CHAPTER III

ANUPALABDHI OR NON-COGNITION IS A DISTINCT SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE: THE VIEWS OF BHATTA MIMAMSA AND ADVAITA-VEDANTA
As it has been already pointed out in the introduction, in Indian Philosophy, *abhāva* is discussed in two forms, viz., as an Ontological reality, as a way of knowing. In other words it is taken to mean either contrast or non-cognition. In the first sense it means a relation of contrast or antithesis between two things as between existence and non-existence. When there is such a relation of contrast or contradiction between two things, then from the existence of the one we may know the non-existence of the other and vice versa. Thus from the non-existence of rain we know the existence of some contact of the clouds with high winds which prevent rainfall. It is on account of the obstruction offered by high winds that raindrops do not fall to the ground, as they otherwise would by the force of gravity. In the preceding chapter, we have seen that according to Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika this passage from non-existence to existence is really perceptual, because it is based on a kind of 'sense' object contact called *samyukta-samavāya* or a relation of inherence in what is conjoined to sense.

i. *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā* and Advaita on *Anupalabdhi*:

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins take *abhāva* to mean the absence of cognition and not the relation of contrast or opposition between two things. In this sense *abhāva* coincides with *anupalabdhi* or non-cognition. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta, *anupalabdhi* is an independent *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge. It is the
unique cause of such presentative knowledge of non-existence as is not due to inference or any other kind of knowledge. Thus the non-existence of a jar on the table which I see before me is known from the absence of its cognition or its non-perception (anupalabdhi). I judge that the jar does not exist on the table because it is not perceived, while I know that it would have been perceived if it existed there. This knowledge of non-existence cannot be explained by inference, since it is not brought about by the knowledge of vyāpti or a universal relation between two terms. It cannot be said that the non-existence of the jar is inferred from its non-perception which is known to be universally related to non-existence. The knowledge of a universal relation between non-perception and non-existence requires a previous knowledge of non-existence as such, which cannot be given by any inference. Nor can we explain the knowledge of the jar’s non-existence by comparison (upamāna) or testimony, since it is not due to any knowledge of similarity or of words and sentences. Hence to explain the direct knowledge of the jar’s non-existence we have to recognise anupalabdhi or non-perception as a separate and independent source of knowledge. All non-perception, however, does not prove the non-existence of what is not perceived. We cannot perceive such supersensible entities as dharma and adharma, ether and atom. Yet we do not judge them to be non-existent. Non-perception gives us the knowledge of the non-existence of such objects as should have been perceived if they existed. If a thing should
be perceived under certain circumstances, then its non-perception under those circumstances is a proof of its non-existence. It is this appropriate non-perception (yogyānupalabdhi) that is the source of our knowledge of non-existence.

The Bhaṭṭas and the Advaita Vedāntins hold that abhāva is the non-existence of an object in a specific locus and its ascertainment requires an independent means of knowledge called anupalabdhi. The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, maintain that though abhāva has no objective reality, it is capable of being cognised through perception. The Buddhists believe that reality consists of existence only and negation as a way of knowing is already included in inference.

The Sāṁkhya view is identical with that of the Prābhākaras. They maintain that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is nothing but the ground that is devoid of any content. And the bare ground is nothing but the ground itself. Thus, the cognition of the non-existence of the jar on the ground is the cognition of the ground. Therefore, the Sāṁkhyaṇa conclude that the non-existence of the jar on the ground can be cognised through perception. Mere non-perception cannot prove non-existence, since it may be due to other causes, such as excessive distance or proximity, disturbance of sense organs, absent-mindedness, etc. The Yoga also does not accept negation.
(anupalabdhi) as a distinct means on the same grounds on which the Sāṅkhyaṇs reject it.

In the earlier works of the Mīmāṃsā school the problem of abhāva has not been adequately discussed. Jaimini simply refers to two types of logical negation, namely, paryudāśa and prasajyapratisēdu. Thus, it is Śabara who has touched the epistemological aspect of the problem for the first time. Kumārila analysis the metaphysical as well as the epistemological aspects and is largely responsible for formulating the theory of negation (anupalabdhi) as a distinct way of knowing.

The basis of Kumārila's theory is that in the case of an object where other means of knowledge do not function towards the comprehension of its existence, we have negation as the only means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-existence of an object depends upon the validity of negation as a way of knowing. On this basic thesis of Kumārila, the Bhāṭṭas have built up a comprehensive theory of negation which though vigorously refuted by the Naiyāyikas, made a tremendous impact in the field of learning. The Bhāṭṭas believe that every object has two forms - one of existence and the other of non-existence. When a pot has existence in a room, it can be cognised by means of perception or by some other means of knowledge. When no such means yield any knowledge of the object, the object is judged by the very absence of knowledge anupalabdhi. The Bhāṭṭas maintain that non-existence is
not identical with its locus but is something additional to it. according to them existence and non-existence are two different aspects of a thing and one is not reducible to other. The ground has two equally real aspects, viz., its own existence and the non-existence of other things on it.

The statement of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the Śloka vārtika or that of Pārhasārathi Miśra in Sāstradīpika to the effect that every thing has two forms, one of existence and the other of non-existence, appears to be similar to the view of the Prābhākara stated above, namely that non-existence is nothing but existence of something else, and that the non-existence of the jar is nothing but an aspect of its locus, the ground. A critical study of the texts of the two schools reveals, however, the real distinction underlying this superficial similarity: and it may be summed up like this:- In saying that existence and non-existence are but two aspects of the same thing, the Prābhākara desire to show that the non-existence aspect of a thing cannot be divorced nor abstracted from its existence aspect, but that, on the contrary, the former is reducible ultimately to the latter, which is, therefore, the basic and the only real aspect. The non-existence of a pot is thus nothing but the existence of its bare locus, the ground. But the Bhaṭṭas assert that existence and non-existence are the two different aspects of a thing, and as such the one is not reducible to the other; that the two serve two different purposes and possess two different meanings. Non-existence therefore is something different from existence. The ground has
two equally real and fundamental aspects – its own existence and the non-existence in it of all other things except it; and these two are mutually irreducible. The Advaitins, as the *Vivarana-Pramāṇya-Saṅgṛaha* states follow the Bhāṭṭas in these empirical matters, and we do not find any independent elaborate discussion of this point in their works. Let us see how the Bhāṭṭas and, after them, the Advaitins establish their theory by refuting the other two views stated above.

