CHAPTER IV

KINDS OF ABHAVA: OBJECTS OF ANUPALABDHI
The acceptance of *abhāva* as a category came perhaps at a much later stage in Indian Logic. Though the theory of *abhāva* has been dealt in all details by the neologists, the formulation and development of the theory is largely due to the Buddhists and the Jains. Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāya Bindu* divides *abhāva* into *Anyonyābhāva* and *Saṁsargābhāva*. The logician of the Nyāya School also first divided non-existence into two kinds the Mutual Non-existence or *Anyonyābhāva* and Conactual Non-existence or *Saṁsargābhāva*. *Saṁsargābhāva* is further divided into three kinds. They are: i) Antecedent Non-existence (*prāgābhāva*) e.g., the non-existence of the cloth in the threads before its production, ii) Consequent Non-existence (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of cloth after its destruction, iii) Absolute Non-existence (*atyantābhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of a jar on the ground. This classification is found almost in identical form in all the later manuals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

In earlier works such as those of Jayanta, Sṛidhara, and others, however, we find a good deal of divergence of opinion with regard to the four-fold classification of non-existence. According to some ancient writers, non-existence of a jar on the ground, which can be effected by removing the jar and destroyed by bringing it back, is not an instance of absolute non-existence. They hold it to be another kind of non-existence which has a beginning and an end. The absolute non-existence (which is eternal) is found in such instances as
the non-existence of colour in the air. There are other points of divergence in
the account and classification of non-existence, some of which may be noted
here.

Jayanta, for instance, thinks that besides the two principal non-
existence, prāgābhāva, pradhvainśābhāva, there are two more kinds of non-
existence, subject to condition that these other kinds of non-existence depend
on particular conditions¹. In fact, Jayanta thinks that all other abhāva i.e.
absence of identity (anyonyābhāva) and absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva)
are included in the prāgābhāva². All this would look strange to a modern
student of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who is acquainted only with the theories of the
later manuals. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika system subscribes to the four kinds of non-existence, e.g.,
Prāgābhāva, Pradhvainśābhāva, Anyonyābhāva, and Atyantābhāva. The
marks of ink on this paper were absent some moments ago. These are negative
facts of the first kind. The negation of a cause in its effect after the production
of the latter is an instance of posterior negation. The non-existence of a thing
after its destruction is a negative fact. The non-existence of a man after his
death is a fact of the second kind. A cow is not a horse and a horse is not a
cow. The paper which is blue in colour is not at the same time green, and
another which is green is not blue. These are cases of mutual negation. The
non-existence of a sky-flower, the absence of horns on a donkey’s skull etc., are instances of absolute negation.

For defending the plurality of the world, Kumārila accepted abhāva as the category of reality. In categorizing the world, Kumārila and Prabhakara differ from each other. According to Kumārila, the categories are first divided into two kinds, the positive and the negative. The positive categories are four: Substance, Quality, Activity, and Generality. The negative categories also are four: Prior Negation (prāgabhāva), Posterior Negation (pradāvaniṣabhāva), Infinite or Absolute Negation (anyamabhāva), and Mutual Negation (anyonyabhāva). We thus get the following chart.

If the world is a manifold in essence, then nothing can be the same as another thing and everything exists only in its time and place. So all the four forms of negation have to be accepted as belonging to reality itself.

Advaita-Vedānta also accepts the four-fold classification of abhāva.

According to the author of the Vedānta-Paribhāṣa, four-kinds of non-
existence, that can be known through non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). They are respectively called Prāgābhāva, Pradhwāminśabhāva, Anyonyābhāva, and Anyantābhāva.

i. Prāgābhāva:

Prāgābhāva literally means previous non-existence. It is defined as the non-existence of the effect in its material cause previous to its coming into existence. To illustrate, the non-existence of the jar in its component material, earth, prior to the production of the jar, would be called prāgābhāva. It is distinguished from other kinds of non-existence by the fact that it is the basis of the peculiar judgment of futurity like “the jar will exist”. The judgments the jar does not exist, is common to all kinds of non-existence. But the judgment, “The jar will exist”, applies only to the case of previous non-existence. Another distinguishing feature of this kind of non-existence mentioned by the Naiyāyikas is that it has no beginning, but has always an end. The previous non-existence of a particular object can not be assigned any beginning, but it is put an end to as soon as the object comes into existence.

