CHAPTER III

Review of Literature
CHAPTER-III

3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Many social scientists have studied the process of migration, but the majority of them emphasized its socio-cultural and economic aspects. Very few of them have covered the political dimension of migration. The studies of Gerard Heuze, Jan Breman, Marguerite S. Robinson, Myron Weiner, Connél John and Dasgupta are reviewed for the present study. Gerard Heuze (1996)\(^1\) study of miners in Dhanbad of Bihar emphasized unemployment, employment and various socio-economic and political factors, which influence their daily lives. The book also explores the relationship between poverty, Hinduism and political affiliations of the people of the coalfields which were studied. While analysing the coal fields of Bihar, Heuze questions the validity of economic and political terms that are applied to India where the submission and destitution of man and woman in society do not necessarily correspond to economic dependence and material impoverishment. The aggregate of relations between economic facts and social evolution has very frequently been represented in mechanic terms. India can barely be categorized as an industrialised society because the majority (80% in 1981) of its population is living in rural areas and only 13% of the active working population. He found that religion plays a dominant role in India in seeking a job, accumulating wealth and even shaping ideology. He says that his place of study i.e. Dhanbad in Bihar is the Jharkhand area where education and employment facilities are very scarce. Discussing the social structure, Heuze laid emphasis on family rather than caste in identifying a man's place in the society. Here the outsiders, i.e. migrants, are treated as enemies to the local people as unemployment is rampant in the area. Alcoholism, prostitution, divorce and violence are also on the rise in the
coal fields of Dhanbad. Election battles in India, particularly in Bihar are common and result in criminal politics. He concludes that everything can be foreseen and planned and that the fate of the masses is in the hands of minorities of rational and well-intentioned policy makers and institutions.

Jan Breman (1985)² in his study of South Gujarat explored the plight of intra-rural migrants of different kinds such as the pastoral nomads from north Gujarat with their flocks; donkey drivers from the same area; 'navvies' from Saurashtra; road workers from Panch Mahals; quarry workers from Bharuch district; and cane cutters from neighbouring Maharastra state. This study gave much importance to the 'hali' (one form of bonded labour) system and studied the main castes in Surat like Anvail Brahmins, Patidars and Halipatis in light of changes in rural agricultural practices.

He was of the opinion that the owners of land and Co-operative sugar factories were exploiting migrants and Halipatis. Though the socioeconomic importance of the higher castes is gradually decreasing, the halis and seasonal migrant labour are not in a position to unite and fight against the exploitation and oppression.

Breman concentrated on seasonal migrants in agriculture and found that during the peak periods, migrants comprise at least a fifth of all the rural workers. He was critical of the Government, which paid scant attention to labour migration. The plight of these migrants is that they are being paid only Rs.5 (in 1984) and are not in a position to unite and fight against the exploitation. Though peasant leaders like Sharad Joshi tried to organize the rural people, the hegemony of the rural bourgeoisie resisted all these attempts. Breman was of the opinion that the rural bourgeoisie are enjoying a high degree of autonomy.
The agricultural sector in India is facing the problem of disguised unemployment. Mechanization of agriculture, High Yield Variety seeds, the Green Revolution, White Revolution, efforts of co-operatives of sugar cane and cotton and the Grow More Food campaign have all played a part in reducing the demand for labour in this sector. Here, the land owning castes are Patidars and Anavail Brahmins and most of the agricultural labourers are recruited from among members of Halpatis, a tribal caste. Hali was the name given to a farm servant who had bound himself by indebtedness to a farmer and in exchange for his subsistence performed any task given to him in the field and household.

It is assumed that in earlier times Halpatis were also owners of some pieces of land, but at the time of famines they did not pay the revenue tax and went for loans. Later on they sold their lands to pay off the debts and thus became land less. Now they are solely attached to the master is usually of land-owning castes like Patidars and Anvail Brahmins. Tribal castes did not unite for the single reason that even within the tribes there were a lot of differences and social rankings. Breman focused on the seasonal migrants who trek towards Bordoli at the time of the harvesting season. He briefly sketched their daily lives, working conditions and a Hali’s family relation with his master, etc.

This study includes the casual labourers and workers engaged in nonagricultural sectors like diamond cutters, workers in roof tile factories, etc. But there were no official statistics about these people. Breman argues that though there are laws related to the debt relief act in the 20-point programme and the Halpati Seva Sangh to uplift these people the difference is meagre.

Jan Breman’s (1996) work, “Foot loose labour” in the same area i.e. Chikhligam and Gandevigam of South Gujarat tells the story of workers in the informal sector. At the beginning of 1991, the greater part
of the Surat's workforce, perhaps 700,000 out of the total of one million, was engaged in the informal sector. These workers spread over the districts of Valsad, Surat and Dangs and worked in textile, diamond cutting, cane cutting, brick making and construction fields etc. Most of the people of this kind are migrants. The study concentrated mainly on the supply and demand of the workforce in the area and the debt bondage, wages, and state response for the cause of the informal workforce in the area. Trade unions are by and large nonexistent in the informal sector. He was critical about the acts of: The Bonded Labour system (Abolition) Act (1976), the Equal Remuneration Act (1976) and the Child Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act (1986). All this legislation, though perhaps enacted in good faith, was formulated too hastily and carelessly and therefore lacks efficacy. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 was meant to cover the country as a whole and was accompanied by directives to the state governments to take appropriate measures.

He suggests that instead of promoting exit policies for formal sector labour, state intervention should redress the deplorable lack of control over informal sector capital. The later option points to the need to change the policy trend from deregularising to regularising modes of employment. Marguerite S. Robinson's (1988)'s study of "Local Politics" discussed the socio-economic and political dimensions of a village in the Medak district of Andhra Pradesh. She explored the relationships among land and credit, labour caste, and force - and their roles in determining voting behaviour. In her study she emphasised the poverty of the labourers and wealth of landlords and the consequences of this inequitable distribution of wealth, particularly on how the rich people manipulate everything that is useful for their own sake and ruin and oppress the poor people. This ruin and oppression includes local power politics. The very subtitle of the book, "Law of Fishes" itself tells the
whole story. She was of the opinion that the plight of the poor did not change even after the introduction of the Green Revolution. The Green Revolution has been spectacular, both in its success and in failure. Overall, Indian food grain production has increased dramatically, reaching a record 153 million tons during 1984 (an increase of 112% over 72 million tons produced in 1965, at the beginning of Green Revolution). However, half the population cannot obtain enough food to reach the minimum level of caloric intake necessary to overcome malnutrition. Credit is an essential feature of Indian villages. Since landless labourers and small farmers usually take loans from the landlords, they in turn will naturally obey the orders of the landlords. Bonded labourers also follow the same path. Otherwise they loose their employment. The landlords, who happen to be the land owning dominant upper castes, use this credit facility at the time of elections as vote banks. They also use force, if these tricks do not work. Poverty, unemployment and agricultural credit are essential components of the power structure in rural India. Her conclusion about this connection is that a landlord without a regular labour supply, or a moneylender without mortgaged or bonded debtors, is also a man without a vote bank. Agricultural labourers, bonded labourers and other poor are the vote banks in the villages and these people follow the orders of the village elders.

The author found that the means of force, boycott is still in operation in the village politics. Since the debt and bonded labour systems are never ending, the inevitable submission of the downtrodden themselves to the property owners is also a never ending process. Keeping this connection in mind, she analysed the voting behaviour of the people in all the periodical elections in India. Medak is one of the less advanced districts and continued to be the stronghold of the Congress party. So after the 1977 shock, Indira Gandhi chose to
contest from Medak parliamentary constituency in the 1980 elections. In the 1977 elections, of the 153 seats which the Congress party obtained, 92 came from four southern states (41 from AP) and it was concluded as that the south escaped the worst of the emergency. The ongoing process of agricultural overhaul, the land ceiling act, government credit facilities, wage laws and employment opportunities through industrialization are dramatically changing the political polarization in Indian politics. She found that the rural are elite losing some of their powers and that traditional vote banks are collapsing. Myron Wiener's (1981) study of "India's preferential policies, migrants, the middle classes, and ethnic equality with special reference to Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Assam" reveals that migration results in political confrontations between local people and migrants. In this situation the government tries to provide some preferential policies.

This study provides a history and analysis of policies in three of India's states; Maharashtra in western India, whose government intervened in response to demands in Bombay city for preferential treatment in employment for local people; the southern state of Andhra Pradesh where there is a long history of government efforts in the Telangana region to reserve positions in the universities and in public employment for local people; and Assam, in the north east, where a hundred years of migration have so transformed the social structure that resulting ethnic inequalities have become the central political issue.

