

**CHAPTER IX**

**SUMMARY AND PERSONAL OBSERVATION**

## SUMMARY AND PERSONAL OBSERVATION

I now propose to examine and summarise the views upheld by Buddhism and David Hume regarding the concept of causality. Before summarising the findings and giving the concluding remarks on the subject of my enquiry, I, feel it necessary to justify certain <sup>cc</sup> summing depressions here and there in course of my discussions. Certain topics in course of my investigation, necessitated detailed discussions with a view to bringing out the Western thinkers and the views of different Indian systems, to institute a comparison of the subject.

From the foregoing discussions it seems that though the problem of causation is one of the main problem of philosophy, yet it is very difficult to give a final solution. In the history of thought the problem of causation has not been attacked always from the same angle of vision which can satisfy the demands of reason. Both science and philosophy fail to furnish us with that comprehensive conception of causality that can satisfy the demands of reason.

The concept of causality plays an important role in both science and philosophy. Common-sense always explains events in terms of causes and effects. All the sciences are engaged in the search for causes not only for the sake of knowledge itself, but because, if causes are understood, the forces of nature can be controlled and the future predicted. So the scientist seeks for the cause of rust, of disease etc.

We perceive a constant change in the world. Some of it is seemingly automatic, i.e., without the efforts of some perceptible agent, i.e., vegetation grows, blossoms and gives fruits. Sometimes the change seems to be due to some efforts of a perceptible active agent, eg., the potter turns the clay into a pot with the help of his rod and wheel.

A lay man does not bother much about change. If he is asked why there is change he will most probably say that it is due to causes.

Therefore in the light of the above evidences, we may say that causality plays an important role both in the scientific world as well as in philosophy. And at the same time the controversy is also there over the concept of causality. Although the nature of that controversy varied from time to time.

In the study of the concept of causality, there are various problems to be solved. In the first place what is a cause ? Regarding this question we may say that it is too difficult to give the correct answer. There must be something more in causality. There must be some inner connection between cause and effect.

Again another problem is — Does every event in the world have a cause ? To this question the physical sciences assume the universality of the law of causation. Nothing happens without a cause. The present is wholly the product or outcome of the past and the future will be the outcome of the present. The untrained mind looks upon the relation between cause and effect as the cause produces the effect.

There is a process of enforcement between the cause and the effect. In the case of mechanical causes; it is very hard to believe that this is not true and it would be also very difficult to prove that there is something like mechanical necessity to unite the effect with the cause. But science does not know anything of such necessary connection and philosophy also hesitates to affirm it. Hume, for example, pointed out that the only necessity in the cause may be a necessity of thought. We do not know anything of objective necessity and the conception of cause as agent. No doubt it is a kind of analogy carried over to the nature from our own experience as agents. But after all this has been explained, we still believe that there must be some other connection or relation between events and so philosophy goes beyond science and has attempted various theories of causation. The world is a timeless process in which we can reduce the principle of causality to the principle of logical ground. Again this may be the most important interpretation of all that cause is supposed to be productive activity, creative power etc.

As we have seen that the problem of causation among objects of nature has proved a great puzzle to many philosophers when these objects are regarded as independent entities, one cannot understand that how one of them can produce the other. Bradley shows in the form of a dilemma that if the cause is identical with the effect then there is nothing to say about the word causation. Again if one is different from the other, how one can give rise to something different from itself ?

The modern physics have cast a suspicion on our belief that all things are causally determined. Science is interested in causality in so far as it is capable of quantitative determination. But for physics, the ultimate components of things do not seem to come under the laws of causal determination. As a result, it is maintained that things at bottom are undetermined. Now philosophy cannot leave the fate of causality to the hands of scientists. From the standpoint of our everyday experience, the law of universal causation is of tremendous important. Hence the philosophers have taken the problem of causation which was banished from the domain of science.

It is strangely enough that causality has meant many things to many minds at different times. One thinker after another has grappled with the problem of causation and has made a solution acceptable to both science and commonsense. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is a crying need of the times in which we live.

