CHAPTER VI

CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY — INDIAN VIEWS
In Western treatment of causality, we have seen that the efficient cause plays a vital role. They have neglected the material cause. And the material cause has come into consideration there secondarily only. But when we come to the Indian treatment of causation we have seen something else. Their main subject of treatment is the material cause, i.e., the matter in which the change is produced. Of course they accepted the efficient cause (Nimitta-kāraṇa) as one of the causes. But we have also seen that the material cause has appeared differently in different systems of Indian Philosophy. And this material cause, in Indian thought is not always passive.

In Śāṅkhyā, the material cause is the permanent basis of changing states which are real. Prakṛti of Śāṅkhyā, constitutes the material cause of the whole universe, which is active. In Vedānta, the material cause is the permanent basis of the changing states which are not real, but appeared as real due to illusion. It is the substratum of the whole illusory appearance of the universe, is itself a material cause as well as an instrumental cause. The conception of the material cause of Vedānta is parallel to the immanent causality of the Western thought.

Main problems of causation discussed by Indian thinkers:

The main problem discussed by Indian thinkers is that of the relation of the material cause with its effect. Therefrom the essence of effect is derived? Does the material cause impart any essence to its effect or is it completely external?
to the cause so far the essence is concerned? Is the essence then derived from void, i.e., the effect is created out of nothing? What happens to the cause when the effect comes into existence — is it annihilated or continues to exist side by side? Does the material cause actually turn into its effect or presents only an illusory appearance? These are the main problems discussed by the Indian thought.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of causality for example, an effect is completely a new entity with its essence different from that of its inherent cause and exists side by side with it, the problem of different weights of the cause and its effect has been a cause of much botheration.

**Problem of Essence of Effect:**

The problem of the essence of effect is the basic problem of Indian thinkers, and, in fact the whole of the division of Indian theories of causality is based on its consideration. With regard to the essence of effect, there are only two possibilities: either an effect derives its essence from the cause, i.e., so far the essence of the effect is concerned, it is existent in some form even prior to coming into formal existence or it does not, i.e., the effect is not at all existent in any form whatsoever prior to its coming into formal existence. We have seen two Indian theories of causation on the basis of these two possibilities. They are the sātākārya-vāda, i.e., the theory of the existent effect, and asātākārya vāda, i.e., the theory of the non-existent effect.
Satkārya-vāda maintains that an effect is existent in a potential or latent form before the causal process; i.e., the effect is existent even prior to coming into formal existence so far its essence is concerned. The main exponents of Satkārya-vāda in Indian thought are Sāṅkhya-yoga and Vedānta. This theory can be split up into two forms according to the different conceptions of reality. They are the Pariṇāma-vāda or Vikara-vāda of Sāṅkhya-yoga and Vivarta-vāda of Vedāntist Sāṅkarācārya. If we believe that through a causal process change actually occurs and cause actually takes the shape of effect, it will be Pariṇāma-vāda. Vivarta-vāda of Bhāskara is that the ultimate reality is unchanging and all kinds of changes are only apparent and illusory.

According to asatkārya-vāda, an effect is a new entity. It maintains that an effect is completely non-existent before the causal process in any form. The main exponents of asatkārya-vāda are Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhists. With regard to the asatkārya-vāda some questions can be asked: What happens to the cause when its effect comes into existence? Is the cause annihilated or continues to exist with the effect? With these two alternative answers there have come into existence two types of theories in asatkārya-vāda. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains, that, the cause which is in the form of the parts of the effect, continues to exist even after the appearance of the effect. Buddhists adopt the latter position and declare that cause is completely annihilated after giving rise to its effect. They maintain that the Reality is momentary and these moments follow each other in succession give rise to other moments in their place and
themselves dying out. The specific name of asatkāryavāda of Nyāya-Vaisesika is known as ārambha-vāda. It means that an affect starts a fresh existence. It has no existence before.

The technical name for Buddhist theory is Pratityā-samutpāda, i.e., the theory of dependent origination — the former originating when the latter dies out.

Jaina system however takes a middle course and says that an effect is both existent and non-existent. It is existent with respect to its matter (Dravya) and non-existent with respect to its aspects (Paryāyas).

Now the above mentioned classification can be depicted by the following chart:

**Indian theories of causation**

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(1) Svabhāva-vāda
    |   or
    |   Yadrogchāvāda
    |   of Carvāka

(2) Satkāryavāda

(3) Asatkāryavāda

(4) Sad-asatkārya vāda
    of Jainas and Theistic Schools of Vedānta.
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(a) Parināma-vāda
    or
    Vikara-vāda of Sānkhya-yoga.

(b) Vivarta-vāda of Śaṅkara school of Vedānta.
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(a) Ārambha-vāda of Nyāya-Vaisesika followed by Mīmāṃsā

(b) Pratityā-samutpāda vāda of Buddhism.
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(1) **Svabhāva-vāda or Yadrocchāvāda of Cārṇāka**: 

In Sanskrit philosophical works we sometimes find a worldview which is designated as svabhāva-vāda. It is a very old doctrine going so far back as the Upaniṣads. We have seen that the reaction against the Vedic religion was very old. The svabhāva-vāda should have an important offshoot of this re-action.

Cārṇākas are extreme materialists believing in the validity of perception as the only means of valid knowledge. Again they also maintain that causal relation is not ascertainable as it is cannot be established by perception. The relation of cause and effect is only that of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) and no invariable, universal relation can be established by perception.

But it may be asked: If we do not believe in fixed universal law underlying the phenomena of the world, how would we explain the uniformities that experienced objects possess? Why is fire always experienced to be hot and water to be cool? The Cārṇāka reply is that it is due to the inherent nature (svabhāva) of things that they possess particular characters.

But can we not base our knowledge of the invariable relation between two events on causal relation between them? The Cārṇāka reply would be that a causal relation, being only a kind of invariable relation, being established by perception owing to the same difficulties.

We do see antecedent and consequent events, but we cannot say that there is an invariable relation between the two. Because
we can see only particular instances which are limited in number. An invariable concomitance is established by seeing two events occurring regularly together, but even if we see so in a thousand cases, it can fail in other cases. As to the notion of invariability in the human mind, Cārvākas like David Hume attribute it to the habit of mind. Conjunction of two events on numerous occasions produces an expectation that they will be always conjoined.

The Cārvāka would further point out that a causal or any other invariable relation cannot be established merely by repeated perception of two things occurring together. For example, if a man perceives a number of times fire accompanied by smoke and on another occasion he infers the existence of smoke on the perception of fire, he would be liable to error, because he failed to notice a condition (upādhi), namely, wetness of fuel, on the presence of which alone fire is attended with smoke. So long as the relation between two phenomena is not proved to be unconditional, it is uncertain. And unconditionality or absence of conditions cannot be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may always remain hidden. Thus perception is not competent to take into account the upādhīs that might be present in the so-called cases of causation.

It is necessary to distinguish the svabhāva-vāda from another which is also very old and may be mistaken for it, viz., "accidentalism" described Yādṛcchā-vāda or Animitta-vāda. Both the svabhāva-vāda and the yādṛcchāvāda are found separately mentioned in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. Here Jāṅkara explains Yādṛcchāvāda as the doctrine of accidental production of effects, i.e., the effects are produced merely due to change. Ācārānanda explains Yādṛcchā-vāda as the doctrine that effects are produced at any time without depending on definite causes.

Jāṅkara explains svabhāva as the natural powers inherent in different things, e.g., the heat in fire. Ācārānanda explains it as power in a particular thing for producing a particular effect. Fire, for example, has a natural power of burning.

After all, the Cārvākas have not admitted causation and its universality, so all necessary connections between cause and effect have been discarded. They say that there is only accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequence.

Now it is appeared that the philosophy of Cārvāka is based on pure empiricism. That is why, they like David Hume, deny the relation of cause and effect, because it assumes some sort of necessary connection between the two, which is imperceivable. Their denial of the relation of invariable concomitance, like that of Hume, is difficult to be refuted, because on the basis of what we have seen we cannot say that it will always be so. But the main difficulty as we have noticed that Cārvāka denies causality on the logical ground. Logic is based on inference, so it is self-contradictory. Thus Cārvākas contradict their own
basis of argumentation as criticized by Buddhists and Naiyayikas.

2. Ātākṣārya-vāda in its two forms: (a) Parināma-vāda or Vikāra-vāda of Sāṅkhya-yoga, and (b) Vivarta-vāda of Saṁkara school of Vedānta.

(a) The theory that an effect is existent in a potential or latent form before the causal process is one of the main features of the Sāṅkhya system. The Sāṅkhya gives some ground in support of it, which were propounded in the following verse of Sāṅkhya-Karika.⁴

> "Asadakṣeranād upādāna-grahanāt sarva sambhava bhavat,
> jñāna-sākṣya-kāraṇāt kāraṇa-bhavacca sat karyam /"

(i) That which is non-existent can never be produced. The sky-flower can never be produced. If the effect were really non-existent in the material cause, then no amount of effort on the part of any agent could bring it into existence.

Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary on Sāṅkhya-kārika, boldly asserts in support that blue cannot be made into yellow even by a thousand artists.⁵

(ii) We see that only certain effects can be produced from some causes. This means that there is a definite relation of cause with effect. Card can be got only out of milk.

4. Sāṅkhya-karika - Pg. 9. - Ṣvarakṛṣṇa, five grounds—

5. Nahi nālam śilpaśaṅkṛaṇāpi pīṭhā kartuśa sakyate.
   — (Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudi, Pg.9).
(iii) The effect must exist in the material cause before it is actually produced. There is an invariable relation between a material cause and its effect. Everything is not possible everywhere and always. A material cause can produce only that effect with which it is causally related.

(iv) Causal efficiency belongs to that which has the necessary potency. The fact is that only a potent cause can produce a desired effect goes to show that the effect must be potentially contained in the cause. The potent cause of an effect is that which possesses some power that is definitely related to the effect. This means that the effect exists in the cause in an unmanifested form before its production or manifestation.

But we have seen that concepts like agents, production, efficiency have been implicitly denied in all schools of Buddhism. They maintain that there is nothing called any causal efficacy. An event only arises depending on certain other conditions (Pratityásamutpáda). In the tattvaságraha-panjika, Kamalaśīla and Sāntarakṣita have tried to establish the validity of their theory. They maintain that since the future event is not yet in existence and the past event is defunct and hence bereft of causal efficiency, neither the future event nor the past event can be supposed to bring about the present event. The present event also, being momentary, is absolutely destroyed.

in the next moment. Hence it will no longer remain in existence in order to exert its causal influence on the effect which invariably succeeds the cause. It might be argued by the Buddhist philosophers that there is no need for the causes exerting any influence on the effect. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalasila have ruthlessly criticised this concept that causal efficiency has neither the sanction of logic nor that of experience.

