CHAPTER 4

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AFRICA
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This chapter attempts an analysis of the interaction and intervention between OAU and the issues raised in the continent, as this will help us in providing a more in-depth understanding of the nature, character and development of the OAU as a regional organization. The imperative for this analysis arises out of the fact that any regional organization is significantly influenced by its regional environment context, in terms of its formation and functioning as well as in its progress. It is also true that a regional organization affects its milieu, consequently, the interaction between them “states” is highly complex and dynamic. Therefore, it is necessary for understanding the development of any regional organization to have adequate knowledge of its milieu.

The preceding chapter which analyzed the interaction and intervention of the OAU to promote security, peace, decolonization, conflict management and socio-economic development in sub-Saharan Africa in particular and international relation in general indicated that the organization has not lived up to its aims and aspirations envisaged by its founders. Further, it has also not succeeded in fostering the regionalist scheme in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite its operation over a period of three decades, the OAU has still to generate a sub-culture of African regionalism which offers the hope to encompass the African states system, transcending intra-state and inter-state disputes, in addition to attracting the loyalties of contending political elites therein. As such the OAU has had an afflicted progress toward reform as well as evolving and moulding a regional culture to further dignity, stability and progress of tropical Africa. So the question arises: What has caused this overwhelming change of mood and perspective during the last few
years. It would be too facile and also fallacious to point to certain phenomena as being responsible for the present predicament. In fact, a host of factors are responsible for the situation the OAU finds itself in today.

In this situation, the OAU presents a picture of fragmentation and disarray. It is against this backdrop that the present research systematically and analytically presents the impediments to African conflicts, and problems. It should be noted that there are a number of intrinsic African traits on the one hand and external one on the other that provide a valid challenge to the responsiveness of the OAU. For analytical purposes, the impediments to OAU in sub-Saharan Africa will be tackled from the challenges to state integrity on the one hand and the challenges to organizational responsiveness on the other.

**Challenges To State Integrity And Legitimacy Crisis:**

African states are plural entities and like most in the developing world they have never been an integrated whole in the sense evinced by the differentiation model. In analytical terms, their integrative problems are four-dimensional as reflected in the following:

a. Primordial differentiation, that is the original and as yet unabridged indeed, frequently intensified - lines of cleavages (ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, sectional etc.);

b. Modernizing differentiation, that is the fragmentation into sub-systems training toward autonomy within the modern sector as a result of the pluralizing (i.e., differentiation) impact of economic and social modernization;

c. Compounded differentiation, as manifested in those explosive situations where the lines of cleavages of (a) and (b) coincide and are mutually reinforcing, and
uneven differentiation, as reflected in the wide gap between the highly differentiated politico-administrative superstructure imported from the west on the one hand and the medley of fragmented elements in the society on which it has been placed on the other.

The aforementioned factors constitute the integrative load thrust on the new politics. Further, their already fragile capacity is simultaneously challenged to contain or "domestic" as Gertz would put it, the divisiveness of (i) hopefully by avoiding, (ii) as well as to develop new integrative mechanisms to bridge the discontinuities between (a) and (d). It is from such a backdrop that the challenges to state integrity will be presented.

The fact that legitimacy involves both the performance capacity of the system and the sentiments of the population towards governmental participation, penetration or distribution, can ultimately, culminates in a problem of legitimacy, for in a sense all crises raised questions about legitimacy. As we saw in the discussion in chapter III, Africa is the most disjointed of all continental masses, with 53 sovereign states. Furthermore, due to the harsh colonial experience, post-colonial problems of youthful adjustment to the national and international political milieu and economic hardship culminates in a limited predisposition to give and take in negotiations with and among the African states system. Moreover, in many African countries a common feature is the uncomfortable marriage of state and nation. In more cases, where there is a colonial past and political borders have been drawn arbitrarily by the colonizing powers the boundaries of modern state and original nation (Where such existed) do not coincide.

Consequently, this weakens the sense of identification of certain communities or regions with the new state. Added to this is the problem of dividing political power between groups of varying ethnic and sectarian origins. When the answer is in minority rule, further alienation from the state by other group is inevitable. At another level, partly...
as a result of the colonial inheritance, state structure have often embodied alien concepts and mechanisms of societal mobilization and control. Beside reducing legitimacy by appearing to be imposed from above or outside, such inherent inappropriateness has limited their practical utility. The tensions generated by the nation/state dichotomy have taken varied, usually violent forms: absence of elite value complementary, nationalism and secessionism, rise of religious resurgence, coups d’etate among others.

**Absence Of Elite Value Complementarity:**

The first generation of African ruling elites (1960 - 1975) who were mainly western educated in their struggle against imperialism submerged their differences as they viewed European based imperialism as the common enemy and stood in favour of pan-Africanism. Further, they were also faced with the task of dismantling the political systems left behind by the former colonial powers. In this sense to achieve this end, they resorted to more authoritarian forms of governance based on centralization of power and personal rule. It is important to note, however, that ruling elites were not exclusively interested in acquiring power for powers sake, but often shared many high-minded principles (e.g., rapid development to satisfy popular demands), that at least in their eyes, made the suspension of democratic practices and undesirable necessity. Yet, what was originally evinced as temporary suspensions of democratic procedures in practice usually became long term in nature. As a direct consequence ruling elites such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Felix Houphouet Boingy of Ivory Coast, invariably turned to a variety of authoritarian measures to enhance their powers and ensure political survival of their nascent state at the behest of other elite gripes within society. This was carried through such actions as the staffing of enlarged bureaucracies,
militaries and police forces with members of the leader’s ethnic or clan group (as well as
with members of their primary ethnic or clan allies, the rejection of institutional
principles, the emasculation and, in many cases, the disbanding of independent
parliaments and judiciaries that at best became rubber-stamp organizations incapable of
serving as a check and balance on the powers of the executive, including labour unions
and student organizations and the outlawing of rural political parties and the disbanding
of multi-party political systems in favour of single-party system 4

However, the growing stagnation of the elite-party from the 1950s to the
beginning of the early 1970s was matched by the growing power and influence of African
militaries and military elites Most important, the emergence of military elites as power
brokers within African executive mansion and parliaments did not usher in a new era of
progress and prosperity Rather, it soon became clear that military coups d’etat usually
led to new forms of military - led authoritarianism as bad as, if no worse than, their
civilian counter parts For instance, in the period from the late 1970’s through the 1980’s
evined growing levels of political repression and human rights abuses throughout the
African continent. This culminated in neo-patrimonialism - a form of organization in
which relationship of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative
system which is formally constructed on rational - legal lines This is characterized in
tribal societies by loyalty to ones kind group which is the primary social value A point
in case is the Tutsi community in Burundi which has discriminated widely against the
majority Hutu peoples, going as far as severally limiting the number of Hutu who enter
the state apparatus, army educational system and professions Furthermore, the former
have also carried out mass acts of genocide against the latter
In sum, the contest over political ascendancy in the African state system largely takes place among the same group of contestants—a very small elite (whether civilian or military) that generally favours political self-preservation over policies and political structures truly designed to benefit the dis-empowered majority of most states. Furthermore, in case after case, ruling elites continue to impede not only the process of sharing political and economic power more broadly, but also the facilitation of trade-off within the framework of the OAU.

**Increase Of Religious Resurgence**

The ideological divisions in Africa are also compounded by moral issue, particularly those of a theological nature. These revolve around the religious identity of the state, and are fueled by traditional social divisions, the encounter with outside cultures, and the failure of the state to live up to its expectations. Africa, in this present decade, is experiencing a serious problem in the form of the rise of religious resurgence. This movement finds manifestation on two counts, viz (1) the phenomenon of re-Islamization (usually termed as Islamic Fundamentalism or integrated Islam,\(^5\) and, (2) the rise of militant Christian cults. The former is prevalent in north Africa where Islam is taken as an ideology intended to set Islamism (or pan-Islamism) from other ideologies. As a direct consequence, there is displacement of all forms of secularism. As far as the latter, Sudan offers the best example, the demands by Northerners for the adoption of Islamic laws alarmed southern Christians and animists, thereby fueling the Christian insurgency.

In each case, autonomous groupings attempt to promote or impose a particular view of society and the economy, with possible impact on foreign relations and alliance.
As a result this has led to internal violence in several countries—bombs in Tunisia and Algeria, assassination of leaders in Egypt (e.g., Anwar Sadat), civil/tribal war in Uganda, genocide in Sudan, Rwanda, Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo at present), the list is endless. Consequently, this has driven a wedge in the responsiveness of the OAU, whereby two distinct groups have emerged viz. Arabized north (pan-Arab) and African south (pan-Christian). In sum the notion of pan-Africanism has been altered if not negated.

