CHAPTER - II
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The will to power is the fundamental principle of human nature. This principle is capable of justifying existence in general and life in particular. It is the reality behind all things. The desire to become powerful is extremely natural everywhere in nature and society. It is the sole duty of mankind. Power can extend from the minimum to the maximum. The different powers are at different levels. Animals are more powerful than material or lifeless things but intellectual power is superior to animal power due to which man is more powerful than animal.

Let us discuss first in this chapter how Nietzsche's conception of power is inextricably linked to the tradition of Plato, Spinoza and Schopenhauer. All these great thinkers were moved by human tragedy but did not condemn man to eternal suffering. They raised their voice against the cult of guilt, panic, despair and all -- pervasive evasion.

Plato

An important phase of Plato's psychology is the doctrine of eros. Platonic eros is, therefore, "wholly telic, goal - directed, and moves towards

Plato's psychology is dualistic in its separation of the soul into a higher, rational and a lower, irrational part. The irrational part is further divided into spirited and the appetitive, therefore it is called tripartite soul. The spirited element covers three things --- (a) fighting spirit, (b) What makes a man indignant at injustice and when he feels himself in the wrong. (c) ambition and competitiveness. While reason is the essential part of the soul, the spirited part is the seat of higher emotions and nobler impulses. Appetite is the animal part of the soul. For appetite Plato uses the term (epithymia) which he sometimes applies to desire in general. In this connection Nettleship said that the real conflict is not between reason and desire, but between different kinds of desires.

Human behaviour, says Plato, flows from three main sources -- desire, emotion and knowledge. Desire, appetite, instinct, these are one; emotion, spirit, ambition, courage, these are one; knowledge, thought, intellect, reason, these are one. Desire is a bursting reservoir of energy and emotion which has its seat in the heart as the flow and force of the blood and knowledge has its seat in the head as the eye of desire. These powers and qualities are all in all men in diverse degrees.

For Plato, these different levels of the self, when they reach the divine level are knit together by a conative urge and is merged into one which is

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2. D.N. Morgan, Love: Plato, the Bible and Freud, P. 165.
called reason. This urge is called by Plato 'EROS'. It is a single stream of
desire capable of being channelled in three main directions, only one of
which is conceivable in its purity. According to Plato, eros is one creative
energy which manifests itself from its lowest form of biological satisfaction
to spiritual creation. Thus in Plato's conception of eros the biological is not
denied but incorporated and transcended. The sensuous love and the yearn­
ing for beautiful and good derive from one and the same basic impulse
which is called by Plato eros. Eros represents love of beauty. Eros is in
every way intermediate between beautiful and ugly, good and bad, wise
and foolish. According to Plato, Eros is described as 'desire for the good'.
(Symposium 204 e). Reason which is called by Plato eros itself is a form of
love which makes him fond of what he understands and again makes him
want to understand what he is attracted to. Besides beauty, eros possesses
all virtues. Eros is self - controlled, for that means mastering pleasures and
desires. The connexion between the immortality of the soul as self - moving,
and the doctrine of eros which is the ostensible subject is closer than ap­
ppears on the surface. The soul moves through the power of eros. Eros is a
single stream of force directed at different objects of three main sorts --
bodily pleasures, social and political influence, truth and goodness. Thus
the essential mark and internal motive force of soul is eros. Eros is de­
scribed as the stream of desire which may be directed into different chan­
nels. Thus, it is a single motive force which by association with the body is
diverted into 3 main channels. When channelled in one direction it is weakened in others, and those who will not have it that the souls of the gods are unitary may perhaps agree on this, that their eros is set in one direction only. By itself eros is of course a unity, divine passion for wisdom alone, and on earth it may achieve earthly unity by bringing three drives into harmony or concord, just as the state achieves its unity: '.... that each individual by doing one work, his own, may become not many but one, and thus the whole city may grow to be one'.

According to Plato, Eros is described as a realm "intermediate" between the human level and the divine, a realm that, because of its intermediate position, "unites the cosmos with itself." Eros is described as a symbol for a higher realm of higher existence and therefore also an intermediate or mediating world. Without Eros, heaven and Earth would asurder. Eros belongs to spirits who mediate between Gods and mortals, conveying upwards the prayers and sacrifices of men, and downwards the commands and answers from the Gods. Thus, without them, heaven and earth would fall apart, for there is no direct intercourse between God and Man. The spirits are of many sorts, and Eros is one of them. Thus the function of Eros is fulfilled only within the widest possible context. Eros is active not only in men's souls, but in the bodies of all living beings or quite generally in all

3. Paul Friedlander, Plato: An Introduction, 423d
forms of existence. The "desire for the beyond" is the eros which is the motivating power, the wings, borrowed from the god of love, symbolic of this striving which pervades and unifies the world.

**Spinoza**

For Spinoza, man as a finite being a part of nature. His nature is not to be explained by appealing to mystical or supernatural influence. There is no such thing as free will; everything in nature is determined. Everything follows necessarily from something else and all things are ultimately conditioned by the universal substance. No particular thing exist, in virtue of the necessity of its own essence: its essence and its actuality are derivative. But if it looks differently, then it will reach further results. The essential nature of anything short of the complete Reality is in the end derivative and not self-sustaining. But, apart from the ultimate reduction, things have a relative independence, a modal distinctness of being which expresses itself in their existence and actions in time and space. From this point of view, the 'essential nature' of a thing is that, the being and conception of which reciprocally imply the being and conception of the thing. So far as the essence of the thing is concerned -- within the four corners of its essence, there is nothing which can destroy the thing and there is pure affirmation of the thing's being. For otherwise the thing's essence would be inwardly self-contradictory, and the thing could never be at all. This is expressed by saying that
"everything in so far as it lies in itself endeavours to persist in its own being." This 'tendency' or 'endeavour' or 'effort', inherent in the essence of each existing thing is called by Spinoza Conatus. "The Conatus of each thing to persist in its existence is simply the actual essence of the thing itself." It is in the end a portion of the complete affirmation of God's essence which is his omnipotence.

