An Overview

The research reported in the foregoing pages was designed to be primarily an empirical analysis of the political behaviour of three sets of party organizational activists in an urban setting. It was argued that participation in political parties is a rarer and more important form of political participation than mere "voting."

Compared to the general electorate, the party activists, though constituting a very small percentage of the total electorate, shoulder a much greater responsibility for managing the political system. An empirical investigation of the determinants and sub-processes of people's participation in political parties may thus be seen as a worthwhile endeavour on the part of the student of political behaviour.

An empirical political analysis such as the present one may be viewed either as a "particularizing analysis" or as a "generalizing analysis."¹ A particularizing analysis seeks to provide information regarding the operation of the particular "cases" or "subjects" of the inquiry. By contrast, a generalizing analysis

¹ I owe this distinction to Seymour Martin Lipset et al., Union Democracy, pp. 419-420.
seeks to develop or verify "empirical generalizations or theory through the analysis of the single case [or of more cases], using it not to discover anything about it as a system but as an empirical basis either for generalization or theory construction."\(^2\)

The present research cannot be said to belong exclusively to either of these two types of analysis. I have indeed attempted to make the present inquiry rise to the level of a generalizing analysis, though in many instances I may not have succeeded in making anything more than a particularizing type of analysis. The fusion of these two analytic orientations in the present investigation may be justified on the ground that specific political processes cannot be properly studied "except as special cases of more general sociological and psychological relationships."\(^3\) The data I have gathered and used pertain to the organizational activists of three particular parties in a particular place and at a particular time and, as such, their analysis has helped to throw insights into certain underlying behavioural dimensions of these three particular party units and their activists. I do not, however, claim to have presented an over-all, exhaustive

\(^2\) ibid.
\(^3\) See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, p. 9.
treatment of the working of these three party units. Primarily, I was concerned with certain theoretical or generic aspects of people's participation in party activities as well as with certain general properties of party organizations.

The main guiding question for this investigation has been: How and why do people participate in the activities of political parties? This question required us to attempt a micro-level analysis of political behaviour, viz. an analysis of the behaviour of individuals who are involved in the organizational life of political parties.4

Largely for reasons of convenience and managability, I restricted my investigation to the three major political parties of Baroda City, viz. the Congress (O), Swatantra and Praja Socialist parties. I interviewed 138 party activists who were formally or informally members of the executive bodies of their respective parties (Congress=82; PSP=30, and Swatantra=26). In addition, I also interviewed eight of the nine "top leaders" of these three party units.

4. The distinction drawn here between micro-level political behaviour and macro-level political behaviour consists in this that the former refers to the behaviour of individuals, while the latter refers to the behaviour of organizations or systems. It may be noted here that sometimes "micro" is used to refer to the analysis of small units whereas "macro" is used to refer to the analysis of large units. See, in this connection, Laster Milbrath, Political Participation, p.5. See also Richard Snyder's remarks in Ithiel De Sola Pool, ed., Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), pp. ix-x.
As for the ninth leader who could not be interviewed for this study, it may be stated that some valuable research data pertaining to him were available in two contemporary studies. Information has also been gathered about a few socio-demographic characteristics of the total of 585 active Congress members and 466 active Swatantra Party members.

In chapter II, I have given a brief socio-economic profile of Baroda City, which has been characterized as a fast-developing university-industrial city. In this chapter, I have also given a short account of the historical background and the present set-up of the Congress, Swatantra and Praja Socialist parties in Baroda. In this chapter, finally, I have given a brief description of the elite nuclei of these three party units. Compared to the organizational activists, the "top leaders," who occupy high political offices, play political roles of a greater magnitude and have greater connections with the major institutions and associations of the City. The profiles of these top leaders, given in chapter II, it is hoped, has offered a proper perspective both for understanding the "behaviour" of the rest of the party organizational activists and for grasping the nature

5. See footnote No.43 of chapter II.
of certain empirical dimensions of the organizational life of the three party units.

In chapters III through VII, I have, through an analysis of the data pertaining to the party organizational activists, sought to explore the following theoretical aspects relating to their participation in party activities:

i) the social determination of their party participation;

ii) their political socialization, recruitment and career patterns;

iii) the motivational and ideological determinants of their party participation; and

iv) their role perceptions and task performance.

The political participation patterns of the individual party activists have implications for the macro-level behaviour of the party organizations which are manned and operated by them. The parties, in fact, function through the behaviour patterns of their activists. I have therefore made use of the data pertaining to the participation patterns of the individual activists for exploring certain behavioural dimensions of the party organizations. Accordingly, I have also spoken, in chapters III through VII, of the following behavioural dimensions of the party organizations:

6. In chapter III, I have also dealt with a few socio-demographic characteristics of all the "active members" of the Congress and Swatantra parties in Baroda City.
i) the social composition of the party organizations;

ii) the recruitment patterns and political career types within the three party units;

iii) the incentive systems of the party organizations;

iv) the ideological congruence of the three party units;

v) the "value terrain" within which the three party units operate;

vi) the task potential of the three party organizations; and

vii) the dimension of intra-party democracy.

