CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER IV

INDIAN THEORIES ON GENDER

INTRODUCTION

The basis for all the Indian grammatical thought was implicitly or explicitly given by Pāṇini in his celebrated work Asṭādhyāyī written about 2500 years ago. Kātyāyana made some improvements, but Patañjali - the grammarian par excellence - discussed almost all the linguistic problems in his Mahābhāṣya. In Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya we have a proper work on the philosophy of language. Helārāja and later commentators made their own contributions and clarifications. In the following study on gender in Sanskrit all the contributions of these authors are consulted. Before touching the main problems of gender we start with some preliminary clarifications.

THE CONCEPT OF 'PRĀTIPADIKA'

In other languages we come across the nominative case first in which the word is given. But Sanskrit has a speciality in comparison with other Indo-European languages: it has a substantive-form called 'prātipadika' which is never used in the language as such. Pāṇini has defined it as 'arthavadadhāturaṇa-pratyayaḥ prātipadikam' and 'kṛttadhitasūrāsamāsācā' (1-2-46, 47). They are the word-forms which are significant but not verbal roots or affixes and also forms ending

in primary and secondary derivatives and compounds. This \textit{prātipadika} is not used in the language without proper modification or '\textit{saṃskaraṇa}'. After \textit{saṃskaraṇa} the declensional suffixes are added to make it a 'pāda' or any one of the seven cases. The first case suffix, namely, the nominative is different from the other oblique cases. It is interesting to note that the concepts of 'grammatical subject and predicate are unknown to Dionysios Thrax and Apollonios Dyskolos. So also Pāṇini has no grammatical category that corresponds to the concept of nominative' (Theme, 1956, 1). The \textit{prātipadika} denotes the meaning. The oblique cases except the genitive (2-3-50) indicate the relation of

1. "As applied to nouns Aristotle had not regarded what we call the 'nominative' as a case at all; he distinguished in nouns between the noun proper (in its nominative case, as we should say), and its derivatives, which included in our terms the oblique cases. The Stoics fixed the use of the term 'case' as we have to today: the nominative was 'the upright case' and the rest were 'oblique'. Generally speaking, they were grouped together as 'oblique' because in at least some of their uses there was prominent not only the meaning of the noun as such but a particular relation between it and another word or words (usually verbs, prepositions or other nouns) in the sentence" (Robins, 1961, 32.)
a given concept, denoted by the nominal stem (prātipadika) to a given action denoted by the root, say, the finite verb. Pāṇini gives the rule: prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacana matre prathama (2-3-46): Where the sense is that of the nominal stem (1-2-45) or of gender only, or measure only or number only, the first case-affix is employed. The sense of a prātipadika is to denote mere existence. The nominative adds to the nominal notion, the concept and the designation of the number of the representatives of the concept and the syntactical relations. In 'anekamanyapārthe' (2-2-24) the word 'artha' is used to mean gender, number and the 'draya'. But Spijier interprets it as "the nominative ending is added when there is to be designated nothing but the gender and the number of the nominal stem notion" (Spijier, 1886, 26, 27; Theme 1956, 2). There is a difference in the interpretation of 'parimaṇa vacana'. The word 'parimaṇavacana' is comprehensive for singular, dual and plural: prātipadikārthasya liṅge ca parimaṇavacana caiva. This explanation goes well with Pāṇini: kimā saṃkhyāparimaṇe dati ca (5-3-41). But Patañjali, Nyāsa on Kaśika, Bhāṭṭogīḍikṣita and others consider 'parimaṇa' as measure. Renou too follows the traditional interpretation (Renou, 1948, 42). According to Spijier's own words himself "has dissented from the traditional

1. For a clear and detailed study of this sutra with reference to other comms. cfr. Kunjunni Raja, 1965, 172-181; another scholarly study is had by Gaurinath Sastri (1969, 136-171).
interpretation" (1886, 27) and on this account his opinion is rejected though he is not grammatically wrong.

But in all the occasions the 'liṅga' and 'vacana' may not be intended. 'Sūtra liṅgavacananamatantram' and the sūtra 'tadaśīgyam sañjāpramapāṇatvāt' (1-2-53) say that gender and number of words are to be understood as it is found used in the common parlance or according to the idiom. 'Dāṣāḥ, āpāḥ, gṛhāḥ, varṣāḥ, sīkaṭāḥ' etc. are not in agreement with gender and number in the objects signified. So Pāṇini leaves the whole question of syntactic agreement to be decided by usage and idiom. But we cannot have a word without gender even if we do not mean it primarily (Sarma, 1940, 441; Vasu, 1962, 102-3; Kunjunni Raja, 1969, 48-50).

The other cases may be signified even without case endings: i.e. by conjugational affixes (tiṅ), by primary affixes (kṛt), by secondary affixes (taddhita), and by compounds (cfr. Anabhihite ca (2-3-1), and the comm. (Vasu, Vol. I, 1962, 277). Hence we do not have a 'pada' in use without the proper mark of gender with it.

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE PRĀTIPADIKA1?

There are three opinions regarding the signification of prātipadika: Some hold that it means the universal (jāti),

1. Prātipadika means the 'meaning' which a word carries with it irrespective of its other meanings due to the suffixes and other syntactical relations.
individual (vyakti) and gender; this is called trika pakṣa. Another opinion is that prātipadika means the universal, individual, gender and number; this is called catuṣṭkapakṣa. The third opinion is that prātipadika means the universal, individual, gender, number and syntactical relations. This is called paṅcakapakṣa (cfr. Pālamanorāma under 2-3-4; Tatvabodhinī, ibidem; Patañjali, I, pp. 245-247). Bhāṭṭojo-diśīta in Sidhānta Kaumudi on 'ajādyataśāp' (4-1-4) explicitly states that the suffixes are only 'dyotaka' not 'vācaka', of the gender. "The question whether or not 'gender' and even 'number' is part of nominal stem notion, the idea of number inherent in it being only restricted to a more specific one by the ending. It has certainly to be answered in the positive for both gender and number if we accept the definition of prātipadikārtha given by Sidhānta Kaumudi, but already Kaiyāṭa considers this view" (Thème, 1956, 10).

**THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD**

There is a discussion whether the word denotes genus or the individual. The grammarian holds that word imports both genus and individual. Vyādi was of the opinion that the import of the word is the individual and Vājapyāyana holds that the import of the word is the universal. According to Pāṇini both can be the meaning of the word since he has given both the rules: 'jātyākhyāyāmekeṣāṃ bahuvacananmanayatarasyām' and 'sarupāṇamekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau' (1-2-58; 1-2-64). According to Sarvadarsanasaṃgraha Vyādi maintained that the
word primarily denoted the individual, while genus is implied and thus he avoids the indefiniteness and wandering away from its proper subjects (Chatterji, 1972, 53-6). Only the individual can have gender and number (anekamanyapadārthe, 2-2-24 Vārttika, 7). Bhartrhari and Helārāja too hold that whatever be the denotation of words - jāti or vyakti - it won’t affect the theory of gender (VP 3-14-328, 331). The Vārttika 7 on 'jātyākhāyāyām...' (1-2-58) says 'jātidabdenahi dravyābhidhānam'¹.

1. For a scholarly study on the problem of 'jāti' and 'vyakti' in Mahābhāṣya vide Sarma, 1957, 54-65.

The Greeks were also discussing the same problem of the universal and the individual at this time while Patañjali was discussing it in India. Plato held extreme realism that the universals are real and exist 'before' the thing either in the order of understanding or in reality-universalia sunt realia ante rem'. Aristotle held that universals are real but exist only in the individual objects-universalia sunt realia in re. Nominalism holds that only individuals are real and genera and species are mere concepts. If the stress is put on the subjective nature of the concept, it is called conceptualism and if the stress is on the identity of the word and the object comprehended under the concept it is extreme nominalism. The formula for both these varieties of nominalism is
IS GENDER IN THE PRĀTIPADIKA OR IN THE SUFFIX?

To put this question in another way will be: is gender natural or grammatical. In Mahābhāṣya there are instances for both the grammatical gender and natural gender. Patañjali holds both the genders to be in the language. Is 'strītva' or 'pumstva' in the prātipadika or in the suffix? If it is in the prātipadika it is natural gender otherwise it is grammatical gender. Whenever Patañjali says 'liṅgamaśiṣyaṃ lokārayatvallīṅgasya' he means grammatical gender. Kāśikā and its commentaries Nyāsa and Padamañjarī, Rhaṭṭojidīkṣita and Nāgęśa continue this discussion. We will see all these one after the other.

First we will see some instances of grammatical gender.

GENDER IN THE SUFFIX - Grammatical Gender

1) In the fifth vārttika - sarvalīṅgatāca - Patañjali discusses that 'caturthi' can have a 'samāsa' with 'artha' and this is used in all the genders though 'artha' is nitya-pulliṅga.

2) In 'naff' (2-2-6) Patañjali discusses the importance of the word in the 'samāsa'. Whether the second word is important as in the tatpurusa or as in bahuvrīhi the third thing is important or as in avyayībhāva the first thing is

important. If it is uttarapadārthapradhāna when one says 'abhrāmaṇam ānaya' one must bring a brāhmaṇa. If it is 'anyapadārthapradhāna' then 'avarṣāḥ' (which may be 'hemantaḥ') gets gender of the third word 'hemantaḥ'. If it is 'pūrvapadārthapradhāna' then there is the problem: the 'avyaya' does not have gender and number. But when it is joined to a 'samāsa' it has gender and number as qualities which alone do not have liṅga but joined to a thing the qualities get the gender of the adhering thing. No word can remain without gender but gender comes in the syntactical context of the word.

3) The 'samāsa' 'citraguḥ' (one who has a spotted cow) means the suffix 'asya' also. One of the references of 'samāsa' is 'vibhaktyartha'. The question is asked: if 'vibhaktyartha' is the meaning of 'samāsa', 'vibhaktyartha' is not an individual and only an individual can have liṅga. The problem is put in two ways: 'vibhaktyarthābhidhāne adravyasya and vibhaktyarthābhidhāne dravyasya' ('anekamanyapadārthe, 2-2-24, vārttika, 7) 'Padārtha' means 'dravya', 'liṅga' and 'samkhya'. Because 'vibhaktyartha' is not a thing 'adravyasya' is taken. Liṅga is superimposed. Just as a quality gets the 'liṅga' and 'samkhya' of the inhering drāya, so the word gets liṅga of the dravya.

4) In 'cārthe dvandva' (2-2-29) Patañjali discusses the gender of 'ca'. It is the same as the 'nāḥ' above. Again on varttika 17 Patañjali says that gender is to be used as it is used in the language.
5) Paravallīṅgaṁ dvandvatatpurusayōḥ (2-4-26) deals with the grammatical gender.

6) Bhāve (3-3-18) the vārttika says 'bhāvesarvalīṅge nirdeśāḥ'. All genders can be applied to 'bhava'.

7) Another instance for grammatical gender is found on Vārttika's four to seven on 'tasyāpatyam' (4-1-92). 'apatyābhīdhamcna striśūlingasyāpyasidhinapumsakatvāt (4) sidhamtu prajanasya vivaksatvat, (5) ekārthe śabdānyatvād đrṣṭam liṅgānyatvam, (6) eg. pugyaḥ, tārakaḥ, nakṣatram, avayavānyatvāt, (7) kuṭi, kuṭīraḥ; śāmi; śūndāraḥ; etc.)'kuṭiśāmiśeṣa-bhyāḥ pratyayasanniyogena pūṣvadbhāvo vaktavyāḥ (vārt. i on 5-3-88).

8) Again other instances are found. On vibhaṣa supo bahucapurastātātu (5-3-68) the vārt. 3 - tugrahaṇam nityapuruṣvārtham - deals with grammatical gender.

9) Commenting on sūtra 'samāsāntaḥ' (5-4-66) on vārt. One Patañjali repeats that liṅgamaśiṣyam lokārayatvāllīṅgasya.

The following are the instances for natural gender

**GENDER IN THE PRATIPADIKA - Natural gender**

On 'strīyāṁ' (4-1-3) it is said strīyāṁ prātipadike ṭab bhavati. When the 'strītva' meant by the prātipadika is to be expressed the suffix 'ṭāp' is to be used. Here ṭāp is only repeating what is in the prātipadika. In vārt. five we
read: sidham tu striyāh prātipadika viśeṣapatvāt svārthe ṭābādayaḥ. 'Viśeṣa' is eternal and 'upalakṣaṇa' is temporal attribute to a thing. In the vārttika we find that ṭāp etc. are to be used as prātipadika viśeṣaṇa.

