CHAPTER II

THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA ON THE REALITY OF ABHAVA
AND ITS COGNITION
In Indian Philosophy, abhāva (negation) has been discussed in two forms, viz., as an ontological reality and as a way of knowing. In the first form it is mentioned by such words as asat, alika, nirūpākhyā, nishvabhāva, etc., and in the second form it is referred to as anupalabdhi. A general epistemological notion of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsākas and Advaita-Vedāntins who closely follow the traditions of Bhaṭṭas in respect of the matters of this world, regarding negation is that there is some reality known as abhāva and there is a way of ascertaining it which is known as anupalabdhi. Here we are primarily concerned with the problem of abhāva as a means of knowledge. But its acceptance or non-acceptance as such involves some serious consideration of its ontological presumption as well.

i. Structure of The Vaiṣeṣika System:

It is in metaphysics, particularly in laying the foundations of an ultimate pluralism, that Vaiṣeṣika shows its genius. Kaṇāda’s discovery and formulation of the category of the particular (vīṣeṣa) as the final differentiator of each of the ultimate entities of the manifold world prevents any attempt to reduce the manifold to a monistic unity. And the school got its name from the term vīṣeṣa (particular). There is a tradition, according to which the founder of the school obtained his name ‘Kaṇāda’ from the particulars, which were thought to be ultimate particles (kaṇas). Kaṇa means particle and the root at means “to eat”. So, Kaṇāda means one who eats ultimate particles. The
ancient Sanskritists would call Bertrand Russell and the other Logical Atomists “the eaters of Logical Atoms”. According to another tradition, Kaṇāda was a great ascetic and was living on grain particles (kaṇas) that fell from plants. In addition, he was the foremost exponent of the atomic theory.

The number of categories originally enunciated by Kaṇāda are six. He says that by understanding the similarities and dissimilarities of substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), activity (karma), universal (samānyā), particular (vīṣeṣa), and inherence (samavāya), one obtains the Superme Good. Praśataपāda explains that such understanding enables man to seek the good and avoid the evil. These six categories are called the meanings of words (padārthas), but what is meant by a word need not be a thing (vastu) in the ordinary sense. Nor do they cover the meanings of all words, which are many. They are the main categorial meanings or the categories of reality. That is, they are the central nameables or thinkables in terms of which we think of the objects of the world. They are the key concepts of intelligibility. Yet, they are not the categories of Existence or Being (satta). They are not forms of Being or kinds of Being. The kinds of Being are only three and are called artha, which may be translated as beings or existences. Artha may mean thing (vastu), entity (ens). The three kinds of Being are: substance, quality and activity. Words refer to these three directly, to the others indirectly, i.e., through the former. These others are: universal, particular, and inherence.
Their nature is dependent on thought and is relative to it \((buddhyap\text{\`kṣyam})\). The six categories are positive \((bhāva)\) and concern Being. In fact, the former three alone have Being \((satta)\), but not the latter three, although all the six are positive. The category of Non-being also is accepted and mentioned in the IX-Chapter of the \textit{Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms}. It is not mentioned in the beginning, as the negative is dependent on the positive. All subsequent writers mention seven categories, and include the negative also.

We are struck by the way the categories are classified in terms of Being and Non-being. The first six categories are called positive, but Being is not found in all of them. It is found in only the first three substance, quality, and activity. Although it is not found in the other three – universal, particular, and inherence, they are not forms of Non-being, but are positive. According to this school, the first three are objects of our knowledge and are independent of our thought \((buddhi)\); the other three are objects only relatively to our thought. Again, the latter three belong to the first three, which are forms of Being, but not to Non-being. They are, therefore, called positive. Non-being can have neither a universal nor a particular; nor is anything, positive or negative, related to it through the relation of inherence. Non-being or negation also is relative to thought; but unlike the second group, it is negative, not positive. Yet in controversies with rival schools, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika defend the reality of all the seven categories. Such defence may confuse the student, who
will ask: "If four of the seven categories cannot have Being, how can one defend their reality?" And what can one mean by such defence? The answer can only be: Being\(^7\) is not the same as reality, and not even the same as the positive. Reality\(^8\) includes everything, positive and negative that thought has to accept for the purposes of understanding the cosmos; but Being is only part of the positive. Everything that is not Being is not the same as Non-being. The universal, the particular, or inherence are neither kinds of Being nor kinds of Non-being. These distinctions are not clearly explained by the Vaiśeṣika, but are implied by its categorial scheme.

1. **Dravya:** Substance (dravya) is defined as that in which qualities and actions inhere (samavēla). Qualities and actions cannot exist except in a substance. It is thus their substratum (āśraya). The relation between substance and its qualities and actions is the inseparable relation of inherence (samavēya). There can be no substance without qualities and activities and vice versa. Substance is also the material cause. It can be defined also as that which can be the material cause of every causal process and can constitute the effect (samavēyākāraṇa). Clay and the parts of the pot constitute the pot, which as the effect (kārya) inheres in them. Qualities and activities cannot be material causes. Now, the effect, pot, can be produced when its parts are brought together into contact (samyoga): such parts can be substances only, but not qualities and activities. So another peculiar characteristic, which can also
be a definition of substance is that it alone can come into contact (sāmyoga) and there can be contact only between substances.

There are nine kinds of substances: earth, water, fire, air, ether (ākāśa), time (kāla), space (dik), spirit (ātman), and mind (manas). The first five are generally called physical substances (muhābhūtas) and each of them has its own peculiar quality or property. Smell is the property of earth, taste of water, colour of fire, touch of air, and sound of ether. Each divides itself into, and assumes three forms: the corresponding cognitive sense, the corresponding physical sense organ, and the corresponding physical object and its quality. Thus there is a psychological sense and the physical sense organ, which is a part of the physical body. There is the physical nose and the sense of smell; the physical tongue and the sense of taste; the physical eye and the sense of vision; the physical skin and the sense of touch; and the physical ear and the sense of hearing.

Of the five substances, only the first three - earth, water, and fire are perceptible; air and ether are inferred from the qualities, touch and sound, respectively. For every quality must have a substance as its substratum, and the substances here concerned are air and ether. Perception is taken as visual perception. Kaṇāda thinks that, as air is not perceived like the cow, it is to be inferred, and we have come to talk of it as perceptible because the Veda and popular tradition speak of it. The Mīmāṃsā does not accept ether, and many
Indian thinkers treat air as an object of perception cognized by the sense of touch and do not limit perception to sight. The Vaiśeṣika lays down two conditions for a substance to be an object of perception: (1) it must be big enough, i.e., it must have molecular dimension (muharva); and (2) it should have manifest colour or form (rūpa). Of course, either air nor ether has manifest colour and so it does not satisfy the second condition. Perhaps, what Kaṇāda meant was that, for an object to be perceived, it must have a definite form or shape (rūpa) like the cow; air and ether do not have such forms or shapes.