Kumārila Bhāṭṭa holds an objective view of negation. We frequently have such negative judgments as ‘the souls does not have a shape’, ‘there is no pot on the ground’ etc., and they are found to be valid. This is a sufficient ground for the reality of negation. If there were no negative facts corresponding to our valid negative judgments, the latter would always be false. The falsity of a judgment implies the truth of its contradictory. If negative facts are not recognised, the contradictories of ‘there is no milk in curds’, ‘a cow is not a horse’, ‘the soul has no form’ etc., viz. ‘there is milk in the curds’, ‘a cow is a horse’, ‘the soul has form’ and so on would be true. To avoid such an absurdity we are forced to recognise negative facts. Our discrimination between cause and effect and the differences among things are grounded on the reality of negation. There are four varieties of negation. If negation were unreal it could not have varieties. A sky-flower which is an unreal thing can have no varieties.
The knowledge of a negative fact arises in the form of a negative judgment. When there is no jar before me, I judge that 'there is no jar'. This judgment is as primary as the judgment that I make when there is a jar before me. Affirmative and negative judgments are equally primary, psychologically as well as logically. I am not conscious of any other judgment from which the negative judgment 'there is no jar' is derived, nor does this judgment stand in need of premises from which it can follow as a conclusion. A thing has a double form, one positive and the other negative. A jar is a jar because it is a jar, and because it is not a cloth or some other thing. It is positive in its own form and negative in the form of other things. Both the positive and the negative forms of it constitute its being and hence they are equally fundamental. Therefore, both the affirmative and negative judgments, which represent the positive and negative aspects of a thing respectively, are equally fundamental. Though a thing possesses a positive as well as a negative form, yet sometimes it reveals one form to our consciousness and sometimes the other. Sometimes we judge that a particular thing is blue and sometimes that it is not green. What determines our judgement is largely out of interest at the moment. The moment when we are interested in the positive aspect of a thing that aspect is revealed to us and the negative aspect in which we are not interested remains concealed. Some people hold that a negative judgment presupposes an affirmative one, while an affirmative judgment does not
presuppose a negative one. When, for instance, we judge that a thing is not blue our judgment implicitly refers to the affirmative judgment that the thing is green, but when we judge that the thing is green there is no implicit reference to its not being blue. On this ground it is concluded that affirmative judgments are primary and negative ones derivative. It is also said that the positive form of a thing constitutes its being and the negative form is super-imposed on it by thought. But this is wrong. When we say 'this is the same thing', it is implied that it is not some other thing. And when we say 'it is not that thing', it is implied that 'it is something else'. Position and negation are thus complementary to each other. If we describe a thing in terms of what it is our description would not be complete until we describe it in terms of what it is not. Thus the function of the word 'not' is obviously very important and it cannot be eliminated.

Now what is the pramāṇa involved in our knowledge of negative facts? The pramāṇa according to Kumārila is non-apprehension and it is a distinct means of cognition. The source of our negative judgments is neither perception nor syllogistic inference. Perception, inference etc. are the means of knowing the positive aspect of things. In perception the object is some positive entity. The sense-organs and manas act in some positive way and there is a corresponding modal change in the soul. But when the object concerned is negative, e.g. the absence of a jar on the ground, there is no sense-
activity and no corresponding modification of the soul. Whatever sense-
activity or modification of the soul there may be it pertains not to the absent
object but to the object that is present instead of the former. Absence of
knowledge is thus the means of the knowledge of absence. In knowledge there
is a subjective activity corresponding to some objective fact. When the
objective fact is positive, the corresponding subjective activity also is positive,
and it takes the form of a positive pramāṇa, e.g. perception, inference etc.
When the objective fact is negative, the corresponding subjective activity in a
similar way should be negative. The means of knowing negative facts cannot
be perception or inference, which are positive means. In perception there is a
contact of a sense-organ with an appropriate object. Contact is possible only
between two existing things. The eye of the perceiver, and the jar on the
ground both are existing things and from the eye-jar contact the perception of
the jar arises. But when the jar does not exist on the ground, how can there be
any sense-contact? Hence the knowledge of the absence of the jar cannot be
perceptual. There is no doubt that we make the judgment ‘there is no jar on the
ground’ validity with our eyes open and fixed on the ground where the jar
would be expected. But here the eye-functioning pertains to the ground which
is a positive entity. There can be no pure negation. Negation is always of
some positive entity in some positive locus. So far as the positive locus of the
jar is concerned, the cognition is perceptual and so far as the counter-correlate
of negation, viz. the jar, is concerned the knowledge is memory, but the
negation itself is known neither through perception nor through memory but
purely through the manas.10

Here we should guard against some possible misinterpretations of
Kumārīla’s view. It is obvious that the words ‘purely through the manas’
cannot mean that the negative judgment is an ideal of intellectual construction,
since, otherwise, negation would be deprived of its objective character. The
possibility of interpreting the words as meaning that negation is mentally
perceived also is ruled out, since only the soul and its qualities such as
pleasure, pain etc. are the objects of mental perception. Mental perception is
what is generally called introspection. But negation which is supposed to be an
objective fact cannot be an object of introspection. The negation of the jar on
the ground is a fact belonging to the outside world. How can it be known
through introspection? Moreover, when Kumārīla says that non-apprehension
is different from perception, it is clear that it is different from introspection
also which is a form of perception. Hence the remark made by Dr. P.T.Raju,
viz. “The Mīmāṃsakas, for example, Kumārīla, hold that it (negation) is not
perceived by our senses but by our mind, though it is real. It is an object of
Mānasapratyakṣa, not of Indriya-Pratyakṣa”11, is totally misleading.

The absence of sense-functioning in the cognition of negation is proved
by the following example. A man goes out in the morning. In the evening
somebody asks him if Caitra was in his house in the morning, and he answers that Caitra was not there. Now there is no sense-functioning in this case. And hence it cannot be a case of perception but is a case of non-apprehension. Sucaritamisra points out that it is not a case of memory even. It cannot be a case of the memory of an earlier perception. In the morning when the man was in his house, the idea of Caitra did not occur to him and so he could not be conscious of the absence of Caitra at that time. he becomes conscious of Caitra's absence in the evening only. So it cannot be said that he perceived Caitra's absence in the morning and remembers it in the evening.

The cognition of negation is not a result of syllogistic reasoning even, since, unlike the latter, it arises immediately without being preceded by the cognition of a middle term and the memory of a vyāpti. The belief in the absence of a jar on the ground does not seem to derive its strength from any other belief. In the syllogistic process there must be some middle term. What can in the present case serve as the middle term? Not the jar, since it is not present at the time. The cognition of the absence of the jar arises when its presence is not cognised. But if the jar itself be present to serve as the middle term there can be no cognition of its absence. The ground too, which is perceived, cannot serve as the middle term, since it is not invariably related to the absence of the jar. The present locus of the absence of something is at times found to be associated with the presence of that thing. Moreover.
sometimes we cognise the absence of a thing in a place where we never previously cognised it. let, for argument's sake; it be admitted that a vyāpti between a locus and absence is possible. Now a vyāpti between two terms requires a frequent past experience of the terms related, which must be independent of the knowledge of the vyāpti. This shows that our first experience of absence cannot be derived through syllogistic reasoning. It may be said that the non-perception of the jar can serve as the middle term: 'the jar is absent, because it is not perceived'. But here, it may be asked, what exactly is the middle term? Is it absence of perception in general or the absence of the perception of the jar in particular? It cannot be the former, since absence of any perception is not concomitant with absence of the jar. It cannot be the latter for the following reasons. The middle term should be the property of the minor term. But if the ground be the minor term, non-perception cannot be related to it, since it is actually perceived. Let, then, the jar itself be the minor term to which non-perception is related. But the jar is not the probandum i.e. the object to be known through inference. The probandum is always, the minor term qualified by the major, so that in the present case it would be the existing jar qualified by some property, while the jar is actually non-existent. The non-perception is related to the non-existence of the jar, but the latter cannot be the minor term, because it is not known, and if it is already known then the inferential process becomes superfluous. The non-perception of the
jar cannot be the middle term for the following reason too. A thing which is unknown cannot serve as the middle term. So the non-perception of the jar must be known before it can serve as the middle term. But, since, it too is of the nature of negation and negation, by hypothesis, is known through non-perception as the middle term, so we need another non-perception to know it. The process, however, involves the fallacy of infinite regress. And hence the cognition of negation cannot be syllogistic. Non-perception immediately results in the cognition of negation without the intervention of any other cognition. Therefore, the former is the pramāṇa or means of the latter and is different from perception and syllogistic inference. Non-perception has some affinity with perception in two respects, viz. that it is immediate like the latter and that it gives the knowledge of non-existence without itself being known just as sense-activity gives the knowledge of existence without itself being known.