I shall now present a resumé of the major findings which have been reported in detail in the preceding chapters.

A Resumé of the Findings

The Social Determination of Party Participation and Party Affiliation

In chapter III, I have investigated the social determination of people's participation in, and affiliation to, political parties. I have also explored the nature of the social compositions of the three party organizations. This has been done through an analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics which, on the one hand, differentiated one party group from another and, on
As the other hand, differentiated the composite group of the party activists from the general population of Baroda City. The major findings may be generalized as follows:

Participation in political parties is socially determined; persons of high income, high caste, high education and high-status occupations are more favourably placed for participation in political parties than their less fortunate fellowmen.

The upper castes, viz. Patidars, Banias and Brahmins, were found to be overrepresented not only among the party organizational activists but also among the "active members" of the Congress (69.6%) and the Swatantra (71.9%). Muslims, who form 12.60% of the total population of Baroda City, constitute only 5.2% and 4.3% of the "active members" of the Swatantra and the Congress, respectively.

Integration into the local community structure (as measured by the duration of residence) is a contributive factor of party career mobility.

Those who are better integrated into the local community structure (as measured by the duration of residence) tend to join the dominant party rather than any opposition party.

The three sets of party organizational activists are not recruited from identical strata of the social structure. The Patidar community and the medical profession are not represented within the PSP group. The lower castes and the medical and teaching professions are not represented within the Swatantra group. Even when the three parties recruit their organizational activists
from the same social stratum, they do so in varying proportions. For instance, the Marathi- and Urdu-speaking strata of the general population of the city, which are not unrepresented in the Congress and Swatantra groups, are overrepresented in the PSP group, which, in its turn, is underrepresentative of the Gujarati-speaking stratum.

Findings such as these suggest the following theoretical generalizations:

Socio-demographic factors are major determinants of people's party affiliations in the Indian setting.

The social diversity of Baroda City is better represented within the group of the organizational activists of the Congress than within the PSP and Swatantra groups. The latter parties however do share in the systemic functionality of the Congress party in so far as they constitute the preferred channels of political participation to certain strata of the general population.

A comparison, along a few socio-demographic variables, has been made between the "organizational activists" and the "active members" of the Congress Party in Baroda City. The findings are:

The group of organizational activists of the Congress is highly overrepresentative of that section of the party's active membership base which is engaged in professional occupations.

As a group the organizational activists of the Congress are older than the Congress active members (who, in their turn, are drawn more from the older age group of the general population than from the younger age group). This age differential between these two categories of party personnel, I argued, is suggestive of the existence of a period of apprenticeship which the active members have to undergo before they can move up the party ladder and become organizational activists.
Data on the extra-party associational involvement of the party organizational activists led to the following generalizations:

Participation in political parties appears to be closely and positively associated with involvement in extra-party associations.

There are significant differences in the extent and type of associational attachments of the three sets of party activists. For instance, membership in trade unions and social welfare associations is maximal within the PSP group and minimal within the Swatantra group.

In general, both the top leaders and the organizational activists of the three parties were found to be remarkably well connected with the various associations and institutions in the city. This is a machine phenomenon; party actors operating in a context of rapid urbanization tend to be drawn into almost every aspect of the life of the community.

Political Socialization, Recruitment and Career Patterns

The political career of the adult politician has its roots in some early political socialization experiences which he may have undergone in his childhood or adolescence. The early political socialization experiences of the party personnel may therefore be said to have marked them off for their eventual party careers. Some of the findings
The nationalist movement was the politically mobilizing event par excellence for those who are currently the organizational activists of the Congress, Swatantra and Praja Socialist parties in Baroda City. Other significant politically mobilizing events were the Maha Gujarat Movement, election campaigns and the formation of trade unions.

About one-half of the composite total of the three party groups attributed the arousal of their earliest political interest to teachers and/or political workers. One-fourth said that their parents or near-relatives were responsible for the arousal of their earliest political interest.

As anticipated, those party activists whose parents or near-relatives were politically active became interested in politics at a younger age than those party activists whose parents or near-relatives were not politically active (gamma probability = .55).

While the early political socialization of the party personnel may be said to have directed them towards the threshold of a party career, their immediate recruitment experiences may be said to have made them cross the threshold and actually launch their party careers. In chapter IV, therefore, I have also investigated the recruitment and career patterns of the three sets of party organizational activists. Illustratively, some of the findings are:

Compared to their counterparts in an American locale, the Baroda party activists launched their party career at a younger age.
This lower party entrance age from the Indian setting was explained, firstly, in terms of the "disturbance," caused by political movements, such as the freedom struggle and the Maha Gujarat Movement, in the normal evolution of the people's lives; these movements mobilized even those persons who had not yet settled down in their lives. Secondly, in a context of scarce economic and occupational opportunities, as is the case with India, young persons are likely to join a party either because they have nothing else to do or in the hope that the party would be instrumental to their rise in life. In a more established society, by contrast, people would tend to join political parties after they have settled down in their lives so that they may voice or defend their "interests" through their respective parties.