We should note here that remarkable similarity with that of Hume. Hume grants that, at least according to common notions, the concepts of POWER, FORCE, ENERGY or NECESSARY CONNECTION etc. are fundamental to the concept of cause. Yet he restores that "there are no ideals, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary connection." Hume urges his reader to examine the impression from which the idea of power is derived. But Hume also declares that when we look about us towards external objects and consider the operation of causes we are never able, in a single instance to discover any power or necessary connection.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalasila ask that does this causal efficacy produce the effect through the medium of another efficacy or not? If it does, then the causal character should be imputed to that other efficacy. And this latter efficacy

8. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding - Hume, Pg. 63
9. Ibid.
10. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding - Hume, Pg. 63
will also, in that case, depend on another efficacy to bring about the effect. The same argument would apply to the third efficacy, and hence we shall be faced with an infinitum.

Anyway, they reject the utility of the concept of causal efficacy and say that "the only basis for the relation of cause and effect consists in immediate sequence, and not in any efficacious action."

(v) The effect is of the same nature as the cause. The cloth is not different from the threads in its essence. The causal relation cannot subsist between objects essentially different from one another.

Development is the coming to light of what is latent and hidden, or as Aristotle would say, it is the transition from potential being to actual being, or, in Hegel's words, it is the passage from the implicit to the explicit. According to this doctrine of satkārya vāda, the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and the developed states of one and the same substance.

Cause and effect are different states, and so are distinct from each other, though this distinction is based on our

11. Ānantaryaka mātram eva kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvavyavasthānibandham, na vyāpāra.
   - Tattvasangraha panjikā, Pg. 130, Kamalasīla and Sāntarakṣita.
12. Tattvakumudī, Pg. 9, Vācaspati Miśra.
13. Kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt - Sāṅkhya kārika, Pg. 15.
practical interests. While a jar can hold water, clay cannot. Identity is fundamental, while difference is only practical.

The sāṁkhya distinguishes two kinds of causes, efficient and material. While the material cause enters into the effect, the efficient cause exerts influence from outside. Though the effect is contained in the cause, something else is necessary to liberate it from the causal state. We have to press the seeds to get the oil. Again, though the effect is potentially contained in the cause, this potentiality is not actualised all at once. Two kinds of effects are also distinguished, when the quality of a thing changes, we have a cause of dharma parināma; when the potential becomes actual and the change is only external, we have a case of lakṣaṇa-parināma. The change of state due to mere lapse of time is avasthāparināma. Change is taking place everywhere and at every moment. All things and states, outward and inward are subject to this law of change. From out of this changing process the mind of man constructs the rule of causality, by means of the relation of antecedents and consequents.

Again it has been stated that the theory/ causation in Yoga system is practically the same as that in Sāṁkhya. According to Yoga, the primordial Prakṛti is the basis of all modifications. It is constituted of three guṇas: sattva, rājas and tāmas.

14. Yoga Bhūṣya, iii, 13., Vyāsa
15. Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra, 1, 121, Kapila.
16. Buddhinirnāṇa
All the modifications are nothing but the different collocation of the gunas. It is only the collections which vary in their form, the substance at the background remains unchanged. This substance is called 'dharmin' and the changing modifications are called 'dharmas'. According to Yoga, the relation of cause and effect is only the relation of dharmin and its dharmas.

Dharmas have been classified into three heads, viz., (a) Sānta (past), (b) Udita (present), and Avyapadesya (future). Dharmin is the original matter and dharmas are its varying manifestations or forms.

It must be noted here that there is the fundamental difference between the view of Yoga and that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhists. Yoga system hold that there is an identity between dharmas and dharmin, while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhists hold them to be absolutely different. Buddhists hold that there are only impermanent dharmas without any permanent dharmin (substance). In the Yoga system dharmin, the substance represent as the material cause. According to Yoga, Prākṛti the ultimate material cause, is self-propelled (svatāḥ pariṇāṁśh); motion is inherent in it. But there are some obstructing forces which act as barriers in its functioning. When these barriers are removed, Prākṛti transforms itself into effects spontaneously. It is here that nisīthakārāpanas come into play, they remove the barriers.

17. tatra trayah khalu dharminah dharman
   sānta udita avyapadesya ca iti
God is the original nimitta-kārlga of the world because He disturbs the equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, and removes all the barriers (akhlā-varaṇa-bhaṅga) to the production of particular effects out of them.\(^{18}\) Merits (dharma) and demerits (adharma) are the effects of the guṇas. Effect cannot move their causes to action.\(^{19}\) So merits and demerits cannot move the guṇas to action. But when they come into existence by God's breaking the barriers of prakṛti, they themselves work as efficient causes. Both God, and merits and demerits, liberate the causal powers in the material cause.\(^{20}\) Prakṛti has the potentiality of producing every effect. We may say that the function of nimitta-kārlga is two-fold, negatively it counteracts the opposing forces and positively it liberates the energy in the direction of producing a particular effect.

The Limitations (Upabandhas) of Effect:

The causes for each and every effect are always present, but we do not see them being manifested always and everywhere. According to Yoga, this is due to some limitations (upabandhas) which are of four kinds. They are space (desa), time (kāla), form (ākāra) and condition (nimitta).\(^{21}\) All these limitations can be removed by the will of God.

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19. na kāryeṇa kāraṇaṁ pravartate - Yoga Bhāṣya, IV, 3.
21. desakālākāraṇimittāpabandhānā khalu

Samanakāla ma tmanāma bhivyaktiriti - Yoga Bhāṣya, III, 14.
Of the teachers before Sañkara, Gaudapāda, in his Māṇḍūkyakārikā has discussed the problem of causation in detail and has shown that there is actually nothing like origination. It is a mere illusion. His view regarding causation is known as ajāti-vāda, i.e., the theory of non-origination.

Gaudapāda maintains that the birth of a real entity is justified only through Māyā and not in reality. What is real cannot have a real transformation; its transformation can only be of an illusory character. Nihilists (i.e., Buddhists) say that a non-existent is born. But the birth of non-existent entity is justified neither in reality, nor through Māyā. Gaudapāda has, in his dialectic, successfully shown that the relation of cause and effect is not logically understandable. His arguments are:

1. Nothing can ever change its nature. This refutes the Sañkhyā view that the prakṛti, which is unborn, gives rise to derivatives like intellect etc.

2. The causal relation cannot be established by the Mānasaka method of mutual interdependence on the pattern of the seed and the sprout leading to a beginningless series, for, here too we ought to know which of the two comes first and in the absence of this knowledge of sequence, the relation of cause and effect cannot be established.

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22. That is, a seed is the cause of a sprout and a sprout that of a seed.
3. The origination cannot be demonstrated in any way:

(i) A non-existent cannot be produced from a non-existent.
(ii) A non-existent cannot produce an existent.
(iii) An existent cannot produce another existent because nothing can ever change its nature.
(iv) An existent cannot produce a non-existent.

Thus Gaudapāda established that there is no origination. When there is no relation of cause and effect, the idea of only one entity underlying the whole world is automatically established.

Regarding causation Śaṅkara more or less adopted the legacy of Gaudapāda and placed it on a firm footing by developing the theory of mayā. On ontological plane Śaṅkara accepted Gaudapāda's theory of non-origination, but on phenomenal plane, he advocated satkāryavāda which was much similar to the sāṅkhya view. Śaṅkara holds that, an effect must pre-exist in its cause. If the effect were not pre-figured in the cause, no amount of activity could bring it forth from the cause. All that the agent does is to transform the cause into the form of the effect. If the effect were not in existence before its manifestation, then the activity of the agent respecting it would be without an object. Cause and effect are continuous, i.e., there is no lapse of time in which the cause persists unchanged. If causation is continuous, then cause and effect are not two distinct things, and we cannot speak of one becoming the other. The difference between the effect before manifestation and after is a relative one. The
cause and the effect represent two phases of one thing and are really of one nature. Śaṅkara adopts the theory that cause and effect are not different. He reduces the transition from causes to effects which underlie the entire dynamic evolution of reality to a static relation of sequence characteristic of certain types of logical and theoretic connection.  

Śaṅkara has maintained that Śūnyavādin and the vijnānavādins were right in maintaining, against Sākhya that if the effect were real and if it really pre-existed in the cause, then it is already an accomplished fact and its production will be vain repetition. He also goes against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in maintaining that if the effect were a non-entity, it would be like a hare's horn, and its production would be impossible. Śaṅkara however agrees with Śūnyavādin and maintains that causation in a real sense is an impossibility.

Śaṅkara takes the central principles of experience, and declares that whatever is bound by space, time and cause cannot be real. Causal explanation cannot be complete. There is an infinite number of times before and after any given number of the series. To say that A is the cause of B is not to explain B.

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23. Some scientists of the present day dispense with dynamic concepts like force and energy and are content with descriptive formula devoid of any implication of ultimate causal explanation.

To postulate a first cause is arbitrary, since it would be to assume
a beginning for the causal series, a beginning for time. Either the
first cause has a previous cause or else the whole causal scheme is
illogical. But if there is no first cause, the causal explanation
is inadequate. We are obliged to break up the continuity of nature
into past, present and future. We begin with one event A, followed
by another B, between which we try to institute a causal connection.
At best the category of causality can explain phenomena only so long
as we look upon them as completely determined by their relation to
each other, without reference to the ultimate principle which is not
itself one of the phenomena determined. Anyway, causality is a
relation and all relations are ultimately unintelligible.

In his account of causality Śaṅkara makes the causal nature the
svabhāva, or the sāmānyya or the universal, while the effect is regarded
as a condition, avasthā or vīṣeṣa. There are in the world many
sāmānyas with their vīṣeṣas — both conscious and unconscious. All
these sāmānyas in their graduated series are included and comprehen-
ded in one great sāmānyya, i.e., in Brahman's nature as a mass of
intelligence. 25 To understand the nature of this universal reality
is to know all the particulars involved in it. 26

Śaṅkara holds that the relation between the cause and the effect
like that between substance and qualities must be that of identity
(tādātmya). The relation cannot be the nature of inherence (saṃavāya)
because inherence will require another relation to relate it to cause

25. Cp. Plato's Idea of the Good as the ground of all other
Ideas.
26. Sāmānyasya grahaṇenaiva tadgatā vīṣeṣa grhātā bhavanti
(Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 11, 4.7)
According to Śaṅkara, this entire world is illusory and the only reality is Brahman. But we can ask a question that how can an unreal cause give rise to a real effect. Śaṅkara answer that in practical experience we do see real effects sprining from unreal causes, for we see that a dreamer, in his dream experiences the effects of the bite of a snake. If it is objected that this effect itself is unreal, Śaṅkara replies that though this effect is indeed unreal, but the consciousness which the dreaming person attains, is not unreal. A man who has risen from sleep, does indeed regard the effects such as being bitten by a snake, seen in his dream to be unreal. But he does not regard the consciousness he had to be unreal. This proves that unreal things can also give rise to real effects.