In migration from rural areas Connel J. (1976), Dasgupta B., Laishly R. and Lipton M (Connel John and Dasgupta Biplab) found that the expanding employment opportunities and higher wages in urban areas, and the limited employment and comparatively lower wages in the stagnating villages complement each other, causing the so-called "push-pull" effects. These result in the migration of wage earners from
villages to cities. This deferential in the income potential between the city and village is the most potent force operating in the economic environment and provides a constant stimulus to the mobility of potential migrants among the rural people. A number of factors influence the process of migration. Such factors include: Socio-economic conditions—major capital investment, technological change, social welfare provision, graduation, marriage, employment offer, natural disasters etc., (Shrawan K.Acharya: 1994:138)⁷. It can be argued that socio-economic structure and technological change have provided the background to migratory movements in the second half of the 19th century. These migrations can be viewed as demographic responses to the restructuring of the demand for labour in the different socio-economic sectors and geographic areas in the country. The dominant component of migratory movements in that period was the dramatic exodus from rural and agricultural areas to areas of alternative, more profitable economic activities. These migratory movements of millions of the people were activated by both “push” and “pull” factors (Dov Friedlander: 1992:315)⁸. The reason for migration to the Gulf is to overcome economic problems. People are migrating to the Gulf countries irrespective of bad conditions at the destination. The “push-pull” hypothesis has dominated the mode of thinking in most migratory movements. The vast literature has produced a “standard” migration model in which inter-state migration depends on such factors as distance, wage, unemployment rates, educational characteristics and average levels of human capital in source and destination areas. The most salient feature of this family of migration models is their focus on purely economic determinations of migration. In some of the developing countries there is a new type of migration where forced displacement of populations is caused by many infrastructure development programmes. The process of involuntary resettlement is also distinct from voluntary population movements. Voluntary mobility including rural-urban
migration reflects people’s willing to pursue new opportunities. Voluntary migration stimulates economic growth. In contrast, resettlement becomes involuntary when the choice to remain in place of origin is not granted; both in rural and urban contexts; the forcibly displaced people (called “outsiders” in India and “resettles in most other countries) are facing more risks than opportunities. Usually forced relocation is seen to be a consequence of constructing hydro power generating dams. Michael M.Cernea’s study shows statistics related to these forced migrants or forced displacement of populations caused by “development”. It reveals that in India around 0.75 million people were forcibly displaced due to the construction of seven dams, namely Srisailam, Almatti, Narayanpur, Narmada, Tehri, Gandhisagar and Sabarmarekha (Michael M. Cernea: 1996:1516)⁹.

In several Latin American countries, however, there is strong reason to believe that a particular non-economic variable - fear of death from political violence-plays a key role in many individual migration decisions. This is almost certainly the case in Guatemala and El Salvador in Central America and in Colombia and Peru in South America. A non-liner relationship is suggested between violence and migration. While violence is posited to effect migration at all nonzero level of violence that escalates (Andrew R.Morrison: 1993:817)¹⁰. This was also true in case of Yugoslavia. War is also one of the reasons for migration. Occasional wars between India and Pakistan also result in large-scale migration.

Several studies show that there is a clear-cut relationship between the migration process and its impact on multiple facets of the society. In this study, we have tried to depict the impact of migration on the rural power structure. There is a dearth of systematic and comprehensive studies on migration with in India as well to other countries of the world. However a few studies have been conducted and
the findings were narrated in different journals, textbooks and thesis. The findings of the studies are hereunder reviewed under the following aspects.

The characteristics of the Migrants
The determinates of migration.
The problems of migrants adjacent in the new socio-economic milieu and
- The method of recruitment and wage payment.

Many of the irrigated countries in the tropics/subtropics are approaching the bottom of the blue water barrel. This is most obvious in the Middle East and North Africa region. As noted by Allan (2002)\textsuperscript{11} this region ran out of water for food self-sufficiency already in the 1970s. Also, some countries in Southern Africa display worrying water scarcity trends. Irrigated agriculture accounts for more than 70 percent of global freshwater withdrawals and 40 percent of world food production (Rijsberman and Molden 2001)\textsuperscript{12}. It is thus evident that the average peasant in, for example, Sub-Saharan Africa has to rely on rainfed agriculture as the livelihood mainstay. The Green Revolution’s strong emphasis on irrigation came with a whole package of related investments to increase the withdrawal of blue surface and groundwater, research and development of high-yielding crops and extension services. The long-standing emphasis on irrigated agriculture has largely had the side-effect of neglecting potential and substantial improvements of the productivity of rainfed agriculture. In fact, and as will be maintained throughout this report, there exists huge opportunities within rainfed agriculture, on which most poor farmers rely, to increase food production.
Reducing poverty does presume an improvement in two regards: income for those who need more food and other goods and services (but who do not produce it themselves) and better prices or wages for those who produce the food and other goods and services. Poverty in urban areas and, generally, poverty among a growing number of consumers in society is closely linked to poverty among the producers, i.e. the small farmers and farm workers. The farmers cannot increase prices of their products because those who need to improve their food security cannot afford to pay or buy more and those who are better-off have already reached a "saturated level" in terms of food. A general trend is that the demand for staple food items is reduced, while the demand for meat, dairy products and fruits is increasing. The new demand pattern has implications for water pressure since the production of food items from animals is more water intensive per energy unit (SIWI and IWMI, 2004; SIWI et al. 2005; SEI, 2005).13

Governments in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) also tend to keep prices of staple products at a low level to cater for the poor. Increasing prices of basic food items have led to serious riots and most Governments are therefore very sensitive to the voice of growing numbers of urban poor. Procurement prices paid by the government to farmers in India for rice, for instance, have been at about the same level for several decades while prices for inputs in production and for most industrial goods and societal services have steadily increased. Eradication of poverty presumes an increase in income and livelihood opportunities for both producers and consumers. The net result is that the pressure and competition for water resources will increase. There is no simple governance formula which can be applied to deal with the complex challenge. Obviously, it is necessary to produce "more drop per drop" of water withdrawn. There is also a need to deal with both consumption and production patterns.
Current trends in the composition in the diet, for instance, more meat and dairy products, means a more heavy pressure on water resources. This trend is warranted for the poor from a nutrition point of view (SIWI and IWMI 2004; SIWI et al, 2005). However, there is a considerable wastage in the food chain, “from the field to the stomach”. Much more is produced as compared to what is actually consumed or what is required from a public health perspective (see e.g. Smil, 2000).

Countries suggest that there in practice has been fairly little impact on improving efficiency and equity. For example the theory behind marginal cost pricing (sometimes called the opportunity cost pricing, including fee collection, O&M, extraction costs, externalities, social costs and benefits, etc.) provides that water can be allocated efficiently according to a Paretooptimal, solution, that is, you cannot make anyone better off without making someone else worse off (see for example, Ostrom, 1990). But a major difficulty is to assess all the marginal costs and benefits, especially since they vary across the seasons as well as over the years (Johansson, 2000). It has also been observed that volumetric pricing in combination with opportunity cost pricing can have detrimental effects on lower income groups. Water scarcities will consequently lead to higher marginal cost for water and that such pricing can lead to negative social effects (Thobani, 1998). Due to the nature of surface and groundwater systems they are inherently difficult to monitor and police. It has been noted that transaction costs are high in fee collection and monitoring of use and to exclude those without the right to use. For example, Ostrom (1990) noted that keeping “free-riders” out of the irrigation system requires heavy transaction costs that may outweigh benefits. The equity concern is often vaguely defined but normally refers to “just and fair” allocation of water and can include cost recovery from users, income redistribution and subsidized food production. According to Tsur and Dinar (1995)
water pricing is in general not a very effective mechanism to redistribute incomes, as equity effects of pricing are dependent on land endowments. Others have noted, however, that water pricing and water markets can redistribute income between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, as well as between various irrigation districts (Diao and Roe, 1998)\textsuperscript{21}. At times and with the aim of income redistribution there can also be a trade-off between equity and efficiency. It can for example be politically motivated to subsidize irrigated water use of certain low income groups in society at the expense of efficiency.

In a case from Northern China, Yang et al. (2003)\textsuperscript{22} demonstrated that despite rapid increases in irrigation costs and thus higher water prices (based on per area) this had no effect on water conservation. On the contrary, the shift to more water intensive high-value added crops led to an intensification of overexploitation of groundwater. In this case, which is a rather typical case for many developing countries, the cost for using groundwater was equal to power supply costs for pumping and equipments. Due to current water governance systems, there were instead incentives to continue to increase water use, such as government agencies wanting to increase their budgets through intensified water use and very lax monitoring of groundwater regulations.

The theories behind water pricing and water markets are normally based on assumptions of perfect information, no externalities and rational economic behavior from actors. But in reality information is far from perfect, and irrigation and damming externalities – third party effect on return flows, etc. -- occur frequently, affect downstream users or decrease the environmental flow of rivers.

