CHAPTER III
CHAPTER III
MODERN EUROPEAN STUDIES ON GENDER

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

We have already seen in the previous chapter the thoughts of grammarians and the philosophers up to the middle ages about the origin of grammatical gender. It is important to note that there were only a few languages known to those writers. When we come to the modern age it is marked by the discovery of different continents, study of many unknown languages since then, the study of mythology and comparative mythology, comparative religion and comparative linguistics etc. The study of many new languages gave an impetus to the study of comparative linguistics. In the modern times Panini was studied by the Western Scholars. This study of Panini enabled them to analyse language phonetically and morphologically (Robins, 1964, 377-78).

As comparative linguistics developed the linguists thought of reconstructing the original language. Hence every aspect of language was studied to go back to its original source. Not only for gender but also, as far as all the aspects of language are concerned, we cannot go beyond the written record of languages. It is true to say, it seems, that the origin of gender is connected with the problem of the origin of language. Since the linguists could not go beyond the written records of languages they left the idea of reconstruction of the original language. Then the comparative mythology came to the help.
When man had not scientific knowledge about the phenomena around him he gave the explanation of his experience of facts in myths, symbols and rituals. These are the mediums to go to the human understanding and concepts beyond the written records in language. Each myth is a symbol also. Rituals presuppose and contain symbols. What I mean to say is that we have to make use of the data from these branches of study. Here we give Sarges Hughes study of Cassirer (Word, 3 (1947) 222-29).

"Myth according to Cassirer is explainable only as a manifestation of a particular mental horizon in which the things are seen in their uniqueness, and in which the 'here and now' of things stands out in bold relief... Language as a symbolic form is concomitant with myth, for language in its origin, evidences the mythical mode of ideation. It too expresses a concrete 'here and now' and ignoring the conceptual amplifications, deepens the content of a unique experience... Cassirer identifies the initial mythical ideation with the creation of language... Language slowly comes out of the mythical stage to the conceptual stage"1.

Gatschet Albert S., (PAPA, 20, 1888, 159-71) gives the following information: "The most cursory consideration of the

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things in nature teaches us the fact, that there are living and lifeless objects in the world around us, that is, beings which spontaneously show signs of inward life, and objects deprived of the signs of life or appearing to be so. To reach such a degree of mental apperception our race had to pass through a long period of training and experience, and among rude and primitive nations the human mind has not reached this stage of logical perfection; much less can this be said of the intelligence of the primordial man of many thousand years ago. The primordial man easily confounded action, motion, variation and change with life, this being a natural sequence of the animism which then pervaded all human understanding. Man at the remote period also confounded cause and effect with sequence in time, and both errors were the fruitful agencies which produced that wonderful maze of religious ideas, myths, and superstitions which are now being published in the literature of folklore. Objects like wind, lightning, dew or fog could then be regarded as animate as well as pearls, precious stones and flowers, although we would now laugh at the idea that there is life in them. But primeval ideas like these still survive in the gender of some languages, part of which are spoken by the most cultured nations".

The same author writes: "The point which we have to examine next is, what objects or categories of objects are assigned to one or the other. For we find that the attribution of some sex to inanimate things must have started from the same mental activity which has assigned to the Sun a male sex in the
classic and a female in the Germanic languages, and to the Moon just the reverse, although there is nothing male or female to be perceived in either of the two celestial bodies. It was the same energy of the mind which caused primitive men to produce myth by personifying the inanimate objects of nature observed around them". (Gatschel, 1888, 166).

Poets also play a great role in the formation of language. He is playing his role in between language and myth. Here is a quote from Serge Hughs (1947, 224): "To avoid the development of language into colourless instrument of thought is the task of the poet. In the middle realm between language and myth, he can return language to its pristine concreteness and original intensity, but now in the state of freedom unfettered by the passive receptivity of myth. In that realm, the lyrical poet can best effect that revelation by which 'word and image' are recognised as forms of spirit's own self revelation". Poet is like a fiddlist giving life to the strings of the fiddle. For an ordinary man it is only a lifeless instrument.

Anthropology and Psychology have a lot to say about the subject under discussion. Later we will see that we have to reject some of the arguments based on the already abandoned theories or disproved ones which the linguists presupposed or assumed to be true. With all these background in mind we shall study the leading thinkers on gender in the modern era. Most of them are already studied by Gerlach Royen (1929), Fodor Isthavan (1958-59) and Kupush Linsey (1962).
There can be four possible viewpoints regarding the origin and meaning of gender in Indo-European. It is noticed that scholars hold one or the other view. Kupush Linsey (1962, 6) has given them as follows:

"(1) Gender is purely semantic, that a form had its gender because of its meaning. (2) It was formal, that is, a term like duenos showed masculine gender because it had a certain linear series of sounds. (3) Gender was both semantic and formal, that a form had a particular gender because it had a particular meaning and because it had a certain form. (4) One can agnostically deny gender completely and then there is no necessity to discuss the original nature and defending it as purposeless and unfounded, the result and the product of the grammarian's efforts to cast language and languages into a common form".

Carrol (1959, 38) denies semantic import to gender. Hjelmslev is hesitating to say that gender is meaningless (1928, 164-169).

Gatschet holds differently: "Man and the higher animals, as quadrupeds and birds were known to be divided into two sexes, and an imitation of these was expressed in grammatic forms of some languages. In Aryan languages the majority of lower animals and plants were also given a grammatic sex, but most other objects of nature were relegated into what is now called the neuter gender" (1888, 159).
W. Schmidt, Wundt, G.H. Müller, H. Paul, Gundert, Meinhof, Hennig De la Grasserie and Velten who give general linguistic validity to their proposals in all the languages regarding gender; (2) The following scholars, however, like Brugmann, Meillet, Hirt, Martinet, Westermann, Specht and Hjelmslev give applicability only to one family (Royen, 1929, 42-270; Fodor Isthavan, 1958-59, 7; and Kupush Linsey 1962, 9).

On our part, we take a via media - not only regarding gender but also regarding other categories in language. Language has two aspects: Language is perennial - there was no time when man was without language and language is historical - all the languages undergo change in the course of history. We can see the development and spread of languages. What is perennial in language has universal applicability and what is historical in language has not. The concept 'man' is universal which is expressed in manusya (Sanskrit), homo (Latin), anthropos (Greek) etc. These terms are not universal and may have their own history of evolution but the underlying is
universal. And regarding each word in any language we may say 'universal' as applied to word or 'śabda' in contrast with sound or 'dhvani' which is evanescent (kārya). The sound we make is impermanent, the concept it leaves in the mind is permanent. Yāska, hence, quotes Auḍumbarāyana to have said "indriyanityam vacanam" (Mir. I. 1) and we name things with words for intercourse in the community (II. 1). (cfr. Laghumaṇjusa 1927, 485; V.P., II. 1; Subramaniaya Iyer, 1966, intro. 19-21; Joshi, 1967, 82-3; Abhyankar, 1977, 219; Russel, 1975, 108-115; Patañjali, 1, 1, l. p. 6).

The Modists were holding the possibility of a universal grammar considering the concept of categories as universal. When we say universal application or particular application of the theory what is in mind is the distinction between: concept and convention, semantic and morphological, eternal and temporal, natural and artificial, deep structure and superstructure, formal and material etc. (Bursill-Hall, 1971, 329). Hence gender as a conceptual category has universal application but as a morphological category we have to see it in individual language family. All the languages must employ some device to express the idea of gender. Language is an empirical phenomenon and conceptual phenomenon at the same time.

1. Indriyanityam vacanam (Mir. I. 1), Šabdena sanjākaraṇam vyavahārartham loke (Mir. II. 1).
Patanjali has discussed the problem of eternity and non-eternity of words (MB. 1.1.1.). Vājapeyayana maintained that genus is the meaning of the word and Vyadi held that the individual is the meaning of the word. According to Panini both are the meaning of the word for he has made the sūtra "jā-tyākyāyāmekasmin bahuvacanamanyataryām (1-2-58) and sarupā-nāmekaseṣa ekavibhaktau (1-3-64)". Regarding the applicability of gender theory to all the families of languages or particular family of languages we have to take a similar stand (Chatterji, 1972, 53-57).

Again the scholars are divided into two groups regarding the source of grammatical gender. Bopp, Grimm, Wundt, Paul, de la Grasserie, Specht, Hirt, W. Schmidt, Hennig, G.H. Müller etc. hold that the grammatical gender is reflection of natural gender. Brugmann, Meillet, Lohmann, Martinet, Kurylowicz, Hjelmslev, Lehmann, Gundert, Velten, Westermann etc. hold that gender is only grammatical and the clue to gender must be found in the inner laws of language. It is important to note here that many of these scholars could not keep their doctrine consistent in their limits and have given concessions to the natural gender theory. Meillet, Guntert, Lohmann, Paul, Hennig, G.H. Müller, Specht, Hirt etc. belong to this group. Regarding the derivation of gender suffixes the large group follows Bopp who tried to derive them from agglutination of the pronoun, first of all the demonstrative pronoun. In this camp we find Bopp, Paul, G.H. Müller, Specht, Hirt, Martinet,
Meillet, Hjemslev etc. (Royen, 1929, 43-270; F. Ishtvan, 1958, 6-7; K. Linsey, 1982, 7-10).

A clear idea as to what is meant by natural gender is to be formed. Fodor (1958, 7-8) has explained it: "In this view human thinking created a linguistic category for the sexual difference between living beings. The neuter gender was brought into cover those concepts that had nothing to do with sex. The disorder in this respect... was explained away by the linguistic development disrupting the supposed initial order through a series of sound changes and the force of analogy". As Robins (1951, 84) puts it: "In certain places there are rather obvious weaknesses of detail, for example, where genders have no parallel sex differentiation in the thing signified, we are told, that the quality of masculinity is 'attributed' to the thing in question. To justify a grammatical distinction a distinction in the realm of things must at all costs be preserved if the theory of grammar is to survive". Many writers did not explain what is natural gender. What is in their presupposition is something as Fodor has said above.

Here another question may be asked: What is sex? Sex and the idea of sex cannot be said to be fully verified in sexual organs, breast or hair of animal species. Even these external signs are secondary sexual organs. It is important to understand the meaning of the Sanskrit word 'liṅga'.
Liga means sign or indicator. Even the Greek term 'genos' and Latin term 'genus' mean 'that which can generate'. Organs do not generate; they help generative processes. Then what is sex? Are they finally the hormones? If they are or any other thing is, it follows that 'male' and 'female' distinction does not depend on the external signs but on the ideas which we have derived from our experience of male and female beings. The idea of 'maleness' and 'femaleness' is deeprooted in us from the experience in the world... Wherever this idea is verified - irrespective of male or female, living or non-living - we use and attribute gender according to the idea. Male and female beings are the primary source from which we derived the idea of 'maleness' and 'femaleness' which due to many other reasons, which we see later, are attributed to other beings in the world. If there were no sex difference in the world there would not have been gender difference in the language. Hence gender is semantic and formal in Indo-European languages. A certain extent of transcendence from the

1. Is bearing the child the basic nature of the female? Not at all! A barren woman is female. Is it then the ability to do the sexual act that makes one female? It is also doubtful. Really speaking, even the external signs are not sure guide to sex:

2. It seems that when woman is considered barren she is named 'kalatram' (neuter); when she shows more masculinity she is 'dārāh' (nom. pl. masculine); when she is a pleasing and obedient woman 'bharyā' all meaning wife?
physicality of sex will enable us to understand the reasonableness of natural gender theory. If gender were to originate from sex as such all the creative poets and ancient Vedic ātis would have been blamed for misleading us in the use of gender! Primitive man considered everything to be endowed with life (Bergaigne, 1978, Vols. I & II).

The ancient Indo-European mind, not only animated but also personified everything that existed in the world. This animation and personification gave rise to myths. Later a less imaginative but more natural usage gained ground (Caldwell, 1976, 220).

Man had an 'I', 'Thou' relationship to nature. Everything was living and wonderful for man. Nature and man never stood in opposition, but in a living and loving unity. The world was a 'Thou' for him, not an 'It'. This understanding of nature is superior to that of a personalistic and animistic understanding of nature (Frankfort, 1949, 13-14).

With a greater emphasis Frankfort concludes (237-8):....
"We found that the assumption of an essential correlation between nature and man provided us with a basis for understanding of mythopoeic though. Its logic, its peculiar structure, was seen to derive from an unceasing awareness of a live relationship between man and the phenomenal world. In the significant moments of his life, early man was confronted not by an inanimate, impersonal nature - not by an 'It' - but by a
Thou'. We have seen that such a relationship involved not only man's intellect but the whole of his being - his feeling and his will, no less than his thought. Hence early man would have rejected the detachment of a purely intellectual attitude towards nature, had he been able to conceive it, as inadequate to his experience.
W. Wundt

Wundt tried to broaden the concept of natural gender theory to include the elements hitherto excluded from it. His classification is based on the meaning of nominal classes. According to him the primitive society classified things according to the value they attributed to them, such as living and non-living, gods and men, big and small, strong and weak etc. This value-differentiation (Vertunterscheidung) became the basis for classification of words. There are five types of value differentiation: (1) Higher and lower things, e.g. Iroquois language; (2) Man and non-man, Fulbe language; (3) Living and non-living, American Dakota; (4) Man and woman - this differentiation is extended to all other concepts - Semitic and Hamitic languages and (5) Three gender system; as we find it in Indo-European (Royen, 1929, 142; Fodor Isthvan, 1968, 9-10).