2) In nyāpprātipadikāt (4-1-1) on vārttika one Patañjali says: 'yattacchabdarūpam striyām vartate tasmād utpattistasya-itāḥ saṇjā bhaviṣyanti'. Here he explicitly means that feminine gender is in the word and not in the suffix. Again in vārttika 21 we read 'sidham tu striyāh prātipadikaviśeṣapatvāt svārthe ṭābādaya iti.'prātipadikaviśeṣaṇam...' this means that when we find that prātipadika means feminine we should use 'ṇyāp'.

KĀŚIKA

In Kāśika we find both the ideas that gender can be in prātipadika or in the suffix. 'Strītvam ca pratyayārthaḥ, prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam cetyubhayathāpi jujuyect/ striyāmahbih- dheyāyām striyām vā yat prātipadikam vartata iti'/

When discussing on striyām (4-1-3), Padamañjarī also agrees that gender can be in the prātipadika and in the suffix but prefers to say that gender is mainly in prātipadika. The meaning is that the 'pratyaya' shows that strītvam is the property of ṭāp. This strītvam can be of the 'vastu' or of a quality or of one who is having the quality. This 'having the quality' can be in two ways: upalakṣaṇa or viśeṣaṇa - temporary or permanent. It cannot be temporary. So strītvam
as a quality must be in the prātipadika. If strītvā is a temporary quality alone strītvam is in the pratyaya. If it is a property a thing is having then it is in the prātipadika. If strītvā is pratyayārtha there is only one strītvā. Then we cannot use dual and plural and more than one suffix as gārgyāyanī etc. If it is only in the suffix why should we use kumarī devadattā as kumara devadattā is enough.

Nyāsa on prātipadikārthaliṅgavacanaparimāṇamātre
prathamā says explicitly that gender is in the prātipadika itself\(^1\). On striyāṁ (4-1-3) nyāsa agrees that gender can be in prātipadika or in the suffix. If the gender is in the thing, suffix is just revealing it or expressing it. It adds nothing to the thing.

NĀGEŚA

Nāgeśa emphatically says that liṅga is only in the prātipadika. Liṅga is the meaning of the prātipadika, not of the suffix. Because, he says: (1) pratyaya is always important (pradhāna). When I say 'Rāmam' the importance goes to the 'karma', the accusative case. The other things are subordinate here. 'Am' is important and there is the 'padārtha' having the 'karma'. This 'padārtha' is subordinate.

1. Nyāsa on prātipadikarth... (2-3-46): pratipadikārthah satteti/ .... liṅgamapi pratipadikārthā eva bhavati/
siddhāstau striyāḥ pratipadikavideśanatvat svārthe
ṭabādayah/ Again striyāmabhidheyāyāṃti/

\(^1\) Nyāsa on prātipadikārthaliṅgavacanaparimāṇamātre
to 'karma'. Here strītva cannot get importance. So it is in the prātipadika. If gender were the meaning of the suffix it would get predominance over the meaning of the prātipadika which is not found.

2) The word 'vāc' etc. give strībodha without any suffix.

3) In liṅganuṣāsanam, ākāśa, vihāyas, etc. speak of liṅga based on prātipadika not on pratyaya.

4) Again 'svamōrnapumsakā' (7-1-23), 'hrasvo napumsake' (1-2-47), napumsakasya jhalacaḥ (7-1-72) etc. all mean the prātipadika.

5) If the nominative suffix were to have the liṅga then instrumental etc. should not give liṅga at all. So liṅga is for prātipadika.

6) In 'tasmācchaso naḥ pumṣi' by 'pumṣi' is meant prātipadika. Pulliṅgaśabda means that which has pulliṅga; in strīyām also that which has strīliṅga - not strīyām dotyām' of Bhaṭṭoji but 'strīyam varttamānāt prātipadikat' is the meaning. Sabdārtheśviti liṅgamiti ca svadharmopalakṣaṇam' (cfr. Mahīṣa, 1141-1146).

Nāgeśa continues the thought as follows: In the world whatever we can identify with signs as 'stanakesā... etc. are given liṅga accordingly. And that which cannot be identified so are attributed liṅga based on 'śabda'. This
'šabda' is given the gender with some identification before the suffix is added. It is done by seers. Prātipadika means the thing or the meaning of the word. In abstract word 'mamaḥ', cinta etc. the liṅga is without a thing but with meaning. Cinta, mamaḥ all mean the same. This Nāgēśa calls 'śāstrīya liṅga'. 'Śāstrīyam api liṅgām laukikaliṅgāt śabdabodhe sambhavate tathānuḥbhavat (1146). The question is why should one give a liṅga to a word? This kind of identification is the cause. When the word is read or heard, when you know that there is a pratyaya to mean the gender you know that it belongs to that particular gender.

BHĀTOJI DIKŚITA

Bhaṭṭoji in 'ajadyatastāp (4-1-4) says (we have seen it already): 'yatstrītvam tatra dyotye ṭāp syāt'. When suffix is 'dyotya', liṅga is in the prātipadika; when vācyā it is in the suffix.

WHERE IS GENDER EXISTING?

Gender can be understood as existing in three ways: in the thing (vastu), in the meaning (artha) and what is in the 'artha' can be either in the prātipadika or in the suffix. And the expression brings to the mind the idea of masculine or feminine or neuter.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Thing} & \text{meaning} & \text{word} \\
& & \text{mas., fem., neu.} \\
& & \text{suffix} \\
\end{array}
\]
'Sabda' gives the 'artha', 'artha' gives the 'vastu'.
First from the vastu is gender. 'Svarthamabhidhaya sabdo
nirapeko dravyamanah samavetam, samavetasya tu vacane lingam
samkhyam vibhaktim cabhidhaya...' (Padamahari on Nyaprapati.)