Nearly one-fourth of the composite total of the three party groups were found to have had at least one change in their party affiliations. Such a change was much more in evidence within the PSP and Swatantra groups than within the Congress group. (The various patterns of changes in party affiliations have been identified and documented in chapter IV.)

There was a greater incidence of changes in party affiliation among those who joined their first party at a younger age than among those who joined their first party at a more advanced age (gamma = -.69).
This association between party career entrance age and subsequent change of party affiliation was explained in terms of the identity needs of the young recruits. A younger recruit is perhaps in a greater need of an identity than an older recruit. This need may be met with either through ideological satisfactions or through material rewards. When the younger recruit does not get these needs satisfied, he is more likely than the older recruits to seek an alternate party.

A much greater proportion of the Congress group (72 per cent) than of the PSP and Swatantra groups (about 43 per cent each) joined their present parties at the instance of urging by others. Only 18 per cent of the Congress group, contrasted with 54 per cent each of the PSP and Swatantra groups, said that their entry into their present parties was self-generated.

That the Congress has accumulated a disproportionate share of those party personnel who launched their party careers at the instance of urging by others may be understood against the fact that the Congress, being the dominant party, has a more efficient organization and a more extensive membership than the two opposition parties.

One of the postulates of the oligarchic theory, as indicated in chapter I, is that the oligarchs or would-be oligarchs within a party would tend to screen and select
the new entrants into it. Accordingly, the presence, within a party, of a large proportion of self-recruited activists would be indicative of a lack of any oligarchic recruitment within that party. We found that 54 per cent each of the PSP and Swatantra groups were self-recruited, and not drafted by others. They did not, in other words, enter their respective parties in compliance with the self-perpetuation efforts of any oligarchs. A below-the-surface analysis of the recruitment patterns of the Congress activists also revealed that they also had not been oligarchically drafted. True, slightly less than three-fourths of the Congress group said that they entered the party at the instance of urging by other. There were, however, compelling reasons why this could not be interpreted as an oligarchic phenomenon. Firstly, the so-called Congress "draftees" had not been recruited for becoming the pedestal of any established party; they had been mobilized for the nationalist movement. Secondly, the mobilizers or drafters, referred to by the Congress "draftees," were so numerous and diverse that they could not be thought of as constituting any small, compact, oligarchic group. In fact, the Congress "draftees" mentioned a much larger number of "draftees" than the PSP and Swatantra "draftees." Finally, many of the persons
who were mentioned by the Congress draftees did not themselves ever occupy any political positions and could therefore not be attributed with any oligarchic intentions. In general, it may therefore be concluded that none of the three party organizations can be said to be manned mostly by oligarchically recruited persons. There were, however, within the Congress and Swatantra groups, a few "prominent activists," who said they had been co-opted into the party just on the eve of the 1968 municipal elections. The top leaders of these parties or their political lieutenants persuaded these prominent citizens to contest the election on their party tickets. Whether or not these co-optations were done with oligarchic intentions remains a problematic issue which could be explored further.

Compared to the PSP and Swatantra party organizations, the Congress party organization is operated by persons who have had a longer period of party activism. The mere length of party activism is positively associated with political career prominence (i.e. upward mobility).

Compared to the average "member" of either the PSP or the Swatantra, the average "member" of the Congress has to undergo a longer period of apprenticeship before he can move up to the rank of organizational activist.

It was explained that the Congress, being the dominant party, need not and cannot give a quick promotion to its recruits. It cannot give a quick promotion to its fresh
recruits because they have to await their turn in a long queue. It need not give a quick promotion because it has a large stock of material rewards to offer to its recruits in compensation for a delayed promotion within the party hierarchy. The PSP and the Swatantra, being minority parties in the political system of Baroda, do not have either long queues or large amounts of patronage. As a result, within these two parties, the period of apprenticeship is done away with or shortened and the new recruit is quickly promoted to the rank of the organizational activist.

Greater proportions of the Congress and PSP groups than of the Swatantra group, were found to be aspirants for higher political offices in the future. In general, political career aspiration tended to be greater among the younger activists than among the older activists, among the better educated activists than among the poorly educated, among the poor than among the well-to-do, among the lower castes than among the upper castes, and among the low-status occupations than among the high status occupations. Political career aspiration was also found to be positively and strongly associated with extra-party associational involvement.
The Motivational Determinants of Party Participation

The political behaviour of the party personnel cannot be fully understood solely in terms of their social backgrounds, early political socialization, political recruitment and career patterns. We also need to study their political perceptions and attitudes. In chapters V and VI, therefore, I have investigated the motivational and attitudinal determinants of their participation in party activities. The motivations and attitudes of the party personnel have also been interpreted to be reflective of the incentive systems and ideological congruence of the party organizations. Some of the major findings are summarized below:

In explaining their entry motivations, the recruits to the PSP and the Swatantra mentioned ideological considerations much more frequently than the Congress recruits. The Congress recruits, by contrast, emphasized "moral considerations" and "social contacts."