Again Śaṅkara maintains that Brahman is the only reality and is thus the only cause of the world. This leaves no room for an external instrumental cause. Generally we see that effects are affected by the instrumental cause, eg., potter. But how Brahman, being alone without a second can effect the world? Śaṅkara points out that instrumental cause is not a necessary condition. In the case of milk-cured, milk turns into curd without the aid of any external agent. If it is objected that milk actually require an external agency in the form of heat, Śaṅkara points out that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of change and the function of heat is only to accelerate it. If it is so, milk could not have
turned into curd forcibly. The process is only completed by the instrumental cause. 27

Brahman is both the material cause and the instrumental cause of the world.

We have seen that on the phenomenal plane Saṅkara’s theory of causation is not much different from that of Sāṅkhya. But on the absolute plane, there is no room for parināma-vāda in Saṅkara’s theory. His Vivarta-vāda, in fact, a direct corollary of his theory of the absolute reality.

According to Saṅkara, Brahman is only one Absolute reality. The category of causation implies impermanence, divisibility, mutability and finitude. Something which is eternal, indivisible, immutable and finite cannot be subjected to the category of causation. Brahman is therefore beyond all causation, as it is immutable. But what we will say about this universe, which is divisible mutable, impermanent and finite? Surely it is an effect. But it is impossible that an effect has come out something which is not a cause. Saṅkara gives a solution that Brahman is not a cause in the ordinary sense of the cause, but it is a cause in the sense, in which a rope is the cause of a snake in the case of snake-rope illusion. This world is a superimposition on Brahman. It is vivarta or an unreal transformation of Brahman.

Again Saṅkara has shown that an effect exists in its cause even before coming into existence. He maintains that the instrumental causes simply rearrange the material cause in a different

27. Saṁhanasamagraya ca tasya purnata sampadyate.
- Saṅkara Bhāṣya, II, 1, 26.
form. There is no ontological change in cause but it begins to appear in a different form. This is nothing but the Vivarta theory.

Thus it is clear that Vivarta-vāda is not different from the ajativeda of Gauḍapāda.

Causation in Viśistādīvaita-vāda:

We can say that the parināma-vāda of Śāṅkhyā reappears in Viśistādīvaita-vāda (Qualified Monism), which goes against the Vivarta-vāda of Śāṅkara. According to his theory, both cause and effect are real not only empirically but also ontologically. For Rāmānuja, both cause and effect are identical as well as real. But we should also note here that the satkārya-vāda of Viśistādīvaita-vādins is not exactly like that of Śāṅkhyā. Śāṅkhyā has never maintained that there is anything in the effect which is not existent potentially already. But Viśistādīvaita-vādin admits that though as substance the effect already exist in the cause, as form, it does not.

Asatkārya-vāda - Its two forms:

(a) Ārambhā-vāda of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mimāṃsā:

Many of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers accept a somewhat improved definition of cause. They maintain that (specially Kesava Miśra) to be a cause is to be a cause is to be unconditioned invariable antecedent of effect.

Among Western thinkers, J.S. Mill reaches a similar definition of cause, after a parallel analysis. He says, "We may define ..... the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent or
the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariable and unconditionally consequent. Nyāya-Vaśesika thinkers (rather all the Indian thinkers) assume that a cause is antecedent to its effect. All Western thinkers except some have been regarding cause to be necessarily antecedent to effect. Aristotle mentions four types of causation, one of which, the final cause, is not antecedent to effect; it is rather consequent. Bertrand Russell says "It is customary only to give the name 'effect' to an event which is later than the cause, but there is no kind of reason for this restriction. We shall do better to allow the effect to be before the cause or simultaneous with it, because nothing at any scientific importance depends upon its being after the cause." 29

A.K. Taylor, an advocate of the Entailment theory also disfavours the idea of antecedence on logical, metaphysical and empirical grounds. He says, "cause as currently understood, is thus identical not with the whole true logical ground, but with the ground so far as it can be discovered in the train of temporally antecedent circumstances, i.e., cause is incomplete ground. 30 This point is important, as it shows that the principle of Causation is not, like the principle of sufficient Reason, axiomatic. "Again", says he, "the principle of causation cannot be empirically established by an appeal to the

29. Our Knowledge of the External World, Pg. 229
   Bertrand Russell.
actual course of experience. Actual experience is certainly not sufficient to show that every event is absolutely determined by its antecedent conditions. 31

but in spite of the disfavour, ever Taylor had to say. In more technical language, causation for everyday thought and for the sciences means one-sided dependence of the present on the past, and the future on the present. 32 Mrs. L. S. Stebbing also, remarking on the above quoted passage of Russell says, "there can, however, be little doubt that it is extremely inconvenient to give the name 'cause' to that which is temporally successive to the effect." 33

The fact that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not doubt the antecedence of cause simply means that it is based on phenomenal Realism: What is seen is true. Time being a real substance (dravya), for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is no difficulty for it in determining sequence of cause and effect.

For the Naiyāyikas, the law of causation is a self-evident axiom known intuitively as it were and corroborated by experience. Observed causal relations confirm the principle with which all investigation starts. A cause is that which invariably precedes the effect and is not merely accessory to but is necessary for the production of the effect.

Two things can never said to be causally related unless there is the positive-negative (anvaya-vyātireki) relation

31. Ibid., Pg. 167  
32. Ibid., Pg. 166  
33. A Modern Introduction to Logic, Pg. 272, fn. 1.  
- L. S. Stebbing.
Causal relations are not derived either a-priori or a-posteriori. They are not presented facts, but intellectual constructions based on presented data. To say that A is the cause of B is to go beyond the particulars of sense and apprehend the law of succession. Causation is not mere phenomenal sequence but a connection of elements, while the elements are presented, the connection is not.

The Nyāya believes that there is no plurality and there is only one cause for one effect. The appearance of plurality is due to defective analysis. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the whole endeavour after explanation becomes useless if we admit plurality of causes. If plurality of causes were scientifically true, then inference would not be a valid means of knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta ask us to consider the full complement of the causes when the appearance of plurality vanishes.

The Nyāya distinguishes three different kinds of causes, (1) the material (upādāna) cause is the stuff from out of which the effect is produced, e.g., the threads are the material cause.

of the cloth. (2) The non-material or non-inherent (asaavayi) cause is that which inheres in the material cause, and whose efficiency is well known. The conjunction (sāmyoga) of the threads is the non-material cause, while the material cause is a substance, the non-material cause is a quality or an action.

(3) The efficient (nimitta) cause is distinct from the preceding ones. The potter is the efficient cause of the jar, while his stick and wheel are regarded as accessory (sahakāri). These three kinds of causes correspond to Aristotle's material, formal and efficient causes. The effect itself may be regarded as the final cause of Aristotle.

In modern Western Philosophy, Spinoza, and others distinguished between 'immanent' and 'transient' cause, the former being one which produces a change within itself, and the latter being one which produces a change in something else. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika includes both of these in nimitta-kāraṇa. Thomas Reid and John Stuart Mill introduced a distinction between 'efficient causes and 'physical' causes. Any way, in Indian philosophy, the conception of upādāna-kāraṇa (material cause) in the case of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta and that of asaavayi-kāraṇa in the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has an equal or rather greater importance in comparison to the nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause), in present day western philosophy, it is only efficient cause which figures as a cause.

36. The Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta have never admitted this second kind of cause. They regard the cause and effect as bound by the relation of identity. Strictly speaking only the efficient cause is non-inherent. While the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta admit the material and efficient causes, the Buddhists do not admit even this distinction.
From the above analysis it is appeared that the Nāyāyika lays stress on antecedence, which, strictly speaking is logical and not chronological. The sun is the cause of light, and the two, the cause and the effect, are simultaneous. The Nāyāyika exaggerates the importance of antecedence (pūrvabhaṇa) for causality. The Nyāya analysis into the antecedent conditions and the change which brings together the conditions and makes them into causes so as to result in the effect is artificial. Sāṅkara rightly urges that we cannot insist on both antecedence and unconditionality or inseparability. If the cause and the effect are in inseparable union (ayuta-siddha), then the cause need not always precede the effect. It is correct to say that the cause and the effect are two modes of one thing than that they are two separate things joined together inseparably. This conclusion is strengthened by the Nyāya insistence on samavāya or inherence.

The conception of the non-existence of the effect in the cause, adopted by the Nyāya has its source in the naturalistic bias which regards the real as the perceived. We actually see the higher and more complex levels arising out of the lower and simpler ones, in which they were not exist previously. Many scientific thinkers of the present day accept this view of reality as a one-way series, proceeding from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher. They may differ from the

37. Kasūrāṇjali, i, 19. - Udayana
38. Sāṅkara's-Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra, ii, 2, 17.
Kyāya with regard to the nature of the ultimate simple unit,
but their ideal of explanation is in essence the same.

The Naiyāyikas insist on the continuity between the cause
and the effect. If we attempt to formulate the Nyāya view in
terms of modern science, we may say that it regards all causa-
tion as expenditure of energy. Causation is a mere redistribu-
tion of energy. The cause is the totality of conditions
(Kāraṇasāmagri) and the effect is what issues from it. In his
anxiety, the Naiyāyika runs the risk of overlooking the conti-
unuity of nature. He attempts to reconcile the popular view,
that nothing comes from nothing, with the notion that things
begin to be.

Again we have seen that the law of causality, as the
Naiyāyika interprets it, has no universal validity. It has no
other significance than uniform and concomitant variation.
Since its evidence is derived from the phenomenal world, it is
wrong to extend its scope beyond it. To know the cause of the
world is not within the power of the human understanding. The
impossibility of an infinite regress of infinite causes leads
the Naiyāyika to assert the reality of a cause outside the
series, an uncaused cause.

