CHAPTER - VI

Lexicographically, strategy implies the science and art of conducting military campaigns on a broad scale. It is related to long-term policies and techniques designed to achieve a large objective in the long run, and is distinguished from tactics. Tactics, on the other hand, is the science and the art of handling the troops in front of the enemy in a military operation designed to achieve an immediate objective, in a sense a short-term policy or technique.

Henderson stated that employment of strategy in war, according to the official text-book of the British Infantry, is the art of bringing the enemy to battle, while tactics of war are the methods by which a commander endeavours to over-reach the enemy when battle is joined.\(^1\) It is well established that the general principles of war, such as how to get at the enemy’s armed forces, how to crush it, and thus destroy the people’s will to continue the war basically are same in all times and climes.

For the purpose of the study of strategy and tactics in war, we shall bring all wars under three categories, namely, land warfare,

naval warfare and aerial warfare. Land battles generally implies battles in the plain, forests and hilly regions. The battle of Kurukṣetra between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas may be cited as an example of land-battle, where strategy and tactics were used to the utmost degree by both sides. On the other hand, the battle between the Indian king, Poros and Alexander, the Macedonian hero, fought on the plains of the Žhelum, may also be cited as an instance of a land-battle where strategic skills and tactics were employed in a large measure.

It may be noted that strategy and tactics in a land-battle are largely influenced by the geographical features of the locality where the battle takes place. Here, let us have a discussion first on how geography dictates strategy of wars. A look at the map of India will at once explain to us how topography has laid down some inexorable laws for the time and manner of conducting war in ancient India. If some parts of this land is very hot with scanty rain, some other parts have too much rain. Thus, the physical geography dictated the campaigning season. There can be no movement during the months of June to September, i.e. Šravaṇa to Āśvina, because by that time the rivers are in high flood, the roads are full of mud pools, and the fields are submerged with the high-land villages standing up like islands surrounded by a sea of
water, thus impaling the movement of the war machinery. Hence, the authors on statecraft recommend the period between October and March as the best time for military campaign.

Thus, according to the Maratha tradition the Daśahara day, early in October, is the most auspicious time for a king to set out on conquest, *digvijaya*. Because, in a month or so the crops are being harvested in the country-side, so that the invaders can live off the country without burdening themselves with supplies; the herbage has not yet been blated by the summer sun, so that their elephants and horses can get green fodder; and the falling river levels enables them to cross the rivers by fording them at the upper reaches of the streams flowing down from the high mountains without having to build bridges of boats, or waste time by camping on the river banks.

In this context, it has rightly been pointed by Jadunath Sarkar in his *Military History of India*, that the Maratha-type of warfare had certain peculiarities, which were the natural consequences of their country and race. The Decean land is dry and broken, being cut up into many small compartments by hill spurs and deep stony-bedded rivers. The people were a frugal hardy high-spirited race, mostly peasants, habituated to self-government in their village-communities; hence they supplied a type of soldiers quite different
from the armed retainers of rich and luxurious kingdoms who received costly equipments and elaborate training in standing camps. The Marathas always pursued enveloping tactics, intended to harass their enemy and cut off his supplies. They would not offer a standup fight, nor go forth to a pitched battle in reply to a formal challenge, as was the Rajput practice.

As regards the strategy and tactics adopted by the Macedonian army under the leadership of Alexander, who after overcoming Ambhi, the king of Taxila and his ally Abhisar, the king of Rajaur and Jammu, called upon the Paurava (Greek spelling Poros) to pay tribute and wait upon the Macedonian conquerer at his own frontier. By this envoy, Poros sent back the reply that he would comply only with the second of these demands, and when Alexander entered his realm he would meet him, but come armed for battle. Alexander was then determined to crush Poros’s spirit of independence as an offence to himself, marched in about the middle of May, 326 B.C., down to the west bank of the river Jhelum and pitched his camp at a place opposite to that Poros’s camp on the other bank. The Jhelum at this point was a very swift stream, fully half a mile in breadth, and the approaching monsoon rain would soon make it impassable. On the eastern bank stood Poros’s huge war elephants near the water’s edge, and behind them were amassed
his infantry and cavalry ready to oppose the landing of the Macedonians. Alexander knew that it was not easy to cross in the face of such a foe. He pondered, surveyed the west bank up and down, and played a master stroke of strategy to steal a passage 17 miles upstream. Alexander’s crossing of the Jhelum was a feat of strategic genius. Alexander made it a point never to attack the enemy when holding a defended position, but only when they were on the move and thrown into disorder by the broken ground. This was exactly the policy of Wellington which he followed in his Maratha campaign.