According to both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika in general, none of the nine substances, except the first three, is perceptible. The existence of all the other six is inferred. Time is inferred from the ideas of past, present, and future; and it is the universal common generator of everything that is born. Space is inferred from the ideas of near and far. According to Kaṇāda, ātman is not perceived even by mind, but only inferred. He gives more indicators than the Nyāya does for inferring the ātman. They are the different vital principles (prāṇas), the movement of the eye, life, mind, bodily movement, the activities of senses, pain, pleasure, desire, hate and effort. All these presuppose the ātman, which is their guide and controller. Mind (manus) is inferred from the fact that, even when there is contact of the ātman, senses, and the object, there will be no cognition if there is no mind or if mind is absent.
To understand this argument, we should remember that, according to both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, cognition of external objects involves four terms and three relations connecting them. The four terms are: the ātman, mind, senses, and objects. If any of the terms is absent, there can be no cognition. We know that sometimes objects are within our vision; our ātman also is there; but we are not aware of the objects. We explain this lack of cognition by saying that our mind is absent or that we are absent-minded. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says that such experience is proof of the reality of mind as distinct from the ātman and senses.

2. **Guna**: Guna or quality is defined as the being that is different from substance and activity and that is itself without qualities and activities. The school gives a list of twenty-three qualities. They are: colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness (pythakīva), conjunction (sāniyoga), disjunction (vibhava), nearness (temporal and spatial), remoteness (temporal and spatial), cognition (buddhi, consciousness), pleasure, pain, desire, hate, effort, weight, fluidity, viscosity (snēha), tendency (saṁskāra), unseen merit or demerit (adṛṣṭa), and sound. Some give the number of qualities as twenty-four, separating merit and demerit and treating them as two.

Of the above, cognition, as mentioned already, is an adventitious, though a specific, quality of the ātman. Viscidity is the oily nature of some of the liquids. Tendency (saṁskāra) is not only what is left in our spirit by our
ethical actions, but also the tendencies produced in physical objects by our actions, e.g., the tendency of a spring to regain its original form after it is stretched or pulled. The unseen merit and demerit produced in us by ethical actions are treated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as qualities, distinct from tendencies (saṁskāra), which are also qualities whereas the Mīmāṁśā would treat tendencies and ethical merit and demerit as the same and as potencies (saktis). The Buddhists, particularly of the Mahāyāna, follow the Mīmāṁśā. However, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, tendency is of three kinds: velocity (vēga), mental impressions (bhāvanas), and elasticity. The first keeps things in motion, the second enables us to remember, and the third enables a physical body to regain its original state or position. Sound is of two main kinds: noises like the sound of a drum and words which have meanings. Another quality that interests us is number, which, instead of being treated as quantity, is called quality. The idea of number originates out of referential cognition (apēkṣābuddhi) and disappears when its origin is destroyed. We refer the quality “two” to two apples, when each is taken along with, or with reference to the other. It is not understandable, therefore, why it is regarded as a quality at all; for quality is a form of Being, while number is dependent upon thought; and for being dependent upon thought, the universal, particular, and inherence are not regarded as forms of Being. Magnitude is recognized, but only as a kind of quality with four subdivisions: the atomic, the infinite, the
small, and the large. It is interesting to observe that quantity as a distinct category is not found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. There are further subdivisions of the qualities, such as different colours, tastes, smells, etc., which the reader can easily visualize.

3. Karma: Kaṇḍāda defines an karma or Action as an entity, which inheres in one substance, which is devoid of a quality, and which is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction. Action is physical movement like an attribute, it inheres only in substance. It is different from both substance and attribute.

Five kinds of action or motion are recognised viz., upward motion (utkṣēpana), downward motion (avakṣēpana), contraction (akuncana), expansion (prasarana) and locomotion or movement in general (gamana). Upward motion brings a body into contact with a higher region, e.g., throwing a stone upward. Downward motion brings a body into contact with a lower region, e.g. throwing a stone downward from a tree to the ground. Contraction brings the parts of a body closer to one another e.g. the rolling of a cloth. Expansion makes the parts of a body further from one another, e.g., the unfolding of a cloth. All other kinds of motion are comprised in locomotion. walking, evacuation, flow, flaming up and slanting motion are different kinds of locomotion. This division of karma into five kinds does not appear to be very logical. If all miscellaneous motions such as walking, flow etc.; are to be
classed under simple going (locomotion), why can not, it may be asked, upward motion and the other three also be similarly included under it? for this, Athalye explains that motion can be divided into three kinds: vertical, horizontal and slanting. The vertical motion may be from below upwards, or from above downwards. Horizontal motion also may be two fold, motions nearer to oneself or motion further from oneself. All other motions are relegated to the comprehensive class of simple going (gamana)²³.

Action is physical motion. It resides in a substance like a quality. But an action is its dynamic and temporary feature, whereas a quality is its static and enduring feature. Conjunction, which is a quality, resides in many substances, which are conjoined with each other. But an action or motion abides in one substance only. It does not reside in many substances. Conjunction of a book with a table resides in the two substances. But the motion of a fan resides in it only. An action, like a quality, resides in a substance, and is devoid of a quality. But it is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction²⁴, whereas a quality is not their cause. The motion of a carriage is the direct and immediate cause of its disjunction from one part of the ground and conjunction with another part of it. An action is a non-inherent cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) of conjunction and disjunction. The carriage which is a substance, is the inherent cause or material cause of its disjunction from one part of the ground, and of its conjunction with another part

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of it. but its motion is their non-inherent cause. Its colour, which is its quality, is never their non-inherent cause. Śivāditya observes that an action is a non-inherent cause of the first conjunction and disjunction, which are not produced by any prior conjunction and disjunction.

Action or motion belong to substances as earth, water, air, light or fire and the mind. Those inhering in the mind are imperceptible, since the mind is so. The action of perceptible substances can be perceived by the senses of sight and touch. In the perception of movement the second kind of sense object contact, viz., samyukta-samavāya is operative. The senses come in contact with movement through their conjunction with the things in which it inheres.