The Mīmāṃsā view of Causation:

The Mīmāṃsā view on causation is much the same as that
of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika except some minor points on which Mīmāṃsā
differs from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The main point on which Mīmāṃsā
diffs
from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that of the doctrine of
potency (śakti) in a cause to which Mīmāṃsā substitutes, but
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refutes.

Just like the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas define cause as "an invariable and unconditional antecedent." The adjectives of "antecedent" are also justified in the same way as done by Naiyāyikas.

Three conditional antecedents (ananyathasiddha) are also mentioned. The first is that quality which in itself cannot be established as a cause by means of co-presence or co-absence, e.g., stickiness in respect of a pot. The second is that in which the antecedence is established due to its being a causal antecedence of some other effect, e.g., either in respect of a pot. The third one is that which is devoid of determinate co-presence and co-absence.

Classification of Causes:

There are two types of classification of causes. According to one the cause is of two kinds: (1) Svāraṇa-vyāsa - that which does not produce its effect owing to the absence of other auxiliaries, (2) Phalorahila that which is aided by auxiliaries.

The other classification corresponds to the three-fold classification of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, viz., that of inherent (samavāyin), non-inherent (asamavāyin) and instrumental (nimitta). Prabhakara accepts the category of inherence (samavāya) and speaks of two kinds of causes: inherent (samavāyin) and non-inherent (asamavāyin). The non-inherent cause includes all the circumstances which, in conjunction
with an inherent cause result in an effect.

This classification of inherent and non-inherent cause is clearly the same as that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and is doubtlessly taken from it. But this classification has been attempted only by Prabhākara. Kumārila does not accept the category of inherence and, hence, this distinction of inherent and non-inherent cause for him is meaningless.

The instrumental (nimitta) cause seems to acceptable to Mīmāṃsakas, though it has neither been advocated anywhere nor refuted.

It is important to note here in this connection, that the Mīmāṃsakas do not regard all types of causes to be necessary in the production of a thing. For them, an effect is sufficiently explained by having a cause; it need not have all kinds of causes. Though Mīmāṃsakas recognise all the three types of causes, they also maintain that in the production of an effect all of the three causes are not essential. The Naiyāyikas object to it. A cause is three-fold and in the absence of any one of these three causes, there can be no manifestation of effect. In reply the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that there is no need of there being all the three types of causes for the production of an effect.

Mīmāṃsakas advocate Asatkārya-वāda the theory that the effect is non-existent before its production and refute the Jñānaka satkāryavāda, according to which, an effect is existent in a latent form in its cause even before its production. The followers of Jñānaka often cited the statement of Vāsudeva in
Gītā in support of their view. "Of the non-existent", says Gītā there is no being of the existent there is no non-being. 40

**The theory of Potential Energy (Sakti):**

In connection with the causation, the Māmsakas formulate the theory of potential energy (śakti). A seed possesses in it an imperceptible power (śakti) with the help of which it can produce the sprout. When this power is destroyed, it fails to produce that effect. The necessity of admitting such unperceived power in the cause is that it explains why in some cases though the cause (e.g. seed) is there, the effect (e.g. sprout) does not take place.

The Nyāya realists reject this theory. They maintain that without admitting an imperceptible potency in causes the above difficulty may be solved by holding that a cause produces the effect in the absence of obstructions and does not produce it in their presence. The Māmsakas meets this objection by saying that the Nyāya suggestion is no improvement. If we must suppose something, as the Nyāyāyikas suggest, why not admit a positive something in the very substance (e.g. seed) which is taken by all as the cause (e.g. sprout), rather than an additional negative condition having a causal power. It would be reasonable, therefore, to suppose in the - cause - substance a positive power (śakti) to explain the positive effect.

40. nāsato vidyate bhūvo nābhāvo vidyate sateḥ /
- Gītā, II, 16.
Prabhākara recognizes potency to be a distinct category. It's existence, according to him, is proved by inference. Fire, we see, normally burns. But under the influence of a fire-extinguishing gem or a spell, it does burn. There must, therefore, be some power or potency (sakti) in the fire, which causes burns. This potency is eternal in eternal things and transient in transient things.

Kumārila, on the other hand, recognizes potency as only a quality, but not as a separate category. According to him, it is not a distinct category and also cannot be known by inference. By presumption (arthāpatti) and vedic testimony we can prove it. Potency is of two kinds, vis., worldly (laukika) and scriptural (vedic). The first one is known by presumption (arthāpatti), e.g., the power of burning in fire. The second one is understood only by vedic injunctions, e.g., how an action like a sacrifice performed now bears fruit after a long time (i.e., after this life, in Heaven) when the action has ceased.

Naiyāyikas attack this idea of potency as something different from the nature of substance. This potency is nothing but distinctive nature of the substance like fire etc. The Mīmāṃsakas refute this view by maintaining that one's own nature exists as long as the substance lasts. Again they maintain that one's own nature is not different from potency, it is just a synonym. The Naiyāyikas again maintain that, there are not only positive causes in the origination of an effect, there are negative causes as well and these negative causes include the absence of counteracting agencies. This is not acceptable
to Mīmāṁsakas because they do not accept non-existence as causal condition.

From the above analysis it is apparent that much of the mīmāṁsaka view on causation is borrowed from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Their only difference is in the case of potency or causal power (śakti). This difference too does not contribute much to the theory of causation.

Sad-asatkārya-vāda of Jainas and Theistic schools of Vedānta:

The Jain view on causation is based on its conception of substance. Jainas maintains that a substance has two attribute: one is an essential unchanging character guṇa (quality) and the other one is an accidental, changing character pārāyāyas or modes. Substance and quality are inseparable. The qualities are the very nature (svarūpa) of the substance without which the substance cannot exist, e.g., the consciousness possessed by a soul.

But we see that forms are changing. These changing forms or modes are called pārāyāyas which are not the nature of the substance, but some accidental properties. In the case of causation, Jainas disagrees with the absolute views of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta on the one hand and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhās on the other hand. Sāṅkhya and Vedānta advocate satkārya-vāda according to which the effect is already existent in its cause. They criticize the view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhās, who advocate asatkārya-vāda — the theory that as effect is absolutely non-existent in its cause. Satkārya-vādins argue against
Asatkāryavadinś that if effect were non-existent in cause anything could have been produced from anything; cloth could have been produced from clay etc., but we do not see so.

Asatkāryavadinś also criticize satkāryavadinś that if an effect is already existent in its cause, there is no need to attempt for its production. Besides, if effect is already existent in its cause, it should be seen there and all the actions performed by the effect should be performed by the cause itself. But we do not find so. Jaina reconciles the truth in both of these views and says that both these criticisms against each other are true.

Jainas maintain that both satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda become the best philosophies when governed by the anekānta-vāda, because separately they do not cause liberation from the miseries of the world. Since a jar is not different from clay, it should be identical with it and since the clay was not jar in the beginning, it is therefore different from it.

Thus Jaina view on causation is that, cause and effect are partly identical and partly distinct. Therefore an effect is partly existent in its cause and partly non-existent. A particular cause has a power or potency (sakti) to produce a particular effect and so an effect is existent in its cause in the form of this potency. But an effect is a new substance so far its form is concerned and thus with reference to its form it is non-existent in its cause.
In fact, Jaina view is nearer to Sāṃkhya Satkārya-vāda, as Sāṃkhya also admits that an effect is existent in its cause in a latent form and requires a manifestation. The only difference between them appears to be that Sāṃkhya is not prepared to admit this manifestation as something newly emergent, which Jaina do.

In Yoga system, it is stated that effect is only a rearrangement of the cause and thus something new is also virtually admitted. Jains admit it in explicit terms. Jains are opposed to the absolute views of sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhists and advance many arguments to refute these views.

**Kinds of causes**

According to Jains, there are three kinds of causes:

(a) material cause (upādāna), (b) instrumental cause (karana or sādhana) and (c) accomplishing or efficient cause (kartā).

In the production of a pot, for example, clay is the material cause, stick is the instrumental cause and potter is the efficient or accomplishing cause. Again instrumental causes are also of two kinds: instrumental proper and anticipated cause. The instrumental proper cause is that where there is both applied activity and natural ripening activity, e.g., sticks in the production of a pot. In the anticipated cause there is only the natural ripening activity, e.g. in the case of merit etc.

The special feature of Jains in the classification of causes is that of making distinction between instrumental cause and efficient cause. Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika include both
these in only instrumental cause (nimitta kāraṇa).

Matter in Jaina philosophy is called Pudgala, which etymologically means "that which is liable to integration and disintegration." The broadest classification of substances, according to the Jaina, is into the extended and the non-extended. There is only one substance, namely, time (kāla) which is devoid of extension. All other substances possess extension.

They are called by the general name astikāya. When matter and consciousness (Jīva) are in motion or rest, the three astikāyas ākāsa (space), dharma (the principle of motion) and adharma (the principle of rest) become instrumental causes with respect to their extension in space, their motion and rest respectively.

Time (kāla), which is the only anastikāya is also a relative instrumental cause. Thus Jaina mentioned his own view of causation with special reference to his concept of substance.

Concept of causation - Theistic schools of Vedānta.

The position of God in Śaṅkara's Vedanta is very insignificant, because God as Brahman is not an absolute reality as it is associated with māyā. But there are some systems of Vedānta, who have a much important place of God in them and they are often designated as the system of theistic Vedānta. These systems are Visisṭhādvaitya-vaśa (Qualified monism), Dvaita-vaśa (Dualism), Dvaitādvaitya-vaśa (Dualism-Monism) and suddhādvaitya-vaśa (Pure monism). The illustrious writer of the first system are Bhāskara, Vādenapratikīśa and Rāmānuja.

41. Pūrayanti galanti ca, Sarvadarśana, III.
these Rāmānuja is the most important. The writer of the second system is Kāṇḍhava, that of the third is Nimbārka and that of fourth is Vallabha.

**Theory of causation in Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda:**

Rāmānuja adopts the theory of Satkārya-vāda. Every effect implies a pre-existence material cause. Alteration of state is the meaning of causation.42 The Parināma-vāda of Śāṅkīya reappears in Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda which does away with the Vivarta-vāda of Śāṅkara vedānta, and regards both cause and effect as real not only empirically but also ontologically. For Bhāskara, effect is a modification of its cause, both being real. Effect is both identical with and different from cause.43 For Yādava-prakāśa, “Brahman and the world are both non-different and different from each other, even as the sea and its waves are both non-different and different from each other.”44 This is nothing but Parināma-vāda. For Rāmānuja, both cause and effect are identical as well as real. “Production, existence and destruction are the different states of causal substance even as childhood, youth and old age are the different states of a person.”45 Rāmānuja adopts the theory of Satkārya-vāda, and maintains that every effect implies a pre-existent material cause. Alteration of state is the meaning of causation.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita-vādins hold the Parināma-vāda, like that of Śāṅkīya. But their Satkārya-vāda, is not exactly like that of Śāṅkīya. Because unlike Śāṅkīya Viśiṣṭādvaita admits that though as substance, the effect already exists in its cause, as form it does not. Thus this is a Satkārya-vāda, which is more akin to the Jaina view.