I argued that the reference made by one-third of the Congress recruits, to "social contacts" as their entry motivations might be understood against the fact that the Congress, being the dominant party, has a pervasive organization in Baroda City. That moral considerations or, in other words, the "saintly idiom," should have motivated a little less than one-half of the Congress recruits may be attributed to their actual participation in the nationalist movement. "That movement," writes
Morris-Jones, "did bring out of ordinary men and women a remarkable standard of behaviour. From a sense of dedication or merely from sheer excitement and exhilaration men forgot about themselves and thought only of the cause."

Analysing the initial motivations of the party personnel by the eras of their party career origin, I found that, in general,

impersonal considerations (i.e. moral and ideological considerations) were mentioned less frequently by the recent joiners than by the old-time members. The former tended to emphasize personally instrumental expectations.

I have suggested that these motivational differences between the recent joiners and the old-timers of the three sets of party activists might be indicative of the fact that the "saintly idiom" of the nationalist movement and the anti-power orientations of the 1950's are yielding place to the "self-interest axiom" of political behaviour. I have also argued that the emphasis of the recent joiners on personally instrumental satisfactions rather than on moral and ideological considerations might be a "machine phenomenon" arising out of the rapid urbanization context of Baroda City.

As expected, actual participation in party activities has affected the initial motivational perspectives of the

party personnel.

In general, the predominant tendency has been one of re-socialization from ideological and moral motivations to personally instrumental satisfactions.

The Congress party organization has confirmed 39 per cent of its organizational activists in their initial personalized motivations and re-socialized one-fourth from impersonal to personalized motivations. Thus, by and large, the Congress party in Baroda City seems to be operating a material and solidary incentive system. Such a system of incentives may be said to enhance the party's adaptive and aggregative capability. A potential weakness of such an incentive system is that the party organization would not be able to perform any ideology based innovative function since any particular ideological stance on its part would alienate one section or another of its wide clientele. There is also the possibility that the party's political largesse might prove to be inadequate for an ever widening clientele.

During the decade of its existence, and very probably in the context of its recent electrol successes (See chapter II), the Swatantra party has re-socialized nearly one-fifth of its organizational activists from impersonal to personalized motivational perspectives. It
has also confirmed 15 per cent of its activists in their 
initial personalized motivations, and 43 per cent in 
their initial impersonal motivations. Strikingly, none 
has changed from personalized to impersonal motivations 
and, yet more strikingly, 23 per cent have become dis-
illusioned motivationally. Some of these disillusioned 
activists were very bitter about the way the party's 
affairs were being managed by "a few leaders." Their 
main complaints were against the "improper" selection 
of candidates for the general and municipal elections 
and against the absence of regular party meetings. The 
Swatantra Party unit is known to be run in an informal, 
personalized sort of manner. Such a way of running the 
party may be claimed to contribute to the flexibility 
of its operation. But it is flexibility of an extreme 
sort which does little either by way of "indoctrinating," 
i.e. ideologizing, its members or by way of institutiona-
izing the party.

The PSP has re-oriented 13 per cent of its activists 
from personalized motivations to impersonal motivations. 
It has also confirmed about one-half of its activists in 
their initial impersonal motivations. One-fifth of the 
PSP group have been re-socialized from impersonal motiva-
tions to personalized expectations. Finally, 7 per cent
have been confirmed in their personalized motivational perspectives. Thus, although material and solidary incentives are not wholly absent within the PSP, the emphasis seems to be on purposive incentives. These purposive incentives, especially their ideological content, contribute to the innovative potential of the party. This was crudely expressed by a PSP activist who said: "Our agitations and our shouting do influence the policies and actions of the ruling party in the municipal corporation." It may be said that agitational politics which give ideological satisfactions to the activists of a leftist party such as the PSP are a means of injecting innovative policy proposals into the stream of political communications.

True, being a minor opposition party, the PSP cannot hold out promises of material and solidary incentives for all its activists. It has to rely upon a certain amount of purposive incentives. But too much of a reliance on purposive incentives tends to make the party organization ideologically rigid. This hampers or limits not only the flexibility of the party organization but also its adaptability to the social environment.

It was hypothesized in chapter I that the presence within the party organization of many persons who are motivated for personally instrumental satisfactions is
a countervailing force against the emergence of oligarchy. Such activists, it was explained, would maintain a mutually exploitative relationship with their party leaders. In explaining their entry motivations, the members of each of the three party groups made frequent references to personally instrumental satisfactions. More strikingly, in the course of their party career, the activists of each of these party groups tended to re-orient their motivations from impersonal to personalized satisfactions rather than from personalized to impersonal considerations.

The loyalty of these activists to their respective party organizations or their compliance with their leaders cannot be taken for granted. They do not constitute the unquestioning "pedestal of an oligarchy." Their relationship to their party organization is cemented by their expectations of personally instrumental satisfactions. When these satisfactions are not available to them, they would not hesitate to leave the party and to seek company elsewhere.

The Ideological Determinants of Party Affiliation

The party affiliations of the individual activists have been found to be significantly related to their ideological perspectives. True, within each of the three party groups, there were some who dissented with the
official ideology of their own party. But they were a small minority; the majority tended to toe the official line of their respective parties. Comparatively, the degree of ideological congruence was greater within the PSP group than within the Congress and Swatantra groups, and in that order.