A crude estimate by a co-convenor of the first Global Convention of People of Indian Origin, held in New York in 1989, puts the figure as 20 million (Jagat, 1994)\textsuperscript{23}. The High Level Committee on the Indian
Diaspora in its foreword writes in December 2001 'the population of Indian Diaspora is estimated to be around 20 million'. However, country wise estimates provided in the same report submitted to the Ministry of External Affairs (2001)²⁴, New Delhi, give the approximate number of Indians settled throughout the world in 133 countries is around 16.9 million²; of which 51 per cent belong to the people of Indian origin. There are about 10,000 Indians or more in 48 countries and more than half a million persons of Indian descent in 11 countries. Among the emigrants of diverse nationalities, overseas Indians constitute a sizeable segment. In terms of sheer numbers, they make the third largest group, next to the British and Chinese (Bhat et al, 2002)²⁵. Among them, around 0.5 million Indians were reported as stateless population in eleven countries of the world – Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Finland, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Myanmar, Netherlands, Philippines, Switzerland and Venezuela. The highest number of stateless Indian population is reported in Myanmar with 0.4 million. The breakdown of India’s population by three categories (people of Indian origin, Indian citizens and stateless Indians) is not available for three countries in the world. They are: United States of America (1.7 million), United Kingdom (1.2 million) and South Africa (1.0 million). The non-resident Indians⁵, as per the latest report, are estimated at around 3.9 million excluding the Indians reported in South Africa, United Kingdom and United States of America. Interestingly, around 3.3 million Indians (about 85%) live in six countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) in the Middle East.

Where do they migrate as labour from India? Our analysis indicates around 95 per cent of labour outflows reach the following six destinations (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar) in the Middle East in 1988 continued till 2002 with 75 per cent. Few more countries such as Singapore and Malaysia are also
added in the recent list of labour migration from India. In 2002, 24,399 labourers from India migrated to Singapore and another 10,512 to Malaysia. Trends in this aspect are presented in table 3. In 1994, Saudi Arabia led with 65 per cent annual labour outflows from India followed by United Arab Emirates. Even in absolute numbers, except in 1999, Saudi Arabia attracted large number of Indian labourers. This is also true for 2002. The available labour outflow reveals that Gulf countries became an important destination for Indians. The recent United Nations publication (2002) reveals that most of the countries listed above in the Gulf region felt that the immigration levels are too high and they would like to follow the policy of lowering the migration flows in the future. Migrant stock to the total population in the United Arab Emirates is 74 per cent (United Nations 2002) and Indian accounts for 33 per cent (Zachariah, Prakash and Rajan, 2002). This is also true for Saudi Arabia where 39 per cent of migrants are from India (for details, see Zachariah, Prakash and Rajan, 2002). The United Arab Emirates imposed stringent restrictions on migrant unskilled labourers since 1996. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also imposed stringent measures on migrant labour since 1997.

The principal source of data for the study is a large-scale sample survey, conducted during March-December 1998, of 10,000 households selected from 200 panchayats/municipal wards comprising all the districts and all the taluks of the State (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2001a; 2001b). According to the study conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, 1.36 million Keralites were working abroad and among them 95 per cent lived in the Middle East (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2003). Very few estimates of emigrants were available in Kerala using an untested methodology. The Economic Review published by the Government of Kerala, State Planning Board gives the number of emigrants at about 1.6 million in 1997 (Government of Kerala,
Yet, another source gives an estimate of 1.4 million for 1996 (Praksah, 1998)\textsuperscript{33}. Based on the survey data and using the backward projection up to 1973, Kannan and Hari (2002)\textsuperscript{34} estimated that the Gulf migration accounted for 0.03 millions in 1973; this figure reached a peak in 1998 with 1.32 million. Comparing the migration to Gulf from Kerala as well as from India, it shows that Kerala contributed 36 per cent of emigrants. In other words, one out of three living in Gulf is a Keralite.

Emigration to Godavari, and later, to Burma was the customary safety valve to the people in the area (Francis 1907 (reprint 1992): 107)\textsuperscript{35} and, "in 1901 the Godvari district contained no fewer than 120,940 persons who had been born in Vizagapatnam, Kistna included 17,524 more and Ganjam another 8,795... From no other district in the Presidency did emigration occur on anything even approaching this large scale, and the inference arises that the people of Vizagapatnam are not particularly contented with their lot." (Francis, 1907: 60)\textsuperscript{36} From the available records, it is difficult to say exactly when the people of east coast of India began migrating to Burma, but there is evidence to show that people had been going there even in early 19\textsuperscript{th} Century (Satyanarayana, 2001)\textsuperscript{37}. The long history of trade and commercial contacts between ancient Andhra-Kalinga area and Burma indicate strong social, economic and cultural links dating back to centuries. What is certain is that it was in the 1870s, with the growth of transport and communications facilities between Burma and the east coast of India as well as the increasing demand for manual labour in the newly industrialising Burma and Malaya that successive waves of south Indian immigrants began to move to these countries.

Frequent 'fish droughts', failure of fishing seasons and hard working conditions that the open-sea based fishing imposed upon the fishers were cited by the fishers as the main causes for migration. Satyanarayana (2001)\textsuperscript{38} lists the other important 'push' factors
contributing to the migration of fishers from Srikakulam area in the first period as: growing pressure on land, poverty, unemployment, adverse seasonal conditions, natural calamities like famine, flood and cyclones and notes that a definite correlation existed between natural calamities and increased migration in certain years. Large-scale emigration of people from the area to Burma reportedly averted the spread of famines in their places of origin, and also increased work opportunities to those who chose to remain behind.

Obviously, social exclusion had an important role to play as well. To quote Deshingkar and Start (2003)39, “Much of the migration has been undertaken by historically poor and assetless communities who are typically lower caste and tribals”. As Satyanarayana (2001)40 notes, “for the lower social groups and cases, migration meant opportunity, equality and emancipation”. Burma drew a number of Telugu speaking untouchable and lower Sudra peasant castes. The migrants from Srikakulam largely belonged to the Vadaballiya community, while those from Kakinada area included large numbers of people belonging to the Palle community.

International migrants are well known to add significantly to the foreign exchange reserves of sending countries through remittances. If properly used, the remittances can assist economic development by providing scarce foreign exchange so strategically needed by many developing countries to acquire hard currency, in order to acquire machinery and technology to facilitate development. If properly used, the remittances can assist economic development.

Remittances have contributed a substantial proportion of private capital flows in recent years. In 1970, official development assistance amounted to US$5.60 billion while total private flows were $5.80 billion. By 1996, according to preliminary numbers, the picture had changed
dramatically. While official development assistance rose to $40.80 billion, private flows were at $243.80 billion (Kappagoda, 1998)\(^4\). Developing countries received 40% of foreign direct investment flows in 1996 compared to 15% in 1990 and the share of East Asia and the Pacific was US$61.1 billion with China getting the major share. The Chinese Diaspora in developed countries is presumed to have a lot to do with these investment flows to that region. Remittances of emigrants improve balance of payments of the recipient country and the living standards of emigrants and their relatives. A World Bank study on the use of remittances in Bangladesh, the Philippines, Turkey, Pakistan and India shows that "purchase of residential plots, house construction and house improvement are expenditures that receive priority" (Swamy, 1984: 44)\(^4\). In Turkey, Bangladesh and Pakistan substantial investments in private businesses were also reported. A study from Greece reported "considerable benefits and limited costs for the Greek economy... Remittances promote economic growth, employment and capital formation" (Glytsos, 1993: 154)\(^4\). Even if all the remittances do not go immediately into investment, consumption promotes demand for goods and services and creates employment with a multiplier effect. A study from Mexico supports the generally-held view that Mexico-US migration stimulates economic activity, both directly and indirectly, and that it leads to significantly higher levels of employment, investment, and income within specific communities and the nation as a whole. The annual arrival of around $2 billion migradollars generates economic activity and accounts for 10% of Mexico's output and 3% of its Gross Domestic Product" (Durand, et al., 1996: 423)\(^4\). The belief that US earnings of Mexican immigrants are used in consumption and home construction often ignores the multiplier effect it has on investment. Also, the small share that goes directly into investment is ignored. Migradollars has a large multiplier effect in agriculture, helps to overcome failures in credit markets to access capital, increases output
in manufacturing and service sectors, improves transportation facilities, finances commercial activities, permits investment in education, and stimulates manufacturing. As a result, the US$2 billion in migradollars that are conservatively estimated to enter Mexico each year ultimately raise national output by a total of $6.5 billion. According to reports with the help of emigrants from Hong Kong, Over 2 million workers in China are being employed by companies with substantial Hong Kong investments (Tsang, 1990: 7).45

Most of the literature within the realm of political economy in this bibliography conceptualises workers' identities as strongly influenced by class-consciousness; further worker-employer relations are thought of in terms of class confrontations. One of the works included offers a fresh approach for looking at employer-employee interactions, emphasising the relevance of ethnicity in the analysis of production relations in Californian agriculture. Wells (1996)46 describes how Mexican workers in Mexican-owned plantations in California displayed a feeling of reverence and gratitude toward employers, as well as a complacent attitude regarding their appalling working conditions. This is contrasted with the actions and attitudes of Mexican workers in plantations owned by American or Japanese employers. Wells shows how ethnic identity can act as a bridge across classes. Thus their ethnicity can directly influence the living and working conditions of migrant workers. The reverse is also true: the experience of migration can impact on the ethnic identities of migrant workers, as several works cited here suggest. Breman (1996)47 refers to migrants not complying with caste expectations either in destination areas or in their own communities once back from migration. In the same vein, Kirchner (1980)48 describes how indigenous people behave like locals in destination areas, speaking Spanish and wearing modern clothes during the migration period in many parts of Latin America. Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2001)49
use the politics of body representation to explain how migrants challenge caste and wider cultural norms (as well as class relations) by displaying non-conventional consumption habits. Breman (1993) also describes more subtle changes produced by migration that not only affect workers’ caste identities but also alter the configuration of caste relations between source area employers and migrants. He does this by showing how Dodhias’ migration to nearby brickyards in south Gujarat undermines Anavil landlords’ power over them in their origin areas. From the three sections above, we conclude that migrants’ identities are dynamic and multiple. Migrants have different interests and concerns, attributable in part at least to their class, gender, ethnic and individual characteristics. Rather than adopting a particular subject position at a particular moment (Moore, 1994), these and other different dimensions of identity interact throughout the migration experience and it is their interface which shapes migrants’ identities. Take for instance the case of migrant women described by Schenk-Sandbergen (1995). These women’s concerns as fish processing workers blur with their worries and aspirations as mothers, daughters or sisters, and again as members of a low caste in Kerala. Besides, the interplay of their subject positions is different from that of men and women sugar cane cutters from south Gujarat (Breman, 1996) or Tucuman (Argentina, Kirchner, 1980).