4. Samānya: The definition of the universal (sāmānyā, jāti) is that which is eternal (nitya) and inheres in many. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is opposed to any form of idealism, it accepts the reality of the universal. The universal is not a kind of being, although real and it is dependent on our cognition (buddhyapēksyam). It exists in substances, qualities, and activities. It is first of two kinds, the higher and the lower. The higher beyond which there is nothing higher (para) is Being (satta) itself. As it is present in substances, qualities, and activities, they are cognized as beings (sats). But Being does not exist in Being again; it is meaningless to ask: "Has Being Being?", but only "Has substance Being?" Again, it does not exist in
substance-ness (substantiality, dravyatva), etc., it does not exist in any kind of universal, but only in individuals. Substances-ness, quality-ness and action-ness are universals lower than Being (satta). Man-ness, red-ness, throw-ness etc., are lower than substance-ness, etc. The individuals are never universals and Being is never an individual.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insists that simply by adding "-ness" to a word we do not get a real universal. Otherwise, we can have universals like man-ness, man-ness-ness, man-ness-ness-ness, etc., ad infinitum. In such cases, all except man-ness are false universals; they are not real but conceptual (upādhis). This school lays down, therefore, six conditions which a real universal has to satisfy. (1) It should exist in a plurality of individuals. This condition is found in the definition itself of the universal. Because of this condition, space-ness (spatiality) and time-ness (temporality) are not real universals. For there is only one space and one time. Space-ness and time-ness are only conceptual forms (upādhis). (2) If two supposed universals refer to the same class of individuals, they are not two universals, but only one. We may have two words, two definitions of the same class of objects or two connotations having the same denotation. Man and human being refer to the same object; so "man-ness" and "human-being-ness" cannot be two different universals. If man is defined as a political animal and also as a rational animal—which Aristotle does-then "political animal-ness" and "rational animal-ness"
cannot be two different universals. (3) If a universal leads to cross-classification or hybridity (Sankara)-neither the Nyāya nor the Vaiśeṣika is unanimous at this point nor has either analyzed this condition well-such a universal cannot be a real universal. For instance, “two-legged-ness” cannot be a real universal. For men are two-legged and swans are two-legged; but the former belong to the class of animals and the latter to the class of birds. “Two-legged-ness” belongs therefore to hybrid universals, leading to cross-classification. But we may retain the idea as a concept. (4) A universal cannot be real, if its formation by our mind leads to an infinite regress. This condition is laid down for avoiding universals like man-ness-ness, etc. (5) A universal is not real, if it is not capable of being positively related to the individuals. This condition is laid down for excluding the universals of Non-being. For instance, in front of me on the table there is the absence of water and there is absence of water on the floor also. We cannot, therefore, conclude that the absence-ness of water is a real universal. It is trivial and insignificant to think that the universal absence-ness of water exists in different absences of water. The universal exists in the individuals by being related to them through the relation of inherence, which will be explained later. Now, any relation can exist only between positive entities, but not between negative entities. So there can be no relation between the universal absence and the different absences. Furthermore, in front of me there is absence of water, absence of fire, absence...
of the tree, absence of the mountain, etc., on the same table at the same time. It cannot perceive any differentiating characteristic among them, except in my mind. Now, in which of these absences can the absence-ness of water exist? All of them are there as one object on the table. No kind of Non-being can, therefore, have a universal. (6) No universal can be a real universal, if its presence in the individuals destroys their very nature. This condition is very important for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to defend its ultimate pluralism, and can best be explained under the category of the particular.

5. **Viśeṣa:** Viśeṣa, the particular is defined as that which is ultimate and exists in eternal substances. That is, it does not exist in anything except substances, then too only in ultimate, eternal substances. They are the four kinds of atoms, ether, the ātman, space, time, and mind. The particular is the ultimate differentiator and is different from that in which it exists. All the earth atoms are alike; yet they are differentiated from one another as each has a particular in it. So also are the water atoms, fire atoms, and air atoms to be understood. The ātman are also ultimately alike and are differentiated from one another by each one having a particular. So also are minds differentiated from one another. Ether, space, and time are differentiated from one another by each of them having a particular, although all are all-pervasive. One ordinary object can be differentiated from another ordinary object, as each has different qualities or occupies different spaces or times. But when and where
none of the ordinary differentiators is available and yet objects, infinite and
infinitesimal, exist as a plurality, there must be a particular that is the ultimate
differentiator residing in each and every one of them. Such a differentiator is a
positive entity, not a negative one.

Now, the question arises: If there is a particular for each of the
ultimate entities and there is, therefore, a plurality of such particulars, must
there not be the universal, particularity (viṣeṣatva, particular-ness), that resides
in every member of the class of particulars? The answer is that particularity
cannot be a real universal. For instance, every ātman has the same
characteristics as any other; the characteristics cannot, therefore, differentiate
one ātman from another. So we postulate a particular in every one to function
as the ultimate differentiator. But if every particular is similar to every other
particular, and it becomes similar to the others, if all have the same universal
particularity, then it loses its power as the ultimate differentiator. For the
particulars to have a universal is to destroy themselves. They cannot have a
universal, called particularity, which however, can be retained as a concept.

6. Samāvāya: Inherence (samavāya) is defined as the eternal relation. But by the word “eternal” the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika means a kind of inseparability.
Yet every kind of inseparability is not inherence. For instance, the leaf of a
book has two sides and they are inseparable; but the relation between them is
not inherence. Each side of the page does not inhere in the other side. But the
whole leaf inhere in both the sides. Inherence is found between the whole and parts, between substance and qualities, between substance and activities, and between the universals on the one side and substances, qualities, and activities on the other. The whole inhere in its parts, qualities and activities inhere in substances, and universals inhere in substances, qualities, and activities. But no higher universal, as mention already inhere in the lower universals, but directly in the individuals. In any individual man, Being (satta), substance-ness (dravyatva), and man-ness\(^3\) (mānava\(^{4}\)atva) inhere together. Being is higher than substance-ness because it is found not only where substances are found, but also where qualities and activities are found. For the same reason, substance-ness is higher than man-ness. But that it is higher does not mean that it inhere in the lower. The old Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika held that there is only one relation of inherence in the world, just as there is only one space.

7. Abhāva: Kanāda mentions only six categories (padārthas) through whose correct perspective one can attain the higher good (niḥśreyasa)\(^3\). The seventh category non-existence (abhāva) was not recognised by Kanada as a separate category. It seems to have been introduced by Śivāditya and Udayana who were contemporaries (10\(^{th}\) century A.D.). The title of Śivāditya's work "Saptapadārtha" indicates for the first time regarding the currency of abhāva\(^4\). For Non-being, Non-existence, Absence, and Negation the Sanskrit word used is abhāva, but occasionally asat. Non-being is defined
merely as what is not or as different from the six positive categories: substance, quality, activity, universal, particular, and inherence. As all the six categories are positive, Non-being is the negative reality. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thus accepts that reality is both positive and negative. The recognition of non-existence as a separate category is the outcome of working out the full implications of the realistic hypothesis of the system. If all knowledge refers to an entity independent of the apparatus of knowledge, our knowledge of negation should also have an ontological correlate in the external world.

Non-being or negation is primarily of two types: relational absence (saṁsargābhāva) and difference (anyonyābhāva) or mutual negation. Relational absence is the absence of something at or on or in something else, like the absence of the pen on the table. Difference or mutual negation is the difference between two individuals or universals. Jim is different from Bill: that each is not the other means that they mutually negate each other. Mutual negation exists in the two, not merely in one. Similarly, the lion as a class is different from the tiger as a class and lion-ness is different from tiger-ness.