**Ethnic Secessionism In Sub-Saharan Africa:**

Most African states are characterized by ethnic plurality which has hampered the development of their state-centric nationalism which encompasses but transcends ethnic loyalties and identities. Perhaps the only exception to this are the Arab countries in the north Africa and a handful of sub-Saharan African countries which have ethnically homogeneous populations. However, the rest are a pot-pourri of diverse ethnic groups, cultures, languages and religions.

The post-independent political processes in sub-Saharan African states have accentuated the ethnic cleavages and promoted ethnicity as a competing identity to the identity of the state. Generally it has been the practice in African states that the ruling elites have tried to foster the interests of their ethnic group at the cost of the other ethnic groups. As a result this has often led to the latter to not only perceive the existing state as an instrument of a particular ethnic group but also a structure of dominance and exploitation. For instance, in Somalia during the regime of Mohammed Said Barre claim rivalries were kept in check partly through a powerful army and partly by Barre’s adeptness at playing them off against each other in the granting of governments.
privileges and jobs  It should be pointed out that although Somalis speak the same language and have the same religion (Islam) and culture, discontent of Barre’s regime paved way for intense intra-clan conflicts. As a result, three major rebel movements became engaged in a secessionist conflict (all were clan-based and had little in common except their dislike of Barre’s regime), this culminated in the ouster of Barre regime in 1991.

Another best example is the struggle waged by the Eritrean people’s liberation front (EPLF) in Ethiopia to achieve an independent Eritrean State. In Sudan, for instance, there has been a relentless bloody conflict between the ruling Arabised-Islamic north and the African Christian south for nearly two decades. In the south, the Sudanese people’s liberation movement (SPLM) and its armed wing the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) are engaged in a secessionist war for independence. Yet another point in case is the Cameroon which is facing a real secessionist threat. Since 1960, it has been dominated by French-speaking eastern and southern parts at the expense of the English-speaking south-Western regions. In its struggle for political reform which began in the early 1990s, the English-speaking portion around the country’s commercial capital Douala has been asserting itself with increasing vigour. On the whole, a host of other African states like Angola, Zaire, Liberia are and have experienced varying levels of ethnic conflicts.

In sub-Saharan Africa, from the discussion presented, we find that ethnic nationalism is based on inter or intra-tribal competition and not on ideology. That is, ethnic conflicts in the continent have for long time back synonymous with what was a clearly perforative term, tribal fighting. Ethnic secessionism in this sense remain ever-present dangers not only to many African states but also to effective pan-African integration.
Coups D'état In Sub-Saharan Africa :-

The phenomena of coups d'état is very endemic to Africa of diverse origin. These coups are the most grievous destabilizing factor as they pose a threat to the OAU because they breed a train of political problems - governments in exile, refugees, famines and even wars. Specifically, a veritable exposition of military coups d'état led to the replacement of entrenched civilian elites with their military counterparts and became the primary form of regime change in sub-Saharan Africa politics during the post-colonial era. From 1956 to 1986, for example, 60 out of 131 attempted coups d'état resulted in the overthrow of the civilian regime of an African country (if one includes reported 'plots' against an established government, the number of potential episodes of military involvement equal 257). Leaders such as Nkrumah, Emperor Haile Selassie, Patrick Lumumba, Jamal Abdul Nasser among others were toppled as a result of coups d'état.

These coups d'état rob the OAU the continuity of experienced and senior advise as well as the service of devoted governments and statesmen. Consequently, this discontinuity destabilize the OAU as exemplified by the Chadian crisis (conflict), which consumed time and dangerously rocked several OAU General Assemblies. In addition to the phenomenon of coups d'état, many members of the OAU have unusually large and unstable national armies whose size is disproportionately large upon which they depend. Furthermore, these armies are very consumptive of resources as well as being the frequent cause of national and regional instability. As a result, as long as militarism remains a dominant feature of national internal security and inter-state relations, instability of sorts will not only plague states but also relationships within the OAU.

Refugee Crises in Sub-Saharan African :-

The refugee crises is an overwhelmingly third world problem, whether in terms of numbers involved or of root causes. Besides, the enormous material burden of keeping the refugees alive by host governments has created a number of consequences in terms of
their stability and security. The presence of thousands of impoverished refugees receiving international attention and assistance can create resentment among neighbouring host communities, which moreover are often separated from the refugees by ethnic, tribal, regional or religious differences. In Africa, the obvious examples are Ethiopians in Sudan, Sudanese in Uganda, Rwandese in Kenya and Uganda. Further, the presence of refugees may also accelerate existing internal conflict in the host countries, as the refugee problem is compounded by the emergence of organized groups of exiles who agitate for changes in their home countries within host countries. For instance, south Africans from black front-line states, Polisario refugees from Algeria, Ugandans in Kenya, Rwandese in Burundi to mention a few. In this regard, the security of the host country (not to mention the refugees country of origin) is affected by the presence of exiles.

A bureau for placement and education for African refugees has been in operation at the OAU headquarters since 1968. A refugees status and right of asylum are recognized by all independent African countries. “No longer are refugees subject to rejection at the frontier, return of expulsion, which would compel them to return to or remain in a territory where their life or freedom would be threatened.” Many African refugees have been provided with education and job opportunities.

Briefly stating, therefore, the OAU was not set up with any narrow end in view but rather for the purpose of promoting and strengthening regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa. To what extent, then has the OAU been able to provide for effective and durable impetus towards achieving the pan-African dream envisaged in 1963? This question among a horde of other will be answered in the succeeding chapter where an in depth analysis of the OAU’s role, programs and policies will be undertaken.
OAU And Sub-regional Organizations :-

In the area of creating regional economic associations, the OAU has work closely though not always in harmony with the UN specialized agency, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The ECA, the first pan-African organization to be set-up, west established in 1958, by Resolution 674 (XXV) of the Economic and Social Council of the UN, which designated Addis Ababa as its Headquarters. The ECU was the fourth of the UN regional commission, the other three being the Economic Commission of Europe (EKE), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAPE), and the Economic Commission for Latin America (UCLA). The Economic and Social Council set the terms of reference of ECU which to seek and promote economic development on the continent. The ECU is also concerned with social aspects of economic development and the inter-relationship between economic and social factors. Its terms of reference allow it to make recommendations on any matter within its area of competence to the governments of the region and to other specialized agencies. But it has only advisory and recommendatory powers are functions. It cannot undertake any action in the sphere national socio-economic development without the prior consent of the concerned country. To facilitate the functioning of the ECA, it has seen Sub-regional zonal groups. The zonal groups are adequately staffed with technical and supervisory personnel. The most important sub-regional organizations are the East Africa Community (EAC), the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic Community (CFAO), the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghrib Union, the Mono River Union and the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). A major objective of all these organizations has
been to increase intra-African trade with a view to substitute African imports for non-African imports. The following are some of the institutions created for the above-mentioned regions:

1. **The Meghrib Union**:

   This comprises of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya who have established a number of functional institutions and signed several treaties to foster closer economic and political relations. However, these treaties have been so what impeded by the controversy over the western Sahara and by the idiosyncratic policies of Libya’s President Col Gadhafy.

2. **The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**:

   This organization emerged as a result of significant break through when Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Togo Bridged and Anglophone - Francophone gulf to bring 17 governments, together. While this major grouping has not flourished as promisingly as was at first hoped, it nevertheless exists as a functioning unit and is pragmatically engaged in resolving the obstacles to effective cooperation. However, it is said that the organization is more beneficial to Nigeria than to other members. It is notable that Nigeria which played the principle role in founding the organization in 1975, contributes 35 percent of its budget, and hosts its headquarters. But it is equally pertinent to note that the organization has 17 members with a total population of 150 million, 85 million of whom are Nigerians. In this sense it is said that the organization was created largely out of Nigeria’s pervasive concern with controlling its external environment. A more distressing fact is the predominant economic dependence on the metropolitan the progressive militarization of the ECOWAS is an additional source of instability in the sub-region.
3. The West African Economic Community (CEAO) :-

Was created in April 1973 by six Francophone countries - the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mauritania - with the active support of France. The idea behind its creation was to revive the defunct French West African Federation under a new guise by encouraging economic relations among the member states. Another aim for the organization's establishment was to counter-balance Nigerian influence in West Africa.

On the basis of the apparent institutional successes and economic achievements of CEAO, its members proclaimed their willingness to preserve their identity and supposed acquired advantages (le acquis) with the wider and much loser ECOWAS framework to the extent that CEAO and ECOWAS have similar objectives, multiple membership raises the issue of primary allegiance and conflicting loyalties. It is no wonder that this seems to provide grist to the mill of those who argue that ECOWAS is a purely neo-colonial institution which should be scrapped in order to allow ECOWAS to be fully operational.

4. The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) :-

It was established in Dec 1981, comprises of 19 member states, belonging to countries in the Eastern and Southern African region. The organization has had to deal with threats of withdrawal by countries that feel they have not gained much from it. There is the belief in some of the smaller PTA member-countries that its main beneficiaries are Kenya and Zambia.

5. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) :-

This organization was established in October, 1983 by 11 countries belonging to the central African sub-region. The member-states are mostly French-speaking under a joint, Cameroon Zaire leadership. However, there has been little or not cooperation...
among the members as predicted upon the actual progress toward integration. organization remains a purely popper organization that has shown no tangible achievements so far nor has it demonstrated any dynamism 18

6. The South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) :-

The organization was created mainly to help reduce Southern African States dependence on South Africa. There is no formal treaty establishing SADCC, and the organization relies on a declaration setting out its objective. The SADCC comprises of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland among others 19

However South Africa’s economic strength in the sub-region has proved to be a major stumbling block to cohesive cooperation as most of the SADCC states are dependent upon it for trade, transport, and even employment. Another factor is its military strength and the ease with which it can invade and occupy any state in the sub-region.

Thus, while the creation of sub-regional associations has proceeded unevenly, the tendency has been towards unity rather than for fragmentation. Further, these sub-regional organizations supplement and are fully in conformity with OAU aspirations. But there is at least one reason for optimism. A number of the existing sub-regional organization’s are already applying the lessons learned from experience to the operations to overcome the impediments to cooperation and integration. ECOWAS, for instance, began removing trade barriers between member states on January, 1990, and all non-tariff barriers to intra-community trade are to be completely lifted over a four-year period. In eastern Africa, PTA members, signed several instrument covering multi-lateral industrial enterprises and institutions, a custom bond guarantee agreement, and a PTA reinsurance
company in the meeting held in Mbabane, Swaziland in 1990. The ECCAS has also made good progress. The 1990 summit attended by ECCAS heads of states in Kigali, Rwanda authorized free movement of certain categories of citizens among member states. They also approved measures aimed at strengthening cooperation between their airlines beginning January 1991.  

Lastly with the successful holding of multi-racial elections in South Africa in April 1994 there has been a dramatic change in the SADCC sub-regional scheme. That is South Africa is no longer considered a foe but a friend to boost a move comprehensive cooperative scheme in the sub-region. However, African states have much grounds to cover to achieve regionalism and the various attempts at strengthening economic cooperation at the sub-regional levels will be of crucial significance in the establishment of a sound continental economic cooperative scheme.

**Promotion Of Economic Development And Cooperation In Sub-Saharan Africa:**

Economic cooperation among sub-Saharan African countries has received increasing attention in recent years. The idea of collective self-reliance among certain groups of countries attracted much support in the 1960s and 1970s. This was especially so in those countries having similarity in geography, culture, race, politico-economic systems and security. It is a fact that many of the international negotiating conferences and meetings held in the last two decades within the framework of the North-South dialogue have emphasized South-South cooperation to overcome the problems of backwardness. Thus, sub-Saharan African countries have urged a greater degree of economic cooperation among or between themselves.

Over the first quarter of its existence the operational agenda of the OAU has been overwhelmingly political quite understandably. It deal with issues such as
decolonization, Apartheid, Refugees, inter and intra-state conflicts and so on. These issues posed immediate challenge to political liberty, dignity and stability in Africa. Consequently, the OAU and ECA were forced into a sobering reassessment of their options, what is the correct path towards economic development? What kind of economic security should OAU initiate and promote in sub-Saharan Africa? In any case, how relevant is the inherited colonial and neo-colonial economic policy to sub-Saharan Africa development? or simply put how beneficial to sub-Saharan African foreign policies theories of development an economic growth? Is the trickle down approach to development and economic growth relevant to Africa? Closely related to these is the question about the forcible integration of the countries of the continent into the mainstream of world trade and investment and the consequent external orientation of development and economic growth efforts. The OAU by the late 1970s was therefore faced with a choice between continuing to support an inherited structure of dependence or create at the regional and sub-regional levels new economic arrangements based on the principles of self-reliance and self-sustainance.

On the initiative of the ECA the OAU at its 16th session held in Monrovia, in July 1979 opted for the later choice. Consequently, the OAU adopted the Monrovia strategy for the economic development of Africa and the Monrovia declaration of commitment on guidelines and measures for national and collective self-reliance in social and economic development for the establishment of a new international economic order. In April 1980, the OAU at its special economic summit held in Lagos adopted the historic Lagos plan of action (LPA) for the economic development of sub-Saharan Africa based on the Monrovia strategy.
OAU’s (LPA) : Objectives, Goals, Aims and Strategies :

The Lagos plan of action,\textsuperscript{23} (LPA) unanimously endorsed by the African Heads of Government at a conference jointly convened by the OAU and ECA, held at Lagos in April 1980, advocated essentially a self-reliant development strategy. This regional and sub-regional organs, conceived under its inspiration were, therefore, as much concerned with the specific economic problems of day-to-day concern, as also with the deeper maladies that lay at the roots of Africa’s underdevelopment.

The LPA constitutes the first comprehensive continent-wide formulation and articulation of the preferred long-term economic and development objective of African countries that OAU has produced. Its main theme is Africa’s reduction of dependence on external strategy. Hence the plan identified as its basic objectives “self-reliance,” both national and regional and “self-sustained development.” This in effect, meant first, a substantial shift from external to internal demand stimuli, that is policies, plans, strategies reflecting internal demand rather than demand expressed in developed economies, and second, a shift from reliance primarily on imports to primarily on domestically produced factor inputs.\textsuperscript{24}

Described as Africa’s economic Magna Carta, the LPA is a complete departure from past, inherited externally-oriented development strategies. It puts a substantial question mark against the relevance of “imitative life styles” and “borrowed foreign concepts and ideologies to Africa’s social and economic transformation”.\textsuperscript{25} By adopting the plan and the final act of Lagos (FAL), the OAU has demonstrated inter alia, its desire for a far-promoting Africa’s economic security. As an objective of greater economic security, the plans seeks to reduce the exposure the vulnerability of a national or regional economy to outside forces such as demand conditions in external market and world
commodity prices. To a large extent, therefore the LPA is a significant step on the part of the OAU to provide the much needed economic security of Africa.

Although self-reliance and self-sustaining development as a strategy of the LPA and the FAL were accepted in 1980 to provide economic security in Africa, its implementation has not yet advanced beyond ratification. Particularly disturbing is the lack of progress in the promotion of continental cooperation and integration, which constitutes an integral condition for the implementation of both the LPA and FAL. For instance, in the member one LPA priority of self-sufficiency in food production and supply, no action has been forthcoming in setting up sub-regional food security arrangements and undertaking the feasibility of establishing an African Food Relief support scheme. Similarly, in the industrial sector, in the field of natural resources, promotion of intra-regional trade and in the establishment of multi-national regional and sub-regional institutions, no action has been made. Needless to mention, the most outstanding progress made was in the establishment of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African States in December, 1981, the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) in Oct, 1983, and the founding of the African Federation Chambers of Commerce (AFCC).

Notwithstanding, the slow progress in the implementation of the Lagos document it did not per se suggest any lack of interest on the part of the OAU members in the LPA as an instrument of economic security. Indeed, the Nov, 1984 OAU, summit at Addis Ababa solemnly proclaimed the firm determination of the African leaders to “achieve accelerated economic development and independence of Africa, in accordance with the aims, objectives and principles of the OAU charter and the LPA and the FAL through the effective mobilization of our countries immense becomes and material resources.”
However, impediments to the implementation of the plan were partly due to the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Africa. In addition to this, the crises management resulted in wide-spread neglect of programmes dealing with the long-term contracts of development. Furthermore, the limited resources available for the implementation of the LPA and FAL were directed to meet emergency crisis situation. Besides, politico-economic commercial arrangement such as the Lome agreements also effectively reinforced the North-bound vertical orientation of the African economy and impeded intra-African economic cooperation. For Euro-Africanism exemplified by Lome not only symbolizes the “continuity of an unequal division of labour between the two sets of parties,” Timothy show has shown, it is also essentially incompatible with the self-reliance and self-sustain objectives of the Lagos plan.

Due to the OAU efforts, African countries have been able to harmonize their policies with regard to UNCTAD, IBRD, IMF, UNIDO, ILO. Consequently, their claims for better terms of trade, full participation in a new international monetary system and more multilateral aid carry more weight.

Through the OAU, African states have proclaimed their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. Also the persistent quest by these states for the modification of international law with regard to the continental shelf and territorial waters has gained momentum.