It is not also reasonable to accept the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view which, while granting that non-existing is different from its locus, lays down that it can be perceived as adjectival to the locus. Since it cannot be understood how non-existence can be related either with its locus or with sense. The Bhāṭṭas point out that, although the non-existence of a jar and the ground seem to be a simultaneously cognised by the senses, the former can not be a sense-object, because “firstly, it is devoid of colour (rūpa) which is a necessary condition of
visual perception, and secondly, it can have no contact with the sense 13. As for contact in the form of viśeṣa-bhāva, it is not all a form of contact, because “contact is possible only through one of the two kinds of relations, viz., (i) Connection (sāṁyoga) and (ii) Inherence (samatīya), or one of their combinations, such as connected inherence (sāmaryukta samatīya), etc. More over, an object that becomes an attribute of some other object is related to the latter either by connection as in the instance, ‘a man with a stick’. Or by inherence as in the instance, ‘the whiteness of cloth’, non-existence, being a non-substance, can have no relation with the ground in the form of connection (sāṁyoga), and being different from qualities, etc : it also can not have the relation of inherence (samatīya) with the ground”. Kesāva Miśra quotes the argument of the Mīmaṁsaka to show that viśeṣa-bhāva or rather “the viśeṣa-viśeṣya-bhāva, i.e., the so-collected relation of attribute and substantive is not a relation at all, because it is devoid of the characteristics of a relation. A relation is (i) different from the objects related, (ii) it resides in both the related objects, and (iii) it is one” 14. The relation of attribute and substantive is (i) not an entity different from them, because the relation of the substantive is identical with the substantive, and the relation of attribute, with the attribute. (ii) it does not reside in both the related objects, because ‘substantive-ness’ (viśeṣya-bhāva) resides only in the substantive, and ‘attributeness’ (viśeṣa-bhāva) resides only in the attribute, and further, (iv)
the so called relation is not one entity: it is two, substantiveness and attribute-
ness put together. Thus the very basis of perception i.e., the sense-object-
contact (indriyāṇthasannikāraṇa) is absent in the present case.

According to Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsā an object other than a positive one
signifies here the negation of a jar. The judgment that there is no jar here is not
perceptual since it does not owe its existence to the sense-object contact.
Sense-object-contact admits of two kinds, viz. conjunction and inherence.
These two are fundamental types. There are other varieties of sense-object-
contact. They arise from the combination of these two contacts such as
conjunction-cum-inherence etc. Such a contact is not possible here. The state
of being an adjective to an object, conjoined to a sense-organ, does not
constitute the sense-object-contact in this particular case. The negation of a jar
does not qualify the ground. What qualifies another object must be either in
conjunction with it or inhere in it. A stick which is conjoined to a person
qualifies him (a person possessed of a stick). The colour 'white' which inheres
in an object qualifies it. This is the nature of an adjective which we learn from
experience. The negation of an object is not conjoined to an object, its
container, since it is neither a quality nor an action nor a universal.

Even if it is taken for granted that the negation of a jar is visualised
because of the sense-object-contact in the shape of conjunction cum the
relation of the qualifying to the qualified then it would also be admitted that

107
one visualises taste etc., belonging to an object to which his eyes are conjoined. The Naiyāyikas may meet this objection with the remark that taste is not visualised since it is not capable of being visualised. But this very answer goes against the perception of negation since it is imperceptible. Moreover, if the perceptibility of an object or its imperceptibility determines its perception or non-perception then why should the sense-object-contact with its six-fold division be assumed as one of the conditions of perception? The capability of being perceived should alone determine perception. Therefore, the awareness of the negation of a jar is not visual. The Naiyāyikas put forward a cogent argument in support of their thesis. They say “When we attentively direct our eyes to a ground we perceive both the ground and the negation of a jar. But when we shut up our eyes we behold none of them. If both these pieces of awareness are alike dependent upon our eyes then how can we say that we perceive the ground but not the negation of a jar? How can the proposed difference in the knowledge of negation be accounted for? The Mīmāṃsakas boldly meet this objection and emphatically say, “Oh, yes there exists a difference between the perception of a ground and the awareness of negation. The negation of an object is not perceived because no sense-organ has contact with it.”

If the eyes do not come in contact with the perceptible object then the perception of the object does not arise. Though the eyes make contribution
towards the growth of the awareness of negation yet this contribution being indirect the awareness of negation is due to some other factors. As we have knowledge of heat at the sight of the brilliant colour of blazing fire encircled by the voluminous flames at a distance so we are aware of negation seeing the ground. In the above instance we infer heat on the strength of the perception of colour. Our eyes are not the unconditional antecedent to the knowledge of heat. Similarly, eyes are not the indispensable condition of the awareness of the negation of a jar which is not invariably connected with the visual perception of the ground.

It has been stated in Kumārīśa's Ślokavārtika that the knower at the outset perceives the locus of negation. Then he recollects the object negated. Afterwards his inner organ in co-operation with the non-perception of the perceptible object produces the knowledge of negation without receiving direct help from the outer perceptual sense-organs. (Thus, the awareness of negation is never perceptual since it does not directly owe its existence to the sense-stimulus).

For the reason stated above, we have, sometimes, the knowledge of the negation of an object - the negation which lies outside the range of our sense-organs. Let us cite an example. A man who has thoroughly seen all the objects of Gauramulaka, a village, has gone out of the village to a distant place. There he has been asked by a person whether Gārga lives at Gauramulaka or
not. Now he who thoroughly knows Gauramulaka recollects for sometime and
knowledge dawns in his mind that Gārga is not present at Gauramulaka which
lies outside the range of his sense-organs. Sense-organs play no part to
produce this negative judgment. Hence, the awareness of negation is not
perceptual. The negation of Gārga, just cited above, is not an inference.
Neither the locus of negation, i.e., the particular space in Gauramulaka nor the
non-perception of the object negated is the required hētu necessary for an
inference. The ground in question cannot be the hētu since a man who is
innocent of the invariable relation obtaining between the ground and the
negation of an object is aware of such negation on the ground. Moreover, the
ground in question contains both an object and its negation and it cannot be an
invariable concomitant of the negation of an object alone. Moreover, a reliable
hētu rests upon the subject of inference without an exception. The subject of
inference is, here, the ground. The ground is also the hētu. The ground cannot
rest upon itself. Hence, if the ground is the hētu, then it does not belong to the
subject of inference. Negations of objects belonging to the ground in question
are innumerable. Moreover, the negation of an object does not belong to a
particular ground. The number of its locii is countless. Hence it is absurd to
discover that the relation of invariable concomitance holds between the ground
in question and the negation of a particular object.
The non-perception of an object negated cannot play the part of a hētu which leads to the inferential knowledge of the negation of the object since it does not belong to the object of inference. The non-perception of a jar may somehow belong to a jar but does not belong to the ground which contains the negation of a jar. It may be urged that as non-perception of a jar contributes its quota towards the appearance of the awareness of the negation of a jar so it belongs to the ground. Such an argument involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. The fallacy may be thus illustrated. If the non-perception of a jar belongs to the ground, the subject of inference, the hētu, i.e., the non-perception in question, becomes strong enough to produce the required inferential knowledge of the sādhyā in question. Again, if the inferential knowledge of the sādhyā correctly arises from the premises then the hētu is known to belong truly to the subject of inference. Thus, these two propositions pre-suppose each other. Hence, it is impossible to establish that non-perception belongs to the locus of negation. The upholder of the view that the non-perception of an object is the hētu may argue that if the sādhyā is inferred even by means of the defective hētu then it is of no use to know it as belonging to the subject of inference. Moreover, if the hētu in the shape of the non-perception is not discovered as an invariable concomitant of the sādhyā in question then how can it help to infer the negation of the object in question? The discovery of invariable concomitance depends upon the previous
knowledge of both the ṛehū and the sādhya as it has been found in the case of
smoke and fire. Now, if you stick to the above argument then it will be open to
a serious charge since you do not show what sort of knowledge you have of the
sādhya in the shape of the negation of an object when the relation of
concomitance obtaining between the sādhya and the probans is discovered. If
you hold that the sādhya is inferred even at that time then it is a clear instance
of mutual dependence. On the other hand, if it is held that the knowledge of
the negation of an object is due to another distinct act of inference then this
line of argument will be vitiated by the fallacy of a regressus ad infinitum. The
ṛehū, viz., non-perception is itself a negative fact. We must have recourse to
the same process of thought in order to know it. (To infer a negative fact we
require a ṛehū which is also a negative fact. The ṛehū, being a negative fact, is
to be inferred. Another negative ṛehū is thus necessary. It also cannot but be
inferred by means of some other negative fact which is a ṛehū, and so on ad
infinitum. Thus, the fallacy of a regressus ad infinitum cannot be avoided.)
Hence, we cannot count upon an inference as revealing negation. After taking
a few baffled steps we will admit that a competent distinct pramāṇa produces
the knowledge of negation and that negation is not an inference. It is not
proper for us even to entertain a hypothesis that the negative judgment that
there is no jar on this ground is due to either verbal testimony or comparison or
presumption. Therefore, it stands to reason that the knowledge of a negative
fact is due to a pramāṇa which is itself negative in its character since all the positive pramāṇas exclusively throw light on the positive objects.

