CHAPTER-V

CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PERSPECTIVE
In the contemporary western philosophy we find tremendous discussions regarding the nature and concept of consciousness. A number of thinkers have offered their opinions on this topic and I have attempted to discuss some of those opinions in four different philosophical groups. In the idealistic group, I have to mention George Berkeley, Hegel, Kant and Bradley. The materialist group includes John Locke, David Hume and Armstrong. Here I would try to show that Descartes has directed to the way of materialism by indicating that material substance is independent of mental substance. Although materialists have further developed their theory and even denied the mental substance they have taken the key to the problem of consciousness from Descartes. The existentialist concept of consciousness is discussed basically on Jean Paul Sartre's who has emphasized a peculiar concept of consciousness. In the analytic group, G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Gilbert Ryle are the philosophers to whom the discussion is contended. Here an attempt is made to show that the analytic philosophers have tried their best to reject Descartes' concept of consciousness but failed to do so. They couldn't even disclose the mystery of consciousness.

In his "A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge" George Berkeley expresses his concept of mind and consciousness. He maintains that minds and the perceptions of those minds are the
only things that do exist. To be is either to be perceived or to be a perceiver. In other words, whatever exist must be perceived i.e., esse-est-percipi. So-called physical objects exist only in the mind, as classes of perceptions. Here Berkeley's broad use of the word “perception” includes all the conscious activities of mind. For him, the possibility of consciousness presupposes the identity of spiritual substance. In Principles section 26, he maintains that consciousness entails a mental substance. For him, consciousness or conscious perceptions are the essence of mind. In Principles § 98, he maintains that the soul always thinks and that separation of the existence of a spirit from its cogitation violates the anti-abstractionist principle. Berkeley admits that the subject of consciousness or experiences is the mind or spirit. For him, mind or spirit is the substance and it is the subject of consciousness. He rejects the existence of a material substance which is independent of our consciousness. Minds or spirits are active and ideas are passive. As he says, "This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, or myself. By which words I do not denote anyone of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, where in they exist, or, which is the same thing, where by they are perceived....." (Principles §2). The same statement is made in the Three Dialogues: "I do nevertheless know, that I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist." (Il, 231).
According to Berkeley, everything we perceive is "visibly inactive". We don't perceive any causal agency. We do perceive a succession of ideas. "There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them" (Principles §26). That cause can't be an idea, it must there be a substance. The cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit. In section 27, Berkeley tells us that "A spirit is one, simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will". For Berkeley, we can't have an idea of a spirit because ideas are passive and spirits are active. Spirits and ideas are things of different natures. There is nothing alike or common in them. Berkeley simply states the standard substantialist's view that our will must be present when we will a range of awareness. Such a will is not a momentary event in a larger collection of events. It is not a "congeries of perceptions". It is a spirit.

Berkeley maintains that there is mind and there is consciousness as the essence of the mind. There are material things or bodies but they exist only in the mind as perceptions. Regarding the relation between the mind or consciousness and the body or matter Berkeley is clear that bodies are not independent substances but exist as perceptions or objects of consciousness. He is in the opinion that
consciousness exists even after death for, mind or spirit is immortal. As a true devotee of God Berkeley believes in the immortality of the soul and declares that material things, in my absence, are the perceptions of God. Berkeley consciously advanced a doctrine of mental substance and it is unfortunate that he has often been interpreted as not having noticed his argument against matter works against mind. He has ruled matter out not because he has no notion of it but because the notion of it is inconsistent. Berkeley differs from Descartes' concept of mind in denying the independent existence of the contents of consciousness. For the contents of consciousness is inaccessible, unexperienceable, unconceptualisable. Here Berkeley's claim was that what is out there is not material, not matter. When Descartes regards mind and matter to be independent substances, Berkeley rejects the independent existence of material substance.

Immanuel Kant's concept of consciousness and mind is expressed in his famous work "The Critique of Pure Reason". He offers a purely subjective concept of consciousness. He approaches the problem of consciousness from the epistemological point of view and his account of consciousness could be understood in the light of his theory of knowledge. According to Kant, Consciousness is an activity of the mind. Consciousness reveals its objects. It does not reveal itself. In other words, there is no awareness of awareness. So far as our mental
states and processes can be known at all, they are known in the same objective manner in which we apprehend existences in space. We cannot have immediate knowledge of consciousness. Consciousness is always reflective. There is an immediate element in all knowledge, but our consciousness of it is always conditioned and accompanied by interpretative process. Mind can unfold its contents in the sunshine of consciousness. Kant argues that our specific knowledge is exclusively limited. So, we cannot have knowledge of consciousness. But consciousness is analyzable and it cannot be regarded as ultimate or as unanalysable.

