Chapter V

Challenge and Response to Feudal System

Feudal crisis or challenges denote an unpleasant phenomenon characterizing decline in the rural population, extent of arable land, quantum of produce and yield of land revenue. It was triggered by several factors which the scholars explain in their own ways. Whereas Maurice Dobb attributes it to “internal crises”,¹ Henri Pirenne views the growth of trade and towns as its fundamental cause.² However, Georgus Duby foresaw its reason in the development of technology and increased production, and labour.³ Whatever the underlying factors of the feudal decline, it has to be recognized that the decline pre-empted transformation of feudal to capitalist mode of production ending thereby the over-exploitation of scores of serfs or land-tied cultivators by the privileged feudal class in Central Asia as elsewhere. The decline was indeed the offshoot of the customary and legal recognition of the military powers of the feudal lords from time to time.⁴ Anyhow, given scenario was challenging to all the stakeholders for power gain and optimization of regional resources both from above and below. Each contending party had obviously its own specific mode to react, respond and contribute to the declining feudal trend for their own expediency. The whole dynamics of feudal crisis and its allied response in Central Asia was sequentially multilayered in nature, organization, time and space as can be gauged from the below-given discussion:

(A). Internal Crisis, Serf Reaction and Feudal Respond:

(A. i). Internal Crises:

To begin with the established reality that the feudal institution was based on the exploitation of produce and labour of the tenants under the aegis of landlordism. Even though the serf-lord relations were apparently smooth but a simmering indignation existed at its root on the issue of the appropriation of produce. The feudal lords targeted to take away maximum from the serf, which they were reluctant to surrender for their own compulsions: growing family needs, traditional means of productions and climatic excesses. According to Maurice Dobb, the clandestine anti-feudal contempt finally proved counterprove to both the stakeholders. Nevertheless, the tenant reaction was obvious because feudalism was meant to favour the feudal lords at their cost. Quite exactly, they were subjected to multitude of exorbitant taxes and levies. For example, kharaj, was realized at 2/3rd of the produce as against ½ or 1/4th prescribed by the state. In addition, mirobana (water duty) was charged at the rate of 10% of the annual produce and so were four cattle required to be annually delivered by each tribal family in the name of kibitka (house tax). The additional levies (wajuhat) included kish puli (levy on a pair of draught animal in relation to

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6 *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, p. 36.


11 It was a household tax covering the nomadic population. Each household was to pay annually four cattle to the authority.
land holding), *yak shira* (head-wise levy on draught animals), *gafshan* (levy paid towards revenue functionaries like *amlokdar*), *tanaf puli* and *alaf puli* (levy on orchards and vegetable gardens), *kuprul puli* (toll on bridges), *baj* (custom duty paid towards the lord), *nikhana* (duty on marriage contracts), *tarikana/tarakana* (duty on legal documents of inheritance),

12 various gifts presented to feudal lords on the eve of community feasts (*toi*) apart.

13 in all fifty five in Bukhara and twenty five in Khiva.

14 There number was in fact so large that Sadruddin Ayni argued: “only air was exempted from taxes and levies in Bukhara”. Further, the tenants were required to perform several unpaid services (*hasher*) to the feudal lords, to maintain their orchards, canals, houses and roads.

15 Not only the tenants but even the artisans and merchant communities were subjected to *aminana* (tax paid by whole-sales in Bukhara Khanate) and *dallyali* (tax paid by the retailers towards the lords), the payment of *zakat* at the rate of 2 ½ % of their annual earnings aside.

16 The exactions were so high that the concept of saving did not exist and purchasing over land

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15 *The Life of Alimqul: A Native Chronicle of the 19th century Central Asia*, pp. 16, 60, fns. 77, 206, 207, 208; *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from Early Times*, p. 67;


19 *Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand*, p. 92.
(milki)\textsuperscript{20} was too distant for fear of high exactions.\textsuperscript{21} Paradoxically, rent was collected in advance for several years together and arbitrarily increased as high as seven fold.\textsuperscript{22} Consequently, the tenants had just not a little earnings for the whole year.\textsuperscript{23} Under the circumstances, they were forced to look around for food and borrow loans or else resort to theft and brigandage.\textsuperscript{24} The loans (bunak) were provided by the feudal lords at quite high interest rates ranging between 40 and 60\% when these were obtained by the feudatories at low interest rates of 8-9\%.\textsuperscript{25} The debts so accumulated would force the tenant to sell whatever and if ever they had any material possession with them.\textsuperscript{26} On top of it, they had to buy the commodities at the exorbitant prices fixed by the feudatories themselves which was embarrassing to all lower strata of the Khanates.\textsuperscript{27} Compared to the high prices, wages were substantially low. A cobbler in Bukhara earned only 45 puls daily,\textsuperscript{28} whereas bread alone cost half the amount of his daily

\textsuperscript{20} It may be mentioned here that in the Khanates was also a class of free peasants who held land under milkiyat\(i\) rights. These peasants pay tax direct to state through intermediaries and rent to landlords.