A pramāṇa and an object which is known by it should be alike in their character (similiasimilibus etc.). A pramāṇa which is negative in its character cannot reveal a positive object. Similarly, a negative fact cannot be established by a pramāṇa which is positive in its character. A pramāṇa which throws light only on a negative fact cannot be gainsaid. Therefore, a pramāṇa which is negative in its character should be admitted in order to enlighten a negative fact.

On no grounds, therefore, can it be maintained that non-existence is perceptible through sense. But can it be said, then, that it is inferred? No, because a thing can be inferred from the knowledge of some hēnu that is invariably related with it, and when the nature of the thing itself is unascertained, as is the case with non-existence, how can the relation of something else with it be ascertained? Let us explain this remark more fully. The attempt to derive the knowledge of non-existence from inference will take some such plausible form as "The jar does not exist on the ground because it is not perceived there. What is not perceived in a place does not exist there." The major premise of this inference implies a universal relation between non-perception and non-existence. But this presupposes the knowledge of non-existence; and the
question would be raised, how is that non-existence again known? As a consequence of this, either a regressus ad infinitum or a petito principii would follow.

But if non-existence is known through neither perception nor inference, and the knowledge of it through any other means generally known is inconceivable, how do we at all speak of non-existence? How is it then known? It is known, conclude the Advaitins and the Bhāṭṭas, through a unique means of knowledge (pramāṇa) called non-cognition (anupalabdhi), or rather appropriate non-cognition (yagvanupalabdhi).

To understand more fully and clearly the conception of this method of non-cognition, it is necessary for us to refer to the account given by the Bhāṭṭas whom the Advaitins, as already said, mostly follow in this matter. Śabarasvāmin (the author of the Jaimini-Sūtra-Bhāṣya) says that the absence of other means of knowledge is itself a means of the knowledge of non-existence of things not presented to any sense. This meaning is more clearly expressed by Kumārīla Bhāṭṭa, who says that if a thing be such that while it exists, its existence is revealed through any of the five means of knowledge, and if still there is no knowledge of the thing, then this non-cognition (anupalabdhi) of the thing is evidence (pramāṇa) for the non-existence (abhāva) of the thing. Pārthasārathi Miśra further explains this view in the following way:- Every object has double aspects, namely existence and non-existence. When an
object like a jar has existence in some place at some time, it is judged through perception or some other means of knowledge to be existing then and there. But when no such means yields any knowledge of the object, though it is capable of being known under those conditions, the object is judged, through that very absence of knowledge, to be non-existent in that place at that time. 

Advaitins (like the authors of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa*, *Sikhōdwa*, *Maniprabha*, etc.) define *anupalabdhi* more precisely and formally in order to obviate possible objections. The *pramāṇa* of *anupalabdhi*, says the author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa*, is the specific cause of such immediate knowledge of non-existence as has not been produced by any of the known means of knowledge such as perception, inference, etc. The chief points sought to be brought out in this definition are the following - (1) Knowledge derived through *anupalabdhi* has for its object non-existence of something; (2) it is immediate and presentative, so that it does not include the memory of past non-existence; (3) it is not produced by any of the ordinary positive means of knowledge, so that inferential knowledge, of non-existence also is to be excluded from it. knowledge of this specified character is then to be regarded as a product of the specific method, i.e. *anupalabdhi* or non-cognition.

But the question may be asked. “Does non-cognition of a thing always lead to the knowledge of its non-existence? If not, when does it do so?” That non-cognition does not always cause the knowledge of non-existence can be
easily seen from the fact that we do not judge the non-existence of a visible thing, say a chair, in a dark room, simply because we do not then have any visual knowledge of it. It is, therefore, necessary to answer the question as to when non-cognition can yield the judgment of non-existence.

The author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa* replies that only an appropriate non-cognition can lead to the knowledge of non-existence. But how is this appropriateness to be ascertained? It may appear at first sight that an appropriate non-cognition is the non-cognition of a perceptible object. This world, of course, holds good of cases like the non-cognition of the pot on the ground: the absent object, the pot is perceptible if present; and hence non-perception of it yields the knowledge of its non-existence. But it does not apply to the case of a judgment of non-existence like “There is the difference from a spirit in this pillar” (i.e. This pillar is not a spirit), or “There is the difference from ether in earth,” (i.e. earth is not ether) which can be legitimately formed on the visual perception of the locus — the pillar or the earth — though in such a case the absent object (the spirit or the ether) cannot be said to be appropriate because it is not by itself perceptible. These exceptions might tempt one to maintain that the appropriateness of a non-cognition depends really on the appropriateness of the locus (*adhisthāna*) of absence and not on that of the absent object (*abhāva-pratyayi*). This will of course hold good in the above cases because there the loci, the pillar, the earth,
etc. are all perceptible. But exception to this view also can be taken. For if it were true, the non-existence of virtue and vice (dharma and adharma) in the self (ātman) would be known through non-cognition, because the self is perceptible and therefore an appropriate locus. But the non-existence of virtue or vice can never be so known; it is known through inference. Hence it is easily seen that the appropriateness of a non-cognition cannot be ascertained either from the appropriateness of the object that is absent, or the appropriateness of the locus of absence.

The appropriateness (yagyata) of a particular non-cognition can, however, be tested, says the Vedānta-Paribhāṣa, by ascertaining whether the object not known would have been known, had it been present there, under those very circumstance. To take a concrete instance, the absence of the visual knowledge of a jar on the ground in the broad daylight is an appropriate non-cognition, and can therefore lead to the judgment of the absence of the jar, because we can argue, "Had there been a jar under these circumstances, it would have been seen." But the non-perception of a jar in the dark room is not an appropriate non-cognition (and we cannot, therefore, judge that the jar does not exist) because we cannot feel sure that if the jar had been there it would have been seen. Again, though a spirit (or ether) is not perceptible by itself, we can yet argue that if there were a spirit (or ether) as identical with a pillar (or earth), it would have been perceived. Hence the non-existence of the spirit (or
ether) as a pillar (or earth) can be said to be known through anupalabdhi. But we cannot similarly argue, had there been dharma in the self it would have been perceived. Hence the absence of dharma in the self cannot be known through anupalabdhi.

