CHAPTER I

KNOWLEDGE, VALID KNOWLEDGE AND SOURCE OF VALID KNOWLEDGE
Man finds himself in the possession of certain convictions which, roughly speaking, he calls knowledge. Further, he finds that all his convictions are not of the same value, and that he has to distinguish them as true or false. The awareness of this distinction naturally leads him to enquire into the origin and validity of all knowledge. Such a study, which, in the words of Dr. Ward is a systematic reflection concerning knowledge, and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science, is Epistemology. It will appear that while the acquirement of knowledge is common to all men, a systematic reflection about it has been the concern of few. Even among philosophers, not all of them have been alive to the problem of knowledge as a distinct branch of study. Whereas in the history of European Philosophy, the beginning of a systematic study of theory of knowledge may be traced to Locke's enunciation of the enquiry in his 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', and a definite formation of it to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'; in Indian Philosophy, the first systematic treatment of the means of knowledge the pramāṇas is to be found in Gautama's Nyāya-Sūtras, which also deals with the objects of knowledge prameya. The Nyāya Philosophy is primarily concerned with the conditions of valid thought and the means of acquiring a true knowledge of objects. Nyāya as a science lays down the rules and methods which are essentially necessary for a clear and precise understanding of all the materials of our knowledge as these are derived from observation and authority. With this end in view, the
science of Nyāya deals with all the processes and methods that are involved, either directly or indirectly, in the right and consistent knowledge of reality. That this is so appears clearly from the common use of the word ‘Ānvikṣikī’ as a synonym for the Nyāya-Śāstra. The name Ānvikṣikī means the science of the processes and methods of a reasoned and systematic knowledge of subjects, supervening on a vague understanding of them on the basis of mere perception and uncritical testimony. In other words, it is the science of an analytic and reflective knowledge of objects in continuation of and as an advance on the unreflective general knowledge in which we are more receptive than critical. It is the mediated knowledge of the contents of faith, feeling and intuition. Accordingly, Nyāya (literal meaning: methodical study) may be described as the science of the methods and conditions of valid thought and true knowledge of objects.

It should, however, be remarked here that the epistemological problem as to the methods and conditions of valid knowledge is neither the sole nor the ultimate concern of the Nyāya Philosophy. Epistemology in the arena of Indian Philosophy is developed as an aid to metaphysics. It provides the method for the proper understanding of the metaphysical investigations regarding the nature of the ultimate reality and the relation between the ultimate reality and the empirical self as well as the objective world. Though, every system of Indian Philosophy devotes a considerable part of discussion to
the epistemological and logical problems, yet their chief aim was to provide methodological explanation for metaphysical investigations. Gautama, the first systematic exponent of Epistemology in Indian Philosophy, discusses the question whether it is possible to conceive the means of knowledge independently of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. ¹ He maintains that while the existence of the means of knowledge is proved by the fact that there is knowledge of objects, just as the existence of a distant drum is proved by the fact that there is sound produced out of it,² their validity is proved by the means of knowledge themselves. In this respect, he compares the means of knowledge to a lamp which illuminates other things as well as itself.³

An examination of knowledge, which Epistemology undertakes, provides, however, a method of Metaphysical enquiry and criticism. The sages who expound different systems of Philosophy realised the nature of ultimate reality, through yogic practices. They tried to convey their supernatural and mystic experiences through words of various āgumās precisely and methodologically. Epistemology was sought as a method for correct understanding of the metaphysical experiences handed down to us; and we find that, in the history of Philosophy, whether consciously or unconsciously, it has been used as such. This is most true of our own times, when all metaphysical problems are attacked through an analysis of knowledge; and again, all Philosophical criticism is usually based upon Epistemological ground. The
same conception is implied in the term \textit{pramāṇa} in Indian Philosophy which signifies both means of knowledge and means of proof. The beginnings of the analysis of knowledge and means of proof for the beliefs which they had come to hold, for their own satisfaction, but still more, for producing conviction in others. This is evident from the fact that systematic logic in India took its rise from such rules and forms of debating as are found in some of the works of the early period. Hence, to regard Epistemology as a mere formal analysis of knowledge is not only futile but also untrue to facts.

Considered from this point of view, Epistemology can be exactly distinguished from Logic only in so far as the latter is treated in its purely formal aspect; otherwise, it is substantially the same. Unlike in Western Philosophy, Logic could not develop as a branch of study independent of metaphysical colouring in the arena of Indian Philosophy. The study of Epistemological and logical problems of Indian Philosophy under the heading \textit{Nyāya} which aims at discussing the process of knowing and argumentation cannot be called \textit{‘logic’} in the strict sense of the term. Logic in the west is understood as formal form of argumentation but Indian Philosophy does not demarcate formal from informal argumentation and consequently does not differentiate logic from means of knowledge. Moreover, the scope of Nyaya is wider than that of logic. While the former deals with all the means of knowledge with a metaphysical colouring, the latter is primarily concerned
with inferential problems. Thus, 'Nyāya' is the study of the means of knowing and the means of testing this knowledge and does not restrict its scope only to formal logic.

In order to discuss the validity of the various means of knowledge, Epistemology has to depend upon an analysis of the mental processes leading to them, and hence, it is intimately connected with Psychology. It was because of this close connection between the two studies that in the earlier works of Indian Philosophy an enquiry into the nature of the Pramānas is of a mixed nature; that is to say, the distinction between the Psychological and Epistemological aspects of the enquiry is not quite clear.