\textsuperscript{22} Subhan Kuli Khan (1681-1702 AD), an Astarkhanid ruler increased the tax and levies seven fold. Similarly, Khudyar Khan (1845-1858) of Khokand imposed levies even on wild fruit trees in mountain areas of Osh: Central Asia: Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times, Vol. 2, p. 391; S. Frederick Starr (ed.), Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia, Caucasus Institute and Silk Route Studies Program: Sharpe Publishers, 1886, p. 39.


\textsuperscript{25} Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from Early Times, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{26} Through Khiva to Golden Samarqand, p. 235; Central Asia: Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times, Vol. 2, p. 391.


There was, therefore, a marked difference between the tenant earnings and the market prices of their daily consumer goods. The gap could have been easily plugged by them with surplus produce, which they did not have due to high exactions, traditional agricultural tools and lack of requisite manures.\footnote{The droppings of the cattle were mostly used as coal. The only manure was the silt from rivers and canals and pigeon droppings: \textit{Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule}, p. 277.} Most of the land situated between Panjdeh to Yalatun of the Murgab valley of Samarkand\footnote{About Samarkand, Mir Izzatullah observed, “It (Samarkand) had fallen into such utter ruin and decay, that tigers and wolves had actually taken adobe in the colleges … which was situated in the centre of the city”: Mir Izzatullah, \textit{Travels in Central Asia in the Year 1812-13}, tr. P. D. Henderson, Calcutta: Foreign Department, 1882, p. 56; Yuri Bregal, “Central Asia in the end of XVIII at the beginning of XIX century”: \url{http://www.ast.uz/en/catalog.php?bid=72&sid=71&aid=358}} was deserted.\footnote{Frederic John Goldsmid, “On Journeys Between Herat and Khiva: Lecture,” Friday, January 31, 1875, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, pp. 11, 12: \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/60234476}, (accessed: 25/02/2010).}\footnote{Cf. Scott. C. Levi (ed.), India and Central Asia: Commerce and Culture (1500-1800), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007, fn. 84, p. 120; Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian, pp. 35-36.}

This brought them face to face with their feudatories with exodus as a viable alternative to escape feudal highhandedness.\footnote{The exodus was also facilitated by better life standards in cities and the failure of the feudatories to protect the tenants amid external invasions. Following the series of Qipchaq invasions into Samarkand in 1735 about 12,000 residents fled to India: T. K. Beisembiev, “Farghana’s Contacts with India in the 18th and 19th Centuries,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 124-35: Cf. Scott. C. Levi (ed.), India and Central Asia: Commerce and Culture (1500-1800), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007, fn. 84, p. 120; Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian, pp. 35-36.}

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\footnote{29 E. V. Rtveladze, “Eastern and Northern Central Asia (c. 1750 to c. 1850),” \textit{History of Civilizations of Central Asia}, Part V, p. 449.}
(A. ii). Serf Reactions:

Serf reaction may simply be described as an anti-feudal civil dissension triggered by an inequitable resource sharing pattern, which recognized the feudatories as the chief appropriators of surplus. However, for want of political wisdom and proper leadership, the tenant reactions or uprisings were mostly expressed through the acts of exodus, protest, denial of rent and unwarranted services to the feudatories. Thus like the peasant uprisings, the tenant uprisings in the Khanates were symbolic of the “weapons of the weak.”

However, references to such uprising though ample lack several details about their real nature. In 1784 A.D. and on the eve of the assumption of Bukharan throne by Shah Murad (1785-1800 A.D.), a rebellion took place in which one thousand people died. In 1800 A.D., the Turkmen tenants and artisans of Merv reacted to the excesses of the Bukharan zakatchis and in 1801, the revolt spread to Kerki. The similar demonstration was recorded against the ill treatment of Mirza Razi of Mazandaran in 1813. The Yamuts and Goklan tribes stirred up and resisted the rule of Astrakhan in 1826-27 and 1841. The biggest uprising was that of the Kitay Qipchaq of Miyan Qala situated between Bukhara and Samarkand against the reign of Sultan Haider (1800-25 AD).