Wundt thinks that there were only two genders in the beginning and the third came as a result of value-differentiation between male and female and that which is indifferent to sex. He accepted the inner forces of language in the further development of gender system which was started by value - differentiation. They are analogy, sound change and association. From Indogermanic 'a' and Greek 'ē' came 'Geōnē', 'terra', 'erda', 'Erde', 'gaia' 'selēnē', 'theos'
'equus', 'hypnus', 'fluvius', etc. (Royen, ibidem 142).

EVALUATION

Wundt did not take pains to prove his statements beyond doubt. Some statements remain affirmations but no proof is given.

We see that Wundt's theory is in a vicious circle. There must be words to denote all the five groups of value-differentiation factors we have already mentioned. If value differentiation is to be held as a cause for gender difference Wundt must be able to show a stage when those words were without gender prior to the value-differentiation.

Wundt cannot account for the necessity of expressing the value-differentiation in grammatical gender. Value difference can be expressed in many other ways. This is only an attempt to bring under certain groups, the words in languages by applying this logic of value-differentiation.

Value differentiation is so abstract and general that it cannot account for the concrete facts of gender in a given language (f. István, ibidem, 12). This is only a semantic basis for gender differentiation, while there can be a thousand other causes more. It is not wise to conclude that based on some nouns, which mean certain values in our estimation, the complex system of gender arose, though we accept analogy, assimilation and sound change.
This theory of value-differentiation cannot explain when and where this process started in language and through what processes the gender developed in Indo-European.

We do not also think that it is possible to find out the gender origin by analysing the individual languages. But Fodor (op. cit. 12-13) thinks so. As long as we cannot show a stage of a language without gender we cannot account how gender has come into that language linguistically.

Vumdt is to be thanked for his daring attempt but not much for his success in solving the problem.
Brugmann's explanation of grammatical gender is based on the force of principle of analogy within the language. The -ā- noun stems subsumed many abstract words like the Latin words fuga, juventa etc. There are abstract nouns in -ī- like mentis (mens) ending in -i-. It is probable that adjectives with -a- endings kept the same -a- ending also when they qualified words with -i- ending by way of external analogy because of the similarity in abstract meaning of the noun. Hence the -a- ending spread in all the feminine declensions. Also adjectives in -a- endings are used as substantives (noxius) 'noxia' harm or sin.

"Female creatures were distinguished by the -ā- suffixes and by iē -ī-, e.g. ekua - female horse, mare; Skr asva, Lat. equā, Lith. asva; *ulq-iē, *ulq-ī- she wolf..... It must I think, be assumed, as has been already observed (in para no. 57 Rem. p. 104, cp my essay on Gender there cited), that originally neither -o- and -ā- suffixes nor even iē (-ī-) had any connection with animal sex; it is far more probable that in one or two words, perhaps in *genā - 'woman' *mamā - 'mother' s-tr-iiē- *s-tr-ī- 'woman', the idea of female nature contained in the root of the word was imparted to the suffix, and that this led to the creation of such forms as "ekuā- beside *ekua, *ulquīā beside *ulqō-, to describe the female as distinct from the male animal" (Brugmann, 1972, Vol. II, 458; cfr. Vol. II

He thought also that the adjectives would have had many forms which did not agree with the noun endings, but that each form had a special meaning. Therefore the -a- ending of the adjective is used very often in Indo-European dialects.

EVALUATION

The hypothesis of irradiation of -ā- and -ī- and suffi-
xing it to other substantives and adjectives to form feminine is not quite plausible. These two words are too meager to account for such a great linguistic phenomenon. "He bases his entire hypotheses on a few semantically feminine words and puts the weight of the development of feminine gender, or rather the feminine suffixes on what might have been, because of their meaning, highly frequent items in the languages" (K. Linzey, 1962, 16). He is not primarily here dealing with the form and function but meaning. Because a word had a meaning 'woman' its suffix then came to mean 'woman like', 'female'. In this suffix were then added to a root or base, the word thus formed would mean female. Because of the meaning of a single noun the suffix acquired the new meaning and function.

Brugmann himself started with the natural gender genā, māmā and strī. These are female because these referred to something female; not because it has the suffix -ā- . However a contemporaneous form having -ā-, if it referred to a male, would be masculine, or at least common gender and not feminine
for Brugmann. He was not really setting up a theory for the origin of gender but rather a formula to show how derivation occurred with -ā- and -ī- suffixes. He does not indicate where *genē* got its -ā- in the first place and *-strī* the -ē--; nor does he indicate whether there was gender before the semantic analogy took place. He seems to suggest that gender was a result of the formation of nominal classes (K. Linzey, 1962, 16-19).

Brugmann did not say anything about the development of masculine and neuter genders. The adjectives can be substantives also e.g. *Janas* - 'creature', *birth*, *dubius* - 'dubious' *dubium*, *doubt*.

Later Brugmann said that grammatical form of a word is determined by psychological impulse or analogy, whether it should be masculine, feminine or neuter (K. Linzey, 1962, 16-20; F. István, 1938, 17-20; Royen, 1929, 99-102).

In fact as we have already explained gender is determined by the idea of 'maleness' and 'femaleness' and in truth the suffix 's' is masculine in idea and -ā- and -ī- feminine and 'm' neuter. The very ending is attributed the idea of gender, of maleness and femaleness.

Going through the writings of western scholars regarding gender it seems to me that they make a great distinction between the noun and adjective. Actually any adjective can be used as substantive. We have already seen the examples given by Brugmann
himself.

Regarding nouns also we may hold that gender can be changed, especially when they are used in the compound. In Latin and Greek compounds are less. But in Sanskrit it abounds in compounds. Some examples are here to show the flexibility of gender in nouns:

In the Avyayībhāva compound (Avyayībhāvāśca, 1-1-41) all endings are shortened even if they are long feminine endings: yathādevatam, upakumāri, (hrasvo napumsake prātipadikasya 1-2-47).

The gender of the word changes according to the main word which it qualifies: gunavacanānām sabdanām āśrayato lingavacanā- ni bhavati.... yadāsau dravyam srito bhavati gunastasya yalligam vacanānica tadbhavati (MB. 2-2-24, 18-22), e.g. āśuklam vastram, suklā satī, suklah kambalah.

In the Bahuvṛihi compound we can have any noun in any ending. In the following three sets of examples we have masculine and feminine and neuter endings in all the three endings.

1) a. vīrapurusaḥ grāmaḥ             purusaḥ masculine  
b. vīrapurusaḥ nagarī            
c. vīrapurusam kulaṃ

2) a. pītāmbaraḥ Hariḥ          ambaram neuter  
b. pītāmbaraḥ kanyā         
c. pītāmbaram mitram

3) a. tunganāsikaḥ purusaḥ     nāsikā feminine  
b. tunganāsikī (or kā) stri    
c. tunganāsikam kalatram
Panini gives gender rules in 2.4. 17-31. More over the non rigidity of nominal gender is pointed out in "tadasisyam samjapramanusatvat" (1-2-53): "This (concord of gender and number of the primitive and derivative nouns, and of attributes and substitutes) need not be taught (or proved) because it has the authority of sañjna (or conventional term or idiom).

Even in non samśa the gender according to the gender of substractum of the negation is applied to the compound: e.g. avarṣah hemantah, anāpah prthvi etc.

In fact any noun or adjective (ad jacent) falling near to the noun is supposed to possess the nature of that noun as far as the gender and number are concerned.

Adjectives used attributively or predicatively should agree in gender, number and case with the noun and with the subject of that predicate respectively; e.g. Deus sanctus and pueri sunt boni. (Jean, 1958, 189).

There is in Indo-European a class of nouns characterized by the inflection of gender. But this class does not agree with nouns of which the use favours the function of the epithet: Latin offers deus, dea; filius, filia; etc. German der Mündel, die Mündel (minor); Sanskrit, taṭah, taṭi and taṭam. The nouns which admit the inflection of the gender reserve most often certain declensions (formations of themes), which - it is very important - are at the same time particular causal systems for each one of the genders. The syncretisms characterizing each
one of those particular systems are consequently dominated by the genders.... But this reservation of noun-endings for each gender is not exclusive. We see Latin 'nauta' masculine; 'fagus' feminine. In all these cases the gender is determined according to the meaning.

There are occasions where the neuter gender dominates without regard for the gender inflection. The Sanskrit grammarians have expressed it by saying: 'samānaye napumsakam' (Vārtika, 5043). When the noun and adjectives are to be put together and the maleness and femaleness of the noun is not clear neuter gender is logically used as Patanjali has said: 'ubhayorantaram yacca tadabhāve napumsakam' (Mbh. 4.1.3. Vol. II, 196; Bālamanorama Vol. II, 123). "Sometimes, instead of agreeing with the grammatical subject, an adjective or a participle used predicatively, is made agree with the idea which is in the mind: turpitudo pejus est quam dolor (Cic)". (Jean, 1958, 189). Here instead of pejor (masculine and feminine) pejus (neuter) is used - turpitudo is feminine. Determination of gender is based here on the meaning as far as variable gender words are concerned.

...."The gender of the noun is determined first independently of the concordance, then one selects the particular causal system dominated by this gender and finally, inside the system, the causal form which is required. Reserve being made for the concordance of the primary term, the first of these choices is entirely free, and depends on the notion which the speaking subject wishes to formulate. One can see it by the
usage of the names of the animals known in the ancient grammar as 'communia' and 'incerta' (for the last one has to take into consideration a certain participation between the two grammatical genders, what does not alter the fact to recognize that the choice is free and that the gender can be chosen to restore the sex, 'canis albus' and 'canis alba' - 'canis rabiosus', 'canis gravida'. On the other hand, except in rare cases where the primary term permits the free choice between the three solutions (masculine, feminine and neuter) the concordance does not cease to play and to regulate the limits of the liberty - 'canis', for example, does not admit a neuter epithet. The situation of the attribute is different, because the simple attribute suppresses the frontier which separates the epithet and primary term, which gives free way to a construction as found in the famous sally of Virgil: Varium et mutabile semper femina". (Hjemslev, 1959, 204-6). Here Virgil used neuter 'varium' and 'mutabile' instead of 'varia' and 'mutabilis' in agreement with 'femina' which is feminine.

There are, on the contrary, words which do not change the gender even when they are used in samānādhikaraṇa. They are
matallika, macarcika, prakāṇḍam, udhaḥ and tallajaḥ, all meaning excellent (Amarakosa, Padachandrika, 1966, 164-5; 1969, 26). Examples are the following: aśvakmatallika, goprapāṇḍam, kumaritallajaḥ, gomacarciaka and puruṣodhah. So the gender rules are not so rigid but the context and the meaning has a role to play.

1. "Kimca śastavacanāḥ śivādayo guṇe varṭante dvraṇye'pi/
Matallikādayastu āvīṣṭalīṅgā dvraṇya eva varṭante khatvādīvat/
Āvīṣṭalīṅgascānyaliṅgānām samānādhikaranye'pi nijalīṅgam
na jahāti" (Padacandrika, 1966, 165).

"Ete tu pañcā nityam dvraṇya eva liṅgāntareṇa samānādhi-
karaneye pi svalīṅgam na jahāti" (Mahesvari, 1969, 26).
H. HIRT

THEORY

Hirt's studies on gender are found in Indogermanische Grammatik, (Vol. III, 1927, 320-47 and Vol. VI, 1943, 27-29) and Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache (1925, 28-30). The Indogermanische Grammatik Vol. III gives the summary of his studies in PP. 346-47 and Vol. VI is also giving a gist of his doctrines on gender. He knew the work of Brugmann and some of the works of Meillet. He asks a pertinent question why there is gender inherent but not signified from outside (1934, 27-28)\(^1\). Hirt gives prominence to the pronoun as far as the gender origin is concerned (1927, 346)\(^2\). Grammatical gender appeared rather late in Indo-European according to Hirt. Neuter gender is older than masculine and feminine and it is the remanence of the genderless state which he presupposes and feminine is later than masculine (1934, 28)\(^3\). For Meillet

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1. "Die Hauptfrage aber bleibt, weshalb hat jedes Substantivum ein ihm innewohnendes, äusserlich nicht gekennzeichnetes Geschlecht"?.


neuter is older because of the agreement of nominative and accusative; for Hirt neuter is older because it is a relic of the primitive genderless state. He believes that masculine and feminine genders are the reflection of natural gender. The concord of neuter adjectives and pronouns to neuter nouns is the remanence of the genderless state of the language. It is not the nominal character of the adjective or pronoun.

