CHAPTER - III

NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF
CHRISTIAN MORALITY AND
CHRISTIAN RELIGION
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY

Nietzsche begins his philosophy as a revolutionary against the morality of his time and he sees morality therefore as an instrument for power in the hands of the weak. For him morality is no laughing matter. He sees it as the ultimate and most successful expression of decadence and nihilism, though the leading moralists claim that it is only morality that protects us from the evil forces of decadence and nihilism.

But morality has two different senses. The first sense means morality as a genus in which there may be many species; it is a concept in anthropology. Every culture, whether it is cosmopolitan or 'primitive', whether it is single-minded or multicultural, has its values, its ideals, its practical guidelines, its rules. Thus, in this sense, to be human is to have a morality. Even a hermit separated from society, necessarily lives according to some values,
ideals, practical guidelines and even rules. A morality is a collection of inherited, invented, or even instinctual practices. As such, the concept contains no specific values, no concrete rules or prohibitions, no particular guidelines or philosophical orientation. The second sense of the word 'morality' is quite specific and particular, even if it is described in terms of very general, even 'universal' rules or principles.

Different philosophers have given different opinions regarding morality. Kant, the exemplar of moral philosopher, argued that reason alone can determine right and wrong, and that the principles of morality are identical for all human beings. He focuses on general rules, particular obligations and a particular logical form, namely, as unconditional commands, which Kant called 'the Categorical imperative'. Kant denied that the necessity of morality lies in its supposed Divine origin and claimed it rather as a product of practical Reason.

It is this conception of morality as something singular, as something categorical, as something largely prohibitive that Nietzsche rejects and against which he wages war. But the attack on morality does not signify that "everything is permitted". Nietzsche says, "Each of us has a unique set of virtues, but by thinking that what we really are is defined by a set of general rules or principles (Categorical Imperative), we deny that uniqueness and
sacrifice those virtues to the bland and anonymous category of 'being a good person.' According to Nietzsche, a virtue must be our invention, our most personal defence and need, in every other sense it is merely a danger. That which does not support our life harms it. The virtue, the duty, the good stamped with the character of universality—these are mere delusions in which the decline and the ultimate enfeeblement of life express themselves. The most fundamental laws of preservation and growth demand precisely the reverse, namely, that each individual invent his own virtue, his own categorical imperative. It is not that Nietzsche wants to defend immortality but rather that he wants to defend the idea of human excellence that defines his ethics.

On the other hand, Aristotle, an ancient philosopher, focused rather on individual excellence or virtue. He never denied or ignored the social and political context in which excellence could be achieved. In fact, he assumed that it was only within certain social and political contexts that excellence could be achieved. ("To live a good life, one must live in a great city") But individual excellence is also defined by particular circumstances, by character, by one's role in society. And although the virtues can be generally described (courage, truthfulness, and so on), the focus, for Aristotle, remaining on the individuals who exemplify and cultivate those virtues. Gen-

eral principles tend to be empty rhetoric. The proof is in one's behaviour, not in the principles one follows or claims to follow.

There is even a very brief contrast with Kant and Mill.

According to Kant, man is not morally good unless his conduct is marked by the total absence of any psychological inclination and motivated solely by respect for reason. He opposed all other views of morality as sheer perversions. Mill, did not similarly repudiate kant's ethics rather he claimed that "to all those a-priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, Utilitarian arguments are indispensable."\(^2\) To this extent, Mill instead of opposing his own Utilitarianism to other conceptions of morality seems to have advanced it as a formulation of the essence of all moral codes. Mill could include Kant's ethics within the fold of Utilitarianism only on the basis of crucial misunderstanding of Kant. For Kant expediency was not a matter of concern at all, but moral worth was, to his mind, solely a function of rationality i.e. consistency, of the maxim according to which an action was resolved. He thought that any inconsistency might be made explicit by universalizing the maxim and determining whether its universal adoption would give rise to a situation in which the maxim could no longer be applied. As a generic definition of morality, Utilitarianism would fail to include Kant's morality. The force of Kant's ethics is that he crystallized elements

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that had long been implicit in the Western religious tradition, which com-
mmanded man to do the good because God willed it, regardless of the con-
sequences. This is the reason why Nietzsche finds Kant's Categorical Im-
perative to be dangerous to life.

But moral conduct is said to be "expedient" if actions are inspired by
love of God, fear of divine wrath or a less clearly defined sense of awe
should all be referred to expediency. Thus, the word "expediency" is given
so wide a meaning that all conduct might well be called expedient and the
distinguishing characteristic of moral conduct is lost. As a generic defini-
tion of moral goodness, the Utilitarian definition must therefore be rejected.
There is also distinction between the expediency of an act motivated by
fear and the expediency of simple acting on impulse, but this distinction
only confirms that expediency as such is not the essence of morality. But it
is an important characteristic of some moral code but not like self overcom-
ing which is the very essence of morality itself.

Now, we are to consider especially Nietzsche's conceptions of moral-
ity. Nietzsche is more like Aristotle than like Kant. In Contemporary termi-
nology, Nietzsche defends an ethics of virtue rather than an ethics of ra-
tional principles or obligations. Aristotle defends a role for rational prin-
ciples, but it is not obedience or respect for principles that motivates or justi-
fies an action. So, too, the Greeks had a clear sense of duty, but duties
followed from one's role's and responsibilities. They were not, as in Kant, derived from universal principles. But Nietzsche went much further than Aristotle in stressing the uniqueness of the individual.

Nietzsche's passage shows nothing less than a generic definition of morality, an attempt to crystallize the common essence of moral codes. Nietzsche himself offers four illustrations — codes of the Greeks, the Persians, the Jews and the Germans. And instead of stating any preference, he stresses the common generic element, self-overcoming. According to Nietzsche, there is another element that distinguishes the moral from the non-moral, it is self-overcoming. Kant's ethics also shows that the element of self overcoming is no less essential to the Utilitarian position. The force and plausibility of utilitarianism are inseparable from its insistence that the individual must overcome himself and subordinate his own interests to those of the greatest number. In so called primitive moral codes, too, the element of self-control and the disciplining of the inclinations is invariably present. Self-overcoming may thus be considered the common essence of all moral codes from "totem to taboo" to the ethics of the Buddha.