But what it is ? This is the puzzled problem. Causality stands for the relationship between a cause and its effect. We

cannot deal properly with things unless we know their causes and effects. This relationship has been defined as a relation between events, processes in the same time series, such that when one occurs the other necessarily follows (sufficient condition); when the latter occurs, the former must have preceded (necessary condition). Again, it is a relation between events, processes or entities in the same time tries, such that when one occurs the other invariably follows (invariable antecedents). It is also a relation between events or processes, such that one has the efficacy to produce or alter the other.<sup>1</sup> It is a relation between events, processes or entities such that without one the other could not occur. There are the material cause out of which a product is made, sturcture or form and the individual embodying it which is named as formal cause. The goal or purpose which is the final cause and also the moving force and the process which is known as the efficient cause.

The causal relation is also regarded as the relation between experienced events, processes or entities and extra-experiential but either temporal or non-temporal events, processes or entities upon whose existence the former depend. It is also the relation between a thing and itself when it is dependent upon nothing else for its existence (self-causality). Sometimes again it is regarded as a relation between an event, process or entity and the reason or explanation for its being;

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1. Quoted from The Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Dagober D. Runes, Ph.D. London Peter owen : Division Press.

It is also described as a relation between an idea and an experience whose expectation the idea arouses because of customary association of the two in this sequence. Again causal relation may be an explanatory hypothesis, a postulate, an convenient fiction or a necessary form of thought. Causality has been conceived to prevail between processes, parts of a continuous process, changing parts of an unchanging whole, objects, events, ideas or something of one of these types and something of another. When an entity event or process is said to follow from another, it may be ~~mean~~ that it must succeed but can be neither contemporaneous with nor prior to the other, that it must either succeed or be contemporaneous with and dependent upon but cannot precede the other.

The existence of everything in the world, material and mental, is caused by some other thing. We may say in the words of Buddha that nothing is permanent in the world. All things are subject to change owing to the change of the conditions on which they depend. Buddha described the conception of causality in the light of his special conception of natural causation (pratityā-samutpāda).

We can say from our day to day experience that everything in this world is related each other as both a cause and an effect. We cannot think of any particular physical object which has not the cause- effect relation to other objects. Everything of the physical world must have a cause and everything must be the cause of certain effects. The totality of all objects of the world is said to be as one endless chain of causes and

effects. The whole world is also regarded as created or evolved by some ultimate cause, which though not caused is related to the world as cause and effect. Whatever exists must be in some time and place and be related to other things by way of cause and effect.

The world in which we live appears to us as a system of substances with attributes which stand to another in various relations. Of those, the relation of interaction or reciprocity is the most important both for science and philosophy. A substance is a real amongst other reals which act and react upon one another. That which acts is regarded as the cause and that which is acted upon as the effect and the relation that obtains between the two is called the relation of causation.

In this thesis I have come across different views of different thinkers at different times in special connection with the concept of causality in both Buddhism and David Hume. To give the clear picture of the concept of causality that occurred in Buddhism and in the philosophy of David Hume, I have discussed the other theories of different thinkers.

(A) In the first chapter (Introduction) I want to introduce the topic of my investigation. There I also feel the necessity to give the historical background of Buddha's pratityā-samutpāda.

Every creature wants to enjoy peace and tries to avoid pain. All activities are based upon some desire or will and for its fulfilment these activities are initiated.

Again every event demands an explanation and no event is without a cause. Buddhism is based upon such a causal theory and it attempts to explain events with reference to cause of its origination.

The traditional problem of causation covers the doctrine of universality and uniformity of causation. Universality of causation means that change occurs without some cause, i.e., every event has a cause. The law of universal causation, with its corollary of the external continuity of becoming is the chief contribution of Buddhism to Indian thought.

Some thinkers are of the opinion that cause has got some idea of power that produces the effect. David Hume discusses his problem of cause by completely diminating the idea of power.

Like the idea of power and force, the idea of necessary connection is equally important for causation. Some philosophers before Hume took such a connection for granted. Hume rejected the idea of necessary connection also. Because it is beyond our sense experience.

In our experience, we sometimes see that one event follows another event regularly. In such a case, we make a generalization that preceding events causes the following event. We regularly see that striking a match stick with a match box produces a flame and from that we conclude that striking the match is the cause of the production of the flame. This is (1) the regularity theory which denies the intrinsic necessary connection

between cause and effect and all active power on the part of cause.

This theory of causality is quite popular among the modern philosophers because it agrees with the modern trend of empiricism. Its best known exponent is B. Russell. He maintains causal laws as laws with approximate invariability. In regularity theory causes and effects are regarded as two separate unconnected facts.