Hirt then deals with the separation of masculine and feminine genders. The declension of nouns has nothing to do with the division of gender. Nouns of different genders belong to the same stem. But the demonstrative pronoun and the formal differences of the third person singular of the personal pronoun brought about the congruence of other pronouns and adjectives and at last resulted in the grammatical gender (Hirt, 1927, 346-7). The difference of form in these pronouns (Greek ἡ, Iranian گا, گئ, Latin ɪs, ɡa etc.) was due to the fact that feminine gender was marked by -ι- and -ɡ-. The -ι- of the adjective must have come by its meaning from the pronoun -ι-, meaning 'she'. The ending -ι- is of later time and it is derived from -ɡ- (1934, 29)\(^1\). There was no outer sign to signify the gender with the noun originally (1934, 28)\(^2\).
Hirt gave less consideration to the form and function of language and more to the meaning and analogy. He does not say how -go- and -ga- got the feminine meaning. He does not pay much attention to the masculine forms. Sex and semantic aspect are more prominent in his consideration.

All the writers give more importance to personal pronouns as far as grammatical gender development is concerned - "The personal pronoun is that part of speech in which the masculine sex is at first distinguished from the feminine by separate words or grammatical signs. From the personal pronoun this distinction gradually invades the possessive, reflexive, demonstrative, interrogative and relative pronoun. Sex may be made distinct in the pronoun of one, but not of another dialect of the same linguistic family" (Gatschet, 1888, 60) - but none says from where the personal pronoun got the gender.

Hirt brings nothing new "Hirt bringt nicht viel Neues (Royen, 1929, 164)."
Meillet is one who has written very much about gender. He accounted the origin of gender to the opposition of animate and inanimate-gendre animé et gendre inanimé - and again in the animate group masculine and feminine. The inanimate gender is neuter. This neuter is distinguished by the nominative and accusative forms which are the same for it ¹.

According to Meillet, as far as the gender has a semantic value, masculine and feminine indicated beings of male or female sex and neuter gender indicated inanimate things without gender (1923, 211; 1924, 95, 156-7) ². He holds that gender was semantic in the beginning and the meaning is lost now in most of the cases. Feminine gender has a semantic force according to Meillet (1964, 124, 1931, 10). The distinction of masculine and of feminine is not in regression, but in growth, at the time which precedes the historical period of most Indo-European languages ³.

1. "Les anciens opposaient nettement le masculine et le féminin..... masculin ni féminin oudeteron (neutrum).
2. "En tant qu'ils ont une valeur semantique, les gendres masculin et féminin designent des êtres animés, de sexe male ou femelle, et le genre neutre désigne ce qui inanimé. L'opposition du masculin-féminin et du neutre est donc une opposition de anime-inanimé" (Meillet, 1923, 211).
3. "Bien qu'on tende des lors.... indo-européennes" (1931, 11).
"As far as the feminine is opposed to masculine it appears that there is a differentiation: on the one hand masculine indicates the generic type and on the other hand in particular the male sense. This is expressed by the morphological fact, that the feminine form is derived from the masculine form; e.g. gurvi-heavy- (feminine) shows the masculine 'guruh' plus the suffix -i-" (1928, 228) ¹.

The distinction in cases between animate and inanimate is found only in nominative, accusative and vocative cases. The animate gender has distinct forms for these three cases. The vocative is important, as the sense demands, for the names of persons and other animated beings. The distinctions between subject, agents and objects that undergo the actions are important for the animate beings. Hence the genre animé became distinguished in form from genre inanimé where for nominative, vocative and accusative there is only one form in Latin and Greek. But we note here that Sanskrit has separate form for neuter vocative case (1931, 9). Many nouns and pronouns do

¹. "Dans la mesure où le féminin 's' oppose au masculin, il apparaît comme une différenciation; le masculin indique d'une part, le type générique, et de l'autre, en particulier, le sens mâle; ceci s'exprime par le fait morphologique que la forme du féminin est dérivée de celle du masculin; le féminin gurvi du masculin Sanskrit guru-h-lourd- représente la forme du masculin, plus un suffixe secondaire" Méllet, 1928, 229.
not distinguish masculine and feminine forms even now. Early they were the same. As far as the separation of feminine is concerned the motion of pronoun 'so-sa-' (Sanskrit sa, Greek -o-, Gothic -sa-, Sanskrit -sā-, Greek σθα, Ionian attic -n-, Gothic -so- (fem) etc. played the decisive part (1931, 19; cfr. 19-23). He does not give much importance to -guenā- as Brugmann but he brings in other suffixes -trix-, -n-ya, etc. -genitor, genitrix, patīn etc. (1931, 21). The suffixes -to-, -ta- came to distinguish 'masculine and neuter' and feminine in opposition (1931, 16). The distinction of feminine gender is shown by the distinction of word formation. 'Renus' and 'bona' are differentiated in their stems 'buno', 'bona'. "The feminine form is obtained from the masculine form by means of suffix -ā- or -yā-. The feminine is subdivision of the "animate gender". It is not marked in the noun itself, but only in the adjective which occasionally occurs with it" (1964, 124).

Meillet holds that the distinction between animate and inanimate, and the distinction between masculine and feminine were heterogeneous (1926, 215)\(^1\). Without congruence with adjectives the distinction between masculine and feminine would never have existed in Indo-European. He gives importance to

\(^1\) "Ces faits - et l'on ne marque ici que les principaux-montrent que la distinction entre le genre animé (masculin-feminin) et le genre inanimé (neutre) et la distinction entre le masculin et le feminin sont heterogènes (Meillet, 1926, 215)."
natural sex for the bifurcation of masculine and feminine and at the same time gives much consideration to the congruence of adjective and pronoun.

For names of living beings, the feminine serves to designate the female and masculine the male. The notion of 'animate' is extended to not only living beings but also to beings supposed to be so. We cannot explain all directly and equally how the names are attributed. Once the category is formed it is applied throughout the language. The apportionment between two genders of all animate beings is compelled by grammatical machinery. It is then often difficult to distinguish between cases in which the distinction had a clear meaning and those in which a gender was attributed to this or that word, simply because the language assigned every noun to one of the fixed number of "genders" (1964, 124). We shall see some of the reasons for gender attribution as Meillet has given them (1931).

All the Indo-European themes of substantives can be used either as masculine or feminine. e.g. Sanskrit 'navaḥ' and 'nava'; Greek 'neos' and 'nea'; Latin 'nouus' and noua'; old Slave 'novu' and 'nova'.

The same substantive can be considered as masculine or as feminine as one considers the being as male or female. Sanskrit 'gauh', Greek 'bous', Latin 'bos', are considered as those words indicate a male or female 'bovine'. The old Indo-European "dyeu- of 'heaven sky' (ciel) may be masculine and 'g 'hem".
the earth (terre) may be feminine. What is true is that
heaven is imagined as male and earth female. Hence the corres-
ponding nouns are considered to be in masculine and feminine
genders respectively. In Latin 'humus', 'tellus', and 'terra'
are feminine. In Greek heaven and gods - 'ouranos - Dios',
'theus' are masculine, foot - pous - is masculine, while 'way'
'odos', 'hattrapos' is feminine. Hand which receives is
feminine and foot is masculine in opposition. It goes without
saying that no more male and female being matters, for the
gender cannot be forseen because the conception of that sort
is purely arbitrary. Certain demonstratives, indefinitives,
relatives - more generally - certain adjectives which relate
to notions imagined as male or female have two forms as one
thinks of a male or a female notion: Sanskrit - sa-, Greek -e-,
Gothic - sa-. Latin has no article. But the 'nouus' or 'nouus'
are for masculine and feminine respectively as one imagines
(1931, 7-9). "We know that the feminine substantives express
notion considered as female and beings of female sex and also
all the notions to which feminine character is attributed.
Well, behind every activity, it seems, that it may have been
imagined a female power, one of those 'mothers' which are so
familiar in the Celtic world and the tradition of which is
still present in the Latton Mythological Songs'... That is why
the nouns of action and nouns of quality are of 'feminine gender'.
The Vedic Vac which is a religious power, is conceived as
female; Latin 'vox' is also feminine..." (1931, 23-24). "Often
one does not perceive why such and such type of words in particular is calling for an adjective of masculine or feminine form. As far as one can see, the forms are intent on the conceptions which unite themselves to those forms which condition the animated or inanimated gender of words...."
(1925, 229). "So in a general way, the masculine and feminine gender was a matter of conception, not a matter of grammar" (1931, 7).

1. "On n'aperçoit souvent pas pourquoi tel ou tel type de mots; tel ou tel mot en particulier, appelle un adjectif de forme masculin ou de forme féminin. Pour autant qu'on aperçoit les raisons, elles tiennent à des conceptions qui se relient à celles qui conditionnent le genre animé ou inanimé des mots; le ciel - d'où vient la pluie fécondante, est du masculin, la - terre - est fécondée, est du féminin; le pied - est du masculin, la - main - qui recoit est du féminin" (Meillet, 1925, 229).

2. "Ainsi, d'une manière générale, le genre masculin ou féminin était affaire de conception, non affaire de grammaire" (Meillet, 1931, 7).

"Modern linguistics has discovered that to distinguish rigidly between semantic and syntactic aspects of language is impossible; and the current tendency to extend the meaning of 'grammatical' to cover the meaning too, is evidence of a new willingness to get to grips with meaning" (Martin, 1975, 249).
In fact the above statement and the fact prove that gender is semantic in its origin and even now the meaning is not faded away. The meaning is always present even if it is not primarily intended. Myth is more real than history in our life. Again in this respect we shall see what some other linguists have to say:

Language is a record of our experience as mathematics is "in the true sense of the word only in its crudest beginnings but, as time goes on it becomes elaborated into a self contained conceptual system which previsages all possible experience in accordance with certain accepted formal limitations. Such categories as number, gender, case, mood, voice "aspect" and a host of others, many of which are not recognized systematically in our Indo-European languages, are, of course derivative of experience at last analysis, but, once abstracted in language and are not so much discovered in experience as imposed upon it because of the tyrannical hold of linguistic form has upon our orientation in the world" (Sapir, 1964, 128).

"Indeed, the covert categories are quite apt to be more rational than overt ones. English unmarked gender is more rational, closer to natural fact, than the marked genders of Latin and German. As outward marks become few, the class tends to crystallize around in idea" (Whorf, 1964, 137).
In languages like English where gender is a covert category the concept of male and female moves closer to the actual reality of sex, not the idea of maleness and femaleness but except for poets and imaginative writers. But, however, the semanticity of the overt category of gender in undeniable.

As far as we can see, it is clear that Meillet was more preoccupied with the separation of feminine gender, not rather with the origin of gender.

His dependence on psychological and semantic criteria, though criticized adversely by Kupush Linzey and Fodor Istvan one must say, is better and it is a way to truth. Language is more related to the idea and psychology of man than to the external morphological form which is a means only of outward expression of internal idea.

The animate and inanimate distinction cannot be granted to be basic since, as we have already seen, everything was animate for the primitive man.

The cases are relative in concept. So we cannot say some cases arose first and the others followed later. More basic it is, we must remember, that three genders are relative. So gender development also cannot be conceived one gender after another.

Gender system is primary, not the motion. Motion is only a side-effect of the developed gender system. Once the gender system is developed motion and gender system get a faster hold.
We cannot speak of a case system without gender system for cases already presuppose the gender. Kupush Linzey is doubting the primacy of the nominative case. Nominative is primary which we will discuss in chapter four (prātipadi-kārthalingavacanaparimānāmātre prathamā 2-3-45). All the other cases are called oblique cases.

Meillet has not distinguished between derivation and syntax.

Borgstrom (1952, 136-147) has pointed out the inadequacy of the distinction of animate and inanimate in the following lines: "The combination of old animate forms in the nominative and accusative with other oblique cases derived from the inanimate stem is found in other words as well, e.g. dyāuh - divāh (besides dyōh) or panthāḥ pāntāḥ - sū-pathāḥ pnth ṭ" (139).

"In many instances it is easy to see how nouns descended from uninflected and inflected forms differ from each other in meaning. The former designate things, processes or actions, while the latter designate living beings or active parts of living beings (pes) or things, processes and actions endowed with divine or magical powers (drus, phloks, prex, uox etc.)" (146).

We can hardly avoid the conclusion that in several stems, the semantic distinction between the old and uninflected and inflected forms has been given up, and that each language has preserved one of the forms and lost the other. The distribution of genders in the known Indo-European languages no longer
corresponds to the ideas which determined the distinction between inanimate (uninflected) and animate (inflected) forms in the prehistoric Indo-European; many old uninflected forms have become masculine or feminine nouns by adding suffixes or endings; e.g. smaivs, zima, domus, oias and all the action nouns in -tis-" (147).

Gatschet (1888, 170-171) writes: "If people wanted only to separate animate and inanimate gender then why they would not have placed animals, plants, minerals, any object of nature and body organs into the same class. Neither would they have done this if they desired to distinguish the noble from ignoble, active from no-active, organic from inorganic. Many feminine nouns show objects hidden, not on the surface, abstract ideas etc".