This type of non-existence is the backbone of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of asatkāryavāda the doctrine of the prior non-existence of the effects in their material causes. When the followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contend that they do not mean by non-existence, a fiction like ‘here's horn or skylotus'.

151
whose existence is neither actual nor possible, but a real entity whose existence is though not actual because of certain limitations, is not altogether inconceivable. When the Vaiśeṣikas contend that the pot is non-existent in the clay prior to its production, it does not imply that the existence of pot is inconceivable in clay like that of a child of the barren women: but it means that the pot does not exist in clay before casual operation. It does not exist as long as it is produced, but the moment the potter works on clay with accessories such as the wheel, staff etc, the pot comes into existence. This kind of non-existence has no beginning, but it has an end. Since the effect never existed in the cause at any time prior to its production, its non-existence is said to be beginningless. But the moment the effect is produced which is possible, its non-existence comes to an end. Thus prior non-existence merely refers to the non-existence of an object before its production, but it never precludes the possibility of future existence.

ii. Pradhvaṁśābhāva:

Pradhvaṁśābhāva, or more simply dharmaṁśābhāva, literally means non-existence as represented by annihilation or destruction. The non-existence of the Jar in the component parts into which the Jar is broken comes under the this class. This kind of non-existence also has some bearing on the causal doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas. According to their causal doctrine, just as the effect does not exist prior to its production which is expressed in the concept of
prāgābhāva, they believe that it does not exist after its destruction which is conveyed by their second type of non-existence viz. pradhvaniśābhāva. The effect when it is produced it is produced anew, it comes into existence for the first time (āraṇībhā) without borrowing any essence from its cause. We do not find any trace of it in its cause. Similarly when it (the effect) gets destroyed, it is destroyed totally without leaving any trace behind. Pradhvaniśābhāva has a beginning, but it has no end⁶. When for instance, a jar is destroyed there is a beginning for its non-existence, but it has no end since we cannot produce the same jar, again. Whether it has an end is a disputed point. The Naiyāyikas hold that it has none; for they think that the destruction of an object, say a jar, can not be further destroyed⁷. The Advaitins question the truth of this view⁸. The non-existence of a thing, they argue, must have a locus (adhikarāṇa). That is to say, whenever we say that a jar does not exist we mean that it does not exist in a certain place. Now the non-existence of the jar, when destroyed, has for its locus its component parts. When, therefore, these parts are further destroyed, the locus of the non-existence of the jar is destroyed and with it the non-existence of the jar in those parts is also destroyed. In other terms, the judgment, “There is non-existence of the jar in these component parts”, becomes untenable and false when those parts no longer exist. Hence the Advaitins conclude that when the locus of the non-existence created by destruction is destructible, that non-existence can not be itself indestructible or
endless; but when the locus, in question, is eternal or endless, the non-existence in question is eternal. As the Advaitins hold nothing except Brahman is endlessly real or eternal, it further follows that according to them only that kind of non-existence is endless which has Brahman for its locus. To illustrate, the non-existence of the world (when negated by the intuition of Brahman) in Brahman is eternal. It need not be supposed that if such non-existence be eternal, there would be another eternal thing except Brahman, this would tell against the pure monism of the Advaitins. For the Advaitins have shown in other contexts that the negation of an object illusorily superimposed on some reality is nothing but the affirmation of that reality and consequently that non-existence (caused by destruction) of the illusory objected is nothing over and above the existence of the real locus. The eternity of the non-existence of the world in Brahman implies, therefore, not another parallel eternal reality but only the eternity of Brahman. But if the non-existence created by the destruction of the jar, the Naiyāyikas might ask, were destructible (and not endless), would not be destroyed jar again spring into existence. For does not the negation of the negation of a thing imply the affirmation of the thing?

In reply to this, the Vedānta-Paribhāṣa points out that the annihilation of the destroyed parts of a jar implies as much non-existence of the jar as of those destroyed parts and does not, therefore, amount to the creation of the
jar. To explain this statement, when the jar is broken into parts we can pass the judgment, "The jar does not exist now in these parts", or "There is non-existence of the jar now in these parts". But when these parts are again broken into smaller pieces, this judgment, as we have seen, can no longer be maintained; it is no longer valid; for "these parts" no longer exist. But falsity of this judgment about the non-existence of the jar in a particular locus does not mean that another judgment about the non-existence of the jar in some other locus can not be passed. On the contrary, when the broken parts are further broken we can still pass the judgment "There is non-existence of the jar now in these still further broken parts" which would be quite valid for that time and would prove not the re-emergence but the non-existence of the jar.