Relational absence is of three kinds: prior negation (prāgābhāva), posterior negation (praddhvaṁśābhāva), and absolute or infinite negation (atyantābhāva). Prior negation is the absence of an object before it is born. The pen with which I write did not exist before it was manufactured. Prior
negation has no beginning, but an end. It disappears at the moment the pen is made. Posterior negation is the absence of the same pen when it is destroyed. It has beginning, but no end. Absolute or infinite negation is the absence of an object in time and space except when and where it exists. Since the time and space in which it does not exist are infinite, this negation is called absolute or infinite. But there is another interpretation of absolute negation. It is that which exists in all times and places. An example is the absence of colour in air. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika did not know of coloured gases like bromine. We do not see colour in ordinary air and this school thought that air is absolutely uncoloured. But then there is no positive relation between air and colour. The upholders of the first interpretation say that, when there is no such positive relation at all, this negation becomes the negation of the non-natural or even the impossible and so insignificant. But the others maintain that absolute negation must truly be absolute; it must be the eternal, natural negation of all relation between two entities.

ii. Abhāva is Real and is Perceived:

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System is an uncompromising Champion of the Reality of Abhāva. Some modern realists like Russell, Alexander and other accepted the objectivity of non-existence. It is significant to note that the Naiyāyikas do not mean by non-existence an inconceivable entity but only negation of something somewhere. The theory of the Reality of Non-existence
is implied in the very conception of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation known as *asaṅkāryavāda* which is opposed to the *sukāryavāda* of the Sāṃkhya. According to the latter, a jar is non-existent before its production or after its destruction. It exists in its unmanifested state even before its production and after its destruction. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that a jar is non-existent before its production as well as after its destruction. But the non-existence is a reality of a negative kind. A statement like "there is no jar" (*ghatotanāsti*) with reference to a jar before its production and after its destruction refers to two negative realities: called *prāgābhāva* and *pradvatāsābhāva*. The non-existence here is thus not unreal like a hares' horn or a sky-flower. It is a negative reality.

*Abhāva* arose as a logical concept. It is serviceable for intellectual distinction. In knowledge the idea negation as the counter part of affirmation is necessarily involved. All idealistic systems of philosophy are based on the opposition between the knowable and the unknowable. As relations play a large part in the intellectual explanation of the universe, they are distinguished from that which is above all relational consciousness. "When we speak of a thing the fact of its being or existence is emphasized, while when we speak of a relation its non-being or negation is emphasized." It was Spinoza that said that all determination is negation.
This logical concept of negation was later adopted into the ontological scheme of the Vaiśeṣika and made into the new category of non-existence. The employment of this category in the syncretist school has been very extensive. According to Athalye, the wonderful accuracy of the Indian Syllogism, the process of reasoning and analysis have been greatly facilitated by the recognition of abhāva (non-existence). The notion of non-existence is claimed to possess as much reality as its opposite. This is stated in the form of a pratiyogi and anuvṛti relation, that is, every entity involves at the same time, the conception of its counter entity vice-versa.

In the Nyāya we find the germ of the idea of not being as something ‘knowable’ and ‘existent’ in the same way as being: the knowledge being based in the Bhāṣya on Inference, but later ascribed to direct perception in a peculiar form. The forms of negation are recognised in the Sūtra, explained in the Bhāṣya as: non-existence prior to being brought into being and non-existence after the destruction of the form of the thing brought into existence. Naiyāyikas go a step further and make non-existence consist of several kinds while properly speaking negation is simply non-existence in general. “All negation is pure and characterless” according to Athalye. In the syncretist school the conception of abhāva is employed in the sense in which the later Nyāya employ it. i.e., as consisting of many kinds and as being as many as there are conceivable counter-entities. This is one of the conceptions of the
Nyāya-Vaiśesika system which has enabled it to develop a very subtle method of intellectual analysis.

Negation is a knowable (ultimate padārtha), because it is perceived to be characterizing the place where the negation is i.e., where something is negated. But it cannot be identified with other knowable ultimates like substance, quality, action, universality, particularity and inherence, because they are positive entities and negation is other than affirmation and though it is a quality or meaning of its substratum, it is quite unlike any other quality. For all other qualities inhere or are internally lodged in their substrata, but negation does not abide in the relation of inherence in its locus, in as much as negation can be removed. The place where the jar does not, is qualified by the non-existence of the jar; but if the jar is replaced, when there is no longer the negation of the jar on the ground. Negation, therefore, does not inhere in its substratum, but resides in it in self-relation (svarūpa-saṁbandha). So that the negation itself is both relatum and relation and is knowable as a distinguishable character of the locus. The Nyāya calls it yiseṣaṇa or adjectivity which is a variety of svavūpa-saṁbandha or self-relation e.g., the table without the chalk means, according to the Nyāya, the table distinguishable by without-ness in respect of the chalk.

Negation not only implies the place which it qualities, but also something negated. Negation, without reference to something negated is
inconceivable. Negation thus has both a locus or substratum and a negatum (the object negated). The former is called the \textit{annyogi} and the latter \textit{pratiyogi}. The \textit{annyogi} is determined by non-existence. Whose necessary \textit{pratiyogi} or negatum signifies that some affirmation must precede negation. A denial in itself and by itself is unmeaning, though denial is not identical with affirmation i.e., to deny is not \textit{ipso facto} to affirm something. We may make the negative judgement, "The sky-flower does not exist". But in making this negative judgement, we do not affirm its \textit{negatum}.

The Nyāya refutes of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhist conceptions of negation with idealistic leanings. The reality of non-existence is argued by the writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika usually against the Prābhākara School. For obvious reasons, the repudiation of non-existence by Prābhākara who is a realist was more annoying than by the Idealist Buddhist who, is some way, repudiated even the positive reality. Vacaspati Misra briefly refutes the arguments of the Prābhākara School against the reality of non-existence. These letter also include the well-known argument of the Prābhākara School that 'non-existence of a jar on the ground' is nothing but a vacant condition of the ground. It appears that Prābhākara in his repudiation of non-existence, as in many other matters, borrowed arguments from the Buddhist. We shall notice here briefly the discourse given by Jayanta.
The Buddhist points out that non-existence is not cognised as an independent entity like positive objects, but it is something conditioned by space, time, and its counter reality. For instance, our experience takes the form of non-existence of a jar on the ground at a particular time. The non-existence can have no relation with the ground because of the two relations-samāyoga and samavāya. Neither is possible here. For the same reason non-existence can have no relation with time: As for the relation of non-existence with its counter-reality, i.e., the jar, it is even more inconceivable because the two, the jar and its non-existence, belong to two different times and the question of their relation does not arise at all. If it be contended that the relation between the two may be that of opposition, the question arises as to what does 'opposition' signify. If non-existence, which may be supposed to be already existing, should come and assail the jar, then alone it should be regarded as the opponent of the jar like club (which destroys the jar). But that is not possible as their times are different. The destroyer and the destroyed should always exist simultaneously. Secondly, it may be asked, 'whether non-existence has the nature of not coming into existence (bhāvana-dharmā) or the nature of not coming into existence (abhāvana-dharmā). In the former case, it would be a positive object (bhāva) like the jar, etc. But if it be of the nature of not coming into existence, it would be an eternal entity. In that case would non-existence be related to one object or to all objects? There being nothing to restrict it to
one object it would be related to all objects (i.e. all the objects would constitute its counter realities) and being itself eternal, there would be left no positive object eternal or non-eternal as existent”.