Nietzsche's position can be established more firmly by considering the form a moral code would have to take to elude his generic definition. Such a code could not place any restraint on the individual and would have
to permit him to act on impulse. While this position is conceivable, it would be in accordance with common usage to refuse to call it "Moral". "A man who adopted it might states his case thus -- I repudiate morality and prefer to act on impulse."³

Wherever man is found he imposes restraints on himself and it seems empirically sound to call man not only a "rational animal" but also a "moral animal". These two epithets are inseparable. The general concepts with characteristic function of reason involve the transcendence of the merely given, including impulse which can thus be criticised reflectively. Such self-criticism - i.e. man's critical reflection on his own intentions and actions is the core of morality. Of course, an action that is not impulsive is not necessarily good. A small baby who acts on impulse, on the other hand, is not immoral but simply amoral agent. Morality consists in not yielding to impulse. Moral codes are systems of injunctions against submission to various impulses and positive moral commandments always enjoy a victory over animal instincts.

Generally, morality is a device by which a particular type of man maintains himself and in establishing his code and enforcing it on others he uses the ordinary means which anyone, moral, immoral, would apply in such a situation. According to Nietzsche, "Morality is just as 'immoral', as any

³. Walter Kaufmann, op. cit, P. 213.
other thing on earth; morality itself is a form of immorality." In the book "The Will to Power," it deals with the grand politics of virtue. It is intended for the use of those whose interest must lie in learning, not how one makes virtuous—how virtue is made to dominate. According to Nietzsche, "The domination of virtue is not established by virtue itself; with virtue itself one renounces power, loses the will to power." "The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by 'immoral' means: force, lying, slander, injustice."

Furthermore, while Nietzsche might have agreed that, ideally, a great society might be lush breeding ground for cultivating the virtue in its individual members. He also rejects the society he lived in and separated individuality and community, virtue and good citizenship. Nietzsche says, "being so enmired by the society, thinking of oneself as a good citizen and following the general rulers than one's own particular virtues, is what Nietzsche so often condemns as 'herd morality', a morality for cows and not for creative human beings."

Nietzsche illustrated two classes in society and two kinds of morality prevalent in them—morality of the masters and morality of slaves. The Roman morality was the morality of masters and its qualities were bravery,
masculinity. The morality of slaves is exemplified by the Jews. The Jews are people "born for slavery" as the whole ancient world would say. The inversion of values (which includes using the word "poor" as synonymous with "holy" and "friend") constitutes the significance of the Jewish people and they mark the beginning of the slave rebellion in morals. The slave morality which is described by Nietzsche "herd morality" is responsible for the deterioration of mankind. This morality is fit for slaves and servants Nietzsche writes that, "the herd instinct of obedience is inherited best, and at the expense of the art of commanding" and draws attention to those who "would suffer from a bad conscience and in order to be able to command would have to practise a deceit upon themselves: the deceit that they too were only obeying. This state of things actually exists in Europe today: I call it the moral hypocrisy of the commanders. They know of no way of defending themselves against their bad conscience other than to pose as executors of more ancient or higher commands (commands of ancestors, of the constitution, of Justice, of the law or even of God.)" In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche boldly announces that "wandering through the many subtler and coarser moralities which have so far been prevalent on earth ....... I finally discovered two basic types and one basic difference --- master mo-

8. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, para 199.
rality and slave morality." He immediately adds that these two usually inter­
mingle and function together in all sorts of complex ways, and they even co­
exist "even in the same human being, within a single soul." Thus, what
Nietzsche is concerned with is the contrast of those who have power and
those who lack it, and he investigates it by contrasting not individuals but
groups of people. The distinction therefore tends to become sociological,
as the consequences of oppression are considered. In spite of the polemi­
cal tone, it does not follow from Nietzsche's "vivisection of slave morality
that he identifies his own position with that of the masters". Nietzsche's own
ethic is beyond both master and slave morality.

Morality, in the singular sense presented in the Bible and defended by
Kant is, slave morality. In its most crude forms it consists of general prin­
ciples imposed from above by the rulers or by God that constrain the indi­
vidual. In its subtler and more sophisticated forms, the external authority is
relocated internally — in the faculty of reason. But the most characteristic of
morality in either its crude or, its sophisticated forms is that it is mainly pro­
hibitive and constraining rather than inspiring.

Master morality, on the other hand, is an ethics of virtue, an ethics in
which personal excellence is primary. But personal excellence is not con­
trasted with personal happiness. According to Nietzsche, achieving excel-
rence is precisely what makes one happy. But to grudgingly fulfil one's obli-
gations, at some cost to one's own goal and satisfaction, makes one un-
happy. The "master" takes as his or her morality just those values, ideals
and practices that are personally preferable and suitable. Master morality
takes as its watch word "Become who you are," and it does not concern
whether or not one turns out to be like anyone else, or even whether or not
one is acceptable to others.

According to Nietzsche, it is the masters, who establish the meaning
of "good". They use this term to refer to what they see as admirable, desir-
able, satisfying and in fact refer to themselves. Thus they recognize the dis-
tinction between what is good and what is bad, but the latter refers only to
deficiencies of the good, what is frustrating or debilitating, to failure, or in-
adequacy, to what is other than themselves, their tastes, their virtues and to
others who fail or fall behind. No principles, rulers, or gods are necessary to
make the distinction, which arise from the ideals and desires of the mas-
ters themselves. Thus, one might summarize master' morality as "being
myself, and getting what I want," with the understanding that what one is and
what one wants may be quite refined and noble.

But for the slaves, getting what one wants is just too difficult, too un-
likely and too implausible. Slaves do not like themselves, so the idea of becoming who you are is not particularly appealing. The masters see the slaves as pathetic, as miserable, as unhappy, both because they don't get what they want and because what they want is often so petty. But the slaves do not see themselves as deprived and oppressed and in modern terms as victims. Nor do they see the masters as merely happy and fulfilled. The slaves see them as oppressors, as people with the wrong values, the wrong ideals, the wrong ideas about living.

NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION

Nietzsche links up morality with religion. In the first instance at least, the moral code is determined by priests. Nietzsche's view of religion, and consequently of the nature and function of priestcraft is not quite unambiguous, and when it seems to him to reflect the code and outlook of an aristocratic or caste society, he inclines to approve of it. According to Nietzsche, all religion is founded on a "holy lie", and is the product of priestcraft. Christianity, he comes to think, is the worst of all religions. The priest, then is the founder of religion and the author of the moral code. He makes the members of the community feel that every event that touches them is conditioned by laws of morality and religion known to the priest, and he must extend his power widely without his hand being seen in it. He does
this by the conception of a life beyond death, where morality and religion reign unchecked.