Before we undertake the problems of anupalabdhi or Non-cognition. For a detailed and systematic consideration, it is very necessary to survey in brief, the conceptions of different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding the nature of knowledge (jñāna), the criterion of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). The problem of knowledge (jñāna) has long engaged the attention of thinkers all over the world. What is the nature of knowledge? What are the means of acquiring it? what is the criterion of the truth of knowledge? Briefly, these are some of the issues which comprise the subject matter of the epistemological queries that lead to the formulation of a theory of knowledge. Even a general survey of the views of different scholars in Western Philosophy regarding these issues shows that there are two groups
of epistemologists, viz., the sceptic and the dogmatic. According to the former the problem of knowledge does not have any solution but the dogmatists believe that it is capable of being solved. In Indian Philosophy, though different systems have adopted divergent attitude towards these issues, yet even the materialist Carvakas attempt to analyse knowledge and its means in their own way and thus obviously one of the views is that the problem of knowledge is not beyond solution. Therefore, it is clear that scepticism in this regard has not clouded any school of Indian Philosophy.

i. The Nature of Knowledge (Jñāna):

As regards the nature of cognition there is a sharp difference of opinion among different systems of Indian Philosophy. Some systems hold that cognition is self-luminous (svaprakāśa), while the others assume that it can be revealed only by some other means of cognition.

Self-luminosity of cognition means that a piece of cognition is cognised by itself. It does not require any other cognition for its own illumination. It illumines itself and its object simultaneously. When a man has the cognition of something blue (nīla) he has at the same time the awareness of the cognition of something blue (nīla-dhī). This awareness is caused by cognition itself. But the term non-self-luminosity paraprakāśa means that a piece of cognition is cognised by some other means of cognition i.e. by perception or by inference.
The self-luminosity of cognition is accepted by the Buddhists, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, the Advaita-Vedāntins and the Jains.\textsuperscript{8} Cognition (buddhi or māhat) being unconscious, is realised by purusa, according to the Sāmkhyas. It is perceptible through anuvyayasāya (apperception), as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas. But it is merely inferable through jñatatā (cognisedness) as accepted by Kamalasaila. It is to be noted in this connection that each school of Indian philosophy has recognised the ideas regarding nature of cognition in accordance with its views on either realism or idealism.

The Sāmkhyas maintain that the cognition, being evolved from prakṛti, is of material nature. As such cognition is unconscious by itself\textsuperscript{9} and is illumined by purusa, which alone is self-conscious.\textsuperscript{10}

The Nyāya-Vaiśesikas put forward the theory of anuvyayasāya (apperception). When the external sense-organ comes into contact with an object, there arises the apprehension (vyayavasāya) of the object. This apprehension is not self-luminous. Its awareness arises by the apperception (anuvyayasāya) through the medium of internal sense-organ or the mind (mānas) which takes the first apprehension as its object.\textsuperscript{11} Thus according to the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas, cognition is not self-luminous, but is apprehensible only through another piece of cognition, which is called anuvyayasāya (apperception).
Kumārila expounds a different view. He, showing himself a greater realist than the Nyāya-Vāisēsikas, goes a step further, in order to show the predominance of external objects, asserts that cognition cannot be cognised perceptually, but is merely inferred through its effect. He contends that "It cannot apprehend itself while it is busy in apprehending an object. Though it is of illuminating nature, yet it depends upon 'something else' for its own manifestation. Just as the visual organ can manifest colour, but cannot manifest itself, so a cognition can manifest an object, but not itself. Its power of illumination is exhausted in manifesting an external object". Then the question arises, what is that 'something else' (anyat) which illuminines the cognition? That thing is 'manifestedness' or 'cognisedness' (prakāsata or jñātata), which, after the manifestation of the object, is produced in that object as its new property. The process is like this: "When an object comes in contact with the sense, the knowledge of that object is produced in the soul. That knowledge being formless and not self-luminous, cannot be directly perceived, but be produced a new quality called 'manifestedness' in the object. It is from this quality that the knowledge is inferred". In this connection, we may refer to one sarcastic remark of Jayanta Bhatta against the jñātata theory of Kumārila. He says "fearing whom, also have these Vedic-scholars (śrotriyah) developed such a defeatist mentality".
Against this strong realistic attitude of Kumārila, Prabhākara, under the influence of Buddhism, takes a bold step and expounds his famous theory of tripūti-samivita, according to which samivita (consciousness) being of self-luminous character, cognizes the three factors simultaneously – (i) it cognizes the object, (ii) it cognizes itself and (iii) it also cognizes the knower (the soul) and hence his theory is called tripūti samivita or tripartite perception.\textsuperscript{15}

The Buddhists are unanimous on this point, whether they are the Vaibhāsikas, the Sautrāntikas or the Idealists, that cognition is self-luminous (svaprākāśa). Even in one early work like the Milinda-Panha, explaining prajñā\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{-}} to the king Nagasena says, “Self-luminosity is also a character of prajñā\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{-}}.\textsuperscript{16} The Buddhists are so certain about the self-luminosity of cognition that they assert: “If cognition does not cognize itself, the cognition of the object is not possible”.\textsuperscript{17} In the Śloka-Vārtikā, Kumārila explained the same view of the Buddhists thus: “And so long as the illumination in the form of cognition (prajñā-khya-prakāśa) is not comprehended, even the object will not be apprehended, because its apprehension depends upon the cognition, just as the illumination of a jar depends upon the illumination of the lamp”.\textsuperscript{18} Explaining the same, he further asserts “Even if the objects have been produced, their apprehension, some times, does not occur either due to the absence of luminosity (as in case of peak darkness) or due to the presence of some impediment (like the obstruction of a wall); while in the case of cognition,
there is no impediment (in its illumination) at the time of its origination, nor is it as a non-luminous nature, on account of which it may not be apprehended (i.e. it is self-luminous and hence it is always apprehensible)". It is further added, "cognition is always produced before the apprehension of the object and its consciousness (sāmvedanam) must also occur at the same time (i.e. at the time of its origination), because if it is not cognised at the same time, it cannot be cognised afterwards. It is thus evident, from the above account that according to the Buddhists, cognition is of self-luminous nature. It originates before the apprehension of the object and is cognised at the same time.