According to Kant, the subject of consciousness is the mind or self. It is the transcendental consciousness which remains the same through the threefold synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition. The unity of consciousness consists in having an identical subject of conceptual apperception. I have no knowledge of myself as "I am" but merely as "I appear to myself." The consciousness of the self is not knowledge of the self. Kant account for the unity of Consciousness on a transcendental level. The transcendental analysis of this unity is intended to show that subject of consciousness is a fixed and abiding non-temporal subject. Inner sense is subjective. But from a transcendental point of view consciousness is purely objective. There is only one transcendental object, which is to say that the a priori
conditions of possible experience are at all times the same. There is a subject only in so far as consciousness as such is the a priori thought of an unchanging object in general. There is no intuition of the subject either. There is only "the bare representation "I". There is only the mere thought "that I am". Kant does not regard the self as a substance. The consciousness of me in thought is not the knowledge of myself as an object. When we take an intuition of the subject as object and apply the category of substance to it, we do mistake. It is because the unity of consciousness underlies the categories. We cannot apply the categories of understanding to the self for; the self is not given in intuition as empirical data. As Kant says, "Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object..." The self is presupposed in knowing anything. So, it is not an object which is known. But we can think of the self as the subject of consciousness. Kant says that scientific knowledge of mind or soul without body is not possible. Pure reason cannot provide us the knowledge of a permanent soul. His paralogism shows that soul cannot be said to exist independently of the body. According to Kant, practical reason demands the disembodied existence of the self. Kant maintains that the disembodied existence is compatible with phenomenal existence. But such existence belongs to noumena. Kant is clear, from the paralogism that for thinking about the self one need not refer to material objects. We cannot have knowledge
of the independent and immortal self. But we can hope for continuous existence of our thinking nature. As he says, "Paralogism gives me the right to hope for an independent and continuing existence of my thinking nature throughout all possible change of my state..."^2

In his famous work "The Phenomenology of Spirit" Hegel presented his doctrine of consciousness and mind. His concept of consciousness can be understood in the light of his absolute idealism. He expresses his concept of consciousness through his dialectic method. According to Hegel, consciousness is an activity of the mind. It is an organization of bodily functions. The soul is not a separate entity from the body. For Hegel, mind or spirit passes through dialectical stages of evolution. Mind reveals itself as subjective mind, objective mind and absolute mind. Mind expresses itself as soul, Consciousness and spirit. Soul is the mind dependent on nature. Consciousness is the mind opposed to nature. Mind reconciled with nature in knowledge is the spirit. Consciousness is an evolution from the very principle of which the body is also an expression. The function of consciousness is knowing. We cannot know reality independently of consciousness.

Hegel regards consciousness as a source of the dialectical operation. For him, consciousness is a creative activity. It is capable of transcending every particular thing, concept and viewpoint. Consciousness is not a determinate object or some distinct category.
Consciousness is pure negativity. The distinction between subject and object is due to the negativity of consciousness. In other words, the negative perfection of consciousness enables the subject to differentiate itself from the unconscious mode of existence (object). Being endowed with negativity, consciousness is compelled to go beyond itself and to transcend every determinate content. Hegel maintains that everything is immanent in consciousness. Consciousness establishes the relation of subject and object, of concept and datum. Consciousness consists a universalizing process. In this process an object yields up a universal meaning. Consciousness disengages universality from partiality. Hegel maintains that consciousness constitutes itself through its own universalizing performance. Hence, for Hegel, the subject of consciousness is no more than this universalizing or unifying activity.

According to Hegel, consciousness constantly relates itself to an object. The fundamental act of consciousness consists in distinguishing this object. To be conscious is to be with objects. Consciousness is sensitive to objects. But it unveils them only through the subjective performance. The perceiving consciousness and perceived object constitutes a dialectical unity. Hegel assumes that only act of consciousness can really constitute the subject matter of philosophical activity.
According to Hegel, consciousness as appearance is relative to the objects. But the Supreme spirit is real. The Supreme spirit is consciousness-in itself and in-and-for-itself. Consciousness-in itself is abstract and becomes concrete in relation to objects. The objects appear as the other of mind. This otherness of objects has to be overcome by being mentalised and spiritualized. Hence, consciousness is not like a search-light which reveals an object out there. But it is a process through which the universal meaning is disengaged from the object.