Madhusudhana Sarasvati in his Advaita-Siddhi states a similar definition of appropriateness (vagya) though in different words: "The non-existence of that thing in a certain place is appropriate, the existence of which in that place is opposed to (not compatible with) its non-perception."21

The Manipurabha, a gloss on the Sikhāmaṇi (a commentary of the Vedānta-Paribhāṣa), defines the Advaita view more explicitly, including in one long sentence all the conditions and qualifications.24 It is impossible literally to translate this complicated definition into one sentence in English; but the sense of it can be expressed as follows: If a particular sense does not yield the knowledge of an object as possessing particular characteristics and as existing in a particular locus, being related to it in a particular way, and if that object be such that it is perceived, if existing, under those circumstances, then that absence of knowledge is a means to the knowledge that the object as possessing those characteristics does not exist in that locus in that relation.

The object of mentioning these various conditions will be clear from some concrete instances. If a jar, while perceived from a distance through the visual sense, is not perceived through touch, we cannot, from the absence of

118
the tactual knowledge, judge its non-existence; because it is not capable of being perceived through that sense (i.e. touch) under those circumstances. Again, if a jar is not perceived as existing on the ground, in the relation of identity with it, it cannot be judged that the jar does not exist on the ground in the relation of conjunction also. If, again, a black jar is not perceived on the ground, it cannot be judged that a red jar also does not exist there, and so forth.

It is needless to note here that the qualification mentioned by the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa*, namely "If the object existed it would have been perceived under those circumstances as such," would, if fully understood, be quite sufficient to remove the various discrepancies sought to be guarded against by the long statement of conditions made by the *Maṇḍūkya*, which only explicates what is implicitly contained in the universe of discourse.

ii. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Refutation of Anupalabdhi as an Independent Pramāṇa:

It is a fact that the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā admitted *abhāva* to be objectively real and distinct. According to Jayanta, one should not search for a distinct *pramāṇa* for its cognition. Since it is revealed by perception and similar other *pramāṇas* already admitted by Nyāya.

A refutation of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view stated above is as follows. It is a truism that a negative fact is admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhaṭṭa school to be objectively real and distinct. One should not search for a distinct
pramāṇa for its cognition since it is revealed by perception and similar other pramāṇas already admitted by Nyāya. When a abhāva rests upon a ground which is within the field of our vision it is seen with our own eyes. But when it lies beyond the range of our sense-organ it is grasped by any other competent pramāṇa. The judgment that there is curd in the pot is a simple one. Similarly, the judgment that there is no jar here is a simple one. In the first case, both the objects, viz., curd and the pot stimulate eyes which produce the first judgment. Similarly, in the second case, the negation of a jar and the ground stimulate eyes which without being passive and functionless produce the second judgment. Now, how can the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the negative judgment is a complicated one? They hold that the one element of it i.e., the ground is visualized whereas the other element of it is grasped by some-other pramāṇa. How can a distinction in the nature of the so-called awareness of the two objects be logically drawn? The judgment that the hill is fiery is a simple one but still it is a judgment by complication. It is a truism that the predicate of this judgment, viz., fire is not perceived and that its knowledge is mediate. If we take the growth of knowledge of fire into consideration then we find that the remembrance of the vyāpti obtaining between smoke and fire and such other thought processes intervene between the perception of smoke and the appearance of the knowledge of fire. But in case of the above negative judgment there is no such delay. No thought process goes between the
perception of the ground and the awareness of the negation of a jar. Like the 
perception of the ground the awareness of the negation of a jar immediately 
and invariably follows the sense-object-contact, i.e., the functioning of the 
sense-organ, viz., the eyes.

The fire on the hill, as stated above, is beyond the range of our vision. But the negation of a perceptible object located upon a near locus is not so. The awareness of negation is causally connected with the senses. Its causal connection is based upon the joint method of agreement and difference. No man can see the above mentioned fire in a hill in spite of the best activities of his eyes. The negative awareness is visual since it is produced when the eyes do not cease to function. Such an awareness closely follows the sense stimulus. The Mīmāṃsakas have pointed out that the colour of a distant fire is seen but its heat is inferred and that the knowledge of heat is not causally connected with the sense-stimulus. They urge that the awareness of negation is not likewise causally connected with the sense-organ. But this analogical argument does not hold good. The conclusion that no eyes are capable of feeling heat has been repeatedly arrived at. Every body knows that the sense of touch grasps only tactile objects. The eyes are capable of revealing colour and the sense of touch can only feel the touch of an object. Thus, in the above case, heat is only inferred since eyes are absolutely incapable of feeling heat.
The conclusion, reached by the Mīmāṁsakas, is one-sided. It is not applicable to the perception of abhāva.

If the awareness of an object which follows the visual perception of its container is not of sensuous origin then it does not follow that every such awareness as follows perception is non-perceptual. If this law had been universal then colour would not have been visualized. A fresh objection arises in our mind, viz, "How can negation which is colourless and has no connection with the eyes be perceived with eyes?" An object is known as visualized when it is an actual object of perception produced by eyes. It is not so because it has colour. No coloured atoms are visualized. Whatever is connected with eyes is not visualized. The sky though connected with eyes is not visualized. Now, if the Naiyāyikas go to the other extreme and hold that an object which is not connected with eyes is also visualized then the very distant and the past objects such as Vibhiṣana and others should have been visualized. The Naiyāyikas now make their position clear. They hold that the law that an object which is not connected with eyes is not visualized is applicable only to the positive objects. Ābhāva though unconnected with eyes may be visualized. The narration of the six-fold division of sense-object-contacts touches only upon the positive objects. Whenever a positive object which is connected with the sense-organ is perceived, the sense-object-contact is one of the six types mentioned in the Nyāya text book. The hypothesis that a sense-organ reveals

122
only an object with which it comes in contact, relates only to the positive objects. But a abhāva, being other than a positive one, is visualized though it does not come in contact with eyes. Such an admission does not interfere with the law of perception mentioned above. Now, if we stick to this conclusion then we smell a scent of possible anomaly that if a abhava which does not come in contact with the sense-organ is perceived then all abhāvas belonging to distant lands should also be perceived since they are also in no way connected with the sense-organ. Such an anomaly does not arise since the awareness of abhāva is determined by the perception of its locus. The locus of abhāva which is within the range of a sense-organ is only perceived. (Jayanta, himself, finds fault with this suggestion. He subscribes to another suggestion which is widely known among the circle of the logicians of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. Or, abhāva which comes in contact with eyes by means of conjunction-cum-the relation of the qualifying to the qualified is visualized. He cites an example to strengthen his case. Those who hold that the relation of inherence is perceived admit that the sense-object-contact is conjunction-cum-the relation of the qualifying to the qualified. This unproved hypothesis is based upon an example which is not admitted by both the contending parties. Naiyāyikas answer that even from the Bhāṭṭa point of view, the relation obtaining between a substance and its attribute cannot but be admitted. The awareness of a substance is not the same as that of an attribute. Therefore a
substance is not identical with its attribute. But neither a substance nor an attribute is perceived if any one of them does not come in contact with the sense-organ. Therefore, some sort of sense-object-contact must be admitted in order to explain the perception of an attribute.