To achieve these ends he diverts the attention of those whom he would control from the ordinary causal sequence of events revealed by experience. He made the people believe that the course of things is governed by moral or supernatural law rather than by natural causes. Then, by means of the conception of another life beyond death, he divorces judgements of good and evil from their natural objects. Good naturally means "life - promoting", "life - retarding", but when life on earth is over balanced by a far greater and more magnificent life to come, the priest is free to attach any value he pleases to ordinary human events. A new scale of values is thus imposed on humanity and given a superhuman sanction. In this way, Nietzsche says, "the famous 'Conscience' is finally created : an inner voice which measures the value of every action not by its consequences but by its intention and conformity of this intention to law."11

Thus, Nietzsche continues, the "holy lie" of the priest invents ------

(a) a God who punishes and rewards, who strictly observes the law-book of the priests, who are then regarded as his mouthpieces and accredited agents ;

11. F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Para, 141.
(b) a life beyond, during which the scale of reward and punishments earned by moral or immoral conduct comes into force,

(c) a conscience, which speaks for God and the priest in the individual soul,

(d) a moral code the laws of which supersede ordinary causation and

(e) faith, which is belief in the infallibility of the priestly dogmas, and which is substituted for truth, as the condition for all salvation and happiness in this life and the next. This, Nietzsche says, amounts to a "kind of castration of the seeking and forward-striving spirit" and it sets forth "the worst mutilation of man that can be imagined, as the 'good man'.

The priest appeals to the herd instinct against those strong ones who wish to stand apart from the group, to the resentment which the suffering and down trodden feel against those who are fortunate and happy, and to the jealousy of the mediocre for the exceptions. And on this foundation of resentment and jealousy he builds up a powerful movement, which, developing with cruelty, falsity and narrow mindedness, overwhelms men of the higher type.

The priest, of course, enters here as a consoler and helper to establish his power all the more firmly. But he is in reality, Nietzsche maintains, no
true physician; at best he removes only symptoms and leaves the disease untouched. The consolation which he promises are unreal and his prescriptions have an evil effect. He exploits the emotional sensitivity of his followers in a morbid way. Nietzsche comments in 'The Genealogy of Morals', "If one intends it to convey that such a system of treatment has reformed man, I shall not contradict him, but I shall add that for me 'reformed' means just the same as 'tamed', 'weakened', 'discouraged', 'refined', 'coddled', 'emasculated'. When however, you have to deal in the main with the ill, the depressed, the oppressed, then such a system, even if it has made the ill man 'better', under all circumstances makes him more ill."12

All this, Nietzsche thinks, is most reprehensible but it is only by resorting to such underhand tactics that morality and religion can impose themselves on the community.

But Nietzsche is not satisfied with it. Its weakness, from the point of view of his philosophy, is that it is beside the point, for any force which it has in practice rests on an appeal to the moral standards which Nietzsche, at other times, explicitly rejects. He therefore asserts that these miserable, moral, superfluous ones are not really strong but they are weak. The general position which he defends in this regard is that weakness gives rise to weakness, that the remedies which the sick man uses only increase his

disease. This is of course the extreme form of religious morality, but according to Nietzsche it shows the principle of the whole in high relief. Thus morality Nietzsche insists, is essentially negative. It arises out of resentment against the code and behaviour of the privileged aristocratic class, and the fundamental principle of it is that of levelling, debasing, destroying all that is vital and good. The ultimate ideal of morality is an ascetic one which is hostile to life. It springs, of course, from the will to power, and it finds its first field in its criticism of the aristocratic mode of life.

"When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear."13 Religion and art strive to effect a change in one's feeling, in part by changing the way by which one judges experiences and in part by awakening a pleasure in pain, in emotion generally. The more the rule of religious and all narcotic arts decreases, the more squarely do men confront the real elimination of the misfortune, which is worse for the priests because until now they fed on the narcotization of human misfortunes.

Nietzsche remarks, "How gladly one would exchange the false claims of priests- that there is a God who demands the good from us, who is guard-
ian and witness of each act, each moment, each thought, who loves us and wants the best for us in every misfortune."\(^{14}\) But the tragic thing is that one can no longer believe those dogmas of religion and metaphysics. Thus, a strong impetus toward espousing atheism as the noblest human creed came from the pen of Friedrich Nietzsche. He served as the turbulent channel for conveying into our own age the atheistic implications of certain new trends in 19th century science and culture. His interpretations convinced the atheistic wing of existentialism that this is a godless world and induced the other existentialists at least to be very wary of making philosophical statements about God. His influence in this matter reached far beyond professional philosophical circles, just as did the impact of Marx's attack on God and religion.

Marx was bound to seek to eliminate God from practical life. He agreed heartily with Feuerbach that the more a man attributes to God, the less he attributes to himself. The God thus indicted was the Hegelian absolute spirit, which was conceived as the only genuine subject in being. In that case, man and nature would be nothing more than mere predicates of this unique, spiritual subject. Hence Marx appealed to men's piety toward nature and their humanistic reverence toward cultural achievements as sufficient reasons for the atheistic attitude. His criticism of God rests on two unspoken

\(^{14}\) Ibid, Para 109.
premises: that Hegel has reduced the doctrine on God entirely to his dialectic of the absolute and that Feuerbach has reduced God or absolute spirit to a mode of alienation of the human mind and desiring power. In his dual reduction is contained the nerve of Marx's denial of God. Hence within the Marxian perspective, theism finds its basic refutation not in speculative analysis but in practical critique of law and politics and more precisely in the social changes.

Nietzsche was encouraged toward atheism from Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), the pessimistic German philosopher whose non-theistic metaphysical views influenced him. Schopenhauer had argued that the principle of sufficient reason, upon which rested the rationalist proofs of God, applied validly only to particular kind of reasons and only to particular sensible objects within the infinite series of phenomena. According to Schopenhauer both the rationalist and the Hegelian use of the principle of sufficient reason to establish the existence of God or absolute spirit was unwarranted. So Schopenhauer says that God is supposed to be a nonsensuous being and an absolute or general reasons for things, where as the principle of sufficient reason applies only to sensuous object and has its real basis only in particular sorts of reasons. Schopenhauer also blocked off the Kantian access to God by means of practical reason. According to him practical reason is without any distinctive content and, in any case, must conform with
the general limitations of the principle of sufficient reason. Thus Schopenhauer was professedly atheistic, since he denied the God of Wolff, the moral postulate of Kant, and the absolute reason of Hegel.