Hegel's concept of consciousness as a function is comparable to James who regards it to be the name of a nonentity. Hegel seems to follow Descartes' path to realize subjectivity but differs in regarding consciousness not as the essence of mind but as a function. Descartes regards the mind or soul to be a separate entity the essence of which is consciousness. But Hegel admits that consciousness is an evolution from the very principle of which the body is also an expression. In other words, there is no such difference between body and consciousness, which Descartes has observed. Hegel's dialectical idealism tries to synthesize the problem of body and mind to avoid the interactionism of Descartes.

F. H. Bradley advocates a concept of consciousness in the light of his monistic idealism. For him, reality is undivided whole of
experience in which nothing is posited and related and consciousness is relational therefore it is only appearance. According to Bradley, consciousness is an aspect, and an inconsistent aspect, of reality. Consciousness is not an entity. Here Bradley agrees with James who regards consciousness as the name of a non-entity. Bradley says that consciousness and its objects are one. Consciousness is reducible to relations between objects and objects are reducible to relations between different states of consciousness and neither point of views is more nearly ultimate than the other. Here Bradley seems to try to avoid the dualism of Descartes by asserting reality to the objects. For him, the only independent reality is immediate experience or feeling. But experience is not identical with consciousness. Experience is not co-extensive with consciousness, but is wider. As Bradley says, "There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one with which knowledge begins." Consciousness and the subject of consciousness are mere appearance but not reality. Bradley admits that immediate experience is a timeless unity, which is not as such present either anywhere or to anyone. It is only in the world of objects that we have time and space and selves. By the failure of any experience to be merely immediate, by its lack of harmony and cohesion, we find ourselves as conscious souls in a world of objects.
The materialistic concept of consciousness is that consciousness arises out of material body. There is nothing in the body to be called mind or soul, which is other than the body itself. It is the conscious body, which is regarded as mind. The materialistic concept of consciousness found its origin in John Locke's philosophy of mind. Locke believes that the mind is like a white paper in which experiences leave deep impressions to form ideas. For him, consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind. Consciousness is inseparable from thinking, that when we perceive or meditate or will we know that we do so, and that it is by this consciousness that each of us considers himself as himself, as one persisting thinking thing. Locke does not agree with Descartes that thinking is the essence of mind or soul. For him, only a waking man thinks, a sleeping man does not and hence thinking is not the essence of the soul or mind. The soul is not always conscious of it. As he says: "I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake. But whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it."^4

Locke's theory of consciousness is not free from that of Descartes. While refusing to follow Descartes in regarding thought as
the essence of mind, he admits the necessity of referring it as an activity to a substance beyond experience. For him, "the first capacity of human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects or by its own operations when it reflects on them." According to Locke, the power of thinking is called understanding, and the power of volition is called the will; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties. The mind can neither make nor destroy the simple ideas. The simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways - sensation and reflection. Locke maintains that it is consciousness that constitutes personal identity, that makes me, for example, the same me, the same person, through and despite the passage of time.

David Hume advocates a theory of consciousness devoid of self or subject. It is a fact that I have perceptions and impressions or consciousness. Consciousness is not to be understood as something existing separately from a body. The concepts of a conscious body doesn't imply "embodiment" because a pure and disembodied consciousness is not found anywhere. There are unconscious bodies, but not un-bodied consciousness. Consciousness is the faculty of the mind, which in turn is the 'activity' of the body. Hume does not find any self as the subject of consciousness. He says: "There are some
philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence... For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.  