OAU, And New International Economic Order :-

The struggle for a radical restructuring of international economic relations on the basis of equality and justice - that is, creation of a new international economic order - has in recent years emerged as a major significant issue in foreign policy agenda of sub-
Saharan African countries. The significance of this issue is rooted in the hurdles African people have been facing since independence to achieve their state building tasks and actualize their economic and social aspirations. At the same time, it needs to be recognized that the evolution of sub-Saharan African states political economies can be meaningfully understood with the help of the underdevelopment approaches in the field of international political economy. The interaction between politics and economics is an old theme in the study of international relations. There are, for example, three ways in which political factors shaped economic processes and outcomes, (1) the structure and cooperation of the international economic system is to a great extent determined by the structure and operation of the international political system, (2) political concerns often shape economic policies in the sense that important economic policies are frequently dictated by overriding political interests; and (3) international economic relations, in and of themselves, are political relations, as international economic interaction is a process by which state and non-state actors, manage or fail to manage their conflicts and by which they operate, or fail to cooperate to achieve common goals. 30

The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 was assigned the task of establishment of a stable world economic order. Subsequently, the Bretton Woods system came into operation in 1947, to manage the commercial and other financial relations between Western European and North American countries. Its significant aims, objectives and function were to ensure stability in the world economic order by preventing the reemergence of destructive economic tendencies including economic nationalism of the 1930's. It is in this regard that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) were founded to help in the reconstruction of European countries after the war by means of long-term loans. The
World Bank consequently sought and found a new role that of promoting the economic development of the Least Developed Countries (LDC’s) as well as increasing economic interactions between all member countries of the international society. As a result, the third world countries were incorporated into this international monetary system and remained subordinate, and linked their development and progress with the developed countries of the west.

However, the Bretton Woods system received a severe jolt in the 1970s as the management of the international economy was severally challenged by the LDC’s. These countries had become increasingly dissatisfied with the system, which according to them distorted and exploited and therefore their economies perpetuated the dominance of the developed western states. Bretton Woods system symbolized neo colonialism in a subtle way unit gradually it was exposed and the third world countries demand new international economic order to replace it. Above all, the aid and loans given by IMF/IBRD were tied to the enhancement of the politico-economic interests of donor states and thereby reinforced structures and processes of the LDC’s on the developed countries dependence. This had inhibited the efforts of the LDC to gain autonomy as the aid giving institutions influenced economic decision making of these countries by promoting certain economic policies. These in turn also served the interests of the developed countries (DC’s), in terms of exercising political influence in the political economies of the least developed countries. Meanwhile, from the very first years of independence, African countries learned first-hand that the Bretton Woods system (BW’s) contradicted their vital interests and seriously impeded the development of independent national economies. They wanted to reform the prevailing international economic order so that it could adhere to the following principles: respect for national
sovereignty over natural resources, the inadmissibility of economic discrimination, and assistance to economically backward countries without any economic, political or military string attached which ran counter to national sovereignty. Subsequently, the African states formed a joined platform for the restructuring of international economic relations by making it a matter of common cause with other third world states.

As far as international economic problems were concerned, the non-aligned movement and the group of 77 became the chief-spokesmen of the developing countries. African countries have been active in the group of 77 since its emergence. A new stage in the struggle of the developing world for a radical restructuring of international economic relations began in the first half of the 1970s. This was largely due to the successes scored by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) asserting its interests with regard to the Bretton Woods power in the form of raising world oil prices substantially in late 1973. In the 1970s Asian and African countries nationalized the property of many oil companies and other transnational monopolies to have firmer control of their national economic and also to change the alignment of international economic forces in favour of developing countries.

Making use of these positive factors and acting on the initiative of president Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, developing countries succeeded in having the UN General Assembly convene its sixth special session in 1974. President Boumedienne’s statement outlined the principal demands of developing countries which formed the basis of the session’s decisions. The session ended in May 1974 by adopting a declaration and a programme of action on Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Consequently, in the years that followed, the demands and proposals of developing countries were specified and expanded in decisions of several representative
international forums, including the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly and the second General Conference of United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Lima, Peru, in 1975. In the 29th, UN General Assembly approved the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States containing many important provisions. For example, Article I of the Charter affirmed the sovereign and inalienable right of each state to choose its economic, political, and cultural system in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference or threat or use of force in any forms.

In addition, third world countries have also actively participated in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Africans Group is always very active at the sessions of the UN and its specialized agencies during the discussions of fundamental issues related to the NIEO. A typical example is during the UNCTAD IV in Nairobi, when Henry Kissinger, former state secretary of the United States, contrasted the US proposal on the setting up of a World Resources Bank to the group of 77 demands on world trade in commodities. No African country supported the American move, developing and socialist countries voted against it resulting in its rejections.

While being active in the joint efforts of developing countries, African states conduct in regional meetings and conferences to draw up their own position on problems of particular concern to Africa. For example, in its analysis of the 1976 Manila program of action, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has pointed out 18 types of mineral and agriculture commodities on which the program envisages to conclude international agreement make up (in terms of value) about 60 percent of all exports by African developing states (excluding oil exporting countries). Understandably, African
countries are very much interested on conducting stabilizing agreement on these commodities and in the creation of a joint fund.

In connection with the elaboration of an international development strategy for the 1980s, several new aspects have emerged in recent years in the views of leading African politicians and economist, on the establishment of a NIEO. This issue was discussed at several ECA sessions and at conference of ministers of African countries. The conclusions reached in such gatherings are reflected in the plan of action approved at the April 1980 OAU Assembly on economic issues held in Lagos. ECA and OAU documents state that the negotiations on restructuring international economic relations held within the framework of UNCTAD and other specialized agencies have failed to create conditions for advancing Africa’s economics or solving its acute socio-economic problems.

From the above discussion, we have seen that Africa has played an important role in defining the demands and drafting the UN resolutions with regard to the NIEO. However, it should be pointed out that in terms of a collectivist stand vis-à-vis the OAU has not been effective in this direction as views of African scholars and politicians differ. For instance, a country like Algeria approaches the problems of the NIEO primarily from the position of an Oil exporting countries that is rapidly developing its industry. The main issues on which Algeria comes out most radically are the right to dispose of its own natural resources, redistribute industrial activities, sell its finished products on the markets of the developed countries and receive technological knowledge. Whereas, Senegal’s position of the NIEO entails special stress being laid on the loss incurred by the African countries from fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and from the rising prices of imports. Thus economist in this country advocate that its is time to raise the
question of economic losses of many African countries suffer from higher Oil prices. As for the machinery for implementing the new order, it must be geared at international recognition of a number of general rules or codes of behaviour. This refers to observance of these rules by national governments, and not to supervision by some utopian world governments or world agency. These two positions among others indicate that in terms of the NIEO many African states are distinguished by extreme radicalism over the issues of what the (New Order) should be.

In addition, African governments have also not fared any better externally. Although Africa, led by Algeria in 1973 and in 1974, had been in the forefront of the struggle for a NIEO, it had become obvious by the late 1970s that the high expectations held in some quarters towards progress for a new order were being frustrated. The breakdown of the Paris conference on International Economic Cooperation in June, 1977, and the failure of the series of UNCTAD meetings - from Nairobi UNCTAD IV (May 1976) through Manila UNCTAD V (June, 1979) and Belgrade UNCTAD VI (June, 1983) to the setback of the UNIDO III in New Delhi in January-February 1980 - all suggest that the advanced industrialized countries are not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to achieve a new order. But even if a new order were to be established, Africa is unprepared to derive optimal benefit from it in view of the continent's high degree of external dependence. As such, the executive secretary of the ECA, Adebayo Adedjdi emphasized, "...what was clear was that unless the continent successfully puts its own house in order by restructuring its economy at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, it will remain the periphery of the periphery in the international economy even if a NIEO were to come into existence."
Thus, the opinions of African states differ greatly with respect to the goals and method for establishing the NIEO. Some of them, however, justly connect the new, equitable, non-exploitative relations in the world market with the collapse of the capitalist system and with the struggle for social change within the African countries. In terms of international economic relations, the OAU's outstanding achievement was to force a revision of the neo-colonial Yaounde Agreement which associated a number of African states with the European Economic Community (EEC). It was largely due to the resolute leadership of Nigeria that the OAU was successful in getting the EEC to adopt the revised Lome Treaty, which not only removed the stigma of a dependent "associate" relationship, but also offered much more improved terms through new cooperation arrangements. Each successive Lome agreement has been a witness to a marked improvement on the previous one. Another gain has been to insist that all African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, whether they were formerly colonial territories or not, should, by right, be entitled to qualify under the terms of Lome Treaty. 37

Finally, although the OAU has been less successful in forcing change in other areas of the international economic system, its role in campaigning for reforms has been strengthened politically by the fact that the organization speaks with one voice for all African governments, as well as because of its close collaborative relationship with other Third World countries through the "Group of 77", and the non-aligned movement.