But can not the Naiyāyikas retort to this explanation by saying, "If you admit that there is non-existence of the jar even when its broken parts are further destroyed, how can you say that its non-existence is destroyed when the parts are so destroyed? You have, on the contrary, to confess that non-existence of the jar still continues and virtually admit, with us, that the non-existence created by the destruction of the jar is endless". This objection is quite possible and reasonable and we do not find it answered by the Advaitins in so many words. We can easily conceive, however, the reply that can be given from their stand point. It can be said that this objection is based on a confusion between unqualified non-existence and non-existence created by
destruction. The jar can be destroyed only once, that is when it is broken into its parts, and consequently non-existence, created by destruction, can take place only then, when these broken parts are further broken, there is destruction of the parts of the jar, not of the jar. So on the completion of the second destruction, though we can say that there is non-existence (general and unqualified) of the jar in the broken pieces, we can not say that this non-existence in the pieces is such as has been created by destruction of the jar. In place of the non-existence created by destruction of the jar, there is at that time in those pieces non-existence created by the destruction of the parts of the jar.

It can not be said, therefore, that the former non-existence continues even then as such, on the contrary, the judgment "there is non-existence created by the destruction of the jar", can not then be formed, as has been already shown. For we fail to answer the question, "where is it?" The parts of the jar in which alone it could be said to be, are no more. The fragments that continue till then represent the destruction of the parts of the jar and not that the jar, and they can not therefore be said to contain the non-existence created by the destruction of the jar. Such non-existence can not, therefore, be said to be endless.

The author of the Vedānta-paribhāṣa gives an indirect proof of the falsity of the statement that the destruction of the non-existence of an object created by its destruction necessarily implies the re-emergence of the object\textsuperscript{12}. The existence of a jar, he argues, represents the non-existence created by the
destruction of the previous non-existence of the jar. The destruction of the jar is equal, therefore, to the destruction of the non-existence created by the destruction of previous non-existence, and it would as such lead to the re-emergence of the previous non-existence of the jar, had it been true that the destruction of the non-existence created by destruction causes re-emergence. But this is never the case. Hence, he concludes, this statement is not true.

A similar problem in another form has been dealt with by the Advaitins (in the Advaitasiddhi, Gaugla-brahmanandi etc1) in another way. The Advaitins say that the world is false and Brahman alone is real. Now the question is raised by their critics: Is the statement, “The world is false” itself true or false? If it be true, then there is another reality in addition to that of Brahman; this the Advaitins can not accept. But if this statement be false, then the Advaitins must contradict themselves: for the falsity of the falsity of the world amounts to the reality of it. Now it is this last question with which we are concerned at present. Does the falsity of the falsity of an object imply its reality? The Advaitins reply that it does not. For they say that anything that is different from Brahman is, according to them, false. Now both the falsity of the world, and the falsity of the falsity of the world, are different from Brahman. Both are therefore false. The negation of the negation of a thing amounts to its affirmation only when there are two different grounds for the two negations. But when the ground for negation (nishedhyatavacchedaka-
amount to its affirmation.

To clarify this remark for students of Western Philosophy we may say that the proposition, "God is not black", does not necessarily amount to saying "God is black" if it be admitted that God falls without the universe of colour. For then the ground on which "not-black" is denied of God would be that on which 'black' also can be denied.

The dictum *duplex negatio affirmat* is generally accepted in Western logic as almost a truism. Indian logicians, except the Advaitins, also agree. The Advaitins do not really object to this dictum; they only desire to point out that it is valid within a certain limit or universe of discourse which, they think, should be explicitly mentioned lest it is applied to the few exceptional cases (like those already mentioned) which really fall outside its scope. It is interesting to find that Bradley does not accept the dictum in its popular meaning. He says; "And we must not say that negation presupposes a judgment, which is left in possession when the negative is negated. For we saw before that this positive judgment is not presupposed". "The real reason why denial of denial is affirmation is merely this. In all denial we must have the assertion of a positive ground and the positive ground of the second denial can be nothing but the predicate denied by the first". In a word, according to Bradley, a double negation, like "A is not B is false", does not necessarily
yield the judgment "A is B". But still he thinks that the ground for the second denial can be nothing but the judgment "A is B". From the exceptional illustration given by the Vedāntins, it would appear that it is not inconceivable that the ground for the second denial should be something other than "A is B"; for it may be "A is C", where 'C' is such that it excludes both not - A and B.

iii. Atyantābhāva:

Atyantābhāva literally means total or absolute non-existence. If a particular thing does not exist in a particular locus at any time, then it is said that there is atyantābhāva or absolute non-existence of that thing in that locus. For instance there is atyantābhāva or total absence of colour in air.