Further evidence is provided by feminine forms distinctive in their bases, such as those cited by Meillet, Introduction, 284; in the Gk. fem. polle 'much'; for example, there is no trace of the /w/ of the masc. polus; and the Skt. fem palikni 'grey' has a completely different stem formation from masc. palitas".

Here is another informative remark from Lehmann: "Unfortunately the old conception persists even in an excellent work like Meillet's Introduction, so that he says (340): 'En se reportant a une mentalité de demi-civilisé, on arrive presque toujours a s'expliquer le genre "anime" ou "inanisé" attribué a un nom donné. On conceit par exemple pourquoi les noms qui
indiquent l'acte sont de genre animé, ainsi gr. phōnos, phorē, phētis, lat. genitus, etc. Differing accounts of Algonquian gender distinction are also instructive. Jespersen, Language, 394, says there is a 'division found in Algonkin languages between a class of "living" and another of "lifeless" things'; and he uses this division to support a similar hypothetical division in pre-Indo-European. Bloomfield, who knew the Algonquian languages at first hand, says of their gender categories Language 271-2: In the Algonquian languages, all persons and animals belong to one category, an "animate" gender, but so do some other objects, such as "raspberry", "kettle", and "knee"; all other objects (including, for instance, "strawberry", "bowl," "elbow") belong to the other, "inanimate" gender. 'A more complete knowledge of Algonquian thus dispels the simplistic dichotomy of gender sought in a 'semi-civilised mentality.'" (Lehmann, 1958, 198, foot note).

Lehmann (1958, 180, f.n.) criticizes Meillet saying that Meillet would not have based his contrast on animate and inanimate distinction but on nominative and accusative singular. He again calls the distinction of animate and inanimate as made by primitive man to be fallacious. From this twofold distinction we do not have sufficient reason for a threefold congruence system. He argues based on the consonant stems and vowel stems.

Burrow T., (1955, 205) attacks Meillet's division of animate and inanimate based on the Hittite evidence where there
are only two genders with the absence of the feminine. He holds that the division was only grammatical and not psychological. The names of common gender or animate gender are on origin agent nouns and they are predominantly 'animate' (and in the main designative of human beings) because it is natural that the agent type of noun is most frequently applied to persons. From Greek examples in 'ter' he illustrates that it need not be exclusively so: e.g. 'aorter', sword-belt; 'lamter', lampstand; 'krater' mixing bowl; 'tripter', pestle etc. These present an ancient type better preserved in Greek than elsewhere and show how in origin the adjective/agent noun class of the stem had nothing to do with the distinction between animate and inanimate. He explains the problem further also.

This same problem of animate and inanimate is discussed with examples by Entwistle, (1964, 192-3).
HERMAN PAUL

DOCTRINE

Paul based his linguistic speculations only on Indo-European languages. But sometimes he has drawn general conclusions also. He follows natural gender theory and at the same time he seeks the help of congruence, personification, sound-shift, phantasy etc. to explain the development of gender system as a whole.

As far as gender system is concerned, he maintains that the psychological category of gender is developed first and then the grammatical category. This grammatical category is an outcome of psychological category. This psychological category is independent of language. Psychological category is anterior to grammatical category and continues to work even after grammatical categories are established. It is living, free, growing, changing and changes from person to person in a general way. Grammatical category is fixed.


2. "Sobald die Wirksamkeit der psychologischen Kategorie in den sprachlichen Ausdrucksmitteln erkennbar wird, wird sie zur grammatischen. Die Schöpfung der grammatischen Kategorie hebt aber die Wirksamkeit der psychologischen nicht auf. Diese ist der Sprache unabhängig. Wie sie vor jener da ist,
The origin of grammatical gender is again in close relation to the origin of changeable adjectives and pronouns. The sexual changeability of an adjective presupposes that the difference of sex has connection with a particular stem ending. The stem ending would have been originally an autonomous word; perhaps, a pronoun, which during its autonomy had a relation to male or female being. One ending was considered to be masculine and the other ending feminine. It happened slowly and accidently. Probably pronoun had the gender difference first. As was the stem so is the agreement of gender made (Paul, 1920, 264).

If there were no natural gender there would have been no grammatical gender. The derivation of grammatical gender from natural gender came slowly.¹

Neuter is nothing but the 'genderless' as the etymology is. Masculine and feminine remained as psychological categories before they became grammatical categories. The neuter constituted itself only in consequence of the formal differentiation of both natural genders and also as the effect of congruence.

**EVALUATION**

Paul was trying to point out what are the forces that led to the present state of gender system; how gender system developed. He considered also sexualization and personification. He is nearer to the truth when he considers the psychological category of gender.

Paul has not said anything regarding how an ending was considered to be masculine or feminine. It is easy to say some endings are masculine and some are feminine. What we want to know is that why some endings are masculine and why some endings are feminine.

1. "Das Neutrum ist ursprünglich nichts weiter als das Geschlechtslose, wie der Name richtig besagt. Während das Masculinum und Femininum als psychologische Kategorien existiert haben, bevor sie zu grammatischen wurden, hat sich das Neutrum lediglich in Folge der formellen Abhebung der beiden natürlichen Geschlechter und in Folge der durchführung der kongruenz zu einem dritten grammatischen Genus konstituiert" (Paul, 1920, 268).
Granting that from pronoun the suffixed forms were separated and they stuck to the noun to be true, Paul has to answer how the pronoun got the gender. Pronoun itself has got motion. So how can we account for that? It is logically wrong to explain the whole using the part when the whole is to be explained. Our problem is how the whole language developed this gender system; then one cannot answer it saying that it came from the pronoun which is nothing but part of the language.
VELTEN, H.V.

THEORY

Velten made his contribution on gender in the article "SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DUGenre, DES CAS ET DESPARTIES DU DISCOURS" (BSL., 99, 1932, 205-223). Unlike many other authors he holds universal validity for his theory of gender, i.e. according to him the phenomena of gender in Indo-European have equal validity as far as the other languages are concerned.

Velten's doctrine in summary is as follows: "The personal-possessive morphemes are the only grammatical universal artifices. It is by the order or by the form of those morphemes that the distinction of agent and patient cases takes place, which is bound, by its origins, to that of genders as well as to the differentiation of the voices of the verb. In many languages, only the 'transitive verbs' represent a particular part of speech since they are provided with double personal affixes; the other grammatical categories have developed by the crossing of original principles of distinction and by the superposition of new ideas to ancient forms". (205). "It was laid down in the form of the third person of the pronoun. Later on the personal pronouns became person endings and these, in turn, gave rise to gender divisions" (Fodor, 1958, 25).

Velten holds that the number of categories increases continually. However, the evolution of grammatical artifices is marked by two curves; the one indicates the gradual

\[ R^2 = 491.25 \]

\[ R_1^2 = 8 \]
diminution of concrete categories, the other the increase of abstract distinctions. The fact of superimposition resulted in the increase and decrease of categories.

Then Velten explains the multiple possibility of forms by superposition which is a universal phenomena according to him. Here are his own words: "Since the logical notions - (1) the names of beings and objects, (2) designations of qualities, (3) ideas of actions - have become, in a number of languages, grammatical categories marked by special morphemes, the words of each class could enter in the two others by accepting the grammatical sign of the category in question. That's why we find in those languages 'substantives' indicating a quality, a state or an action - so to say substantives derived from adjectives of verbal or nominal origin and of denominative verbs etc. Especially the Indo-European and Semitic languages have created themselves like that, in their participles, a very ingenious grammatical artifice". (207).

He then gives examples from the Finno-Ourgian, Turco Tartare etc. He holds that there was a stage in language when there was no separation of verbal and nominal categories. For if this distinction was a principle in grammar, primary and indispensable, it was necessary to suppose that the way of division was nearly the same in all the languages. But that is not the case at all. It is often impossible to determine how such and such notion occurred to the primitive man (208).
Velten gives importance to personal suffixes and says that only personal suffixes have universal application to point out gender differences. Personal suffixes are the grammatical signs with clear gender differences and they are the original sings (210).

Velten agrees with Meillet that the separation of gender started with the distinction of animate and the inanimate and then subsequently the animate got divided into masculine and feminine. He goes with his own examples culled from here and there. According to him the grammatical distinction of gender is originally only accomplished in the adjectives (cf. Lohmann, 1932, 10-11).

**EVALUATION**

His theory of superposition does not appeal to be acceptable since the evidences are not relevant to hold such a theory. All what we said of Meillet's doctrine is applicable to Velten too as far as he follows Meillet.

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MARTINET, A.

THEORY

Martinet has given a functional examination of the problem of feminine gender in Indo-European languages. He does not follow the structural explanation but the functional. Here the satisfaction which a word can give in expressing the idea is important, not the morphological structure. Gender is the structural relic which remains after the function is over. As one saw, in the linguistic facts mental realities more than the instrument of communication, one had to tend to interpret the opposition of masculine and feminine as the product of a more or less 'primitive' thought striving to order the world: man attributed to the soul masculine or feminine gender which they imagined to be belonging to the beings in the world which became crystallized in the language. In French there are only two genders and hence all the objects, inert in other languages, need a sexualization and animation to consider them either as masculine or feminine (Martinet, 1962, 19).

1. "...Celle-ci est concue en effet comme le besoin dont la satisfaction est la fonction première et centrale du langage, et dont les modalités, qui varient selon les époques et les climats, rythment l'évolution des langues". (1956, 83).
He stresses the communicative and intellective function of the language. The distinction in gender is the remains of the language when gender was functional. This state cannot be reached now by textual comparison.

Martinet is concerned not with the origin of gender and the opposition of animate and inanimate but just with the functional separation of feminine from masculine gender. He considers the adjectives with two distinct themes for masculine and neuter in -o- alternating with feminine in -ā-, as nouns, 'noua', showing the concord for determining feminine gender of the substantives (1956, 85).

He criticizes Meillet's thesis: "That thesis of Meillet, although excellently established, has not been evident universally.... Meillet has not distinguished between gender and sex and also between syntax and derivation" (1956, 85). So also in the ancient Indo-European, the existence of a suffix -tri- (Latin-trix*) for the derivation of the agent nouns of feminine SEX is entirely another thing than that of a grammatical gender marked by the concordance of the adjective (86-89).

Martinet then gives the chronology of the development of the feminine gender (86-89). He gives four distinct cases: (1) The -ī-, -yā- was used to designate female beings at the common Indo-European period. "If our hypothesis of a regular phonetic evolution of -H2s-to-ks- is founded we have to find in it evidences of classes of words derived by means of suffix
-yeH2 (\( \rightarrow \) \( y\bar{a} \), in the zero degree -H2 \( \rightarrow \) \( \bar{I} \)), as Sanskrit shows it, certain of those classes have been able to provide with the -a- of the nominative. Much more than -eH2- the suffixal -yeH2- has been bound anciently to mark the feminine sex.... In the origin, therefore, -yeH2- was not more femininity implicated than eH2-" (1955, 50).

(2) The suffix -\( \bar{a} \)- as the adjectival suffix marking the feminine gender: It marked the feminine gender in the common Indo-European period when the adjectival themes in -o- and -\( \bar{a} \)- referred to certain substantives in -o- and -\( \bar{a} \)- called masculine (or neuter) and feminine respectively.

(3) The derivational suffix -\( \bar{a} \)-: This was used as a derivational marker of substantives indicating females in opposition to the substantives in -o- indicating males. The extension of the suffix -\( \bar{a} \)- to designate female beings distinct from males in -o- is explained by the substantival use of the adjectives in -o-/-\( \bar{a} \)-. This use is very old but the process of extension is largely a historical one.

(4) The suffix in -\( \bar{I} \)-, -\( y\bar{a} \)- as adjectival suffix marking the feminine gender: The extension of the suffix to form athematic adjectives must be more recent than the appearance of the suffix and its special use for designating female being. After -\( \bar{a} \)-/o- alternation was set up in the adjectives and the -a- opposing -o- designated females, the condition for -\( \bar{I} \)-,-\( y\bar{a} \)- to shift from substantives to adjectives was set up,
Martinet asks how and by what process a certain number of substantives which had no formal trait and semantic relation came to be accompanied not by adjectives in -o- but by corresponding themes in -à-. If we use different terms for male and female no valuable congruence will be made. Where the gender difference is not lexically marked the concord of adjectives will solve the ambiguity. For Martinet gender is useful only to distinguish two locutions which otherwise will be identical. It is clear, that in this sense, the distinction between masculine and feminine would be of little value if it was bound to manifest itself only in reference to substantives present in the context: e.g. l'homme courageux, l'homme est courageux (the courageous man and the man is courageous). The distinction is not pertinent in the case of homophones of different genders, e.g. voile blanc, voile blanche (voile - vail, also canvas, sail). The distinction of gender must never appear if it has nothing to do with communication (89). A category cannot last unless it has a definite sense. It is therefore inconceivable that the distinction of feminine gender appeared in circumstances where it did not correspond to any need of communication (90).

