INTRODUCTION
There is much difference of opinion among Indian Epistemologists as to what the ultimate sources of human knowledge are. For the Carvākas, who are radical empiricists, pratyakṣa or perception is the only valid source of knowledge and all valid knowledge comes from perception. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that pratyakṣa or perception and anumāna or inference are the ultimate sources of valid knowledge. According to Sāṁkhya and the Yoga systems, śabda or verbal testimony also should be recognised as an independent source of knowledge like perception and inference. The Sāṁkhya includes upamāna and arthāpatti under inference, and abhāva under perception. Naiyāyikas are in favour of the view that there are four independent sources of knowledge namely, perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison. According to them, the other sources of knowledge namely arthāpatti or presumption and anupalabdhi or non-apprehension recognised by the systems of Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta may be included within these four and so need not be taken as ultimate or independent sources of knowledge. The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā adds arthāpatti or presumption to the list of four pramāṇas admitted by Nyāya. The Bhāṭṭa School of Purva Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita School of Uttara Mīmāṁsā recognised the above five pramāṇas to the addition of Anupalabdhi or non-apprehension. According to the Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta, arthāpatti is a separate source of knowledge, because it gives us a knowledge of facts which
cannot be otherwise explained. It cannot be explained by perception or inference. According to the Advaita Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa, *amupalabdhi* is an independent pramana or ultimate source of knowledge. It is a unique cause of such a presentative knowledge of non-existence as is not due to inference or any other source of knowledge.

It is, therefore, of immense importance for a student of Indian Epistemology to probe into the question as to why different systems accept different number of pramanas. It is worthwhile to inquire whether the acceptance of the number of pramanas by a system is based on its ontological commitments or convictions. It is of course possible to compare any two or more systems accepting different number of pramanas and find out whether a system accepting more number of pramanas is committing the fallacy of commission or the system accepting a lesser number of pramanas is committing the fallacy of omission. In the present thesis, I have chosen "*amupalabdhi*" or non-cognition for my investigation. *Amupalabdhi* has been accepted as a pramana by the Bhajta School of Purva Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta. On the other hand, the Prabhakara Mimamsa, the Buddhism, the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga refuse to accept *amupalabdhi* as a distinct way of knowing simply because they hold that it is a case of perception or reducible to inference. Bhajta Mimamsa and Advaita, champion this group in the same way in which Jayanta Bhajta leads the opposite camp. Jayanta
follows the conventional Nyāya line in rejecting *anupalabdhi* as a *pramāṇa*. It is perhaps for the first time that a dual approach between the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Advaita on the one hand and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the other, regarding *anupalabdhi* has been brought to the surface and resolved with ingenious and erudite argumentation. Dharmaśāyadharavindra of Advaita who has given a fair account of *anupalabdhi*, is posterior to Jayanta and none of the Vedāntins prior to him has thought it worthwhile to provide a systematic analysis of the problem. It follows that at the time of Jayanta, the main exponents of *anupalabdhi* were the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. Thus, Jayanta Bhāṭṭa had to analyse this problem against the views of the Mīmāṁsakas.

The whole problem of *anupalabdhi* in Indian Philosophy, therefore, ultimately revolves around mainly the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta on the one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the other, the central issue being whether *anupalabdhi* is an independent *pramāṇa* distinct from perception or it is something which can be reduced to perception or inference thereby losing its identity and distinctness as an independent *pramāṇa*. The present researcher contemplates, to start with the elucidation of the reality of *abhāva* as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and perception as the means of knowing it. Secondly, the dissertation contemplates to probe into the respective arguments of the two schools of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Advaita to vouch for its distinctness from *anupalabdhi* or Non-cognition.
as a pramāṇa. Thirdly, it is proposed to inquire into the relative merits and
demerits of each of the claims of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on one hand and Bhatta
Mīmāṁśā and Advaita-Vedānta on the other in respect of the cognition of non-
existence (abhāva).

As the literature of each of the systems is very vast, it has compelled us
to limit the study to the selected works of each of the systems. As regards the
selection of the sources, the texts which are of basic importance and have
constructive value are selected for the present study. I have selected as far as
possible the Śūtras, the Bhāṣyas, and the Vārtikas as well as some celebrated
works of each system. The selection of these texts is prompted by the
consideration that the Śūtras represent the seeds of the thought, the Bhāṣyas
and the Vārtikas indicate their development into a discipline in the form of
concrete and possible criticism and the celebrated works offer a picture of a
full-fledged system. The celebrated works of different systems consulted here
are the manuals, which contain the elaboration or compendium of what has
been said in original texts of the systems. It has been our aim to settle the
chronological controversies. The latest accepted views regarding the age of the
texts have been generally followed. The works of modern scholars are also
consulted for a clearer and critical presentation of the subject matter.