The Naiyāyikas hold that atyantābhāva is eternal. But the Advaitins, following their own theory that Brahman alone is eternal, refuse to accept this view. The author of the Vedānta-Paribhāṣa says, therefore, that atyantābhāva (like ākāśa and other things which also the Naiyāyikas hold to be eternal) is perishable. The author of the Maṇiprabhā, explaining this remark, observes that the non-eternity of atyantābhāva is due to be non-eternity of its locus. That is to say, as everything except Brahman is non-eternal, non-existence as existing in any such thing must also be perishable; the judgment that there is non-existence of A in B can be formed, as we have seen, only so long as B, the locus, exists and not after it has perished. But it may be contended, "If that be the ground for the non-eternity of atyantābhāva, you must admit that at least
the atyantābha or total absence of the world in Brahman is eternal, because
the locus, Brahman, is here eternal”. The same writer meets this objection by
saying that though such a case of non-existence may be said to be eternal. Yet
it can scarcely be distinguished from Brahman itself; the non-existence of an
illusory object super-imposed on a real substratum, as we have stated above,
can not be proved to be something distinct from the substratum.

Since “Time” for the Naiyāyikas is the ultimate substratum since for the
first two prāgābhava and pradhvaṁśābhava, are defined by them in terms of
time, they define atyantābhava also, as the non-existence of a thing for all the
time. But the use of the phrase “all the time” it not temporal but a logic one.

It is really not non-existence for all the time but absolute non-existence.
The Nyāya logicians give several instances of atyantābhava. One such
example is Bhūtale gataḥ nāsti : there is no pot on the ground. They assert
that if this is a fact that there is no pot on the ground it can “never” be negated,
contradicted. But “never” is a “logical never” and not “a temporal one”. For it
can always be negated in a sense by bringing a pot on the ground. So though
atyantābhava has been described as traiikālika it does not stand on the same
level as prāgābhava ad pradhvaṁśābhava. For the Indian logicians the notion
of atyantābhava is at the back of different notions whether they be negation,
contradiction or patently absurd. Śaśāṣṛnga, ākāśakusumāvāyu-rīpa or
square-circle are instances which are expression of only one kind of
atyantabhāva. The Śāṅgasṛṅga means the existence of śāla or horn on the substratum of sasa or hare ākāśakusuma means the existence of flower of kusumā on substratum of sky. vāyurūpa means existence of figure in air and a square-circle means the existence on the square. All these are characterized by impossibility. According to Indian logic the same kind of logical contradiction is involved in saying that there is a pot on the ground, once you say there is no pot on the ground. Modern logicians would draw a distinction between the square-circle or the son of a barren woman and the non-existence of a pot on the ground. The one points to logical absurdity whereas the other points to the non-co-existence of the pot and the ground (at the time of occurrence). It is, therefore, necessary to analyse further the two cases where the notion of atyantābhāva is employed.

It will be relevant to distinguish the notion of negation (atyantābhāva) from that of contradiction (virodha). Negation points to the bare negation or exclusion of something and does not necessarily point to the logical impossibility of existing together at any time. The form of atyantābhāva is, ‘is not’ the form of virodha is ‘cannot’. Though the second alternative will necessarily have the first included in it, the first will not have the second included in it. It is necessary to note that atyantābhāva only refers to the first alternative and not the second. Thus whether it be the non-existence of pot on the ground or the non-existence of a square on the circle, the minimum that is
pointed out is the exclusion of the one from the other. And this exclusion as a fact will remain a fact without any reference to time. It is necessary to note that the word for contradiction in Indian logic is virodha; and the notion of atyantābhāva is quite different from that of virodha. Atyantābhāva may allow the co-existence of two things at a time different from the one under context. This is not the case in virodha. So, whereas virodha points to atyantābhāva the opposite is not the case. Atyantābhāva, so to say, points to the weaker kind of negation. But the maxim seems to be that when a fact can be explained by resorting to a weaker notion why resort to a stronger notion which is only a special case of the weaker notion. It is also necessary to draw a distinction between the two cases of contradiction mentioned in Indian Logic, the Logical or virodha and the temporal or the bādhita. It can be seen that the notion of existence of the pot on the ground can only be bādhita, can never be virodhita. A few logicians, however, recognise the difference between the two types and call the ‘absence of pot on the ground’ as the atyantābhāva characterised by ‘time’ or samayika atyantābhāva.