The African Economic Community

In a remarkable show of consensus, the 27th Summit in Abuja, Nigeria 1991, approved the establishment of an African Economic Community, the continental body's latest effort at promoting economic integration. It is notable that the imperative for
such a programme comes at a time bilateral donors are reluctant to bear the risk in regional programmes on the grounds that the security and continuity of the programmes are doubtful. In addition, neighbouring countries have been hesitating to enter into bilateral deals, when the potential gains are not obvious. According to the summit, the African Economic Community shall be established in six stages of variable duration over a transitional period not exceeding thirty-four years. The six stages are as follows:

**First Stage**: This will entail the strengthening of existing regional economic communities and, within a period not exceeding five years from the date of entry into force of the treaty, the establishment of economic communities in regions where they do not exist.

**Second Stage**: In each regional economic community, within a period of eight years, tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers, customs duties and internal taxes existing at the date of entry into force of this treaty will be stabilized.

**Third Stage**: Within a period of ten years, each regional economic community shall establish a free trade zones. A customs union will be established by means of adopting a common external tariff.

**Fourth Stage**: Further, within a period of two years, tariff and non-tariff systems shall be coordinated and harmonized among the various regional economic communities.

**Fifth Stage**: The African aspiration to establish an African common market within four years will be done by adopting a common policy in areas like agriculture, transport and communications, industry, energy and scientific research, harmonizing monetary financial and fiscal policies, and applying the principle of free movement of persons.
Sixth Stage: Finally, within a five years period the structure of the common market will be consolidated and strengthened by including the free movement of people, goods, capital and services, as well as providing for the rights of residence and establishment.

According to the draft treaty in 2025, economic, political and cultural sectors will be integrated, a single domestic market will be established. The final stages will include the creation of an Africa Monetary Union, a single African Central Bank, and a single African Currency. The pan-African parliament and election of its members by continental universal suffrage will be in political side of African Union.

Support for the economic community finds manifestation in two ways. First, African’s response to the phenomenal international economic and political changes of the 1990s, especially concerning Africa’s leading trading partners and aid donors, such as the EEC, Japan and the USA seeking economic integration and secondly, the profound political and economic changes taking place in the Eastern European countries. In this sense Africa is faced with the prospect of becoming increasingly marginalized by the world’s community of donors. Western donors organization and multi-lateral lending communities have to intervene in Eastern Europe to bring stability and private western capital fund, an irresistible opportunity to make quick gains there. The paucity of international capital adversely affect Africa. Western powers will impose on it, clout policy prescriptions based on the virtues on market economies. African states are already finding themselves in a situation where they are slowly relinquishing their right to plan their own future as a result of the pressure from the west.

Hardly ever mentioned, however, is the fact that some of the much proclaimed newly industrial countries (NICs) achieved impressive economic growth without political
reform. Not is the fact that the current social and economic structures in Africa were built almost entirely with "expert" advise and the approval of western donors in the 1960s through the 1980s. It is therefore ironical that the international agencies now pushing Africa to adopt new policies are the very same ones that encouraged and financed some African countries on their way to economic ruin. Thus political will not guarantee the success of the African Economic Community: the organization will have to grapple with the harsh realities and problems they have in the past grounded operation of similar efforts at economic integration to a halt.

OAU: Continental Challenges To Organizational Responsiveness: -

The potential of an organization is to judge not only by the laudable aims of its charter or constitution, but also by its record performance, and by the momentum for growth, poised against prospective problems and decelerating forces. These are the impediments that hinder the smooth functioning of the OAU in its bid at pan-African cooperation. Furthermore, they are not only stumbling blocks to African regionalism but also to African international relations.

a. Foreign Intervention: -

The OAU has shown its impotence in the prevention of foreign intervention in sub-Saharan Africa disputes. Despite the organization's commitment under its charter to opposition of external interference in the continent's internal conflicts, all the major powers as well as some of the smaller ones, have been drawn more deeply into the affairs of the continent. Indeed, in recent years the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference has been re-enacted in a twentieth century setting in Zaire, Chad, Western Sahara, the Ogaden (Ethiopia) to name a few. External intervention disrupts the peace, development and
security of the African continent. By introducing large-scale and sophisticated weapons of violence into Africa, it widens the sphere of conflict. Consequently, it creates a culture of violence and repression which are destructive of the morale, self-confidence and creative potential of the majority of the population. In this sense foreign intervention considerably weakens the African states by diverting their attention away from other pressing problems, consuming their scarce resource of manpower and material, and further by reinforcing their dependence on foreign countries which adversely affect their economic emancipation.

The OAU has been meeting this challenge of foreign intervention with a divided mind, and with not apparent results for instance, this was clearly evident in the organization's meetings at Libreville in July 1977 and Khartoum in July 1978. The best OAU could offer at Khartoum was to reach a disturbing compromise of the critical issue of foreign military intervention, the right of African states to appeal for help to countries of their choice. This in fact was an unofficial OAU invitation to foreign powers to intervene in the affairs of the continent. Thus negating the ideal of the organization's founding fathers, who in 1963 sought to exclude foreign powers from shaping Africa's destiny, by exploiting the continent's political divisions and economic weakness to their advantages.

b. Lack Of A Supra-National Organ:

The charter of the OAU essentially depends upon the willing cooperation of its member states. Consequently, there are no sanctions to threaten states if they do not cooperate with the organization's decisions. Further, there is no organ bestowed with disciplinary powers, and nowhere in the charter is there a provision of authority to enforce decisions or to expel members for non-compliance with OAU decisions.
Furthermore, OAU decisions are only recommendations to the completely sovereign member states. In addition, no multi-national OAU force peace-keeping forces is also provided for intervening in the territories of member states if they do not fulfill the purpose of the charter or comply with, the resolutions of its Assembly or the council of ministers. It should be noted that OAU institutions are designed to promote cooperation and not exact it, to urge collaboration, not to punish for its refusal. It is on the basis of this the OAU charter lacks a provision for a supra-national institution like the UN security council. Consequently, in such a situation the OAU can hardly be effective.

**c. Limitations Of Authority** :-

This is with regard to the commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Like the international court of justice, the commission lacks the authority that conflicting states appear before it. Moreover, it is even weaker than the world court in the sense that it lacks authority to interprets the OAU charter whereas the world court interprets the UN charter. In addition to this, there is also no provision for the enforcement of its decisions. As for the world court under Article 94, its decisions may be enforced by the UN security council. It is not surprising then, that this commission which is the OAU’s mechanism for handling conflicts, has been ineffective.

**d. Backwardness Of Natural Resources** :-

Closely related to the limitations of the OAU’s institutions, is the backwardness of natural resources available to the organization, which has also limited its ability to become independent of the national leaders. As a consequence, the OAU was and has remained weak in terms of material resources. The organization unlike other regional organizations viz the EEC, NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN and so on controls limited material resources. Coupled with this is the fact that the OAU does not include any of the major
powers among its members on which it can depend to supply such terms when necessary. These may include personnel with expert knowledge of political and/or military affairs and with skills in bargaining and diplomacy and control of financial resources. On the whole, the low level of resources can be attributed to the fact that the OAU members states in majority fail to pay their membership dues. For instance, in 1993 like many before, the OAU received little more than 10 percent of its annual 30 million US dollars budget. 

e. Debt Trap And Economic Repression In The Continent :-

It is a fact that imperialism in the forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism has sustained in Africa is the form of dependent economies that are externally-oriented, dominated by foreign enterprises and are critically dependent on foreign exchange. Moreover, African economies are subservient and passive in the international division of labour. Consequently, their dominant sectors viz. import-export, wholesale trade, shipping, banking, insurance, mining and manufacturing industries do not address the domestic needs and basic consumption needs of Africa. As a result, the rural areas hardly benefit from developments in science and technology on the one hand, and there is no encouragement for indigenous-based science and technology on the other.

It is against this background that the considerations of Africa's debt burden and economic repression should be analyzed. For instance, the debt overhang hitch remained a major preoccupation between 1982 and 1990 is far from waning. That is, the debt keeps mounting, rising from 276 billion US dollars in 1991 to 282 billion US dollars at the end of 1992. It should be noted that this amount is equal to 24 percent of Africa's foreign earnings. In addition to this, debt servicing has also multiplied several-fold, to the extent of gulping 60 percent of Africa's foreign earnings. As a result, in some
countries the debt service obligation is equal to 100 percent of their earnings, while in some it is even more.