The Buddhists are totally against the theory of "non-self-luminosity" (par-prakāśatva) of cognition, maintained by the realists, specially by the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas and the Bhatta Mīmāṁsakās. The Buddhists, as presented by Kumārila 'refute to opponents' theories of anuvyavasīva (apperception) and jñātata (cognisedness). Thus: "Cognition does not require the origination of another cognition, contrary to this if it is held that the cognition of previous cognition depends upon the latter one, then there would occur regressus ad infinitum". At another place Kumarila explains the Buddhists view further. He says that when one cognition is cognised by another cognition, then there would be regressus ad infinitum. But having found that recollection (smṛti) occurs about two things - i.e. about the object as well as its cognition, it is
assumed that all is apprehended (at one and the same time). Thus in case of apprehending all by one cognition only (it can be concluded that) every thing is possible by that alone (and no other cognition is required)".22

What the Buddhist really means to say is: When a person, after apprehending an object, say jar, recollects it afterwards, there arises in his mind the recollection of the jar as well as the cognition of the jar. These two formed recollection of a cognition (dvi-rūpa-smṛtiḥ) shows that at the time of the apprehension of the jar, the person had cognised its cognition too, which proves the self-luminous nature of cognition.23 This idea, mentioned in the Śloka-Vārttika, fully corroborates with a verse of Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dīnāga.24 Later on the same idea of two-formed recollection (dvi-rūpa-smṛtiḥ) is conveyed by Dharmakīrti.25 Śāntarakṣita26 and Kamalaśīla27 in their respective treatises.28

ii. Valid Knowledge (Pramā) :

In the course of Philosophical investigations, we find ourselves in the possession of certain convictions regarding reality and methods of acquiring it. The awareness of the distinction between true and false knowledge naturally leads us to verify the validity of this conviction through various methods which may legitimately be termed as pramāṇa. Vātsyāyana, the author of Nyāya-Bhāṣya defines Nyāya as examination of an object through the pramāṇa.29 The basic aim of the pramāṇa is to test the Validity of various convictions.
But, the convictions which stand the test of validity are the pramā which denotes true or valid knowledge. Thus, pramā in Indian Philosophy, has two-fold purpose: of testing the validity of conviction and to give rise to new convictions of validity.

Different systems of Indian Philosophy have expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of pramā. Prof. D.M. Datta seems perfectly right in his observation that "pramā is generally defined as a cognition having the two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (abādhita�ra or viarthatva and anadhitatva), and that as regards the first characteristic — truth — all schools of Indian Philosophy are unanimous." But on the second characteristic there is difference of opinion. It is, however, seen that even those who hold truth as an essential criterion of knowledge differ among themselves regarding the meaning of truth.

Now let us see what valid knowledge means and what are the methods of arriving at it. As we have seen before, Gautama, Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati-Misra and Jayanta refer to knowledge through the terms 'buddhi', 'upalabdhi' or 'jñāna', irrespective of the validity or non-validity of a particular type of cognition. The later Nyāyikas, however, use the term 'pramā', for valid knowledge and 'apramā' for non-valid cognition. The terms 'pramāna', pramitt, 'prameya', and 'pramānya', were, however, as current in the old Nyāya as in the later. So we may conclude that old
Nayāyikas used pramāṇa in the sense of valid knowledge. The later Mīmāṃsā writers adopt these terms. But kumarila and his commentators are not known to have used them. They have used the terms ‘pramāṇa’ and pramāṇya and apramāṇya to express the opposite notions. The latter two terms have been invariably taken in the same sense while the former two have been used rather indiscriminately. The term ‘pramāṇa’ sometimes stands for a means of right knowledge whose result is termed ‘pramiti’ or ‘miti’ and ‘pramāṇya’ that means the capacity of a means to generate a correct knowledge.

The Nyāya definition of pramāṇa or valid knowledge is that it is a presentational cognition (anubhāva), in which there is a characterization, in thought, of the object as it is in reality (yathārtha), as well as a definite assurance of its being objectively valid (asamdigdha). Pramāṇa or valid knowledge also has been defined by the Nyaya as true presentational cognition (yathārthanubhāva). If we analyse this conception of pramāṇa, we shall get three essential factors involved in all valid knowledge. Knowledge as a function implies a subject-object relation. In all knowledge, be it true or false or neither, we see that a subject or knower stands related to an object, in so far as the former has a cognition of the latter. When, however, we do not have any knowledge or cognition in view but only true or valid knowledge (pramāṇa), there must be another factor, namely, a method of knowledge (pramāṇa). Hence, we see that the conception of pramāṇa or valid knowledge implies three
necessary factors, namely, the subject (pramāña) the object (prameyā) and the method of knowledge (pramāṇa).³¹

The Vaiśeṣikas consider certainly (lack of doubt), non-contradictoriness and definiteness as the marks of valid knowledge. Prasastapada divides knowledge into vidya and avidyā³² which correspond to the pramā (valid knowledge) and apramā (non-valid knowledge) respectively. Sridhara defines vidya as firm, uncontradicted and definite cognition.³³ Thus, the definition introduces definiteness (adhyāvasasya), as a mark of valid knowledge. In this respect, he appears to be influenced by the Nyāya view. But if his view is accepted as a correct interpretation of the Bhāṣya of Prasastapada, it is practically identical with the Bhāṭṭa view of valid knowledge as a definite, true and new cognition.

According to the Buddhists, the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. They define Pramā as the knowledge which reveals an object that is capable of successful volition,³⁴ or as the knowledge which makes us reach the object revealed by it.³⁵ Kamalasilā, however, further clarifies that the valid knowledge refers to a possible successful action, though not to the actual achievement of the object.³⁶ In all these cases, it is common that the validity of knowledge depends upon the success in the practical activity. The Buddhists conception of truth is pragmatic, while the Bhāṭṭa conception is realistic. According to the Buddhists, a knowledge is true if it harmonises with
volitional experience; truth does not consist in its harmony with the real nature of objects, because reality is dynamic, while knowledge represents it as static. Correspondence is a meaningless term for the Buddhists because objects of knowledge are changing from moment to moment, so that correspondence can never be established.