A natural response to Hume would be to say that, even if we cannot detect ourselves apart from our perceptions, we can at least detect ourselves in them that when I introspectively detect an experience - experiencing something or myself experiencing in a certain manner. Indeed, it is not clear in what sense an experience could be introspectively detected without the detection of its subject. Hume's analysis here seems to be self-contradictory. Hume writes, "I never catch myself..." but what or whom does the word 'I' refer to? An owner of experiences? But Hume has already ruled this out. He is aware only of certain states of consciousness but not of the self that has them. But what then makes them this? That they occur in a certain temporal succession? But so do yours and mine. Whose state of consciousness does he finds? No one's, presumably just states of consciousness. But how is this possible? Surely it is his own experiences that he finds. In that case, however, we seem to be driven
back to the view that the 'I' is something more than the series of states of consciousness. Here, perhaps Hume means to convey Descartes' point that 'I am not only logged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but.....I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. Mention of Descartes turns our thoughts to two substances again, but the ideas of close union and intermingling suggest one thing with two sets of states and properties. And that view of the matter comes right to the surface when, writing of pride and humility. Hume claims that they 'have the qualities of our mind and body that is self, for their natural and more immediate causes.'

Hume as the British empiricists before him, emphasize the priority of individual experience in the formation and content of fundamentally passive consciousness. In carrying basic empiricist premises to their logical conclusion, however, Hume rejected the simple mental substance of Locke and Berkeley and offered an analysis of mind in terms of a 'bundle or collection of different perceptions. As Hume writes:" The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations....... The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor
have we the most distinct notion of the place, where these scenes are
represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed.” Hume's
empirical theory of consciousness leaves us with a very limited vision
of the scope and potential of intellectual and spiritual experience.

D. M. Armstrong advocates a materialist account of
consciousness in his "A Materialist Theory of the Mind." He believes
that we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical
terms. He is trying to work out an account of the nature of mind, which
is compatible with the view that man is nothing but a physico-chemical
mechanism. According to Armstrong, a satisfactory theory of mind
ought both to allow the existence of inner mental events, yet also
preserve a logical connection between these inner events and outward
behaviour. It is clear that an account of mental states as states apt for
the production of certain sorts of behaviour will fulfill this demand.
Mental Processes have a nature of their own, although this nature is
not directly given to us. Consciousness is something more than the
occurrence of an inner state apt for the production of certain sorts of
behaviour. For him, consciousness is no more than awareness
(perception) of inner mental states by the person whose states they
are. Armstrong tries to develop an anti-Cartesian account of
consciousness. He says, "Indeed, in the most interesting sense of the
word 'consciousness', consciousness is the cream on the cake of
Armstrong says that the indubitability of consciousness is a Cartesian myth, which has been an enemy of progress in philosophy and psychology. "Just as perception is selective - not all - embracing. So it also may be mistaken. Perceptions may fail to correspond, more or less radically, to reality. In the same way, introspective consciousness may fail to correspond, more or less radically, to the mental reality of which it is a consciousness." He doesn't believe that we logically cannot be mistaken about our own current mental states. We have indubitable or incorrigible knowledge concerning our own mental states. Armstrong tries to show that introspective reports are not incorrigible by pointing to A. J. Ayer's 1959 British Academy lecture 'privacy'. Further he says, "When Descartes set out to examine his thoughts, to see if any were logically indubitable beliefs, he presupposed that he had thoughts. For he could not examine his thoughts unless he head some to examine! But, pace Descartes, this did not make his statement 'I am thinking now' a logically indubitable one. It was simply the presupposition of his starting point. Descartes only got out what he put in. In the same way, if it is given that I make the sincere report 'I am in pain now', then that presupposes that I believe that I am in pain now. But this does not make my belief an
indubitable one. It is simply a presupposition of the given starting point: I get out what I put in.\textsuperscript{10} Taking help from Behaviorism Armstrong establishes that mind is the inner cause of certain behaviour. Behaviorist identifies the mind and mental occurrences with behaviour. He says that they are right in thinking that our notion of a mind and of individual mental states is logically tied to behaviour. For perhaps what we mean by mental state is some state of the person, which, under suitable circumstances, brings about a certain range of behaviour. Perhaps mind can be defined not as behaviour, but rather as the inner cause of certain behaviour. According to Armstrong, the verdict of modern science seems to be that the sole cause of mind-be-to-kennning behaviour in man and the higher animals is the physico-chemical workings of the central nervous system. And so, assuming we have correctly characterized our concept of mental state as nothing built the cause of certain sorts of behaviour, and then we can identify these mental states with purely physical states of the central nervous system.\textsuperscript{11}