42. Avasthāntarāpattir eva hi kāryata
   - Rāmānuja-Bhāṣya on the Bhāgavad-Gītā, XIII, 2.


44. Ibid., Pg. 654.

45. Ibid., Pg. 676
Conception of causation in Dvaita-vāda:

In the Dvaita-vāda of Mādhava, we have seen the influence of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of causation. Mādhava defines 'cause' as the 'unconditional invariable antecedent of effect' and 'effect' as 'that which is the counter-positive of negation prior to existence', which means that the effect is that which does not exist before it is caused to be. The definitions are very much like those of Nyāya and Asatkārya-vāda. But in spite of that undoubted similarity, we cannot say that Mādhava's conception of causation is a reproduction of the Nyāya-view. Nyāya maintains that an effect is absolutely non-existent in its cause. But Pādaśeṣa-Sūri in his Mādhava-siddhānta-sāra, argues that if the Nyāya view is true, then the effect can be produced even out of the absolutely non-existent entities such as the horns of a hare. Again, the Śākhya asserts that an effect always exists in its cause in a potential form, is not logical because by adopting this standpoint anything can be conceived as capable of being produced from anything without any limitation. Therefore the thinkers of this school adopts the middle course and accepts the virtues of both the above contradicting views and rejects the vices. The effect, according to him, is both existent and non-existent. The cause and


47. Kārya prāgbhāva- Pratīyogī I Ibid.
the effect are different aspects of the same principle. Thus to Mādhava school, neither satkārya-vāda nor astakārya-vāda is valid, but a combination of the two. But from the above interpretations, we have seen, that this school seems to advocate nothing more than what Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda had done.

According to Mādhava school, the relation between material cause and effect is that of 'identity' and 'difference' (bheda-bheda), i.e., an effect is neither completely different from, nor completely identical with, its cause. Instrumental cause is also admitted by this school. The activity of the instrumental cause may not always be conative, but the presence of a cause with conative activity is a pre-requisite for the production of an effect. The importance of the conative activity of the cause is really the backbone of the theistic character of Mādhava philosophy. In the Western thought, Berkeley and Locke had similarly advocated the existence of God on the basis of the conative activity.

Thus it is clear that the Mādhava school in its interpretation does not prove to be different from Viśiṣṭādvaita-vādin's view.

Dvaitā-dvaita and Ādhyātvāda view on Causation:

In Dvaitā-dvaita-vāda of Nimbārka, we find nothing about causation, besides what has been said by Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda. According to this school, cause and effect are partly different and partly non-different.48 Vallabha, the propounder of

48. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Pg. 704
   - J.N. Sinha.
Suddha-dvaita-vada advocates the doctrine of immutable transformation (avikṣṭa-parināma-vāda). According to this doctrine a cause remains intact and unchange (avikṣṭa) though it is modified into effect (parināma). In production a cause is manifested as an effect. In destruction an effect is absorbed in its cause. Vallabha maintains that an effect pre-exists in its cause as a power, and thus, advocates only satkārya-vāda in the name of avikṣṭa-parināma-vāda.

Buddhist view on Causation (Pratitya-samutpāda):

In striking conflict with the modern suggestion that the real emphasis of the Buddha's teaching lay in the doctrine of causation as pervading all the things of experience and that his normalism was a new and copernican revolution of thought, is the meagre and inadequate examination accorded to causation in the canon.

To account for the continuity of the world in the absence of a permanent substratum, Buddha announces the law of causation and makes it the basis of continuity. The law of universal causation, with its corollary of the eternal continuity of becoming, is the chief contribution of Buddhism to Indian thought. For Buddha, as for the Upanisads, the whole world is conditioned by causes. While the Upanisads say that things have no self-existence as such, but are products of a causal series which has no beginning or end, Buddha says things are the products of conditions.
That which constitutes being in the material realm of things is only the Paticca samuppāda (Pratityā-samutpāda), or the origin of one thing in dependence on another. Causality is always a self-changing or becoming. We cannot say as in the Nyāya philosophy, that one thing is the cause of something else. As the world process is affiliated to conscious growth, so is the force of causality related to inner motivation. Organic growth is the type of all becoming. The difficulty of external causation is due to the fact that in the outside world our knowledge is confined to relations of phenomena. In the external world causation becomes uniform antecedence. That is the cause, given which another occurs. After all the trouble of modern philosophy, causation is not defined in more adequate terms.

Before going to discuss the Buddhist concept of causality in details, we may quote the words of Karmalabha that "among all the jewels of Buddhist philosophy its theory of causation is the chief jewel." Dr. L.M. Joshi in his "historical introduction" (Pg. 2) has maintained that the two principles pratityā-samutpāda and Nirvāṇa form the core of the Buddha's philosophy. Pratityā-samutpāda was also called the middle way (Madhyamā-pratipad). 49

The theory of causation is contained in the second noble truth which gives us the cessation of suffering. Suffering is

49. Buddhism - Guru Nanak Quincenenary celebration series. Punjabi University, Patiala (India). Published by Sardar Amrik Singh, Registrar, Punjab University.
sāṁsāra; cessation of suffering is Nirvāṇa. Both are only aspects of the same reality. Pratityā- samutpāda viewed from the point of view of relativity is sāṁsāra; while viewed from the point of view of reality is nirvāṇa. It is relativity and dependent causation as well as the absolute; for it is the Absolute itself which appears as relative and acts as the binding thread giving them unity and meaning.

Pratityā- samutpāda tells us that in the empirical world dominated by the intellect everything is relative, conditional, dependent, subject to birth and death and therefore impermanent. The causal formula is "Depending on the cause the effect arises" Thus every object of thought is necessarily relative. And because it is relative it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. All phenomenal things hang between reality and nothingness, avoiding both the extremes. They are like the appearances of the Vedantic Nāyā or Avidyā. It is in this sense that Buddha calls the doctrine the Middle-path, Madhyamāpratītyā, which avoids both eternalism and nihilism. He also identifies it with Dharma. Lord Buddha had declared himself: "He who sees pratityā- samutpāda sees dharma; he who sees dharma sees pratityā- samutpāda." Failure to grasp it is the cause of misery. Its knowledge leads to the cessation of misery.

Buddhist theory of causation is marked by the name of Dependent Origination or more precisely "Combined Dependent Origination." Whatevver exists is a cause, cause and existence

50. Majjhima Nikāya, I, III, 8
are synonymous.\textsuperscript{51} We have seen that the Buddhist theory of causation is a direct consequence of the theory of universal momentariness.

There are three formulas given by Stcherbatsky, disclosing the meaning of the term 'Dependent Origination'. The first is expressed in the words "this being that appears."\textsuperscript{52} The second says — "there is no real production, there is only interdependence."\textsuperscript{53} The third says — "all elements are forceless."\textsuperscript{54} The full meanings of the formulas can be grasped only in contrast to the thesis of the other schools existing at the times with which Buddhism had to fight.

There were the theories of the Sāṇkhya, of the Realists and those of the materialists. As we have seen to sāṇkhya, there is no real causation at all, no causation in the sense of new production, no creative (ārambha) causation. The result is but another manifestation of the same stuff. The Realists, on the other hand, consider every object as a separate whole (avayavini) a whole which is an additional unity to the parts out of which it is composed. The Materialist admitted haphazard production (Yaddrochā-vāda) and denied all strict causal laws.

\textsuperscript{51} Ya bhitiḥ saiva kriyā.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{asmīna sati ādā bhavati} - \textit{Buddhist Logic, Vol. I}, - Th Stcherbatsky, Pg. 121.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Pratityā-tat-samutpattaṁ not pannāṁ tat svabhāvataṁ} - \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{nirvyāpāraḥ} (akīmik-tūrāḥ) sarve dharmāḥ/ \textit{Ibid}. 
To these three theories the Buddhist answer is: "not from one's own self, not from another self, not haphazard are the things produced. A thing is, in fact, not produced at all, it arises in functional dependence upon their causes. The third formula refutes the idea of instrumental causation which is not possible in Buddhism where reality is only instantaneous and has no time to exert force on some other thing.

According to the Buddhists, reality is dynamic, there are no static things at all "causation is kinetic." For the Realists, causation consists in succession of two static things. In this sense, causation is for them a one-to-one relation. The Buddhist objects that the whole conception of causality by the realists is anthropomorphic.

According to the Buddhists, there is no destruction of one thing and no creation of another thing, no influx of one substance into the other, no anthropomorphic mutual help between the causes. A result can indeed be compared with something produced by human co-operation. Material, static and passive causes do not exist at all. Cause, efficiency or moment are but different names for the same thing. Buddhist causality is thus a many-one relation. But the question arises, if causality is a many-one relation, whether these many are calculable. The answer is in the negative.

55. na svato, na parato, nāpy ahētutah, pratitya tat samutpānam

56. Cakah ------------------ pratityā-samutpādaḥ.

According to the Buddhists an effect is not the result of a single cause, but of many causes working together. The term 'dependent origination' is therefore, equivalent to the term 'combined origination' (sāmbhūya-kāraṇa). The totality of causes is called sāmagrī. Vasubandhu asks: "What is a cause in general?" and answers that "there is no causa sui, but with the single exception of one's own self, all the elements (of the universe) are the general cause of an event." That means that there is a constant relation between the state of the universe at any instant and the change which is produced in any part of the universe at that instant.

In connection with the theory of causation the Buddhist attitude relating the great question of Liberty and Necessity must be indicated. The special theory of causation has been established by Buddha himself in defence of Free Will against a theory of Wholesale Determinism. Against determinism the Buddhists maintain free will and responsibility. As against liberty they maintain the strictest necessity of causal laws. Vasubandhu categorically denies free will. After all it is appeared that the Buddhist free will is a freedom within the limits of Necessity. It is a freedom within the prison of

58. Cp. na kimcid ekañ ekasmat, nāpy - ekasmat anekah /
Or na kimcid ekañ ekasmat, sāmagrāhān sarvasampatteh
  - Pg.127, Ibid.