But this regularity theory is not free from defects. Every regular sequence would become causal, if we accept this theory. As we know that all cases of regular sequence are not regarded as the cases of causality, though all cases of causality are the cases of regular sequence.

The second theory of causality is the Entailment theory. Entailment is a logical term and it stands for the relation between the premises and the conclusion, where the latter follows from the former. In this theory a cause is supposed to be intrinsically connected with its effect. Such a theory is more akin to common-sense than the Regularity theory. David Hume for the first time questioned about this theory and established the Regularity theory in place of it.

The Entailment theory is also defective. Here we cannot see any logical connection between cause effect. Again a necessary connection is found to occur only in two simultaneously existing entities, but cause and effect are not simultaneous; they occur at different times. Thirdly the cases of

entailment are the cases of a-priori reasoning and there we attain certainty. But in case of causal reasoning, we do not attain certainty but only probability.

The third theory of causality is the Activity theory which has maintained that cause is an active agent which gives rise to the effect. Here the effect is regarded as passive. This view assumes a power in the cause which compels the effect to be. Locke and Berkeley are the advocates of this theory.

But, L.S. Stebbing has maintained that Activity view is nothing but the view of unsophisticated person. A.C. Ewing also has rejected this view on the ground that an act of will never moves a part of the body by direct causation, but only by means of a number of intermediate links in the nervous system.

(B) But as we have noticed from the above that no body has denied the causality. In Induction and Scientific Investigation we cannot deny the importance of causality. An Induction relies upon the causality. The law of causation states that every event has a cause. A scientific induction based upon the establishment of a causal connection between the ground of inference and the inferred property.

In scientific induction a causal connection is proved by the experimental Methods. Scientific Induction itself is the generalisation on the strength of a causal connection proved by Experimental methods. Sigwart and Bosanquet are of the opinion that causation is the formal ground of scientific induction only. Again the idea of causality is supposed to be

derived by induction or generalization from particular cases of invariable succession. But induction itself is based upon the law of causation. Hence it is arguing in a circle to derive causation from induction and induction from causation.

Again we see that causality has got the importance from the side of scientific investigation. Early Greek thinkers regarded it from the scientific standpoint. Heraclitus maintained that all change is subject to law and thus he associated the inductive principle which is necessary to the law of causality.

In the modern times Bacon has discovered his new method for scientific inquiry into causes. The discovery of "forms" is the professed aim of Bacon's "new" method of induction. The Baconian Induction is not Simple Enumeration, but a complex process of abstraction resting on the metaphysical assumption of the Scholastic Formalism.

Bacon, however, was not the discoverer of inductive inference; that honour goes to Aristotle. Aristotle had used the name 'dialectic' to indicate probable or inductive reasoning.

Baconian induction is not the same as the process which is now-a-days, known as induction.

According to Bacon the object of scientific investigation is to find out the form of the simple quality or nature of a thing. It is, however, not clear as to how Bacon distinguishes between a form and that of which it is the form. He assumes that all that is necessary in inductive investigation is to

collect a number of facts and conclusion can be read off from collection.

Bacon describes his inductive method with the help of what he calls the three Tables of Investigation. The first one is the Table of Affirmation or "the rule of presence". This table corresponds to J.S. Mill's modern Method of Agreement. This table means that we have to collect together all the known instances which agree in having the same quality. For example if we are enquiring into the nature of the heat we should collect all the known bodies emitting heat.

Again in framing the second table we should have to collect many instances as possible which do not possess the quality about which we are investigating. As for example, if we are enquiring into the nature of heat, we should collect as many instances as possible which do not possess heat, eg., the rays of the Moon, the blood of fish etc.

These Bacon's tables of Affirmation and Negation are reproduced in John Stuart Mill's "Joint Method of Agreement and Difference."

Bacon's third table is the table of comparison or "the rule of differing degrees". It requires the study of variations in different phenomena to see if there is any correlation between the various changes observed.

The table also corresponds to Mill's modern Method of concomitant variations.

But Bacon's method is not free from defects, though his scientific method is richer than any other methods. Some crude anticipation of Bacon's inductivism can be found in Greek philosophy, i.e., in pre-Socratics period. But these are fragmentary, whereas Bacon offers a complete theory.