Armstrong's proposal is that consciousness is nothing but perception or awareness of the state of our mind. Consciousness is a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system. For him, a purely physicalist theory of the mind is an existing and plausible intellectual option. In materialist terms, although the brain may
contain self-scanners that scan the rest of the brain, and the scanners, which in turn scan the self-scanners, and so on as far as we please, we must come in the end to un-scanned scanners. This seems to cast light on what philosophers have called the 'systematic elusiveness of the subject'. When we look into our own mind, they have complained, something always except us. But Armstrong is against this scanning procedure. For, in order to say that we know something to be true it is not necessary that we must be able to support our claim by some independent checking procedure, or that we have independent reasons for our claim. All that is necessary is that in the situations where we make the claim, our belief should be empirically sufficient for its own truth. Armstrong advises us to admit the logical possibility of unconscious mental states. We must reject the view that our current mental states are 'self-intimate.' He thinks that one may rise a question that it may seem to be simple to give an account of physical happenings in the brain which will account for things like perceptions, the problem of how a mere physical mechanism could think creatively is obviously much more difficult to solve. If any inner states are to be denied to be purely physical states of the brain on the grounds that no physical mechanism could be adequate to produce behaviour of such sophistication then, clearly, it must be the 'higher' mental activities. But, for Armstrong, these difficulties are difficulties for different steps in the
materialist argument itself. These could be solved only when we know far more about the working of the brain than we do now.

The existentialist concept of consciousness finds its origin in the phenomenology of Edmond Husserl. Husserl gives importance in studying the subject, the ego, the consciousness instead of studying the objects of consciousness. For him, if I reflect properly on my states of consciousness, I will be "learning thus what is the nature of the psychical, and comprehending the being of the soul," and when I follow this procedure to the very end, "I am face to face at last with the ultimate structure of consciousness."\(^{12}\) Husserl maintains that intentionality is the only dimension of consciousness. Consciousness is wholly intentional, it is wholly objective. Consciousness has no interiority, and the phenomena logical reduction tends to reveal better and better to a consciousness less and less lost in the world, more and more a "disinterested spectator," a progressively more complete and explicit view of the objective world that it intends. Following Husserl, Jean Paul Sartre urges that "all consciousness ........ is consciousness of something. The key point here is the essentially intentional aspect of consciousness when I am in conscious mental state; it is directed at or 'about' something." In his philosophy we come across a more fully developed existentialist theory of consciousness. True to the phenomenological standpoint, Sartre takes consciousness necessarily
as having reference to something. Consciousness can hardly have any reality beyond the referential function on the plan of phenomena.

According to Sartre, a phenomenological study of consciousness reveals it as presence to oneself and presence to the world. This table, that wall, etc., exists in themselves; but man alone in this world exists for himself - in Sartrean terminology "pour-soi (for itself) as distinguished from "en-soi", (in itself). For Sartre, consciousness is nothingness. It is what it is not and is not what it is. Consciousness is a lack. Consciousness has no content. It is transparent. It directs us to objects. All physical, psychophysical and psychic objects, all truths, all values are outside consciousness. So consciousness is nothingness. But consciousness is not to be identified with an object. Consciousness is the future of not yet and it is not the past or the present. So, consciousness is future realization of possibility. Consciousness is an object in the eyes of the others but in itself it is not an object. Sartre takes up his stand on a non-ego-logical conception of consciousness. For him, I do not perceive other's consciousness, yet I behave as if other has consciousness. It may be a fact that other is conscious too. But we have to find good reasons to believe that other is a conscious being as much as I am. To follow Cartesian doubt if at all there is anything of which we cannot doubt is the existence of the mind as a substance. For Sartre, distinction
between body and mind is redundant. He does not agree with distinction between body and mind - the body being an extended substance and mind being the thinking substance. Nor does he speak of consciousness per se, for consciousness is always as embodied consciousness. He also rejects the realist's view that there are no difficulties in other's existence to the extent that realism takes everything as given without any doubt, then I can also perceive my consciousness, my body, other's body and other's consciousness distinctly. In that case, it would mean clubbing together substance and ideas, which are ontologically different and incompatible. Consciousness cannot be perceived in the same way as body is perceived. While body can be perceived as (inanimate) object, consciousness cannot be perceived without embodiment. Denying Cartesian dualism Sartre avers: "If the souls are separated by their bodies, they are distinct as this ink well is distinct from this book; that is, we cannot conceive of the immediate presence of the one in the other. And even if we admit that my soul can be immediately present in the other's body. I will have to overcome all the density of a body before I touch his soul. Therefore, if realism bases its certitude upon the presence 'in person' of the spatial-temporal thing in my consciousness, it cannot lay claim to the same evidence for the reality of the other's soul since by this very admission, the other's soul does
not give itself, 'in person' to mine. It is an absence, a meaning, the body points to it without delivering it."