The counter-thesis of the Bhāṭṭas that negation cannot qualify the so-called locus, i.e., the ground, in case of the negation of a jar since it has neither contact with the locus nor inheres in it, is not tenable. We shall prove on the score of experience that there exists a third type of relation which is other than the relation of conjunction and that of inherence and is called the relation of the qualifying to the qualified. The Bhāṭṭas have raised another objection that if the relation of the qualifying to the qualified added to the relation of conjunction were admitted then the perception of taste would have also taken place at the time of the perception of negation by means of this relation. The Nyāya answer to this objection is this that Bhāṭṭas will also have to face the same difficulty since they admit the existence of the complex relation in the shape of conjunction cum inherence in order to perceive the colour of certain objects. The purport of this reply is this that taste and colour co-inhere in an object. If colour comes in contact with our eyes by means of the relation of conjunction cum inherence then taste will also come in contact with the same organ by means of the same relation. Now, the Bhāṭṭas may contend that if such a relation suffers from defects then it should not be admitted and that its
non-admission does not affect our position. Now, the Naiyāyikas subject the contention of their Bhāṭṭas to a severe scrutiny. They urge that if this is the position of the Bhāṭṭas then how do they explain that the eyes perceive colour with which they, the eyes, do not come in contact since colour comes in contact with the eyes only by means of the relation of conjunction cum inherence? The very function of eyes by means of which an object is perceived is called a contact. Or, it may be asserted that the sense-organs are fit to perceive an object and an object is fit to be perceived. Either the function of a sense-organ or the reciprocal fitness explains the perception of an object such as colour, etc. The relation of conjunction cum inherence has no part to play. Now, if this is all what the Bhāṭṭas have got to say then negation should also be perceived since the sense-organ functions or there exists mutual fitness, the prerequisite conditions of perception. If a sense-organ is admitted as an instrument of the perception of an object then it must have contact with the object. But if they refuse to accept the hypothesis that the sense-object-contact is a necessary condition of perception then they blow hot and cold with the same breath.

For the reason stated above, it should be admitted that there are six kinds of fitness and that they correspond to the six-fold sense-object-contact. The mere statement of non-specified fitness will not do. A fit object which is invariably perceived comes in contact with the sense-organ but, on the
contrary, an object which comes in contact with the sense-organ is not necessarily fit for being perceived. If the above hypothesis is accepted then the possibility of visualizing taste or such other qualities is ruled out. Thus taste is never introspected though it comes in contact with the inner organ (manas) since the inner-organ is neither capable of introspecting it nor taste is capable of being introspected.

Even if it is admitted that fitness is the sole condition of perception then it cannot be proved that negation lacks fitness. Now, if the Mīmāṃsakas argue that negation should not have a positive property then the Naiyāyikas meet this argument with the following counter-argument, viz., the Bhāttas also admit that many a positive property belongs to negation. There are only two alternatives open to the Mīmāṃsakas. Either they should hold that negation is absolutely unreal because it defies all characterization or they should accept the Nyāya hypothesis that negation is perceived.

The following verse has been stated by Kumārila Bhāṭa in support of his thesis. This may be explained as follows. The question whether or not such-and-such object existed in the village is put to a person who visited every part of that village. He fails to remember the object which he did not witness. On the strength of this non-remembrance he comes to know that such-and-such object did not exist there at the time of his visit. The inner meaning of this verse is that negation is not a present object and its locus is a remote object.
Both of them are beyond the range of perception. Negation is still cognised. Therefore, the awareness of negation is non-perceptual.

But according to Jayanta thesis does not stand the test of reason. When a person visits the village of Gauramulaka which does not contain some objects he thoroughly perceives it and has also direct knowledge of the negation of those objects not to be found there in a general manner just as a person perceives the absence of light. When a person perceives the absence of light his perception is expressed in a universal negative judgment that there is no light (vyatirēka vyāpti). There is no specification of the absence of all particular lights. When he is asked whether he has seen the absence of such-and-such light he remembers the absence of the particular light. Similarly, the visitor has perceived the negation of Gārga. Now, the person remembers the absence of Gārga. The negation of Gārga cannot be perceived since it is a past object. When he is asked whether Gārga was there (during his visit) he, being truthful, says that Gārga was not there after having remembered what he saw before: Now, a doubt whether Gārga is now there or not lingers in his mind since Gārga may go back to that village from some other place and stay there. Now, an objection is raised that the person did not know that he perceived the negation of all objects. The purport of this objection is that the memory of the object of an act of perception which is not introspected is impossible. The answer to the objection is that the remembrance of the object of perception
which is not introspected is to be admitted here as the relaxation of this law is accepted by all in case of the remembrance of induction in connection with the inference of a familiar object. Thus when he is asked he remembers and gives the reply to all.

Now the Bhaṭṭas may raise an objection is raised that if one perceives all individual abhāvas without knowing that he does so then he should simultaneously remember all of them but not a particular one. This objection according to Jayanta is not sound. He remembers only that particular negation about which a question is asked. In other words, if there is an exciting factor to revive the memory of a particular negation such as a question, etc., then that particular negation is only remembered to the exclusion of the rest since the factors which are required to excite the memory of all particular negations are absent. We shall prove our point by an appeal to facts. All the letters that constitute a word may be simultaneously apprehended. But when the last letter is apprehended all the letters are simultaneously remembered. Therefore, in some cases, all the objects that we simultaneously apprehended are simultaneously remembered. But there are also some other cases which illustrate that the objects which are simultaneously apprehended are successively remembered. Thus, if the objects are perceived without being known that they are so perceived, they are not necessarily recollected simultaneously. Thus, if a person simultaneously perceives a number of
objects having not known that he does so then there is no hard and fast rule that they should be simultaneously remembered.

Moreover, the statement of Kumārila himself that the locus – the village – has been only perceived amounts to this that the negations of all other objects are also perceived along with the locus but this perception is not introspected since the term ‘only’ signifies the negations of objects other than the locus. Kumārila himself subscribes to this view in the following verse.

When we determine a positive object and express our determination in the form that this is so and nothing else such determination necessarily involves a reference to the negation of other objects.

Thus when the village of Gauramulaka with all its positive contents is perceived the negation of absent Gārga is also directly cognised. Hence, the hypothesis that the awareness of negation is indirect should be given up. It should also be admitted that the negation of an object is perceived. The Bhattas have rightly said that the negation of a jar belonging to the field of vision is not inferred. The Naiyāyikas approve of this point. The negation of an object which lies outside the field of vision is also inferred. An instance of the inference of negation is as follows. When in pitch dark night there is continuous and heavy shower of rain and the roots of corns are wet, the absence of the contact of the storm with the raining cloud is inferred. Another example is being cited to bring home on the above point. This example is the
familiar example cited by the Mīmāṃsakas to illustrate presumption arthāpatti. It is as follows. We infer that Caitra is not out because he is in.

The negation of an object is also known on the strength of verbal testimony (śabda). The travellers, having heard the words of trustworthy persons, ascertained that there was no thief, etc. on the way.

The Mīmāṃsakas have also stated that there should be thorough similarity between the means of pramāṇa and the knowable object. They cite an analogous case in support of their hypothesis. They show that a positive object is grasped only by means of a positive means of pramāṇa. Such an argument says Jayanta is not convincing.

The absence of eye-disease is one of the conditions of perception. The absence of the probans on the locus of the negation of the sādhya is one of the concomitant conditions which accompanies the probans to generate inferential knowledge. The absence of defects of a speaker such as absence of negligence, untruthfulness, etc. is the concomitant condition of verbal knowledge to be produced by the testimony of a trustworthy person. Thus, the negative conditions are also included in the totality of conditions that produces positive knowledge. Sometimes, a negative fact constitutes a probans which leads to the inferential knowledge of a positive sādhya. The absence of rainfall leads to the inference of the blowing away of the cloud by the storm (the contact of the cloud with the storm). Thus, it is unreasonable to hold that
abhāva is known only by means of a negative means of pramāṇa. When a semi-divine being, viz., a Yakṣa is worshipped the articles of worship do not change in conformity to the object of worship.

iii. Objections to Anupalabdhi Answered:

The Advaitins and the Bhāṭṭas consider same objections that have been raised against their theory, and it is necessary to mention here the more important of these.