The Buddhist definition is too wide because it applies to such cases of memory also that it possesses practical efficiency. It is too narrow because it does not apply to inferential cognition of past and future objects, which lacks practical efficiency. If truth is equated with practical efficiency, the knowledge of such objects as one destroyed instantaneously after their birth e.g. lightning, will always be false, because they cannot be attained.37

According to the Jaina logician, definiteness is the essential mark of valid knowledge. Vādidevasūri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which reveals itself, and the other objects.38 The characteristic of definiteness here, however, does not differ essentially from the view of the Naiyāyikas because definiteness is further stated by Jaina logicians themselves to be the determination of an object in the form in which it really exists.39 Siddhasena considers non-contradictoriness in place of definiteness as a mark of pramāṇa.40 The definition of pramāṇa offered by Ākālanka41 reveals that he considers non-contradictoriness and novelty as the mark of valid knowledge. Ratnaprabhacarya explains ‘determinate cognition’ as that which determines as
object in the form in which it really exists. Accordingly, absence of doubt and truth are recognised as the essential mark of valid knowledge, while newness is rejected and hence, memory is accepted as a form of valid knowledge.

According to Kumārila “Valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects, which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions.”

Unbeka says that the word drudā excludes doubt from valid knowledge and ‘na visamvādamṛcchati’ (which is not contradicted by other cognitions), which he reads in the place of ‘napi visamvādamṛcchati’ excludes error or illusion. Sucarita-Mistra comments that valid knowledge is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge in the form ‘this is not so’ and that it contains some new information (viṣṇāna) about its subject. Valid knowledge, therefore, is a certain, true and informative cognition of something.

Pārthasārathi extracts from Śūra 1.1.5. of Purva Mīmāṁsā the definition of valid knowledge as an apprehension of previously unapprehended object, which is devoid of defects in its source and is not contradicted by subsequent experience. Later on he defines valid knowledge as “a true cognition which relates to something previously uncognised”. This definition is practically the same as the former except that in the former one the source from which discrepancy may creep in knowledge, viz. the defects of the sense-organs etc., is mentioned and the possibility of the falsification of a valid knowledge in future is precluded. Pārthasārathi mentions three distinctive features of valid
knowledge, viz., (1) its objects are not remembered as having been previously known, (2) it conforms to the real nature of its object, and (3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object. Thus novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge and if any one of these is absent in a knowledge, it ceases to be valid.

A knowledge which does not add something to our present stock of information, cannot be valid. Validity consists in discovering new objects or new features of known objects for thought. Valid knowledge is an advance on what we already know. The Bhatta considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. There is no use in knowing what we already know. Knowledge cannot be separated from the practical value it has for us. The objects in our environment are always changing and the social conditions never continue in the same form. We have to make fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances, and for this purpose knowledge must reveal the changing aspects of things. The practical side of knowledge cannot be neglected when we consider its epistemological worth. Thus, according to the Bhatta a valid knowledge is essentially useful and hence it must reveal something new.

Here a theoretical difficulty arises: Should a continuous perception of something be treated as valid or not? We have such perceptions very frequently, and what the perception reveals in the subsequent moments does
not appear to be different from what is revealed in the first moment. For instance, I have a flower on my table and look at it continuously for some seconds; but I do not find it different in latter seconds from what I find it in the first second. The cognition other than that of the first second do not reveal anything new. Should they then be invalid? The Bhāṣya answer is that newness marks everyone of these cognitions, because, though the object of all such cognitions is identically the same; yet it is cognised as existing in different moments of time in each. The existence of the flower in a subsequent moment cannot be apprehended by its cognition in the preceding moment. If time-moments are symbolised by \( t_1, t_2, t_3 \) etc. and the perceived object by \( o \), then the object of the first moment cognition is \( o t_1 \), that of the second moment cognition is \( o t_2 \) and so on. Thus, each of the cognitions reveals a new thing, all are valid.

It may be objected that though there is a difference among the successive moments of time, yet it cannot be cognised because it is too subtle. The answer is that such statements as ‘I have been seeing this thing since morning till now’; ‘I saw the thing first in the preceding moment’ and the like become unintelligible if the difference of time is not perceived. In these we have a direct consciousness of time. Time is not imperceptible as the Vaiśeṣikas hold. It is true that time has no shape, but perceptibility has nothing to do with shape. That of which we have a direct consciousness is perceptible.
Therefore, continuous perception is not excluded when valid knowledge is defined as the cognition of a previously unknown real objects.46

The Sāṁkhya and Vedānta systems also define valid knowledge along the Bhāṭṭa line. They recognise novelty as a mark of valid knowledge and try to justify the novelty of successive cognitions in a continuous perception similarly. But unlike the Bhāṭṭa they offer an alternative solution of the difficulty. They assert that the continuous perception of an object, for instance, a jar, is one cognition and not a series of successive cognitions, because the mental mode (antarākyāraṇa-vṛtti) that assumes the shape of the jar is one and lasts till another mode arises. Thus, the cognition is one and has one object throughout its duration. The numerical difference among cognitions should be based on that of their objects and not on the moments of time. If I perceive a jar continuously for five seconds, I do not have five cognition but one. If I perceive a jar continuously for the first three seconds and then a flower for the next two seconds, I have two different cognitions and not five.

According to Sāṁkhya valid knowledge is the mode of ‘buddhi’ which apprehends an object, undoubted, real and not known before.47 The definition, like the Bhāṭṭa one recognises novelty, absence of doubt and truth as the essential marks of valid knowledge. Both the Sāṁkya and the Bhāṭṭa are realists. But there is one important difference between the two. According to the Sāṁkhya ‘buddhi’ or cognition assumes the form of the object. Thus the
truth of a cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondence to its object in the sense in which a true copy has it to its original. But the Bhāṭṭa is opposed to the copy-theory of knowledge. According to him cognition is formless. Knowledge reveals objects, but it does not assume any form. Knowledge is judgmental. It arises in the form of such judgments as ‘this is a jar’, ‘this is blue’ etc., but not in the form of pictures. When I see a rose, I judge it to be a rose, and my seeing is true because the rose is actually there, not because I have a picture in my mind which faithfully copies the rose.