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37 Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian, pp. 35-36.


39 The 18th - 19th century tenant reactions though widely discussed, demand real and scientific interpretation.

40 We do not have figures of the causalities of the serfs and milki holders in the rebellion: A. Mukhtarov, “The Manghits,” History of Civilizations of Central Asia (ed.), Part V, p. 57.

41 Zakatchis were entrusted with the work of collecting zakat.

42 Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian, p. 35.


44 “The Manghits”, History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Part V, p. 57
the reign of Sher Ali Khan (1842-45 AD). In 1855, Abdul Vasi organized the revolt of the peasants and the serfs of Baljuan against the exorbitant rent/tax structure of Amir Muzaffar (1860-1885) of Bukhara. Hard pressed by the excesses of the feudatories in Tashkent, the masses at large welcomed the anti-feudal response of General Chernief in 1865 notwithstanding his representing the imperial Russia: “… let every man carry on his work … houses, gardens, fields, lands, and water mills, of which you have possession, will remain your property. The soldiers will take nothing from you … .” It was perhaps for this reason that the masses of the Amirate appreciated the upcoming Russian rule. In 1858 AD, in Tashkent and Dast-i-Qipchaq, the peasants/serfs of Kyrgyz and Kazak ethnic background sharply reacted to the additional taxes and levies levied by Mirza Ahmad Qushbegi. The anti-feudal uprisings gained momentum under the Tsarists (1860-1917 AD). Shahr-i-Sabz region of Samarkand registered a strong uprising in 1868 AD. Similarly, three oblasts of Samarkand, Farghana and Syr Darya experienced 668 uprisings from 1887-1898: 429 in Farghana, 182 in Samarkand, 57 in Syr Darya. The 16 bandit attacks in Farghana and 9 in Samarkand in 1899 enhanced to 324 in Farghana by 1917 and 166 in Samarkand by 1915.

45 To stabilize the situation Musalman Qul, the Mongbashi (commander of 1,000 troops) was sent to quell the revolt: History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Part V, p. 75.
46 The poor peasant leader was defeated and executed at Shahrisabz, nonetheless he remained a legend: Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian, p. 35.
47 Cf. Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand, p. 245.
50 Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from Early Times, p. 82.
(A. iii). Feudal Response:

Since the feudatories thrived on the rent and labour of the tenants, the major source of their income,\(^{52}\) they, as such, strived to keep the tenants in good humour for they laid golden egg for them. Nonetheless, as a pressure tactics, they used force to reckon with the restive peasants and serfs. The response of the Amir Subhan Kuli Khan (1681-1702 AD) and Baqi Mohammad of Bukhara offer the typical example in this behalf. Being the lord and overlord both, the former enhanced the rent of the tenants by seven times,\(^{53}\) and the latter stopped the water supply of Nasaf Canal for irrigation of the arable land of the restive peasants.\(^{54}\) Simultaneously, for strategic reasons, they combined force with aid and assistance of the tenants, and provided them modern agricultural implements like metal plough driven by horses, yoke and assess: the latter were also used to drive mills (Chahar Kharas - Four Ass Mills).\(^{55}\) True the tenants were bound to render extra service to the feudatories for the maintenance of their fields and houses.\(^{56}\) At the same time, the feudatories facilitated them drawing water from the canals for irrigation of their agricultural fields.\(^{57}\) Credit loans (bunak) and other agricultural implements were advanced to them and, at times, levies and

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52 The right to realize rent and extract labour were the essentials of the feudal mode of production: Cf. Irfan Habib, “Classifying pre-Colonial India,” *The Feudalism Debate* (ed.), New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1999, p. 189.