Consequently, sub-Saharan Africa now look at the 1970’s as if it were a dream. During this period sub-Saharan Africa’s total external debt was not more than 50 million US dollars. In addition, official development aid was copious and generous, prices of primary commodities were good even though they did not reflect the real value of the goods. However, today, the reverse is the case and the worst is yet to come. For instance, among the economic problems and other debilitating factors affecting OAU members are hunger and famine, unemployment, limited finance for development and deficient relationships with external markets and sources of essential supplies. Furthermore, the rate of the deterioration in food productivity in sub-Saharan Africa in the last two decades has been very alarming. This has been propelled by adverse climatic conditions and mismanagement of the agricultural sector. In contrast to following production, the population growth has been phenomenal and the resulting disparity has become a monumental calamity. On the whole, member states suffer economic stagnation, poverty, food shortages, and serious unemployment, which have high potential to provide political instability in vast scale and great intensity. Further, indebtedness raises other problems of a special nature. For instance involves international agencies as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to interfere in the sub-Saharan Africa economies and also those of the developing countries in general. Negotiations for the rescheduling of debts have regularly required the imposition of austerity measures such as lifting of subsidies on basic commodities, removal of trade barriers and exchange controls and the privatization of national industries. Whether or not such mechanisms are indeed the best to regulate the world
economy and stimulate development, their actual and potential impact on the developing countries can be seriously detrimental to immediate and long-term security (though no government has yet fallen as a clearly identifiable consequence of IMF/World Bank Policy). For instance, government decisions to reduce subsidies triggered widespread ‘food riots’ in Egypt in 1977 and in 1986 members of the public security force mutinied, similar riots struck Tunisia in 1974 and 1984, Zambia in 1986 and Sudan in 1988.

f. Balkanization Of The Continent :-

The initial scramble is Africa divided the continent into colonial territories which soon manifested themselves in psychological regions. This divisive psychology still finds expression in the relationships within the OAU. For instance, Francophone African states tend to find unity among themselves than between them and Anglophone states, and the same is true of every foreign languages group. In other words, an imposed linguistic association produces more affinity among distant territories than say blood brotherhood can be between neighbouring states which speak for example, French and English. The initial balkanization has left negative legacies which hinder cooperation among the OAU member states.

In addition to linguistic divides, there is also balkanization based on ideological shifts. In sub-Saharan Africa today, it has become difficult to achieve cooperation due to shifts of balance between two of the major camps, the so-called ‘radical’ and ‘conservatives’ on the one hand and those classifiable as ‘moderates’ on the other. The ‘moderates’ are Nigeria, Cameroon, Botswana, Upper Volta, Togo, Uganda, Lesotho, Sierra Leone and Mauritania who previously held the middle ground can no longer provide an effective bridge between the hard core of the ‘radicals’ consisting of Libya, Ethiopia, Seychelles, Congo ‘Zaire’ or (Democratic Republic of Congo at present),
Benin, Angola and Mozambique and the hard core of the ‘conservative’ represented by Morocco, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Kenya. For instance, a possible threat comes from a small group of the radicals led by Col. Gadhafy, who argue that it is better to split the OAU between militants and pro-American conservatives than to preserve a figment of unity, if that means depriving militant Africans of a sharp cutting-edge. This kind of argument led Gadhafy and a few others to create the Arab steadfastness front in disagreement with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Further, Gadhafy has been a constant problem to the OAU. For instance, there was a serious protest at the 18th summit in Nairobi after Libya was nominated to host the 19th summit. This protest was led by five countries; Ivory Coast, Ghana, Gabon, Egypt and Sudan. They opposed Libya’s choice on two grounds viz. (i) President Gadhafy’s links with international terrorism and (ii) his intervention in the affairs of some sub-Saharan African Countries e.g. in Chad where the Maitasine incident led to rioting by religious fanatics, in Liberia where President Samuel Doe executed Weysen on the suspicion that he was a Libyan agent, in Uganda where Libyan troops fought against the Tanzanians in order to retain President Idi Amin’s tyrannical regime and so on. However, it should be noted that a host of other African countries such as Congo, Madagascar, and Republic of Benin, despite the opposition against Gadhafy maintained links with him and even supported his policies. Consequently, a division was created among OAU member countries thereby making it extremely difficult to form a quorum each time a summit of the OAU was to be held in Tripoli, Libya.
decade of its establishment the OAU’s activity was concerned with territorial disputes between its member-states. For instance, it was active in the highly intense dispute between Algeria and Morocco, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, further, the OAU also directed its activity on disputes of low intensity between its member-states such as Ghana and Upper Volta and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. In addition, during this period, a number of border disputes of low intensity were settled bilateral. For example, the Lake Island dispute between Dahomey and Niger was settled within a sub-regional organization, the council of the Entente, to assess the role of the OAU in terms of conflict management, the following have been taken as sample for analysis, Nigerian Civil War, Congo Crisis, Chadian Conflict, Algerian-Morocco Conflict, Rwanda-Burundi Conflict, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia Conflict.

**Nigerian Conflict (The Biafran War 1967-70):**

From 1967-70, Nigeria a multi-ethnic state experienced a secessionist civil war based on ethnicity. The Ibo, the most developed of three most prominent ethnic groups, the other two being the Hausa Muslim and Yoruba, in 200 odd ethnic groups wanted a separate Ibo state. It should be noted that beneath the facade of clan, tribal and regional politics were unsettling processes at work. In January 1966, these processes surfaced on the political horizon in the form of a military coup d'état. The Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was murdered, Nigeria’s most powerful figure, as was Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, when major general John Aguiyi-Irons, an Ibo, became the head of state, he moved the country toward a more unitary form of government, replacing the system which had been in vogue since 1960, that is a loose federation largely under Northern control.
The coup d'état and the centralization of power in southern hands move away from regionalism and traditional forms of govern were perceived as threats to continue northern dominance of the system. These and other complex reasons led to a counter coup d'état by northern forces in late July 1966. Lt Col Yakubu Gowon, the army chief of staff was selected to head the return to federalism. The counter coup d'état it should be noted that it has succeeded in the west and the north, but not in the east where the military commander, Col. Emeka Ojukwu appointed by Ironsi refused to recognize Gowon as the supreme commander of the army. As a result, widespread anti-southern violence flared up in the north in mid September in the form of a pogrom against Ibos (in which as many as 30,000 Ibos may have been killed) The government did not move to stop it and by November the situation had become extremely volatile. This culminated in the fleeing of about a million of the remaining Ibo population in the north to the east where they were joined by another half a million of Ibos from the west and mid-west. In January 1967, Gowon and Ojukwu met in Abusi, Ghana to resolve the crisis but the talks failed as the Lagos government refused to implement the accord. As a result since no other compromise was acceptable to Col Ojukwu, he announced the birth of Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967.

The OAU Role In Nigerian Conflict:-

The first initiative of the OAU on the Nigerian conflict took place at the OAU Assembly meeting at Kinshasa in September, 1967. In the resolution, the Heads of the state and government appointed six presidents to visit Lagos in quest of territorial integrity and peace. However, this partiality to the federal position regarding sovereignty, recognized the situation as an internal affair, the solution of which is primarily the
responsibility of the Nigerians themselves and called to send a consultative committee on Nigeria. The communique issued by the mission at the end of its visit to Lagos expressed full agreement with General Gowon’s views by reaffirming that any solution of the crisis must be in the context of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria. The outcome of the OAU mission was a bitter disappointment for the Biafrans. The OAU was caused of condoning genocide and of proving itself a rubber stamp by merely endorsing General Gowon’s warning that their own countries would disintegrate if they did not rally to his support. Further, the Biafrans rejection of the OAU initiative was the reason why the first peace talk between the two parties were held under the auspices of the commonwealth secretariat rather than those of the OAU, in the spring and summer of 1968, after recognition of Biafran sovereignty by several African states and the failure of talks initiated by the commonwealth secretariat, fruitless talks were held in Addis Ababa under the sponsorship of the OAU. The 1968 and 1969 Heads of states meetings voted to support the position of the Lagos government. Consequently, the majority of the OAU’s action ‘Role’ were partial to Nigerian sovereignty and violated the requirement of neutrality which is necessary for conciliation. In addition to this, some African states supported the Biafran cause, and as a result in terms of the OAU providing a solution to the conflict proved difficult. This stems from the fact that the organization’s non-recognition of Biafra made it impossible to treat the two sides equally. Further, the OAU did not carry out any operations to curb the conflict nor did it attempt to violate it. The Lagos government received arms from Britain and Soviet Union while Biafran from Portugal and France. As a consequence, the OAU did not help abate the conflict nor provide a settlement which came via military action.
The significance of the policy of non-recognition of Biafra was that it upheld the principle of African Unity. This might be seriously undermined if secessions of the Biafran type are allowed to pass. The OAU’s resolute opposition to any kind of secession has been the main reason for Africa’s lack of interest in the struggle of the Eritrean people for self-determination and independent existence. In the southern Sudan, the internationalization of the conflict made the OAU irrelevant.

The Congo Conflict (The Democratic Republic of Congo at present):-

The internal dissatisfaction with Congolese government increased in 1964 with the departure of UN forces (UNUC) and the appointment of Tshombe as premier. In opposition, the political heirs of Patrick Lumumba organized the counsel National de-liberation (CNL) in sanctuaries provided by two neighbouring states, Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi. Tshombe’s government became increasingly reliant on armed forces led by white mercenaries and on arms from USA. The CNL was on the other hand dependent on support from Congo’s more radical neighbours and assistance from China and the Soviet Union. Fighting between government and CNL was intense and as a result it involved over 1000 falsities.