According to the Prabhakara, the non-existence of a jar is nothing but the vacant condition of the ground. Sridhara, like Jayanta rebuts it and says that if the vacant condition were the nature of the ground, non-existence of the jar should be comprehended even when it is brought there, because the nature of the ground will persist even then. And if, on the other hand the vacant condition is different from the ground, then the reality of non-existence stands accepted in another form. The Prabhakara Mimamsaka might say, “A positive object may be in one of the two states, i.e., it may be alone or it may be associated with a second object of these two states, that of being alone is the nature of the object which is said to be solitary. The comprehension of that state at a time when a perceptible thing like a jar is also desired to be grasped, causes the expression of non-existence of the jar”. To this the Nyaya-Vaiseshika replies: “When you take the ground apart from the non-existence of the jar, what meaning do you assign to the word ‘vacant’ which may be the object-support of the cognition of an object not being there? Admittedly, without difference in the state of the object, there can be no difference in the cognition or in its expression. If the Mimamsaka were to argue that the natural state of ‘being one (ekatva) possessed by a positive object is its solitary
condition (ekaikatva), it may be asked what is this oneness? Is it the state of
being devoid of a counter-reality or having the number called oneness? The
latter, the number ‘oneness’ exists as long as its substratum exists and as such
it will be there even when another object (a jar etc.) is present. If you however,
say that natural oneness means being devoid of a counter reality then the other
reality (i.e. non-existence) stands established”.

The Prabhâkara Mîmâmsaka then arises a subtle point: “Even those who
accept the reality of non-existence will to admit that comprehension of the
ground is the cause of comprehension of non-existence because without the
comprehension of the ground the comprehension of non-existence is not
possible. But one can not comprehend that there are no thorns on the ground,
if the ground has been comprehended with thorns on it. the comprehension of
the ground as qualified by the non-existence (of thorns) is thus the cause of the
comprehension of the non-existence (of thorns). But the comprehension of the
ground as qualified by a particular non-existence can be possible only when
that particular non-existence has been comprehended and the non-existence
will be comprehended only when the ground as qualified by that particular
non-existence has been comprehended. It comes to this that the self-same
thing is to be held to be its own cause. That being so, even the Nyâya-
Vaiśeṣika will have to accept that there is a certain vacant state of the ground,
which is other than non-existence and which has no relation with the counter-
reality. The comprehension of non-existence. Now, according to us the same vacant condition is the cause of the notion of non-existence". To this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies: "This, too is not correct because the comprehension of the nature of the ground itself cause the comprehension of non-existence. And this cognition of non-existence can not occur when the ground is comprehended with something else (counter-reality) because like the comprehension of the ground, the contact of the sense with non-existence is also included in the sum-total of the causes of comprehension of non-existence. When the thorns, etc., are there, non-existence of the same is not there and therefore although the ground is comprehended, there is no comprehension of non-existence".

Vācaspati Miśra examines the view of Prābhākara and refutes it, following the usual line of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument viz., if the non-existence of the jar is the nature of the ground, it should be cognised even when the jar is present there.

We pass judgments about the non-existence of things as well as about their existence. The question is, through what type of knowledge is the judgment of non-existence derived when, for instance, a person endowed with sight and sitting in a room, sufficiently lighted, says, "There is no jar now on the ground"? At first sight this judgment of non-existence appears to be one of perception, because the knowledge obtained is evidently immediate. But
difficulty arises when we try to understand how sense can possibly grasp non-existence. If the sense perception of an object presupposes some relation of that sense with that object, we cannot by any stretch of imagination conceive how sense can come into any relation with non-existence, so that it might be perceived. How, then, is non-existence known as such a case? This, in short, is the problem discussed by the different systems of Indian Philosophy. The solution of this problem is primarily based on the conception of abhāva or non-existence. In Indian Philosophy there are three main conceptions of abhāva, and consequently three different ways of solving this problem. (1) The Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins who maintain that abhāva is an entity and is cognized through anupalabdhi; (2) The Prābhākaras, and the Samkhyaśas who are of the view that abhāva is not an entity and that this can be ascertained through perception. (3) The Naiyāyikas who hold that abhāva is a reality but it can be cognised through perception and that there is no need of accepting anupalabdhi as an additional source of knowledge.

The Prābhākaras refute the theory that abhāva is a distinct category. They contend that the basis of negative propositions is the mere container (kāvaladhikaraṇa). For instance, in the proposition, “Here, on this spot, there is no jar”, the only thing which, in fact, is referred to is the empty floor (kēvala-bhūtala). If abhāva should thus be equated with the empty container (kēvaladhikaraṇa), it might easily be argued from the opposite camp that this
is an evasive trick of the Prabhakaras which could be easily seen through and
that the concept of the emptiness of the container, inevitably, presupposes non-
existence. The Prabhakaras, however, meet this difficulty by explaining that
the phrase empty container is only a description of the form of the cognition
underlying negative statements and that abhāva, strictly speaking, is the
cognition of the container, and of nothing else, in such circumstances as would
necessarily lead to the missing object (pratyagānta) being cognized, were it
present.

Prabhakara does not recognize negation as a separate category, and non-
apprehension as a separate pramāṇa. Non-existence is nothing over the above
existence, and non-perception is nothing over the above perception. Is then a
negative judgment such as 'there is no jar on the ground' invalid? No, it is
valid, but there is no reality corresponding to the word 'no'. Reality is always
positive and a negative judgment is a subjective mode of apprehending it. A
negative judgment is valid, not because a negative fact corresponds to it, but
because it refers indirectly to a positive fact. When we say there is no jar on
the ground it does not imply that we cognise non-existence in the same manner
as we cognise existence. 'There is a jar' refers to the existence of the jar as a
positive fact. But there is no jar refers to the subjective fact that we do not
perceive the jar. The knowledge of 'no jar' is not a positive knowledge of a
negative entity, but is a negative knowledge of a positive entity and the
negative too is not a mode of knowledge different from positive knowledge. Non-perception of a jar means perception of the bare ground with the idea of the jar which could have been perceived if it were present there. A positive entity is perceived in two ways. It is perceived sometimes with another positive entity and some times by itself. We perceive the ground sometimes with a jar and sometimes without it. The perception of a positive entity by itself is of two kinds according as the other entity is imperceptible or perceptible. When two things are equally perceptible but we perceive one of them alone, then there arises a valid negative judgment. The ground alone is perceived. This gives rise to the judgment 'there is no jar on the ground'. Here an objection may be raised. We perceive two things e.g., the jar and the ground and later on we perceive the ground alone. Now, what is the cause of this difference if not the removal or destruction of the jar? If it is the latter than Prābhākara must admit the reality of negation, since it is what is known as pradhvanisabhāva or Posterior Negation. Prābhākara's answer to this objection is that the cause in question is the presence of the jar else where or the two holes or the pieces into which the jar is reduced that there is no need of admitting posterior negation does not stand in need of another Pramāṇa, because it is self-luminous (svaprajñā). The Sāṅkhya also hold that of the many forms or transformations (parināma) of the locus, the ground, the one that is devoid of any content is identical with the non-existence of the jar on
ground. In a word, according to both the Prābhākaras and the Sāṃkhyaists the non-existence of a thing in a particular locus is nothing but the existence of the bare locus or the locus per se (adhiṣṭāna-mātram or adhiṣṭhāna-svarūpam).