The modes of God in their temporal appearance conflict with one another or God to the imaginative consciousness passes through ever-varying states of himself. Hence the affirmation, which the essence of a particular thing involves, is only a Conatus, a force, whereby it strives to persist in its being. Hence, too, it is in its nature temporal, though it does not involve a determinate period of time. (Ethics iii Prop 8). The actuality of things regarded in their relative independence is temporal actuality, and not eternity. Though the term 'Conatus' and its implication of time make it clear that Spinoza conceives it primarily as the source of the actual existence of things in the temporal world, yet he never loses sight of its ultimate derivation from the omnipotence of God. And the 'Conatus' is thus, in the end the 'effort' which imperfectly expresses under the conditions of temporal actuality the full self -- affirmation of things in their timeless coherence. However obscurely Spinoza may express himself, temporal existence is an incomplete

5. Ibid, III, VII.
manifestation of eternal actuality; and the 'Conatus' is, in its ultimate conception, the complete self-maintenance which the modes of God involve in their full or eternal being.

Spinoza says, "I speaks of this Law (Conatus) as 'assumed' not withstanding the proof adduced in its support, because it is proved in one sense and applied in another: the plea urged on its behalf is the mere negative consideration that a particular thing, being a determinate mode of the attributes, cannot have in itself any suicidal element, but, being in existence, will not disappear without any external cause." But to exclude a cause of destruction is not to provide a cause of fresh phenomena, Spinoza lays upon the shoulders of his Conatus, when he plants it and sets it to work within our human nature. On this Conatus, however, Spinoza leaps the parallels and rides across from the eternities to the world of phenomena, from affirmation to volition, from deductive thinking to action and passion. The passions are not errors of human nature, but properties necessarily belonging to it. So Spinoza resolved to "regard human actions and desires exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes and bodies."

The 'Conatus' of man, as the determinate state of his being from which activity follows, is called by Spinoza 'Cupiditas' -- 'desire'. This term is intended to cover all forms of human impulse --- the striving of which man is

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6. Ibid, III, VI
7. Ibid, P. 84.
conscious, as well as those instincts and tendencies which are not present to him, but present in him as mere vague feelings. What human nature strives for, the human mind is often conscious of. This conscious striving is Will (Voluntas) when related to the mind alone or desire (Cupiditas) when related to mind and body. 'Desire' is not anything specially distinctive of man. Spinoza expressly tells that the substitution of 'Cupiditas' for 'appetitus' is a mere convenience of terminology. 'The term "Cupiditas" is generally used of men in so far as they are conscious of their appetites". (Ethics III, 9s) - but there is no real difference: "for whether man is conscious of his "appetitus", or whether he is not, the "appetitus" itself remains one and the same."8

Hence, term 'Cupiditas' (Desire) covers the whole range of human self -- affirmation. "Man's 'Cupiditas' is his essential nature; so far as that is conceived as determined -- by a given modification of itself -- to do a definite thing."9 'Cupiditas' therefore -- the tendency to self -- affirmation and self -- maintenance which is involved in human nature and takes the place in Spinoza's system of 'will' (voluntas) in the broadest sense of the term.

Thus, there are three fundamental passions -- desire, pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are functions of the Conatus towards the desired goals. Without Pleasure and pain there would be no desire and without de-

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9. B. Spinoza, Ethics III, Aff def, I
sire no awakening and no direction of Conatus and therefore no possibility
and no contents of the ethical life. Thus, the will (voluntas), the Cupiditas, all
of them are different varieties of Conatus, which is the main spring of the
whole ethical life.

Schopenhauer

Another philosopher who described the power or vital force as 'Will'
was Arthur Schopenhauer. He developed a comprehensive philosophy of
will. He said, "Consciousness is the mere surface of our mind, of which, as
of the earth, we do not know the inside but only the crust." Under the con-
scious intellect there is the conscious will, a persistent vital force, a sponta-
neous activity, a will of imperious desire. According to Schopenhauer, will
is blind and radically opposed to intelligence. Intelligence is the servant of
the 'Will to live', like the claw or teeth of the animal. Its function is practical,
not metaphysical.

The will -- so Schopenhauer teaches -- exists at various levels of de-
velopment such as the inorganic, the vital, the human, and objectifies itself
in various determinate forms, or species in the Aristotelian sense. Being
universal, they are the same in every individual that manifests them, and at
all times and places. Every concrete thing and every event is an illustration
of one or another of these eternal forms.

According to Schopenhauer, the will is the key to one’s existence, reveals to him the significance, shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his movements. Outwardly he is a body, but inwardly he is will. Every true act of his will is also at once and without exception a movement of his body as the body itself is the product of the will. The act of will and movement of the body are not two different things objectively known. Thus in a certain sense the will is the knowledge apriori of the body, and the body is the knowledge a-posteriori of the will.