Economic elements of migration are frequently researched in the migration studies cited here. According to Massey et al, looking at migration as a whole across almost any era “reveals a consistent propensity towards geographic mobility among men and women, who are driven to wander by diverse motives, but nearly always with some idea of material improvement” (1998, p1). Lack of employment opportunities is at the root of migration decisions in most of the research referred to in this annotated bibliography. The influence of agro-
ecological conditions in dictating economic opportunities is highlighted by many authors (Anonymous, 1986; Breman, 1993; Kawakara, 1990; Schenk-Sandbergen, 1995; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Rizvi and Hashim, 1982-3). Migration by agriculturalists with insufficient production to cover year round need is common globally. Processes that affect land availability can be especially influential in fostering migration or contributing to population retention. For example, during the 1930s, Mexican peasants stayed in their communities due to expectations about land reform. After the actual land redistribution, many of them began migrating in order to save and make productive investments in their new properties (Durand and Massey, 1992).

Government interventions influencing peoples' access to common lands or forests can be important to migration decisions. Several examples in this bibliography refer to how policy interventions reducing such access encourage migration, particularly of tribal peoples (Schenk-Sandbergen, 1995; Goza, 1992; Rizvi and Hashim, 1982-3). Furthermore, agro-ecological conditions determine the direction of migration flows. Roy (1995) and Goza (1992) show how migrants move from regions with poor soils and lack of irrigation facilities, to areas where ecological conditions have allowed a higher development of commercial agriculture. Finally, we believe that migration can lead to changes in agro-ecology. When working in destination areas, migrants may learn new skills and be in contact with new technologies that can lead to changes in their own production when applied to their local areas. However, we do not have enough evidence to test this hypothesis in our review and more research is needed in this particular aspect of the relation of migration to agro ecology.

At the start of this introductory essay, we referred to the growing policy interest in international migration in western Europe and the USA. Much of this has emerged, not surprisingly, from a starting point which
emphasises the economic and political interests of receiving country
governments. In contrast, many authors cited here considered the
consequences of migration - internal as well as international - for
migrants themselves, and for sending areas. Several of them analyse
the impact of immigration regimes on migrants working and living
conditions Sharma, 1997\textsuperscript{67} for Canada; Roberts, 1997\textsuperscript{68} for Chinese
internal migration policy; Tsuda, 1999\textsuperscript{69}, for Japanese policy; and
Simmons 1998\textsuperscript{70} for the US). They show how the official category of
migrant is defined differently across countries and how this has direct
consequences on migrants' wellbeing. Sharma (1997)\textsuperscript{71}, for example,
points to how Canadian laws define actual migrants as officially non-
migrants under the \textit{Non-Immigrant Employment Authorisation Program}.
This allows local employers to restrict these workers' mobility, bargaining
power, and other rights that can be claimed by those officially defined as
immigrant workers. In general, two trends with regard to migration
policies arise from this bibliography.

There is a group of authors that sees migration as a threat to local
development or which concentrates on the negative impact of migration
on migrants themselves and their source areas. They therefore propose
different mechanisms to discourage migration directly and/or indirectly
by promoting rural development in local areas (Reichter, 1981\textsuperscript{72};
Schenk-Sandbergen, 1995\textsuperscript{73}; Taylor et al. 1996\textsuperscript{74}), or by checking
immigration flows (Balakrishna, et al, 1981)\textsuperscript{75}.

Countering this trend is a second group of authors, who
emphasise the role of migration as a source of livelihoods for origin
communities (De Haan et. al., 2000)\textsuperscript{76} and propose different measures
to make migration less insecure (Roy, 1995\textsuperscript{77}; Breman, 1996\textsuperscript{78}; Barron
and Rello, 2000\textsuperscript{79}; Raven et al, 1995\textsuperscript{80}; Frances and Gamsey, 1998\textsuperscript{81};
ORSEU2000, 1997\textsuperscript{82}). Their recommendations address the weak
position of workers in destination areas. Some of them support the strengthening of union action (Roy, 1995)\textsuperscript{83} and increased capacity-building to make this action more effective. For example, the UK Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) supports the idea of mobile union offices during the agricultural season supervising the action of gang masters. This group of authors is also concerned with the living conditions of workers in destination areas and some authors propose the improvement of infrastructure there. Barron and Rello (2000)\textsuperscript{84} recommend the provision of schools in the tomato-growing areas for working children in Mexico in order to meet both the education and income needs of migrant families. In the UK context, ORSEU2000 (1997)\textsuperscript{85}, Raven et al (1995)\textsuperscript{86}, and Frances and Garnsey (1996)\textsuperscript{87} argue that the way to improve workers conditions consists of passing legislation to make supermarkets co-liable (together with producers) for labour and other social costs in their supply chain. Our reading of the literature suggests that where there has been legislation to protect migrants’ interests, it has not necessarily had the effects that might be expected from its stated intentions. For example, Breman (1996)\textsuperscript{88} reports that legislation to improve migrants’ working and living conditions has not been implemented effectively in his Indian research area. Verhaeren (1986)\textsuperscript{89} describes how protective legislation for temporary workers in France translated into a hardening of working conditions in farms and building sites as a defence mechanism by employers. In their recent research, Rogaly, Coppard, Rafique, Rana, Sengupta and Biswas have warned that heavy-handed regulation of seasonal migration in West Bengal might not be in the interest of migrant workers. At the same time they advocate public action to address migrant workers and their families’ exclusion from health, education and other social provision.
To conclude, migration for hard manual work may be undertaken out of economic necessity but it can also serve migrants' interests in reshaping the social space and their position in it. Material interests are only part of this as Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan remind us. Migration influences migrant workers' identities and in some circumstances enables them to challenge and change social relations of dominance. If it is to be undertaken from the perspective of migrant workers, public action needs to be based in a proper understanding of migration as a social and political economic process.

3.1. Characteristics of migrants

A number of studies showed that a majority of the migrants consisted of young people mainly in the age group of 15-34 years (Zachariah, 196890; Illsley, 197091; Belhum, 197492; Lakshmaiah, 197493; Bala Krishna, 197694; Arrora and Kumar, 198095; Singh and Yadava, 198196). Other scholars (Chauhan, 196697; Zachariah, 196698; Dheshi and Gumbar, 198299) showed the migrants were young and unmarried before there migration to new area. However, another study (Grewal and Sidhu, 1979)100; contradicated the above findings and show that a majority of Migrants in the Punjab villagers were married. Chatterjee (1983)101 also found that a substantial majority of the migrants in the Burdwan district of the West Bengal was married. But scholars like Kamath (1914)102; Wattal (1934)103; Chandra Sekahr (1950)104; Davis (1951)105; Gosal (1961)106; Supranovich (1971)107 and Maujumdar and early thirties were more migratory than other groups.

Zachariah (1964, 1968)108 has made extensive study of internal migration in India where he has found an excess of adolescents and adults among the migrants. The studies conducted by Hamsaleelavathy (1970)109, Kayastha and Prakash (1971)110 and Garkovich (1983)111 uphold the above finding. Russell and Strachan (1980)112 supported
the above finding that most migrants emigrated from their native communities as young single male in the age group of 15-20 years. Similarly, Dhesi and Gumbar (1982)\textsuperscript{113} had observed that 74 percent of the migrants in the Amristar district of Punjab were in the 16-25 years of age group. Swinson et al (1979)\textsuperscript{114} found that the age of migrants was negatively correlated with willingness to move.