Nagesa explicitly says that gender is the property of
the thing and also of the meaning of the word. Since satvaraja-
jastamah are the constituting factors of all the thing which
are the cause of masculine, feminine and neuter, gender is in
the very core of the thing - iya vyaktiridam vastu ayam
padartha ityadivyavaharanam sarvatrapratibadadhaprasaratvat
arthanistham ca tat'. Anything can be called 'artha-',
'vyakti' or 'vastu' in any of the three genders. Pronouns
and adjectives agree with the noun in gender, number and case.
Hence any noun in any other gender can be put in any of the
three genders as we want. It depends on what gender we want
to mean. Hence gender is depending on the meaning also.
'Arthanistham is stanakesavyatiriktam' (1142). 'Na hi rupada-
aya sabdagatah'. Here too he means that gender is artha-
nistham. When we say pulliya the gender is not for the
word because of the vacyavacakayorabheda (1143). In some
words laukikaliiga and in some others sastriyaliiga are under-
stood. What is said to be the sastriyaliiga is the gender
understood from word to thing. If gender is understood from
thing to the word it is natural gender, laukikaliiga.

There is no liiga for 'Sabda' but 'Sabda' can be used to
express the liixa which is in the 'vastu' or in the 'artha'.

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But 'śabda' doesn't have a liṅga. By 'ī' or 'ē' we can show that the thing which is expressed using this ending of 'ī' or 'ē' is feminine in gender. He is quite clear that gender is semantic (1165-7). It is also the opinion of Kaiyāṭa and Hari. Bhāṣya says that there is no word 'napumṣaka'. 'Napumṣaṅkārabhidhāyitvāttadabhedaḥca śabdasya napumṣaṅkavatvamiti kaiyāṭahari..

BASIS FOR GENDER DETERMINATION

'Strī', 'pumān' and 'napumṣakam' - these three words are used in the language. Helārāja says that all the nouns have a denotation of gender more than the meaning; Liṅgam tu nāmapadānāmadhikam vācyam (VP. 3-13-1). Seeing what one concludes which is the proper gender of a word? Patañjalī has given three answers:

1) That which has got breasts and hair is female; one who has his beard is male and that which is without the signs

1. stanakeśavatīnārī lomasah puruṣah svṛtaḥ
   ubhayorantaram yacca tadabhāve napumṣakam (Bhāṣya 4-1-3)

The following studies also may be consulted on 'śtrīyān' (4-1-3).

Strass, 1927, 84-94;
Charudeva Sastri, 1974, 382-411;
of male and female sex but has resemblances of that is neuter\(^1\).

2) Growth and decay of the three guṇas is liṅga:

'śamstyaṇaprasavaḥ liṅgam'.

3) Grammatical gender - 'liṅgamāśiṣyam lokāśrayatvāliṅgasya'

Before going into details we will see what Hari has to say about it. He has given seven theories and these are given by those who know the truth concerning gender. The theories are: (1) that it is the relation of a thing with sex-signs such as breast and hair, (2) that it is the sex-signs themselves characterised by that relation, (3) that it is the universal manifested by the sex-signs, (4) that it is the three conditions āvirbhāva, tirobhāva and sthiti, of the three guṇas (satva, rajas and tamas), (5) that it is the three guṇas themselves in these conditions, (6) that it is an attribute created in objects by words, (7) that it is an attribute of words themselves (Subramanía Iyer, 1974, 105).

1. It is clear that biology is behind certain language structures as a pregnant one must be a female and one who shaves his beard most probably must be a male. These understandings are powerful forces behind the actual expressions of language and are based on distinctions which are not regarded as trivial by the speakers of the language (Ritchie Key, 1972, 21-3).

2. Stanakeśaśāntisambandho viśiṣṭā va stanaśayaḥ/

   tadupavyāfjanājātirguṇāvasthā guṇastathā// 1 //
Patañjali's three divisions in our usual terms will come under (1) natural gender, (2) grammarian's philosophical gender, and (3) grammatical gender\(^1\). The first deals with natural sex and this is one of the causes of gender division in our day to day life and with our common sense we feel so. The second one is based on the three guṇas which are supposed to be the basic components of all beings in the world and hence this deals with gender in things. When we cannot account for gender any way for the things expressed by some words we attribute that gender to the usage in the language - grammatical gender. Here

\[^{1}\text{1. Here we also note that Pāṇini has made the distinction of animate and inanimate as the western thinkers did later. His terms are 'prāṇin' and aprāṇin: e.g. 'avayave ca prāṇyoṣa-dhyavikṣebhyah (4-3-135) and prāṇirajatādibhyo aśi (4-3-154) etc. We find also the usages 'cittavat' and 'acittavat': e.g. cittavati nityam (5-1-89) and acittahastidhenoṣṭak (4-2-47). Pāṇini has used prāṇabhṛt in prāṇabhṛjātivayo-vacanodgatādibhyo aśi (5-1-129). Man and other animals are also distinguished in sūtras: manusyastathayorvasti (4-2-134) and samudāyorajah paśū (3-3-69) (Agrawala, 1949, 213). But this has not made any influence on Indian grammarian-philosophers to give any importance to it as far as the gender origin is concerned.}\]
we see that Patañjali did not adhere to any one theory. For grammarians the third one is enough but for the philosopher of language it is not enough. The word 'liṅga' is used for gender and sex. The 'stanakeśavatī...' is used here in the sense of sex. The above three divisions can, in the same order, come under the following three headings: (1) gender according to the sex, (2) gender according to the meaning and (3) gender in the suffix.

For the ordinary man 'stanakesavatī' etc. is the basis for gender. For the philosopher of grammar, where the gross 'stanādi' are not seen the subtle 'stanakeśa' etc. is the basis for gender. The seers see the subtle liṅga. Gender according to the meaning can be based on gross or subtle sex-signs.

When we carefully analyse we find that the seven reasons given by Hari can be grouped as three and this three groups will agree with that of Patañjali. The first three come under natural gender: the relation of sex-signs, the sex-signs themselves and the universal manifested by the sex-signs. The next two (4 & 5), the condition of three guṇas and the guṇas themselves, come under 'samstyaṇaprāsavaṇu liṅgam'. The last two (6 & 7) - an attribute created in the objects by words and the attribute of words themselves - will come under liṅgamaśī- ṣyam lokārayatvāliṅgasya or śabdasaṃskāra. Padamaṇḍari on 'striyaṃ' (4-1-3) has already combined the three lakṣaṇas as one which is called natural gender-laukikaliṅgam - as stana- keśasambandha or stanādaya eva or tadupavyaṅjanā jātyah.
Nāgęśa has made it clear that the first division is dealing with natural gender. The second opinion is 'samstyaṇaprasavau.' Nyāsa again says that jāti is meant by the author of Kāśīka.