However, Martinet sees real service rendered by gender distinctions in pronouns; the interrogative and indefinite pronouns show differences in gender. His study is based on the nominative singular of the demonstrative pronoun -so/sâ-. Then Martinet proceeded to imagine a stage in Indo-European
where the distinction between masculine and feminine gender did not exist; however, the derivation designating male and female agents was possible (91). From this supposed state he finds following development and expansion (92-94):

(1) Semantic expansion (Une expansion semantique): the form *sā-* is used in reference to other terms designating women or females, whatever their theme may be; e.g. mater, snusos etc.

(2) Formal expansion (Une expansion formelle): Here *sā-* is extended in use to refer terms in *-a-* which do not designate female beings; e.g. dngghwa.

(3) Distributional expansion (Une expansion distributionnelle): *sā-* is employed adjectively, and it redundantly replaces *so-* e.g. gwnā becomes gagnā.

(4) Lexical expansion (Une expansion lexical): The alternate form in *-ā-* is expanded: (a) to other pronouns in *-o-*: *so-* *-sā-, yo, y. (b) to other adjectival forms: les grands, les grandes.

(5) Flectional expansion (Une expansion flexionnelle): "The *-ā-* form is spreading out to other cases than the nominative; the accusative being probably the first affected..... and the expansion being more rapid in the adjectives where it is not hindered by a suppletive system of the type sa/to". "But since the moment where all the adjectives in *-o-* have parallel themes in *-ā-*, the use of which does not contribute
the success of communication, the use of -ā- automatises itself and tends to the servitude which one calls the gender. That servitude is acquired from the day when the cases of non-congruence have become so exceptional that a new generation no longer regards them as tacit (1956, 94).

EVALUATION

Martinet starts on functional basis and continues the study of Meillet. He deals with the separation of feminine gender from the masculine but not the origin of gender in the language which is our problem. He does not also study neuter gender. For him the cause of gender origin is sex difference in living beings and he carries on his study further to congruence. The function of gender is not obsolete even now in the languages where there is grammatical gender. His explanation of -yā- and -eHā- are not easily acceptable on a structural discussion because he attaches meaning to the form. He selects only demonstrative -sā-, what about other forms and pronouns? There is no *su- for -strī-. He has not studied the whole gender system. His study is applicable only to the historical period of Indo-European and that too in a limited sphere. The

1. "Mais dès l'instant ou tous les adjectifs in -o- ont des themes paralleles en -ā- dont l'emploi ne contribue en rien au succes de la communication, l'usage de -ā s'automatis et aboutit à la servitude qu'on nomme le genre. Cette servitude est acquise du, jour ou les cas de non-accord sont devenus si exceptionnels qu' une nouvelle génération ne les enregistre plus comme licites".
prehistoric facts are only hypothetical. Most of his adjectives are really substantives and therefore without gender marker.

Martinet is right in giving primacy to the nominative case. The case distinction cannot be studied without gender distinction first (Fodor István 1958, 24-5; Kupush Linsey, 1962, 46-56).
Hjelmslev's work forms a preparation for the comparative and theoretical study of general problems of grammatical gender and especially distinctions between the animate and inanimate and between the personal and non-personal which especially are known through the Slave language, but which are also found elsewhere.... The evolution of the category of gender in Indo-European and particularly for the Slave is attributed to the concourse of a conservative tendency (or l'optimum de manifestation) and of a tendency of motivation. For certain languages, especially for those of Western Europe, one makes reservations with regard to the existence of a tendency of simplification, which represents rather one of the exterior aspects, taken by the tendency of motivation. By that way he insists on the importance of the role played by the pronouns (interrogative and others).

It is pointed out at last in what manner the tendency of motivation effects in Slave languages, but in each language separately, a reintroduction of ancient Indo-European distinctions, obtained especially by the utilization of causal syncretism (Hjelmslev, 1956 A, 155). This is the sum and substance of what Hjelmslev has to say about his own work in his own words.

Slave languages have a declensional difference between animate and inanimate and between personal and non-personal.
In some of them they are united and in some they are evident and in some vague. Hjelmslev considers this fact as having general linguistic validity.

In its typical form, Hjelmslev defines, grammatical gender is a strictly grammatical category or rather grammaticalized, first of all being dependent on the pure form in the same scheme as the language; it takes easily the appearance of a purely mechanical category, being used for the simple goals of concord according to the rules of reaction. He bases his study on Wackernagel and Meillet. In that extreme case the grammatical gender can go as far back as to become, in reality or in appearance, semantically motivated, completely arbitrary, empty, devoid of signification or at any rate of a signification empirically revealable and objectively verifiable (156). The problem of defining the semantic substance of the morpheme is presented. The problem is to know whether it is necessary to recognize or not, the existence of pure syntactic operators, of pure signs of construction deprived of signification and therefore destitute of substance. Here we face a dilemma: (1) The sign and the signified are co-mensurable; (2) Semantic criteria must be invoked negating a purely empirical proof. Then he tries to develop a tentative methodology for discovering the nature of gender and he affirms his terms 'anime' et 'inanimé' and 'personnel' et 'non-personnel' etc. mainly from the evidence of Slave languages (157-164).
He then proceeds to distinguish different degree of motivation, ..... correspondence between form and substance, till the opposite extreme where the generic term seems to remain a pure artifice of method, subject to the discussion and submissive to doubts. This distinction is useful because it will explain the evolutive tendencies: there are always two tendencies which at the same time claim the priority and corroborate mutually: the tendency of conservation and the tendency of motivation (164). Where the tendencies of conservation and motivation work the effect is to rationalize the system.

The grammatical category involves better not only the morphological facts but also the describer and the semantist: (1) The oppositions between the terms of the category are not submissive to the logical rule of exclusion but to that of inclusion. That is why the entire terminology built on the logical exclusion is necessarily approximate and that such an opposition as animate, inanimate; personal, non-personal; masculine, feminine etc. are, whatever be the intentional point of view and exact signification one attributes to them, misleading simplification which corresponds only indirectly to the linguistic realization. (2) Another important factor is to be added here: The semantic facts are, by definition, facts of appreciation, of evaluation, and not of 'objective' facts which would be possible to be defined outside an ethnical, social and often even psychological setting. So 'animate and personal' are to be imagined to be animate and personal as one
wants. The above two facts - of mutual inclusion and subjective evaluation - are to be combined together. These subjective classifications are rarely grounded on the physical characters of the indicated object but most often on the role, the function and the output - imagined or real - of such an object.

(3) In the linguistic community in question and in the case of the considered language, the signification of a category can fall into disuse, the focus having disappeared from the conscious of the speaking subjects. That is why the 'masculine' and 'feminine' of inanimate objects seem to us to be fully arbitrary. We do not have access to the prehistoric stage of these languages. This hypothesis will explain the mechanical and grammaticalized genders of the languages. We also must remember that the linguistic system once constituted and propagated through the time, is constantly imposed on the speaking subjects. The same prehistoric cause can resurge and can be the object of reinterpretation. The 'moon' is feminine in French and masculine in German. This fact may seem to be absolutely arbitrary and immotivated, a pure survival destitute of sense. The idea of personification subsists in the potential state and can be utilized always either in poetry or in everyday thought. This fact is imposed on the spirit, and a semantic interpretation of this fact can arise readily at any time. The linguistic system even if it is deprived of reason, speaks always to the imagination and directs it.
(4) How to describe the signification? One can choose different proceedings: (1) the particular signification can be properly enumerated (where one can verify the significations so far as possible); (2) One can concentrate on one sphere where the distribution of forms seems particularly easy to motivate (as masculine and feminine point out male and female beings respectively with certain inclusiveness). These forms constitute a typical example in considering other functions, which seem arbitrary - as representing the latent state, the lack of manifestation in considering eventually the poetical or spontaneous imaginations like metaphorical improvisations. Further, it will help to establish by abstraction, a 'concept' or a generic term rendering an account as much as possible of all particular significations which happen to be stated as possible. The generic term can be established without complicating any postulates of existence. It is a simple method of description by which one gathers and explains the biggest possible number of particular possibilities in bringing them back to a general formula (159-164).

Through the above described methods Hjelmslev points out the importance and applicability of the tendency of conservation and motivation. These two tendencies conserve and resurge the old forms and also motivate new forms and adaptations. He applies the method in different languages with examples (164-177).
In the domains where the tendency of motivation succeeded to be imposed, it arrives most frequently at introducing a re-organization of the category. This re-organization can take several aspects. One of the tendencies of motivation is simplification of the category. Hjelmslev prefers the simplification of the gender system into animate and inanimate to the simplification of masculine and feminine. We are also of opinion that the simplification, the simple reduction of number of terms, constitutes only an exterior aspect of the tendency to the motivation (1956 A. 177).

Hjelmslev now considers the importance of the pronouns. There are languages which ignore the distinction of gender even in anaphoric usages and there are languages which keep the distinction in interrogative pronouns. A distinction between animate gender and inanimate gender, or personal gender and non-personal gender is extremely spread among the languages of the world. The distinction between the interrogatives 'who' and 'what' (whom or which) is known even to the Finnish, the Hungarian, the Chinese, the Sudamese, the Georgian etc., as well as the classical Armenian for example; that is to say even in all the languages which ignore, in the anaphoric pronoun, the distinction between 'he' and 'she'.

Hjelmslev asserts that "there is reason to point out that everywhere in Slave are found the two distinctions between the animate and the inanimate and between the personal and the
non-personal. These distinctions superadd themselves to distinctions acknowledged by the inherited system of the common Indo-European which in fact subsists everywhere in the Slave world. There is no Slave language which does not continue with fidelity the ancient system allowing the masculine, the feminine and the neuter, and which continues to be established on the ancient, fundamental and primary distinction between the animate gender and the inanimate gender. The Slave presents us consequently an extremely curious fact: either inside the masculine or inside the plural, according to the circumstances which present themselves in each language, one reintroduces still again a distinction between the animate and the inanimate, one introduces either the rather analogous distinction between the personal and the non-personal, or one attains to mark those two distinctions at once, separated or combined. That is, if one wants a typically reactionary innovation, one retraces so to say one's steps to retake and to recreate a distinction which is already present on another point of the system. Because of this in Slave, and only there, the two tendencies concur: the conservative tendency and the tendency of motivation, and reunite their efforts to arrive at 'rationalizing the system'. The culmination of this effort occurs in Sorabian. One can see at a glance the whole curve of development and all that which admits the essentials of the initial system by relying on the system which has been established by Meillet for the common Indo-European, when we draw
the picture following the Sorabian system:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>personal</th>
<th>animate</th>
<th>non-personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
<td>inanimate</td>
<td>(neuter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>animate</td>
<td>(non-neuter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hjelmslev, 1956. A, 183-184)".

EVALUATION

"Hjelmslev accepts Meillet's central idea of the original division of gender animé and gender inanimé and the further separation of masculine and feminine. He is quite certain throughout his essay, because of the historical evidence of the Slavic dialects, that language - forces were constantly operating to form a second classification, the triple gender system, as a category of animate and inanimate and personal and non-personal, but that the re-establishment failed, leaving the modern Slavic languages with a variety of old and new items" (Kupush Linzey 1962, 61).

Hjelmslev has collected, studied and synthesised the materials on gender very well. But all the previous materials did not deal exactly with the origin of gender in Indo-European and hence Hjelmslev's study too did not touch the problem of the origin of gender but the spread of it. Hjelmslev wrote:
"... numerous authors who have dealt with the grammatical gender, have much followed Grimm in that account, in introducing at the same time with him, an evolutive perspective which vanishes in the nebulae of the problem of the 'origins' " (Hjelmslev, 1956. A. 168). This statement is equally valid as far as Hjelmslev also is concerned.

He does not distinguish between the processes of the development of Slavic and Indo-European gender system. He accepts identical development for both. But the development of gender system in Slavic is not identical to that of Proto-Indo-European. It was not just the difference between nominative and accusative forms. In Slavic, however, the process had to be superimposed on, or insinuated into an already well-established system of grammatical gender (K. Linzey, 1962, 61-2) Fodor Isthvan, 1959, 202-3).

Hjelmslev's study of the difference of interrogative and relative pronouns of genderless languages (Hungarian) and the third person singular of English (he, she, it) with the category of animé an inanimé is questionable because in Hungarian and in English genders and forms are determined based on the semantic character and not on the grammatical structure.

1. "... des nombreux auteurs qui ont traité du genre gratical beaucoup ont suivi Grimm a cet égard, en introduisant en meme temps; avec lui, une perspective évolutive qui se perd dans les nêbuleuses du problème des 'origines'".
He has rightly given due importance to the psychological and philosophical aspects and also to the morphological aspects but we cannot take it for granted that whatever is true for Slavic tongues is valid for Proto-Indo-European.

Since he bases his study on Meillet, all what is said of Meillet is applicable here also.

He has rightly given due importance to the nominative case. Masculine is the dominant gender according to him. In the system of language all the genders are equal but psychologically he is right.