57 Mirza Haider Daughlat informs by writing that in 1544 “he often found Chagtayid Khan, Sultan Vays Khan during hot seasons, with the help of his slaves, drawing water from the well in pitchers and pouring it himself over the land”: Mirza Hayder Daughlat, *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, Eng. tr. N. Elias and E. Denison Ross, *History of Mongols of Central Asia, 2nd ed.*, London, 1898, p. 67; *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, p. 377.
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taxes were remitted.\textsuperscript{58} The provision of providing food, clothes etc. were the other sources of support to the tenants.\textsuperscript{59}

No doubt, at times, such a relief caused financial loss to the feudatories. But they made up the same by enforcing their own choice of production on the tenants. While Mohammad Rahim, Khan of Khiva, exempted cattle and other taxes of the tenants, he juxtapose forced them to grow wheat, rice, sesame and jugan to meet their export demand, which automatically restricted the scope of “free peasant production”. Further, the tenants were barred to sell whatever little surplus they had until the feudatories had disposed whole lot of produce and that too at the arbitrarily fixed prices.\textsuperscript{60} Similarly, the credit loans were advanced to the tenants at the high interest rate of 40-60\%.\textsuperscript{61} Slaves too were subjected to a certain share of their produce to the feudal lords. For instance, a Russian slave, Gregory Pulakoff, paid seven tillas (30 tillas = 200 rupees\textsuperscript{62}) to his master out of income.\textsuperscript{63} Thus, feudal support to the tenants was virtually rhetoric, and sounded more to the benefit of lords than the tenants. Peasants’ recalcitrance was but natural to follow the above phenomenon.

\textbf{(B). Role of the States:}

Though theoretically, the Amir/Khan was sovereign and the feudatories were subservient to him, yet privileges granted to them virtually made them overlords in their respective estates. This sounded not only decentralization of royal power but

\textsuperscript{58} Nikolay Murav’yov, \textit{Journey to Khiva Through the Turkmon Country}, London: Oguz Press, 1977, pp. 139-140.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Journey to Khiva Through the Turkmon Country}, pp. 139-140.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from the Early 19th Century}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Travels into Bukhara together with a Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus}, p. 119.
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Travels into Bukhara together with a Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus}, p. 136.
loss of state revenue in the regions so assigned to the feudatories. More so, it exposed the tenants to increasing complications. Perhaps for this reason, the state brought the lord-overlord relationship within the legal framework. With this intention, Amir Nasrullah (1826-1860) in Bukhara, introduced several politico-administrative reforms, to re-establish the state sovereignty and subject everything including the *bega* to it. Accordingly, he confiscated all *tankho* grants and brought them under *amluk* (state land) suggesting thereby that the rights of the feudatories on land were of non-usufruct nature. Subsequently, *tankho* grants were re-allotted to the able and loyal men who acknowledged the king as their sovereign. Similarly, *waqf* grants were rationalized on paternal rather than the hierarchical lines. The *bega* were also directed to share a certain part of their revenue with the state (the king as an overlord), and at the same time, state dependence on the feudatories for military services, were ended by creating regular state army (*sarloz/askariyya*) under the supervision of *Tupchi-bashi-vi-lashkar* (commander of artillery). Slavery was abolished by Abdul Ahad (Amir of Bukhara 1885-1910) though its reminiscence

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64 The weak feudal lords sub-infeudated their estates for reasons: to escape the obligations of payment of tribute to the overlord, and protection to the subjects in the event of external invasions.

65 He brought about radical change in the politico-administrative set up, he divided his whole Emirate into well defined twenty five to twenty eight *vilayats* and kept them under the control of *bega* (governors). The *vilayats* were sub-divided into *amloks* (from three to twenty five per *vilayat*), run by the *amlokdars*, who again were put under the control of *bega*. The *amloks* were further divided into hamlets/villages (*qishloks*) each kept under the *aqsoqols* (village elders). In financial matters, the position *devanbegi* (revenue minister) was consolidated. The *zakatchis* (collectors of *zakat*) were made accountable for the revenues to the Khans and *bega*. In this way, two administrative systems were evolved, one from above and another from below. More important was that the nobility was diversified to include people of different ethnic groups, the Tajik, Turkmen, Persians, etc.: *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, pp. 25-26, 28-29.


67 *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, pp. 25, 26, 27, 29.

68 *Travel into Central Asia*, p. 100; *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, p. 27.
continued.\textsuperscript{69} The Khan of Khokand, Alim Khan (1799-1811), worked out a four-pronged plan to strengthen the state against the feudal system:\textsuperscript{70} forbade feudal gifts and the taxes/levies except those prescribed by the state. He also de-recognized the prices of legal deeds at will and instead of land grants paid his officials in terms of regular salary.\textsuperscript{71} Similarly, in Khiva, Illtuzar or Ilt Nazar (1804-1806) marginalized the power of the feudatories by including Sarts in administration.\textsuperscript{72}

Notwithstanding these measures to reinforce state system, the lord-serf relationship continued to be dominated by the seigniorial rights of the feudatories. As a matter of the fact, the feudal legacy was so well-propounded that it continued even after the fall of the Khanates and their occupation by the Tsars (1856-1917).\textsuperscript{73} Even the Tsars allowed Bukharan and Khivan vassals to retain their feudal privileges.\textsuperscript{74}


\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian}, p. 90.


