CHAPTER - I

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Nietzsche : The Life in Brief

Whatever one may think about Nietzsche's ideas, one cannot ques­tion his vast reputation and the power of his ideas to act like a potent wine in the minds of a good many people. Nietzsche belongs among those very few thinkers whose standing as modern masters is undoubted.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born in Rocken, Germany, on 15 October, 1844, and was raised in an atmosphere of pious Lutheran Christi­anity. From 1854 to 1858 he studied at the local Gymnasium, and from 1858 to 1864, he attended the elite P-forta school where he received a first-rate classical education. In 1864 at the University of Bonn he began to study theology, but a growing skepticism, abetted by his discovery of the writings of Schopenhauer, put an end to this. He switched to the study of classical philology first at Bonn, then at the University of Leipzig.

By the age of 23 he had gained so great a reputation that he was appointed professor of classical philology at the University of Basel, Swit­zerland, before having attained his doctorate, which was later awarded to
him without examination. One of his awestruck professors spoke for many when in a letter of recommendation he described the brilliant young Nietzsche as a "phenomenon". In May 1869 he delivered his inaugural lecture on Homer and Classical Philology. On the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war Nietzsche joined the ambulance corps of the German army; but illness forced him to abandon this work, and after an insufficient period of convalescence he resumed his professional duties at Basel.

Nietzsche taught at Basel for ten years (1869-1879), but was never satisfied with the "mole-like activities" of University scholars and "their indifference to the urgent problems of life." Though named a full professor in 1870, Nietzsche already knew that the regime of the University was incompatible with the unfettered thinking he felt called to do.

In 'The Birth of Tragedy' from the spirit of Music which appeared in 1872, he first drew a contrast between Greek culture before and after Socrates, to the disadvantage of the latter, German culture bore a strong resemblance to the Greek culture after Socrates and it could be saved only if it were permeated with the spirit of Wagner.

In the period 1873-1876 Nietzsche published four essays with the common title 'Untimely Meditations' which is rendered as 'Thoughts out of Season' in the English translation of his works. In the first he vehemently attacked the unfortunate David Strauss as a representative of German cul-
ture - philistinism. In the second he attacked the idolization of historical learning as a substitute for a living culture. The third essay was devoted to extolling Schopenhauer as an educator, to the disadvantage of the University professors of philosophy and the fourth depicted Wagner as originating a rebirth of the Greek genius.

By 1876, the date of publication of the fourth essay, entitled Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Nietzsche and Wagner had already begun to drift apart. And his break with the composer represented the end of the first phase or period in Nietzsche's development. In the first period culture, in other words, human life in general, is depicted as finding its justification in the production of the genius. The creative artist, poet and musician in the second Nietzsche prefers science to poetry, questions all accepted beliefs, plays the part of a rationalistic philosopher of the French Enlightenment.

Characteristic of the second period is 'Human-All-Too-Human' which was originally published in three parts, 1878-1879. In a sense the work is positivistic in outlook. He later explained the significance of 'Human-All-Too-Human, "where you see ideal things, I see -- human, alas all too human things."'

A combination of bad health and dissatisfaction, amounting to disgust, with his professional duties led Nietzsche to resign from his chair at

1. F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Para, 1, P. 59
Basel in the spring of 1879. And for the next ten years he led a wandering life, seeking health in various places in Switzerland and Italy, with occasional visits to Germany.

In 1881 Nietzsche published 'The Dawn of Day' in which he opened his campaign against the morality of self-renunciation. And this was followed in 1882 by 'The Gay Science' and 'Joyful Wisdom' in which we find the idea of Christianity as hostile to life.

In 1881 the idea of the eternal recurrence came to Nietzsche. In infinite time there are periodic cycles in which all that has been is repeated over again. This somewhat depressing idea was scarcely new, but it came to Nietzsche with the force of an inspiration. And he conceived the plan of presenting the ideas which were fermenting in his mind through the lips of the Persian sage Zarathustra. The result was his most famous work 'Thus Spake Zarathustra.' The first two parts were published separately in 1883. The third, in which the doctrine of the eternal recurrence was proclaimed, appeared at the beginning of 1884, and the fourth part was published early in 1885.