According to Schopenhauer, under the conscious intellect there is the unconscious will, a persistent vital force. The unconscious will constitutes the inner, true and indestructible nature of man. Man can apprehend himself in two ways. He is an object in space and can be studied like other objects. But he is also aware of himself from within and is immediately conscious of his own being as living, striving and willing. For Schopenhauer, the will is not only the essence of man, it is also the essence of life in all its forms and even of inanimate matter.

The will, of course, is a will to live, a will to maximum life. "Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will."\(^{11}\) Therefore one called the phenomenal world the mirror of the will, its objectivity. And since what

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the will wills is always life, just because life is nothing but the representation of that willing for the idea, it is all one and instead of simply saying "the will", we say "the will to live." Life accompanies the will as inseperably as the shadow accompanies the body and if will exists, so will life, the world, exist. Life is therefore, assured to the will to live and so long as we are filled with the will to live we need have no fear for our existence, even in the presence of death.

The will of Schopenhauer, like the Conatus of Spinoza, is equivalent to Freud's libido or eros. Just as in the Freudian web of life, the supporting thread is libido, a sexualised vital force, so also Schopenhauer advocated the primacy of the sexual instinct as the basic expression of the will to live. He regarded sexual passion as "the kernel of the will to live." Thus, "every human being and his course of life is but another short dream of the endless spirit of nature, the persistent will to live; is only another fleeting form which (nature) carelessly sketches in its infinite pages allows to remain for a time so short it vanishes into nothing... and then obliterates to make new room."13

The Will to Power : An Explanatory Principle

As the nineteenth century was drawing to its close, a voice of an icono-

clast was heard. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) declared himself the destroyer of old values to clear the way for the virtues of strength against weakness, health against decadence and freedom of spirit against slave morality. Modern man finds that his values are worthless, that his ends do not give his life any purpose, and that his pleasures do not give him happiness. Nietzsche confronts the basic problem about happiness and enquires whether a new goal can be found that will give an aim to human life. These difficulties are best removed in his early works where no will to power and no doctrine of recurrence stamp the understanding. Still Nietzsche encounters similar problems and was able to solve them by temporarily abandoning his ambitious project and turned to psychological inquiries where he discovered the will to power by bold induction.

Thus the central idea in Nietzsche's philosophy is expressed by his phrase The Will to Power. The phrase "Will to Power" makes its first appearance in the notes of the late eighteen-seventies, not as the basic force of a monistic metaphysics but as one of two cardinal psychological phenomena: "Fear (negative) and will to Power (Positive) explain our strong consideration for the opinions of men."14 But the note in which the will to power is first explicitly referred to in an attempt to "explain our strong consideration for the opinions of men", is probably to be understood in terms of

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the Wagner experience. Wagner found both the will to worldly power, the excessive ambition and a suggestion of transformation of such a will to power into artistic creativity. According to Nietzsche also power does not mean domination over others, but can be achieved in creative activity. It is associated with self-sufficiency and self-confidence.

In the 'Dawn' Nietzsche does not celebrate or repudiate either power or fear. He uses both to explain phenomena and he considers both sometimes good and sometimes not. Primarily, however, fear is nothing but our attitude toward power or, in Nietzsche's own previous words, the negative aspect of our will to power. A privation of power gives rise to both fear and the will to power, fear is considered as the negative motive which would make us avoid something and will to power is the positive motive which would make us strive for something. Nietzsche does not yet conclude that, wherever there is fear, there is also a will to have the power to cope with what is feared. The two are still employed as separate principles.

Nietzsche does not evidently mean by power "worldly power" and social success, making friends and influencing people. Because men wish to have such power, they betray their destiny, fail to cultivate their Physis, and conform. For this reason Nietzsche in his early period hated power. Then his "craving for the highest power ....... is entirely transformed into artistic
creativity”; and finally, “when he renounced success ............ and foreswore
the thought of power, 'success' and 'power' come to him.”15

It is thus apparent that Nietzsche approached the conception of a will
to power from two distinct points of view. First, he thought of it as a craving
for worldly success, which he repudiated as harmful to man's interest in
perfecting himself. Secondly, he thought of the will to power as a psycho-
logical drive in terms of which many diverse phenomena could be explained;
e.g., gratitude, pity and self-abasement.

According to Nietzsche, the basic drive that prompted the develop-
ment of Greek culture might well have been the will to power. He notes that
the Greeks preferred power to anything "useful" and even to a good reputa-
tion. This sudden association of the will to power with the Greeks was one
of the most decisive steps in the development of this conception into an all
-embracing monism. In Zarathustra's initial proclamation the culture of
Greece is explicitly referred to and explained in terms of the will to power.
Power in Greek thought is described by Nietzsche in terms of Apollo and
Dionysus. The Key conceptions of "The Birth of Tragedy" are the Apollonian
and the Dionysian. Apollo represents the aspects of the classical Greek
genius praised by Winckelmann and Goethe and this power creates har-
monious and measured beauty. Dionysus, in Nietzsche's first book, is the

15. Ibid, P. 180.
symbol of that drunken frenzy which threatens to destroy all forms and codes and the ceaseless striving which apparently defies all limitations Nietzsche did not extol one at the expense of the other. Instead he favours one of the two gods and it is Apollo. There is the onslaught of the Dionysian "fever" which was rampant everywhere "from Rome to Babylon". Only the Apollonian power of the Greeks was able to control this destructive disease, to harness the Dionysian flood, and to use it creatively.