59. Svayañ vihāya sarve dharmañ svatoñye kāraññhetāḥ /
  - Abhidharma-Kośa by Vasubandhu, II, 50.


61. The twelve-membered pratityā-samutpāda.
Dependent Origination. In all the phases of its development Buddhism remained faithful to its theory of causation.

The whole of the Buddhist philosophical literature is classified primarily into two schools: Hinayana and Mahasana, of which Hinayana is earlier. Hinayana consists of two main schools: Theravada and Vaibhasika and Sarvastivada.

In Theravada we find the theory of causation - Paticcasamuppada - in a particular form applicable on a wheel of twelve parts representing the phenomenal life. Generally speaking, in Buddhism the process of conditioned life is viewed as one of continual phenomenal change (samsara) pluralistically caused. For example, a cycle of this process is commonly analysed and stated in interrelated phases (nidana, usually twelve in number in number: dvadasa-anga.

1. Former Life

1. Avidya - Ignorance (Caitta-dharma, duhkha-satya).
2. Sankha - (Impressions of karma (the fact that actions will have consequences affecting future existence).

Present Life


62. The doctrine of the wheel of life having twelve parts is itself the final developed stage. In the earlier undeveloped doctrine, lesser number of parts are also found. See, E.J. Thomas: "The History of Buddhist Thought", pp. 58 ff.


Ch. The Second Principle: The Nature of Causation.
4. Nāma-rūpa - Psycho-physical organism. The five skandhas
(groups of collections of all dharmas in space-time) in the
embryo before the formation of sense-organs.

5. Sać-āyatana - Six sense-organs.

6. Sparśa - Sense-object contact. Organs and Consciousness
begin to co-operate.

7. Vedanā - Sense-experience.

8. Trsna - Craving for the objects of the senses. Awakening
of the sexual instinct.

9. Upādana - the hyper thirst or attachment demanding never to
leave the pleasure possessed and asking for more.\textsuperscript{64}

10. Bhāva - Will to become.\textsuperscript{65}

11. Jāti - Rebirth denoting the union of consciousness and
matter in the womb.


Thus these twelve members can be classified into three
parts called Kāṇḍas. Pratityā-samutpāda has, therefore, been
referred to as having twelve members (aṅgāni) and three parts
(Kāṇḍāh).\textsuperscript{66} This is the cycle of birth and death. This is again
known as vicious circle of causation. It does not end with
death. Death is only a beginning of a new life. It is called
Bhāva-Chakra, Saṃsāra-Chakra, Janama-maraṇa-Chakra, Dharma-
Chakra, Pratityā-samutpāda-Chakra, etc. It can be destroyed

\textsuperscript{64} Buddhist Philosophy in Indian and Ceylon, Pg. 103 - A.B.Kei
\textsuperscript{65} bhavatyanena iti bhavah
\textsuperscript{66} pratityasamutpāda dvādasankhaḥ trikāndah.
only when its root cause is destroyed. And Ignorance can be destroyed only by knowledge. So knowledge is the sole means of liberation. An analysis of these twelve links shows their psychological significance.

The first factor Ignorance (avidya) hides the nature of life, which is sorrow. Individuality is the product of avidya. It is ignorance consisting in assuming as real what is not, that produces the craving for life. It impels us to live and enjoy the world. Ignorance in early Buddhism is the cause of egoism, or the I-sense. The force of ignorance is so great that in spite of the worst suffering men display a tenacious clinging to life.

The second link in the chain is saṃskāras. The word saṃskāra comes from the root which means to prepare or arrange. Saṃskāra is translated "synthesis" or "conformation". It stands for the product as well as for the process of making. In the wide sense of the term it means the will force or the spirit energy which determines the new existence.

The third term is consciousness (vijñāna) from which name and form (nāma-rūpa) arise. At death, while the other elements, body, feelings, perceptions vanish, vijñāna or consciousness persists, as the connecting link between the old and the new. The two, consciousness and name and form are inter-dependent.

From feeling arises trāna or thirst or longing, which leads us from birth to birth. It is the potent cause of life and suffering. We are because we thirst for being. We suffer
because we thirst for pleasure. Thirst is the cause of all suffering.

From thirst comes clinging or Upādāna. The flame of thirst clings to the fuel of upādāna. Deliverance is the extinction of thirst, and bondage is clinging to things.

From clinging to existence comes becoming or bhāva, which Candrakīrti interprets as the karma which brings about re-birth. From becoming comes birth, old age and death, pain, sorrow etc.

The whole scheme seems dogmatic. It aims at showing that vijnāna or consciousness of "I" does not reside in an eternal soul, but is a continuous phenomenon arising by way of cause and effect. The whole scheme rests on avidyā, but we are not told how exactly this avidyā arises. The beginning of the circuit is not apparent. We cannot find its cause. It seems to be a blind end or an incomprehensible reality which we must accept unthinkingly. We infer avidyā to be the antecedent condition of all existence. There is nothing prior to it, for the process of the world is beginningless.

Buddha recognizes that ignorance is nothing absolute. It comes into play that it may abolish itself. The metaphysical problem of the rise of ignorance seems to be evaded. We cannot account for it. We cannot say that it is real, for it can be sublated. Nor is it unreal, for in that case it could not

68. Purvarbhavajana-kāma karma - Mādhymika vṛtti by Candrakīrti.

produce anything. But Buddhism does not consider avidyā to be a cause by courtesy. It is really the source of all existence. Perhaps the Upaniṣad theory is truer. Avidyā is not absolutely useless. It provides room for the possibility of deliverance from itself. Later Buddhist writers like Ānāgārika speak of an abrupt upheaval of avidyā out of the Tathātā, the sudden rise of the individual will out of the universal. Avidyā, then, is the sakti or the force of the absolute which brings about the procession of individual existences from out of the universal. It is the principle of negativity at the very heart of reality. Buddhistic metaphysics becomes satisfactory and intelligible only if it is completed by some form of absolute idealism.

Causal explanations play a vital role in the Buddhist philosophy. Because of which they had to devise their special theory of causation, pratitya-samutpāda. The formula which concisely express this theory often takes the following form:

"imasya satīdaṁ bhavati; imasyāsato idaṁ na bhavati, imasyotpādād idaṁ utpadyate; imasya nirodhād idaṁ niruddhati."

This may be rendered into English as: If this is present that comes to be, if this is absent, that does not come to be. From the arising of this that arises; on the cessation of this that ceases. This formula expresses the idea of 'Constant conjunction'. If fire should be the sole cause of heat, then if fire is there heat will always be conjoined with it, if

70. Mahāvastu, II, 286.
fire is absent, no heat will follow.

This analysis of the notion of causation seems to be a natural consequence of denying 'agents'. Although concepts like agents, production and efficacy have been implicitly denied in all schools of Buddhism, nowhere have they been so explicitly and emphatically denied as in the causal analysis of Śāntarakṣita and Āmalasīla.

Now the above discussion of causation does also, at once, bring to our mind the Humean analysis of causation. Hume proposed to eliminate the idea of causal efficacy or power from the conception of causation altogether maintaining essentially that causes and effects are merely changes that we find 'constantly conjoined'. We should not, according to Hume, explain changes in terms of causes having the power to produce them.

The doctrine of Dependent Origination is the central teaching of Buddha and his other teachings can be easily deduced from its as corollaries. The theory of karma is based on this, being an implication of the law of causation. Our present life is due to the impressions of the karma of the past life and it will shape our future life. Again the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇa-bhāṅga-vāda) is also a corollary of Dependent Origination. Because things depend on their causes and conditions. Again things must be momentary as they are relative, dependent, conditional and finite. To say that a thing arises depending on its cause is to admit that it is momentary for when the cause is removed thing will cease to be. The theory of Non-Kṣaṇa (Nairatmya-vāda), the theory that the individual
ego is ultimately false is also based on this doctrine. When everything is momentary, the ego is also momentary and therefore relative and false. The theory that the so-called matter is unreal, that there is no material substance (saṅghāta-vāda) is also derived from this doctrine. Matter being momentary, is relative and therefore ultimately unreal. The theory of causal efficiency (artna-kriyā-kārītva) is also based on it, because each preceding link is causally efficient to produce the succeeding link and thus the capacity to produce an effect becomes the criterion of existence.

The Doctrine of Dependent Origination is opposed to accidentalism (vādṛṣṭha-vāda) who denies the law of causality regards an event as an accidental happening. It is opposed to naturalism (svabhāva-vāda) which ascribes an effect to its inherent nature, for example, heat is inherent in the nature of fire. It is opposed to (fatalism niyati-vāda) which regards all things good and bad, as unalterably fixed and pre-determined by fate. It is opposed to super-naturalism also. An event is not generated by super-natural intervention of God. Super-naturalism was advocated by Brahminism. Accidentalism and naturalism were advocated by materialists.

According to Buddha, every event is determined by its previous event - there being something the result will follow.\footnote{71. asmin sati ādā bhavati.} The Buddhist doctrine of causality was a great contribution to philosophical thought. All existence, physical and psychical
are subject to the law of universal causation. Nothing is uncaused. There is no transcendental cause of the world. There is no first cause.

Sarvastivadinss admit the existence of all elements in all times. Every element appearing in phenomenal life is affected simultaneously by four different forces. They are the forces of origination (upāda), decay (jarā), maintenance (sthitī) and destruction (amītyatā). These four forces, for sarvastivadinss are realities (dravyātāṃ) and are additional to the elements originating and disappearing at the same moment. They maintain that all elements exist on two different planes, the real essence of the element (dharma-svabhāva) and its momentary manifestation (dharma-lakṣaṇa). The first exists always in past, present and future. It is this phenomenal existence (dharma-lakṣaṇa) which is momentary.

Another important contribution of the sarvastivadinss to the theory of causation is their treatment of different kinds of causes (hetu), conditions (pratyaya) and effects (phala). Abhidharmakosā, however gives the classification in a final form. They recognise the four kinds of conditions (pratyayās) and six kinds of causes (hetus). The four conditions are:

(1) Cause-condition (hetu pratyaya),
(2) the immediately preceding and homogenous condition (samanantarapratyaya),
(3) the object condition (ālambana-pratyaya) and
(4) the efficient

72. Th. Stecherbatsky: The central conception of Buddhism, p. 40
73. Abhidharma Kośa, II, Pg. 31
decisive or 'ruling' condition (adhipati pratyaya). The six causes often take the following formula:

\[ \text{Karana-hetu} \text{ sahabhu} \text{h sabhaga} \text{h sampravyuktakah} / \]
\[ \text{sarvatrago vipaka} \text{h ca sadbidho heturisyate} // \]

The six causes are (1) the general cause (kāraṇa-hetu), (2) the simultaneous cause (saḥabhuh-hetu), (3) the homogeneous cause (sabhaga-hetu), (4) the interpenetrating cause (saṃpravyuktakah-hetu), (5) the all powerful cause (sarvatraga-hetu) and (6) the moral cause (vipaka hetu). Abhidharma-kosa mentions five kinds of effects: Visāmyoga, vipāka, ādhipata, niṣyanda and puruṣākara.