Bacon himself made no important discovery, but his indirect service to science was enormous. Again it is to be mentioned that the fundamental postulate behind the Baconian method is wholly wrong.

In Mill's view, induction is of central importance as it is the only possible source of substantive general propositions. All methodical or critical induction rests on the fundamental principle of the uniformity of nature, namely what has happened earlier, once will happen again, if circumstances are sufficiently similar.

Mill describes induction with the help of four inductive method : "the method of agreement, the method of difference, the method of residues and the method of concomitant variations." He also discussed a combination of the first two, naming it the joint method of agreement and difference."

The Buddhist logicians had expected Mill's inductive method in their discussion of five conditioned method (Pañcakāraṇi) in connection with the establishment of the causal relation.

Early Buddhist thinkers say that if A precedes B, the disappearance of A means the disappearance of B and the other factors remaining the same, then we may say that A is the cause

of B. This<sup>is</sup> the method of difference. Later Buddhist thinkers develop this doctrine by emphasizing the immediate antecedents of the cause. Of course, relations of co-existence such as those of genus and species can also be established though in a different manner. According to the Buddhists, among successions the causal one and among co-existences the genus-species ones warrant generalisations.

Again we may note here that science does not rely upon induction and experiment alone. The empirical laws are not to be considered as the basic laws of nature. Frankly speaking the aim of science is to discover laws of nature and empirical science and to connect them in a deductive system, in such a way as to show how the unrestricted laws give rise to the regularities reported by the empirical laws.

When we say that causation is universal, what it means is that no change ever occurs without some cause. It shows that similar causes will always produce similar effects. Hume and Mill have expressed the principle of uniformity in the dictum "the future will resemble the past."

J.S. Mill maintains that law of causation is the main pillar of inductive science. In his Logic, Mill ignores the basic difficulties in his attempt to build a positive theory of causality on Humean foundations. Then it might be possible on purely inductive principles to discover the cause of a phenomenon, which according to Mill, is the antecedent or concurrence of antecedents on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent.

It should be mentioned that all the modern discussion of the philosophy of induction takes off from Hume's analysis of causation, according to which all reasoning concerning matters of fact is founded on the relation between cause and effect.

Again, it is well known to all that unlike Mill, Hume was not satisfied with analysing the notion of cause and effect into the notions spatial contiguity, temporal succession and joint occurrence. He added to these the criterion of "necessary connection". Hume's scepticism rests upon his rejection of the principle of induction.

We should also point out that the problem of causation is logically important as the inductive logic is based on it. The validity of inference depends on the validity of the law of causation. Again it is sometimes said that science now-a-days is able to dispense with cause. It is absolutely necessary for science to pass on to generalisations from observed regularity to two kinds of events and thus to infer the second kind of event.

In any case, the belief we entertain in the universality, of the law of cause and effect is an instance of induction. We arrive at this universal law by generalisation from any laws of inferior generality.

Buddhist logicians attempted to make a distinction between inferences concerned with production and inferences concerned with identity. The Buddhists usually denied that cause could be usually simultaneous with effect. The real is the efficient, i.e., that which causes some effect (artha-kriyā-kāritva).

Hume rejects the ideas of necessity and efficiency in causal connection which is the view of popular notion of causal connection.

Again Hume has denied the existence of a purely rational knowledge of matters of fact, that is, knowledge which mind has produced by its own activity independently of experience. Regarding the Universal law of causation, Hume says that this universal law like any other judgments connecting a particular cause with a particular effect cannot be regarded as necessary.

Immanuel Kant did not seriously try to explain the nature of the causal relation or causation, but merely sought to prove that causality is necessary and universal. The Inductive Principle is important than the law of causality, which is quite formal without the latter. When Hume speaks of the Inductive Principle, Kant speaks of the Law of causality.

B. Russell says that with the help of the principle of Induction we can prove the inferences, without it all such inferences are invalid. But the inductive principle itself can never be proved or disproved by experience, which Hume has already hinted.

Any way we may say that induction is not a modern invention but it is also true that induction was not investigated in detail in early times. Thus we may conclude that there is the importance of the principle of causality in induction and scientific investigation.

(C) The principle of causality plays its role in Metaphysics also, as it has played in Logic. As far as the metaphysical aspect is concerned, the causal relation is a demand for the determination of the existential status of the two in relation to each other.