Nietzsche celebrated Dionysus as his own god in his later writings. He is no longer the deity of formless frenzy which is found at first but it has been overlooked. Only the name remains, but later the Dionysian represents passion controlled. In 'The Birth of Tragedy', the Apollonian power to give form is further associated with the creation of illusion. The beautiful illusion of the dream worlds, in the creation of which every man is a consummate artist, is the precondition of all visual art. But even when this dream reality is presented to us with the great intensity, then we still have a glimmering awareness that it is an illusion. Beneath the reality in which we live there is hidden a second, quite different world, and that our own world is therefore an illusion. According to Schopenhauer, "the gift of being able at times to see men and objects as mere phantoms or dream images is the mark of the philosophical capacity." Nietzsche credits the distinction

between Apollonian art and Dionysian art i.e., between plastic visual art
and the non-visual Dionysian art of music to Schopenhauer and agrees with
him in assigning to music a totally different character from all other arts. In
his view, Apollonian art is illusion-creating, representing only the eternal and
the beautiful in appearance. It throws a veil over the miseries of life. Dionysian
art on the other hand reveals the real character of life. It transfigures the
suffering of the world while retaining its reality. It transforms ugliness into
beauty and grief into joy. To it applies the category of the tragic. Thus the
man who is responsive to artistic stimuli reacts to the duality of dreams as
does the philosopher to the reality of existence. It is not only pleasant and
agreeable images that a man experiences with such universal understand-
ing but also experiences dreams with profound pleasure and joyful neces-
sity. This joyful necessity of dream experiences was expressed by the
Greeks in the figure of Apollo. Apollo, the deity of light, holds sway over the
beautiful illusion of the inner fantasy world. The higher truth, the perfection
of these states in contrast to imperfectly comprehensible daily reality, is the
symbolic analogue of soothsaying powers and of art in general, through
which life is made both possible and worth living.

Tragic art was the "comfort" which the Greeks, created for themselves
and which they needed because they were "uniquely capable of the tenderest
and deepest suffering." Nietzsche discovers in Greek tragic art that they re-affirm life with the creation of works of art. He also discovers in Greek tragic art a bulwark against Schopenhauer's pessimism. Rejecting pessimism as being alien to the ethos of tragic art, Nietzsche sees that one can face the terrors of history and nature with unbroken courage and say 'yes to life'. Nietzsche retained Schopenhauer's metaphysical interpretation of the 'thing-in-itself' as impersonal will, the blind striving and strife of things. In such a world, a world of suffering relieved only by illusion where Schopenhauer's supreme choice was the will not to will. Nietzsche says 'Yes' to this world to which Schopenhauer 'under the dominion of Christian value' had said 'No'.

Nietzsche regards Dionysian art alone as authentic. Nature speaks through Dionysian art. "Be like me, the Original Mother, who constantly creating, finds satisfaction in the turbulent flux of appearances." With the coming of the Dionysian cult, the truth dawned on the Greeks that at the base of their existence is suffering - the truth that had been hidden from them by Apollonian art. "The individual, with his limits and moderations, forgot himself in the Dionysian vortex, and became oblivious to the laws of Apollo. Indiscreet extravagance revealed itself as truth, and contradiction, a delight.

18. F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, XVI.
born of pain, spoke out of the bosom of nature."¹⁹ Dionysus for Nietzsche, is a "mysterious symbol of the highest word affirmation and transfiguration of existence."²⁰ and the "religious affirmation of life, life whole and not denied or in part."²¹ It also symbolises the liberation of man. The Dionysian orgies are symbolic of the Greek will to eternal life, "the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change."²² It is Apollo who fashions Dionysian in sights into endurable forms. Nietzsche sees a reconciliation of Apollo and Dionysus in Greek tragedy, which comes to have the characteristics of both the art-forms. "Thus we have come to interpret Greek tragedy as a Dionysiac chorus which again and again discharges itself in Apollonian images."²³ The tragic characters are the luminous images which give hope to man horrified by the terrors of life. As beautiful symbols they are Apollonian in character, though Dionysian in their encounters with fate. They are, in the words of Schacht, "Symbols of human possibility."²⁴

Nietzsche rejects Aristotle's view."²⁵ that tragedy arouses the emotions of terror and pity and through a discharge of these emotions relieves the spectator. According to Nietzsche this view makes tragic art decadent and

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¹⁹ Ibid, IV.
²⁰ F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1051.
²¹ Ibid, 1052.
²³ F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, VIII.
²⁴ Schacht, R, Nietzsche, P. 505.
²⁵ See, Aristotle, Poetics, 13.
nihilistic."26 "Courage and freedom of feeling before a powerful enemy, before a sublime calamity, before a problem that arouses dread -- this triumphant state is what the tragic artist chooses, what he glorifies."27 Nietzsche finds the same dichotomy of creative impulse in man and nature as he finds in art -- the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Through the Apollonian impulse man creates illusions of beauty, justice, good and rationality as a veil for all that is awful, ugly, unjust and irrational. Through the Dionysian impulse man brings about a transfiguration of the awful and the evil into the beautiful and desirable. As the Apollonian man is constrained by norms, he is not a value-creator. The Dionysian man leads the life of tragic man and takes the sorrows of life as challenges for the creation of values. He is not a pessimist. Nietzsche associates pessimism with decadence. He discovers in the ancient Greeks no evidence of a life-denying spirit, but rather an affirmative answer to life. They overcame their sufferings through the marvellous phenomenon of the Dionysian cult.