According to this view, the judgment of non-existence of the type in question can be easily said to be derived through perception. The difficulty as to how non-existence can become the object of perception does not at all arise, because perception of the non-existence of the jar on the ground means, according to this view, as everybody will grant, can be perceived through sense. The non-existence of the jar, therefore, can be known through perception.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika comes to the same conclusion, though by a different line of argument. The system not only upholds the objectivity of abhāva, but it also insisted that it was directly perceived by the senses. In fact, perception of non-existence was the chief argument for proving its reality against Prābhākara and the Buddhist. The theory of perception of abhāva, however, had to be special established against Kumārila who accepted the objective reality of abhāva, but held that it was comprehended not by direct perception, but by a separate means of knowledge called 'non-comprehension' (anupalabdhi). Kumārila and Advaita pointed out that abhāva, being of a negative nature, should also be comprehended by a negative means of knowledge, viz., 'non-
comprehension' which means the negation of comprehension by any means of knowledge\textsuperscript{47}.

The cognition 'there is no jar on the ground' is a unitary cognition like the cognition there is curds in the bowl: How, then, can there be such distinction as the ground is cognised through the senses while the negation of the jar through a different means? The ground as well as the negation of the jar are cognised when the eyes function. I open my eyes and perceive them; I close my eyes and cease to perceive them. In the cognition of fire on a distant hill, the hill is perceived but not the fire which is inferred. But it is a different case because between the perception of the smoky hill and the inference of fire there is an intermediate cognition, viz., the memory of vy\textap\textsc{p}t\textsc{i}. In the present case, however, both the ground and the negation of the jar on it are equally immediately cognised.

It has been said that negation is devoid of shape and colour, and since only things with shape and colour can be the objects of visual perception, it cannot be perceived through the eyes. Again, it has been said that the eyes and other sense-organs can perceive existent things only with which they can have a contact and that non-existence, in whose case no contact is possible, cannot be perceived. But this is wrong. A thing is said to be perceived by the eyes not because it has colour and shape but because its cognition is born of the activity of the visual sense. The atoms possess shape and colour, yet they are
not perceived through vision. Contact too is not essential, since either is in contact with the eyes, yet it is not perceived. It may be said that in case contact is supposed to be inessential in vision. We could perceive even such things as are lying on the other side of the globe. To this the answer is that the condition that we can perceive only those things which are in contact with the senses has relevance in the case of existing things only, not in that of non-existence. Or, there is sense-contact in the case of non-existence too which is termed ‘Samyukta-vīśeṣaṇata’. In it the sense is in contact with its object in so far as the object is a qualification (vīsesa) of another term connected with sense. It is by means of such sense-object contact that the Naïyāyikas explain the perceptions of non-existence (abhāva) and the relation of inherence (samavāya). It takes different forms according to the different ways in which the mediating term is related to sense.

The Naïyāyikas analyse the contact between senses and objects into six kinds. As metaphysical realists, they regard every object of cognition as present there in the world. Unlike the Buddhists, they maintain that the universal and negation are real and are perceived by the senses themselves through one of the six kinds of contact process (vyāpāra, pratyāsattti). The relation, which is a process but is not static, between sense and substance is contact or conjunction (samayoga). Thus first, substance is perceived by contact with a sense. Secondly, qualities (guṇas), activities (karmas), and
universals (jātis, sāmānyas), all of which inhere in substances are perceived by
the combined relation, contact-cum-inherence (samyūkta-samanavāya). Thirdly,
the universals inhere in qualities and activities — like red-ness and walking-ness
— and are perceived through the relation of contact-cum-inherence-cum-
inherence. For instance, red colour inhes in the substance of the rose, and
red-ness inhes in the red colour. Fourthly, the relation of inherence itself —
like that between substance and its qualities — is perceived as a characteristic or
attribute49 (viśeṣaṇa) of substance. That is, the relation between senses and the
relation of inherence is contact-cum-attribute (samyūkta-viśeṣaṇa). Absences
and negations also are perceived in the same way. If there is absence of the
pen on the table, then that absence is perceived as an attribute of the table.
Fifthly, sound is perceived only through the relation of inherence. According to
the Nyāya, the substance (element) to which sound belongs as a property is
ether (ākāśa) and is not accepted as an object of sense-perception. So there is
no contact of any sense and the substance ether. Yet, its peculiar quality,
sound, is perceived directly by the ear. As a quality, sound inhes in ether.
So in the perception of sound, the sense of hearing comes into relation with
sound through the relation of inherence. The Naiyāyikas say that the sense of
hearing is ether itself as limited by the physical ear (śrūtra-vicchinna) and
sound is perceived as inhering in that limited ether. Sixthly, the qualities
inhering in sound — like mellowness and harshness — are perceived by the ear
through the relation of inherence-cum-inherence. That is, sound inheres in the ear (ether) and "harsh" inheres in sound.

The aim of the Naiyāyikas in enunciating the six kinds of sense-object relational process is to defend that substances, qualities, actions, universals, relations, and negations are all real and objects of sense-perception also. Universals and relations are perceived through the very senses through which the individuals and terms are perceived. If the individual horse is perceived by the eye, then the universal "horse-ness" also is perceived by it. If two books in contact are perceived by touch, then the relation of contact also is perceived by it. The same view holds about negation. If the pen is perceived by the eye, then the negation or absence also of the pen is perceived by the eye.

By making negation or absence an object of sense-perception, the Naiyāyikas reject not only the doctrine of the Buddhists that it is an object of inference, but also that of Kumārila that it is an object of a special knowing called non-apprehension (anupalpādhan). The Naiyāyikas admit that the simple perception of the table is not the same as the perception of the absence of the pen on it. For perceiving the absence, the thought "If the pen been there, I would have perceived it" must accompany the perception of the table. The resulting perception is that of the absence. The Buddhists say that the necessary introduction of the thinking process makes the cognition of absence an inference, although it is a spontaneous inference without explicit reasoning.
Kumārila says that here there can be no inference, as there is no major premise. And as it cannot be simple perception also, we have to accept another valid form of cognition to be called non-apprehension.

The main argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School for holding that abhāva is directly perceived by the senses is given by Śrīdhara. He says, "when vacant ground is comprehended through sense-contact, there also occurs the cognition of non-existence in the form 'the ground is without a jar'. That being the case, why should the cognition of non-existence be not held to be a sense-perception like that of the ground itself". Jayanta repeats the same argument: "When we open our eyes, we perceive the ground as well as the non-existence of the jar, but when we close them, we do not see either. Both the cognitions being, thus, equally consequences of the same phenomenon (opening of the eye), there is no reason to make the distinction that cognition of the ground should be held to be a sense-perception and that of the non-existence to be non-sense-perception". Śrīdhara says: "Non-existence is also grasped by the sense as much as an existent (positive) object is. The function of the senses having been thus observed some form of sense-contact should also be assumed". And the sense-contact is assumed, as already noted, in the form of viśeṣa-bhāva samnikāra (the contact in the form of an attribute). Non-existence is held to be the attribute of the ground which is connected with the sense, and therefore, the contact is called samyukta-viśeṣa-bhāva-
sannikarṣa, i.e., the contact in the form of an attribute of the object which is connected with the sense.