The Advaita Vedānta definition of validity has more points of disagreement. Dharmarājādhibarindra gives two alternative definitions, viz., “Valid knowledge is that knowledge which apprehends an object that is not already known and which is not contradicted” and “Valid knowledge is an uncontradicted knowledge”. The first definition excludes memory from valid knowledge, while the second includes it. Thus the Vedāntin is not necessarily opposed to memory and he does not mention certitude as an essential mark of valid knowledge. However, both Vedāntin and the Bhāṭṭa mention (abādhita) or ‘non-contradiction’ as a mark or validity. There is a more outstanding difference between the two in that the Vedāntin distinguishes between relative and absolute truth, while for the Bhāṭṭa all truth is absolute and all that is not absolutely true is false. Dharmarājādhibarindra says "the term
'not contradicted' (abādhīta) means 'not contradicted during the transmigratory state'.49 All empirical cognitions according to the Vedāntin, are true only so long as the ultimate truth, the identity of all existence, is not realised. Even the illusory cognition and dream cognition are true so long as they last. But the Bhāṭṭa is definitely opposed to the truth of illusions and dreams and to the falsehood of empirical cognitions.50

Salikanatha, a commentator of Prābhākara, criticises the Bhāṭṭa definition of valid knowledge as follows:-

In a continuous perception the successive cognitions apprehend the same object; so all the cognitions except the first cease to be valid. Kumārila says that they are valid as they apprehend different moments of time. But the difference between two successive moments of time cannot be apprehended, because it is too subtle. Thus the Bhāṭṭa definition is too narrow. Again, the word 'drdha' in that definition is useless. This word is interested with a view to exclude doubt from valid knowledge; but doubt is already excluded when valid knowledge is said to be an apprehension of the previously unapprehended. Doubt is not one cognition. When some tall object is cognised indefinitely as 'a man or a post', the tallness is perceived which revives the memories of 'man' and 'post' in the mind, and the perceiver doubts whether the tallness belongs to a man or a post. Here the element of perception is valid and the element of recollection is invalid, because it is the
apprehension of the apprehended. Therefore, Bhāṣṭa definition is redundant. It is redundant in one more respect. The word ‘avisamvādi’ (unerring) is absolutely unnecessary, because all knowledge which is not memory, is true. Even illusions are true so far as they are of the nature of experience (anubhūthi) while the element of memory in them is false.51

Prābhākara’s definition of valid knowledge is the same as that of later Nyāya except that he does not feel the necessity of including the term ‘yathārthatva’ in the definition. Salikanatha gives the following definition of valid knowledge:

“Valid knowledge is experience, and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience”. In a continuous perception the later cognitions arising from sense-object intercourse, like the first cognition, are different from memory, and hence they are valid. Recognition too is valid, because it is not produced solely from impression. It is an experience aided by impression. Memory is not valid in as much as it depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently. Sometimes a past experience reinstates itself and its past character is forgotten and thus it appears to be a new experience instead of a recollection. It also is invalid because it depends solely on the impression for its birth.52
Prābhākara’s definition of valid knowledge ‘anubhūti’ is vague, for it is difficult to define the term ‘anubhūti’. From the verse quoted above it is obvious that ‘anubhūti’ is a cognition other than memory and that it is produced sometimes by such cases as the operation of the senses which are different from impressions and sometimes by the cooperation of such causes with impressions as in the case of recognition and inference. So far there is no difficulty. But the difficulty arises when Salikanatha differentiates ‘anubhūti’ from memory on the ground that the former does not depend on any other cognition while the latter depends on a past cognition. Inference depends on the recollection of a general rule and the perception of some mark, and determinate perception too depends on the indeterminate perception. Then, are they not ‘anubhūti’? If they are not ‘anubhūti’ they can never be valid according to the definition of valid knowledge.53 Again, there is a practical difficulty also. We are ordinarily aware, when a cognition arises, of its being a memory if it is memory and thus by the method of exclusion we can easily know whether a cognition is memory or ‘anubhūti’. But some times when memory is obscured a memory – cognition is taken to be ‘anubhūti’ and sometimes an ‘anubhūti’ is taken to be a memory-cognition. Now, as there is no means of knowing real nature of a cognition except the direct consciousness of an individual, we cannot be confident in the above cases as to the correctness of our judgment of validity or invalidity. Prabhakara says that
memory is invalid. But he merely says it dogmatically without showing any reason why it should be called invalid. After all it is also a form of knowledge like 'anubhūti'. Kumārila, on the other hand, points out that memory repeats as old experience and does not add anything new to what we already known. The difference between 'anubhūti' and memory cannot be other than that the former gives something new while the latter repeats an old experience, and if Prābhākara chooses to appeal to reason rather than be dogmatic, he cannot offer any other ground for the indivisibility of memory save its being an apprehension of the apprehended. Hence, he cannot but recognise newness as a condition or validity.