Religion-wise, Muslims (Rao, 1976)\textsuperscript{115} and caste-wise non-scheduled caste people (D Souza, 1975)\textsuperscript{116} and or low caste categories (Bhakoo, 1978\textsuperscript{117}, Grewal, 1979\textsuperscript{118}, Arora and Kumar, 1980\textsuperscript{119}, Gupta, 1980\textsuperscript{120}) had a greater rate of migration than others. But the studies of Eames (1954)\textsuperscript{121}, Joshi (1957)\textsuperscript{122}, Eames and Schwab (1964)\textsuperscript{123} and Connel et al., (1976)\textsuperscript{124} clearly reveal the fact that upper caste people are more migratory than those belonging to lower castes. Some studies revealed that a majority of the migrants belonged to medium or large family size group consisting of five or more members (Dhesi and Gumbar, 1982\textsuperscript{125} and Chatterjee, 1983\textsuperscript{126}). Another relation between caste and migration is that castes which are no longer functionally integrated in to the village economically are more mobile than those who are integrated in to the village economically (Mishra, 1952)\textsuperscript{127}. However, Jain and Lucas (1985)\textsuperscript{128} found a negative correlation between caste and status and migration.

According to Mishra (1952)\textsuperscript{129}, many low caste people migrate from the rural areas to other places chiefly with a view to liberating themselves from age old social discriminations and to conceal their low social status in the hierarchy of caste system. This observation has been maintained by some other scholars too (Majundar and Majundar 1978)\textsuperscript{130}.
Ravinsetein (1989)\textsuperscript{131} generalize that females appear to predominate among short journey migrants, holds good only in the case of rural to rural migration. But in the case of rural urban migration males outnumber females whether it is a short or long – distance migration. Internal migration in India, unlike migration in western countries is highly elective of males (Zachariah, 1964)\textsuperscript{132}.

Economic factors are responsible for the preponderance women in rural to rural migration (Premi, 1980)\textsuperscript{133}. In the slack agricultural season, a large number poor woman move out of their villages to seek casual employment in irrigation project, construction of roads, Rail roads, and Buildings and such other public works (Jain, 1979)\textsuperscript{134}. Similarly, rural women migrants are greater in number than men migrants in plantations in West Bengali and Assam. In case of rural men migrants economic factors are more important than social ones Rele, (1969)\textsuperscript{135}. Intra-rural migration of the tribals is essential brought out the economic necessity (Chowdary, 1963\textsuperscript{136}; Singh and Singh, 1976\textsuperscript{137}).

The process of adjustment of the rural migrants to the new environment at the place of destination depends mostly upon the facilities and opportunities that are available for them, in terms of residence, neighborhood relationship, etc the migrant has to make adjustments. Further, he has to change his value, attitudes and other forms of behavior (Raju, 1989)\textsuperscript{138}.

Bulsara (1965)\textsuperscript{139} relates differential rate of migration between sexes to the caste and community backgrounds. Certain castes and communities are found to have a tradition of migrating without their womenfolk and children (Sharma, 1977)\textsuperscript{140}. The migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Orissa have a tendency to migrate without their womenfolk, but in South India, the migration is undertaken by all the members of the family together (Caplan, 1976)\textsuperscript{141}.
Occupation is also considered as an important factor attracting migration. Hamsaleelavathy's study (1970)\textsuperscript{142} suggests that skilled and technical workers are more migratory than non-skilled workers and non-technical personnel. A study conducted by Belvins (1971)\textsuperscript{143} pointed out that in U.S.A., The larger proportion of immigrants were from blue collar skilled jobs than unskilled occupations. Mayer (1973)\textsuperscript{144} showed that Indians in Fiji came from different occupations viz, business, farming and crafts. Sen (1960)\textsuperscript{145} found in this study conducted in Calcutta that 84.20 percent of total immigrants were unskilled manual workers, 2.70 percent were skilled manual workers workers and 13.10 percent belonged to other occupations.

Lambart (1963)\textsuperscript{146}, Grewal (1979)\textsuperscript{147}, Arora and Kumar (1980)\textsuperscript{148} and Garkovich (1983)\textsuperscript{149} studied the educational level of migrants and reported that the migrants, in general, had low literacy level. On the contrary, many other studies have indicated that literacy or low level of education hinders migration (Kamath, 1914\textsuperscript{150}; Wattal (1934)\textsuperscript{151}; Chandrasekhar (1950)\textsuperscript{152}, Majundar and Majundar (1978)\textsuperscript{153} and Singh and Yadava (1981)\textsuperscript{154}. Thus it is evident that age, caste, Sex, Occupation, education and marital status have some association with migration.

3.2. Determinants of Migration

Several studies have been conducted on the determinants of migration. Stone (1973)\textsuperscript{155} reported that the economic factors are more responsible than political factors for migration. He found that majority of the males migrated from Britian to South Africa for better employment opportunities there. Stouffer (1940)\textsuperscript{156} was of the view that spacial distance did not hinder the mobility of people from one place to another provided better job opportunities are available at the place of migration. Russel and Strachan (1980)\textsuperscript{157} had analyzed that 82 percent of the
migrants moved to other places because of more remunerative jobs there. In the opinion of Mishra (1952)\textsuperscript{155}, indebtedness, instead of acting as a barrier to migration, impels the rural poor to go to find a more remunerative jobs to clear their debts to the village money-lenders.

Mukherjee (1967)\textsuperscript{159} asserted that the more an individual is poor, landless and socio-economically deprived, the greater the change of his migration from rural to other areas. According to Swanson et al (1979)\textsuperscript{160} the socio-economic status consisted of three factors, i.e., education, occupation, and income. The higher the socio-economic status, the greater the migration. On the other hand, some scholars (Sovani, 1966\textsuperscript{151}; Rao, 1974\textsuperscript{162}; Connell et al., 1976\textsuperscript{163}; Saxena, 1978\textsuperscript{164}) have contended that both the rich and the poor are almost equally prone to migration. The rich migrate out if desire for better and greater comforts of life, while the poor migrate out of economic compulsion to take out their leaving. In addition to the above, better living conditions in respect of house, sanitation, medical aid, electric and water supply, protection of life and property, means of transportation and communication, entertainment, educational facilities and liking for white-collar jobs also significantly accelerate the pace of rural out-migration (Mishra, 1956\textsuperscript{165}; Gosal and Krishna, 1975\textsuperscript{166}).

Some studies revealed that not only economic but also the non-economic factors affect migration of persons from one place to another. Illsley (1970)\textsuperscript{167} was of the opinion that majority of the migrants came in Scotland because of the presence of friends and relatives already living their who are willing to help them. Nicholson (1980)\textsuperscript{168} had documented those personal contacts with the fellow community members who have already migrated to other places help in encouraging and facilitating migration. The role of social contacts in motivating migration was also repotted by Rusell and Stachan (1980)\textsuperscript{169}, Dhesi and Gumber.
(1982)\textsuperscript{170} and Williams and Mcmillan (1983)\textsuperscript{171}. But on the contrary, it was found that some times community affiliation and Kinship ties retard migration (Uhlenberg, 1973)\textsuperscript{172}. People having more community affiliations and kinship ties are comparatively less mobile than otherwise.

It is reported by some studies (Stoltman, 1971\textsuperscript{173}; Saxena, 1973\textsuperscript{174}; Simic, 1973\textsuperscript{175}; Bhakoo, 1978\textsuperscript{176}; Gupta, 1980\textsuperscript{177}) that the natural calamities like flood and drought and widespread poverty also effected large scale migration from the villages of Eastern Uttar Pradesh.

Political factors are also considered to be the important determinates of migration. Hilda (1965)\textsuperscript{178} found that in West Africa the rate of migration was low during the Pre-colonial era but during the colonial era it enhanced considerably as a result of important political decision for developing communication and transportation means. Gosal (1961)\textsuperscript{178} indicated that the migration is bound to increase as a result of the grooving diversification of economic activity due to industrialization, communalization and urbanization. Improvement in transport facilities and spread of modern education are likely to increase the mobility of Indian population.

3.3. Push-Pull Factors

Scholars generally explicate the phenomenon of internal migration on the line of "Push-Pull" model. The high pressure of population on limited land base, seasonal employment, low wages and gradual decay of traditional occupations and village industry have considerably aggravated the economic miseries of the rural masses, leading to migration from rural areas (Bhargava, 1971a)\textsuperscript{180}. the out of migration of people in india has resulted not so much from pull factors as from push factors (Bose, 1961, 1978\textsuperscript{181}; Bulsara, 1965\textsuperscript{182}; Gare, 1973\textsuperscript{183}; and Lakshmaiah, 1974\textsuperscript{184}; but in certain studies (Pilai and
Majumdar, 1969)\textsuperscript{185}, the pull force is believed to be more important than the push force in inducing migration from rural to urban areas. On the other hand it was very difficult for Goswamy (1963)\textsuperscript{186} to ascertain whether migrants were pushed or pulled in the case of in-migration of people from the outside into the state of Assam during 1901-1961. Both the forces were found equally responsible in effecting migration. Some people were pushed out under economic hardship and uncongenial atmosphere from the place of residence, while others were pulled on account developmental activities to the place of destination (Goswamy, 1963\textsuperscript{187}; Gupta, 1961\textsuperscript{188}; and Connell et al 1976\textsuperscript{189}). The push and pull forces are not independent of one another but are complementary. They do not work in isolation, rather, their reinforce each other (Sovani, 1966)\textsuperscript{190}.