Thus, Apollonian and Dionysian powers are considered as "artistic powers which spring from nature itself, without the mediation of human artist."28 Their artistic power of the whole of nature reveals itself to the supreme gratification. The will to power is not only the devil who diverts man from

achieving culture but it is envisaged as the basis of Greek culture, which Nietzsche then considered the acme of humanity. Instead of being associated primarily with neurotics who crave pity, with modern man's lust for money, the will to power is now envisaged as the basic drive of all human efforts. In Zarathustra will to power is proclaimed as the basic force underlying all human activities.

Nietzsche offers will to power as a principle capable of justifying existence in general and life in particular. He rejects the traditional categories of 'being', 'becoming' and 'substance' and overcomes metaphysical nihilism through this principle -- a principle that for him is "not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos -- the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge." He says that, "all driving force is will to power, that there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this" He ascribes to the concept of force in the mechanistic interpretation of the world an inner will -- the will to power i.e. an insatiable desire to manifest power or the employment and exercise of power, a creative drive etc. Nietzsche's will should not be mistaken for the psychologist's conception of will. The will of the psychologist is an empty generalisation, a myth, involving an illegitimate deletion of the content of the will.

29. F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Para. 635
30. Ibid, Para. 688
Nietzsche offers certain points on the relation of power and the will to power. The point is that the will to power may be ruthless and a source of evil-doing, while power itself does not corrupt but ennobles the mind and if they do hurt others, they do so incidently in the process of using their power creatively and "without thinking of it". He also refers to the degree of reason in strength. In comparison to reason power appears almost as an evil principle and reason as the good principle. He speaks of power as the demon of man and proclaims that reason must control strength. He introduces reason as his value standard but later he repudiates it. Apparently, Dionysus defeats Apollo, the demon of darkness overpowers the restraining forces of the sun god and reason is no longer recognised as the supreme principle and standard of values. This interpretation, however, would be only partly correct.

Instead of assuming two qualitatively different principles, such as strength and reason, he would reduce both to a single more fundamental force -- the will to power. It is further true that will to power is proclaimed as the one and only basic force of the cosmos. The conception of the will to power as essentially self -- overcoming as it does when he defined health as the ability to overcome disease, for he substitutes health for power. The strongest tide which carries the peoples forward is the need for the feeling of power. The masses are ready to stake their life, their goods, their conscience, their virtue so as to acquire higher enjoyment. "The first effect of
happiness is the feeling of power: this wants to express itself, either to us ourselves, or to other men, or to ideas or imaginary beings. The most common modes of expression are: to bestow, to mock, to destroy -- all three out of a common basic drive. "What men desire is not pleasure, men willingly sacrifice pleasures and incur suffering for the sake of greater power and the power which finds expression in creative activity offers the ultimate happiness which all men desire although it involves a large measure of pain and discomfort. Happiness -- in the sense of that state which is desired ultimately does not consist of excess of pleasurable moments which are free from pain, but in the ownership and creative exercise of power. Pursuit of this happiness involves a high degree of self-discipline.

Nietzsche's philosophy of power entails the repudiation of the pleasure principle as a moral standard. There is a sense in which it is found that all men desire pleasure or happiness. But according to Nietzsche, "Men feel a life devoted to the pursuit of power to be more satisfactory human life than a life devoted to the pursuit of happiness." "Happiness" is, in other words "elastic" and man can enjoy this feeling in a great number of different ways. It is also conceivable that power gives them the greatest possible degree of it. "Happiness" has at least two different meanings -- first, a man's happiness consists in the state he desires and secondly, happiness may

32. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, P. 258
be something more specific that possibly is not desired by all men. Thus, according to Nietzsche, all men do not seek pleasure and as a matter of fact their happiness consists in the possession of power.

Nietzsche's critics claim that Nietzsche's conception of the will to power can mean only one of two things -- either all human activity is a manifestation of it in which "power" loses all specific meaning or "power" refers to something specific and "un-Christian."33 Exactly the same could be said of the striving for happiness or pleasure.

Nietzsche does claim that all human activities are expressions of a will to power. Yet "power" means something specific i.e. self - overcoming and what Nietzsche has in mind is an empirical fact of nature which is not contrary to Christian morals. Nietzsche noted that there is a marked difference between the "elasticity" of power and pleasure. Pleasure is co-extensive with consciousness while power does not. According to him the feeling of pleasure is merely that conscious state which attends the possession of power. Yet even if pleasure were granted to be a mere "epiphenomenon" of the possession of power, one need not at all concede that, for that reason, man does not strive for pleasure. Nietzsche however, denied that man strives for pleasure. Briefly stated, he claims, "not only that the feeling of pleasure is an epiphenomenon of the possession of power, but also that the striving for pleasure is,

33. Ibid, P. 259.
Similarly, an epiphenomenon of the will to power, which is independent of consciousness."\textsuperscript{34} Thus, Nietzsche says "Not for pleasure does man strive, but for power."\textsuperscript{35} Nietzsche developed this point in this way "To understand ...... what kind of a striving ...... life is, the formula must apply to trees and plants as well as to animals."\textsuperscript{36} These, however strive to "expand, absorb, grow" or in one word "for power". Thus, it would be rash that Nietzsche claimed that what man enjoys most is suffering. Rather he insisted that man by nature strives for something to which pleasure and pain are only incidental.