Again, Prābhākara's definition is too wide as it applies to doubt and illusion also. He says that doubt and illusion are valid so far as they are 'anubhūti'. But the duty of a philosopher is to examine the grounds of the concepts that are universally held and not to destroy them, so Prābhākara cannot go against the verdict of common-sense that doubt and illusion are invalid. He says that doubt and illusion are invalid so far as the element of memory is involved in them. But they are not recognised by people to be invalid on the ground of the memory - element, but on that of their being respectively unassured and false. Therefore, Prābhākara has to accept newness, certitude and truth as the essential characteristics of valid knowledge, and therefore all his objections against the Bhāṭṭa definition fall to the ground.
Pārthasārathi points out some inconsistencies in Prābhākara's view. According to Prābhākara's definition a dream - cognition, which arises solely from mental impressions, is invalid; but this is not consistent with his view that a dream-cognition is valid so far as the elements of cognition and the cogniser in it is concerned. In all cognitions, whatever, their status, the self and the cognition are, according to Prābhākara, necessarily known and validity known, and dream-cognition, too is a cognition. If Prābhākara says that a dream-cognition, being memory in respect of its object and 'anūbhūti' in respect of its form and the cogniser, is partly valid and partly invalid, then recognition too, involving an element of memory and an element of 'anubhūti', must be called partly valid and partly invalid. But this is against the universally accepted opinion of people. Either a cognition is wholly valid or wholly invalid. Practical activities of life cannot be based on partly valid and partly invalid cognitions. Again, the illusion of a yellow conch will be wholly valid as it does not involve any memory and, hence, is purely an 'anubhūti' but none can accept this. Prābhākara's definition is not a definition of valid knowledge at all. When it is said that all knowledge except memory is valid knowledge, Prābhākara must have the generally accepted conception of validity in his mind and after examining all knowledge in the light of that conception he must have arrived at the above conclusion.
Thus all the systems unanimously hold validity or truth as the characteristic of *pramāṇa* but differ in respect of the mark of validity of truth. The above discussion of the nature of *pramāṇa* further reveals that according to some schools like the Śāṅkhyas and Purva-Mīmāṁsā novelty also is an essential part or differentia of valid knowledge. Some systematists like the Vaiśeṣikas and Jainas do not consider novelty as a mark of valid knowledge since they include remembrance (*smṛti*) into the case of valid knowledge. Some schools like the Advaita are indifferent to the controversy. Dharmarāja Advaryu defines *pramāṇa* in two ways with and without validity as the mark of valid knowledge. Here, the crux of the problem lies in the acceptance or rejection of validity of remembrance as a means of knowledge. The Mīmāṁsakas and the Śāṅkhyas have accepted novelty as a mark of *pramāṇa* to exclude remembrance from the domain of valid knowledge. The Jainas also accept remembrance among the forms of valid mediate knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta is indifferent to the problem. The Naiyāyikas consider the presentation knowledge (*ānumāna*) as a mark of *pramāṇa* and exclude remembrance which is not the presentation of an object but a reproduction of previous experience solely caused by the impressions of past experience. The recognition of novelty as an essential factor of valid knowledge further poses the question of the ground for inclusion of the persistent knowledge of the same object (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) into the valid knowledge because the
persistent knowledge is considered as a form of valid knowledge by all systematists. The different schools assign different reasons to justify the inclusion of this kind of knowledge into valid knowledge.

iii. The Source of Valid Knowledge (Pramāṇa):

The organisation of knowledge presupposes a subject, an object, a source or means to acquire knowledge and the resultant cognition. Vatsyayana aptly remarks: "He, who is induced to an action out of his desire to seek or shun an object, is pramāta. The object that is cognised, is prameya. The knowledge of the object is pramiti. And the apparatus whereby the object is apprehended is pramāṇa. With these four, the circuit of cognition of an object completes itself." 58

Pramāṇa derivatively means the instrument of valid knowledge (pramāyāḥ kāram). Hence, generally speaking we may say that pramāṇa is the means or source of right knowledge. It is that which gives us valid knowledge, and only valid knowledge of objects. So, it has been said: "There cannot be any right understanding of things except by means of pramāṇa. A subject arrives at the valid knowledge of objects by means of pramāṇa, for the existence and nature of objects are to be ascertained only by such cognitions as are based on pramāṇa". Again, we are told: "Pramāṇa is the cause of valid cognition of objects, inasmuch as it gives us a knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves". 59 Pramāṇa has a real correspondence with
objects, in the sense that the nature and attributes of objects, as revealed by pramāṇa, are uncontradictiorily true of them, despite all variations in time, place and other conditions.  

So far we are given to understand, not what a pramāṇa exactly is, but what the general character of pramāṇa must be. We do not go beyond such general description of pramāṇa when we are told by others that “pramāṇa is that which is invariably related to pramāṇa” or “to be pramāṇa is never to be disconnected from a knower possessing right knowledge”. All this means only that pramāṇa is the kāraṇa or means of pramāṇa or valid knowledge. What then is a kāraṇa and how is it constituted? In order to answer the first part of this question we should follow the distinction between kāraṇa and kāraṇa (means and cause).

A cause has been defined as the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect (ananyatha siddha niyata purvabhavi). Conversely, an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent. Or, an effect is what begins to be and thereby negates its antecedent non-existence. There are three kinds of causes, namely, the constituent (samavayi), the non-constituent (asamavayi) and the efficient (nimitta). The constituent cause is the substratum in which the effect is inherent, e.g. the threads of the cloth. The non-constituent cause is the mediate cause of an effect. It determines the effect only in so far as it stands as an inherent attribute of a constituent cause. Its causal efficiency,
therefore, is mediated through its intimate relation to the material or constituent cause. In relation to the effect 'cloth' the contact of the threads is the mediate cause of the colour or cloth. The efficient cause is different from both the constituent and non-constituent causes. It is not merely the passive substratum in which the effect inheres, nor any inherent attribute of the substratum that indirectly determines the effect. Rather, it is the agency that acts on both the constituent and non-constituent causes and makes them produce the effect. In relation to the cloth, the loom and such other agents constitute the efficient cause. It is the efficient cause that is to be regarded as kāraṇa as means, because it is principally concerned in bringing about the effect. While the first two are general causes or rather conditions of the effect, the last is actually the operative cause of it. It is the special cause, or simply, the cause of the effect.63

Now reverting to the definition of pramāṇa, we may say that it is the specific cause of valid knowledge as distinguished from its general causes or universal conditions. Pramāṇa is the unique operative cause (kāraṇa) of right knowledge (pramāṇa). It does not, however, follow from this that pramāṇa is a simple concept denoting a single thing. On the other hand, we are told that it denotes a complex of many conditions which are partly physical or mental in nature. In fact, any instance of knowledge involves a long and complicated process which is either physical and physiological or mental or both. The
visual perception of a jar, for example is conditioned by physical contact between the eyes and the object as well as by internal operations of the visual organ, its contact with manas or the mind, and that of the latter with soul. Hence, *pramāṇa* is taken to mean the entire complex or collection of all the specific physical conditions (*bodhābodha svabhāva sāmagrī*) that are actually operative in bringing about a valid and assured cognition of objects (*pramāṇa*). This however, does not include such universal conditions of all knowledge as subject and object, time and space, etc., within the compass of *pramāṇa* or the method of knowledge. Hence, the final definition of *pramāṇa* is that it is the complex of specific conditions, other than the subject and that object, which does not normally fail to produce valid knowledge.\(^{64}\)