Each one of four selected "domestic issues" served to differentiate one party group from another. The only issue on which there was a near-consensus between any two of the three party groups was the foreign policy item of non-alignment, which was supported by 74 per cent and 78 per cent of the PSP and Congress groups, respectively. The only issue on which at least 50 per cent of each of the three party groups agreed was the item supportive of "social control" over banks, which, probably was an issue which did not affect our respondents directly.

On all the issues, except the issue of social control over banks, there was greater ideological affinity between the PSP and Congress groups than between the Congress and Swatantra groups. Next to the issue of non-alignment, the issue of ceilings on income and property was the least discriminative issue between the Congress and PSP groups. The most discriminative issue between
them was the issue of public sector expansion which was favoured by 93 per cent and 61 per cent of the PSP and Congress groups, respectively. The greatest ideological distance between the Congress and Swatantra groups was generated by the policy statement: "India can prosper only through competitive free enterprise," which was agreed to by 89 per cent and 35 per cent of the Swatantra and Congress groups, respectively. The issue of social control over banks was the least discriminative issue between the Congress and Swatantra groups.

On an over-all index of "liberalism," as anticipated, the PSP organizational activists as a group scored higher than the Congress and Swatantra groups, and in that order. The index scores were: PSP = +70; Congress = +3; and Swatantra = -72. As explanations for the differential degrees of liberalism among the individual activists, it has been found that the party activists belonging to the upper castes and to the occupational category of business tended to score "low" on the index of liberalism. Liberalism has also been found to be strongly and inversely associated with income (gamma = -.52).

The Role Perceptions and Task Performance of the Party Activists

The political party is not merely an attitude structure; it is also a task group. For being able to
perform its functions for the larger political system, the party must get performed certain tasks by its activists. Hence the activities undertaken by the party personnel merit investigation. Activities, as such, however, have no social meaning; they become meaningful only in the light of the roles in accordance with which they are performed. Hence I have made a distinction between the role perceptions and role performance of the party actors. The findings, reported in detail in chapter VII, may be summarized as follows:

Of the composite total of the three party groups, nearly one-half thought of themselves primarily as socio-economic welfare-promoters, one-fourth as party organizational or campaign workers, and one-fifth as political educators or ideological mentors. Nearly one-tenth of the composite group of party activists, belonging mostly to the Swatantra group, were unable to define a clear role for themselves. These findings on the major generalized role perceptions of the party organizational activists contrast sharply with the findings from some American locales.

The welfare-promoter's role has been found to be more widely assumed by the Baroda party activists than by their American counterparts. The percentage assuming a vote mobilizer's role
however, is bigger within the American "samples" than within the composite total of the three Baroda party groups.

Two related explanations have been offered for these differential patterns of role perceptions. Firstly, it has been suggested that the rapid urbanization context of Baroda City might have made the party activists feel that a welfare promoter's role is more salient than any other role. Secondly, it has been argued that the relatively low percentage of the Baroda activists assuming the vote mobilizer's role does not indicate that they underestimate the importance of vote mobilization; it only suggests that the Indian party personnel, unlike their American counterparts, view the party as something more than a mere vote mobilizing and/or interest aggregating agency. Vote mobilization, as perceived by the Baroda party personnel, is indeed important. But it seems to be regarded as being only secondary to, and dependent upon, the performance of such other tasks as the promotion of the people's socio-economic welfare, the advocacy of a particular ideology and the promotion of the political education of the masses.

A greater proportion of the dominant party than of the opposition parties assumed the welfare promoter's role. In contrast, a bigger per cent of the two opposition parties than of the dominant party perceived themselves primarily as political educators or ideological mentors.
It has been interpreted that the awareness of the Congress activists that they constitute the ruling party and that they have better access to, and control over, the administrative machinery of government may be responsible for making them feel that it is their responsibility to foster the general welfare of the people. By contrast, the opposition parties, which have a relatively small role in the formulation of governmental policies, and whose access to the administrative machinery of government is limited, appear to be making their active members feel that their primary role is that of an ideological mentor or political educator.

After documenting the performance, by the party activists, of a number of party organizational and campaign tasks, I have constructed an over-all index of their performance of these tasks. On this index of party organizational and campaign task performance, the Congress group scored higher than the PSP and Swatantra groups, and in that order. The index scores were: Swatantra = -27, PSP = +6, and Congress = +8. Some explanatory findings for the differential task productivity of the individual activists have also been explored. Their task productivity, it has been found, is positively and highly associated with their extra-party associational involvement (gamma=.38),
political career aspiration for the future \((\text{gamma} = .56)\), and perceived decisional involvement. It has also been found that those party activists who regarded themselves primarily as socio-economic welfare promoters were more efficient performers of party organizational and campaign tasks than those who assigned any other role to themselves. This finding, it has been argued, lends additional support to the interpretation, presented above, that the Indian party activists, unlike their American counterparts, perceive themselves more as socio-economic welfare promoters than as mere vote mobilizers, not because they underestimate the importance of vote mobilization, but because they view the party as something more than a mere vote mobilizing agency. It has also been argued that the greater assumption of the welfare promoter's role by the Baroda party activists might not be unrelated to the rapid urbanization context of Baroda. Rapid urbanization generates a rapid increase in the needs of the people for governmental licences and services, and the party organizations operating in such a context seek to win the votes and support of the people through "a 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year social service operation." In fact, as reported by them, the Baroda party activists were actually engaged in the performance of a number of broker-mediator tasks for the benefit of the people.