iv. Anyonyābhāva:

While saṃsargābhāva is the absence of a connection between two things, anyonyābhāva underlies the difference (bhēda) of one thing from another thing. When one thing is different from another thing, they mutually exclude each other and there is the non-existence of either as the other. A table
is different from a chair. This means that a table does not exist as a chair, or, more simply, a table is not a chair. Anyonyābhāva is this non-existence of one thing as another, from which it is different. Thus sanīsargābhāva is the absence of a connection (sanīsarga) between two entities, and its opposite is just their connection. On the other hand, anyonyābhāva is the absence of one thing as another, and its opposite is just their sameness or identity. Take the following illustrations: ‘A hare has no horn; there is no colour in air’ are propositions which express the absence of a connection between a hare and horn, between colour and air. The opposite of these will be propositions ‘a hare has horns’; ‘there is colour in air’; ‘a cow is not a horse’; ‘a jar is not a cloth’ are propositions which express the difference between a cow and a horse, a jar and a cloth. The opposite of these will be the propositions ‘a cow is a horse’, ‘a jar is a cloth’. Thus we may say that sanīsargābhāva is relative non-existence in the sense of a negation of the presence (sanīsarga) of something in some other thing, while anyonyābhāva is mutual non-existence or difference in the sense of a negation of the identity (tādātmya) between two objects. Like atyantābhāva or absolute non-existence anyonyābhāva or mutual non-existence is without a beginning and an end i.e. is eternal. According to Advaitins anyonyābhāva nothing but difference or separateness (bhēda or prthaktva) owing to which we judge ‘This is not that’. It also has beginning in time, or not, according as its locus has beginning, or not. Thus
the difference of a pot from a cloth has a beginning because the pot has a
beginning in time. Again the difference of an individual soul (jīva) from
Brahman, or the difference of the latter from the former, is beginningless
because jīva and Brahman are beginningless, according to the Advaitins. But
none of these two cases of difference is eternal19. The reason for its non-
eternity is the same as in the case of the other kinds of non-existence.