The discussions and controversies regarding the nature and status of
anupalabdhi cover a wide range of problems. Therefore, a definite
arrangement is followed in writing this dissertation. The thesis is prepared in five chapters.

In the first chapter entitled "Knowledge, Valid knowledge and Sources of Valid knowledge", the theories of different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding the nature of knowledge (jñāna), the criterion of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), are discussed in brief. Regarding the essential nature of knowledge, the three main conceptions advocated by the different schools of Indian Philosophy are explained. The Nyāya view, that the knowledge is an attribute (guṇa) of the self, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga view of knowledge as a substantive modification of buddhi and the Baudhā and the Mīmāṁsā view that knowledge is an activity (karma), a transitive process have been discussed.

It is generally admitted by the schools of Indian Philosophy that pramāṇa is true or valid knowledge. There is, however, a difference of opinion between the schools regarding the test of validity itself. Hence the several definitions of pramāṇa as offered by the different systems are clearly explained. The views of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsā, the Baudhā, the Sāṁkhya and the Jaina views of pramāṇa are critically explained.

The third part of discussion is devoted to the theories of pramāṇa or the means of valid knowledge. All the systems of Indian Philosophy agree in respect of the literal meaning as well as the function or the purpose of pramāṇa.
that it is conducive to the attainment of valid knowledge. There is, however, divergence of opinion about the exact nature of karāya of valid knowledge. A karāya is generally conceived as a special cause in producing a particular effect. The criterion of karāya, however, is variously interpreted by different systems. The views of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhaṭṭācharya, the Jaina, the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Advaita Vedānta are presented.

The second chapter "The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the Reality of Abhāva and its Cognition" is devoted to a comprehensive discussion of the status of abhāva or non-existence in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and the pramāṇa or the means of knowledge by which non-existence is known. To facilitate a correct appraisal of the system, the chapter is discussed in two parts.

The Nyāya system practically incorporates the Metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika. It is in Metaphysics: particularly in laying the foundation of an ultimate pluralism that Kanāda shows his genius. The number of categories originally enunciated by Kanāda is six. The category of abhāva also is accepted and mentioned in the IX chapter of the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms, though an explicit formulation of it as an independent category appears for the first time in Saptapadārthi of Sivāditya. First six categories or padārthas, namely, Substance (dravya), Quality (guṇa), Activity (karma), Universal (samānyu), Particular (viśeṣa), and Inherence (samavāya) are positive and concern existence. The category of abhāva or non being as the negative is dependent
on the positive or being: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accordingly accepts that reality is both positive and negative. Abhāva is defined merely as what is not or as different from the bhāvas or the six positive categories. As all the six categories are positive realities, non-being or abhāva is the negative reality.

In the first part an attempt is made to expound the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of the reality of abhāva and that pratyaksha or perception is the means of knowing it.

The third chapter is entitled "Ampalabdhi or non-cognition is a Distinct Source of Knowledge: The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Advaita-Vedānta view", is discussed in three parts. As the Mīmāṁsā accepts the reality of the world and of the individual and his actions, builds up an epistemology for supporting its realism. Advaita which follows the Mīmāṁsā system as for as the matters of this world go, is one with the Bhatta Mīmāṁsā in this regard.

Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and Advaita advocated the distinctiveness of ampalabdhi or non-cognition. This is because they thought as pluralists, they had to depend on the reality of non-existence and negation. In their view, there is no place for inference or comparison in the cognition of non-existence nor, abhāva, ampalabdhi, in the view of Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins is the non-functioning of every other way of knowing, but is itself a distinct way of knowing.
In the second part of this chapter Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's refutation of "anupalabdhi" as an independent pramāṇa is attempted. In Jayanta's view we need not search for a distinct pramāṇa for the cognition of abhāva since it is revealed by perception and is similar to other pramāṇas already admitted as distinct ways of knowing.

In the third part, a comprehensive account of the Bhaṭṭa and the Advaita justification of "anupalabdhi" in the face of several objections that were raised from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system on the one hand and Prābhākara Mīmāṃśā on the other has been attempted.

The fourth chapter is "Kinds of Abhāva: Objects of Anupalabdhi". In this chapter an effort is made to explain the four kinds of abhāva that have been admitted by the system's of philosophy in which abhāva is accepted as a reality. They are 1) Prāgābhāva 2) Pradhvanisābhāva 3) Atyantābhāva and 4) Anyonyābhāva.

Abhāva is primarily of two kinds: Sansargābhāva or Relational Absence and Anyonyābhāva or Mutual Negation. Prāgābhāva or Prior Negation, Pradhvanisābhāva or Posterior Negation and Atyantābhāva or Absolute Negation are the three kinds of relational absence.

The fifth and final chapter is "An Evaluation". Here a sincere effort is made to present this researcher's attitude in the face of the important epistemological controversy whether anupalabdhi can distinguish itself from
other pramāṇas, primarily from perception or pratyaksha and claim to be an independent or irreducible pramāṇa.