By the power of the word (śabḍaśaktī) the universal of the feminine gender (strītvajāti) is revealed.

GRAMMARIAN'S PHILOSOPHY ON GENDER

1) NATURAL GENDER

Having said so much generally about the thought of Patañjali, Hari and other commentators let us examine the progress of their thought on gender. Patañjali found it difficult to hold the natural gender alone to explain the whole gender peculiarities in the language. If breasts and hair are feminine signs, the beard is the mark of male sex, what about the word 'bhrukuma' (male acting female part)? Seeing the breast etc. we do not add ṭāp and say 'bhrukumā;' nor do we make 'kharakuti (barber's shop) masculine seeing the hair spread over there. The difficulty is greater when we turn to inanimate things. In khavā (coat) and vṛkṣah (tree) no sex can be found even if we cut them into small pieces. If it is hidden we must see it when the cover is removed. If it is due to our defect in sight due to extreme distance, extreme proximity, injury to the senses, unsteadiness of the mind, subtlety, veiling, superimposition and blending with the similar1, then at least some one must see it or is it

1. atidurāt sāmipyādindriyagṛtārmano anavāsthānāt/
Like a mirage or a gandharvanagara? At least we must see it in its effect as we see the Sun moved in the sky though we do not see the actual movement. Moreover, the same word can have three genders like taṭah, taṭī and taṭam. If it is due to the feminine sex that we use feminine gender and vice versa then it is in the vicious circle. Hence Patañjali wants some philosophy for gender which is of the grammarians.¹

Hence "no doubt the idea of gender has its origin in the distinction of sexes such as male and female but when we turn towards on masculine and feminine names and discuss the propriety of their respective genders, we find them too obstinate to yield to any logical generalization, so far as the popular conception of sex is concerned" (Chakravarti, 1933, 449). Of course we have to agree that... in the realm of language, as in the world of nature, uniformity and variety are intrinsically intermingled with one another" (Sandys, 1906, 161).

¹ sauksmyād vyavadhānādabhibhavāt samānabhihārācchā // 7 //
(Saṃkhyaśāstra, 7).

On (4-1-3) striyām we read in the Bhaṣya
liṅgāt stripuṣayorśījāne bhrukumṣe ūp prasajyate
natvam kharakuti paśya
khatvāyṛksau na sidhyataḥ
asattu mṛgaḥpranāvam,
gandharvanagaram yathā
tayostu tat kṛtam dṛṣṭvā yathākāśena jyotiṣaḥ
anyonyasamārayam tvetat
Bhartṛhari explains the natural gender theory in two ways: it can be the state of relation to breast etc. or the person qualified by that relation 'stanakēsadisambandha' or 'stanakēsadisandhavīdīśṭa vyakti'. One is giving the importance to the suffix 'matup' which gives the relation and the other is giving importance to the thing to which the suffix is added. In one case it will be the relation which is in the form of 'sāmyoga' or 'samavāya' in the terms of Vaiśeṣika. This relation itself is liṅga, or the things which are having such a relationship are the liṅga.

Nāpumsaka liṅga also has a vyāñjakaṭva: ubhayorantara - abhayavyaṅjanābhāvat tadabhāve... Here the nāpumsaka is meaning something other than masculine and feminine: the 'abhāva' of masculine and feminine. The signification of the absence of masculine and feminine is neuter. Another liṅga is there which is different from masculine and feminine. Padamañjari (4-1-3) points out that when both the sex signs are found in one that also is nāpumsaka - male and female sex signs in one person. The 'tadabhāvatva' is found in the verb. 'Udbhayarantarāṃ' alone is not enough. In 'kukkuṭamayuryau' one is masculine and the other is feminine but they are not together in one. The breast, hair, beard etc. are only upalakṣaṇa. There are other lākṣaṇas also.

Bhartṛhari then considers gender where sex is not clear or sex signs are there but liṅga is not in accordance with it. Hari adds: 'tadupavyaṅjanā jātih' from the Vaiśeṣika. This
jāti of 'stana...' etc. is not verified in many things. Therefore he says that 'arthaḥ', 'vyakti', and 'vastu' bring respectively the idea of masculine, feminine and neuter with them and anything can be called 'arthaḥ', 'vyakti' or 'vasthu'. So he says that all the universals can co-exist. Mutually opposing sex-signs cannot co-exist unless they are universals. 'Arthaḥ', 'vyakti' and 'vastu' cannot be explained as the name of one thing in three genders. So Heḷāraja says that Pṛhasyakāra proposed the theory of three guṇas of the Śāṅkhya and the three stages of the ever continuing evolution of growth, decay and static state as the masculine, feminine and neuter respectively. So according to the intention of the speaker any gender can be expressed in any thing or one thing in three genders as 'arthaḥ', 'vyakti' and 'vastu' or 'taṭāḥ', 'taṭī' and 'taṭam'. ... satvarajastamasāṁ guṇānāṁ satatapari-

Being itself can have three genders as 'bhāvaḥ', 'sattā' and 'sāmanyam'; being has gender, not becoming. Noun signifies being and verb signifies becoming. The universal itself can be in the three genders as 'bhāvaḥ', 'jāti' and 'sāmanyam'.

All the language is only naming taking the named thing as if it is a dravya. 'Sabdāhi dravyāyamāṇām vastvācakṣānā-

1. tisro jātaya evaitaḥ keśaficit samavasthitāḥ
   aviruddhā viruddhābhīrgomahīṣyādījātibhiḥ// 4 //
staddharmalīṅgoṇādhitayaiva tatra tatra varcete'. Hence even a particular sex-gender can be presented in three genders as 'stribhāvak', 'striq' and 'stritvaṁ'. The jātiliṅga' behaves like grammatical gender - ābdasamśkāra (VP. 3-13-5). Any gender can have other genders (3-13-7; cfr. Varro, cha. II, p. 29).