In later logic, the concepts of aṁvyābhāva and aṁvantābhāva have
been regarded as permanent or constant20. Unless this is accepted logical
difficulties like postulating infinite number of abhāvas arise. To avoid such
difficulties the logicians presumed that the absolute non-existence of
everything exists everywhere, at all times. For instance, even when a pot exists
on the ground, there is its non-existence from the view-point of the relation of
inherence, since the pot exists only by the relation of conjunction. In this way
the non-existence of everything can be shown everywhere through some
relation or other. "So this non-existence is eternal; but when there is a pot on
the ground, its non-existence is not apprehended because there is no relation
between the non-existence and the ground at the time"21. "The relation of the
non-existence in question is the particular ground associated with the particular
time (i.e. when one has the notion that the pot is not there ) Tat tat kālānām tat
tat bhūtalādikam tat tat abhāvanam svaṁbhandhah."22
Greek logicians present two laws which are connected and are presupposed by the theory of negation. These laws are (1) the law of contradiction and (2) the law of excluded middle. The law of contradiction is usually expressed in the form “not both p and not-p”\(^{23}\). P and not-p are the only alternatives. They exclude each other and exhaust the whole universe between themselves. P is equivalent to “there is p” which means that p is true; not-p means “there is not p” which means that p is false. It is taken for granted that there is a duality of truth and falsity and each proposition can be expressed in a double way: if a proposition is true it means that its negation is false and if its negation is true then it means that the proposition itself is false. This is what Frege called the truth value and most logics are worked out on the basis that each proposition can have either the truth value false or the truth value true. If the laws of contradiction and excluded middle are to be explained under the two valued logic it will be evident that one will follow from the other. The law of contradiction which is stated in the form “not both p and not-p” would mean that at least one of the two alternatives is false. Either p is false or not-p is false. The Aristotelian formulation of the law of contradiction allows for the falsity of both. p as well as not-p. But under the two valued logic, not-p is false means p is true and p is false, means not-p is true. That is the law not only implies that at least one of the alternatives is false but also implies the law of excluded middle which says that one of the alternatives is
true. Similarly if we take the law of excluded middle which is expressed in the form, \( p \) or not-\( p \), it means that out of the two alternatives, \( p \) and not-\( p \) one must be true, that is if \( p \) is false then not-\( p \) is true and if not-\( p \) is false then \( p \) is true. But though this form allows for the truth of both the alternatives, once the two-valued logic is accepted and the law of contradiction is taken for granted the third alternative is excluded. Though the form allows a third alternative, the third alternative is excluded as one of the two alternatives is false under the law of contradiction. Thus under the two-valued logic ordinarily the two laws (1) the law of contradiction and (2) the law of excluded middle, will imply each other and can be expressed in the form of equivalence. Not both \( p \) and \( q \), is identical with \( p \) or \( q \). \( (p \land \neg p) \land (p \lor \neg p) \). It is on the basis of these laws that Aristotle gave us what is known as the contradictory opposition of propositions. Of the four-fold scheme of propositions, A, E, I and O, A and O represent the contradictory relation, so do E and I. The contradictory relation tells us that if the one is false the other is true and if the one is true the other is false. If "All men are mortal" is true, then "Some men are not mortal" is false and if "Some men are not mortal" is true then "All men are mortal" is false. Similarly, if "All men are mortal" is false then "Some men are not mortal" is true and if "Some men are not mortal" is false then "All men are mortal" is true. This is what is called the contradictory opposition. It is not difficult to find out that such a contradictory relation takes for granted both the laws (1)
the law of contradiction and (2) the law of excluded middle and accepts the identity of the two laws. On the other hand, the contrary opposition tells us that if one proposition is true then the other is false but if one is false we do not know whether the other is true or false. If we take contrary opposition which exists between A proposition and E proposition, e.g. between the propositions “All men are mortal” and “No man is mortal” then if “All men are mortal” is true “No man is mortal” is false and if “No man is mortal” is true “All men are mortal” is false. But if the proposition “All men are mortal” is false one cannot say whether “No man is mortal” is true. Similarly if “No man is mortal” is false one cannot be sure whether “All men are mortal: is true. A third alternative may exist and the law of excluded middle may not operate. It is something like this: If there are only two existents in the world then negation of the one means an affirmation of the other and vice versa. But if there are more than two things in the world then there will be more than two alternatives, and the affirmation or negation of the one will not mean the negation or affirmation of the other. This was, in fact, the criticism of the Nyaya logicians against the Buddhist logicians who were the pioneers in formulating the laws of double negation, “not-not-p=\neg p”.

The Nyāya logicians pointed out that p and not-p do not exhaust the whole universe but only state a difference or the anyonyābhāva. As we have seen two differences do not necessarily give us the original. The original is not
the same as \textit{advayavrtti} (other than the other). Thus if what is thought to be
the law of contradiction does not state the relation between \( p \) and \( \neg p \) but
leaves an open texture and if it is expressed in the form

\[ (p.p........) \]

it will only represent the contrary opposition. We will still be able to say that
both \( p \) and \( q \) cannot be true and at least one of them must be false. But such a
law will not be equivalent to the law of excluded middle which states that one
of the two alternatives must be true. The original formulation of the law of
excluded middle will, thus, have to be modified to the form \((p \lor q \lor \ldots..)\)\textsuperscript{24}.
Thus the law of excluded middle will not follow from the law of contradiction,
\textquoteleft not both \( (p \text{ and } q) \text{...)\textquoteleft. It cannot be identical with the law of contradiction and
may even be false. That is if of the two alternatives \( p \) and \( \neg p \), the negation of
the one will not be equivalent to the assertion of the other; \( p \) will not be
equivalent to \( \neg \neg p \). This will be so because the second term \( \neg p \) will not
be a real \textquoteleft \( \neg p \text{\ldots}\)\textquoteleft but will be something like \textquoteleft \( q \text{\ldots}\)\textquoteleft. Thus from the negation of
the one alternative one will not be able to go to the affirmation of the other
alternative and the law of double negation will not work. In such a case the
law of excluded middle will have to be given up. In the opposition of
propositions we have seen that in the contrary relation one can go from the
truth of the one to the falsity of the other but cannot go from the falsity of the
one to the truth of the other. The law of excluded middle aims at going from