\textsuperscript{72} Sarts were the members of the non-tribal or urban class. They spoke Turkic though the Tajiks among them spoke Persian: Svat Succek, \textit{History of Inner Asia}, London: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 187.

The only change was in the composition of hitherto existing feudal structure. A new class (*kulaks*), loyal to the Tsars, was reorganized by the new regime by changing the feudal land tenure and its allied taxation systems. However, towards 1886, feudal basis were gradually marginalized, and vide “Statute for the Administration of the Turkestan Region”, the ownership rights of the feudatories, the *mulki/milki* (ownership) rights, on the big estates, were abolished and declared state property. The confiscated land was distributed among the tenants on customary law and hereditary basis. *Waqf* grants were transferred to village communities for use, and those held by the private persons (*waqf-i-ahli*) were allowed to be passed on next to their heirs. No land could be henceforth declared as *waqf* without the consent of the state, exceptions apart. *Waqf* grants were, therefore, directly brought under the state control. Though in the beginning, rights of the feudatories on water were allowed to continue under the regulation, “Temporary Rules on Irrigation of the Turkestan Region” (1877), but in 1888, district heads - *aqsoqols* (village elders), *aryk-aqsoqols* (village official in-charge of small streams) and *mirobs* (an official in charge of irrigation) were made responsible for equitable distribution of water with no preferential treatment to feudatories. Besides, a host of feudal levies were done away with and instead *kharaj* (at the rate of 1/10th of the gross produce), *tanop* (orchard tax) and *zakat* (2 ½ %) on the trading capital were realized. Any

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77 However, full ownership rights were not granted to them for these were related to water rights for irrigation and thus retained with the feudatories: “Fiscal Reform in Turkestan,” p. 429.


79 *Water problems of Central Asia*, p. 23.

80 As per the Art. 6 of the Russo-Bukharan Friendship Treaty of 1873, only 1/40th was levied on the imports from Russia to Bukhara and exports from Bukhara to Russia: *Russian Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (185-1924)*, Appendix 3, p. 319.
collection beyond the fixed schedule by the revenue functionaries was strictly checked.\textsuperscript{82} Land distribution was properly registered to avoid dispute among the users.\textsuperscript{83} In judicial matters, a plaintiff had the right to appeal to the Qazi whom he trusted more.\textsuperscript{84} These legislations regulated the feudal laws in Central Asia, which in itself posed a great threat to the existential reality of feudalism in the post-Khanate Central Asia. In fact, such changes in the feudal structure were pre-empted by commercialization of agriculture,\textsuperscript{85} and development of trade (both internal and external) and growth of cities and towns.\textsuperscript{86} At the end of it, feudalism gradually


\textsuperscript{82} “Fiscal Reform in Turkestan,” The Slavonic and East European Review, p. 392.

\textsuperscript{83} The practice was introduced by General Kaufman in 1880. The work first started in Farghana Oblast of Uzbekistan: “Land Reforms in Turkistan,” pp. 431.