Sartre maintains that consciousness is unperceivable. Unperceivability of consciousness is not like that of perceiving an illusory image but of conceiving a function. Consciousness is not a substantial or perceivable substance; it is merely an operational notion—a function. 'Pain', for example, is not a perceivable object. It is inferred from some perceivable phenomena like say, yelling, crying etc., though these phenomena by themselves are not pain. Regarding the relation between consciousness and body, Sartre thinks that Descartes was led to distinguish in a radical manner between the two, as he thought, "mind is easier to know than the body." He discovered the ideas that he thought were signs to indicate the body. But the division between mind and body led to the consequence that the body as it is experienced by consciousness was suppressed. The separation of consciousness and body gave rise to the pseudo-problem of re-uniting them. For Sartre, body cannot be separated from consciousness, and what we conceive as body is the conscious body. Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness; it cannot be united with a body. Similarly being-for-others, is wholly body: there are no "psychic phenomena" there to be united with the body. There is nothing behind the body. But the body is wholly psychic. Sartre says: "The problem of
the body and its relations with consciousness is often obscure because of the fact that while the body is from the beginning posited as a certain thing having its own laws and capable of being defined from outside, consciousness is then reached by the type of inner intuition which is peculiar to it.\footnote{14}

Jean Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or even more strongly that consciousness is self-consciousness. He distinguishes between positional and non-positional consciousness. Obviously related to the intentional nature of consciousness the idea is that when one's conscious attention is focused on something else, one 'posits' the existence of an intentional object. On the other hand, one merely has 'non-positional' consciousness of 'anything that falls within the field of awareness but to which one is not now paying attention. Sartre also distinguishes between pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness. Suffice it to say for now that the former is basically outer-directed consciousness and the later is inner-directed consciousness. For Sartre, reflection is a consciousness which posits a consciousness. Sartre explicitly rejects the existence of the Freudian unconscious, which would seem to rule out the existence of first-order non-conscious mental states. For example, Sartre says that 'pleasure cannot exist
'before' consciousness of pleasure' and 'to believe is to know that one believes.'

The analytic group of philosophers does not offer a clear concept of consciousness; rather they try to criticize the existing concept through analysis. Let us consider the analytic concept of consciousness from G. E. Moore onwards. G. E. Moore expresses his concept of consciousness while refuting Berkeley's idealism. In "Refutation of Idealism,"15 Moore rejects the subjective concept of consciousness. Berkeley holds that whatever exists must be perceived or must be the content of consciousness. Moore says that the existence of an object is different from the consciousness of it. It is wrong to identify the object with the consciousness of it. According to Moore, the sensation of blue is a conscious mental act which exists only when we are conscious, but the 'blue' which is sensed is an object of sensation which may very well exist unseen and unperceived. In this way Moore distinguishes two distinct elements in every sensation, namely - a) consciousness and b) the object of consciousness. For him, the 'blue' does not belong to 'consciousness' but to the 'sky' and 'green' belongs to 'leaves of trees' and not to our awareness of the tree. Moore's concept of consciousness reflects Descartes' concept where he believes in separate existence of consciousness and bodies. He
seems to agree with dualism of mind and body. But he failed to find out the exact nature of consciousness. As he says:

"The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous."