Sen Gupta and Bhattacharya (1966)\textsuperscript{191} have analyzed that both the push and pull forces operate at the origin and destination simultaneously. Agarwala's study (1968)\textsuperscript{192} made an interesting observation that in the case of male migrants push factors is more important than pull factor, but in the case of female migrants both pull and push factors are equally significant because in most cases the immigration of females occurs as a result of migration.

According to Singh and Yadava (1981)\textsuperscript{193}, the important push factors in the migration of the respondents were: poverty, unemployment, social network i.e., persons showing interest in migration, strained family relations etc. The study revealed that 'unemployment' was the most important push factor. The important pull factors were better schooling facilities, liking for the place, transferable post, some relatives/friends already there, better employment opportunities and more secured job.
The motivation for migration is mainly the economic gain but the causes are often a complex-mix factors. A majority of the immigrants came to Burdawam for earning money to pay-off their loans. About one-fourth came for employment and the rest for high wage attraction (Chatterjee, 1983). The push factors at the native place which compelled people to migrate were: high indebtedness and chronic unemployment. In case of seasonal migration, the push factors were more important than the pull factors.

3.4. Consequence of Migration

Sovani 1969 analysing the demographic consequences of migration in underdeveloped countries said that in these areas migration has negligible effect, that too for short time only. The reason is that rates of migration are low, and most of the migrants move temporarily for short time. In the long run these migrants return to their place and make up the loss of migration. But reverse was the case in certain regions of united kingdom and united states where migration from rural areas resulted into acute depopulation, shortage of workforce and natural decrease (Lowenthal and Couitas, 1962).

Myrdal (1957) taken up the topic of migration and economic development. He argued that because it is often advance region which attracts migrants, internal migration tends to widen regional disparity, and thus is a handicap for over all economic development. Hathaway (1960) in the case of migration from agriculture in United States, reached to conclusion that migration has not improved the relative position of low income areas in agriculture, Because most of the people, capable of making such improvement was among out migrants.

A major consequence of migration is transfer of cash to the areas of origin. Conell et al., (1976) in his recent rural study found that in the case of Indian villages the proposition of remittance to the total rural
income is very low ranging from 0 to 8 per cent only. While in the villages of Taiwan it is estimated to be 39 to 76 percent of total village income.

3.5. Adjustment Problems of Immigrants

Adjustment of immigrants may be considered at two levels: 1. adjustment with the community where they migrate and 2. adjustment with their original community where they migrate from. The adjustment problem at the first stage may be caused due to diverse language and cultural background. Duocestella (1970) found that in Catalonia the language spoken was different from Spain. Therefore, most of the immigrants from Spain to Catalonia faced the problem of maladjustment due to language variation. But the immigrants who had come from south regions of Spain were well adjusted because they did not have the problem of language pickup. The hostile attitude of locals and shortage of houses created difficulties for the settlement of the immigrants (Duocestella, 1970). The hostile attitude is caused by the feeling of relative deprivation between the locals and the immigrants. Bevins (1971) in his study of Brazilian farmers observed that the feeling of relative deprivation may arise either of the locals or the immigrants compared themselves with others in terms of living, education, income, representation in power structure etc. In some areas, locals are better than the immigrants, while in other areas, the reverse is true.

The problem of adjustment is also dependent upon the duration of stay of immigrants in the immigrating place. A study (Zachariah, 1968) of greater Bombay showed that longer the exposure of immigrants to the city life, the greater is the resemblance to city born persons and hence more adjustment. As the duration of stay extends and immigrants adopt new cultural values to adjust with the new settings, they find it difficult to adjust with their original community.
Reddy (1971)\textsuperscript{204} noticed the conflict among the migrant students and their parents. The extend of this adjustment may be dependent upon immigrants contacts with their original community. Bhakoo (1978)\textsuperscript{205} noticed in his study that the immigrants did not adjust well in the new social milieu as they had low degree of social participation, lack of free movement, more of frustration, non-cooperation and a feeling of relative deprivation. In the new social setting, the immigrants acquired many new skills in various farming operations such as sowing of seeds, spreading of fertilizers, use of farm machinery and cleaning of irrigation channels. The food habits, dress and language had also undergone changes to adjust in accordance with the will of the employers.

3.6. Method of Recruitment and Wage Payment

The study of Arora and Kumar (1980)\textsuperscript{206} indicated that 88 percent immigrants belonged to Bihar. From 1973-74 to 1979, there had been a gradual increase in the migrants labour force. The labourers from Bihar were recruited by the local agents of the traders and transported to Punjab. They were supplied to the farmers after charging the commission between Rs. 300 and 400. The majority of the labourers who came to Punjab for the first time came through the traders. The agents gave many allurements to the migrants for attracting them for employment in Punjab. After employment, the labourers normally preferred to get their wages at the time of going back to their native places. The commission to these agents was paid by the farmers on the understanding that they (farmers) were not to pay first two month's salary to the immigrant farm workers. In this way, a big chunk of the potential earnings of migrants was taken away by these agents and traders. Rao (1980)\textsuperscript{207} also found that the migrants in general and the seasonal migrants in particular tend to be exploited by the middlemen.
On the basis of the studies reviewed above, the major determinants of migration are age, education, sex, marital status, caste, occupation and income. The people move from one region to another both for economic and non-economic considerations. The immigrants face many problems in the new social setting such as problems of housing, health and sanitation and non-adjustment with the locals due to the diversity of language and culture, non-cordial attitude of locals and the feeling of relative deprivation between the locals and the immigrant. The adjustability of the immigrants however, increases with the extension of their stay in the immigrants' community because in due course of time they adapt to the new values and norms and pick up the local language. But this sometimes creates difficulty in their adjustment with their original community.

Though there are many studies dealing with the subject of migration, yet many studies are required to understand the complexity of factors which are either causes or consequences of migration.

The steady demand for labor in some parts of the world, for example, has grown steadily since the Second World War to a point where "international labor migration has become one of the most unsettled sociopolitical issues of our time" Papademetriou and Martin, (1991), p. ix]208. Technological change, reduced transportation costs, and the integration of global economies have all contributed to an increase in migration. Today, "about one hundred and forty million persons – or roughly two percent of the world's population – reside in a country they were not born in Borjas, (1994), p.1209. At a very simplistic level, three factors affect the migration decision. The first two factors have to do with the mindset of the individual migrant. Specifically, what motivates a worker to migrate, and what influences his decision to return, if he does? The third and equally important factor is the
immigration policy and the socio-economic conditions in the home and host state.

The decision to migrate is affected by many factors. Oded Stark, director of the Migration and Development Program at Harvard University, points out that "attitudes toward risk, relative deprivation and intra-household interactions" are just a few of the influences that prompt workers to migrate [Stark, (1991), p.33]210. A worker's attitude towards risk is central to the migration process. More than just a transfer of residence, migration entails acclimating to a completely different culture and generally involves a prolonged stay away from home. The pecuniary costs of migration are significant too. A migration study undertaken by the Center for Development Studies (CDS) in India noted that "each worker had to spend, Rupees 44,000 to migrate to the Middle East . . . they raised this money from family savings, borrowed from relatives, took institutional loans, and even sold ornaments and jewelry" [Business Line, September 23, 1999]211. Migration is also motivated by relative deprivation, an assessment of which occurs when "people engage in interpersonal income comparisons within their reference group" [Stark, (1991), p.24]212. The greater the relative deprivation (dissatisfaction), the higher the probability that the worker will migrate. Sjaastad (1977)213, for example, argue that "a man making a real income of two hundred and fifty dollars per year as a tribal chief in Africa may not be willing to move to the United States for ten times this income, because he would be considered a pauper with an income of only two thousand five hundred a year. A third impetus for migration is intra-household interactions. Stark reports on the importance of "network and kinship capital" in the migratory process [Stark, (1991), p.26]214. He believes that potential migrants and current migrants are involved in a prisoner's dilemma super game. Potential migrants, for example, cooperate in the first game. Once they migrate, they reciprocate by
assisting future workers to do the same. The underlying assumption used in this model is that "the arrival of new migrants confers benefits upon the earlier migrants". Two of the most frequently employed economic models used to explain migrations are the classical economic model and the historical-structural model.