In Hume's philosophy of the nature of causal concept, we have found two different levels. One of them is the metaphysical. The metaphysical levels covers the joint resultant of Hume's adoption of the theory of ideas and of his interpretation of the 'contingency' of propositions concerning matters of fact. At this level we meet Hume's atomistic claim concerning the separateness of all things, the absence of any 'real' causal connections.

Deduction from self-evident principles must be the method by means of which metaphysics reaps the fruits of its analysis of the most general factors of the real, being, change, causation and the rest. Metaphysics must provide the causal principles and Logic should have something to say about the method with the aid of which causal laws may be discovered.

In this context we may mention that it seems paradoxical to say that metaphysics is more solid and certain than physical science. Any way we may point out <sup>that</sup> conception of causality is also the metaphysical problem.

(D) Like the metaphysical importance, the concept of causality has got the logical importance too. Traditional logicians have recognised the concept of causality, though the

modern logicians have not recognized it.

Aristotle, Plato have discussed causation somewhat elaborately. Plato emphasizes the dynamic aspect of the causal relation. The cause is the force, power or agent that produces the effect. Hume grants that at least according to the common notions the concepts of power, force, energy or necessary connection etc. are fundamental for causation.

Locke, Berkeley, Bacon, Spinoza, all of them have discussed causality from different angles. Of course Berkeley does not criticize the general conception of cause.

Again though Bacon laid great emphasis on the importance of discovering the causes of things yet he was not free from defects. We may at least say that Bacon looks upon causation as static, not as dynamic. He thought that a thing can be a cause simply by existing. But the true doctrine is that a thing can be a cause only if it acts.

Many modern philosophers to analyze the causal relation within a frame work of empiricism have sought to avoid the foregoing difficulties by appealing to the laws of nature. Laws of nature were once commonly thought of as necessary or inviolable principles. Such a conception of causation is said to be quite worthless by empiricists and scientists. However, it is obvious that it preserves the very notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect which Hume sought to avoid.

Again both Hume and Russell regard cause and effect as contiguous in time. Contiguity does not involve continuity. Hume never speaks of time series as continuous, Unlike Hume,

Buddhism in Indian thought speaks of the continuity of the world.

Breadley says that causa and effect cannot be continuous with one another. He is of the opinion that the cause forces the effect to happen as soon as it is strong enough. But his view is erroneous. Causality is a relation only. If we treat it as a term then it will lead us to an ad infinitum.

Prof. L.S. Stebbing also speaks of qualitative laws of causal relation between substantive things in defined states to quantitative laws of functional dependence.

H.W.B. Joseph says that the causal relation which connects  $y$  with  $x$  means that a cause of the nature  $y$  connects the effect of the nature  $x$ . He is of the opinion that the inductive principle is a consequence of the law of Identity which declares that  $A$  is  $A$ . The same cause must always give rise to the same effect.

In contrast with the views derived from, there have been many attempts in recent years to a commonsense view of causality. Prof. Whitehead<sup>1</sup> maintains that Hume mistakes a repetition of impressions for an impression of repetition. Hume abolishes the distinction between so-called moral and physical necessity and reduces them to a subjective necessity.

But it is to be mentioned here that the analysis of the meaning of 'causality' is a most difficult task. The logicians cannot enter upon it as it is not a task for them. But we must observe that various kinds of order are sometimes confounded

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1. Process and Reality - Whitehead, pg. 196

as identical with the causal order. Modern logicians have ignored this problem.

(E) Again we may discuss the concept of causality from the view point of metaphysics also. Some have regarded cause as the world-stuff, i.e., the stuff of reality, out of which all things have come out. In this context we can give reference of the philosophy of Early Greek. Parmenides regard it as the Principle of Being. Leucippus associated it with change. Nothing happens without a cause. Everything has a cause and is necessary. Heraclitus held that all change is subject to the law of causality. He thought that the inductive principle is necessary to the law of causality. Thales regarded water as the material cause of all things. Anaximander regarded air as the cause.

Anaximander maintains that cause must contain as much reality as there is in the effect. This is the view of Descartes also. But the world-stuff of Anaximander is indefinite in character.

Heraclitus isolating change and raising it to the position of ultimate reality. But people of those days could not agree with him. So the Eleatics came out with suggestion that reality must be possessed of permanence.