His method and psychological-semantic approach coupled with morphological application is very good. But as far as the origin of gender is concerned we do not find an answer. All what he has said is quite relevant as far as the growth and spread of grammatical gender are concerned.
KURYLOWICZ

THEORY

Bühler has pointed out two planes of linguistic representation; the exterior situation and the contextual situation, which he claims to be necessary for analysing the phenomena of morphology and syntax (Kurylowicz, 1935, 244). Brugmann has pointed out two functions for the demonstrative pronoun: deictic and anaphoric; the first indicates the objects (exterior), the second indicates words (contextual) (1935, 244). Kurylowicz applies the same distinction in the realm of grammatical gender. He limits his studies to the masculine and feminine opposition. Grammatical gender in the adjective and the adjectival elements (pronominal, numeral adjectives etc.) designates the gender of the substantive with which the adjective agrees, that is the semantic class to which the adjective refers. Hence, the distinction between deictic and anaphoric is applicable to the problem of grammatical gender. Grammatical gender essentially consists in the anaphoric function of the adjective. The designation of female sex in a language by derivation is no proof for the existence of the category of grammatical gender unless the differences in the substantives are reflected in the adjectival elements (244-5).

In the demonstrative pronouns new anaphoric elements are always derived from old deictic elements; So also in anaphoric gender, the grammatical gender of adjectives presupposes a previous existence of deictic gender, that is, grammatical gender in the substantives (245).
Kurylowicz finds the reason for the origin of
tical gender in the highly developed process of nominal
derivation. Every suffix refers to many semantic categories
and also every semantic category can be represented by many
suffixes. The substantivised adjectives play an important
role in every derivation of substantives. Kurylowicz calls
the semantic substantivation deictic in distinction to syntactic
substantivation anaphoric. Thus by different suffixes abstract
substantives and concrete substantives are formed referring to
different semantic groups (245).

The essential stage in the origin of grammatical gender
is the partial replacement of adjectives by substantives
derived from adjectives, that is the replacement of the epithets
by appositions. The relation of derivation which is establi-
shed between old adjectives and anaphoric adjectives becomes
the source of new themes, e.g. from the opposition -an-, -a-, (blindan, blinda) an opposition -on-, -o- (blindon, blindo)
can be established (248). In Germanic languages substantives
like blinda which become anaphoric are used as epithets as
well as appositional forms.

The next step as far as the development of grammatical
gender is concerned is the formal expansion of the rapport
between the substantive and adjective. This agreement is
originally of a strictly semantic group. In Indo-European
-ā- -ī- we can see that as long as the substantive in -ā- and
-ī- is formed on an adjective functioning as a substantive we
cannot speak of a feminine grammatical gender. Grammatical gender arises only when the substantives in -ā- and -ī- replace the adjectives determining the substantives indicating female sex. The -ā- -ī- suffixes no longer designate female sex but become anaphoric markers of female sex. On the other hand almost all the substantival suffix is used to characterize many semantic categories. This community of form is the indispensible condition for the expansion of new adjectives, which replace old adjectives in part of their functions. A relation of derivation is established between the group of uninflected adjectives and substantives with a given suffix, and new anaphoric adjective. This relation permits the extension of the anaphoric adjective outside of its original scope. For example from the opposition -ti- (female sex and deictic) -ā-, -ī- (anaphoric and female sex) a new opposition is obtained, -ti- (deictic); -ā-, -ī- (anaphoric), without the substantive meaning of the determined entering into consideration, so that the feminine gender is not excluded, as it would happen if the substantive designated a being of the male sex. Kurylowicz holds that the criterion of natural gender is primary to all formal consideration and adds that in all Indo-European languages the names of human beings and certain animals especially those which are domesticated, show grammatical gender corresponding to the natural gender. The correlation between a given grammatical and a primitive suffix proves only the fact that at the time of appearance of grammatical gender the suffix is question served to form nouns of male or female sex (Kurylowicz, 1935, 246-47; Kupush Linsey, 1962, 36-7).
The substantives which has grammatical gender which is based neither on sense nor on form i.e. that they do not indicate living beings and have no suffix pertaining to the determined grammatical gender, adopt the gender of other substantives with which they alternate semantically. The word inherits the grammatical gender: e.g. the German 'Fenster', neuter (Latin fenestra feminine) must have received its gender from the Germanic *"windos-ojgan" (English-window) (247). The corrélation between suffix and gender is feable ("Par contre la base formelle du genre, c. -a-d. sa correlation avec certains suffixes déterminés, est assez faible"; Kurylowicz, 1935, 248).

Kurylowicz explains the three essential factors for the grammatical opposition of masculine and feminine; (1) natural gender (sex); (2) congruence, based on the fixed agreement between substantive morphs and adjective morphs; (3) functional alternation between marked and non-marked members of semantic pairs. To each of these factors there corresponds a mechanical proportion: to (1) e.g. Germanic blinde-*blinden, blindo blinon, the replacement of old adjectives by substantives indicating animate beings; to (2) -ti- (female sex and deictic); -ă- -î- female sex and anaphoric, -ti- (deictic, but, for example, abstract); -ă- -î- (anaphoric); to (3) tempeste; orage; une violente tempeste; une violente orage (Kurylowics, 1935, 249; Kupush Linsey, 1962, 39).
For the grammatical gender to originate two conditions are necessary: a morphological system where substantives indicating male and female beings are able to be derived immediately from the adjectives and the opposition of animé and inanimé. Kurylowicz's explanation of the manner in which the opposition deictique became anaphoric is used for the opposition animé and inanimé as well as for the opposition of masculine and feminine (Kurylowicz, 1935, 249-50; Kupush Linzey, 1962, 40).

**EVALUATION**

Kurylowicz agrees with Jacobi and Brugmann that the opposition between -o- and -a- was a result of natural gender. The -a- is feminine because of substantival and not of adjectival or pronominal origin ("Parmi les théories qui essaient d'expliquer la catégorie du genre au point de vue génétique, celles de Jacobi et de Brugmann sont sans doute les plus importantes. Nous admettons avec acobi que l'opposition -o-: -a- était d'abord bornée au genre naturel (sexe)" (Kurylowicz, 250).

Kurylowicz accepts the teachings of Brugmann, Meillet and Jacobi and the doctrines are properly made use of by him. He accepts the -o- -a- opposition for masculine and feminine and the distinction of animé and inanimé. Congruence is primary for grammatical gender; but he gives equal importance to derivation. Stem formation is equated to gender origin. Natural gender is the first cause of grammatical gender and rightly so.
His distinction of deictic and anaphoric opposition for the formation of grammatical gender is only a possibility. Once the category is established, for its spread it may help. The distinction between noun and adjective is syntactic and not morphological and also according to the context, function and use. The distinction he gives between adjectives and substantives is feasible since at any context one can turn to be the other. A stage of substantives without gender cannot be understood.

What Kuryłowicz could show is that how masculine and feminine gender developed and became regularized and expanded; and he has also shown how gender can undergo change. The origin of all the three genders which is our problem remains untouched.
W.P. Lehmann made his contribution in the article "On Earlier Stages of the Indo-European Nominal Inflection" (1958, 179-202). After a brief survey of the materials and positions taken by the previous authors he says that the new morphological data have also been provided by our new materials, and new insights into the data previously available. Brugmann and Hirt could hardly hope to reconstruct an Indo-European earlier than 1500 B.C. We now have data in two dialects from this time or earlier, Anatolian and Greek. The data in Anatolian include graphic evidence for phonological items which predecessors of Brugmann and Hirt had proposed, but which they themselves neglected, the laryngeals; the inclusion of laryngeals in the Indo-European phonological system, as we will note, clarifies some of the Indo-European forms that eluded their analysis. The very presence of these new, early materials makes reconstruction of the noun system more pertinent for present-day Indo-Europeanists than it seemed a few decades ago, when attempts at reconstruction were often dismissed as glottoconic speculation (181-2).

Lehmann thinks that the origin of grammatical gender is to be accounted for based on the development of the three contrasting forms of the nominative singular endings of masculine, feminine and neuter. All the other oblique case endings are of later origin. He sights Hittite, Sanskrit
Sandhi, and variation of the oblique cases in Proto-Indo-European. Gender contrast is primarily limited to nominative and accusative (182-3).

Lehmann then tries to reconstruct the Proto-Indo-European system of gender with the available data from the study of other linguists and his own. According to him "the assumption that -h (of the -a-, -i- and -u- stems) was collective ending removes the feminine from the categories assumed for pre Indo-European and suggests that gender as a category of the Indo-European noun needs re-examination. For outside these declensions there is no distinctive mark of the feminine"(188).

In reconstructing the early Proto-Indo-European Lehmann has assumed on the basis of their inflection three nominal declensions: (1) consonant stems, (2) vocalic resonant stems, and (3) vowel stems. In the group of consonant stems no formal distinction indicating gender is found in the nominative singular of the early dialects, e.g. Skt. pāt 'foot' masculine, ārāt 'splendor' feminine, ārāt 'trust' neuter. In the group of resonant stems, the nominative singular neuter is distinguished from the nominative singular masculine and feminine, but these are not formally distinguished from each other, e.g. Skt. avas 'sheep' masculine, mātis 'thought' feminine, but ākṣi 'eye' neuter. In the vowel stems, different forms mark the nominative singular of all three genders, e.g. Skt. deva 'god' masculine, jāvā 'spouse' feminine, oākra 'wheel' neuter. Phonological criteria enable us to determine that the consonant stems are the oldest, the vocalic stems latest, for
example, devāś with two 'full-grade' vowels must be subsequent to the period at which the ablaut changes took place, while the equivalent Indo-European form of dvīś may be anterior to it.

For Proto-Indo-European he assumes a paradigm of four forms: they are forms marked with -s-, -m-, -h- and zero which are the later nominative singular masculine, accusative singular and later neuter nominative/accusative singular, nominative singular feminine and later nominative/accusative plural neuter, and vocative singular for some nouns respectively. There was another form marked with -s- which was first identical with the above -s- and later turned to be the genitive singular masculine/neuter (188-9).

He again assumes that -h- was a nominal ending in early Proto-Indo-European, parallel to -s-, and we find reflexes in which the earlier functions of -h- and -s- are still apparent; e.g. "Skt. himā 'winter' as opposed to himās 'cold, frost'. In this pair we note that the collective meaning the season of -cold- is preserved in himā, a reflex of the form with -h- and the specific limited meaning is preserved in himās a reflex of the form with -s-...... The function of -h- to mark a collective and -s- to mark a specific, limited meaning is still apparent even in the nomina actionis and the nomina agentis, e.g. Gk. phorē 'produce', fruit' but phorōs 'a tribute, a payment', phorōs 'a bearing, i.e. favorable (wind). Moreover, the individualizing force of -s- is apparent in the types of -i-stems in Sanskrit; those in -s-, e.g. vykiś, primarily indicate
He then proceeds to prove the relationship of -\( g \)- with -\( g \)- and -\( h \)-. "Skt. \( p\)ad\( \dot{\text{a}} \) means 'the placing down of the foot, footprint, stride', in contrast with forms ending in -\( g \)-, which like Lat. \( p\)egis 'foot' mean the performer of an action. The -\( g \)- is found in nouns indicating an active or specific object, or an individual involved in the action. Compare also Skt. \( y\)ug\( \dot{\text{a}} \)m 'yoke' and Lat. \textit{con}junctSpouseSpouse', Skt. mit\( \dot{\text{r}} \)\( \dot{\text{a}} \)m friendship and mit\( \dot{\text{r}} \)\( \dot{\text{a}} \)m 'friend' cit\( \dot{\text{r}} \)\( \dot{\text{a}} \)m 'splendor' and cit\( \dot{\text{r}} \)\( \dot{\text{a}} \)m name of a king. A slightly different contrast is found between Skt. \( p\)\( \dot{\text{a}} \)r\( \dot{\text{r}} \)\( \dot{\text{a}} \)m 'region of the ribs' and \( p\)\( \dot{\text{r}} \)\( \dot{\text{a}} \)us 'rib', which may be masculine or feminine, but with final -\( g \)- indicates a single, specific object. Other pairs, such as Lat. \textit{a}\( \text{ey} \)\( \text{u} \)m 'life' vs \( a\)\( \text{yu} \)\( \text{u} \)m 'living being, man', may be used to illustrate that nouns in -\( g \)-, even without reference to the -\( g \)-: -\( g \)- contrast in the nominative: accusative masculine, indicate the result of an action, not (like those in -\( g \)-) the performer or individual specified in an action.

"The original meanings of -\( g \)- and -\( h \)- may also be illustrated from pairs, one with final -\( g \)-, the other with final -\( h \)-. An example is Gk. \( p\)hr\( \dot{\text{e}} \)\( \text{tr} \)\( \text{e} \), which in keeping with the force of -\( h \)- means 'a collection of brothers, a tribe, clan', as opposed to Skt. \( b\)hr\( \dot{\text{e}} \)\( \text{tr} \)\( \text{d} \)\( \text{m} \) 'the relationship of brothers, brotherhood'."

Lehmann says that later when Indo-European nominal declension developed the nouns inherited from the pre-Indo-European
were fitted into the new system. He holds that pre-Indo-European was lacking in both gender and many of the case categories. "The Indo-European gender congruence system arose in great part as a result of the fixing of forms induced by the shift of accent and by the rise of long vowels resulting from the loss of laryngeals. The phonological change of greatest significance for the development of the Indo-European system of noun inflection was the loss of laryngeals between stressed vowels and obstruents. Their loss in this position, which took place in the stage of pre-Indo-European labelled E, gave rise to the long vowels/ e.a.o.i.u./"(195).