8. See Table 7.11 and the relevant text in chapter VII.
Some Factors Affecting Intra-Party Democracy

The present research was not designed specifically to investigate the actual distribution of power or influence within the three party units whose organizational activists have been studied here. I cannot therefore speak definitively about the actual degree of internal democracy within each of these three party organizations. Such a study, as I shall soon show, yet remains to be undertaken. It is, however, claimed here that some of the specific findings relating to the social characteristics, political perspectives and political participation patterns of the individual party activists have implications for the democratic (or, conversely, oligarchic) functioning of the party organizations.

As I have shown in chapter I, oligarchy and internal democracy may properly be regarded as constituting the two poles of a single continuum. Any given party, operating within a democratic framework, is therefore neither wholly oligarchic nor wholly democratic. There are always some factors which favour and some other factors which disfavour intra-party democracy. In the foregoing resume of the findings relating to the associational attachments, recruitment modes and motivational perspectives of the
party activists, I have already discussed their implications for intra-party democracy. I shall now review certain other findings which also have implications for the oligarchic (or, conversely, democratic) potential of the party organizations.

The party personnel were asked to give "agree" or "disagree" responses on four items constituting an index of respect for the norm of intra-party democracy (chapter VI). On this index, the PSP organizational activists, as a group, scored higher than the Congress and Swatantra groups, and in that order. The index scores were: Swatantra = -21, PSP = +52, and Congress = -4. As explanations for the differential scores obtained by the individual activists on the index of respect for intra-party democracy, it was found that democratic orientations (as operationalized here) were positively associated with education (gamma = .06) and negatively associated with income (gamma = -.29). Of the various occupational groups, the labourers and the professionals tended to have better appreciation of democratic procedures of party decision-making. I offered the explanation that the democratic attitudes of the labourers may be attributed to their participation in trade unions and that the democratic orientations of the professionals may be attributed to
their special training and education. A high degree of positive association (gamma = .35) was also found to exist between the party activists' attitude supportive of intra-party democracy and their attitude favouring a "liberal," i.e. egalitarian, ideology. This may partly explain why the PSP activists, as a group, scored higher on the index of respect for the norm of intra-party democracy than the Congress and Swatantra activists; on the index of "liberalism," the PSP group scored higher than the Congress and Swatantra groups (chapter VI).

One of the component propositions of Michels' iron law of oligarchy is that the top leaders of a party would be characterized by a lower degree of respect for internal democracy than the rest of the activists of that party. In Baroda, the top leader of the PSP scored "high" on the index of respect for the norm of intra-party democracy. But the top leader of the Congress and the Swatantra, in general, tended to score lower on the index of respect for the norm of intra-party democracy than their respective sets of organizational activists. Some of these top leaders, in fact, expressed their conviction that leaders who are democratically elected and who are conscious of their social responsibility should enjoy a
sufficient amount of operational independence and scope for managerial control.

The reluctance of the party personnel, be they top leaders or organizational activists, to recognize the saliency of democratic procedures of party decision-making has long-range political implications. True, when the institutionalization of democratic structures, such as political parties, is yet in its incipient stage, the management of a political system comes to be heavily dependent upon the intuitions and insights of the "men at the top." It is indeed good for the system when these "men at the top" happen to be competent and conscious of their social responsibility. But it would be still better if such top leaders were to run public affairs, not purely on the basis of their intuitive insights and personalized loyalties, but through institutional arrangements which give the widest scope to political discussion and debate. Political decisions so arrived at would indeed be slower, but the procedures underlying them would help in the institutionalization of democratic structures which would not only offer political training to the emerging leadership but also ensure that in the event of the non-availability of benevolent leaders (in future), the common
affairs of the community (or of an organization such as the political party) would not be left to chance or to the caprice of malevolent leaders.

I have not assumed naively that those top leaders and organizational activists who scored "low" on the index of respect for the norm of intra-party democracy are necessarily practising oligarchs, just as I have not assumed that those who scored "high" are necessarily practising democrats. There may indeed be variations between a politician's actual behaviour on the one hand and, on the other, his genuine beliefs and rhetorical statements. Here I have only assumed that the commitment of the party personnel to the norm of intra-party democracy has an importance of its own, irrespective of the degree of its translation into actual practice. When the active cadres of a party know that their leaders are committed to the norm of intra-party democracy they will tend to believe in the legitimacy of the party decisions with which they are expected to comply. Similarly, when the leaders know that their followers are committed to the norm, they will try to be responsive in their actions.