Zarathustra, with its ideas of Superman and the transvaluation of values, expresses the third phase of Nietzsche's thought. But its poetic and prophetical style gives it the appearance of being the work of a visionary. Calmer expositions of Nietzsche's ideas are to be found in
'Beyond Good and Evil' (1886) and 'A Genealogy of Morals' (1887), which together with 'Zarathustra', are probably Nietzsche's most important writings.

Nietzsche planned a systematic exposition of his philosophy, for which he made copious notes. His ideas of the appropriate title underwent several changes. At first it was to be 'The Will to Power: a New Interpretation of Nature' or 'The Will to Power: an Essay towards a New Interpretation of the Universe'. In other words, just as Schopenhauer had based a philosophy on the concept of the will to life, so would Nietzsche base a philosophy on the idea of the Will to Power. Later the emphasis changed, and the proposed title was 'The Will to Power: an Essay towards the transvaluation of all values.'

Nietzsche turned aside from his projected work to write a ferocious attack on Wagner, 'The Case of Wagner' and followed it up with 'Nietzsche Contra Wagner'. This second essay was published only after Nietzsche's breakdown, as were also other writings of 1888, 'The Twilight of the Idols', 'The Antichrist' and 'Ecce Homo', a kind of autobiography.

At the end of the year definite signs of madness began to show themselves, and in January 1889 Nietzsche was taken from Turin, where he then was, to a clinic at Basel. He never really recovered, but after treatment at
Basel and then at Jena he was able to go to his mother's home at Naumburg. After her death he lived with his sister at Weimar. By that time he had become a famous man, though he was hardly in a position to appreciate the fact. He died on August 25th, 1900.

**Contemporary German Philosophy**

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), a German philosopher, declared himself the destroyer of old values to clear the way for the virtues of strength against weakness. But before Nietzsche there are also some other German philosophers who developed a comprehensive philosophy and their philosophy has greatly influence Nietzsche.

For a comprehension of Contemporary German philosophy, it is indispensable first to consider those two powerful movements which formed the intellectual setting for modern German thought. These movements are (1) the philosophy of German Humanism (1775 to 1830) and (2) the development of the separate sciences since the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century.

In the period from about 1775 to 1830, thought and poetry were intimately related, both being inspired by a humanism which was actually realised in the lives of the noblest men of the time. Kant with his realisation of the limits of human understanding and with his reverence for freedom,
followed in an unconditional devotion to the dictates of duty. After Hamann and Herder, who had speculated on the profound and intellectually inaccessible forces in nations, languages, art and religion, Goethe by his life and still more by his work gave expression to his faith that "all human deficiency can be atoned for by pure humanity, by the aspiring efforts of the individual."

It was this specific approach to life and the world for which Fichte, Schelling tried to give philosophical justification; and this faith in humanity, lending to the Germans of those decades a nobility, a dignity and an enthusiasm hitherto rare, found its final intellectual expression in Hegel's philosophy which aimed at penetrating all being and comprehending it in its true import, conceiving it as taken up and reconciled in the sphere of absolute spirit beyond all human life, individual guilt and social injustice."

Here, only very little can be said about the evolution of the inorganic sciences, which more than all the other branches of knowledge have developed internationally. The most important features are first of all the significance of the expansion of physics, beyond the limits of mechanics in Newton's sense, to include new branches, especially electricity; and also of the rise of chemistry. This development led in particular to a wealth of technical discoveries and, in the intellectual sphere, to the quantum theory and the theory of relativity, which placed the problems of the atom and of the

2. Werner Brock, Introduction to Contemporary German philosophy. PP. 3-4
physical character of space-time as well as that of the perceptibility of physical objects on an entirely new basis.

In spite of the intellectual significance of these two theories, and although it cannot be doubted that the scientific exploration of inorganic nature, and its practical mastery by technical achievements must be an important subject for philosophical thought, it should not be supposed that physics in the 19th century had as a standard for philosophy the same significance that mathematics and physics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had for Descartes, Leibnitz or Kant.