Still, Schopenhauer admitted one noumenal entity, the blind and restless cosmic will-to-live, which we can grasp only through an irrational intuition. Since this will is the source of all striving and pain, Schopenhauer counseled men to quell its power, either through aesthetic contemplation and altruistic acts or more radically and permanently, through the ascetic attitude recommended by the Eastern religions and Christianity. He held that the essential message of Christianity is the denial of the world both in its sensuous aspects and in its inner will toward the increase of life. However, Schopenhauer was curiously reluctant to conclude unqualifiedly that the denial of the will-to-live leads to utter nothingness. He left a loophole open for maintaining that this denial is only the converse side of a new act of affirming the existence of a completely transcendent being. Because of the restriction of the principle of sufficient reason and the evil consequences of the will-to-live, however, Schopenhauer taught that it is beyond the philosopher's competence to make this new affirmation of being. Only the mystics could perhaps do that, but there would be no philosophical means for verifying their assertions.
Nietzsche sees in Schopenhauer's system a resurrection of the Christian conception of the world and of the nature of man.\textsuperscript{15} Nietzsche regards Christianity as inspired by an attitude of world-negation—an attitude of renunciation. He also views Schopenhauer as seeking to articulate and justify pessimism based on the perception of the world as an evil, salvation being sought in the total transcendence of the duality of good and evil— in the will's complete denial of itself. Nietzsche too argues for this transcendence but for an entirely different reason. According to him, transcendence is a precondition for the will's desire for authentic being— the desire to assert itself through rejection followed by creation. Thus transcendence is neither a necessary means for escaping from the evil that is the world nor does it lead to a state of denial and non-being.\textsuperscript{16}

Although Nietzsche endeavours to seal off even the extraphilosophical possibility of a genuinely transcendent reality, he welcomes Schopenhauer's negative arguments. They give him the courage to break with his religious past and openly advocate atheism. Nietzsche would like to persuade us to embrace atheism out of sheer honesty and courage to face the truth about being and to see the harsh but unavoidable implication of all the healthy advances in Western Culture. When he says that he himself is an atheist by

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, Para 26.
\textsuperscript{16} F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Para 56.
instinct and taste, he does not mean to rule out all antitheistic arguments but rather to lend them the added weight of scientific inevitability and humanistic liberation.

Like Karl Marx, Nietzsche is fascinated by the myth of Prometheus, hurling his defiant hatred at all the gods. He describes his own promethean atheism as stemming from hubris, or an overbearing, passionate pride in human freedom and to resolve to remain true to the earth at all costs. Because this attitude goes against the grain of the theistic religious and intellectual traditions, its successful propagation among other minds requires a criticism of these prevailing traditions. Nietzsche's antitheistic program is carried out in two stages—

1. An experimental revision of our view of being and knowledge and


1. An experiment concerning the world and truth -- Nietzsche follows the customary pattern of modern atheism, as set by Feurbach and Marx. According to the outlines given in 'Beyond Good and Evil' (1886), the coming philosopher is to be a tripartite mixture of sceptic, critic and experimenter. He is to be sceptical about all traditions and absolutes of the past

Yet he is not to be paralyzed by the indecisiveness of the complete sceptic but is to be a critical moralist using a definite method and standard of values. Above all, however, the philosopher of the future is to engage in intellectual and moral experiments, in harmony with his conviction about the total fluidity of everything. He must be prepared to take a radically new stance toward the world, himself and God. It is only through introducing a "dangerous perhaps" about the nature of things that the hold of God and a theistically grounded morality can be loosened and finally broken.

According to Nietzsche, one cannot properly speak about "the" truth but only about humanly founded truth. There is no absolute truth corresponding to some region of permanent essences because there is no evidence of such a region in being. Hence it is meaningless to proclaim the absolute truth of God's transcendent reality. Human truths are perspectives taken on a particular situation for a particular purpose. They remain many, subject to revision and confined to human projects. This also applies, with equal rigour, to moral truths. There is no universal moral world order or absolute good -- only the plural goods of human aims and the finite sanctions they impose.

2. The hammer - blow of God's death: In announcing the death of God, Nietzsche does much more than simply echo a theme already elaborated by Hegel. Instead of making it the prelude to the truth about absolute spirit, he makes it the outcome of the error about absolute spirit. Where as
Hegel interprets God's death in terms of becoming which is already pre-contained within the absolute. Nietzsche divorces becoming entirely from the context of absolute spirit and then takes God as a synonym for the illusion about the absolute. Thus God is dead precisely because the absolutism of infinite and eternal spirit is exposed as a mortifying creation of the human mind.

According to Nietzsche, there can be no independent reality of God. The whole issue concerns only the origin and value of the idea of God, taken without any metaphysical possibility of having a real, suprahuman referent. Hegel suggested the decline of effective belief in God. Nietzsche's resolute psychologism on this point requires the meaning to be the only tenable one — "The cultural decay of the idea of God spells the decline of the only kind of being God has ever enjoyed."17 Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not want to imply that the removal of this idea is a painless and insignificant event, like the banishing of the idea of hobgoblins. God's death raises the essential question whether worldly existence has any intrinsic meaning by itself.

Nietzsche is perhaps best known for having proclaimed the death of God. He does in fact mention that God is dead, but his fullest and most force-
ful statement to this effect actually belongs to one of his fictional characters, the madman of Gay Science. Nietzsche by using the figure of the madman who tries to spread the news of God's death, castigates what might be called the frivolous and non-aggressive way of receiving this news. Nietzsche's madman declares not only that God is dead and the churches are now 'tombs and sepulchres of God', but also that "we have killed him -- you and I. All of us are his murderers." Although the madman may accept these statements as literally true, they clearly function as metaphors for Nietzsche. The 'death of God' is a metaphor for a cultural event that he believes has already taken place but which, like the death of a distant star, is not yet visible to normal sight. Belief in God has become unbelievable, the Christian idea of God is no longer a living force in Western Culture.

The death of God means the deliberate extirpation of the idea of God and the downfall of the entire system of standards and conduct hinging upon the acceptance of that idea. Men who no longer adhere to it are murderers of God, and must bear personal responsibility for the deed and its incalculable repercussions upon our culture. Nietzsche insists that the essential message of modern atheism is neither speculative impossibility of demonstrating God's existence nor the purely factual cultural report that God is no longer widely believed. The real core of Nietzschean antitheism is that god

18. F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Para, 125
is not believed because he is no longer believable, no longer worthy of en­
listing human assent and support.