"The classical view focuses on equilibrium models that treat migration as a voluntary and rational decision made by individuals who seek to enhance their economic position by responding to the higher wages offered away from home" [Papademetriou and Martin, (1991)215, p. 8]143. Proponents of this theory argue that migrants arrive at a rational decision by taking the individual costs and benefits of migration into consideration. A migrant's attitude towards risk, their relative deprivation, and intra-household interactions are but a few factors considered by this theory. Critics, however, argue that these models "ignore the international distribution of production factors and natural resources, and the state-level economic and political decisions that directly affect individual decisions to migrate" [Papademetriou and Martin, (1991), p. 8]216 (also see e.g. Sjasstad, (1962)217 and Todaro, (1976)218]. In contrast, the "historical-structural model of migration shifts focus from individual actions to national and international political and economic forces" [Papademetriou and Martin, (1991), p. 9]219. Conditions in the host country are an example of determinants, according to this theory. However, critics point out that the historical-structural model has obvious limitations. Coastal states, for example, have significantly more outflows of migrants than do landlocked states. "With their unitary view of the global system, historical-structuralists often underestimate the economic dynamism of some peripheral states, for example, the fact that migration brings peasant communities and households into direct contact with international capital", which may provide an impetus for future immigration [Papademetriou and Martin, (1991), p. 11]220.
Additionally, has extensively analyzed the relationships between migration and overpopulation, poverty and economic development. Her work reveals that lesser developed countries (LDCs) with high population-growth rates, high levels of poverty and stagnating economic growth have higher migration rates. Both theories noted above have merit. They contribute to our understanding by primarily increasing the "awareness of the interdependence between the international politico-economic system and migration, and of the economics and sociopolitical implications of such interdependence" [Papademetriou and Martin, (1991), p.12]. This has stimulated much debate concerning how governments must view the migration process. Immigration laws are often driven by the impact that immigrants can have on the local economy. Immigrants influence the labor market, wage rates, standard of living, educational standards, and the welfare systems of the host nation.

The scope of the influence of immigrants, policy makers need to "resolve two distinct issues: how many immigrants the country should admit, and what kinds of people they should be" [Borjas. (1994), p.3]. The role that immigrants play in the economy of a host country hinges heavily upon the number of immigrants in the state as well as their occupational status. Today, the Indian immigrant population in the United States, for example, is over one million people. Based on their "median income, they comprise one of the highest paid groups in the country". Their standing in society has enabled them to influence policy decisions in Washington, an indication of the political power they command in their host country. Still, not all immigrant groups can exert as much influence relative to their numbers as Indian immigrants in the United States. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for example, the proportion of expatriates to the local population is 4:1. This makes the local population a minority in their own land. Yet, despite their
disproportionately high numbers, immigrants in the UAE wield almost no political power. Hence, gathering insights into the socio-economic dynamics of migrants is essential to gain a richer understanding of the migratory process.

Populations in the MENA region tend to be unevenly distributed on the land, both among MENA countries and within each country. While all six GCC countries together have a population of about 32 million (with Saudi Arabia alone having about 22 million inhabitants), Egypt alone has a population of about 69 million (IMF, 2003). The density per square kilometre varies sharply from three persons in Libya to as many as 1,000 in Bahrain. One reason for this is that a very large percentage of MENA is barren desert. Thus, in Egypt the non-desert areas of the Nile Valley and the Delta have a density of over 1,200 inhabitants per square kilometre, while the desert areas (over 95% of total territory) have a density of one

This characteristic of MENA explains why, despite the vastness of territory, many villages and cities appear to be overcrowded. This pattern also implies mounting pressures on the limited non-desert areas in the region. About 70% of the poor in the MENA region live in rural areas, even though rural areas support only 43% of the total population. (World Bank, 2003)\(^{223}\). Together with several political and socio-economic factors, this situation has triggered a stream of rural-urban migration in all MENA countries, leading to rapid urbanization and, in turn, to the transformation of urban spaces into increasingly significant clusters of communities originating from the countryside. The inflow of rural migrants in MENA has been much more rapid than the pace at which they are absorbed into the market. As a result, many cities in the region are populated with unemployed and underemployed people.
Rural-urban migration is linked to changes in the sectoral distribution of employment. Since the 1970s, the share of employment in agriculture declined rapidly until the mid 1980s and more slowly since then. However, manufacturing and other industries have not increased proportionally to the decline of the agricultural sector. The development of urban areas is still closely tied to the rural economy through the exchange of labour, goods, services, information and technology. Remittances from urban areas to rural areas are an important source of income for rural populations in the MENA region as elsewhere. In Morocco, for example, urban remittances are as high as 30% of the income of the poor (World Bank, 2000).224

Internal migration data is indicative of the real and perceived employment opportunities in different regions, and differences of educational, health and other services. One important outcome of rural-urban migration has been the growth of the so-called informal sector in urban areas. Although associated with hidden unemployment, urban under-employment and poverty, informal activities have become a means for many countries to cope with population growth, rural-urban migration, economic crises and unemployment. In some countries of the MENA region, the informal sector is estimated to contribute anywhere between one-quarter and two-thirds of non-agricultural employment, with Algeria (1985) at 25.4 percent; Tunisia (1989) at 39.3 percent; Morocco (1982) at 56.9 percent; Egypt (1986) at 65.3 percent; Mauritania (1988) at 75.3 percent; Iran (1986) at 43.5 percent; and Turkey (1990) at 17.4 percent. As for their contribution to GDP, informal activities are largely under-recorded in the national income accounts of all Third World countries (ERF, 1996, Editorial).
According to the Global IDP Project, the Middle East is home to the world's largest single refugee population – the Palestinians. Regionally, it has one of the smallest internally displaced populations. Across the region there are an estimated 1.8 million internally displaced compared to 4.8 million refugees. This estimate should be treated with caution, however, as many IDPs in the region have never been registered. At the same time, the number includes many descendants of IDPs, reflecting the fact that internal displacement in the region has often spanned over several generations. In fact, over half the internally displaced people in the Middle East have been displaced for at least twenty years.

Hundreds of thousands of people were internally displaced by the civil war in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. Some 300,000 IDPs remain unable to return because of continued instability in the southern part of the country, which despite the withdrawal of the Israeli army in 2000 is still plagued by clashes between the Lebanese guerrilla group Hizbollah and Israeli forces. The wars between Israel and its neighbours after 1948 caused large-scale displacement, including the internal displacement of Arabs within Israel and of inhabitants of the Golan Heights within Syria. These IDP populations, each of whom now totals several hundred thousand, have been displaced for decades and there is little prospect for return.

In 2003 the US-led armed intervention in Iraq, followed by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime produced a large scale of internal displacement in the Middle East. The UN had feared that an additional one million people would become displaced within Iraq as a result of the war. While displacement did not take place on this scale, close to 80,000 people were forced from their homes during the fighting. In the wake of the fall of Saddam Hussein, a number of international humanitarian organisations, including some assisting IDPs, established
a presence in Iraq. By the end of 2003 many of these NGOs and charity groups had left Iraq due to the growing insecurity and the direct targeting of humanitarian actors. The resultant reduction of humanitarian operations has, for the near future at least, diminished the chance of finding durable solutions for the many Iraqis who were displaced by the war.

The situation for existing IDPs in the region has also not improved. The current state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has caused the additional internal displacement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and continuing tensions between Israel and Syria have prevented the return of IDPs displaced from the Golan Heights.

Over the last decade, research on population displacement by development projects has considerably expanded. However, while researchers of Asia, Africa and Latin America have produced a great deal of writings on resettlement processes and their failures, literature on the MENA region has been relatively scarce. This is despite the fact that displacements have become more frequent in the region in recent years, especially in urban settings, due to urban regeneration and infrastructure investments, as witnessed extensively in Lebanon and Egypt, for example. Displacement related to rural areas is often linked to water security, i.e. the Ilisu dam on the river Tigris, which threatens to displace thousands of Kurds and the Taiz Municipal and Flood Protection Project in Yemen, which affects the already marginalized Akhdam caste. It is beyond the scope of this report to explore development-induced migration in the MENA region in any detail, but it is an issue that should be explored further, especially in the context of pro-poor policies.
The main population flows within the MENA region have been associated with labour migration from non-oil producing Mashreq countries, especially Egypt and Yemen, but also Jordan and Palestine and to a lesser degree Syria and Iraq, to the oil-producing countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Although official data on these flows is either unavailable or not sufficiently accurate and reliable, most analysts agree that this type of regional migration peaked in the mid- Employment estimates of Arab labour migrants to the Gulf during this period range between a low of 1.54 million to a high of 3.45 million (Shah, 1994, in IOM, 2002: 40).

Long before the Gulf crisis in 1990 and the subsequent war in 1991, GCC states started to recruit workers from Asia. The economic argument posited for this change in employment patterns was that Asian workers worked for less money and were more productive. Yet, in order to understand the recruitment policy drives of the GCC states in these period non-economic considerations also need to be given weight. In the context of political instability, especially in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, GCC governments were wary of radical social and political ideas. In addition to the upsurge of Islamist ideologies in the 1980s, leftist and pan-Arab ideologies were widespread and threatened the conservative monarchies in the Gulf.

Moreover, the sheer presence and dependence on foreign labour was felt to pose a threat and measures were taken to make this migration phenomenon temporary rather than permanent. As Arab migrants had often tried to bring over their families, Asian workers appeared to be the safer choice in terms of both their politics and their status as temporary migrants.
The preference for non-Arab foreign nationals became even more pertinent in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait and Yemen, Jordan and Palestine’s support for Iraq. About 1.5 million people were displaced in the wake of the Gulf crisis in 1990/1991: about 800,000 Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia, alongside 200,000 Jordanians and 350,000 Palestinians who were mainly expelled from Kuwait (IOM, 2000)\textsuperscript{227}. No in-depth research has been carried out to study the impact of this situation on the economies and poverty levels of the sending countries. But obviously the lack of remittances, as well as pressures on local labour markets, have been a huge burden, especially in Yemen, Egypt and Jordan where unemployment and recession rose significantly.