The trend of German philosophy in the last century, and indeed since Kant, cannot be properly understood, unless it is realised that within the domain of science, mathematics and physics are no longer supreme, and that many other sciences such as biology, sociology, psychology and history are more important than mathematics and physics for the philosophy of recent times, and will probably remain so in the future. Among the German scientists of that time after Goethe and Schelling the widespread influence of Darwin in Germany and also upon Nietzsche, is well known. What was important in Darwin's work for our world-view was that the relationship of man to the rest of living beings, and even his origin from them, was recognised; and that the actual importance of the dark emergence of existence exemplified in the struggle and in the destruction of the many was set forth
Of more consequence to us, therefore, than the one-sided and contestable Darwinian theory, is the consideration without illusions of the origin of species and of man as phenomena of this earthly existence, a conception entirely opposed to the idealistic interpretation of man in the age of Goethe. Later, Freud's exploration of unconscious psychic life had a similar effect, though progress in this field had previously been made by psychologists like Carus and Edward V. Hartmann, and in an entirely different way by Nietzsche. To sum up, the course of development of the new sciences in the nineteenth century was in one respect characterised by the new significance acquired by biological studies and by the change from the psychology of the conscious to the psychology of the unconscious.

No better characterisation of scientific research during the nineteenth century in contrast to German idealism as a whole, can be found than the dictum of the great economist and sociologist, Max Weber: A disenchantment of the world is taking place. While German Humanism sought in everything, even in nature, the significant and the sublime, the nineteenth century doubted everything from the very beginning, examining thoroughly and accepting only what proved to be indubitable.

In the midst of such activity, after the decline of German Humanism and contemporaneously with the newly emerging separate sciences and the belated fame of Schopenhauer's work; which at that time seemed to
earnest and resigned thinkers to offer an expression of our present-day philosophy Nietzsche developed his life-affirming vision. The vital question now was: what, in the era of such sciences, is the real task of philosophy?

The first answer given to this question was: philosophy has, in metaphysics, to bring about a synthesis of scientific results. Its aim must be, as Wundt says, "the construction of a logically consistent world-view which shall bring all special knowledge into one general system of thought." Here Wundt distinguishes between "that which is given in experience," that is, from which we have to start, and the "ultimate causes, not given in experience," and he requires from metaphysics as its chief task that such a synthesis be accomplished by proceeding inductively from what is given in experience to the ultimate causes.

It was in this way that the three most important scientific metaphysicians of the second half of the 19th century, Fechner, Lotze and Edward V. Hartmann conceived their philosophical task. From a scientific basis they outlined metaphysics in different ways: Fechner in a synthesis of Romantic philosophy of Nature and experimental research, Lotze in a reconciliation of mechanical investigation and an idealistic world-view, Edward V. Hartmann in a combination of physiological and psychological results with the speculation of Schelling, Schopenhauer and Hegel. But they thereby

gave satisfaction neither to science nor to philosophy. Instead of consid­
ing the essence of science and the specific character of philosophy, or of
penetrating into the meaning of the collapse of idealistic speculation, which
would have enabled them through increased clearness to attempt a new
manner of philosophising.

Yet inspite of the failure of this first movement of contemporary
philosophy to satisfy critical claims, its exponents are of importance be­
cause, in an age of great scientific productivity and of almost complete philo­
sophical sterility, they have the credit of following the sincere desire to pro­
ceed beyond science to a world view, even though their philosophical power
and insight into principles were far inferior to those of a Fichte, a Schelling,
a Hegel or a Schlermacher.

The second group of philosophers gave to the fundamental question
of the task of philosophy an entirely different answer: they did not aim at
presenting a philosophical world-view nor did they seek to synthesise sci­
entific results. They enquired into the presuppositions, principles and meth­
ods which are not investigated by the sciences themselves. Through such
researches concerning the problems and critique of knowledge, philoso­
phy gained for itself a definite sphere of enquiry which belonged to no other
science. This meant in fact the development of a science of scientific think­
ing and research; while other philosophical tasks, such as those of Ethics
and Aesthetics, did not in the same way receive adequate treatment but were carried out --- either in the traditional metaphysical way or from the epistemological point of view, or by the methods employed in the separate sciences -- according to the personal convictions of the individual thinkers. It was through the discussion of these epistemological problems that German philosophy in the last third of the 19th century assumed its "academic" character, the philosophers themselves took up a scientific attitude; and though they renounced essential, and probably even the main, tasks of philosophy, the movement has, in spite of its limitations, been surprisingly productive, and has rendered possible all future developments.

The significance of the philosophy of Nietzsche cannot be considered apart from Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer.