\textsuperscript{85} Cotton and wheat cultivation was widened to reduce the dependence on foreign imports. The cotton area increased from 1,080,000 in 1903 to 1,320,000 by 1913 in Bukhara, and from 510,000 to 915,000 in Khiva during the same period. The area under grains also increased substantially, with total harvest in southern Central Asia increasing from 2.2 million tons (138.6 million poods) in 1900 to 4.3 million tons (264 million poods) in 1915: Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, pp. 272, 276; Gerard O’Neill, “Land and Water ‘Reform’ in the 1920s,” Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, (ed.), Tom Everett-Heath, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{86} The development of trade was nurtured by the means of communication in which construction of Trans-Caspian Railway played a crucial role. Started in 1881 from Gulf of Mikhailovsky to Qazil Arvat, the line reached Ashkhabad four years later, Merv in 1886, Charju and Amu Darya across the desert of Qara Kum at the end of 1886, and Samarkand in 1888. In 1894, the point of departure was shifted to Krasnovodsk. In 1898, the Marv-Khshki branch line was built and in 1899 appeared a new line from Samarkand to Andijan, with branches stretching to Tashkent and Novy Margelan. The main line from Krasnovodsk to Tashkent stretched over 1,748 versts: Cf. Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia, p. 39; George Dubson, Russia’s Railway Advances into Central Asia, London, 1980, pp. 370-371; Russian Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (1865-1924), pp. 188-191. With the railway network, import-export increased. For example, Bukharan imports from Russia increased from 142.7 million rubles to 1,139 million rubles during 1849 to 1867 and from 43 thousand poods to 265 thousand poods during 1880 to 1913: Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia, p. 42. Similarly, Khivan import-export from and into Russia increased from 3 million rubles between 1873-1885 to 11.8 million annually in 1898: Mary Holdsworth, Turkistan in Nineteenth Century, London, 1959, p. 25; I. I. Geier, Turkistan, Tashkent, 1909, pp. 159, 166; Hugo Stunn, Russia in Central Asia, Eng. tr., James William Ozanne, London: Oxford University, 1885, p. 219; Russian Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (1865-1924), p. 193.
declined giving way to the development of the capitalist mode of production.\(^{87}\) Though peasant exploitation continued,\(^{88}\) but the serfs were no more tied to land of the feudatories. The Law Code (Uložhenie) of 1649 A.D. granted serfs the right to leave the village temporarily in order to seek employment or to pursue other economic activities\(^{89}\) and take services with new class of bourgeoisie in towns and cities for better wages,\(^{90}\) food, and wage earnings in cash.\(^{91}\) The cash earnings, according to Marx, naturally was the last form of the dissolution of feudalism and growth of capitalism,\(^{92}\) and thereby a redeemer stimulant of age-long exploitation of servile serfs at the hands of the feudatories.\(^{93}\) Rustam Khan Urfi attests to the impact of money/gold circulation on the members of those families who were tied to the land of and bound by service to the great lord, Alim Khan, from 1910-1920.\(^{94}\) The gradual shift from natural to market economy was, therefore, the last nail in the coffin of feudal mode of production in Central Asia and elsewhere.\(^{95}\)

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88 Ya. Ya. Lyutsh, Russian political agent in Bukhara from I902 to I911, calculated that the peasants of Bukhara were taxed eight times as heavily as their cousins in Russian Turkestan: Cf. “Fiscal Reform in Turkestan,” Vol. 52, No. 128, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, p. 392.


90 Turkmens employed in Khiva for making troughs and pipes from the trunks of the tress for water supply were paid forty to eighty kopecks a day with food: *Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand*, pp. 76, 204.

91 Page: Socialist Agrarian Reforms in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan, p.73.


Though the Tsars relaxed the feudal laws,\textsuperscript{96} it were actually the Soviets who actually eliminated feudalism for it ran across the Leninist-Marxist ideology of social development. They nationalized all means and forces of production to pave way for a classless society. The land and water under the big estates\textsuperscript{97} of the feudatories and the church,\textsuperscript{98} were confiscated and distributed among landless.\textsuperscript{99} Stalin’s “Two class - one Stratum”\textsuperscript{100} policy made a breakthrough in this behalf. Consequently, the share of feudal estates and kulak-bay holdings which was 11% in 1913, decreased to 5% by 1928 and just 0% zero percent by 1939.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{96} Vasily Jan (1874-1954), was a Soviet scholar who visited Khiva in 1902 and served as an inspector of wells in Turkistan between 1901-1904: Cf. Aftandil Erkinov, “A. N. Samojlovich’s Visit to the Khanate of Khiva in 1908 and His Assessment of the Literary Environment,” International Journal of Central Asian Studies, p. 119.


\textsuperscript{98} All waqf grants of whatever nature were confiscated. Even mosques and madrassas were not spared, the Baraq Khan Madrassa (Tashkent) and Mir Arab Mosque (Bukhara) made exceptions: Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from Early Times p. 231; R. R. Sharma, USSR in Transition: Issues and Themes (1922-82), New Delhi, 1985, p.212.


\textsuperscript{100} Joseph Stalin defined class in terms of peasant/labour relations with the means of production and production relations, on which they held no proprietorship under the Soviets. Therefore, he recognized only two classes - working class and peasantry in the country. L. G. Churchward, Soviet Socialism: Social and Political Essays, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1987, pp. 26-27.

\textsuperscript{101} Socialist Agrarian reforms in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan, p.91; Soviet Peasantry: An Outline History, pp. 93-94.