Thus, we may say that strategy is the science as distinguished from the art of war. In connection with the matter of strategy it may be said that in case of any expedition undertaken, the element of time played a prominent part. The month of Mārgaśīrṣa (November-December) is generally recommended for long marches and Caitra (March-April) for short distance march.¹ However, though this was the principle, there were exceptions. In case the aspiring monarch (vijigīṣu) found it advantageous to lead an expedition irrespective of the season, then he should do so.³ The Arthaśāstra prescribes, which is corroborated also by the

2. Aś. IX.1. 34-40.
3. ibid. XII. 100; Manu. VII. 182.
Kāmandaṅkīya and the Agnipurāṇa, that during the hot season only asses, camels and horses were to be employed in preference to elephants.

As regards the opportune time for launching a military campaign Kautilya states: ‘Time is of the nature of cold, heat and rain. Its various parts are: night, day, fortnight, month, season, half-year, year and yuga. In them, the vijīṃṣu should start work that would augment his own strength.’

Kautilya further stated that, ‘A king should march in winter against a country which is very hot or which has little fodder, fuel and water. He should march in summer against a country with showers of snow, or consisting mostly of deep water, or with dense grass and trees. He should march when it is raining against a country suited to the operations of his own army and unsuited to those of the enemy. He should march on an expedition of long duration between the Mārgaśīrṣa and the Pauṣa full-moon days, on one of medium duration between the Caitra and the Vaiśākha full-moon days, on one of short duration between the Jyeṣṭha and the Āśāḍha full-moon days on the fourth (expedition), if desirous of burning up (the enemy) in his calamity.’

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4. kālāḥ śītavārasātmāḥ / tātya rātrirahāḥ pakṣō māsa rturayānāṁ sarīvatsaro yogamity vīcesāḥ / teṣu yathāsvabalavṛddhiḥ karma prayuṇijita.

-As. IX. 1. 22-24).

5. ibid. IX. 1. 37-40
In connection with the battle-array, Kautilya states, ‘In case of an attack in front, it is recommended that a king should march in the crocodile array, in the rear, in the art array, on the two flanks, in the thunderbolt array, on all sides, in the “excellent-on-all-sides” array, in a region where march in a single file alone is possible, in the needle array.’ Thus, it is seen that consideration of disposition of the army or order of battle, called vyūha, belongs to the province of tactics, while the planning for war is strategy.

In tactics we call a battle defensive if the enemy takes the initiative and the defender awaits him from his own station.

According to Kautilya, the deployment and the drawing up of the army in array form the chief part of the plan of battle which should be arranged in accordance with the nature of the ground. If the ground is level, the army may be arranged on daṇḍa or staff-like array and maṇḍala or circular array (saṃyām daṇḍamaṇḍalavyūhāh). If the ground is uneven, bhoga or snake-like and asaṁhata or detached arrays (viṣamāyām bhogasaṁhatavyūhāh). If the ground is complex, viṣama or an irregular array (viśamisrayāṁ viṣamavyūhāḥ).
In Māgha’s Śiśupālavadha we find the description of various types of vyūha, which indicates the necessity of these in battle fields. In verses 27, 29, 46, 72, 120 of canto IX of the work, we find mention of muraja, gomūtrikā, ardhabhramaka, cakrabandha arrays, respectively.

The vyūha is generally formed to coordinate action of all arms and units, and sub-units thereof, flung over a wide area, and to actuate them for a common purpose.

The Mahābhārata contains sketchy description of various formations in a literary way. In the battle of Kurukṣetra, there are mention of the following formations: sarvatomukha-vyūha, achala-vyūha, bajra-vyūha, krauṇa-vyūha, garuḍa-vyūha, ardha-candra-vyūha, makara-vyūha, śyena-vyūha, śūcī-vyūha, maṇḍala-vyūha, śṛiṅgata-vyūha, sarvatobhadra-vyūha, śakaṭa-vyūha, cakra-vyūha and also mahā-vyūha, i.e. great formation.