In Mahāyāna schools — Mādhyamika and Yogācāra — the theory of Pratītyā-samutpāda holds a key position, but their interpretations have completely changed.

The Mādhyamika system interprets pratītyā-samutpāda as relativity and relativity means śunya — the unreality of the separate elements. Nāgārjuna, the author of Mādhyamika-kārikā, shows the inner connection of all the views on causation through a dialectical criticism and thus shows that causation is not possible on an absolute basis.

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74. Ibid, Pg. 61
75. Ibid., Pg. 49
76. Ibid., Pg. 55,56
77. Cp. Yaḥ pratītyā-samutpādaṁ paśyatīdaṁ sa paśyatī /
   - Mādhyamika-kārikā, XXIV, 40
78. Parasparāpeksatva = Pratītyāsamutpattatva = śunya-ta =
   dharmatā /

The Mādhyamikas criticise mainly the sarvāstivāda, who hold: that a single entity is the cause of an effect and the cause is different from the effect. For Mādhyamika, all phenomena are conditioned and the conditioned is not a thing in itself, because what is in itself, is not produced by causes and conditions. All is thus relative and the relativity of things is called śūnyatā.

The interpretation of pratitya-samutpāda has again changed in the Yoga-cāra school, which is a pure idealistic (vijñānavādin) school. In this school, pratitya-samutpāda means Motion, a cosmos which is essentially kinetic. Nagarjuna like Bradley showed that cause etc. are self discrepant and therefore relative or ultimately unreal. He says "I salute the Buddha who has proclaimed the principle of pratitya-samutpāda, according to which there is no plurality, no differentiation, no beginning and no end, no motion neither hither nor thither." Again Jántaraksita says, "I salute the Buddha who has proclaimed the principle of pratitya-samutpāda, according to which everything is kinetic, there is no God, no matter, no substance, no quality, no (separate) actions, no universals and no inherence, but there is strict conformity between every fact and its result."

Similarities and Dissimilarities with other schools — Indian and Westerns
Buddhism and Sāṅkhya:
Passing over some of the interpretations of different

79. Caleb pratityasamutpādah
81. quoted by Th. Stcherbatsky in his 'Buddhist Logic' Vol. I, Pg. 141
82. Ibid.
systems of Indian thought we may notice Jacobi's suggestion that the formula of paticcasamuppāda ought to be derived from sāṅkhya scheme of evolution. In spite of A.B. Keith and Belvalkar and Ranade the comparison between the sāṅkhya scheme of the tattvas and pratityā-samutpāda appears forced. Keith has discovered a partial parallelism between the Buddhist and the sāṅkhya system as follows:

Buddhi parallel Vijñāna
Ahamkāra " Nāma-rūpa.
Dharmādharmān " Upādāna.

Any way we may say that the Buddhist sequence is an illustration of the principle of pratityā-samutpāda, while the sāṅkhya illustrates parināma-vāda and two are very different. Thus the logical relation between the Nidānas and those between tattvas are disparate.

Avidyā may be common to both the systems. But it is also true that avidyā is common to almost all systems of Indian thought. The meaning of samskāra is widely different in the two systems. Empirical vijñāna cannot exist independently of Nāma-rūpa, while Buddhi has no such dependence on Ahamkāra. Nāma-rūpa are the concrete individual or sometimes the concrete bases of individuality; while Ahamkāra is only the bare sense of individuality.

It is of course true that the sāṅkhya like Buddhism, sees the origin of Duhkha in desire prompted actions and the origin

83. Buddhist philosophy, Pg. 106
84. sāṅkhya-kārika, 9-10.
of desire in some sort of "ignorance". But Buddha need not have borrowed it from Sāṅkhya. Again in Sāṅkhya the essence of effect is the same as that of cause; it is not so in Buddhist theory.

It is argued that Buddha could have been as little free from Sāṅkhya influence. This is the opinion of Aristotle. Taking over so much from Yoga, he could not fail to be influence by Sāṅkhya. Asvaghosa describes the philosophy of Arūḍa as a variety of Sāṅkhya. Both Sāṅkhya and Buddhism set out with the same enquiry and, we are told, the explanation given of the genesis of duḥkha is substantially the same in both.

According to Oldenberg, Sāṅkhya did not influence Buddhism directly, although indirect influence is undeniable. It is certainly undeniable that both Sāṅkhya and Buddhism agree in regarding the psycho-physical complex to be changeful and non-self. Finally, the differences between the basic principles of the two systems are prominent. The Sāṅkhya doctrine of satkāryavāda and its corollary the eternal prakṛti are clearly opposed to the Buddhist ideas of Pratityā-samutpāda and impermanence. The idea that sukha, duḥkha and mohā are the sole constituents of phenomena is quite unacceptable to Buddhism. There is nothing in Buddhism which quite corresponds to the Puruṣa of Sāṅkhya.

It appears that Sāṅkhya influence on Buddhism has been too lightly assumed. That the world is changeful and full of misery is an idea which was by no means peculiar to Sāṅkhya in the 6th century B.C. The Pratīyāsaṅgha of the Sāṅkhya and the pratītyā-

84. Sāṅkhya-kārīka, 9-10

85. Cf. Tattva saṅgraha, 7-45.
samutpāda of the Buddha closely remember each other. Thus it appears that, Sāṅkhya did not exert any direct or distinctive influence on early Buddhism.

**Buddhism and Yoga**:

The influence of Yoga on Buddhism has been supported to be patent. The definition of Avidyā as given in the Yoga-sūtra approximates to the Buddhist notion of it. In both systems we find the conception of three duḥkhatās. Parināma-duḥkhatā is common in both of them. But the conception of saṃskāra is different in the two. Vyāsa tells us that avoiding Ucchāzagādā and Hetuvāḍa, we must take to Śāsvatavāḍa, the true doctrine. This remains one of the Buddhist attempt to steer clear of Śāsvatavāḍa and Ucchāzagādā by means of pratitya-samutpāda.

**Buddhism and Jainism**:

The idea of past and future Enlightened Ones is Buddhist as well as Jaina. The case is similar with the idea of the impermanence of worldly pleasures and the futility of pursuing them. Sāṃsāra is in both systems undesirable, without a first beginning and without a personal creator or controller of destiny. Both systems see the roots of sāṃsāra in an ignorance of the true nature of reality.

Another important difference between early Buddhism and Jainism relates to the nature of karma. The former regarded it as a psychological function, i.e., primarily mental and the

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latter regarded it as a quasi-material substance, i.e., primarily physical.

Buddhism and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika:

The particular theory of causation (pratityā-samutpāda), cannot be compared with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. The general theory of causation is, however, applicable on all the elements of the world, and therefore, can be compared with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory.

Of the idealistic schools of Buddhist philosophy, the Mādhyaṃkika school only puts forth a dialectic in criticism of the theory of causation, it denies all types of change and causality on an absolute basis. As such, it is akin to the theory of the Jñākara school of Vedānta, more specifically to the theory of non-origination (ajāti-vāda) of Gauḍapāda. The Mādhyamika school has shown that everything in the universe is conditional, i.e., dependent on others and what is dependent has no reality of its own. But according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, things have their own independent reality. Causation, according to Mādhyamika school, is only of the nature of māyā, it is a mystery which cannot be explained. But according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, causation is a factual reality. Mādhyamika school interprets Pratityā-samutpāda, the Buddhist theory of causation, as the theory of relative existence or śunyata, which means that it cannot be rationally explained. But according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, causation can be rationally explained; there is no mystery behind it.
Yogācāra school again interprets Pratityā-samutpāda-vāda as a theory of motion and according to it, it refers to a cosmos which is essentially kinetic. According to Pratityā-samutpāda, as Santarakṣita interprets it, everything is kinetic; there is no God, no matter, no substance, no quality, no (separate) action, no universals and no inherence, but there is strict conformity between every fact and its result. This interpretation leads us to the three general formulas given by Stcherbatsky\textsuperscript{87}, disclosing the meaning and implications of Buddhist theory of causation. The third formula says that "all elements are forceless". Now to say like this is to deny the instrumental or efficient cause. To exert force on another thing it must live for more than one moment. But as everything is momentary, nothing can exert force on anything. Thus while instrumental causality plays an important role in the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika theory, it has no room in the Buddhist theory. Again, while inherent cause is a passive substance in Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika, there is nothing passive in the Buddhist theory. According to Buddhist theory, the essence of effect is not the same as that of cause. In Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika, the essence of effect, though different from its cause resides in its inherent cause, which does not die out and exists side by side with the effect.

According to both Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika and the Buddhists, there is not one cause of an effect. According to Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika, however, the number of causes is limited. There is the inherent cause in the form of parts, there is the non-inherent cause in

the form of connection of the parts. But in the Buddhist theory, the number of causes is not calculable; it is unlimited. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika we find causes helping or influencing each other, but in Buddhist theory they do not help or exert influence on each other. Therefore, the Buddhist theory is called the one-result-production theory (eka-kārya-kāritva or eka-kriyā-kāritva) in contrast to the 'mutual help' or 'mutual influence' theory (Paraspara upakārītva) of the Naiyāyikas.

There is another distinctive point between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory and the Buddhist theory. According to the former, the effect, after being produced, resides in its cause which does not perish and subsists side by side with it, and according to the latter, the cause, after the appearance of the effect, disappears in total.

Regarding the similarities and dissimilarities of Buddhist theory with the Western schools we may notice first towards David Hume. The rejection of substance, soul and all relations is Humean in character. Hume recognises two main principles of his philosophy: "that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences." Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. 88

But there is a very important difference which should not be ignored. Hume would account for the notion of substance,

88. Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix, pp. 636-6
(Selby-Bigge's Edn.)
causality etc. through the operation of the empirical laws of association and habit. The Buddhist was alive, like Kant, to the fact that these notions are a-priori and are not of empirical origin. Alongside of their rejection of the substance view and the acceptance of the real as momentary states (model view), the Buddhists developed the complementary doctrine of avidya and vicālpa; with a metaphysic largely Humean, they elaborated their analysis of knowledge more or less on Kantian lines.