Under normal conditions, returning migrants bring to their countries of origin accumulated savings that help their return and often allow for better economic prospects at home. This was not possible during the Gulf crisis and many migrants even had to leave their personal belongings behind. Aside from the economic setback, migrants have also suffered psychologically, similar to refugees during war and conflict. In Egypt, the outcome has been more mixed as Egyptian nationals replaced many of the former Palestine, Jordanian and CGC countries (Richards & Waterbury 1996:370-1)\textsuperscript{228}.

In the mid 1990s, Asian labour migrants from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea and Bangladesh outnumbered Arab migrants by about one million (Girgis, 2002: 10)\textsuperscript{229}. However, a more in-depth study of Kuwait from 1989-2000 reveals that despite a decrease in numbers, Arab migrant workers have dominated the upper echelons of skill categories (technical, managerial and clerical), while Asian workers have dominated services, agriculture and production-related jobs. Jobs in sales have also been dominated by Arab workers. It is interesting to note that the overall foreign Arab
population outnumbered the Asian population as many Arab workers tend to migrate with their families while Asian workers (both men and women) migrate on their own. This is partly related to the conditions (salaries, housing etc) related to high and low skilled jobs, as well as the particular migration culture of Arab and Asian workers. According to Evans and Papps (1999 213)\textsuperscript{230}, about one third of Arab adult migrants (other than Jordanian and Palestinian migrants for whom no data was available) is living with at least a part of their families in the country of settlement. This is despite the fact that GCC states have severely curtailed family reunion, except for foreign workers of high-income levels. Aside from the need to provide visas and bank guarantees, migrant workers are obliged to pay a considerable fee before family members are allowed temporary residency.

Since the 1990s, there has been a new trend influencing recruitment strategies and, potentially, future populations flows. As a result of persistently weak oil prices, financial contributions, depleted foreign assets and loss due to two Gulf wars (1980-1988, 1991), the GCC countries have started to experience recessions, and for the first time have recorded unemployment figures for nationals. In Saudi-Arabia, for example, the Manpower Council estimated the unemployment rate among Saudi nationals at 14\% in 2000, and at 15 \% in 2001 (EIU, 2002) In addition to an economic crisis, GCC countries face a large pool of young first time job seekers (including women), who benefited from the expanded and improved education system. About half a million GCC nationals are unemployed in a region that employs 7.5 million expatriate workers (Girgis, 2002\textsuperscript{231}, in IOM, 2002: 44\textsuperscript{232}). Based on population growth projections and the maturing of the large proportion of the 0-14 years age group, Girgis estimates that the share of the labour force within the overall population will increase from 58\% (1975) to 63\% in
2005, thereby considerably increasing the number of people in search for waged employment.

All GCC states have introduced policies to reduce rising unemployment among their nationals, and to maintain or increase birth rates in order to curtail their dependence on foreign labour (IOM, 2000)\(^\text{233}\). Despite ongoing attempts by GCC governments to nationalize their labour forces, "nationalization" or "localization policies" – i.e. the attempt to replace foreign with national labour - seem to have been only partially successful. This is largely due to the preference for better-paid and prestigious public sector jobs at a time that government expansion has come to a halt. The public sector can not be sufficiently enlarged to absorb the large numbers of first time job seekers. Despite obvious improvements in the education systems, there also seems to exist a skills-mismatch between national graduates and private sector needs (Girgis, 2002:38)\(^\text{234}\).

The increased participation of women in the labour force poses another challenge as the educational profile of women is higher than those of men. While still low in comparison to other MENA countries and regions, female participation in the Gulf is expected to rise due to a) economic recession and negative per capita income growth which will force young families to rely on two salaries rather than one; b) the rise in education levels, particularly higher education; c) women's ongoing demands for greater recognition and rights, particularly pertaining to freedom of movement, education, political participation and contribution to the economy and d) reliance on expatriate maids and nannies, which will push well-educated women to seek careers outside the confines of their homes (Girgis, 2002: 21)\(^\text{235}\).

Whatever obstacles exist in the present time to speed up the process of the nationalization of the labour force, there is no doubt that,
in the long run, national workers will replace a large number of expatriate workers. As GCC nationals will seek well paid skilled jobs, this trend will affect Arab migrants much more than Asian migrants who are predominately found in low skilled jobs. Jobs currently held by Arab labour migrants include teachers, engineers, lawyers, physicians, researchers etc., which will eventually be sought more intensely by the national labour force. Girgis (2002) predicts "slow Arab out-migration" over the next decades. According to his estimates, the current out-migration in Arab countries will amount to a loss of remittances worth $1.55 billion over the period of 2003-2007 alone. In addition, there will be an increase in return migration which, in turn, will lead to greater pressures on local labour markets and may lead to greater unemployment rates.

Other less significant regional population flows have been associated with migration to Libya (mainly from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Palestine), to Jordan (mainly from Iraq and Palestine) and to Iraq (mainly from Egypt and Palestine). The migration flow to Libya has increased since the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 and the Treaty of Marrakech, which was supposed to facilitate labour movements within the Union. Rapprochement with Egypt has also increased the number of Egyptian migrant labourers. Moreover, restrictions on migration imposed by European countries is cited as a reason for the increase in migration to Libya (Nassar, 2004).

However, several analysts and academics have challenged the effectiveness of the Union of Arab Maghreb to produce regional integration. Libya has enjoyed the highest per capita income in Africa, estimated at $5410 in 1990. In this same period the Libyan government began to shift its political focus away from the Arab world towards Africa, increasing its influence on African politics and diplomacy. In this context, the government tolerated the flow of migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa who largely became involved in a project to green the desert. Yet, despite Gaddafi’s pan-African policies, a high number of Libyans resented the presence of African labour migrants. A mixture of economic crisis due to the imposition of sanctions and racist attitudes led to violent outbursts against African migrants, with the killing of hundreds of Africans in 2000. Although the killings were followed by a massive exodus of African migrants, these days the migration flow continues as many are hoping to either find economic betterment in Libya or a chance to transit to Western Europe.

In the past, Jordan and Iraq have both sent and received migrants. The Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein tried to mobilize its own human resources rather than foreign labour (as was the case in the GCC countries). Nevertheless, in the context of the economic boom (late 70s and up to mid 1980s) as well as loss of labour due to war (1980-1988), the Iraqi state needed to import labour from outside. Based on Arab nationalist principles, the Iraqi government rejected the idea of labour migrants from non-Arab countries and allowed in several million mainly unskilled Egyptian workers into Iraq. Despite several violent clashes and incidents during the late 1980s, many Egyptian workers remained in Iraq until the Gulf War in 1991. In the past decade, due to the severe economic and humanitarian crises brought about the comprehensive economic sanctions (1990-2003), as well as continued political instability and violence, Iraq became mainly a country of immigration.

Jordan, on the other hand, has continued to be both a country witnessing out-migration and replacement migration. Yet, the most recent impact of migration needs to be analyzed in the context of return migration of Jordanians and Palestinians from the Gulf countries, mainly Kuwait, in 1991/1992 as well as the large flow of Iraqi refugees since 1990.
REFERENCE


4. Roninson S. Marguerite, 1988, Local Politics. The Law of Fishes:Development through political change in Medak district of Andhra Pradesh (South India), Oxford University Press, Delhi.

5. Weiner, Myron et al, 1982, India's preferential policies, migrants, the middle classes, and ethnic equality, Oxford University Press, Bombay.


78. **Breman, 1996, Contemporary South Asia: Foot Loose Labour. Working in India’s informal economy, Cambridge University Press (ibid).**


92. Belhum,L.H., 1971, "Relative Deprivation and Level of Living Among Brazilian Farmers", Rural Sociology, Fall.


124. Conel.J., 1982, India’s preferential policies, migrants, the middle classes, and ethnic equality, Oxford University Press, Bombay.


133. Premi, 1980 Aspects of Female Migration in India. Economic and Political Weekly.


135. Rele, J.R., 1969, Trends and Significance of Internal Migration in India. Sankhya series. 331 (1x 2).


147. Grewal and Sidhu,,1979, A study on Migrant Agricultural Labour in Punjab. ( Mimeo), Dept. of Economics and Sociology, Punjab Agricultural University, Ludhiana (ibid)


160. Swanson, John, 1979, The Consequences of Emigration for Economic Development: A Review of the Literature in Papers in Anthropology XX:

161. b Urbanisation and Urban India. Asia Publishing House, Bombay (ibid)


163. Conel., J., 1982, India’s preferential policies, migrants, the middle classes, and ethnic equality, Oxford University Press, Bombay (ibid)


189. Conel, J., 1982, India's preferential policies, migrants, the middle classes, and ethnic equality, Oxford University Press, Bombay (ibid).


199. Conel, J., 1982, India's preferential policies, migrants, the middle classes, and ethnic equality, Oxford University Press, Bombay (ibid).


211. Business Line, September 23, 1999


167