As stated above, vyūha belongs to the province of tactics; during war-time the soldiers were found to be organised in various battle formations according to the plans and orders of the Senāpati concerned.

In chapter VIII of our work elaborate discussion is made on battle formations (vyūha).
It is to be noted that one of the strategical considerations which engages the General's mind is the choice of a proper site for the military operation. That battle-field which is damp, hard, full of gravel and water, and also contains granite and shrubs, ought not to be chosen. According to the *Agnipurāṇa*, strategic warfare must be conducted in forests, on rivers and on rainy days, for attacks on open grounds are always difficult.

In the battlefield the commander should aim at the strategical position of the army in its various divisions. Another strategical point to be considered by the commandar was the encampment. Generally, thickly wooded spots were selected for the disposition of the troops. For entrenching horses, the best ground is a level plain with no rocks but covered by only a few trees, and not muddy. A well-laid road, devoid of sand or mud, trees, shrubs etc. is fit for chariots; for elephants, one without mud or having a layer or sharp gravel; and for infantry and others, one free from all defects, but with available supplies of drinking water. Ordinarily, tents were pitched for the residence of troops and officers in the camp. Referring to a camp, Māgha in his *Śiśupālavadha* says that "the residences of chiefs were circular like the moon, made of white cloth, and kept in their position by means of ropes." cf.
The camp was usually quadrangular in shape, furnished with four entrances, six roads and nine divisions, and fitted with walls, towers and ditches thrown around so as to afford a defence in times of danger. Regarding setting up of the camp, Kautilya in his *Arthasastra* stated:

‘On a site, approved by experts in the science of building, the commandant, carpenters and astrologers should cause the camp to be set up, circular, rectangular or square or in conformity with the nature of the ground, with four gates, six roads and nine divisions, endowed with a moat, a rampart, a parapet, gates and towers, when there is danger and when the army has to halt.’

The camp was generally a self-sufficient unit. It was a miniature town. Māgha’s account of a typical eighth-century camp supports this view. The fifth Canto of the *Śiśupālavadha* is devoted to the description of setting camp for Kṛṣṇa and his retinue in the Raivataka mountain. Therein the description of placing the chariots,

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8. Śiśu. V. 52; V. 61, XII. 4
roping and feeding horses, elephants, bulls, camels etc., the unloading of foodstuffs from the back of the bullocks/ bullock-carts are given. In the Śiśupālavadha it is stated: ‘The storing of arms as well as of food-stuffs was ample. Physicians and surgeons were also available in it. To offer prayers was very important in the camp.’

In this connection, Kautilya remarks: “King and allies, in order to secure their triumph should observe in their encampment, the strict-rules of self-denial, liberality and religion.”

Construction and siege of fortresses play an important role in respect of strategy of war. In chapter V of our present work, we have had the occasion to elaborately discussed this topic.

The Rājamaṇḍala, the Śāḍguṇya, the Upāya etc. are also important in the factors of strategy.

The Rājamaṇḍala : The Circle of Powers:

The very concept of raṇamaṇḍala or maṇḍala (‘Circle of kings/states’) is a dynamic one. The maṇḍala is consisted of twelve kings, or states so to say. The twelve kings are, (i) the vijigīśu (i.e. the aspiring king, the one who is desirous of conquest), (ii) the ari, the enemy (the immediate neighbour, i.e., whose territory