The theory of Ideas or Forms of Socrates is nothing the theory of causation only. He says that the Forms are the real causes in the world.

Plato identifies the cause and the agent. On his view, the cause is a Form which is changeless and eternal. He emphasises

the dynamic aspect of the causal relation. The cause is the force, power or agent that produces the effect which is said to be the efficient cause of Aristotle.

Aristotle's theory of causation is said to be metaphysical. Such a metaphysical tackling of the problem characterised ancient philosophy in general — the theories of causality in the various Indian systems. It is therefore a surprisingly heartening fact that Heisenberg, the father of the principle of indeterminacy has offered a scientific account of causation on Aristotelian lines.

Rene Descartes declared that the cause must be equal to or more than the effect in respect of 'reality'. Berkeley held a doctrine of degrees of reality and advocated a three-fold view of causation. He says that the fundamental and supreme cause is God. He shows as Hume did later, that all actually perceive is the uniform succession of our own presentations.

Buddhism is of the opinion that things change, there is no being in the world, but only becoming. In such a state, the supreme reality is the law of change and that is causality.

In Kant's Second Analogy of Experience, we have found that the cause is said to operate during the whole of the time in which the effect takes place is thus a motive power or force. In this context we may say that Kant's conception of causality differs from that of Hume merely in the recognition of necessary connection, but also in the recognition of the metaphysical entities of substance and force as necessarily in phenomena.

Any way, we may say that the category of causality is applicable only within the world of empirical objects. Causality is a relation between the objects viewed in their dynamic aspect.

(F) As far as we know that the name of the principle of causality is familiar enough. Any intellectualistic philosophy is indeed bound to formulate some such general principles covering the whole field of causation. But different thinkers have formulated them very diversely.

It is the problem both for the Indian and the Western thought. In western thought the efficient cause plays a vital role. The material cause has come into consideration there secondarily only. On the other hand in the Indian thought, the main subject of treatment is the material cause, i.e., the matter in which the change is produced. But it accepts the efficient cause (Nimitta kāraṇa) as one of the causes.

Buddhist view is that cause is completely annihilated after giving rise to its effect, There is nothing permanent. According to the Buddhists, when the second moment arrives, the thing which was existing in the first moment ceases to exist and an entirely new thing springs up.

Every system of Indian thought has discussed the problem of causation from different angle. As opposed to Buddhism, Cārvākas like David Hume attribute the notion of invariability to the habit of mind. The Cārvākas have not admitted causation and its universality. They say that there is no necessary

connection as David Hume has maintained.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation and Pratityā-samutpāda of Buddhism are the asatkārya-vāda. But both of them differs from each other. The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism has pointed out that everything in the universe is conditional, i.e., one thing depends on others for its existence and what is dependent has no reality of its own. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains that things have their own independent reality. For the Buddhists, the essence of effect is not the same as that of cause but in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the essence of effect, though different from that of cause, it resides in its inherent cause, which does not die out and exists side by side with the effect.

According to both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhism, there is not one cause of an effect. But while Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says that the number of causes is limited, the Buddhists maintain that the number of causes is not calculable. It is unlimited. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, we find causes helping or influencing each other, but in Buddhist theory they do not help or exert influence on each other. Therefore, the Buddhist theory is called the one result production theory (eka-kārya-kāritva) which goes against the mutual help or mutual influence theory (Paraspara upakāritva) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Thus we have found that almost all systems of Indian thought have discussed this problem of causation in different contexts.

(G) Whether Buddhism has got any metaphysical significance in case of causation, we may say that his doctrine of Pratityā-samutpāda was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and

not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems such as whether the world was eternal or non-eternal were considered as heresis in early Buddhism.

The later history of Buddhism would however show that by silence the Buddha could not put down the metaphysical inquisitiveness of his followers. Speculations started very soon and so many metaphysical schools developed among Buddhist thinkers.

When we come to the Mahāyāna Buddhism we will find that the metaphysical substratum is admitted. Mahāyāna metaphysics is monistic. All objects in this universe are of one reality. The Mahāyāna Buddhists liken the universe to māyā, mirage, flash of lightening or so forth.