Nietzsche holds that pleasure is not an object of desire nor is pain, more properly, unpleasure is an object of aversion. They are merely consequences or accompaniments of the activity of the will, pleasure arising from an extension of the will, an increase in its mastery & unpleasure from an inhibition and restraint of it. Thus, Nietzsche declares, "Pleasure and displeasure are mere consequences, mere epiphenomena -- what man wants, what every smallest part of a living organism wants, is an increase of power."\textsuperscript{37} In the search for power man needs an obstacle to overcome for unless something opposes him, he cannot overcome it and demonstrate his mastery. "Displeasure, as an obstacle to its will to power, is therefore a normal fact, the normal ingredient of every organic event; man does not

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\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid, P. 262.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid, P. 262.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid, P. 262.
\item \textsuperscript{37} F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Para. 702.
\end{itemize}
avoid it, he is rather in continual need of it; every victory, every feeling of
pleasure, every event, presupposes a resistance overcome." Thus, dis-
pleasure does not merely not have to result in a diminution of our feeling of
power but it actually stimulates this feeling of power and the obstacle is the
stimulus of this will to power.

One can exercise one's power upon others by doing good and ill. One
hurts those to whom one wants to feel one's power, for pain is a much more
efficient means to that end than pleasure because pain always raises the
question about its origin while pleasure is inclined to stop with itself without
looking back. According to Nietzsche, "whether benefitting or hurting oth-
ers involves sacrifice for us does not affect the ultimate value of our actions
; even if we offer our lives, as martyrs do for their church, this is a sacrifice
that is offered for our desire for power or for the purpose of preserving our
feeling of power."39

No person could live without evaluating. Every person has good and
evil. There is no greater power on earth than good and evil. A table of val-
ues hangs over all people. This table of values is the table of its overcoming
which is the voice of its will to power. "The living creatures value many things

38. Ibid, Para. 702.
higher than life itself; but out of this evaluation itself speaks -- the will to power!"\textsuperscript{40}

In Nietzsche's interpretation of human nature the will to power is the chief factor in man's evolutionary struggle. It is the motive force behind all life, from the animals upwards, and every instinct is the expression of it disguised or otherwise. "Wherever I found a living creatures, there found I Will to power."\textsuperscript{41} As the lesser man surrenders himself to the greater similarly the greatest man surrenders himself and stakes life for the sake of power. It is the surrender of the greatest to run risk and danger, and play dice for death. And where there is sacrifice and service, there also is the will to be master. "Even in the will of the servant found I the will to be master."\textsuperscript{42} According to Nietzsche, there must be will to procreation, or impulse towards a goal, towards the higher, remoter, more manifold and all leads to one and the same secret -- "I am that which must ever surpass itself."\textsuperscript{43} Thus, it is always through the will to power that one force prevails over others and dominates or commands them. Moreover it is also the will to power which a force obeys within a relation and it is through will to power that it obeys. "Wherever I found living things, there heard I also the language of obedience. All living things are obeying things!"\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Para. 34
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid, Para. 34
\item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid, Para. 34
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid, Para. 34
\item \textsuperscript{44} Ibid, Para. 34
\end{itemize}
According to Nietzsche, the victorious concept "force", by means of which physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed. This can be completed by an inner will which Nietzsche designated as "will to power". It is an "insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive etc."

There is nothing for it that one is obliged to understand all motion, all "appearances", all "laws", only as symptoms of an inner event and to employ man as an analogy to this end. In the case of an animal also, it is possible to trace all its drives to the will to power. "Granted that all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power."

Thus, the will to power is ascribed to force, it is both a complement of force and something internal to it. It is not ascribed to it as a predicate. Indeed, it is not the force that wills but it is the will to power alone that wills and does not let itself be delegated or alienated to another subject even to force. The force has an essential relation to other forces, that the essence of force is its quantitative difference from other forces. Now, difference in quantity necessarily reflects a differential element of related forces which is also the genetic element of the qualities of related forces and this is what is called the will to power. It is the genealogical element of force which is both differential and genetic. The will to power is the element

46. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Para. 36
from which derive both the qualitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces. It is never separable from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities and directions.

The will to power cannot be separated from force but to confuse them is even more risky. Force is what can, will to power is what wills. The concept of force is, by nature, victorious because the relation of force to force, understood conceptually, is one of domination. Of the two forces when related one is dominant and the other is dominated. The victorious concept of force needs a complement and this complement is internal, an internal will. This internal will is described by Nietzsche as the will to power. Thus, the will to power is added to force, but as the differential and genetic element, as the internal element of its production. It is the will to power which is described as the genealogical element of force.

Thus, the will to power is a different element, the genealogical element which determines the relation of force with force and produces their quality. The relationship between forces in each case is determined. Each force is affected by other forces, inferior or superior forces. Thus it follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected. The will to power therefore has double aspect --- from the standpoint of the genesis or
production of forces it determines the relation between forces but from the standpoint of its own manifestations, it is determined by relating forces. This is why the will to power is always determined at the same time as it determines, qualified at the same time as it qualifies. Here, it is difficult to deny the inspiration of Spinoza. Spinoza wanted a capacity for being affected to correspond to every quantity of force. The more ways a body could be affected the more force it had. This capacity measures the force of a body or expresses its power. "On the one hand, this power is not a simple logical possibility for it is actualised at every moment by the bodies to which a given body is related. On the other hand, this capacity is not a physical passivity, the only passive affects are those not adequately caused by the given body." 