9. Śiśu. V. 21.
10. As ś. V. 4.
is contiguous to that of the *vijigīṣu*, (iii) the *mitra*, the ally of the *vijigīṣu*, i.e. the one whose territory lies immediately beyond that of the enemy, (iv) the *ari-mitra*, enemy’s ally, i.e. the one whose territory lies beyond that of the *mitra* (ally of the *vijigīṣu*), (v) the *mitrāmitra*, the *vijigīṣu’s* ally’s ally, (vi) the *arimirāmitra*, enemy’s ally’s ally, (vii) the *pāṛṣṇigrāha*, the rear enemy, (viii) the *ākranda*, *vijigīṣu’s* ally in the rear, whose territory lies beyond that of the *pāṛṣṇigrāha*, (ix) the *pāṛṣṇigrāhasāra*, the ally of the rear enemy and (x) the *ākrandasāra*, the ally of the rear ally of the *vijigīṣu*. Besides, there are (xi) the *madhyama*, the middle king, whose territory adjoins those of both the *vijigīṣu* and the *ari*, and stronger to both of them, who is capable of influencing both, either way, and (xii) the *udāsīna*, the indifferent or neutral king, i.e. whose territory lies outside beyond all of those of the *vijigīṣu*, the *ari* and the *madhyama*. The *madhyama* is a stronger power intermediate between the *vijigīṣu* or the *ari*, on the one hand, and the *udāsīna* on the other.

11. The theory that the immediate neighbouring state in front should be assumed as inimical shows that the enmity between India and Pakistan, between France and Germany, between Poland and Russia, between China and Japan was largely due to their contiguity, which often caused conflict of interests. Vide, Altekar, A. S., *State and Administration in Ancient India*, p. 294.

12. The temporary alliance between Germany and Russia in 1939 and between England and Poland 1937, shows the general truth of this assumption. *ibid*.

13 *Aś. VI. 2. 13-22.*
The vijigīṣu is advised to be watchful about the motives and movements of the constituents of the maṇḍala (the circle of kings), so that the peace and the security of the dominion of the vijigīṣu is not disturbed, and, if possible, his designs of expansion can be achieved by a series of cleverly made treaties or alliances.\(^{14}\)

Māgha suggests that, the vijigīṣu alone can rise or dominate the maṇḍala with his own utsāhaṣakti. cf.

\[
\text{udetumatyajannihāṁ rājasu dvādaśasvapi} / \\
\text{jigīṣureko dinakṛḍādityeśviva kalpate} // -II. 81.
\]

—‘Like the sun among the twelve Ādityas is called dinakṛt because of its utsāhaṣakti, likewise the vijigīṣu can rise amongst the twelve kings.’\(^{15}\) It is also suggested that the buddhi and the utsāha are the impetus to the utsāhaṣakti of the vijigīṣu.\(^{16}\)

There is, however; another version of the maṇḍala concept. According to this version, there are four principal powers (kings/states), viz. vijigīṣu, ari, madhyama and udāsina, each of which, again, has a mitra, (ally) and mitrāmitra (ally’s ally), thus making a circle of twelve kings (states). According to this view, each of

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\(^{14}\) It may be noted here that in the contemporary world politics, i.e., during the World War II, each of the two blocks was seeking to strengthen its position by tagging as many as states as possible within its own sphere of influence.

\(^{15}\) Śīṣu. II. 81.

\(^{16}\) prajñotsāhavataḥ svāmiyatēdhatumātmanī / \\
tau hi mūlamudesyantā jīgisorātmasampadaḥ // -ibid. 76.
the four kings with his two allies constitutes subsidiary *mandala* or circle, of which there are four in all.\(^{17}\)

From the above illustration, it appears that the two immediate neighbouring states tend to be hostile to each other (natural enemy), and the states with a common enemy tend to be allies (natural allies). Mention may be made here that Māgha spoke of three kinds of *ari*,— *viz.*, *sahaja, prākṛta* and *kṛtima*. cf

\[
sakhā garīyān śatruśca kṛttimastau hi kāryataḥ / \\
\text{syātāmamitrau mitre ca sahajaprkṛtāvapi} //\(^{18}\)
\]

The circle of kings centres round the *vijigīśu* (the aspiring conqueror) seeking expansion of his dominion. When the *vijigīśu* marches in one direction, the enemy in the rear becomes *pārśnigrāha* (the hill catcher) and the ally in the rear is the *ārkanda* (who cries out when goes to help *vijigīśu*). In the same way, the two *āsarās* (i.e. the *pārśnigrāhasāra* and the *ākrandasāra*) are *arimitra* and *mitrāmitra* in the rear, respectively. It may be noted that, these terms are not fixed but elastic, since the same king may become a *pārśnigrāha* or an *ari* or even a *vijigīśu* in changed circumstances. It is thus seen that the *mandala* (*rājamanḍala*) is a conglomeration of states loosely divided into two more or less hostile camps, with the leader of one group trying to establish its hegemony over the

\(^{17}\) *As.* VI. 2. 24-27.