"What sets us apart is not that we recognize no God, either in history
or in nature or behind nature --- but that we find that which has been rever­
enced as God no 'god like' but pitiable, absurd, harmful, not merely an error
but a crime against life ........ We deny God as God ............... If this God of
the Christians were proved to us to exist, we should know even less how to
believe in him."19 This revealing text shows the passionate depth of
Nietzsche's antitheism, voluntaristic aspect which would refuse to accept a
demonstration, its recognition of Christian theism as the supreme enemy
and its indictment of God on Vitalistic, moral and humanistic grounds. God
is dead in the emphatic sense that the idea of God no longer represents the
highest value but is at last rejected as the supreme disvalue or antithesis to
human life and ideals. According to Nietzsche, anyone who accepted this
idea of God was a deserter from temporal history a betrayer of the scien­
tific method based on sense knowledge, and a diverter of moral energy
from the immanent, life - promoting aims of the will - to power to a goal that
is enervating and suicidal. When he considers the moral consequences of
regulating one's life by devotion to such a God as he has defined, Nietzsche's
furious denunciation bursts all bounds. In the Anti-Christ, he assails "God

as the declaration of war against life, against nature, against the will to life! God-the formula for every calumny of 'this world', for every lie about 'the next world'! In God nothingness deified, the will to nothingness pronounced holy!

Nietzsche declares that the situation would be unendurable if there were gods and he could not be one of them through his legislating will. He presumes that there is something humiliating about acknowledging the real existence of a being which does not come within one's own self-creative power. Nietzsche's voluntarism of knowledge is a special case of his metaphysics of cosmic becoming and power and it is only within this framework that human freedom is violated by the acknowledgement of God as the transcendent, causal existent. His image of God as God of the sick, as spider etc, is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God.

Thus, Nietzsche views all Gods as human creation, reflections of what human beings value. However, pagan Gods were constructed from the qualities human beings saw and valued in themselves, whereas the Christian God was given qualities that were the opposite of what human perceived in themselves, the opposite of our inescapable animal instincts. According to Nietzsche, our natural being could then be re-interpreted as 'guilt before

20. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zalathustra, III 12.
God' and taken to indicate our unworthiness. Constructed to devalue our natural being, the Christian God is a projection of value from the viewpoint of the ascetic ideal. That this God is dead amounts to a prediction that Christian theism, along with the ascetic ideal that forms its basis, is nearing its end as a major cultural force and that its demise will be brought about by forces that are already at work.

One such force, to which Nietzsche himself has contributed, is the development of atheism in the West, a development that stems from Christian Morality itself and the will to truth it promotes. The will to truth, a commitment to truth 'at any price', is the latest expression of the ascetic ideal.

Now, the question arises - what is the meaning of ascetic ideal? The ascetic ideal, however, is an expression of the basic fact of the human will, "its 'horror of a vacuum', it needs a goal -- and it will rather will nothingness than not will."21 "In the case of artists Ascetic ideal means nothing or too many things ; in the case of philosophers and scholars something like a sense and instinct for the most favourable preconditions of higher spirituality ; .......... in the case of saints, finally a pretext for hibernation, their newest lust for glory, their repose in nothingness ("God"), their form of madness."22 The will to truth also undermines the whole Christian world view of which

22. Ibdi, III, Para. - 1.
'God' is the symbol. Inspired by the will to truth, philosophy since Descartes has progressively undermined the arguments that supported Christian doctrines and science has given us reason to believe that we can explain all the explicable features of empirical reality without appealing to God or any other transcendent reality. Theism has thus become cognitively superfluous. In this situation we can justify atheism without demonstrating the falsity of theism, Nietzsche claims, if we also have a convincing account of how theism could have arisen and acquired its importance without being true. It may not be irrational, but it is psychologically impossible, Nietzsche thinks, to accept theism if the commitment to truthfulness has become fully ingrained, if hardness against oneself in matters of belief has become a matter of conscience. Atheism is "the awe-inspiring catastrophe of a two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally forbids itself the lie involved in belief in God."  

Although atheism, especially among the most spiritual and intellectual human beings, undoubtedly weakens Christianity, actually it does not bring about the death of God by itself. The modern world, as Kierkegaard has seen already, contains many other factors that weaken the influence of Christianity and its ideal. What, has really triumphed over Christian god is that "Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness taken more and more

strictly, the confessional subtlety of the Christian conscience translated and
sublimated into the scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any
price.\textsuperscript{24} All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of
self - overcoming. Thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of
"self - overcoming" in the nature of life -- the law giver himself eventually
receives the call -- "submit to the law you yourself proposed". In this way
Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality and in the same
way Christianity as morality must now perish too which stands on the threshold
of this event.

Thus, Nietzsche as a philosopher and also a psychologist defines his
own significance very largely in terms of his opposition to Christianity.
Nietzsche has no sympathy for Christianity. He explains the relationship of
Christianity to Judaism. He says that the jew was considered a Jew. This is
a central motif where Jesus and Christianity were 'Jewish' precisely in the
sense in which nineteenth - century Christians used to look down on what
was 'Jewish'. "If God wished to become an object of love, he should have
given up judging and justice first of all; a Judge, even a merciful Judge, is
no object of love. The founder of Christianity was not refined enough in his
feelings at this point -- being a Jew."\textsuperscript{25} According to Nietzsche the most

\textsuperscript{24} F. Nietzsche, Gay-Science, para. 357.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, para. 140.
famous pronouncements about Jesus is—"In reality, there has been one Christian, and he died on the Cross."²⁶ For Nietzsche, "The 'Evangel' died on the Cross. What was called 'Evangel' from this moment onwards was already the opposite of what he had lived 'bad tidings', a dysangel."²⁷ While it is evident that Nietzsche would make a sharp distinction between the message of Jesus and the creed of the disciples it would be quite false were one to conclude that Nietzsche accepted the 'glad tidings'. They serve him as a welcome contrast and antithesis to later Christianity. Nietzsche's attitude depends on his conception of Jesus and this conception is not only heretical theologically, but does not recommend itself on purely historical grounds. His attitude toward Jesus is incomprehensible apart from it. Nietzsche offers two pictures of Jesus —. "One from the outside -- a polemical attempt at reconstructing history -- and one from the inside -- an equally polemical attempt at reconstructing what Nietzsche provocatively called 'the psychology of the Redeemer.'"²⁸ The picture of "the psychological type of the Redeemer" is needed and it concerns Nietzsche very much. Because according to Nietzsche, "After all, this could be contained in the Gospels in spite of the Gospels, however much mutilated and overloaded with foreign traits."²⁹ It is not concerned with the truth what he did, what he