It may be said by the Sāṅkhya and the Naiyāyika that since the Advaitins must admit that there can be the cognition of the absence of a jar on the ground only when there is some sense-activity and never without it they should admit also, for simplicity of explanation (lāghava), that the knowledge of the non-existence, like that of its locus, is derived through sense-perception and not through an additional independent pramāṇa. To this the Advaitins reply that the sense-perception that is invariably present accounts for the perception of the locus and the locus alone. It is inconceivable how sense can come into relation with non-existence, and how the antahkarana can assume the form of a non-existent object. It is impossible to argue, therefore, that because the activity of some sense is invariably present in every case of the cognition of non-existence, such cognition must be derived through sense. On the contrary it is reasonable to argue that as sense-activity is present in the immediate cognition of both existence and non-existence, while the non-
cognition of the absent object is present only in the case of cognition of non-existence, it is this particular factor of non-cognition which is specially responsible for the cognition of non-existence.

The question how non-cognition – a non-existent something – can be the cause of some knowledge should not present any difficulty. Just as an existent cognition can yield the knowledge of an existent something. Similarly the non-existent cognition or non-cognition can yield the knowledge of a non-existent something. Besides, even in the opponent’s view, non-existence has to be credited with causality. For how can non-existence be said to be the object of sense-perception unless it is admitted that this perception is caused by non-existence as its object?

It is not true that the cognition of non-existence is more simply explained by admitting that it is a case of sense-perception. As the factor of non-cognition (of the absent object) has also to be admitted to be the cause of the knowledge of non-existence (it also being invariably present like sense-activity), the supporters of the view of the perceptibility of non-existence are forced to assume two causes of such knowledge, viz. sense-activity and non-cognition. In view of this, therefore, it is found that the credit for simplicity of explanation is on the side of those who make non-cognition alone the specific cause of the knowledge of non-existence, and not on the side of those who have to accept two causes. Of the two factors, invariably present, one, non-
cognition, alone must be accepted as the special cause since a sense cannot be
conceived to grasp non-existence.\textsuperscript{29}

By far the most convincing ground for thinking that non-existence is not
perceived through sense is, however, the following argument of the Bhāṭṭas.\textsuperscript{30}
There are cases of the immediate cognition of non-existence relating to past
times. One can think, for example, at noon that one did not see a tiger in a
particular place in the morning. This knowledge of non-existence cannot be
explained as the memory of past perception (of non-existence) that we had in
the morning, because the knowledge of the non-existence of the tiger requires
at least the recollection of a tiger, and as we may not have thought of a tiger at
all that morning, there could not possibly be any knowledge (perceptual or
non-perceptual) of the absence of a tiger at that time. such a case of the
knowledge of non-existence shows, therefore, the inadequacy of the theory that
non-existence can be perceived through sense. On the other hand, it is very
easily explained if non-cognition be held to be the means of the knowledge of
non-existence. The absence of the memory of a tiger at that place and time is a
form of non-cognition, that is a means to the knowledge of non-existence in
this particular case. The question may be asked here : Is not \textit{anupalabdhi}
defined by Šabaravāmin as absence of a means of a right knowledge
(\textit{pramāṇabhāva}), and is not memory excluded from a \textit{pramāṇa}? How, then,
can absence of memory be regarded as a case of the absence of \textit{pramāṇa}?\textsuperscript{31} In
reply to this the author of the Nyāya-Ratnākara says that though memory is not itself a pramāṇa, i.e. an original source of valid knowledge, it is still the result of a pramāṇa (pramāṇa-phala) and consequently the absence of memory implies the absence of pramāṇa as well.32 According to the Advaita theory, the absence of the tiger can be known through anupalabdhi because even here it can be argued, “Had there been a tiger it would have been perceived.” It is not an ordinary case of memory.

From all these considerations it will be sufficiently clear that the knowledge of non-existence in question cannot be regarded as the result of sense-activity, though this latter may be present in every case of such knowledge. But an Advaitin may still be asked by a Naiyāyika: “In the judgment ‘There is no jar here on the ground,’ you must admit that non-existence of the jar is as much immediately known as the ground. Why should you not, therefore, admit that the non-existence is known also in the same way as the ground, i.e. that when the antahkaraṇa goes out to the ground and sets up a relation between it and the knower, it also thereby establishes a similar relation between the knower and the non-existence that inheres in the ground?33 If the character of the knowledge produced be the criterion for ascertaining the means through which the knowledge is derived, how can you, in the present case, say that the ground is known through one means and the
non-existence through another, not withstanding the fact that the knowledge of both of them possesses the same character of immediacy?

In reply to this question the Advaitins say that though the non-existence of the jar is felt to be as immediate as the ground, and though the antahkaraṇa goes out to the ground, we cannot say that the antahkaraṇa takes the form of the non-existence; because non-existence, though an attribute of the ground, is such that no sense can be conceived to come into contact with it, and consequently antahkaraṇa cannot be thought to be assuming the form of it. In consideration of this difficulty it cannot be believed that the non-existence is known in the same way as the ground. Besides, it is not a universal rule that the character of the resulting knowledge decides the question as to the means through which the knowledge is derived. For even knowledge derived through testimony can acquire the character of immediacy. It is the character of the mental function or process (यत्रि) producing knowledge that really decides the question as to its means or method. In the case under discussion, the mental function in the form of the negative judgment, "There is no jar on the ground," cannot be possibly produced by any sense-activity. Hence non-existence cannot be said to be known through sense-perception, even when the knowledge of it is felt to be of an immediate character.

The Advaitins may be asked to solve still another difficulty. Having admitted that the knowledge of the non-existence of the jar is direct or
immediate, they must also admit that the illusory cognition of the non-existence of the jar must be of an immediate type. But the Advaitins also lay down the general theory that in every case of immediate illusory cognition the object presented is produced by Nescience (māyā). So they must admit that when we wrongly judge that there is no pot on the ground (though really there is a pot there), the wrongly perceived non-existence, is produced by māyā. Then the difficulty arises as to how māyā, which is conceived as a positive entity (bhāva-rūpa), can be the material cause of non-existence. But if the present case be said to be an exception, the Advaitins must give up their fundamental theory, namely that māyā is the material cause of all phenomena.

The Advaitins evade this difficulty by saying they do not admit that in all errors of immediate knowledge the object is produced by māyā. In cases where the wrongly perceived object is really present in a contiguous locus and immediately known, the Advaitins (like the Naiyāyikas) hold that the error is caused not through the fresh production of an illusory object, but through the transference of a really perceived object from its own locus to a locus in which it does not really exist (anyathā-khyāti). In the present case also the jar’s non-existence in some other contiguous locus is simply transferred to the ground. For example, the absence of a jar perceived in the colour of the ground may be immediately known and this absence, instead of being judged to be in its real
locus (e.g. the colour of the ground) is judged to be in another locus, the
ground; hence the error.

But even if it be admitted\(^{17}\) that this illusory non-existence also is
produced by \(māyā\), the difficulty pointed out does not really arise. There is no
such rule that the effect-phenomenon must be in every way like the cause-
phenomenon. A cloth is in some respects unlike the yarn out of which it is
made. If it be insisted that there must at least be some resemblance between
the effect and the cause, it can be pointed out that even between an illusory
non-existence and \(māyā\) there is this point of resemblance, namely that both
are different from Brahman, and therefore false from the transcendental
standpoint.

Turning to the other school of Purva Mīmāṁsā, the Bhāṭṭas we have
experience like there is no pot on the ground. The Bhāṭṭas ask, how is such an
experience to be explained? What is the basis (ālaṇībana) of this experience?
If it be said that the ground is the basis, then even when the pot is present we
should have such an experience, i.e. the ground being there we should be
justified in making the assertion that ‘there is no pot’ even when it is there.
Moreover, we also have experiences like ‘a cow is not a horse’, ‘colour is not
taste’ etc. What is the basis of the cognition that a cow is not a horse? It
cannot be ‘cow’, because a cow is cognised without any reference to the horse
while the cognition ‘a cow is not a horse’ has reference to the ‘horse’. If it be
said that the difference from a horse that exists in the cow is the basis, then, what it may be asked, this difference is? If difference means mutual negation, then negation is implicitly recognised to be real. If difference means a special quality 'separateness', then since a quality can exist in a substance only, the cognition of difference between two qualities like 'colour is not taste' cannot be accounted for. Thus Prābhākara's theory falls when distinction among qualities is cognised, because a quality cannot inhere in another quality.