Before Nietzsche it is not surprising that Hegel's influence was also felt in a variety of fields, in view of comprehensive character of Hegel's system and of commanding position he came to occupy in the German philosophical world of the 19th century. As one would expect in the case of a man whose thought centred round the Absolute and who appeared, to the not too critical or too orthodox observer, to have provided a rational justification of Christianity in terms of the most up-to-date philosophy, his sphere of influence included the theological field. For example, Karl Daul (1765-1836), professor of theology at Heidelberg, abandoned the ideas of Schelling
and endeavoured to use the dialectical method of Hegel in the service of Protestant theology. In the field of law Hegel's influence was considerable. Prominent among his disciples was the celebrated jurist Eduard Gans (1798-1839) who obtained a chair of law at Berlin and published a well-known work on the right of inheritance. In the field of aesthetics Heinrich Theodor Rotscher (1803-1871) may be mentioned as one of those who derived inspiration from Hegel. In the history of philosophy Hegel's influence was felt by such eminent historians as Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805-1892), Eduard Zeller (1814-1908) and Kuno Fisher (1824-1907). Whatever one may think of absolute idealism, one cannot deny Hegel's stimulating effect on scholars in a variety of fields.

Under the heading of the influence of Hegel we might refer, of course, to the British idealism of the second half of the 19th century and of the first two decades of the 20th century and we can turn to consideration of the reaction against metaphysical idealism and of the emergence of other lines of thought in the German philosophical world of the 19th century.

Nietzsche's view is not so much different from Kant's as it is from Hegel's. Before Nietzsche the influence of Kant also spread widely. With Kant philosophy is to be considered as a critique of cognition, as a description of the modes and the limits of the faculty of knowing. Thus circumscribed it will benefit from the character of certainty belonging to all the
sciences which, like mathematics, geometry and logic, treat of the form of
the mind alone and do not venture, in the train of natural and historical sci-
ences, to explore its content. It is this science of the form and the limits of
our faculty of knowing which proposes to define the role of philosophy. Now,
we shall have to attain, through the detours of philosophical thought, to the
critique of Pure Reason. From the standpoint of astonishment and the prob-
lem it raises the period between Kant and Nietzsche offers a spectacle of
prodigious interest, for in the course of the preceding ages the laws of the
intellect are hidden, but now they are exposed to broad daylight.

Kant was a Protestant and Protestantism already permitted a falsifi-
cation of the dogmatic claim. It virtually implied rationalism. Therefore it is
permissible to suppose that Kant would not have dishonoured the Critique
of Pure Reason by the Critique of Practical Reason. He would have estab-
lished that there is a divorce between reason and revelation and would have
sacrificed one to the other. On the contrary, he was so imbued with protes-
tant dogma that he would unhesitatingly maintain its formula against an
evidence which he himself displayed. Thus, by that absolute faith that he
had since proven, he joined himself from the outset to the dogmatists of the
preceding kind, and it is to that absolute faith that knowledge is indebted
for having been so well served by the analysis of the first Critique.

Kant set himself the task of discovering those necessary forms of the
human mind to which all phenomena -- i.e., all that appear to the human mind must necessarily conform and be subject, while phenomenal experience might be a vast fabrication of the human mind. According to Kant, "mind is constituted along the lines developed in his theory of knowledge that synthetic a-priori judgments about all human experience, past, present and future are possible". While Kant's theory does not start out on the assumption that there is a God, he abstracts from the divine existence only histrionically, without really doubting it. Hence he is not driven to the conclusion that the human mind, including the faculty of reason, is a freak and that the faith in God is an inevitable postulate of practical reason. Kant did not think of the human reason as a naturalistic datum that might be studied scientifically. He believed in a whole rational order. Kant insisted that man is not morally good unless his conduct is marked by the total absence of any psychological inclination and motivated solely by respect for reason. For Kant, moral worth was solely a function of the rationality, i.e. consistency of the maxim according to which an action was resolved. The force of his ethics is due in large measure to the fact that he crystallized elements that had long been implicit in the Western religious tradition, which commanded man to do good because God willed it, regardless of the consequences. Thus, his ethics has a great impetus and also influenced all in variety of fields.

4. F. Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, P. 205.
Nietzsche's first reading of Schopenhauer's "The World as Will and Idea" in 1865 seems to have opened windows for him. It was from Schopenhauer that he derived the idea of Will rather than Reason as the Key to the world. Nietzsche modified, this to suit his own purposes. The metaphysical will which Schopenhauer put in place of Kant's thing-in-itself was conceived by Nietzsche in pluralistic terms, and "Will per se" became transformed for him into "Will to Power".