The OAU Role in Congolese Conflict: -

The major question which the OAU confronted with, was the Congo ‘present democratic republic of Congo’, where its main concern was the withdrawal of all foreign troops and mercenaries. At an emergency meeting of the OAU council on 5th September, 1964 in Addis Ababa, the Congo Prime Minister, Moise Tshombe, whose participation in the deliberation was a major victory, assured the council that he was
ready to dispense with the services of white mercenaries provided they be replaced by a contingent of African troops. But Ghana’s and Kenyan Foreign Ministers warned the delegates that if troops were sent to Congo, they might be required to fight African nationalist. They propose conference of leaders of the main political parties but Tshombe turned it down. He defended the Congo’s relations with the United States and Belgium, both in the supply of military aid and as a strictly internal matter. The OAU refused to accept this view as was stated in the resolution adopted by the council, on 10th September, 1964, in which it made it clear; “that foreign intervention and the use of mercenaries has unfortunate effects on the neighbouring independent states as well as on the struggle for national liberation in Angola, Rhodesia, Mozambique and the other territories in the region which are still under the colonial domination and constitutes a serious threat to peace in the African continent.”

Tshombe was prevented from attending the July 1964, Heads of state conference in Cairo but was allowed to attend a special council meeting in Addis Ababa in September, 1964, which appointed a Ten-nation Congo conciliation commission. Prior to this in August, two states favourable to the CNL had requested an extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU council of minister hoping for a condemnation of Tshombe’s use of mercenaries. It should be noted that Congo’s leaders agreed to the meeting hoping to bring pressure on neighbours to stop their assistance to the CNL. The OAU council of ministers decided to establish an ad hoc commission led by president Kenyatta of Kenya, that was to both encourage internal Congolese reconciliation and make efforts to restore normal relations between Congo and its neighbours.

Despite Tshombe’s objections in this commission took bold initiatives, hearing representatives of the CNL and sending a special mission to Washington. This was to
request Americans to end their military assistance to Congo. At Tshombe's request, president Johnson refused to meet the delegation and an American continued to provide assistance. In November 1964, American planes and Belgium troops claiming officially only to be engage in rescuing CNL held hostages assisted Tshombe's forces in taking the CNL capital city. This was followed by increased arms from China and the Soviet Union to the CNL rebels. A meeting of the UN security council asked all states to refrain from intervention in Congolese affairs and support OAU's efforts at settlement, however, this call went unheeded. Further, a two week OAU council meeting in March 1965, was so severely spilled over the legitimacy of intervention in the Congo that it could not even pass a cease fire resolution. As a result no proposal could get even majority support as the few committed states abstained rather than commit the OAU to resolutions considered favourable to one side or the other. Consequently, the Kenyatta commission never met again and the conflict was eventually ended by a military victory of Tshombe's forces. Although the OAU in effect been disengaged from the conflict, its reputation was tarnished by its ineffectiveness. Furthermore, it failed in the conflict because both superpower were involved.

The Chadian Conflict:

Chad like its neighbour Sudan, has a North-South conflict that generally revolves around the co-existence of two cultural zones: the zone of Arab culture, exclusively Islamic, and the zone of black Africans culture in which African religious and Christianity are to be found. Co-existence does not necessarily imply confrontation for if that was the case, all other African countries its similar cleavages should by now have witnessed their share of civil conflicts.
The North-South conflict in Chad is primarily a function of the legacy of the colonial political economy. For the colonialists, it was only those regions which were economically useful that witnessed the development of infrastructure and supportive social services such as education and health. The French impose two separate administrations in the two cultural zones of Chad. For them, the Chad utile or "useful Chad" was the southern region, where the cultivation of cotton, the major export crop, was made compulsory in 1926. Before World War II, the major portion of the south was incorporated in the French territory of Coubangui - Chari (now the central African Republic), whose people have close cultural ties with the people of southern Chad. The Sara people constitute the major ethnic group in this region and their language dominates the African culture zone. The attainment of national independence witnessed the takeover of administration from the French by the Sara. This was especially in the southern region of Chad. However, the transition period from colonial rule to independence also saw the southerners gaining clout in the north as well.

Contrastingly, the French was greatly under populated, especially in the vast desert region of Borkon-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET). Despite the importance of its cattle, which provided beef to all of French Equatorial Africa, and for export, it was completely neglected in the provision of economic and social services. There were no schools, no health centers and no public wells provided by the government in most of the region. This tradition of neglect continued after independence, with President Ngarta Tombalbaye even deciding to ignore the Libyan occupation of the Aozou strip in exchange for Libya dropping its support for Chadian insurgents in 1972. Chadian administration in the north was more preoccupied with the collection of revenue than with serving the people. Corrupt bureaucrats extorted as much money as they could by
overtaxing the pastoralists, sometimes collecting cattle tax two or more times from the same individual. The fact that the collector was a southern Christian and his victim a northern Muslim did help enhance the feeling of belonging to an oppressed minority among the nomads.

From its creation by Ibrahima Abatcha and others in 1966, the Front de-Liberation Nationale du-Tchad (FROLINAT) has seen its task as that of overthrowing a new-colonial state and replacing it with a people’s state committed to resolving the national question in part by giving equal status to French and Arabic as official languages and to building socialism. Since 1978, however, the Chadian situation has change dramatically. There has been a shift of power from the south to the north, and we are now seeing the south requiring minority status and autonomies sentiments emerging among the Sara. According to General Galtier, southerners, “are particularly hostile to Mr Hissein Habre, who had a very unfavourable attitude toward Christian in 1979 which resulted in inter-communal massacres and whose troops were lording it over everyone in the south.”

The OAU Role In Chadian Conflict :-

This Chadian crisis was one of the knotty issues the OAU faced in its failed 19th summit in Tripoli, Libya from November 23rd-26th 1982. There was a disagreement over which of the two delegations from Chad should represent the country. These two delegations were those of ex-president Goukoni Weddye and president Hissein Habre. For instance, Libya, the host country and some other African states supported the outsted president Weddye on the basis that he had been recognized by the OAU as the leader of the defunct Transitional National Union Government (GUNT). On the other
hand, thirteen member states, particularly the Francophone countries refrained from attending the meeting, should president Habre whom they consider the true leader of Chad be excluded from the OAU summit. As a result the conflicting sectarian interests of OAU member states with regard to who should represent Chad at the summit created a serious problem. Consequently, the organization found it difficult to convene a successful summit. Further, to maintain functional stability in the OAU, the Chadian issue was temporarily put into suspense by an agreement by not seating either of the rivals involved, that is the Weddye group and Habre group.  

In this sense, there was agreement for the selection of a new venue to try and provide solutions to the Chadian problems. The postponed summit took place in Addis Ababa, the site of the permanent headquarters of the OAU in May, 1983. The OAU once again found itself able to operate but still not restored to full health. It had hardly recovered from the Tripoli setback when president Gaddafi of Libya, pursuing his aim of getting Goukoni Weddye restored to the presidency of Chad renewed his military intervention the helpless state which has experienced civil war for most of its period of independence, which it attain from France in 1960.

By implication the Chadian civil conflict presented the OAU as being anxious on the one hand to preserve order and prevent bloodshed, on the other to avoid committing itself to supporting any of the eleven functions principally involved. Furthermore, the organization dispatched a peace-keeping force which was intended to keep the contestants apart but not to fight on behalf of the nominal central government of president Goukhoni. In effect the OAU helped to provide a safe area within which the forces of Goukhoni's main rival, Habre, could regroup before attacking the capital N'djamena after which the OAU force was withdraw. It should be stressed that the OAU general peace-
keeping force was moderate with regard to the Chadian conflict and hence it is not surprising that it failed to defuse tension among the warring factions.

The Algerian-Morocco Conflict:-

In 1962 after the French withdrawal, Algeria and Morocco moved troops into an area where the border was disputed. In early October 1963 further advances by Morocco led to the breaking out of armed conflict with Algeria. This was with regard to a Saharan area administrated by Algeria but claim by Morocco. As a result of Morocco occupation of the disputed territory the ensuing battle claimed over 100 death.

Involvement by other African states was limited to some Egyptian advisers and war material sent to Algeria before the initiation of hostilities. Although the major extra-regional powers had refused request for new weapons, there was concern among African leaders that American ties were with Morocco, Soviet with Algeria and French concern with economic interests in the Saharan resources might promote foreign intervention.

The OAU Role In Algerian-Morocco Conflict:-

Morocco’s annexation of the disputed area in 1962 after the French withdrawal, transgressed two of the OAU’s most sacrosanct principles - the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and the maintenance of the frontiers Africa inherited from colonial powers. As a result of personal initiatives of Emperor Haile Selassie and president Keita of Mali, a cease-fire was arranged and agreement was reached to consider the conflict at an extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU council of ministers in 1964. Morocco, knowing that the OAU majority favoured territorial status-quo, made efforts to raise the conflict in the UN security council but found France and USA (on whom it had counted for support)
desired that it honour the agreement by first trying to solve the dispute at the OAU principles.