The position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is assailed by the Mīmāṃsakas of the Kumārīla School. They point out that, although the non-existence of a jar and the ground seem to be a simultaneously cognised by the senses, the former can not be a sense-object, because “firstly, it is devoid of colour (rūpa) which is a necessary condition of visual perception, and secondly, it can have no contact with the sense”56. As for contact in the form of viśeṣāṇa-bhāva, it is not at all a form of contact, because contact is possible only through one of the two kinds of relations, viz., (i) connection (saṁyoga) and (ii) inherence (saṁavāya), or one of their combinations, such as connected inherence (saṁyukta-saṁavāya), etc. Moreover, an object that becomes an attribute of some other object is related to the latter either by connection as in the instance, ‘a man with a stick’, or by inherence, being a non-substance, ‘the whiteness of cloth’, non-existence, being a non-substance, can have no relation with the ground in the form of connection (saṁyoga), and being different from qualities, etc; it also cannot have the relation of inherence (saṁavāya) with the ground”. Keśava Miśra quotes the argument of the Mīmāṃsaka to show that viśeṣāṇa-bhāva or rather “the viśeṣāṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva, i.e., the so-called relation of attribute and substantive is not a relation at all, because it is deoid of the characteristics of a relation. A relation is (i) different from the objects
related, (ii) it resides in both the related objects, and (iii) it is one"57. The
relation of attribute and substantive is (i) not an entity different from them,
because the relation of the substantive is identical with the substantive, and the
relation of attribute, with the attribute, (ii) it does not reside in both the related
objects, because 'substantive-ness' (viśeṣya-bhāva) resides only in the
substantive, and 'attributeness' (viśeṣaṇa-bhāva) resides only in the attribute,
and further, (iv) the so called relation is not one entity: it is two, substantive-
ness and attribute-ness put together58. Thus the very basis of perception i.e. the
sense-object-contact (indriyārtha-sammākha) is absent in the present case.

With regard to the first point that non-existence has no rūpa (colour),
Jayanta says: "To be perceptible by the eye depends on being the object of
cognition produced by the eye, and not on possessing colour"59. Although
atoms possess colour, they are not perceptible by the eye". Here, the
Mīmāṃsaka's objection is met only by modifying the dictum accepted by the
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that manifested colour (nabhiṇa-rūpa)60 is a condition of
visual perception. Similarly, the objection regarding the sense-object-contact
is also met by rejecting the established principle that the senses grasp an object
only through their contact (saṃskeṇa) with it, i.e., by reaching that object61.
Jayanta says: "The principle of sense reaching an object (for cognising it)
applies only to vastu (positive objects)62. The non-existence being avastu
(negative), the eye can produce its cognition even without having a contact
with it⁶³. Keśava Miśra also gives the same answer, but instead of saying that principle in question applies only to vastu, he says that it applies only to bhava⁶⁴, i.e., positive objects. Obviously, by his time it seems to have been fully established that non-existence (abhāva) was also a vastu (reality). Thus, the answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to the objection of the Mīmāṁsaka is that the non-existence of a jar is perceived by the eye, although it has neither colour nor contact with the eye. The two usual conditions of visual perception are not applicable to the perception of a negative object. Is this answer convincing at all?

The Mīmāṁsaka points to a case where a visual perception of non-existence is impossible. A person goes to a lonely temple, and after sometime when he returns from it, he is asked whether he saw Dēvadatta in the temple. After recollecting the temple, he answers in the negative⁶⁵. Now, in this case, his knowledge of the non-existence of Dēvadatta in the temple can not be a visual perception because even the substratum of the non-existence, i.e., the temple, is not being perceived by the eye at the time of that knowledge. Nor can it be a case of remembrance because the non-existence of Dēvadatta in the temple was not experienced when the temple was seen by that person. Jayanta meets this objection and says that when we see a lonely place, “the non-existence of all the things that are not present there is collectively experienced as in the case of the eye of a peacock’s tail (where all its varied colous are

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collectively cognised\(^6\), and therefore the remembrance of the non-existence
(of one of the objects) is possible. The answer is hardly convincing, because
the non-existence of an object can be experienced only when that object (which
is \textit{pratīyogin}, i.e., the counter-reality of non-existence) is also recollected, and
admittedly here the person concerned can not recollect all the objects including
Devadatta that were not present in the temple.

Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains against Kumārīla that the non-
existence is directly perceived by the sense, the mental factor involved in the
comprehension of non-existence could not be discarded by the early Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika writers. Kumārīla says: “When an object (the substratum of non-
existence e.g., the ground) is perceived, and the counter reality of non-
existence (e.g. the jar) is recollected, there arises the comprehension of non-
existence which is a mental process independent of the senses\(^6\). The Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika does not deny that remembrance of the jar is an essential factor in
the comprehension of its non-existence. Vācaspati Miśra cites an objection
that “sense-object-contact, being obstructed by the remembrance of the
counter-reality, is incapable of producing the perception of non-existence\(^6\). He
replies that there will be no such obstruction, as there is none in the case of
the determinate perception of a jar because of the remembrance of name, etc.
He points out: “In the course of proving that determinate knowledge is a (real)
perception, it has been shown that remembrance of the name of an object and
reference to its previous knowledge and such other factors do not obstruct the operation of the senses. It may be contended that (in the case of determinate perception the remembrance of name, etc., stands in the relation of accord (anayogita) because they are constituent parts of a determinate perception, and it is a rule that a constitute part can not be an obstruction. But the jar in the present case stands in the relation of opposition (pratiyogita). To this contention, the question may be put as to what it is to which the jar stands to its non-existence, it is all right. But so far as the cognition of the non-existence of the jar is concerned, the remembrance of the jar being its cause, stands to it not in the relation of pratiyogin but in that of accord (anayogin)."

But so far as the perception of non-existence is concerned, there is yet another mental factor involved besides that of the remembrance of counter-reality. It was held that reasoning called tarka (which means arriving at a conclusion by reducing the other alternatives to absurdity, i.e., anipta-prasaininga) was not itself a means of knowledge (pramana), but it helped the function of other means of knowledge. In the case of the perception of non-existence, as Vācaspati Miśra has pointed out, there precedes the reasoning (tarka) in the form: if a jar had been present on the ground it would also have been perceived like the ground, because both are perceptible by the sense, and as the jar is not perceived, it is not present. Thus, there occurs the sense-perception of non-existence of the jar with the aid of reasoning (tarka). It is
difficult to appreciate how it can be regarded as a sense-perception, if it arises after that kind of inference-like reasoning which already gives the mental knowledge of non-existence. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, however, maintains that, despite the mental factor, the non-existence, in the last analysis, is directly perceived by the sense.

The Buddhist view of negation is akin to Prabhakara's view. The so-called negation is never experienced independently. Negation is always experienced as pertaining to a particular time; a particular place and a particular object which is the counter-correlate of negation as in the case of the negation of a jar in this room at this time. now, there would be no dispute about the reality of negation if it were really related to the particular time, place etc. But as a matter of fact no relation is possible. The relation of conjunction (saṃyoga) subsists between two substances, while negation is not a substance. There can be no saṃavāya or inherence since otherwise the place itself would be non-existent. There can be no relation between negation and its counter-correlate say, jar because they are not simultaneous. When there is a jar there is no negation of it. How can there be any relation unless the terms are present at the same time? it may be said that there is the relation of opposition or incompatibility. But what is the meaning of opposition? The negation of jar would be opposed to the jar if it existed prior to the jar and then behaved in a way to drive away the jar. But how can negation behave in any
way? Negation is no real entity. An entity possesses a specific nature of its own by virtue of which it differs from other entities; but we do not find any specific nature of negation which may differentiate it from other entities. So negation is featureless, and our linguistic usage viz., it is not so and so 'is thus to be somehow explained in terms of position'.