168
the falsity of the one to the truth of the other and this is represented by the sub-contrary relation. As soon as we give up the two-valued logic the contradictory opposition will have to be given up; the law of contradiction will be equivalent to the contrary opposition and the law of excluded middle which is expressed by the sub-contrary opposition will cease to operate. The original proposition will not imply the obverted proposition and the law of double negation will not work. If the original is $p$, its double negation $\neg\neg p$ will not be equivalent to $p$. However the third negation $\neg\neg\neg p$ will be equivalent to the first negation. The law of double negation does not hold good but the law of triple negation holds good. That is one can go from a positive proposition to its negative but one cannot go from the negative proposition to its positive. The Neo-Nyāya logicians like Raghunātha Śiromaṇi pointed out this and said that it is impossible to infer from something which has a characteristic of non-existence, something which has a characteristic of existence, the two being absolutely different. From the non-existence of a pot on the earth one could never infer the existence of a pot on the earth. One could go from an abhāva, or non-existence to non-existence but never from non-existence to existence. It is not possible to infer the existence of a pot on the ground even if we negate the original proposition, there is no pot on the ground. They gave their own reason for this. When an affirmation is made and when it is said that a pot is on the ground, the pot is on the ground with the
relation of contact or conjunction, but when we say that there is an absence of pot on the ground then "this absence of pot" is not related to the ground with the relation of contact or conjunction: Absence of pot is not like a pot. It is not an entity in the ordinary sense of the term in which a pot is an entity. So an absence of pot has a relation with the ground which cannot be expressed by conjunction or contact but as to be expressed by another kind of relation which is named by the Nyāya logicians as svārūpa relation. So when the svārūpa relation is negated you will get a non-svārūpa relation, but you can never get what is called a conjunction. Thus even in the case of utyantābhāva, as in the case of anyonyābhāva the law of double negation does not work and the law of excluded middle falls to the ground.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CLASSIFICATION:

Some Naiyāyikas classify non-existence into the above four kinds, whereas others recognise only two, anyonyā-bhāva (mutual non-existence or difference) and sanīsargābhāva. They hold that pratībhāva (previous non-existence), dvvainābhāva (non-existence or destruction) and utyantābhāva (or absolute non-existence), are but three different forms of the second kind, sanīsargābhāva. The fundamental divisions of the two-fold classification is the relation of the absent object to its locus. When we say A is different from B, we mean that A is not identical with B. This shows that in the case of anyonyā-bhāva the judgment of non-existence is a negative answer to the
question whether A exists as identical with B. But in the case of sanīsargabhāva we have a judgment, which gives a negative reply to the question whether a certain thing exists in another thing in the relation of association (sanīsarga). In brief, the question involved in the former is, “Does A exist as B?” or “Is A B?” and that in the latter is, “Does A exist in B?” As prāgabhāva, dhnairisābhāva and atyantābhāva involve the second question, they can be brought within one class-sanīsargabhāva.

We may notice another point in this connection. If a jar is temporarily removed from its locus, the ground, what should we call such non-existence of the jar on the ground? That can not be brought under any of the four kinds of non-existence admitted by the Advaitins can be easily seen. Yet we do not find this question discussed by them. Some Naiyāyikas, who admit the fourfold classification, have however noticed this problem and tried to solve it. According to them the temporary absence of a thing from a locus is also to be considered as a form of atyantābhāva. The objection naturally arises as to how this can be so, when atyantābhāva has been defined as an inseparable or perpetual absence of a thing from a locus. To this it is replied that the absence of the jar from the ground does persist even when the jar is brought into contact with the ground, though the absence is not perceived at that time. This explanation does not appear to be at all satisfactory. The only way in which it can be interpreted, so as to make it appear some what plausible, is to say that
the jar never exists on the ground in the relation of sanātana, inherence (just as, it does in its own parts), and such absence exists even when the jar is placed on the ground, which involves the relation of sanāyoga or mere conjunction. Hence there is atyanābhava or perpetual non-existence of the jar on the ground. But this defence is not of much avail. For it may be asked; If the relation meant be inherence, why should the supporters of this view say that absence of the jar from the ground is not perceived while the jar is there? Surely the existence of the thing in the relation of conjunction with its locus can not prevent the knowledge of its non-existence there in some other relation. The unsatisfactoriness of this view, therefore, leads another school of thinkers\(^\text{28}\) to hold that temporary non-existence, as illustrated above, has to be classed apart to constitute a fourth kind of sanāstarga bhava in addition to the three already mentioned.