A countervailing force against the emergence of oligarchy within the party organizations is their social

9. That it is good to believe in and advocate certain norms of political behaviour which may turn out to be very difficult to practice is argued by Lester Milbrath, Political Participation, pp. 151-52.
diversity. A socially heterogeneous party organization, as I have argued in chapter I, has within it a diversity of interests to cope with. The leadership of such a party organization can maximize internal support only through a process of aggregation and compromise, and not through oligarchic domination. In fact, the very leadership of a socially heterogeneous organization: operating within a democratic framework is most likely to be constituted of the leaders of the various subgroups within it.

Of the three party units, whose organizational activists have been studied here, the Congress unit has the greatest amount of social heterogeneity (See chapter III). It has a wide and heterogeneous membership base consisting of 585 active members and 13500 primary members. The Swatantra party has 26 life workers and 440 active workers. The PSP has only 50 active members and 1300 ordinary members. According to Michels, the bigger the organization, the greater the likelihood of oligarchy. Michels ignored the impact of the social diversity of the organization upon the nature of its leadership nucleus. The leadership of a socially heterogeneous organization is likely to be constituted of the leaders of the various subgroups within that organization. The leadership nucleus of such an organization, in other words, would tend to be pluralized
and not oligarchically homogeneous. On account of its wide social heterogeneity, the Congress party organization in Baroda City may be said to be more favourably placed for internal democracy than either the Swatantra or the PSP organizations.

The members of the leadership nucleus of each of the three party organizations described in chapter II, cannot be said to be drawn proportionately from the various socio-economic groupings that are present within them. These elite nuclei reflect neither a cross-section of the general population of Baroda City nor a cross-section of their respective rank and file followings. While saying that the elite nucleus of each of the three party units is not reflective, in any proportional sense, of the social diversity contained within them, I must hasten to add that these elite nuclei cannot also be said to be "closed" or phalanx-like. Quite a degree of social diversity is discernible within each of these elite nuclei. They may therefore be said to exhibit tendencies towards pluralization rather than towards oligarchic homogeneity.

The two dominant castes within the active membership base of the Congress are the Bania and Patidar castes.
For the last decade or so, there has been a tendency that when the city's mayoralty was held by a Bania, the presidency of the City Congress Committee and the deputy mayorship were held by Patidars, and vice versa (see Chapter II, especially Tables 2.2 and 2.3). Another instance of the "accommodation processes" attendant upon the formation of the leadership nucleus within the Congress unit may be seen in the selection of a Scheduled Caste representative for the chairmanship of the City's Primary Education Board.

There have been, of late, fresh admissions into, and expansions of, the leadership nuclei of the PSP and Swatantra units. The plurality of castes and occupations represented in their elite nuclei has been documented in chapter II. As shown there, the elite nucleus of the Swatantra unit is composed of persons belonging to the Patidar, Brahmin, Maratha and Muslim communities. Similarly, the elite nucleus of the PSP consists of persons belonging to the Brahmin, Muslim, Sunar, Bania and Parsee communities.

I have not investigated the decisional participation of the various members of the elite nucleus of each of the three party units. However, the fact that accommodative

10. It may be recalled that until the exit of Mr. Chandrakant Parikh in August 1970, the Bania community was also included in the leadership nucleus of the Swatantra party unit. (See chapter II.)
expansions of the sort indicated above are made of the elite nucleus of each of the three party units is indicative of the limitations which the social diversity of a party's membership base places upon its leaders. Internal democracy in a party organization might not require that each and every member of the party should actually participate in the various decisions of the party. The requirements of intra-party democracy might be satisfied if the party's active cadres, as a whole, are able to restrain the power of the leaders.\textsuperscript{11}

It was also hypothesized in chapter I that the extra-party associational involvement of the party organizational activists is related to the oligarchy-democracy dimension of the party organization. It was argued that extra-party associational membership enhances the individual activist's democratic potential, viz. his capacity to maintain a mutually exploitative relationship with (rather than unquestioning obedience to) the top leadership of the party. In this respect, the Congress group appeared to be more favourably placed than the PSP and Swatantra groups—in that order—for internal democracy; on the index of extra-party associational involvement, the Congress group

\textsuperscript{11}. For a parallel argument regarding the participatory role of the members of the general electorate, see Bernard E. Berelson et al., Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), Chapter 14: "Democratic Theory and Democratic Practice."
scored higher (index score = +6) than the PSP and Swatantra groups (index scores -13 and -43, respectively).

Within the Swatantra and PSP groups, the percentages scoring "high" on the index of associational involvement were smaller than the percentages scoring "low." This suggests that a pattern of "cumulative inequalities" in associational attachments operates in these party units. This cumulative pattern was also visible in the case of the "top leaders" of each of the three party units; compared to the organizational activists, the "top leaders" had much greater connections with the major institutions and associations of the City. This cumulative tendency in the extra-party associational attachments of the top leaders of the three party units may be said to constitute a contributive factor to their oligarchic potential.