The Vaiśeṣika system defines *pramāṇa* as the unique operative cause (*kāraṇa*) of both true presentational knowledge and memory.\(^ {65}\) It would take memory as a distinct *pramāṇa* or method of knowledge like perception and inference. The Nyāya restricts *pramāṇa* to the ground of presentational knowledge has been set aside and memory has been rightly shown to be an independent method of knowledge by the Vaiśeṣikas.\(^ {66}\)

The Jainas take *pramāṇa* in a general sense so as to make it applicable to both immediate presentational knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and mediate knowledge (*parokṣa*). So far, they are true. Under mediate knowledge they include sense - perception, inference, memory and recognition. In this general
sense, *pramāṇa* is knowledge that reveals both itself and its object in a way that is not liable to contradiction. According to the Jainas, *pramāṇa* is the nature of knowledge. Amongst various definitions of *pramāṇa* offered by the Jaina logicians, it is commonly accepted that the *pramāṇa* reveals itself as well as its object.\(^6\)

Siddhasena states that *pramāṇa* is that which illumines itself the object and which is not sublated.\(^6\) Here it is to be seen that term ‘*bādhavivarjita*’ is the same as ‘*bādhavarjita*’ of the Mīmāṁsakas and ‘*avisamvadin*’ of Dharmakirti. Thus, the Jaina theory of *pramāṇa* as presented by Hemachandra is the synthesis of the views of all the systems. It is perhaps the reason that Jayanta does not think it worthwhile to refute the Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* under a separate heading. It is one of the greatest qualities of Jayanta that he avoids repetition.

The Buddhist philosophers differ amongst themselves with regard to the definition of *pramāṇa*. The Sautrantika and the Vaibhāsika, the two realistic schools of Buddhist Philosophy, maintain that *pramāṇa* is that which gives a true knowledge of objects. But true knowledge (*pramāṇa*) they mean the identity of content between the cognition and the cognitum, but the idealist school of Buddhism namely, the Vijnanavada which is also known as Yogacara, is of the view that consciousness (*vijñāna*) is the principle of self-manifestation and it is the source of all knowledge. According to Vijnānavadins, *Pramāṇa* is practically
useful knowledge and *pramāṇa* is that which brings about such knowledge. Nagarjuna, the propounder of the Madhyamika school of Buddhism, refers to the existence of *pramāṇa* in his work. *Pramāṇa-viddhavaansa* there is no question of his accepting or defining the concept of *pramāṇa*. Dinnaga on the other hand presents a positive theory of knowledge, which is in sharp contrast to Nagarjuna’s denial of the means of knowledge.

Dinnaga includes in his definition of *pramāṇa* the characteristic ‘sava-samvithi’ meaning that the effect of *pramāṇa* should involve self-cognition. Dharmakirti maintains that *pramāṇa* is an uncontradicted experience. Hence, *pramāṇa* or the method of knowledge fulfils its function when it shows an object in such a way as to enable us to act successfully in relation to it. In short, *prama* is practically useful knowledge, and *pramāṇa* is the source of such knowledge.

According to the Śāmkhya, *pramāṇa* is a modification of *buddhi*. Kapila states that *pramāṇa* is a determinate knowledge of an object not known before and *pramāṇa* is that which is most conducive to such a knowledge. Vijñanabhikṣu is of the view that whenever the *purusa* is spoken of as having valid cognition, the modification of *buddhi* is *pramāṇa*, but when the *buddhi* is held as one that cognises, it is the sense-object contact, etc., that constitute *pramāṇa*. Whereas Vijñanabhikṣu suggests two alternative features of *pramāṇa*. Vacaspati is definite that it is a modification of the *citta*, having a
content free from all that is doubtful and erroneous. Isvarakrsna simply maintains that *pramāṇa* is that which brings about the cognition of objects.\textsuperscript{73}

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga concept of *pramāṇa* is different from all these. Patanjali holds that pramāṇa is the function of *citta* (*citta-vṛtti*).\textsuperscript{74} The *Yuktidipikā* states that since the *citta* is one, the *pramāṇa* is one only.\textsuperscript{75} It is through limiting adjuncts that it is said to be three-fold.\textsuperscript{76} Vācaspati Misra also accepts the usually accepted meaning of *pramāṇa* as the means of valid knowledge. He, however, offers two definitions of *pramāṇa* which imply two different opinions regarding the nature of *pramāṇa* also. He defines *pramāṇa* as the modification of *citta* (*citta-vṛtti*) the object of which is not either doubtful (*sandigdhā*) contradictory (*vipākā*) or known (*adhigata*).\textsuperscript{77} The *pramāṇa* as the means of that will be the sense-object contact etc. He gives an alternative definition of *pramāṇa* as the apprehension of the *pureṣa* which results from the modification of *buddhi*.\textsuperscript{78} In that case, the *pramāṇa* will be the modification of the *buddhi* itself. Vijnanabhikshu explains it more vividly. When the result of knowledge is considered to be located in the *buddhi*, the *pramāṇa* is the sense-object contact, etc., and when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in the *pureṣa*, the *pramāṇa* is the function of the *buddhi* itself.\textsuperscript{79} Vijnanabhikshu also makes it clear that the use of *pramāṇa* with reference to the sense, is always indirect.\textsuperscript{80}
The Prābhākara school of Purva-Mīmāṃsā defines pramāṇa as immediate experience (anubhūti). Śalikantha states that valid knowledge is an experience, which is different from memory. Prābhākara’s definition on the whole is vague, since it is difficult to define the term ‘anubhūti’. It is too wide because it applies to doubt and illusion. Basically however, Prābhākara’s views on this issue are more or less identical with that of Nyāya.

Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and his followers have formulated such a general definition of pramāṇa, that consists in the combination of the main tenets of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as well as of the Buddhist Schools. According to Kumārila, pramāṇa is a definite and assured cognition of objects which does not require confirmation by other cognitions. Umbeka maintains that the terms ‘dṛṣṭā’ and ‘avisamveda’ exclude doubt and error respectively from valid knowledge. Pardhasarathi explains the Bhāṭṭa standpoint stating that a pramāṇa should be free from defects in the source and subsequent contradiction of the revealed truth. It should not cover the knowledge of the already-known objects. Briefly speaking, according to the Bhatta’s, a pramāṇa is a method of cognition of an unknown object which is not liable to be sublated by subsequent experience.

The Advaita Vedānta defines pramāṇa as the operative cause (kāraṇa) of pramāṇa or true knowledge. It defines pramāṇa in two ways. First, pramāṇa means knowledge that has both the characteristic of novelty and un-
contradictedness (*anadhistavaodhita*). This means that true knowledge is uncontradicted and original, i.e. that gives us new information. Secondly, *pramāṇa* is taken to mean simply uncontradicted knowledge of objects. The result is that *pramāṇa* is made to exclude or include memory accordingly as we accept the one or the other way of definition *pramāṇa* or true knowledge.  

In any inquiry into the Indian theories of the valid sources of cognitions or *pramāṇas*, it is necessary to note at the very outset that there is no unanimity among the different Schools of Indian Philosophy about the number of these sources. The minimum number is one, standing for perception (*pratyakṣa*) which is regarded by the materialists and naturalists led by the Carvakas as the only source of cognition. The next higher number is two, including perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) which, in the view of Buddhism and Kanāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika School of Indian Philosophy, are the only two sources of cognition. The Sāṁkhya goes further in admitting three sources of cognition, including testimony (*śabda; āptavacana*) in addition to perception and inference. One section of the Nyāya is in agreement with the Sāṁkhya in admitting these three only, but another section adds to this number by recognizing comparison (*upamāna*) as a separate source of cognition. Further addition to the number is made by the Mīmāṃsa School, with the result that the sources of cognition become five in number, including presumption (*arthāpatti*) over and above the four recognised by the Nyāya. But even then,
the process of the increase of the number of the sources of cognition did not come to an end. For in the hands of the Vedānta and the section of Mīmāṃsā Philosophy headed by Kumārila, the number increased to six with the addition of non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) to the list admitted by the Mīmāṃsā School as a whole. One wished, however, that the tendency to multiply the sources of cognition came to an end at least at this stage. But that did not happen. For it was left for the Paurāṇikas (believers in the authority of the semi-historical branch of Sanskrit literature known as the purāṇas) to increase the number of the sources of cognition to eight by means of the addition of tradition (aitihva) and inclusion (saunbhava). But even this was not the end of the matter. Mention has been made in Indian Philosophical literature of two more sources of cognition respectively called gesture (ceṣṭā) and elimination (prariśeṣa).

It means that philosophers usually admit perception, inference and testimony as separate and independent sources of cognition, and that now where else outside India have they cared to consider the possibility of there being sources of cognition other than these three. It is especially in view of this that it would be worthwhile to try to ascertain whether comparison (upamāna), presumption (anupalabdhi), etc., which have come to be recognised as additional independent sources of cognition within the field of Indian Philosophy, really deserve to be so recognised. Let us then begin the
consideration of anupalabdhi (non-cognition), it being kept in view, however, that there is a fundamental difference between the Bhātta, Mīmāṇsā and Advaita Vedānt on the one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the other, with regard to the understanding of the nature of this source of cognition.

It would be useful to consider here how the chief champions of anupalabdhi the Bhāttras and Advaitins maintain that it is a distinct pramāṇa and should not be brought under pratyakṣa or anumāna and on what grounds the Naiyāyikas refuse to recognise it as a distinct pramāṇa.
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5. Ibid,


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15. (i) *Prakarana pancika*, p.171.

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19. Ibid Ka, 23, 24 (Choukhambha).


22. Ibid, Ka, 187 & 188.


29. *Nyaya-Bhasya*, 1.1


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37. Kasika of Sucarita-Misra, (Trivandrum) on Sloka-Vartika of Kumarila (Chowkhamba), II.76.
39. Prameyar-Kamalamartanada, p.27.
41. Astasahasri, p.175.
42. Sloka-Vartika of Kumarila (Chowkhamba) 2.80.
43. Sastra-Dipika of Parthasarathi (Nimaya Sagar), p.45.
44. Ibid.
45. Nyaya-Ratnamala of Parthasarathi, (Chowkhamba), p.35.
47. Samkhya-Karika of Iswara Krishna, 4.
50. Sloka-Vartika of Kumarila (Chowkhamba), Niralambana, VI, 10.
51. Prakaranapancika of Salikanatha (Chowkhamba), pp.40-42.
52. Ibid.
54. Sloka-Vartika of Kumarila (Chowkhamba), V.11.

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55. *Kasika of Sucarita-Misra* (Trivandrum) on *Sloka-Vartika of Kumarila*, V.11.


57. *Sastra-Dipika of Parthasarathi* (Nirnaya Sagar), p.45.


59. Ibid, i.i.1., IV.ii.29.

60. *Nyaya-Vartika-Tatparya-Tika*, Ibid.


62. This implies that the relation between cause and effect is one-one relation, there being only one cause for one effect. It thus excludes the idea of a plurality of causes as endorsed by common sense and ordinary text book of logic.


66. Vide Infra, BK, V, Chapter XX, Section 4.

67. Cf. fn. 17 and 20.

68. *Nyaya-Vartika.*

70. *Pramana-Vartika*, II-1.

71. *Nyaya-Bindutika*, (Bibliotheca Edition), Chapter, I.

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