In 3-13-6, there is a discussion on 'kukkūtanām' where only the jāti (kukkūtaṇāti) is meant and it is not said 'hen's' egg (kukkutī, kukkutyaṇām). Similar is the 'daraṇiyabhārya' which also gets a pumvadbhāva. This is an instance of gender without the vivakṣa of it. It is ābdasamśkāra. So also is 'mrgakṣīram'.

Tārakā, puṣyaḥ and nakṣatraḥ - here the liṅga is 'aropita' by the word (3-13-9). Language is used for real and false refer-ences: 'ābdohi samyāmiṣṭyānjanaveditamarthamviṣeṣēṇābhidhatte'. Gandharvanagara has no reality. Yet gender is attributed to it. It is only an analogical understanding of nagara which we have seen. But in khatvā and vṛkṣaḥ we do not have such knowledge from the memory (3-13-7 to 12).

2) GENDER BASED ON GIMNAS

Patañjali has said that all the things in the tād world manifest 'ābdarūparasagandhasparśa' - 'sarvāśca punāṃurcaya

1. paratantrasya yaliṅgasampodbhāre vivakṣite/
   tatrāsam ābdasamśkāraḥ sābdairova vyapāriṣitaḥ// 6 //
evamātmikā'. He has not directly mentioned the guṇas—satva, rajas and tamas, but the experienced aspect of it he mentioned, 'satva' guṇa has its property prakāśa, prasava and avirbhāva. Rajas manifests 'pravṛtti' and 'kriya'. 'Tamas' is having the property of 'vāraṇam', 'tirobhāva' and 'sthiti'-covering, disappearance and static state respectively (cfr. Helārāja on 3-13-12). Hence Patañjali proposed that 'samstyaṇaprasavau liṅgamāsththeyau'. The growth and decay show masculine and feminine. The activity is continuous in all things. Then there is a problem. All the things are having the activities—growth and decay. How can one say then what is masculine and what is feminine and when can one find the absence of both? Patañjali says that the gender is depending on the 'vivakṣa'-on what you want to say. If you do not mean any of the two genders you use neuter gender—'ubhayaravivakṣāyām napuṣpākam'. It is the 'vivakṣa' of the seers, sidhā or cultured men who know the truth that gives the particular gender to things. He is the namer.

1. For Prothagoras next to 'number' the highest wisdom belonged to 'him who gave things their names'. Heraclitus is, however, known to have held the view that words existed naturally (physei). He said that words were not like the artificial, but like the natural images of visible things; they resembled shadows and reflections in water or images seen in the mirrors. Democritus described the names of gods as their 'vocal images'. For Hypocrates names are ordinances of
Before we proceed further we explain some of the terms used by Patañjali, Hari and Helārāja and other commentators. Patañjali used 'vārdhate'-increase, for 'prasava' and 'āpāyena yuyjate' - decrease, for 'samstyaṇa'. Once he used 'pravṛtti' for activity to mean 'pumān'. Bhartṛhari uses 'āvirbhāva', 'tirobhāva' and 'sthitī' for 'pumān', 'stri' and 'napūmsaka' respectively. Helārāja says that 'samsthyāna', 'samhananam', 'pratilaya' and 'tirobhāva' are 'stṛītva': 'prasava', 'pravṛtti', 'āvirbhāva' are 'pumān'; the absence of both is neuter or the static state. The regularity in growth and decline is also neuter.

Helārāja has given (on 3-13-12) a different interpretation for 'pumān' by deriving it as follows: To the root 'pū' ṣumṣum (us) suffix is added for the form 'pūms'. Prasava is the property of the male. Prasava is derived from the root 'sū'. In the place of the root 'sū' 'pū' is added as the proper root according to the expression: 'sūteh saḥ p prasave pumān' (cfr. Tattvabodhini on 4-1-4). Pāterṣumṣum ityevam tasya prasiddheḥ. Therefore in the 'śāstra' also 'prasavaḥ, pravṛttiravirbhāva' are the qualities of the male. For feminine gender also he gives the ordinary worldly meaning: 'samstyaṇam'- decrease is feminine. So also 'loke tu styaṇati nature (Sandeys, I, 1906, 91-2). Names express the nature of things and it is the invention of a names.

( Ibidem, I, 1906, 94).
All the things in the world are composed of the basic three guṇas - satva, rajas and tamas. This is the doctrine of the Sāmkhya. But the interpretation given to the Sāmkhya doctrine is unique. It is made viable for the complicated explanation of gender in the language.

These three guṇas satva, rajas and tamas are not seen by anybody but experienced through śabdārūpasagandhasparśa. These five guṇas are again composed of the three unmanifest guṇas and five manifest guṇas; everything is composed of every guṇa in a process ad infinitum, i.e. satvarajastamoguṇa has got satvarajastamoguṇa in each one and śabdārūpasagandhasparśa has got satvarajastamoguṇa in each one and also śabdārūpasagandhasparśa in each one. The guṇa has got guṇas in it and here we need not accept the vaiśeṣika dictum 'guṇe guṇo na'. Even in the smallest particle (kana or mātra) we find every

1. Here we see the male chauvinism. The genderless 'yuṣmat' and 'asmat' have masculine form 'uṣmān' and 'asmān'. The reason may be that liṅga is determined by man not by woman.

2. prītyaprītivisadātmakāḥ prakāśapravṛttiniyamārthāḥ/
anyonyāvirbheśārayajanaamithunavṛttayaśca guṇah// 12 //
satvam laghuprakāśaṇaṁṣtamupāṣṭambhakaṁ ca rajaḥ/
guru vaṟṇaṁkamo va taṁḥ pradipavacćārthato vṛttih// 13 //
(Sāmkhya Karika, 12-13)
gūṇa to the infinity. The whole is in constant flux (3-13-16).
The knower of truth, the seer, gives names to thing in particular genders seeing the use of which gender is meritorious.