At the extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU, an ad hoc commission was established to study the border issue and make recommendations for settlement. During the following years this commission held a dozen meetings with the disputants. As their claims were exclusive, the commission made no effort to suggest substantive settlement but instead served as a vehicle for communications between the two. Soon after the commencement of the committee meetings were held and then agreements were made for the withdrawal of troops, release of the prisoners, and restoration of diplomatic relations. However, in 1968 the defacto lines had become more or less acceptable and the heads of states of the two countries met privately during the OAU summit conference in Algeria to symbolize their reconciliation. As a result of their direct negotiations, the territorial issue was settled with agreement to maintain the colonial boundaries. In addition, a jointly owned company would exploit the mineral resources of the area under dispute.

On the whole, OAU role or action helped isolate the conflict. Further actions undertaken in its name also helped and the fighting and abate the conflict. However, the organization did not provide a settlement to the conflict which came via direct negotiation by the heads of the two belligerent states.

**Rwanda-Burundi Conflict:**

The OAU has also concerned itself in conflicts which have included charges that one member has encouraged subversive activities directed against the government of another. Such charges were major elements in conflict between Rwanda and Burundi, Ghana and its Francophone neighbours, Guinea and Senegal, and Tanzania and Uganda.
In addition to these, other allegations of subversion are also found in conflicts between Ghana and Guinea and between Guinea and Ivory Coast. But it should be noted that these involved the kidnapping of diplomats. It is on the basis of this that Rwanda - Burundi conflict has been selected as a sample for analyses.  

Ethnic conflict in Rwanda caused large members of the Tutsi people to take refuge in Burundi, where Tutsi’s were dominant on the national level. Allegedly armed and supported by Burundi, these refugees were committed to the overthrow of the Rwanda’s government. Consequently, they staged frequent raids across the border to achieve their objectives. This resulted in the appeal to the UN by the Rwanda’s government, but it was answered only by the dispatch of a special observer who reported that the refugees were “getting support from various sources.” However, the UN observer did not offer any suggestions for settlement.

The OAU Role In Rwanda-Burundi Conflict:—

In 1964 when Rwanda’s troops in pursuit of terrorist raiders crossed the border, Burundi unsuccessfully tried to get support for convening an extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU council. An appeal for peaceful settlement from the provisional OAU secretary general had no effect. Further, a special commission on the problems of refugees in Africa suggested that such persons be settled as far as possible from the borders of their country of origin, but Burundi lacked the resources to effect such relocation.

In 1965 the OAU Assembly requested president Mobutu of Zaire who had already made an unsuccessful attempt at mediation to try and assist the two states in reaching a settlement. Following a change of government in Burundi which replaced the kind with a leader who for reasons of his own wished to control the terrorists, made it possible for
Mobutu to meet the Rwanda's and Burundi leaders. The result was that an agreement was reached for controlling the refugees, some of whom were disarmed by troops furnished by Mobutu. This contributed to the improvement of relations between the two states and for six years the border area remained quiescent.

However, in 1972, serious ethnic strife within Burundi forced refugees to take shelter in Rwanda. When these persons began attacks against the Burundi government, its foreign minister used the 1973, OAU summit meetings to accuse Rwanda of supporting subversion. The OAU Assembly set up a committee to mediate the dispute. However, before it could act a coup d'etat in Rwanda brought a new government to power and Burundi responded by withdrawing its previous complaint. However, clashes between Burundi's army and refugee groups have continued to disrupt relations with other neighbouring states.

**Ethiopia, Kenya And Somalia Conflict:**

In Africa, the main instance of irredentism has been that of ethnic Somalis in the eastern region of the continent to seek unification with Somalia. This has been mainly in the Ogaden and the sections of the Haud and Bale in Ethiopia, in Djibouti, (formerly French Somaliland or French Territory of the Afar and Issa) and in the North-Eastern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya. The Somali question arose as a direct consequence of the arbitrary manner in which Africa was partitioned and the subsequent establishment of independent states on the basis of colonial frontiers. A culturally homogeneous and distinct people made up of related clans of nomads, the Somalis were divided between contending European colonial powers (viz Britain, France and Italy). The Somali, according to Catherine Hoskyns, “are one of the few people in sub-Saharan Africa whose
wide-spread sense of community leads them to a ‘nation-makes-state’ type of nationalism (a la nineteenth century Italy) rather than ‘state-makes-nation’ 67. It is on this basis that Somali leadership has been committed to reunification of Somalia by supporting guerrillas activities by Somali secessionists living in Southern Ethiopia and North-Eastern Kenya.

It should be noted that Somali nationalism finds inspiration in the heroic resistance to colonial conquest led by Mohammed Abdille Hassan between the early 1920s and 1930s. This was given a new impetus after Italy’s defeat in 1941. Furthermore, the dream of a pan-Somali territorial unity was reinforced by the seemingly approving attitude of the major regional power, Britain. The British actually promised to create such an entity by incorporating all the Somali-inhabited areas. However, despite these promises, Britain recognized Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden in 1942, in addition to relinquishing control over most of it in 1948 and ceding the Haud to Ethiopia in 1954. As a direct consequence, only British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were united at independence in 1960 to form the Somali Democratic Republic (SDR) 68. In October 1962, the leaders of the approximately 200,000 Somalis in Kenya demanded the integration of the NFD into Somalia. However, this was rejected by both Britain and the Transitional Kenyan government. No sooner had Kenya become independent on 12 December 1963, the Somali pressures forced the new state to declare a state of emergency in January 1964, in its northern district 69.

The Ogaden unlike the NED had one million Somalis and in this sense it experienced a stronger irredentist movement. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) created immediately after Somalia’s independence maintained a close collaboration with the Somali government. However, the double nature of the Ogaden
question as both a territorial dispute between two sovereign states and a question of an oppressed minority created tensions and differences between the two. This has further worsened today, as a more radical WSLF sees itself not only as an irredentist movement but as a liberation movement. In addition to demanding self-determination and having the option of either merging with Somalia or remaining with Ethiopia as an autonomous region it has posed a serious problem in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia and Somalia went to war over the Ogaden in 1964 and in 1977. The 1964 confrontation was a simple border war and one for which OAU mediation was sufficient to help bring an end to hostilities. As a result mindful of the OAU’s position favouring Ethiopia’s retention of the Ogaden, the Somali government launched the 1977 war in which the Soviet Union and Cuba gave military support to Ethiopia including the deployment of Cuban troops in the Ogaden. Consequently, this culminated in the internationalization of the conflict as the United States backed the Somali’s military in what became a major theater of global strategic confrontation.

The OAU Role In Ethiopia, Kenya And Somalia Conflict:

Like Morocco, Somalia appealed to the UN security council to mediate, however, she was turned down by secretary-general. With African concurrence pending OAU action, the Ethiopia, Kenya and Somali disputes were then added to the agenda of an already scheduled extraordinary meeting of the OAU council at Dar-es-Salaam in February 1964. Its resolution called for a cease-fire, negotiations and further discussion. However, the council’s call for a cease-fire went unheeded, but a joint commission to supervise withdrawal of regular forces was successfully arranged by the president of Sudan. With regard to the Somalia-Kenya dispute the OAU had some success in
dampening the open fighting by providing a forum for suasion of settlement. Further, this dispute received attention in the OAU meeting in Lagos. On the whole, in spite of the OAU providing for a local for quite diplomacy in 1967 it did not help in ending the fighting nor in providing an amicable settlement between Somalia and Kenya. Consequently, the Somalis continued their guerrilla activities in the NED of Kenya.

With regard to the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute, the Somali call for OAU observers was turned down by the Ethiopians. From 1964-67 clashes between regular forces were avoided but there were numerous guerrilla incidents and hostile relations. However, in 1967 which saw a change of government and a reduction of Soviet support the Somalis were prompted to seek reconciliation. At the 1967 meeting of the OAU Assembly, Somalia's president met with leaders from Ethiopia and Kenya. This resulted in reaching agreements, establishing diplomatic relations and halting of aid to Somali dissidents. Only a few incidents, all of minor nature occurred during the next four years.

The issues, however, have remained unsettled and the 1973 meeting of the OAU Assembly was marked by Somali raising the changes that Ethiopia was engaged in military build up in the disputed area. Ethiopia on the other hand denied that this was an issue for the organization and agreed not only to the creating of a good offices committee which has twice sent delegations to both countries. To date the mutually exclusive claims of the parties and the inability of the OAU to take strong action, have left the organization unable to do nothing more than to encourage and facilitate communication between the protagonists leaders while trying to dissuade them from military solutions.
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