\(^{18}\) *Śiśu.* II. 36.
entire conglomeration.¹⁹

Magha suggests that the *vijigīṣu* should mostly depend upon his *prajñā-utsāha-śakti*, and thereby his hegemony is easily accepted in the *rajaṃṇḍala* (the conglomeration of states). cf.

*analpatvātpradhānatvadhvarṇāsasyevetare svarāḥ /
vijigīṣornīpatayah prayānti parivāratāṁ //²⁰.*

Kāmandaka also opines that a king who is industrious and possesses *utsāha-śakti* along with the six *prakṛtis* is regarded as the *vijigīṣu*. He adds further that the *vijigīṣu* should possess all the moral qualities, like being respectful towards seniors, eloquence, intelligence, valour and so forth.²² He compares a valorous king with a lion capable of winning over other animals.²³ Kāmandaka furnishes the same idea about the *rajaṃṇḍala* concept as presented by Kautilya.²⁴ and opines that ‘this is the view of Usanas (Śukrācārya). cf.

*uśanā maṇḍalamidam prāha dvādaśarājakam //-(VIII, 22)*

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¹⁹. *As. II. 90.*

²⁰. *Śiśu. II. 90.*

²¹. *sampannastu prakṛtibhirmahotsāhaḥ kṛtaśrama: /
jetumesaṇaśaśca vijigiriṇī śrītaḥ //
-Nitisāra. VIII. 6.*

²². *ibid. 7-11.*

²³. *ibid. 12.*

²⁴. *ibid. 16ff.*
Sadgunya: The six instruments of policy:

To dwell powerfully among the rājamanḍala, the aspiring king (vijigīṣu) is advised even to take resort to intrigue, treachery and secret assassination in preference to war, which should only be looked upon as the last resort.

In this connection, reference may be made to the doctrines of śādguna (i.e. the six instruments of policy) and the (four) upāya (i.e. the four expedients), for obtaining victory.

The six instruments of policy are: sandhi (peace-treaty), vigraha (war), āsana (waiting for the enemy to strike first), yāna (attack/marching on an expedition), sarinśraya (seeking shelter in the face of defeat of another powerful king or in a fort) and dvaidhibhāva (double policy, i.e. making peace with one enemy and going to war with another at the same time). One of the earlier teachers, Vātavyādhi, holds the view that there are only two policies, peace and war, and that the other policies are only aspects of these two. Kautilya himself, however, favours the six-fold classification, as there are different situations which call for different policies.

25. As. VII. I. 6-12.
26. ibid. I. 3-5.

The adoption of one or the other of the 'six instruments of
policy is to be guided solely for the purpose of increase of one's power at the cost of others, which is intended preliminary to the realisation of the ambition of conquering the world. The appropriate use of the six policies enables the vijigśu to play with the other kings just as he pleases; the other kings become tied to him by the chains of his intellectual power.\footnote{ibid. VII. 18. 44.}

Māgha seems to be well versed in these instruments of policy along with the trisakti, the trisiddhi and three udaya when he remarks:

\begin{quote}
\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{align*}
\text{sadgūṛah saktayastisraḥ siddhayaścodayāstrayaḥ } & \text{//- II. 26.} \\
\text{and also,} \\
\text{sadgūṛyamupayuṅjīta śaktyapekṣī rasāyanam } & \text{//- II. 93.}
\end{align*}
\end{footnotesize}
\end{quote}

Māgha holds that non-application of the guṇas appropriately amounts to the destruction of the administration. Persons responsible for the non-application of the guṇas appropriately, and thus, failing the king in his administration, are really not friends, but are enemies and, thereby, secretly serving the cause of the enemy, by passing information destroys the system of the king under whom he holds services. The king is advised to be careful against such persons. called ‘ubhayer-vetana’ — a double crosser.
About the favourable condition for war, Māgha referred to the differing views of experts on statecraft; he says that some experts on statecraft suggested that when the prabhūśakti is in excellent form, only then the vijīgīśu should march against the enemy, otherwise not, while in the opinion of others, when the enemy is in state of weakness, the vijīgīśu should immediately fall upon the enemy. cf.

svaśaktyupacaye kecit parasya vyasane'pare /
yānamāhaustāśīnamā tvāmutthāpayati dvayam // -II. 57.

