism.

b. African states must re-examine and deliberate on how best to reduce the waste through tailored external aid.

c. Economic transports must be avoided. In this regard Africans require a thorough and informed review of their economic strategies, with a view to overhauling them.

d. Lastly, establishment of a Continental Union Government is not utopian. The advantages arising out of such a scheme are so obvious today, especially with the fact that even the independent countries of Western Europe have sought and created an appropriate European parliament. Whereas much older democracies already realize the
cardinal, divisive mistakes of their founders. Why should Africans not do the same by shortening their host of problems and by merging the weakening factor of their divisions into the OAU.

9. **Formulation Of Regional Integration**

In terms of adaptation and orientation to political instruction has several advantages.

a. It helps us avoid confusing stability with integration, a confusion which is evident in much of African states

b. This formulation of term integration is that it lends itself to comparisons over time at different levels of generalization and between the system.

b. **Solution Within The Framework Of The International Community**

Despite the reluctant attitude of the international community over Bosnia and the current ambivalence in the United States about its involvement in Somalia, new dominant forces of market economy and the conscience of human rights constituency, combined with the eye of the international media, cannot, allow for long the world's democracies to standby and watch countries brutalize themselves in genocide conflicts, and not to involve themselves humanitarian diplomatic, political or even military grounds. For the International community to avoid the humanitarian catastrophe in the region, the following are suggested.

a. With the help of the international community, sub-Saharan African countries must be encouraged to unify their internal front and at the earliest possible opportunity, to organize a truly national peace conference of all the political forces. It should be aided
with international observers to address the major constitutional issues pertaining to regional relations and the form of governance appropriate to their countries.

b. International community should strengthen their control on countries that violate human rights.

c. Through the international organizations, like the United Nations, a system sound resolution should be enacted against such countries. It would be realistic to pass political and economic sanctions against such countries and to uphold them until they prove equality of all citizens.

d. From another perspective, the international community should call for a global conference on internal conflicts. The secessionist conflicts have proved to be the most complex phenomena, as it not only affects the states and its neighbouring or distant ones, but also threatens the world peace and stability. It is in this regards that all nations, be they developed or developing, should pool together and seek comprehensive and lasting solutions to the problem of conflict.

e. Stipulation of basic stability and well-being must be fulfilled by every actor desirous of fitting into the global peace and order. As a logical corollary to this, it is possible to determine the extent to which states, or non-states, fulfil the above mentioned pre-requisite and identify with the global priorities. This is precisely, what the present research, is concerned about.

f. It has been suggested that the internal weakness of Sub-Saharan Africa states that encourage human rights, abuse the need to overcome them.

In conclusion, whether or not peace with justice will be realized in sub-Saharan Africa, and when, will depend on the balance of forces between those committed to a progressive change of the social order in Africa and those whose vested interests compel them to defend the status-quo that is fraught with direct and structural violence. The existence of these latter social forces and the difficulties which they create point to the fact that peace, development, and regional security in sub-Saharan Africa must be seen essentially as political values which are opposed to the interests of powerful social forces.
that are internal and external to Africa and which seek to perpetuate the socio-political
and economic order inherited from the colonial period 13

Management and resolution of conflicts must be defined not in terms of any
abstract identification of what is necessary and sufficient to bring about the pattern and
progress of this struggle against reactionary forces. In other words, peace is essentially a
value which hangs on the balance of forces between patriotism and foreign domination
with the patriotic forces attempting to close the barriers against foreign control of sub-
Saharan Africa development and to create conditions in foreign intervention in sub-
Saharan Africa affairs which would be controlled, if not totally eliminated. 14

However, although the struggle for peace with justice at this historical period
must address itself first and foremost to the political struggle It cannot succeed in this
direction unless the political struggle is also coupled with the economic struggle, the
technological struggle and the struggle in general for the transformation of the productive
forces Unless this is done the tendency will be to win the political struggle but not to
have the economic capability to sustain that victory. Inevitably, such a fragile success
will collapse, setting back the cause of conflict with resolution

As a historical phenomenon the struggle for conflict management (resolution),
development and security in sub-Saharan Africa must advance in stages As a historical
struggle it must be determined and can only be determined, by the character of progress
within it This means that at a certain point the patriotic forces may retreat. At other
times they may advance. But the times when they retreat and when they advance can
only be dictated by the conditions of the struggle. In other words, there cannot be a blue
print created or produced by academics or politicians on the basis of which a once-and-
for-all solution to the problems of peace could be found There can not be a blue print
designed and on the basis of good will or patriotism implemented in such a way as to
solve all the problems in the path of the search for conflict management (resolution) in
sub-Saharan Africa A useful first step in approaching the task would be to build an
Africa-wide social movement around support for peace with justice in sub-Saharan
Africa, develop strategies for such a movement and use it to connect short-term issues
and policy recommendations with a long-term strategy of OAU reform. The last sentence may sound like a visionary cry in the wilderness. The objective of this research was to draw attention to both the hard realities of the present day sub-Saharan Africa situation and the aspects in the current situation which hold the seeds of change. All we can say for the present moment is that Africa faces a troublesome future. The configuration of internal and international forces does not augur well. The present weakness of African leadership, arising partly from its class character but mainly out of the circumstances in which leaders find themselves, combined with the ideological and power vacuum created by the end of direct political control of the former colonial powers, has created the ideal background for superpower intervention into situations in sub-Saharan Africa. These conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are not, as many bourgeois and some left-wing scholars tend to argue, products primarily of the internal tribal, racial, and regional factors, though these do indeed contribute to the conflicts. They are primarily caused by the justifiable attempts on the part of the people of Africa to liberate themselves from this domination. The work discussed schematically the causes and conditions for intervention in international politics. It ascribes the phenomenon to the anarchical nature of the society of states. Furthermore, the causes and conditions have been politically divided into two categories, that is, the conditions which deal with internal causes for intervention, and the condition which is convened with the systematic pressures on states and international organizations to intervene in secessionist civil wars. However, the simultaneous presence of both these sets of conditions, which, in reality, have complex inter-penetrative and interactive relationship, is required for the occurrence of interventions. The work has also looked into the issues like to whom appeal for help will be made by the disputants and whether they would intervene or not. It is argued that the mere presence of the causes and conditions will result in intervention. It would occur only when an intervening party perceive, that the benefits would outweigh the cost and the risks.
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2 Ibid
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6 The United Nations Findings on Rwanda and Burundi, Africa Report, April, 1964, Vol 7, Quoted in Ibid
7 George Ritzer, Sociological Theory, Mc Grow Hill International Editions, New Delhi, 1996, p 265
8 Burton and Groom, Light and Sandole Britain Between East and West, Gower Publisher Company Ltd , 1984, pp 143-146
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