As congruence system developed the mass nouns occupied a peculiar position, for they had only one form for subject and object. This formal characteristic aligned them with nouns having -m- nouns gave rise to the neuter congruence class (197). "Until -h- lost with compensatory lengthening of the preceding vowel, and until -g- came to be the predominant marker of one class of nouns when they were used as subject, and until modifiers were inflected to agree with them, and until the mass nouns fell together with some -m- forms, there were no concord classes in pre-Indo-European and accordingly no gender distinctions. When modifiers were selected for the -g- class (masculines), for the -h- class (feminines), and for the group of mass nouns and the -m- class (neuters), all nouns were required to conform to one of these three congruence categories, and only then may we speak of gender distinctions" (197).
For Lehmann gender was possible only after the development of the thematic nouns, for these alone of the three groups of Indo-European nouns - the consonant stems, the vocalic resonant stems, and the vocalic stems - have a thoroughgoing gender distinction. Hence his main tenet is this: "The Indo-European gender system, then, was occasioned by the morphological realignment following the loss of laryngeals with compensatory lengthening which occurred simultaneously in nouns, in adjectives, and in pronouns" (198).

**EVALUATION**

Though Lehmann says that gender distinctions are based on formal distinctions his classification of nouns is semantic: The basis of classification of nominal suffixes is semantic in content -g- for individual, -m- for collective, -r- for resultative and ə for non-syntactic. The different nominal stems are not based on the differences of function. There is no necessity that the similarity of function should lead to the similarity of form. He says that the -a- forms and -g- forms and -m- forms in nouns call for a difference between ə-, -g-, -m-, forms in adjectives and pronouns.

A genderless state in the language is unimaginable. It would be a wonder if a language without gender were to develop such an elaborate system of gender due to the loss of laryngeals. Gender is one of the primary ideas connected with the stem notion as we have seen already in Panini Sutra Prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanaṁatrey prathamaḥ (3-3-46).
Lehmann says: "If gender distinctions were based on semantic differences, we might admit gender congruence for pre-Indo-European. But since they are largely based on formal distinctions, gender could not have existed until these formal distinctions were present in the language" (198). But gender difference is semantic also. As Panini has said in the above sutra "prātipadikārtha" must be present—the meaning of the partipadika. It is worth noting his words 'largely based on formal distinctions'. He himself finds it difficult to hold a clear position that gender is only formal.

Here is another difficult statement: "This congruence system thereupon expanded to include all Indo-European nouns, adjectives and pronouns; and, as Brugmann suggested, it was overlaid with a natural gender system” (198). Lehmann must answer the question from where came the natural gender system? At last he is yielding to the explanation of Brugmann.

The diversity of feminine formations and the feminine forms distinctive in their bases are taken as a reason to state that in pre-Indo-European there was no congruence system. It is true only if the endings and formations were actually the bases for congruence and gender.

Lehmann says that gender was possible only after the development of thematic nouns since only these nouns show a thoroughgoing gender distinction. It is incredible (Linsey, 1962, 73).
He subscribes to the primacy of the nominative case and rightly so.

Lehmann first says that the gender system developed based on congruence of the phonological system and then he says that gender system is caused by morphological realignment following the loss of laryngeals with compensatory lengthening. Though they are inter-related he has not accounted for the phenomena and the levels which determined gender (Kupush Linzey, 1962, 73).

According to Lehmann noun should agree with pronoun and then adjective should agree with both noun and pronoun. Language is a physiological and a psychological factor; it has morphology and semantics. Mental word is shaping the morpheme. Hence a mere morphological analysis will not lead us to the proper conclusion regarding the origin of gender in the language.

The growth and spread of gender system is different from the origin of gender system. How -m-, -a-, -i- came to be identified as masculine, feminine and neuter? This question must be answered if we are to account for the origin of gender.
Burrow, T. speaks of the problem of gender in his book, Sanskrit Language (1955, 200-207). He finds evidences from the comparative study of Indo-European languages. He holds that gender in Indo-European is comparatively of recent innovation and enough evidences can be gathered from the main existing languages to understand the nature of its development.

He considers that this development has two stages: (1) the earliest one with two classes of nouns; the common which later was divided into masculine and feminine. Hittite has no special feminine gender unlike all the other Indo-European languages. (2) the second stage sees the development of feminine, and it is only at this stage it is proper to speak of gender in the true sense (201).

He gives great importance to the dual system of Hittite when he holds that feminine did not exist at all in the beginning in Indo-European because feminine is not found in Hittite. The evidence of other languages points unambiguously to the pre-existence of a dual system. Since Hittite also preserves in other respects, the archaic features not known to the remaining languages, he takes the Hittite evidence at its face value. Moreover, the evidence from Sanskrit and other languages is briefly that: (1) the bulk of masculine nouns and (2) that the specifically feminine suffixes 'a', 'i' are used also in the masculine derivation (202; cf. Lehmann, 1958, 183, f.n.).
Burrow then gives examples for both the groups. "The existence of this common masculine and feminine formations so abundantly found in Sanskrit and other Indo-European languages, together with the two-fold system of Hittite which shows no trace of a feminine gender, is capable of only one explanation. An older dual system has been replaced by a threefold classification of genders. The old system is preserved in its entirety in Hittite; in Sanskrit and other languages it is still partly preserved, (as the above examples show), but in the main it has been replaced by the threefold system" (204), cf. also to this point, Enwistle, (1954,191-193).

Burrow then tries to disprove Meillet's animate and inanimate distinction based on Hittite evidence which we have seen already when we studied Meillet.

After dealing with some vedic forms and accounting for the absence of some forms he concludes that with the growth of feminine gender which is the final stage in the development of the system, the system of congruence was correspondingly extended (207).

**EVALUATION**

Hittite evidence need not be so final as Burrow has put it since we cannot be sure about the courses the language has taken. This solution based only on the morphology does not account for the semantic aspect and also how man, before feminine gender was developed expressed the gender difference.
STUDIES WITH STRESS ON PSYCHOLOGY

Language has two aspects: (1) psychological or semantic and (2) morphological. Any attempt to study gender origin which does not consider both these two aspects is bound to be partial. We were so far dealing with authors who mainly tried to solve the problem of the origin of gender based on the morphology. Now we shall study some other authors who gave more importance to a psychological aspect of language.

MÜLLER, G.H.

First we shall study the thought of G.H. Müller (1898, 304-315). After a brief survey of the study of his predecessors, Grimm and Brugmann, he says that the relation between art and phantasy shows the parallel of the relation between natural and grammatical gender. He considers two questions: (1) how the original sense of 'a' came and how the adjectives got the feminine endings, (2) how 'o' became opposed to feminine i.e. masculine. He then states that this 'a', 'i' 'og' are concerning only a few words and what about the whole language. According to him 'a' was originally feminine, 'female abstract' and 'a' in masculine is from feminine only. When the suffixes are fixed for masculine and feminine the grouping followed.

Personification is not universal. The feeling of masculine and feminine as Grimm has put it has nothing to do with the exterior form of language. Both Grimm and Brugmann are not
fully right and a third is not found (306).

He considers favourably Winkler's idea that the more developed the people, the more developed is the gender. All people have got the power of personification. Gender difference is rare when sex difference is not expressed in the undeveloped languages. So from sex difference came the gender difference (307). Müller and Schwyzer hold the posteriority of grammatical gender to natural gender. Brugmann has denied that natural gender is transferred to grammatical gender. According to Müller abstraction is the sign of development of language (312). Abstract words were considered to be having female quality. People imagined many beings as wife and mother. We see this fact in mythological naming of gods. There is a transgressing from abstraction to femininity. First of all abstract form in 'a' turned to 'a' feminine. Religious imagination and mythology helped this process. Feminine form came from abstract form. The differentiation of concrete and abstract slowly ceased and the analogy became weak. Differentiation of sex and gender became unconsidered and hence the confusion also arose. Finally the three genders are due to the congruence of forms. Later adjectives simply followed congruence (315).

**EVALUATION**

We notice that Müller was writing in 1898 and he had only a very little material at his disposal. All what he says is true but the full truth of the origin of gender is not uncovered.
The next authors in this group we consider are Edward Schwyzer and Albert Debrunner, their work *Griechische Grammatik* (1950, 29-35). They start with difference of neuter gender from masculine and feminine by its same form in nominative and accusative for the three numbers (29)\(^1\). They subscribe to the theory that the idea of 'animate' caused first differentiation of masculine-feminine from neuter (30). From the lifeless abstract and concrete came masculine and feminine words and these were added to the general masculine and feminine. Primitive phantasy and personification accelerated the process. Parts of the body were personified as masculine or feminine or as neuter, also the names of instruments. They thought of some female powers behind the feminine abstract names.


Gundert, H., (1966, 62-78), ascribes gender origin to animation, metaphor and personification. Anthropomorphism and symbolization also cause gender attribution to things without sex differentiation (63). Religion, language and art help personification and give a particular limited human vision of the world (66). He then continues his discussion about the difficulty in gender-study (67-8).

According to Gundert in the very human consciousness there is the idea of natural gender. The grammatical gender followed partly this division. The complementary relation of male to female is natural. Suffixes became associated with gender later and slowly. These suffixes became traditional gender signs. Slowly the natural 'masculine-feminine-consciousness' disappeared and grammatical category was established. Through the analogy the category became purely grammatical (70). Of course, everywhere the suffix association of masculine, feminine and neuter could not be pushed in (71).

Gundert considers two moments in human understanding and expression through metaphors: the moment of giving a soul and the aesthetic moment when he expresses through metaphors. It is a unique human ability to express through metaphors, and comparisons and also to deal with spiritual matters (73). He
gives utmost importance to metaphors and picturing of mental images of nature personification (75).

Most of the facts he puts forward are acceptable though they seem to be very simplistic and easy.

1. The following references have linguistic and anthropological and other sociological importance:


Greenberg, J.H., (1968, 94-96) for universal relation of gender to other parts of speech.

McCartney, S. Eugene, (1922, 62-71) for sex determination and sex control in antiquity.

Dixit, N.L., (1933, 1-20) for the use of sex denoting terms in the description of sporophytes.
Now we shall turn our attention to the three authors - G. Royen, Fodor Istvan and Kupush Linsey, Jr. - who have studied the important writers on the subject and have their own contributions. The chronological order is followed.

**GERLACH ROYEN**

Royen's monumental work 'Die Nominalen Klassifikations-Systeme in den Sprachen der Erde' was published in 1929. So Royen had not at his disposal all the material which we have now published afterwards. He made use of all the available materials. The work is encyclopaedic. This book of nearly 1000 pages has three sections. In the first chapter he deals with history of all the theories concerning grammatical gender in Indo-European with numerous illustrations and comparisons from other linguistic families, and with a great many highly instructive critical remarks of his own. He studies the doctrines of Greeks, Romans, Scholastics and Humanists, and all the linguists before J. Grimm (1-41). He then studies all the authors up to 1929 (41-270). As Uhlenbeck (1932, 80-2) reviews Royen saying: "Then we logically should expect a chapter, drawing the general conclusions from that historical survey and the abundant materials contained therein, and giving us a systematical exposition of the author's own views about the true nature, the origin, and the evolution of grammatical gender in Indo-European and elsewhere", he has failed to give comprehensive criticism of the views. Here we are a little disappointed,
Royen then gives a long chapter on different problems which in some way or other and sometimes very distantly are connected with grammatical gender. The sub-headings are as follows: Man's and woman's language (272-312), the bearing of psycho-analytical research on the scientific interpretation of gender (313-318), the terminology of gender (318-336), mythology and personification (336-372), sexual contrast (372-401), discrepancy between gender and sex (401-461), class exponents (461-528), wavering and change of gender (528-579), syncretization of the three-gender-system of Indo-European (579-587), new groupings in Indo-European (587-594), collectivity and pluralization (594-659), the masculina in 'a' (659-701), the feminina in 'o' (701-736), in Indo-European motion and congruence (737-780), Sound symbolism and accent (780-810), consonatic and vocalic intermutations (810-864), casus energeticus and casus inertiae (864-939; Uhlembeck ibidem; Royen 272).

Among the topics discussed above the author clearly criticizes and says that sexual bilingualism as it is put forward by Fraser is of little help to solve the problem of origin of gender. Here there is hypothesis piled upon hypothesis which will tumble down at the slightest breeze. Royen holds that psychopathia sexualis is also of no help. He says that mythological personification is not very convincing. Under the heading 'Sound symbolism, accentual variation, vocalic and consonantal intermutation and their possible relationship
to the origin of gender 'Royen collects a lot of interesting materials in the general linguistic point of view. (Ramaswami Aiyer 1931-32, 158-168).

Royen's work is excellent as far as the materials collected. So meticulously he has collected all the relevant materials on the subject.