The Buddhist also criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention regarding anyonyābhava. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika points out that if the negation of mutual identity (anyonyābhava) is not accepted, there will be no differentiation of one object from another, and all objects, which are mutually differentiated by the negation of identity, will get coalesced. The Buddhist asks: "If positive objects are differentiated from other positive objects by non-existence called the negation of mutual identity, how are the positive objects to be differentiated from the anyonyābhava and other kinds of non-existence? If different kinds of
non-existence become differentiated by themselves from one another and from positive objects, what is the fault of the positive objects that they are not held to be differentiated by themselves, and require non-existence called 'the negation of mutual identity' to differentiated one from the other? On the contrary, it may be said that all kinds of non-existence, being of identical nature, are themselves differentiated by positive things, i.e: by their counterrealities (pratīyogin) which are differentiated by themselves. Therefore the differentiation of different kinds of non-existence should be said to be dependent on positive objects and not vice-versa". Here the Buddhist is asked: "If he does not accept the reality of non-existence what would be the object denoted by the negative prefix man? The Buddhist answers: "We do not assume realities in accordance with mere word expressions". And further: "we the Buddhists, are known all over the world as deft in assuming that meanings of words are mere mental constructions. The Buddhist also endorses the view of the Prābhākara School viz the apprehension of the non-existence of a jar (as accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika) is merely the fact that the jar is not apprehended when the ground is apprehended as devoid of the jar".

Jayanta, in the course of his answer to the Buddhist, first establishes the reality of non-existence. There are two kinds of cognitions experienced by everybody viz., 'there is a jar here' and there is no jar here'. Now whether (according to the Dignāga School) you say that it is a mere mental
construction, or (according to Yogācāra) you call it a modification of the self (consciousness), the cognition is similar in both the cases (of the existence or non-existence of the jar). Either both these cognitions are valid or none of them is valid. It is a mere vagary to say that the cognition of existence is valid and that of non-existence is invalid". Jayantha, then, answers the contention that the non-existence of a jar is nothing except that the jar is not apprehended at the time when the ground is apprehended to be devoid of the jar. He poses a question "what is this vacant condition of the ground which you call devoid of the jar? Is it identical with the ground or different from it? If it be identical then the ground remaining the same, there should be the cognition of the non-existence of the jar even when the jar is actually present there. If it be different from the ground, then out dispute is reduced to mere name. Further, if in the case of one's experience, viz., "there is no jar here; the vacant state of the ground devoid of the jar be taken as its object support (ālāṁbana), it is undisputed that the object-support of the cognition 'here is the ground, because even at the time of a positive cognition' there is a jar here'. The cognition of the ground is admitted as the object support of the cognition 'here'. Now, therefore, what is apprehended at the time of the cognition 'there is no jar here' can not be merely the 'ground' because it is also cognized at the time of the cognition of the existence of the jar. It is, therefore, necessary that there must be apprehension of something else: and it is immaterial if that something else
is called 'the vacant state of the ground devoid of the jar' or 'the non-existence of the jar'.
REFERENCES

4. Ibid, “Sa eva bhavisyati Pratiti-Visayhi”.
16. Ibid.
17. Maniprabha, p.329: “Adhikarana-nasa eva atyantabhavadhvamsa - Prayojakah”.

176
18. In hare there is absence of horse, in sky there is absence of flower; in air there is absence of figure or colour.


20. It need not be translated as "Always existing".

21. *Introduction to Manikan*, p.XXXII by Dr. S.Sarma.


23. The Excluded Middle is Expressed in the form "p or not-p".

24. This is denial of the law of Excluded Middle.


26. *Bhasa-periccheda* and *Muktavali*.

27. *Siddhantamuktavali on Abhava* (pp.94-8).

28. Ibid., and *Diasakari thereon* (pp.98-99). *Nirmayasagar*.


31. Ibid., line 7.