Since Śiśupāla is in grief due to his friend Jarāsandha’s death at the hands of Bhīmasena,—

hate hiḍimbaripuṇā rājīnī dvaimāture yudhi /
cirasya mitravyasanī sudamo damaghoṣajaḥ // -II. 60.

But in another place Māgha says that to attack an enemy at the time of his distress is held to be shameful for an honourable hero; while to attack an enemy of equal strength is considered an act of honour. cf.

nītirāpadi yadgamyah parastanmānino hriye /
vidhurvidhudhұstасыевыа purṇastasyotsаvаya sah // -II. 61
The general rule is that, when one (the vijigisu) is weaker than his enemy, sandhi is the policy to be followed; if stronger than him (the enemy), then vigraha. If both are equal in power, asana is the right policy; but if one (the vijigisu) is very strong, yana should be resorted to. When one (the vijigisu) is very weak samshraya is necessary, while dvaiddhiba is the policy recommended when, with help from another source, one (the vijigisu) can fight one’s enemy. (-As., VII. 1.13-18). The purpose of all policies is to grow stronger in the long run than the enemy, though sometimes one may have to tolerate temporarily the greater strength of the enemy. (-As., VII.1.20ff)

Upaya: Expedients:

Alongside of the sadguna, there is mention of the upaya, i.e. the four expedients, viz., sama, (alliance = sandhi), dana (gift=conciliation), bheda (sowing seeds of dissension in the enemy camp) and danda (taking resort to arms). These are the four means of overcoming the opposition. The Indian thinkers on statecraft hold that sama, i.e. pacific alliance established through negotiations is the best, while danda, i.e. scoring settlement by taking resort to arms, should be the last when the first three expedients fail. Kauñilya held that the first two, i.e. sama and dana should be applied to subjugate weak kings, while the latter two should be resorted to
overcoming the strong opposition. cf.

*sāmadānābhyāṁ durbalāṇupanamayet, bhedadaṇḍābhyāṁ balavataḥ//(-Aś.VII. 16. 3)

Manu opines that a wise king (well-versed in the rules of politics) must arrange matters by all the (four) expedients so that neither friends, nor neutrals, nor foes could be superior to himself. cf.

*sarvopāyaistathā kuryānnitijñah prthivīpatiḥ /

yathāsyābhyadhikā na syurmitrodāsīnasatraḥ// - MS.,VII. 177.

It may be worth citing here the opinion of Vyāsa, who holds that ‘no king is anybody’s friend or foe; ally or enmity depends upon one’s prowess.’ cf.

*na kaścit kasyacinmitraṁ na kaścit kasyacid ripuḥ /

sāmarthyayogād vijñeyā mitrāṇi ripavastheti iti methātithih //*28

In one place Manu opines that a *vijigīṣu* should try to conquer his foes by conciliation by well-applied gifts and by creating dissension, used either separately or conjointly, and never by fighting (if it can be avoided).*29* Because, experience teaches that

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28. Comm. on *Manu*. VII. 177; also see,.
sakhā garīyāṁ śatruśca kṛtrimastau hi kārayataḥ / syātamamitrau mitre ca sahajapratīyavapi //

-Śiśu. II. 36.

29. cf. sāmna dānena bhedena samastairathavā prthak / vijetuṁ prayatetārinna yuddhena kadācana //

-Manu. VII. 198.
victory or defeat in the battle is uncertain. Therefore, one should avoid an engagement to *danḍa*. However, *danḍa* is recommended in case of failure of the earlier three *upāyas* (expedients). cf.

\[ \text{trayānāmapiyupāyānāṁ pūrvoktānāmasambhave} / \]
\[ \text{tathā yudhyeta sampanno vijayeta ripūn yathā} / -MS., VII. 200. \]

In the opinion of Māgha, the application of *sāma* in case of angry, wicked enemy would amount to giving indulgence to the enemy’s cunningness. Such an enemy could be subdued only by resorting to *danḍa* (arms) by the *nyāya ‘svedyāṁ svedārham* (*svedastu svedane dharma*). cf.