Similarly, for Nietzsche, the capacity for being affected is not necessarily a passivity but an affectivity, a sensibility, a sensation. Thus. Nietzsche even before elaborating the concept of the will to power and giving it its full significance, was already speaking of a feeling of power. Before treating power as a matter of will he treated it as a matter of feeling and sensibility. But when he had elaborated the full concept of the will to power this first characteristic did not disappear, it became the manifestation of the will to power. That is why Nietzsche always says that the will to power is "the primitive affective form" from which all other feelings derive or better it

47. Gilles Deleuz, Nietzsche and Philosophy, P. 62.
is said that "will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos."\textsuperscript{48}
Thus, the will to power manifests itself as the sensibility of force, the different element of forces manifests itself as their differential sensibility.

The central idea in Nietzsche's philosophy is the will to power. The Darwinians explain evolution in terms of the struggle for existence. Nietzsche was not a Darwinist, but only aroused from his dogmatic slumber by Darwin. Nietzsche sought to counter the positivistic challenge from across the channel by developing a new picture of human dignity. At the same time, he makes explicit his opposition to the Darwinistic conception of a "struggle for existence". The struggle for existence "ends unfortunately in a manner contrary to that which the school of Darwin might desire, contrary to that which one might dare, perhaps, desire of it: I mean to the detriment of the strong, the privileged, the happy exceptions. Species do not grow toward perfection, for in the end the weak always become masters of the strong -- because they are more numerous and also because they are more cunning."\textsuperscript{49} Darwin's 'struggle for existence' gives way to the struggle for power. According to Nietzsche, the struggle for existence would be meaningless, unless there is a desire for existence, an active will to exist. This will to exist is really a will to achieve, a will to dominate. The power does not mean domination over others, but can be achieved in creative activity. A man in

\textsuperscript{48} F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Para. 635.
\textsuperscript{49} F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Para. 14.
order to exist has to become daring. Thus, man's will to live, becomes the will to power. According to Nietzsche, "Only where there is life is there will not will to life but .......... will to power." Man -- even the mediocre specimen is in a sense more powerful than other species. But Nietzsche has little thought of power over others and mankind as a whole does not represent to his mind an advance over other animals, any more than reptiles seem to him "superior" to fish. Nietzsche has in mind -- Socrates or Caesar, Leonardo or Goethe who represent the "power" not for 'struggle for existence' as Darwin said but for which all beings strive for the basic drive which is not the will to preserve life but the will to power. Nietzsche contended that all living creatures far from tending to preserve their existence, strive to enhance themselves, to grow, and to generate more life. For this end, Nietzsche believed, most living creatures are willing to risk their existence. Thus, it is clear that Nietzsche's "power" is remote from Darwin's "fitness".

In "Human, All Too Human" Nietzsche seeks to explain the following phenomena in terms of the will to power: our tendency to conform rather than to realize ourselves; the elevation of gratitude to the status of a virtue; the desire of neurotics to arouse pity; Christian self-abasement; and the striving for independence and freedom. Of all these sundry manifestations of the will to power, Nietzsche probably approves only of the striving for

50. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Para. 34.
freedom. According to Nietzsche freedom means "That one has the will to self -- responsibility."\(^5\) He also says that freedom means mastery over the other instincts -- for example, over the instinct for 'happiness'. 'That which is termed "freedom of the will" is essentially the affect of superiority in relation to him who must obey: 'I am free, 'he' must obey'' --- this consciousness is inherent in every will.'\(^6\)

Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as if it were the best known thing in the world. According to Schopenhauer, will is that which is known to people and has taken up a popular prejudice and exaggerated it. "Schopenhauer's 'will' is mere an empty word."\(^7\) But willing seems to Nietzsche "something complicated, something that is unit only as a word and it is precisely in this one word that the popular prejudice resides which has defeated the inadequate caution of the philosopher."\(^8\) It is said that in all willing there is first of all a plurality of sensations, secondly, in every act of will there is a ruling thought and thirdly, will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking but it is above all an emotion of command. A man who wills commands something in himself which obeys or which he believes obeys. Because in the great majority of cases willing takes place only where the effect of the command that is, obedience and action are to be expected.

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51. F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Para. 38.
52. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Para. 19.
54. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Para. 19.
Thus, one who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one. Nietzsche maintains that for will, and still more for the will to life, one must substitute the will to power. Thus, Schopenhauer’s will to live gives place to the will to power.

This will to power is the reality behind all things. The world, according to Nietzsche, although merely an artistic phenomenon without meaning or purpose, still is an expression of the will to power. The will to power, however, as the ultimate reality of all life, and human life in particular, disguises itself and appears in many forms. Instances he gives are the longing for freedom and independence, but also the longing for equilibrium, peace and co-ordination. At the lower level even the impulse to self-preservation is a will to power. In relation to those who are greater and stronger, the will takes devious routes -- the weak one subjects himself -- "Enrolment, so as to satisfy the will to power in a larger whole: submission, making oneself indispensable and useful to those in power; love, as a secret path to the heart of the more powerful -- so as to dominate him." 55 The sense of duty, of belonging intrinsically to a higher rank than to those who rule over us, to condemn ourselves, and the invention of new tables of value, all belong to the same category. They are ultimately disguised modes of control and domination. Thus, the will to power is the source of value as well as of existence.

55. F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Para. 774
ends, purposes and ideals are forms, extensions or tools of it. All valuations are only consequences and narrow perspectives in the service of this one will -- "valuation itself is only this will to power."  