The category of the genius for both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche eclipses that of the saint. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer shared a common interest in the Hellenic world in general and in the poetry of Aeschylus in particular. Schopenhauer's view that the ancient Greeks turned to art to make their sufferings bearable, was also shared by Nietzsche. Beyond this, we find that Nietzsche was different from Schopenhauer especially in matters concerning psychology. Schopenhauer took it for granted "that every voluntary motion is the manifestation of an act of will." He departed from Kant's theory of "practical reason", but he was enough of a Kantian to think of will in terms of agency and spontaneity. Nietzsche expressed his ignorance about all this. He wrote — "...what men have found it so difficult to understand from the most ancient times down to the present day is their ignorance in regard to themselves, not merely with respect to good and evil, but something even more essential. The oldest of illusions lives on, namely that we know, and know precisely, in each case, how human action is originated."  

Thinking had been associated with egoity since the time of Descartes. But Nietzsche believed that "a thought comes when 'it' wishes, and not when 'I' wish".

As far as will is concerned he did not follow either the traditional "faculty psychology" or Schopenhauer's single metaphysical principle but spoke of a "willing - complex" which is "not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an affect, and specifically the affect of the command".

In spite of these departures from Schopenhauer, the influence of Schopenhauer on Nietzsche cannot be underestimated. Schopenhauer's inspirational approach, his dispensing with theology and his finding that such dispensing was not incompatible with an ethical viewpoint and his faith in the historic mission of great personalities, especially the mission of the philosopher, artist and saint -- all these had infinite appeal for Nietzsche.

As the nineteenth century was drawing to its close, apart from these philosophers who had great influence on Nietzsche, Nietzsche is also considered to be a great figure in whose name people of the most astonishingly discrepant and various views have sought to find justification for them. He was a German philosopher and declared himself as the destroyer of old values to clear the way for the virtues of strength against weakness.

6. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Para. 17.
7. Ibid, P. 25, Para. 19
The purpose of this chapter is to show that contemporary German Philosophy is not a disconnected aggregate of miscellaneous opinions but that its course has been determined by the historical situation which resulted from the collapse of Hegel’s philosophy and the emergence of the separate sciences. Nietzsche insisted on the distinction between philosophers and ‘philosophical workers’. The latter, he said, ‘have to fix and formalise some great existing body of valuations — that is to say former determinations of value, creations of value, which have become dominant and are for a time called ‘truths’”8. He mentioned Kant and Hegel as belonging to this class of philosophical labourers engaged in rationalization and justification of existing value frameworks to which they were already committed. The two thinkers of the 19th century Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have the determining influence on contemporary German philosophy.

Nietzsche- The Iconoclast

Friedrich Nietzsche is an existentialist philosopher. Nietzsche’s relation to the atheist existentialists is very much like Kierkegaard’s to the theists. In each case there has been undoubted influence on the one hand and undoubted misunderstanding on the other. In both we find an absence of system, a confessional style which evokes alternately sympathy and irritation, and a constant breaking through of pathological elements which seem

8. Ibid, Para. 211.
to require the understanding of the clinical expert rather than of the philoso-
pher. The fertilising impact of each was felt no less in fields outside philoso-
phy than within this discipline namely, in literature, in the case of Nietzsche,
and in theology, in the case of kierkegaard.

Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are as divided as the poles and as close
as twins. Nietzsche cast his supreme choice upon the finite world which
kierkegaard rejected and resigned. Both opposed themselves to the cul-
ture of the day and returned to the Greeks. Both were existentialists. For
existentialism is not concerned with points of school doctrine but with the
recall of philosophy to the existing individual striving to live in the light of
reflection, as these pre-eminently did.

Of all the thinkers, Nietzsche was only aware of the European heritage
and was so deeply alive to the crisis of European man. Of the contemporary
existentialists only Jaspers shows a parallel sensitivity. In his visionary way
Nietzsche saw beyond the twilight period in which he was living, a twilight
not only of gods, but of men and of concepts, and he was able to gaze into
the future and see horizons which are perhaps denied to men like Sartre.
Nietzsche is really the European philosopher in the modern period who spells
out what consistent atheism involves.