Though Buddha regarded it as a waste of time to discuss metaphysical problem, yet he was not free from it. His doctrine of Pratityā-samutpāda is metaphysical. But he has recognised it as ethical.

The four schools of Buddhism have discussed the concept of causality from the metaphysical point of view. Buddha's avoidance of all metaphysical problems is irritating in its vagueness to the modern historian of philosophy. Buddha's whole attitude is a predominantly ethical one and naturally the ethical aspect of the absolute, its character as righteousness appeals to him most. But though Buddha has claimed the Pratityā-samutpāda as ethical, we may regard this ethical problem as the logical deduction from the metaphysics. Radhakrishnan has maintained that Buddhism is essentially

psychology, logic and ethics and not metaphysics.

(H) Not only the Indian thinkers, but also the western thinkers have discussed the problem of causation as important one. In the eighteenth century, David Hume had accepted this problem and insisted on its correct analysis. Hume has discussed this problem by refuting the common-sense view of causation, according to which there is the power or activity in the cause to bring forth the effect. The common-sense view is that causation involves a relation between two phenomena, an antecedent and a consequent.

Hume is of the opinion that causality is only a uniform temporal relation between a particular antecedent and a particular consequent. There is no necessary tie between the cause and the effect, nor the cause exercise any force or power in bringing about the effect.

With regard to the question of necessary connection between a cause and its effect, Hume points out that our experience does not provide us with any impression of which the idea of necessary connection can be said to be a copy. Necessary connection, says Hume, is the distinctive mark of the causal relation.

Hume says that the only relations that we can discover between things or events are those of contiguity and succession. He is of the opinion that necessity is something that exists in mind not in objects. It is not an affair of the reason, but of the imagination, what we call the effect of an event or

phenomenon is simply another event or phenomenon which has been found by to follow the former a number of times.

But as we have seen that Hume's view of the nature of causal relation is defective. Hume regards experience as consisting of isolated impressions and ideas and he maintains that there is nothing in any object which gives us any reason for going beyond it. Now, it is quite impossible ever to reach an isolated particular — whether it is impression or an object. We can say that a phenomenon is perceived as connected with one or more preceding phenomena and continued into one or more succeeding phenomena.

Again Hume says that all things are loose and separate. Such a view is wrong. And to establish a necessary connection between phenomena is not so difficult as Hume imagines.

Hume has committed mistake in entirely excluding the idea of power or force from the idea of cause. According to him, there is no impression corresponding to the idea of power in our mind. But by denying this we may say that we have an impression of power or force. As for example, in bending a stick, we are at the same time conscious of a counter-action on the part of the thing. Therefore we may say that it is through muscular sensation that we derive the impression of power. Again we cannot mistakenly identify A with B unless we have actually experience B somewhere.

Hume's criticism of the idea of 'necessity' (necessary connection) is also untenable. He asserts quite dogmatically that the idea of necessity is the spurious idea.

Hume is not able to explain the universality of our demand for a cause, or, in other words, he never tells us why we say that every event must have a cause. He mixes up two distinct beliefs, viz., the belief in the uniformity of nature and belief in causality. Our belief in such uniformity is not so strong as to exclude the possibility of contradiction. The belief that a particular cause is followed by a particular effect has its origin in experience but the belief that every event must have a cause cannot be traced to experience.

Again from the above analysis what we gather is that the empirical conception (Hume in particular) of cause and effect has not only failed to give us a true picture of the actual physical world as a system of events, but also has been guilty of confusion between causation as subjectively conceived and causality as it objectively obtains in nature. Nature is a closed system of relations, but experience by cross-sectioning it, has not proved a true ally of science which counts so much on the empirical view of the world. It is not sufficient to say, as Hume has done, that there is no objective causation in the world, for causality is there as an objective relation in the real world. Causality and even causal relation are objectively true and science dealing with the objective world can accept only such objective relations. Hume in spite of his best efforts to picture the causal relation from the empirical and common-sense point of view has given us but a subjective conception of it.

Now, if we throw light on the views of Hume and that of Buddhism, we will find some points of similarities and dissimilarities between them.

In rejection of substance, soul and all relations, Buddhism is Humean in character. In admitting the reality of the separate elements the Buddhists were like Hume.

Buddhistic metaphysics from the very start partook of the Humean. In both of them, causality, change, existence (bhāva), non-existence (abhāva) were equally subjective in character.