\[ \text{caturthopāyasādhye tu ripu sāntvamapakṛiyā} / \]
\[ \text{svedyamāmajvaram prājñāḥ ko’mbhasā parisīncati} / \]
\[ \text{sāmavādāḥ sakopasya tasya pratyuta dipakāḥ} / \]
\[ \text{prataptasyeva sahasā sarpiśastoyabindavaḥ} / \]
\[ \text{31} \]

In this connection, the opinion of Kāmandaka may be cited. He opines that poison can be neutralised by poison alone, a diamond can be cut by a diamond and a king elephant can be cowed down by an elephant alone.\[ \text{caturthopāyasādhye tu ripu sāntvamapakṛiyā} / \]
\[ \text{svedyamāmajvaram prājñāḥ ko’mbhasā parisīncati} / \]
\[ \text{sāmavādāḥ sakopasya tasya pratyuta dipakāḥ} / \]
\[ \text{prataptasyeva sahasā sarpiśastoyabindavaḥ} / \]
\[ \text{31} \]

In this connection, the opinion of Kāmandaka may be cited. He opines that poison can be neutralised by poison alone, a diamond can be cut by a diamond and a king elephant can be cowed down by an elephant alone.\[ \text{caturthopāyasādhye tu ripu sāntvamapakṛiyā} / \]
\[ \text{svedyamāmajvaram prājñāḥ ko’mbhasā parisīncati} / \]
\[ \text{sāmavādāḥ sakopasya tasya pratyuta dipakāḥ} / \]
\[ \text{prataptasyeva sahasā sarpiśastoyabindavaḥ} / \]
\[ \text{31} \]

To dwell strongly amongst the *rājamaṇḍala* a *vijigīṣu* should apply *gunas* and *upāyas* appropriately. Māgha opines that when a

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30. *ibid.* 199.
31. *Śiśu.* II. 54-55.
32. *visāṁ viśeṇa vyathate vajrāṁ/vajreṇa bhidlyate /
   ajendro drstasāreṇa gajendṛṇaiva badhyate // -Nitisāra. VIII. 67.
minister, who is one of the seven *prakrtis* of the *raṣṭra*, does not help the king in using *gunas* appropriately, should be regarded as an enemy, i.e. he is an enemy in the garb of a friend. cf.

*gunānāmāyathātathyādartharīn viplāvayanti ye / amātyavyaṁjanā rājāṁ dūṣyāste satrusamjñītāṁ // -II. 56.*

It may be noted here that the doctrines of *sadgunya* and *upāya* appear to have different connotations. The *gunas* are more concerned with the foreign policy, while the *upāyas* have wider application, such as being useful for securing the submission of any one, be he a recalcitrant son or other relatives, rebellious subject(s) or chief, or a neighbouring prince or a state, whether weak or strong, or a foreign chieftain. cf.

*putrabhrātṛbandhusu sāmadānābhyāṁ siddhiranurūpā, paurajānapadadandaṁukhyesu dānabhēdābhyāṁ sāmant-ātavīkesu bhedadandaṁabhēyāṁ / 33*

It is possible that the introduction of the *upāyas* in political theory, particularly in matters of foreign policy, is secondary.

Kautilya opines that a particular *upāya* alone may be most appropriate in a given situation: *sāma* would be best in case of ministers / officers of the enemy whom the latter suspects of treason; *dāna* would be most useful in winning over the treasonable

33. *As. IX. 7. 68.*
ministers / persons of enemy; bheda would break up confederacies most effectively and the danda would be most effective in case of a strong enemy.\textsuperscript{34}

Māgha is of the opinion that one should enter into treaty with an enemy who is supposed to be helpful, but not with an ally who is harmful.

\begin{quote}
upakartrārīṇā sandhirna naitrenāpakārīṇā /
upakārāpakārau hi lakṣyam lakṣaṇametayoḥ // -II. 37.
\end{quote}

In support of this view, Kamandakas opinion may also be cited. cf.

\begin{quote}
amitrāṇyapi kurvita mitrāṇyupacayavahān /
ahite vartamānāni mitrāṇyapi parityajet // \textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{34} As. IX. 7. 72.
\textsuperscript{35} Nītisāra. VIII. 73.