'Ata eva śīṣṭasamācārādeva siddhau sābdānām liṅgaviśesābhidhoyotanaśaktipratipādakam' (Helārāja, on kārika 21). Takṣa is called so because though he does many other works, the 'vivakṣa' is for the takṣanakriya. In kārika 3 24 Hari speaks about the 'upādhi'. 'Upadhi' is the formal object of our study, i.e. the special aspect under which something is

1. kvathitodakavācaisāmanavasthitavṛttitē/ajasram sarvabhāvānāṃ bhāṣya evopāvarṇītē// 16 //

2. bhāvatattvadṛśaḥ śīṣṭāḥ sābdartheṣu vyavasthitam/ yad yad dhamme aṅgatami liṅgam tattat pracaṅkṣate// 21 //

In plato's Cratylus he holds the view that the names are, as it were, labels belonging by nature to their objects, and anyone not using the appropriate terms does not speak, but merely makes a noise (Thomas, 1949, 132).

Pliny also recognizes the force of authority and accepts the forms sanctioned 'veteri dignitate'. Authority and antiquity are the constant allies of anomalous consuetudo, and against these forces analogy must struggle in vain (Sandeys, 1906, 181).

3. upadhibhedādartheṣu gūṇadharmasya kasyacit/nimittabhāvaḥ sādhutve vivakṣa ca vyavasthitē// 24 //
considered. Based on the 'upādhi' the liṅga rule is made. All the 'liṅgopādhis' are present in everything but it depends also on the 'vyavasthā'. Mahābhāṣya did not mention 'satvādi' guṇas' but the qualities, because we directly do not experience the three guṇas but their manifestations in the qualities. Here Hēlārāja explicitly states that gender is the property of things and not at all of words.

When the size is the 'upādhi' the word will change its gender in some cases: kutī, kutīraṇa; hīmāṇi aranyāṇī etc. Hēlārāja says that these are different words and to treat them as the modification of the other is for the sake convenience-lāghavārtham. 'iti ca pratyākhyanena śabdaśaktibhedopavaraṇatātparyarūpeṇa guṇāvasthā sarvatra saṃbhvinī liṅgamiti sūcitam bhavati/ vākyakārasyāpidam eva dārānamiti vārtikonaṃse kathitamasmābhiḥ' (on 3-13-25). Hence we say that gender is one with the reality. This gender theory is universal for all the things and therefore there is nothing without a gender. Gender goes with existence.¹

¹. For the Greeks and Indian grammar-philosophers the noun as such expresses existence. By 'existence' is meant no more than objectivity or actuality of some kind (Thomas, 1949, 132). Being and becoming or existence and action are the basic ideas for Indian grammarians.
In the kārika 27 Hari gives a different explanation for gender based on the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. So far we have seen only the views of the Saṃkhya. Here now there is 'upādhi' and 'nāsāḥ'-birth and destruction. When we mean 'upādhi' as 'upādhi' it is masculine and 'vināśa' as 'upādhi' it is feminine and that which persists to enable us to understand that the same thing is present which is born and destroyed is neuter.

Helārāja says that 'prakṛtiḥ svarūpaḥ abhidhatte vastu'. Here it is a reverse process of understanding. The man who first used the word did so seeing the gender in reality and now we know the gender from the use of the word. The first seer said vyākṣāḥ in the masculine seeing the masculine sex. We know vyākṣāḥ to be masculine seeing the word.

Patañjali says 'bhāvasya bhāvayuktatvāt (Rhaśya II, 200).

There are three things in our understanding: the thing, the word and the understanding. The gender in the suffix is only an expression of the gender in the thing. Because of the word we have gender; the understanding is the cause of the word. The understanding came from the thing.

THE NEUTER GENDER

Patañjali has said 'abhayoravivakṣaḥyām napusṣakam'. The samgraha already uses many words for the neuter gender:

1. upādhit prasavo anyeṣām nāsāḥ samstyaṇamityaṃ/
   ātmariṇum tu bhāvānām sthitityapadidyate// 27 //
Modern writers have used many words to mean 'sthiti' such as: retention of power, conservation of energy, neutrality, equilibrium, equipoise (sāmyāvasthā).

Hari has discussed what is 'sthiti' in 17th and 18th kārikas of liṅgasamuddeśa:

pravṛttterekarūpatvam sāmyam va sthitirucyate/
āvirbhāvatirobhāvapraśātyāvātistatē// 17 //
guṇā ityeva buddhervā nimittatvam sthitirmaṭā/
sthiteśca sarvalīṅgānām sarvanāmatvamucyate// 18 //

Hēlarāja explains it. There are many definitions here:
(1) 'pravṛttterekarūpatvam'. When we view the growth or decay as a constant one it is neuter - 'sthiti'. (2) When we consider only the equilibrium point only - sāmyāvastha - it is 'sthiti'. (3) The cause of understanding that something is guṇa is sthiti. (4) When something disappears something else comes in its place. This non-finality of disappearance is sthiti. (5) Knowing guṇas as such is sthiti. (6) The co-ordinated understanding of the 'kalās' to be the guṇas is static or sthiti, and (7) Knowing that it is the co-ordinated guṇas is also sthitisāmānyyaṃhi guṇarūpam-sthiti. In the comm. on kārika 27 Hēlarāja says: anityānāmaṇi sarvāvasthāsvantavartamānemakatvena pratyabhijāyamānam svarūpam sthitīḥnapuṣaksam'. That which persists in change is sthiti.
Sthiti is nāma for everything. For all the guṇas sthiti is sarvanāma. It is sarvanāma for each liṅga and it is sarvanāma for all the guṇas separately and together taken. Hence when the gender is doubtful neuter can be used. 'Tat' can refer to anything and also 'sarva' can refer to all the things in the world. It is true of anything conceivable whether it is a word or suffix or a thing. Yathā hi tadādi sarvanāma vastumātrapratyavamarśakamavihitaprayṛtti sarvatra tathā napumśakamapi viśeṣāvivakṣāyāmabhedena sarvaliṅgaparāmarśakam kim jātāmyadāvavyakte guṇasandēhe prayogārhamitī.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, as we have already seen above on karika 27, anything as it is, is neuter. The own form of the thing is neuter. So neuter is the basic gender. According to the Vaiśeṣika theory there is only birth and destruction. Birth is masculine and destruction is feminine. The 'svalakṣaṇa', as that of the Buddhists, is the neuter (cfr. Acquinas, Cha. II, 37-8).