When we say 'There is no jar' what we mean is that we do not see the jar, not that we see the negation of the jar. The objective fact which justifies the use of these words is positive. The assertion 'There is no jar' is preceded by an inferential process of which it is the conclusion. Non-apprehension is the reason in this process. 'A thing which is capable of being apprehended but is not apprehended in the expected place is non-existent there; the jar which is capable of being apprehended is not apprehended on the ground; therefore it does not exist there; the reason here is based on identity of nature. Non-apprehension is identical with non-existence. And non-apprehension or absence of apprehension is not something different from apprehension. Non-apprehension of a thing is the same as the apprehension of only one of the two things which could have been perceived together. This apprehension of one thing is self-luminous. So that there can be no infinite regress; and itself arises from the sense-organs alone. The inference may be stated in the following way as well: The existence of a perceptible thing is invariably accompanied by its
perception; the jar which is a perceptible thing is not perceived; therefore, it does not exist\textsuperscript{71}.

The Buddhist says, that absence is inferred from non-perception and that non-perception is self-luminous, the latter assertion being his device to avoid definite regress. But it has been proved that no cognition is self-luminous. Even if a cognition be self-luminous, non-perception can not be self-luminous, because it has no content. The Buddhist holds that the cognition ‘This is blue’ apprehends its own form, viz. ‘blue’. But the cognition ‘There is no jar’ has no form since ‘no jar’ according to the Buddhist, is nothing. How can then it apprehend itself when it has no form. The Buddhist says that non-perception of the jar is the reason (\textit{liṅga}) of our knowledge of the absence of the jar and at the same time that non-perception is nothing but the perception of the locus, viz., the ground, and absence of the jar is nothing but the presence of the ground. This would mean that the perception of the ground is the reason of our knowledge of the ground. But in this way we bid good-bye to perception as an independent and the most primary means of knowledge, and inference thus becomes the only genuine means of knowledge. Therefore, the Buddhist view which leads to such an absurd conclusion should be rejected.

The Buddhists maintain that non-existence is never known as an independent object. Jayanta objects to this view on the ground that there are two kinds of cognitions which can be experienced by all, viz., there is a jar on
this ground and there is no jar on this ground. The Buddhists are divided in their opinion regarding the content of negative judgment. The Dīnaśa School believes that it is a mere mental construction while according to Yogacara it is the modification of the self. Jayanta points out that none of these statement about a negative judgment makes only difference between a negative judgment and a positive one. But be an arbitrary exercise of will it is held that a positive judgment is true and a negative judgment is false. So their thesis is not based on sound grounds.

If the positive construction enable us to grasp real things, and are therefore valid, it may be said that the validity of the negative mental construction may also be accepted on the same grounds. For instance, grasping the colour, 'blue' implies grasping the negation of those which are other than blue. Is the negation identical with the jar or different from it? if the first is accepted it is nothing but the jar itself, and if the second is accepted, it is the negation of jar.

Thus Jayanta asserts that what is apprehended at the time of the cognition 'There is no jar' can not be merely the ground because it is also cognised at the time of the cognition of the existence of the jar. It is, therefore, necessary that there must be apprehension of something else and it is immaterial if that something else is called the ground devoid of the jar or the
non-existence of the that in the case of non-existence, the relation of viṣeṣaṇa-viṣeṣya-bhāva is possible without the relation of conjunction or inherence.
REFERENCES


3. The Vaisesika has nothing to do with existentialism, in terms of which these words should not be understood.


6. Same as *Vaisesika Philosophy* already referred to.

7. Indian thought makes no distinction between being and existence - a distinction newly made by existentialist philosophies.


15. Kanada; Vaisesika sutras, iii, ii, iv.

16. Ibid; iii, ii, 1.

17. Visvanatha; Kari kavali, P.V.


19. Vaisesika-Sutra; i, 1, 17.

20. Tarka-Bhasa, p.28.

21. Saptapadarthi of Sivaditya; Section 6.

22. Bhasapariccheda (Visvanatha), 97.


24. Vaisesika-Sutra, i, 1, 17.

25. Saptapadarthi of Sivaditya; p.39.

26. Bhasapariccheda; p.54-56.

27. Ibid; p.vi.

28. In Western thought it is the relationalists and Idealists that accept the reality of universals. But in Indian thought most of the Idealists reject their reality.

29. Kanada; Vaisesika-Sutras, 1, ii, 3.

30. Vaisvanatha; Kari kavali, p.6.

31. Some scholars prefer word "subsists" to "exists", but as being (satta) is also a universal, and as substance, quality, and action are kinds of
being or beings, the preference does not make much difference.

Besides, if being is a universal, why not substance-ness etc:

32. C.P. the problem of synonymity.
33. Prasastapada Bhasya; p.321.
34. Sridhara, Nyaya-Kandali; p.323.
35. Sivaditya; Saptapadarthi; p.12.
36. If may lead to confusion in thought if the word visesa is translated.
37. Visvanatha; Kari kavali, p.7.
38. It is better to translate Sanskrit words by adding "ness" to the English substantives and other words, as the case may be.
39. Vaisesika-Sutras; 1. 1. 4.
40. D.N. Shastri: Critique India Realism; p.398.
42. Ibid; p.9.
43. Ibid; p.8.
44. - Tarka-Samgraha of Annambhatta; edited by Bodas and Athalye. Bombay Sanskrit Series.
46. Supra; XI. 5.
47. Sloka-Vartika ; Abhava Section, 11.
48. Visvanatha; Karikavali. p.44.
49. We should note the distinction between quality (guna) and attribute 
(visesana) in the Nyaya Technical terminology. Quality can always 
be an attribute, but not vice-versa. *Gunas* are sounds, tastes, smells, 
colours etc. and are positive; but anything can be an attribute, an 
absence, a substance, or even a whole thing. The distinction is 
ignored in literary language.

50. Visvanatha; *Kari kavali*; p.47.

51. *Pratijayi – Prasanjana*.

52. Jayanta Bhava; *Nyaya-Manjari*, pp.46 to 47.


55. *Nyaya-Manjari*: p.226.


58. Ibid; p.51.


60. In the case of the atoms of earth, water and fire, there is colour, but 
is unmanifested, and therefore, the atoms are not perceptible.

61. *Indriyanam vastu prapya prakasa karitva –Niyamavali*.

62. Here the use of the term *vastu* (which means a reality) is not quite 
happy. See the concluding para of section 2 of this chapter.


65. *Nyaya-Kandali*: p.226. The Mimamsaka's argument is also given and refuted in NVT. P.97. and also in NM. Part 1, p.47.


68. *Nyayavartikaparyatika*, p.97.


71. XX, on *Sloka-Vartika, Abhava* 8 and 38.