We have seen that there is the major difference between Humean and Buddhist philosophy. The chief aim of Buddha was to free people from sorrows and delusions of life. Life in this world is full of suffering (dukkha). All human beings who are involved in this cycle of birth and death should try to attain salvation from it. Birth, death, decay are painful. Even the pleasures are painful because they are always accompanied by the fear that we may lose them. Therefore, all human beings in this world need to be saved from suffering and released from suffering which can be possible only through nirvāṇa or attainment of Buddhahood. Buddha did not stop by telling about life as dukkha, but in the second Noble Truth pointed out the cause of dukkha and in the third and fourth showed that there can be a cessation of the dukkha and the way by which one reaches the cessation of dukkha. Dukkha depends on some conditions, and if those conditions cease, dukkha ceases also. Thus cessation of suffering is possible and attainable in this life, if certain conditions are fulfilled. Buddha followed the path which leads

88. Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix, pp. 635-6
(Selby-Bigge's edn.)
to the extinction of misery and affirmed that others can also follow it, if they want to attain a state free from misery, that is nirvāṇa.

Hume, on the other hand, was not bothered by the suffering in the world, and we do not find in him any concept comparable to the Buddhist concept of nirvāṇa. He was not trying to save human beings from the suffering of this world. Hume's aim was to analyse different ways of knowing and to discover the principles which would meet the most critical examination. 89

The great contribution that Buddhist thought made to Indian philosophy was the discovery of the subjective — the doctrine of appearance. Not merely the categories of substance, but causality, change, existence (bhāva), non-existence (abhāva), were equally subjective. What was avidyā for the Buddhist was real for the Sāṅkhya or the Vedānta and vice versa. We may say that the Buddhist metaphysics from the very start partook of the Humean and the Kantian: in admitting the reality of the separate elements the Buddhists were like Hume; and unlike Hume but like Kant they ascribe the origin of the substance — notion to avidyā which is beginningless and non-empirical in origin. Hume was content to derive the notions of causality, substance etc. from experience itself through the operation of the empirical laws of association and habit. Kant acquaints us with a deeper and more universal subjectivity — the Transcendental.

89. Treatise of Human Nature — Hume, Pg. 272
Not only do the Buddhist philosophers argue that the cause not and cannot co-exist with its effect, they also say that they do not see any necessity why the cause must exert its influence on the effect. In fact, there is no causal operation distinct from the cause anywhere in this universe.

But if there is nothing called 'causal efficacy' how will the Buddhist philosopher then explain such colloquial expressions as "the fire procees the smoke?" Kamalasīla replies that sentences such as "the cause produces the effect" are only metaphorical expressions of proposition such as 'the effect arises depending on the cause.' In fact the word 'depend' only signifies in this context, that "the effect always arises immediately after the cause." And what is meant by the word "the cause acts on the effect" is nothing but 'the cause is always conjoined with the appearance of the effect.'

Santaraksita and Kamalasīla have ruthlessly criticized this concept of causal efficacy, which, according to them, has neither the sanction of logic nor that of experience. They bring out a series of objections against this concept. What is the factual evidence on which this hypothesis of a causal factor distinct from a cause is based? Surely, this mysterious entity called 'causal efficacy' is not amenable to sense-percept-ion.

90. "idam eva hi kāryasya kārane'pekṣā yat tadanantara bhūvitam, kāraṇasyāpi karye'yam eva vyāpāro yat kāryodayakāle sadā sannhitatvam." - Tattvasangraha-panjkā, Pg. 177. - Kamalasīla
Whenever we discover that an object comes into existence if and only if another is present we call the latter the cause of the former. If this is the cause, why should we attribute the causal character to a mysterious entity called 'causal efficacy'? Why not attribute the causal character to the cause itself?

We should note the remarkable similarity of these arguments with that of Hume. Hume grants that, at least according to common notions, the concepts of power, force, energy or necessary connection etc. are fundamental to the concept of cause. Yet he restores that 'there are no ideals, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, then those of power, force, energy or necessary connection.

According to his special method of clarifying obscure ideas by referring to the "impressions or original sentiments from which the ideas are copied." Hume urges his reader to examine the impression from which the idea of power is derived. But Hume declares that "when we look about us towards external

91. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā - Pg. 178. - Kamalasūla.
92. Ibid., Pg. 177
93. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding - Hume, Pg. 63
94. Ibid.
In order to appreciate the full value of Hume's arguments against, "power", "force", "necessary connection" it seems worthwhile to look back at a very old theory strongly believed by many philosophers. According to this theory, things behaved in the way they did because of their possessing a certain property called 'productive power'. This productive power has supposed to be hidden from our view. Now this notion of hidden power had already been the target of philosophical criticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (e.g. by Newton, Locke etc.).

Hume makes several points against such a theory of occult powers. The first point that Hume makes is that, we never have any experience of such a thing as power in the things around us. But it is not very clear from his writing what Hume is exactly pointing out here. Probably what he means is that we do not see anything over and above the objects related by causal relationship and particular states of them.

Even if, for the sake of argument, we admit that such powers do exist in causes, it would be a thoroughly useless concept, in our causal enquiries. Even ordinary men constantly use such terms as 'cause' and 'effect' in their daily lives. Yet they do not have to penetrate into the essence of 'cause'.

95. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding - David Hume, Ch. 63.
96. Treatise of Human Nature - Hume, Pg. 86.
in order to find out some such secret 'power'. They do not need to go to a scientist to determine whether this plant is dying because of the attack of insects.

Besides the notion of 'secret' power leads to some sort of conceptual absurdity. If we do not ever come across any such power in the world around us how can we form any concept of power at all?

But it may be urged that although external objects do not serve as mines from which such metals as 'power' may be extracted. Yet the mind might well serve as such a mine. After all, we are every day confronted with the 'force' that our 'will' is exerting.

Hume disposes of arguments like this in the following way. Firstly, both the command of the will over body, and thought are extremely 'mysterious'. How does the most refined thought actuate the greatest matter?

The influence of the will, both over the organs and over thoughts, is limited. We cannot move certain organs of our body like the liver and the heart by our will. We are masters of our thoughts and sentiments at certain moments, and at other time we are not. It is only by experiments and observations that we know the limits of the will. But were we conscious of a 'power' or 'secret' 'connection' which binds them together and renders them inseparable we would have known the limits a-priori.

97. Enquiry, Pg. 66
Santaraksita and Kamalasila brought against the notion of a occult 'causal power'. Does this causal efficacy, they ask, produce the effect through the medium of another efficacy or not? If it does, then the causal character should be imparted to that other efficacy. And this latter efficacy will also, in that case, depend on another efficacy to bring about the effect. The same argument would apply to the third efficacy, and hence we shall be faced with ad infinitum.

Any way they reject the utility of the concept of causal efficacy and say that "the only basis for the relation of cause and effect consists in immediate sequence, and not in any efficacious action." 98

Thus we have seen that Hume analysed causal relations as relations of uniform sequence between events, but Hume took a simple view of what it is that is found to recur in causal sequences. He often wrote as if it were pairs of single events which are related by way of unvarying sequences.

Our examination of certain aspects of the Buddhist causal theories has, as it has proceeded so far, revealed to us some general points of resemblance between the position of the Buddhists and that of British empiricists like Mill. But how can the Buddhist logicians avoid the necessity of designating every case of constant conjunction as a case of causation.

Buddhist logicians like Xamalasała have shown that the presence of cattle in the cow-shed cannot be said to cause the smoke in that area. The reason is, smoke may be present in some cases at least, even when no cattle are around, whereas nothing can be the cause of smoke if smoke could be present even in some cases in its absence. In other words, the Buddhist logicians are trying to say that smoke can be caused by something only if the former (in addition to being constantly conjoined) is necessarily connected with the latter. That this is what the Buddhists imply, is evident from the following consideration:

The statement, 'No case of X is possible without Y', really means 'X is necessarily connected with Y.' If no case of being a bachelor is possible without its being a case of a male, then being a bachelor is necessarily connected with being a male. Thus one can conclude that if no case of smoke is possible without a case of fire, then smoke is necessarily connected with fire.

Mill had argued that only that phenomenon is a cause which besides being immediately antecedent to the effect, is also an unconditioned antecedent to the latter. But how does one determine whether an antecedent is unconditioned or not? Surely we do so only by repeated observation of the phenomena. Thus we arrive at the 'further quality' which, Mill says, an antecedent must possess if it is to deserve the title of a cause, through our experience of the unvarying succession of several phenomena.
The Buddhist logicians would, however, say that the "further quality" which a case of causation must possess is that of 'necessary connection' and they do not arrive at this concept through observation of several instances of succession. That everything is necessarily connected with the effect it produces follows from the very definition of something as real. A real entity or 'Paramārtha sat' must be able to give rise to an effect, it must be artha-kriyā-kāri. An imaginary fire, whether we imagine it to be in the vicinity or at a distance from us, fails to make any impact on us. That is because it is an unreal entity. That a cause must be necessarily connected with its effect, does, therefore, follow from the very definition of something as real.

Rhys Davids observes that the theory of Dependent origination gives us "not only the whole of early Buddhism in a nutshell, but also just those points concerning which we find the most emphatic affirmations of Dharma as Dharma ascribed to Gautama." And this is the substance of what we have learnt in the above discussion of Buddha's teaching.

Again we have seen in the Buddhism the causality between point instants, not between stabilities or duration. This is likewise the opinion of Mr. Russell, although he would expect them to assert that they obtain between small bits of duration and small pieces of stability. The view that causality is a many-one relation (plurality of causes) and that to every particular change there is a corresponding state of the Universe of Being — there is an almost exact coincidence between
Buddhist views and the views expressed by Mr. Russell. 39

John Stuart Mill says that law of causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar of inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariably of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it.

Henry Bergson says that the law of causality means that every phenomenon is determined by its conditions, or, in other words, that the same causes produce the same effects.

And from the above it is appeared that the problem of causality plays an important role both in Indian and in the Western thought. Pratitīya-samutpāda is the key doctrine of the Buddhism. It is not the temporal sequence of the origin and subsidence of momentary entities but their mutual dependence, their lack of thinghood or reality is thus equated with the unreality of things (niḥ svabhāvatva or 'sunnatā'). This is the resolution in Buddhist thought initiated by the Mādhyamika.