".... Royen presents a certain restating which can do service but which, errors excepted, is lacking of the clearness and desirable generality" (Hjelmslev, 1956, 172).
We have been referring to Fodor Istvan often. He was not at all patient enough to see whether there is any truth in natural gender theory and what are the implications in that theory. He has not got the proper understanding of the natural gender as we have given in beginning of this chapter. His study is more philological than linguistic. He never paid attention to the fact that gender is semantic though often this semantic aspect is not noticed at all. Theory of congruence cannot answer the primary question of the origin of gender, though Fodor thinks so. No theory singly solves the problem of the origin of gender; and grammatical and morphological analysis alone will not give the clue to the problem.

He has taken ten conclusions at the end of his studies:

(1) His definition of gender is traditional as the Greeks and the Romans did. No new insight is found.

(2) He restricts the validity of an investigation to a particular family of languages or language only. This is partially true - as far as the morphological aspects are concerned it is true; as far as the psychological or conceptual aspects are concerned it may not be true (Gilson, 1955, 313).

(3) Fodor thinks that congruence is the cause of the origin of grammatical gender and he puts a limited number of substantival ending types as a precondition. From where this limited number
of substantial ending can come? Congruence theory is in vicious circle; is gender first or congruence first?

(4) "Natural gender, value differentiation and the habits and forms of thinking of a community speaking the language cannot bring about the category of gender because the content of thought cannot be transferred to its external form, the system of language" (213). But once the basic gender concept is developed all these can work in the development of gender system as secondary causes.

(5) "Grammatical gender may originate as a result of the agency of three factors operating on three levels of linguistic system: on the morphological, the syntactic and the lexico-semantic level" (213). But it can be effected by many other causes which Fodor did not mention.

(6) He attributes gender change to syntactic morphological causes alone and accepts the doctrine of Meillet and congruence. Gender change is not due to the above reasons alone. We will see it later.

(7) Conclusion No. 7 is not concerned with Indo-European family of languages.

(8) It is true that there is no compelling necessity for gender to evolve in any language. Of course, we must be speaking of grammatical gender.

(9) "Gender may develop in all types of language with the exception of isolating languages". (214). This conclusion is based upon the method of categorizing languages on the basis
of their morphological system. If gender is a syntactic category as Fodor holds, the morphological character of a language has no essential bearing on its rise. Linzey adds: "It is true that an isolating language, like Chinese, cannot have a grammatical gender, but, nevertheless, it can have a type of gender that is Chinese" (80).

(10) Fodor's final conclusion is regarding the use of grammatical gender. He attributes secondary yet not unimportant functions to gender. But the major categories in Indo-European languages are depended on gender system.

Fodor Istvan says (203): "The gender of foreign loan-words is determined for the most part by grammatical forces, first and foremost, by the influence of their ending. In general a loan-word retains its original gender in the adopting language (provided its gender system is the same as the language of origin), if it was adopted by the learned layers of the society, that is, in the case of 'mots savants' and international words".

Here is again another statement by Fodor (203): "If the historical data in all languages confirm the primary importance of the inner motive forces of the language in the establishment of gender, then we have no reason whatever to assume that other extra-lingual factors had played any part in an earlier stage, unverifiable by linguistic evidence. "But congruence or motion which is the inner motive force cannot be the cause of gender because congruence or motion presupposes the gender
system; let the cart be not put before the horse.

The main tenet Fodor wanted to hold throughout his study is that only internal language forces work for the origin and evolution of gender. Those two statements above are made on the assumption that extra-lingual factors have nothing to do with gender and gender is only morphological and not semantic. But Fodor is wrong in his assumption. The following research conducted by Adrienne Lang (1976, 55-68), proves, Fodor by name, to be wrong. I quote the relevant parts from the study of Adrienne Lang:

"Much work has been done on gender in German, with various explanations given as to the cause and factors involved. These are usually reduced to two bases, i.e. that gender is based on a syntactic/morphological system or that it is based on one of semantics (meaning, analogy, synonym etc)" (55).

"Since loan words should necessarily be assigned a gender and they are few in a language it is helpful to see how a particular language is deciding the gender of a loan word.

"The literature on loan words in German mainly discusses the morphological basis of gender assignment. However, morphology alone does not account for a number of exceptions, and it is my contention that we must assume a semantic basis for the deep gender assignment, with a series of rules to account for the alteration of deep to surface gender" (55-56).

The author puts two hypotheses:
Hypothesis (1) The assignment of gender to loan words is not arbitrary.

Hypothesis (2) Gender assignment is not only a factor of the morphological ending of loan words.

Adrianne Lang then gives the details of the experiments and the following is the conclusion:

"Fodor (1959, 203 f) thinks: that the loan words are first adopted by the upper-socio-economic groups, who presumably know the original language, and thus tend to retain the original gender of the loan in German. However, he states that the lower-socio-economic groups (presumably not speaking the foreign language and not knowing the original gender) change the loan word's spelling or gender to fit their gender system. My contention would be simply that the lower-socio-economic groups tend to prefer the deep semantic base of their own gender system to an imposed morphological ending (as has been shown statistically in tables 5 and 6)" (66).

Here is a foot note too: "Fodor assumes that the gender of loan words is determined' for the most part by grammatical forces, first and foremost by the influence of their ending (1959:203), which I have demonstrated to be incorrect". (66). (cf. also Ervin, 1962, 249-261).

1. I gratefully acknowledge that I had the opportunity to discuss the problem of gender with Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja who
The primitive man's problem of attributing a gender to a word must have been something similar to the problem of person who is determining the gender to a loan word or a child studying the language noticing how the gender is determined. Here is another study how a child is learning the difference between male and female:

"By the time they are 3 years old, children begin to notice and talk about sex differences between females and males. They want to know why boys stand when they urinate, for example, and girls sit down. They also want to know why boy's genital organ is different from the girls'. They may ask why women have large breasts while girls, boys, and men are flat in front. They notice that men have hair on their faces while women do not" (Furlock, 1978, 292-3).

suggested me first to conduct an experiment how the gender of loan words is determined. Since I already got the result of such a scientific research by Adrianne Lang, I could avoid the labour. I realize the importance of the insightful suggestion of Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja.

Korparkar (1952) has taken a similar stand as that of Fedor and the third part of Royen (1929, 270-939). Hence he is not studied here.
Kupush Linzey, Jr.

Kupush Linzey (1962) has studied most of the important modern authors (22-84) with critical evaluation. He is convinced that the congruence alone will not solve the problem of the origin of gender. He has taken inspiration from Lehmann who first tried to approach the problem having recourse to the phonetic change due to the change of accent. "Lehmann says that the diversity of feminine formations and the feminine forms distinctive in their bases are evidence for the absence in Indo-European of any congruence system. This could probably be admitted, if endings and formations were actually the bases for congruence and gender. It is just such evidence which has prompted me to search for markers of gender in the accentual system of language ". (Linzey, 1962, 71).

He says that there must have been a marker which indicated gender primarily and specifically. Later this marker may undergo change and evolution. He thinks that "Stress accent had functioned as a marker of vocalic allophones in pre-Indo-European; but when the vowel system was otherwise organised and the allophones were distributionally marked, stress no longer was a distinctive marker and became instead a marker of syntactic structures. The marker of grammatical gender which I will posit as original is stress accent" (86-7).

The rest of the study is mainly hypothesis and proper evidence is impossible. Here is his conclusion: "In the theory
which I have presented for the origin of grammatical gender in Indo-European, I have concluded that grammatical gender was syntactic in origin, that is, it had its beginning in the utterance patterns of the language, and that it was originally marked by the presence or absence of stress accent. I have further concluded that the origin of grammatical gender was based entirely on factors within the language although its evolution was influenced by factors outside of language; that throughout its development grammatical gender played an integral part in the total structure of the language; and finally that the several grammatical categories of the Indo-European language resulted from the differentiation of the general congruence of pre-Indo-European and that the development of these categories was parallel to the development of gender" (113-114).

He assumes no congruence of any sort prior to the general congruence and he assumes this congruence to have been the source of all the other grammatical categories. The original general congruence is gender. The markers of the category of gender remained suprasegmental until the time when the neutral and non-neutral sub-classes began to develop into the three sub-classes which are common to most Indo-European languages (114).

Kupush Linzey's imagination is very good but there is no surety that language developed as he imagined. He is not giving any consideration to the semantic aspect of language and hence he shares, in this respect, all what Fodor is criticised for.
All the theorists hold that there was no gender in the pre-Indo-European language and the origin of gender must be before the separation of Indo-European languages into dialects. All of them hold that gender in Indo-European is a strictly syntactic phenomenon. They hold that the reason for gender origin must be sought within the language only; no outside factor influenced gender origin in Indo-European.

All the theorists think that gender first appeared as markers of stem classes. Many of them are of opinion that masculine gender and the nominative and accusative cases are more important.

Many of the theorists found it difficult to do away with natural gender, for all of them congruence is the prime cause of gender evolution. Some of them, e.g. Hjelmslev and Lehmann, try to relate gender with other categories of language.

Each one is improving on the previous ones and no answer is comprehensive and satisfactory. A selected few examples are taken by each author and from these few examples they draw conclusions for the whole language.

All of them want to discuss the origin of gender and end up in discussing the evolution of gender by analogy and its development in the historical languages (cf. Fodor, 1962, 81-3). Most of the hypotheses cannot be proved to be right or wrong.

POINTS OF CONCORD IN THEORIES OUTLINED
The conclusions also share the same nature of uncertainty. All of them use only linguistic science to study the phenomena of gender origin. As we have seen, this problem of the origin of gender is not limited to mere linguistic science alone. As a human factor, language must be studied employing all human sciences to arrive at a comprehensive conclusion. Here we see that each author took the problem in a particular state and considered only some aspects of the problem of gender and no one considered the fundamental problem comprehensively.

**CAUSES ADDUCED FOR THE EVOLUTION OF GENDER**

We shall broadly classify the causes as intra-lingual and extra-lingual. We have already seen many of the theories in this chapter and in the second chapter. We must say that in many cases the division is not mutually exclusive; The list below need not be comprehensive too; but this fact won't make any qualitative difference.

The following are the 'intra-lingual' causes; sound-shift due to accent change; congruence; syncretization of the three gender system of Indo-European; new grouping in Indo-European; collectivity and pluralization; masculina in 'a', feminina in 'o'; consonantic and vocalic intermutations; casus energeticus and casus inertiae; agglutination; theory of polarity; active-passive, strong - weak, big - small, living - non-living etc.

**Extra-lingual causes:** The idea of masculinity and femininity and sexual contrast; man's language and woman's language;
mythology and personification; discrepancy between sex and
gender; class exponents; wavering and change of gender; anima-
tion, metaphor, symbolization, anthropomorphism; distinction
of abstract and concrete; change of meaning, hence change of
gender; confusion between gender in vernacular and classical
languages where both are present; immaturity, vagueness, inde-
finiteness cause neuter gender; imagination and poetic expressions
and analogy (Svartengren, 1929, 7-51).

SOME REMARKS

In gender study we must give equal importance to the
semantic and deep structure aspect as well as to morphological
and suprastructure aspect of language. A stage cannot be
clearly shown when there was no gender distinction in Indo-
European languages and a stage when it started. The correlation
of suffix and gender is too feable (Kurylowicz, 1935, 250). The
feminine gender is derived, it is contented. Let it be so; but
it is the grammarian's way of explaining language formations,
not of the people who use the language. Grammar alone cannot
solve the problem of gender. There should be a reason to
attempt for a morphological modification and another one is to
attempt for some uniformity. Hence, what is the reason to
attempt for the morphological modification?

1. For poetic analogy and grammatical analogy vide, Whitney,
1977, 207.
Such an elaborate system would not have developed in language if it had nothing to do with some realities in our experience. All the languages use some device to manifest this fact of our experience. There are inconsistencies and different forces for gender causation.

Gender concept is a relative concept and one alone is not understood without the other two. Origin of gender can be distinguished from the origin of grammatical gender.

The meaninglessness of gender as explained by Hjelmslev, Martinet, Meillet etc. is due to the narrow meaning given to sex as the physical factor. When we consider sex in the meaning we have already explained, this problem does not exist - even though for all the cases we cannot say how man felt the maleness and femaleness and the absence of both. It depends on the different factors of human feelings and tastes on which there is no dispute.

Finally we may say that there would not have been gender differences in the language if there were not to be sex differences in the world. Primarily gender difference must have started with sex differences and all the other causes outlined above coincided with it.

Sinha (1973, 220-221) says: "It can be maintained, quite independently of the relative merits of traditional and structural grammars, that the technical term "gender" (or its
equivalent) in traditional grammar involves a conceptual distinction based initially (and originally) on sex and then extended over objects and ideas whose sex is not known or is of no overwhelming human interest. Although it is certainly true that this extension follows a conceptually arbitrary course, the sex distinction is the core of traditional gender category, albeit, restrictively, structural grammars too, by and large, follow traditional grammar in this respect.

He continues: "The sex based distinction must first start from man and woman notion; then animals and further other beings. This may be the basic concept of living non-living sex distinction. It can be human or non-human, living or non-living."(221).