It may again be asked as to what is the cause of the verbal usage like 'the pot is not on the ground'. The cause according to Prābhākara is the cognition of the bare ground. If it is so, then when there is a cloth on the ground there should not be any such usage, because then the ground is not apprehended as bare ground. If it be said that the apprehension of the ground apart from the pot is the cause, then what is this being 'apart from the pot'? If it is absence of conjunction with the pot, when this is a tacit recognition of the reality of negation. As a matter of fact the cognition of the bare form of the ground arises when there is no cognition of the pot and its non-existence. Thus the apprehension of the bare ground means the apprehension of the ground minus the apprehension of the pot and its non-existence. Therefore, if apprehension of the bare ground is accepted to be the cause of the above usage, then non-apprehension which is implied in the apprehension of bareness has to be accepted.
Prābhākara tries to defend his position by saying that the cause of such usage is the apprehension of a place when the object, viz. the pot, exists in a different place. But if this be so, then the 'cowness' which exists in a black cow must be apprehended as non-existing when a white cow is apprehended, or a pole resting on two pillars must be apprehended as non-existing on one pillar when it exists on the other. Therefore, existence in a different locality cannot be the cause of the said usage. As a matter of fact existence in a different place is known after the non-existence in one place is known.

Finally Prābhākara says that the cause of the usage in question is the perception of the ground while the pot is remembered. But this is not a proper explanation, because we say 'the pot is not there' even when the pot is perceived in the proximity. Even when the pot is brought and kept where it was not we make an assertion about the past non-existence of the pot there.

We shall know turn to what the Bhāṭṭa explanation of the cognition of prabhāva or prior non-existence is. The knowledge of negation arises when there is absence of a positive means of knowledge. And it also arises when a thing is not remembered though it is fit to be remembered. If recollective cognition of a thing does not appear though it could have appeared in case the thing were present, then we know that the thing was absent. Non-recollection is ultimately derived from non-apprehension. Perception is the cause and later recollection is its effect. Similarly non-perception is the cause and non-
recollection its effect. An effect is nothing but the cause in a different guise. So non-recollection is but non-apprehension in a different guise.

Now we come to the Bhāṭṭa explanation of the knowledge of past negation. When the knowledge of the past absence of a pot arises there is no yōgyata in the sense that the relation of the pot to the past time is not fit to be perceived at present. Therefore, it cannot be the result of the present non-apprehension. Nor is there any recollection of the past absence of the pot, because at the time of the absence of the pot the absence was not at all cognised and that which is not cognised cannot be remembered. The knowledge of the past absence really arises by means of the non-recollection of what is fit to be recollected. If the pot which is perceived now were present yesterday also, then it would have surely been perceived by me just as I perceived the place. And if it were perceived it could be remembered now. But I do not remember it, therefore, it was absent yesterday.

Jayanta says that this is a case of memory. In the past the absence was perceived in a general way and now it is remembered in a specific way, i.e. in the past the ground was perceived as devoid of everything other than what was actually present there, and now it is remembered that it was devoid of the pot. But how can there be a specific memory of a general experience? Memory is based on the revival of an impression left by an experience. The impression strictly corresponds to the experience and memory strictly corresponds to the
impression. Therefore, we can remember only a general thing or a specific thing according as the original experience was general or specific. A general experience is vague and undefined. How can it produce a specific and definite memory. It sometimes happens that though the original experience was definite, yet when the impression weakens with the lapse of time the memory becomes indefinite. Thus a definite experience may produce an indefinite memory, but an indefinite experience cannot produce a definite memory.  

Non-apprehension is not the same thing as perception. It is true that the absence of a pot on the ground is seen not by blind persons, nor by one whose eyes are closed. But this fact does not prove that negation is perceived by the eyes. The eyes function only in the cognition of the ground. Moreover, negation is known not merely by non-apprehension but by non-apprehension of a thing fit to be apprehended. A thing is fit to be apprehended when all the conditions, subjective and objective, such as light, eye, etc., which are essential for a normal perception of the thing are present but the thing is absent I keep my eyes open while cognizing the absence of the jar simply to ascertain the fitness of the jar to be perceived. By so doing I fulfil the condition of perceptibility. The opening of the eyes is not related to the cognition of absence but to the expected presence of the jar. Jayanta has said that the different elements of the contents of a unitary cognition should as a rule be apprehended by the same pramāṇa. But this is wrong. In recognition such as
'this is the man whom I saw yesterday' the element 'this' is perceived but the element 'the man whom I saw yesterday' is remembered. It is a unitary cognition, yet it is the combination of a sensory element and a memory element. Thus it is quite reasonable to say that the ground is cognised by perception and the absence of the jar by non-apprehension. Jayanta has again said that the absence of the jar is a qualification and the ground is the qualified object and that it is impossible that the qualified object should be perceived while the qualification is not perceived. This too is wrong. There can be no relation of qualification and qualified unless there be conjunction or inherence or some kind of interaction between two things. Between the absence and the ground there is none of these as the Buddhist has rightly pointed out. So the former cannot be a qualification of the latter. Even if there be the relation of qualification and qualified it is not true to say that in order to perceive the qualified object we should necessarily perceive its qualification. The only truth is that in order to know the qualified object we should necessarily know its qualifications. We cannot make the assertion 'this is Dīthā' meaning this man has the qualification of being name 'Dīthā' unless we know both 'this' and 'Dīthā'. But it is not essential that both should be known by the same pramāṇa, because in the present case we know 'this' by perception and 'Dīthā' by memory. The Naiyāyika says that negation is perceived by the sense-contact named 'samyukta-viśeṣanata'. But inviting a name does not
make an unreal thing real. If it be a real contact, then there is no need of such contacts as 'sāniyukta-sāniavāya' and 'samaṇēta-samaṇavāya' etc. to explain such perceptions as 'the fire is red', 'the sound is loud' etc., because redness is a qualification of the fire and loudness a qualification of sound.

The Buddhist view too is not tenable. The usage 'there is no jar' does not mean that we do not perceive the jar. The absence of the jar is an objective fact. While the absence of perception is a subjective fact. How can an objective fact be identical with a subjective fact? 'There is a jar' is not the same thing as 'I perceive a jar'. Similarly 'there is no jar' is not the same thing as 'I do not perceive a jar'. The absence of a jar cannot be identical with my non-perception, because the jar may be present though I do not perceive it. The Buddhist says that absence is inferred from non-perception and that non-perception is self-luminous, the latter assertion being his device to avoid infinite regress. But it has been proved that no cognition is self-luminous. Even if a cognition be self-luminous, non-perception cannot be self-luminous, because it has no content. The Buddhist holds that the cognition 'this is blue' apprehends its own form, viz. 'blue'. But the cognition 'there is no jar' has no form, since 'no jar', according to the Buddhist, is nothing. How can then it apprehend itself when it has no form. The Buddhist says that non-perception of the jar is the reason of our knowledge of the absence of the jar and at the same time that non-perception is nothing but the perception of the locus, viz.
the ground, and absence of the jar is nothing but the presence of the ground. This would mean that the perception of the ground is the reason of our knowledge of the ground. But in this way we bid good-bye to perception as an independent and the most primary means of knowledge, and inference thus becomes the only genuine means of knowledge. Therefore, the Buddhist view which leads to such an absurd conclusion should be rejected.
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145

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