Puñyarāja on Vp. 2.5 also holds that napumśaka is sarvanāma: evamca sattvabhūtāyāḥ kriyāyā viśeṣānāmyasattvālīṅga-sarvanāmā nuṣāsakena yogāḥ...'

Tattvabodhini on 4-1-4 says: tayorupacayāpacayorabhāve sati tadabhayorantaram sadṛṣam tannapumśakam... tathāvasthiti-sānyam napumśakam'. Here he explains the 'ubhayorantaram' of Patañjali: the absence of growth and decay or the equilibrium of existence.
Nāgęśa explains 'sāmānye napūṣaksam'; sāmyāvastha -
without increase and decrease or the continuous process of
increase and decrease. 'Sāmānye' never means 'generally'.
He explains the kārikā 13 in two ways. 'Sthitiścetyapya-
pāyinaḥ and sthitiścetyapyanapāyinaḥ. The difference is
apāyinaḥ and anapāyinaḥ. All three activities are always
present in all the things. If apāyinaḥ is taken it means one
after the other; all are not together. If we take anapāyinaḥ
all the three states simultaneously are present.

Ātmān and Brahman are masculine and neuter respectively.
But they mean the same. So why Brahman is in neuter and Ātmā
in masculine? In Ātmā all the activities, upacaya and apacaya,
are superimposed (addhyāsa). But in Brahman nothing is super-
imposed. 'upādhisamārgenatu nityasyāpyutpattivināśaviti
puruṣaṁcitirīyādyupapattīḥ'. Ātman is the state of Brahman
having super-imposition. Brahman is devoid of any super-
imposition.

1. bhāṣya samstyaṁnaprasavadipadenāpi utpattināśasthitayaḥ
   nityānāmayātanām va bhāvānāmanapādhiṁkam niṇam tatvam
   sthirnapūṣaksakamityucyate' (1148). Āvirbhāvastirobhāvā-
   ntarālāvasthā sthirucyate sa ca napūṣaksatvena vyava-
   sthāpyate (Bhāṣyapradīpa).

2. Āvirbhāvastirobhāvāḥ sthitiścetyanapāyinaḥ/
   dharma murtisu sarvasu liṅgatvamānudarātāḥ // 13 //
3) GRAMMATICAL GENDER

There are instances where Patañjali repeats that liṅga-
masīgyam lokāśrayatvāliṅgasya (2-2-29; 5-4-68 etc.)¹. There
are examples where the gender of things which is known for
certain is not given to them and different genders are
given as dārāḥ, kalatram, etc. The same thing is given
three different genders as tāṭī, tāṭaḥ and tāṭaṃ; tāraṅgā,
pusyaḥ and naksatram etc.

The last two views of Hari are corresponding to the
above view of Patañjali. The kārikas 28-31 deal with these
two views².

1. "Usus, quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi
(Horace, AP. 71 f)"; for it is usage which regulates the
laws and conventions of speech.
"Judex ejus quo dicitur et secus, erit non arti-
ficiosa aliqua et grammatica ratio, sed artis expers et
simplex observatio" (Sextus Empiricus): The correctness of
speech is judged not by anything artificial nor by any gra-
mmatical reason but by the learned people and simple obser-
vation.
"Indeed, it is the people who should be consulted when there
is any doubt about a question of usage" (Vendryes, 1958, 242).

2. iṣṭam nimattam keśaṇci jātyādīvādavaṭhātam/
dṛṣṭavacchabdaśaṁskāramātram tu parikalpitam// 28 //
yathā prasiddhe apyekeṭve nānātvābhivādeṇaḥ/
nānātvan janaśante vabda liṅge api sa kramāḥ// 29 //
idam veyamaya vetī śabdaśaṁskāramātrakaḥ/
nimittadarśanādarthe kaiḍcit sarvatra varṇyate// 30 //
We see words expressive of natural gender. Therefore we attribute gender to words expressive of inanimate objects with superimposed gender by analogy (or extension). There is actually nothing as sex corresponding to the gender in those things to mean which the words are used. We are in the habit of using words with gender.

Seeing the sex signs in the living beings, the sex is attributed to non-living beings too. It need not be in the thing. Without a mode of being the mode of expression comes and mode of expression is giving a mode of understanding. It is opposed to what the Modists hold (cfr. Ch. II, pp. 44-45).

From the expression in words we get the understanding and the understanding is directly related to the expression. From the understanding of the expression we go to understand the thing. The thing is not directly connected with the expression.

It is just as dārāh, gṛhāḥ etc. giving the idea of the plurality while plurality is not there in reality correspondingly.

Sabdāsaṃskāra is only a word to word agreement. Anything can be referred by words in the three different genders. Three different words in three genders can refer to the same
thing. Hence it is concluded that there is nothing corresponding to the genders in reality. It is the grammarians device to explain the formation of words. It has nothing to do with one's understanding and reality. But Helaraja says that this is not the best theory. Hari and Helaraja defend the theory saying that there is no harm in accepting the view that gender, even if it is not perceptible, can become a factor in the formation of words as the senses themselves though not perceived determine the form of the objects.

Helaraja says that Patañjali holds that 'samstyaānaprasavau liṅgam' theory is the correct one. Bhartṛhari has used also the Vaiśeṣika theory. But the correct one is that of the Sāmkhya for Patañjali, Bhartṛhari and Helaraja himself.

'Siddhāntastu yathābhāṣyam guṇāvasthārūpaṃ liṅgamyātvaṃśaḥbhīrvarvtikonmege yathāgamam vyākhyaṃ tata evāvadhārayam/ guṇadharmarūpe hi liṅge dharmaśūnyasya sarvathaivāvyaharyatvāvadavastuvṣvapi vastutvābhīmānālaukekanām lokaṃsaṃpratyayasamāruḍhaḥsasyaiva śabdārtadattmadinām rūpādinām tamaśchāyāprabhṛtinām ca sarveṣām liṅgayoga upapannaḥ/ abhāvaśadūnavaiśāpānāpi vastubbhūttarapadārthāśrayam liṅgam, na cānyathā, bhāvopādrayatvādabhāvo vyavarāhyata iti vyāpakamidam samstyaānaprasavau sthitisceti liṅgatrayam siddhāntitamavagantavyam/

(Helaraja on 3-13-31).