²⁶. F. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Para. 139.
²⁷. Ibid, Para. 39.
²⁸. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche; Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, P. 338.
said, how he really died, but the question whether his type can still be exhibited at all, whether it has been 'transmitted'. Even the attempts that Nietzsche made, to extract the history of a 'soul' from the Gospels seems to him proofs of a psychological frivolity. In the entire psychology of the 'Gospel' the concept guilt, punishment and reward is lacking. "'Sin', every kind of distancing relationship between God and man, is abolished - precisely this is the 'glad tidings.'"\(^\text{30}\)

Nietzsche said that Monsieur Renan is the buffoon in psychologies, who has introduced the two most inappropriate concepts into his explanation of the Jesus type -- the concept of genius and the concept of the hero ('heros'). But if anything is unevangelical it is the concept of the hero. "Everyone is a child of God -- Jesus definitely claims nothing for himself alone - as a child of God everyone is equal to everyone else ...... To make a hero of Jesus ! And what a worse misunderstanding is the word 'genius'!"\(^\text{31}\) According to Nietzsche, one should translate such a condition into its ultimate consequence -- "an instinctive hatred of every reality, as flight into the 'ungraspable', into the 'inconceivable', as antipathy towards every form ..... all that is custom, institution, Church."\(^\text{32}\) All the concepts of the church are recognised as the most malicious false - coinage for the purpose of

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\(^{30}\) Ibid, Para. 33.
\(^{31}\) Ibid, Para. 29
\(^{32}\) Ibid, Para. 29.
disvaluing nature and natural values. The consequence of such a condition projects itself into a new practice, the true evangelic practice. It is not a 'belief' which distinguishes the Christian, the Christian acts, he is distinguished by a different mode of acting. "The life of the redeemer was nothing else than this practice -- his death too was nothing else.... He no longer required any formulas, any rites for communicating with god -- not even prayer." 33 He knows that it is through the practice of one's life that one feels 'divine', 'blessed', 'evangelic', at all times a 'child of God'. The redeemer use to say that it is not 'penance', not 'prayer for forgiveness' which leads to God but the evangelic practice alone leads to God. On the contrary the history of Christianity and that from the very death on the Cross is the history of progressively cruder misunderstanding of an original symbolism. "With every extension of Christianity over even broader, even ruder masses in whom the preconditions out of which it was born were more and more lacking, it become increasingly necessary to vulgarize, to barbarize Christianity" 34 Christianity absorbed the absurdities of every sort of morbid reason. So Nietzsche says that the fate of Christianity lies in the necessity for its faith itself to grow as morbid, low and vulgar as the requirements it was intended to satisfy were morbid, low and vulgar. "I traverse the madhouse - world of entire millenia, be it called 'Christianity', 'Christian faith', 'Christian Church'.

33. Ibid, Para. 33.
34. Ibid, Para. 37.
with a gloomy circumspection — I take care not to make mankind responsi-
ble for its insanities." But Nietzsche’s feelings suddenly alters, bursts forth
and immediately he enters the modern age. He finds that what was formaly
merely morbid has today become indecent -- it is indecent to be a Christian
today. Christianity has waged a war to the death against every feeling of
reverence and distance between man and man, against everything noble,
joyful, high -spirited on earth and also against our happiness on earth. Thus
Christianity is a revolt of everything that crawls along the ground directed
against that which is elevated. And from here his disgust commences be-
cause Nietzsche finds that there is no longer a word left of what was for-
merly called 'truth'.

According to Nietzsche, "A religion like Christianity, which is at no point
in contact with actuality, which crumbles away as soon as actuality comes
into its own at any point whatever, must naturally be a mortal enemy of the
'wisdom of the world.'" Christianity needs sickness almost as much as
Hegelianism needs a superfluity of health and making sick is the true hid-
den objective of the churches’ system of salvation procedures. "We others,
who have courage for health and also for contempt, what contempt we have
for a religion which teaches misunderstanding of the body!" Thus, the

35. Ibid, Para. 38.
36. Ibid, Para. 47.
37. Ibid, Para. 51.
Christian movement is not only the expression of the decline of a race, but it is an aggregate formation of decadence types from everywhere crowding together and seeking one another out. Sickness belongs to the essence of Christianity and the typical Christian condition 'faith' has to be a form of sickness, every straightforward, honest, scientific road to knowledge is repudiated by the Church as a forbidden road. Nietzsche's main objection to Christianity or to the old morality was that it caused acceptance of what he called "slave morality". It is curious to observe the contrast between his arguments and those of French philosopher who preceded the Revolution. They argued that Christian dogmas are untrue and Christianity teaches submission to what is deemed to be the will of God, whereas self-respecting human beings should not bow before any higher power. The Christian Churches have become the allies of tyrants, and are helping the enemies of democracy to deny liberty and continue to grind the faces of the poor.

Thus, Nietzsche is not interested in the metaphysical truth of either Christianity or any other religion because he is convinced that no religion is really true, he judges all religions entirely by their social effects. He agrees with the philosophers in objecting to submission to the supposed will of God, but he would substitute for it the will of earthly 'artist - tyrants'. Nietzsche says that submission is right, except for these Superman, but not submission to the Christian God. Moreover, Nietzsche's rejection of Christian
belief and criticism of Christian moral values is not at all made from the standpoint of a scientific materialist. The scientific materialist merely assumes 'belief in a world which is supposed to have its equivalent and measure in human thinking and human valuations, a "world of truth at which we might be able ultimately to arrive with the help of our insignificant, four - corned human reason!'\textsuperscript{38}

According to Nietzsche, "If Christianity were right in its tenets of a vengeful god, general sinfulness, predestination, and the danger of an eternal damnation, it would be a sign of stupidity and lack of character not to become a priest, apostle, or hermit, and, with fear and trembling, work exclusively on one's own salvation."\textsuperscript{39} Thus, Christianity came into existence in order to lighten the heart first in order to be able to lighten it afterward. Consequently it will perish. "What is more harmful than any vice? Active sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak - Christianity."\textsuperscript{40} The Christian resolve to find the world ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad. When Christianity came into being, the craving for suicide was immense and Christianity turned it into a level of its power. It allowed only two kinds of suicide, dressed them up with the highest dignity and the highest hopes, and forbade all others in a terrifying manner. "An inescapable hypothesis to which

\textsuperscript{38} Lewis, White Beck, Six Secular Philosopher, P. 31.
\textsuperscript{39} F. Nietzsche, Human, All-too Human, Para. 116.
\textsuperscript{40} F. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Para. 2.
humanity must have recourse again and again is more powerful in the long run than the most firmly believed faith in an untruth which is the Christian faith, for example."\(^{41}\) Christianity crushed and shattered man completely, and submerged him as if in deep mire. All psychological inventions of Christianity work toward the sick excess of feeling, toward the deep corruption of head and heart necessary for it. Nietzsche says that Christianity wants to destroy, shatter, stun and intoxicate it, there is only one thing it does not want that is moderation. According to Nietzsche, "One should not embellish or dress up Christianity: it has waged a war to the death against the higher type of man, it has excommunicated all the fundamental instincts of this type, it has distilled evil, the Evil one, out of these instincts --- the strong human being as the type of reprehensibility, as the 'outcast'."\(^{42}\) It is said that Christianity has taken the side of everything weak, base, ill-constituted and it has made an ideal out of the opposition to the preservative instincts of strong life. Christianity also depraves the reason even of the intellectually strongest nature by teaching men to feel the supreme values of intellectuality as sinful, as misleading, as temptations.