One remarkable similarity is that both of them rejects the concepts of power, force, energy or necessary connection.

Again both Hume and Buddhism have rejected the concepts like agents, production, efficiency. There is nothing called any causal efficacy.

But there is a very important difference which should not be ignored. Hume considers the notions of substance, causality etc., through the operation of the empirical laws of association and habit. On the other hand the Buddhist like Kant maintains that these notions are a-priori and are not of empirical origin. Side by side of their rejection of the substance and the acceptance of the real as momentary states (modal view) the Buddhists developed the complementary doctrine of avidyā and vikalpa. With a metaphysic largely Humean, they elaborated their analysis of knowledge more or less on Kantian lines.

Buddhist view is that an effect is a new thing. According to it we cannot maintain that the preceding thing is the cause

of the succeeding thing or that the latter is the effect of the former. The preceding becomes non-existent when the thing of the succeeding moment comes into being and therefore cannot be regarded as producing the latter. But Hume goes against this view. In Humean concept we have found that in our experience we see one event following the other event. This is sometimes regular and sometimes irregular. As for instance, we regularly see that striking a match stick with a match box produces a flame and from that conclude that striking the match is the cause of the production of the flame. So by means of experience we make a generalisation and saying that the preceding event causes the following event.

According to Buddhism causal relations are of the types of the seed growing into the trees, where the one is necessary for the other. But Hume on the other hand maintains, that the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct and separable.

To Hume the relation which we have found between things or events are those of contiguity and successions, where as Buddha believes in continuity.

Universality of causation, i.e., change ever occurs without some cause, is the view point of Buddhism. But Hume on the other hand never tells us about the universality of causation. He says that causality is only a uniform temporal relation between a particular antecedent and particular consequent.

Any way, on the basis of the study and in course of discussion as contained in this chapter, we have arrived at the following conclusion.

The concept of causality occupies an important place both in Buddhism and in the philosophy of David Hume. We feel that in spite of some of the similarities, they hardly differ from each other in respect of the fundamental facts regarding the concept of causality.

What we gather from the foregoing discussion, it may be said that causal relation is present among all objects of experience. With regard to any object of the world, it may be said that it is related to other objects as both a cause and an effect. Everything in this universe must have a cause which is the view of Buddhism. We cannot accept as satisfactory either the view of Buddhism or that of David Hume. What I will accept only the sound points.

As it was discussed above, Humean concept of causality is not free from criticism. There is the continuity in the causal relation. In this universe the phenomenon is perceived as connected with one or more preceding phenomena and continued into one or more succeeding phenomena. In fact cause and effect are two successive phases of the same continuous process. Regarding this, the Buddhistic concept is said to be correct.

Again it may be noted that in the words of Aristotle that effect is the transition from potential being to actual being. There is also the invariable relation between the two. David Hume has rejected the relation as invariable. Like Hume, the Cārvāka in the Indian thought has rejected the invariability of ~~real~~ causal relation.

The effect appears as a new entity. But it is not, that cause is completely annihilated after giving rise to its effect as Buddhism thinks. In this case it may be said that the cause which is in the form of the parts of the effect continues to exist even after the appearance of the effect. This is the view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system also.

Again it may be noted that effect is potentially contained in the cause (as Sankhya has maintained) and the essence of the effect is the same as that of the cause. All things in this universe are subject to the law of change. From out of this changing process, the mind of man constructs the rule of causality. Further, the totality of all objects of the world is now regarded by us as one endless chain of causes and effects.

Again we cannot ignore the classification of causes as material, efficient and final. The material cause is nothing but the matter or stuff of which a thing is made. It was there before the effect came into being and did not disappear at the time of production, but continues to be in the effect. In this sense 'cause' is not dynamic, but static. The efficient cause is an agent and is the source of force or power necessary for bringing about the process of causation. The final cause is a purpose; it is but the idea of the thing realised. As for example in case of making a pot, the clay is the material cause, the potter is the efficient cause and the pot is the final cause.

Any way, it may be noted that nobody has denied the causal relation among physical objects in this universe. Cause and effect are two successive phases of the same continuous process. It is a relation between processes, events or entities, such that when one occurs the other invariably follows. It is also unconditional. The entire universe is a chain of causes. The present is wholly the product of the past and the future of will be the outcome of the present.

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