Some Issues for Further Research

I have indicated above that a certain degree of pluralization is discernible within the leadership nucleus of each of the three party units. I have not, however, explored the decisional participation of the various individuals who constitute these leadership nuclei. Such an investigation, which would help indicate the actual
distribution of power within the party organizations, yet remains to be undertaken. Three important decisional areas which might be covered in such a study are: (a) the party organizational elections, (b) the selection of candidates for the municipal elections, and (c) the decisions affecting the nature of the relationship between the local party units and their State- and National level organizational units. This last-mentioned decisional area is of particular significance in the present context of party splits and party mergers. In the case of the dominant Congress party, the selection of nominees for the Primary Education Board and for the chairmenship of the various committees of the general board of the municipal corporation could also be investigated. The guiding questions for such an investigation could be as follows: Who initiates? Who opposes and who supports? Who backs out and why? Who are consulted? What type of anticipations are made, by the initiators and their rivals, of the forthcoming reactions from their support bases? Research conducted along these lines would provide insights into the actual distribution of power within the parties. 12

It may also be suggested that research along the lines outlined above or along the lines of the present

12. A theoretical framework for such a study may be found in Peter Y. Medding, "A Framework for the Analysis of Power in Political Parties," op. cit.
investigation may also be undertaken of two other parties which have significant operational bases in Baroda City. These parties are the Jan Sangh and the Communist Parties, which, I understand, have potentially important organizational bases in Baroda City. It is further gathered that the communal riots of 1969 have highlighted the significance of these two parties. An exploration of the support bases and organizational life of these two parties would therefore constitute a necessary part of our knowledge of the local political system of Baroda.

The research reported here and the researches that have just been proposed to be undertaken, it is hoped, would form part of a larger, more ambitious study of the local political system of Baroda City. Some of the major themes of analysis for such a study could be the following:

1) Political Parties and Political Mobilization in Baroda City from the Nationalist Movement to the Present Day:
This would largely be an historical analysis of the role played by political parties and political movements (v.g. the nationalist movement and the Maha Gujarat Movement) in

13. For a very preliminary account of these party units, see Nalin Anadkat, "A Study of Minor Political Parties of Baroda" (Unpublished M.A. dissertation, Deptt. of Political Science, The M.S. University of Baroda, 1967).
generating and increasing citizen participation in the governmental process.\textsuperscript{15} The records of the Praja Mandal and the old volumes of the Praja Mandal bulletin could prove to be valuable source materials for such an inquiry.

ii) Political Parties and Local Government Actions in Baroda City:— This would be an historical and institutional analysis of the roles of the various political parties in the major policy decisions and administrative actions of the Municipal Corporation.\textsuperscript{16}

iii) The Impact of Party Activity upon the Political Perceptions, Attitudes and Behaviour of the "Citizen Sector" of the Local Political System in Baroda:— This could conveniently be undertaken as a survey research dealing with (a) the exposure of the voters to the activities of political parties, and (b) the consequences of such exposure on the political perspectives and behaviour of the voters.\textsuperscript{17}

iv) Trade Unions in Baroda City:— After surveying their history and analysing their inner power patterns, one could investigate their inputs into, and intake from, the local governmental system.

\textsuperscript{15} In this connection, see the works of D.N. Pathak et al., and Rajni Kothari and Tarun Sheth referred to in footnotes 13 and 19 of chapter II.

\textsuperscript{16} A theoretical perspective for such an inquiry may be found in Theodore Lowi, "Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems," \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{17} For a Baroda study of some of the consequences of campaign exposure, see Thomas Pantham, \textit{Voting Behaviour in Baroda City}, chapter VI.
v) Business, Co-operative and Educational Institutions:—
Here, too, the analysis could be focussed on their internal power patterns and on their inputs into, and intake from, the local governmental system.  

vi) Information about the inner power structure of the aforementioned areas or subsystems and about their interactions with the larger political system would help us understand the over-all power structure in Baroda City. Such an analysis could profitably be attempted along the theoretical issues contained in Robert Dahl's *Who Governs*? 

I have not put forward the aforementioned research proposals simply because similar studies have been done elsewhere. I have rather been moved by the consideration that a central task of the political scientist is to make explicit and to analyse the processes of power relations that determine "the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought together."  

In the determination of these "general arrangements" of the society, political parties play a vital role; they, in brief, constitute the channels of participation in the processes of the formulation and implementation of binding

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18. For two contemporary studies of this genre from the Baroda locale see the works of Erdman and the Rudolphs referred to in footnote No. 43 of chapter II.  
policies for the whole society. For understanding their role fully, we need to analyse the functions or consequences of their operations both for the policies and actions of the government - local or national - and for the perceptions and behaviour of the "citizen sector" of the political system. Such studies of the functional consequences of party operations, I felt, should be logically preceded by studies which seek to answer such basic queries as: What really are the party organizations? Who are their activists? What are their backgrounds, beliefs, perceptions and routine political activities?

This, then, was the intellectual perspective with which the present study was undertaken. I conclude with a citation from Lipset:

While an analysis of the actual behaviour of parties in office is crucial to an understanding of their functional significance, the social base and ideology of any movement must also be analysed if it is to be truly understood. 21