The will to power, Nietzsche tells us, includes but exceeds the will to self-preservation. For it seeks not the continuance of life, but more life, an intensification of life. According to Poet William Blake, "Energy is eternal delight", and these words draw us directly into the Nietzschean atmosphere. Nietzsche in his technical language says that our entire instinctual life as the development and ramification can be explained by one basic form of will which is explained as will to power. Nietzsche, believed by this will to power the world can be described and defined.

Nietzsche gave the name 'Truth' to 'will to power'. 'Truth', Nietzsche adds, "is thus not something which is there in existence and which has to be found out -- but something to be created, and which provides the name for a process, still more for a will to overcome, which in itself has no end." It is an endless process, "an actively determining -- not a becoming conscious of something, which might be fixed and determinate in itself. It is a word for the 'will to power.' Will to power means that our mental life is secretly directed by our instinctual drive. Even our so called will to truth is a mask

56. Ibid, Para. 675.
58. Ibid, P. 393.
worn by the will to power. "Truth" is the name which is given to that which agrees with one's instinctual preferences and it is what one calls explanation of the world, especially when one wants to foist it on others. According to Nietzsche, there are no everlasting facts, there are only interpretations, orchestrated by the will to power.

In the book "The Striving for Excellence", Nietzsche makes a sustained attempt to reduce practically all of human behaviour to this single striving, in one uninterrupted analysis. He proceeds to do this in terms of a scale. At the bottom of the scale is the barbarian who tortures others and at the top, the ascetic who tortures himself. The barbarian who is uncultured is considered as the least powerful. "The striving for excellence is the striving to overwhelm one's neighbour, even if only very indirectly or only in one's own feelings or even dreams. There is a long line of degrees of this secretly desired overwhelming, and a complete list of these would almost amount to a history of culture from the first still grimace like barbarism to the grimace of …… over refinement ……….." 59 Thus, "history of culture" is to be explained in terms of man's will to overwhelm, outdo, excel and overpower his neighbour. The barbarian does it by torturing his neighbour. Nietzsche speaks of this as a low degree of the striving for excellence because he wishes to express that, qualitatively, one finds little power at the bottom of the scale.

Towards the middle of the scale one finds the normal degree of power. Here one seeks to evoke envy and admiration, one even seeks to elevate one's neighbour and derives a sense of power from doing so. But Nietzsche believes the ascetic to have a greater feeling of power than almost any other man and this is of momentous significance.

Nietzsche thinks of quantitative degrees of power as corresponding to various forms of behaviour and culture. The saint was in his early philosophy regarded as the most valuable and powerful human being. The powerful human beings still bowed worshipfully before the saint as the riddle of self-conquest and deliberate final renunciation. They bowed before the saint because they sensed the superior force and strength of will in which they recognized and honored their own strength. They honored something in themselves when they honored the saint. Thus, "The powerful of the world learned a new fear before him; they sensed a new power, a strange, as yet unconquered enemy -- it was the "will to power" that made them stop before the saint."60

But both barbarian and ascetic are repudiated by Nietzsche. Both of them are 'grimaces' which are not representation of true culture. Instead he refers to "the degrees of reason in strength". He introduces reason as his value standard. He speaks of power as the demon of man and proclaims

60. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Para. 51.
that reason must control strength. Empirical studies assume that all human
behaviour could be explained in terms of the will to power. Nietzsche con­
cludes that not only our passions but also "our intellect" might well be inter­
preted as "an instrument" of the will to power. Thus, intellect, reason and
spirit all seem to Nietzsche to be manifestations of the same basic drive to
which our passions are reducible. Reason and the sex drive are both forms
of the will to power. The sex drive, however, is an impulse, and man is still
the slave of his passions and has no power over them. Rationality, on the
other hand, gives man mastery over himself, as the will to power is essen­
tially the "instinct of freedom" and it can find fulfilment only through rational­
ity. Rationality is taken to be the mark of great power. Reason is the "high­
est" manifestations of the will to power. Thus, Nietzsche points out that rea­
sion gives men greater power then sheer bodily strength. Irrationality is rec­
ognised as weakness and rationality is considered as a sign of power. Ac­
cording to Nietzsche, the lack of reason, intelligence, or spirit is a lack of
power.

Nietzsche's conception of the will to power is not primarily a meta­
physical principle, as Heidegger supposes. Nietzsche's central concern is
with man, and the power is to him above all a state of the human being. The
projection of the will to power from the human sphere to the cosmos is an
after thought -- an extreme conjecture that is not substantiated by the evi-
dence and is at variance with Nietzsche's own ethical principles. This will to power is the backbone of Nietzsche's philosophy. According to Nietzsche, wealth and military were never signs of great power and he realized fully that power involves self-discipline which is the central point of his conception. "To be trained and harnessed (is) an accession of power detestable to Nietzsche" 61 He considers the hatred of self-discipline a mark of weakness and any resentment, a manifestation of the frustrated will to power of those who cannot attain satisfaction with themselves. Thus, Nietzsche even considered philosophy "the most spiritual will to power." 62 For him, genuine philosophy is a critical and creative enterprise. Zarathustra is his paradigm of an authentic philosopher -- a rebel who rejects the existing order for creating a new one. 63

61. George Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy, PP. 108f
62. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Para. 227.
63. "I have become one who blesses and says yes; and I fought long for that and was a fighter that I might one day get my hands free to bless". F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, III: 4