Nietzsche the existentialist is not the teacher of the Will to Power,
Superman, Eternal Recurrence. It is Nietzsche the artist, philosopher and psychologist and critic of culture. He is an iconoclast. His mission is to sweep away the shibboleths behind which western man had been sheltering. His aim is to strip men of their illusions. He is apparently as Pelagian as Sartre. But at the same time he sees that man cannot live without myths, and so he substitutes the seed of a new mythology of his own and the seed fell on stony ground. His criticisms of the Cartesian ego can be placed along side Sartre’s. Unlike Sartre he sees that man in his present condition may be unable to bear the burden of his loss of identity, his loss of a centre. Some kind of redemption seems to be called for, and Nietzsche tries to indicate what this redemption would involve. It was Nietzsche who foresawed that the pursuit of knowledge can become "a handsome tool for man’s self destruction."9 Nietzsche was a critic not only of the bourgeois but of the intellectual, and the category ‘intellectual’ includes not only the ‘professional philosopher’ but the theoretical scientist. Nietzsche can be counted among those who protested against the cartesian "bifurcation of nature." He saw reality as the product of the commerce between the power in man and the powers in things, without there being any iron curtain between the two. He showed the extent to which he was preoccupied with the problem of knowledge and with the problem of expressing philosophically man’s relation to

9. Margaret Chatterjee, The Existentialist Outlook, P. 22
the world. Nietzsche was one of those who exploded the myth of "objectivity" rather than one of those who decried it. He shows that the world was neither logical nor mathematical. He affirms, "In the last analysis, there are only practical sciences, founded on the basic errors of mankind, the admission of things and identical things."?10 From one point of view this loss of absolute truth amounts to nihilism. From another point of view the inference is that we find proper place not in the limited world of the quantifiable but in the human world in which one strives for liberation. But Nietzsche like Kant does not limit only reason to make room for faith. Rather in place of traditional belief he substitutes a new faith, faith in the new man which the future will bring forth.

Nietzsche desired a new Renaissance, and, like the Italian Renaissance, he began with eulogy of the Greeks. Here, his philological and his philosophical interests made a pact. He wished to animate his science with fresh blood, for he was using it to solve the great life-problem. Greek tragedy found the source of its ruin in Socratism which taught that understanding was the main thing. Under its influence, Euripides became the first matter of fact tragedian. Here enters a new type of humanity, the theoretic man, the inquirer, who finishes perhaps by placing seeking higher than finding. Nietzsche applies the history of culture in great strokes. This is true not

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only of what he says of Greek culture, but also of his statements about Christianity, the Reformation, the Revolution, in his later writing. In Dionysus, Apollo and Socrates he has personified three tendencies which are always striving and struggling with each other in human life. The Greek life was drawn into the whirl of great world-events.

The importance of history does not lie in endless evolution or in the destiny of the great mass of men. Nietzsche says that the whole value of history is concentrated in truly great individual men and in them it has reached its end and the long process of history comes into consideration only because it provides the occasion and the power that is necessary to the rise of such men. Thus Nietzsche holds that the goal of humanity cannot lie at the end of history but only in the highest exemplars of mankind.

Here Nietzsche expresses his radical aristocratism. The primary motivation of aristocratism in Nietzsche stands thus in connection with his notion of history, the significance of which he seeks to reduce to the most exclusive satisfaction at the appearance of the great man, raised above past and future, without being an effect of the former, or cause or means of the latter. Yet there is an inconsequence in making the mass of men not only a hindrance or a copy, but also a means, Schopenhauer's influence, which Nietzsche was never able properly to dispense with lies back of his philosophy of history. It is remarkable that Nietzsche does not grant how
Anarchists, Feminists, Nazis, Socialists and many other have found inspiration in his works. Almost no German cultural or artistic figure of the last century has not acknowledged his influence from Thomas Mann to Jung to Heidegger. In Europe Nietzsche who had never been in disgrace there became after World War II a continued object of study and appropriation for existentialists, phenomenologists, and then during the 1960s and 1970s a cynosure for critical theorists, post structuralists, and decomstructionists. When the latter two movements first gained a foothold in the United States then took the country over, it was Nietzsche who once more was acknowledged as the major source of their inspiration.

Thus, from the above discussion we may conclude that Nietzsche's philosophy influenced many philosophers and thinkers in the modern age.