Christianity is called the religion of pity which has a depressive effect. One loses force when one pities. The loss of force which life has already sustained through suffering is increased and multiplied even further by pity.

\(^{41}\) F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Para. 133.
\(^{42}\) F. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Para. 5.
Suffering itself becomes contagious through pity and sometimes it can bring about a collective loss of life and life-energy. One has ventured to call pity a virtue which in every noble morality it counts as weakness. One has also gone further by considering only virtue as the ground and origin of all virtue and from the viewpoint of nihilistic philosophy which inscribed Denial of Life Schopenhauer was within his rights in this, for according to him life is denied, made more worthy of denial by pity -- pity is practical nihilism. Schopenhauer was hostile to life, therefore pity became for him a virtue. Aristotle, saw in pity a morbid and dangerous condition which one did well to get at from time to time with a purgative. "Nothing in our unhealthy modernity is more unhealthy than Christian pity."43

In Christianity neither morality nor religion come into contact with reality at any point. Imaginary causes ('God', 'Soul', 'Spirit') have nothing but imaginary effects ('Sin', 'redemption', 'punishment', 'grace'). Sin, as it is now experienced wherever Christianity holds sway or has held sway, is a Jewish feeling and a Jewish invention. Regarding this background of all Christian morality, "Christianity did aim to 'Judaize' the world."44 The Christian presupposes a powerful, overpowering being who enjoys revenge. The Christians think that their power is so great that nobody could possibly harm except for their honour. "Every sin is a slight to his honour, the crime of an

43. Ibid, Para. 7.
44. F. Nietzsche the Gay science, Para. 135.
affront to the divine majesty."45 The founder of Christianity thought that there was nothing of which men suffered more than their sins. "That was his error—the error of one who felt that he was without sin and who lacked first hand experience. Thus his soul grew full of that wonderful and fantastic compassion for a misery that even among his people, who had invented sin, was rarely a very great misery.-- But the Christians have found a way of vindicating their master since then and of sanctifying his error by making it 'come truee'"46

A critical examination of the Christian concept of God invites a similar conclusion -- A people which still believes in itself still also has its own God in him it venerates the conditions through which it has prospered, its virtues it projects its joy in itself, its feeling of power on to a being whom one can thank for them. " He who is rich wants to bestow, a proud people needs a God in order to sacrifice ....... within the bounds of such presuppositions religion is a form of gratitude."47 One needs a God for one is grateful for oneself and such a God must be able to be both useful and harmful, both friend and foe. Thus one has as much need of the evil God as of the Good God-- "for one does not owe one's existence to philanthropy or tolerance precisely .......... of what consequence would a God be who knew nothing

45. Ibid, Para. 135.
46. Ibid, para. 138.
47. F. Nietzsche, The Anti Christ, Para. -16.
of anger, revengefulness, envy, mockery, cunning, acts of violence? One would not understand such a God: why should one have him? Then God takes its alter when a people is perishing, when it feels its faith in the future, its hope of freedom vanish completely and when it becomes conscious that the most profitable thing of all is submissiveness and this is the condition of its survival. He now becomes a dissembler, timid, modest, no more hatred, forbearance, 'love' even towards friend and foe. He then creeps into the cave of every private virtue, becomes a God for every body, becomes a private man, becomes a cosmopolitan. Formerly he represented a people, the strength of a people, everything aggressive and thirsting for power in the soul of a people who now becomes merely the good God. "There is in fact no other alternative for Gods: either they are the will to power -- and so long as they are they will be national Gods -- or else the importance for power -- and then they necessarily become good.......

But wherever the will to power declines, there is physiological regression, a decadence. The divinity of decadence, becomes the God of the physiologically retarded, the weak. They do not call themselves the weak, they call themselves 'the good'. Both 'Good God and the Devil' are the products of decadence. So, according to Nietzsche, "How can one today still defer so far to the simplicity of Christian theologians as to join them in

48. Ibid, para. 16.
49. Ibid, para. 16.
proclaiming that the evolution of the concept of God from the 'God of Israel', the national God, to the Christian God, the epitome of everything good, is an advance? The Christian conception of God, though it is the God of the 'great majority' is called the dark corners and places, of all unhealthy quarters underworld empire and he himself so pale, so weak and decadent. Thus, the Christian conception of God -- God as God of the sick. God as spider, God as spirit is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God arrived at on earth. It even represents the low-water mark in the descending development of the God type.

Nietzsche believes that though Christianity and Buddhism are decadence religions but they are distinguished from one another in the most remarkable way. Buddhism is a hundred times more realistic than Christianity. Buddhism has the heritage of a cool and objective posing problems in its composition. It arrives after a philosophical movement lasting hundreds of years and the concept 'God' is already abolished by the time it arrives. Buddhism is the only really positivistic religion history has shown and even in its epistemology it no longer speaks of 'the struggle against sin' but 'the struggle against suffering'. Nietzsche believed, "this distinguishes it profoundly from Christianity --- the self - deception of moral concepts behind it --- it stands, in my language, beyond good and evil." Among the

50. Ibid, para. 17.
51. Ibid, Para. 20.
nihilistic religions Nietzsche singles out Buddhism as being "the expression of a fine evening, a perfect sweetness and mildness -- it is gratitude toward all that lies behind and also for what is lacking: bitterness, disillusionment, rancour." Nietzsche's finest tribute to Buddhism is expressed in the remark: "Emancipation from good and evil appears to be of the essence of the Buddhist ideal: a refined state beyond morality is conceived that is identical with the state of perfection, in the presupposition that one needs to perform even good actions only for the time being, merely as a means -- namely, as a means to emancipation from all actions."53

Nietzsche's main charge against Christianity is that Christianity is a 'crime against life', a deliberate aim to foster a lower types of life by emphasizing as virtues those very qualities which the slaves themselves were forced to exhibit. Thus, Nietzsche's criticisms of Christianity are the natural outcome of his philosophical doctrines, and the two main ideas that permeate his philosophy are Master and Slave Morality and the Will to Power. These two doctrines furnish him with plenty of ammunition for his offensive against the Christian ideal of life. Let us first note the following views of Nietzsche:

(1) Nietzsche regards Christianity as the typical slave morality:

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52. F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, para. 154.
53. Ibid, para. 155.
Nietzsche believes that Christianity is 'an artful device' consciously and unconsciously evolved for the self-preservation of the inferior classes. It is the revolt of the slaves against their masters. The slaves wanted power and so they flung on to the landscape of Calvary the living epitome of those virtues which had to characterize their lives as inferiors, placarding them before the world on a cross of shame. The submissive spirit which Christianity extols is the outcome of a slave -- cowards' soul, and is aimed at destroying the strong. Hence the words 'Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you', 'put into the mouth of Jesus' is a 'way of getting the slaves own back', and 'the Golden Rule becomes a maxim of the herd', the expression of a slave's ideal who is forced to submit to oppression. Christianity, in other words, is a system of revenge, a complete contradiction of the so-called Gospel of Love and Forgiveness which it preaches. The sentiments which Christians have cherished for nineteen hundred years are in reality artificial means of attaining vengeance and power

(2) Nietzsche looks at Christianity from the angle of his will to power and believes that Christianity is its very antithesis: -- Nietzsche's criterion of values is all is good that proceeds from and helps on the will to power. He declares that the Christian religion is the 'will to break the spirit of the strong' and must be combated. Looking upon Christianity as the enemy of the will to power and master morality, and asserting it to be the religion of pity, he
sees in it the 'most sinister symptom of our modern European civilization.' Thus, a man loses power when he pitieds and Christianity in acclaiming pity and sympathy as values is striking at the very roots of the will to power. Christianity is a retrogressive principle, a way of life which has a weak debasing effect on man, the very antithesis of strong, masterly development. Nietzsche believes 'Christianity preserved that which should perish.'

Nietzsche's criticism, too, of Christian values centres round his ethic of aristocracy, which is opposed to the Christian conception of the equality of man. Christianity is democratic and in one fundamental sense Anti-Selective. Nietzsche believed in the essential inequality of man, and his 'class' philosophy is fundamentally opposed both to communism and Christianity. 'The best shall rule', cries Nietzsche, and by the best he means the strong. Nietzsche claims to stand for a neglected minority. The real neglected minority is the very type that Nietzsche despises, i.e., Christians. Thus Nietzsche's main objection to Christianity or to the old morality is that it 'accepts 'slave morality'

Lastly, Nietzsche condemn Christianity because it is the extremest thinkable form of corruption. Christianity has made a great contribution to the enlightenment and taught moral skepticism very trenchantly and

54. F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, Para. 5.
effectively accusing and embittering men. Yet with untiring patience it destroyed the faith in his "virtues" in every single individual. The Christians have found a way of vindicating their master since then and of sanctifying his error by making it "come true". The Christian Church has left nothing untouched by its depravity, it has made of every value a disvalue, of every truth a lie, of every kind of integrity a vileness of soul. It was only the Church which enriched mankind with this state of distress. The 'Humanitarian' blessings of Christianity is a self-contradiction, an art of self violation, a will to falsehood at any price an antipathy, a contempt for every good and honest instinct. "I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct for revenge for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, petty- I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind."55

TRANSCALUATION OF VALUES:

Nietzsche's programme of transvaluation of all values has its beginning in his first major work "The Birth of Tragedy". (The Twilight of the Idols. X : 5) While accepting the tragic aspect of life he offers the formula of life-affirmation, i.e. amor fati: the love of fate. This formula conveys the essence of his philosophy of life: "that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is

necessary, still less conceal it -- all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary -- but love it.\textsuperscript{56} Nietzsche's Dionysian view of life has a significant impact upon his thinking with respect to values and morality. Life for him is essentially the will to power understood as the freedom to overcome and conquer resistance, as "a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness".\textsuperscript{57} Value for him, therefore, is value for life and the enhancement of its power. The basis of his distinction between natural, healthy morality and anti-natural decadent morality lies here. According to him, natural morality enhances the will to grow and conquer whereas anti-natural morality debilitates it.\textsuperscript{57} Enhancement of life is not possible without the affirmation of all the basic drives which are neither good nor bad in themselves. Nietzsche should not be understood as advocating a reversion to the level of the beast of prey. Making his position clear he says, "I too speak of a 'return to nature' although it is really not a going back but an ascent."\textsuperscript{59} So he is not calling for a return to animal nature but rather for its transcendence to a higher level where the natural drives are neither condemned nor repressed but stand transfigured.

To Nietzsche Christianity's goal of eternal bliss and salvation is a symptom of degeneration and impoverishment. It is not the voice of "a rich and

\textsuperscript{56} F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, II : 10
\textsuperscript{57} F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Para. 1067.
\textsuperscript{58} F. Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, V : 4.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. IX : 48.
self confident type.\textsuperscript{60} Christianity invents the goal of 'eternal bliss' to nourish resentment towards the world. Only a Dionysian world-view can repair the immense damage done by the Christian world-view. Suffering for Nietzsche is intrinsic to man's role as creator. It is the price he has to pay for the joy of liberation and power. Animality can be transcended only by value creation. History shows that everyone who has overthrown an established law of creation has been regarded as wicked, as a law-breaker. Nietzsche, on the other hand, regards the law-breaker in this sense as the real creator. These destroyers are the free men, the men of the future, the creators of new values. But the members of the 'herd' will call them 'immoral'. The realization of Nietzsche's aim necessitates the annihilation of the 'old morality' of a morality which depreciates the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards life.

Nietzsche speaks of different moralities for different kinds of men, slave or herd morality for the weak and the mediocre, and master morality for the powerful ones who create values through self-affirmation. Christian morality, according to him, is appropriate for the mediocre man. The valuable man for him is the strong man who can create. The good life is not a life of obedience to established norms, but manifests itself rather in the transcendence and creation of values and in the adding of new dimensions to existing

\textsuperscript{60} F. Nietzsche, The will to Power, Para. 781.
ones.\textsuperscript{61} Such value creators are accidental occurrences scattered over centuries and countries, often unrecognised by their own contemporaries. These creators stand for above mankind in general. They are a sort of 'Superman', but by no means the full realization of the ideal; for 'Superman' is an ideal. Nietzsche's vision of Superman will be discussed in another chapter.

\textsuperscript{61} F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Para. 999.