As a realist, Moore supposed that consciousness must be something like 'blue object' but it is consciousness which makes mind to be mind and it is the essence of mind. On the other hand, consciousness is not emptiness. Moore claims that mind is nothing but acts of consciousness. For him, when we say we have minds we simply say that we perform certain acts of consciousness. As he writes:

".....we believe that we men, besides having bodies, also have minds; and one of the chief things which we mean, by saying we have minds, is, I think, this: namely, that we perform certain mental acts or acts of consciousness. That is to say, we see and hear and feel and remember and imagine and think and believe and desire and like and dislike and will and love and are angry and afraid, etc. These things that we do are all of them mental acts - acts of mind or acts of consciousness: whenever we do any of them, we are conscious of something."
Here he seems to deny the possibility of consciousness devoid of contents or objects of consciousness. Phenomenalogists have claimed that consciousness is always consciousness of something. But we can feel that we are conscious. Moore does not believe in the existence of consciousness without a body. He differs from Descartes who believes in the existence of consciousness without a body and mind and body interacts. Further, Moore believes in the relation between the two, which is different from mind-body interactionism. For him, consciousness occurs only within the body. He says: "But the simplest and most universal relation which we believe to hold between acts of consciousness and particular bodies is, I think, the one I have mentioned - namely, that they occur where those bodies are."18

As a true realist Moore is right in saying that we cannot find consciousness devoid of body for our experiences do not reveal it. But the logical possibility of disembodied consciousness cannot be denied, keeping faith on the scientific development and theories of evolution. Moore says that consciousness emerges out of human bodies as an evolute of the evolution of the universe and at another time consciousness may be vanished. He writes that just as we believe that, at some time in the past, there were probably no conscious beings at all upon the earth, and certainly nonbeings with human consciousness;
so we believe that there may come a time, in the future, when this will again be so. But it is to be noted that it is the conscious human being who with his limited knowledge of science has imagined the evolutionary process of the earth and it may be the case that a time will come when the mysteries of consciousness would be disclosed when we will be able to find consciousness devoid of bodies. There is a logical possibility of falsifying the recent theories of science in future.

A. J. Ayer offers an anti-metaphysical concept of consciousness. He believes in the Jamesian concept of consciousness as a stream, continuous state of experiences. He does not accept the Cartesian view that consciousness inheres in a mental substance. On the other hand, he does not agree with the physicalistic concept of consciousness. While regarding the subject of consciousness Ayer wished to avoid the idea of an enduring subject. He suggests that when we refer to a self as the subject of consciousness, what we refer to is revealed on paper analysis to be a relation between the total temporary states. Ayer's main concern is to produce a theory that will account for the continuity of the self, or in other terms, with the unity of succession of total temporary states. He rejects the self as a metaphysical entity. As Ayer says: "We know that self, if it is not to be treated as a metaphysical entity, must be held to be a logical construction out of the sense-experiences. And, accordingly, if we ask what the nature of the
self is, we are asking what is the relationship that must obtain between sense-experiences for them to belong to the sense-history of the same self."

Ayer, in his "The Central Questions of Philosophy", denies the existence of Kantian self which is transcendental ego standing outside of this world. Further he says that the postulation of mental substance is not needed to explain self-consciousness. He expresses his opinion by quoting James (Principles of Psychology, P-397), thus: "Spiritualists do not deduce any properties of the soul. They simply find various characters in the mental life and these they clap into the soul, say 'Lo! He holds the source from which they flow.' But an entity which is neither observable nor fulfils any explanatory function can have no interest for us." While rejecting the subject of consciousness as a metaphysical entity Ayer goes to talk against privacy of the immediate contents of consciousness. In his famous essay "Privacy", Ayer has distinguished four different criteria of privacy and found that none of those criterions are followed while treating the immediate content of consciousness as private. Privacy does not remain private in its ultimate sense of the term. It is often said that 'you cannot have my feelings' but at the same style we can say that, "you cannot sleep my sleep, or smile my smile or speak with my voice". These show that these are public as well as private. Hence privacy is not the criteria of
the mental. Actually none of the mental activities are private but in some sense public. Ayer advises us not to raise such a question which has no answer at all. He seems to prefer the person theory, which rejects the dualism of Descartes. For him, mind and body exists in their way but we cannot keep them in two different water tight compartments. On the other hand, we cannot deny the existence of physical events as well as mental. What Ayer wants to say is that it is non-sensical to doubt our own experience. As he says: "I may be in doubt as to what I perceive or what I feel, but I cannot be in any doubt as to their being my perceptions and my feelings. The suggestion is that this headache might not be mine at all but somebody else's is quite non-sensical."

Ayer prefers the assumption "that what I perceive in some cases at least are public object which exist independently of myself". This presumably leaves at least your body for me to perceive, without skepticism breeding inference or "construction" out of private impressions in that mode of perception. But since the body that I see is seen strictly as a physical object, not initially as the body of a person, I must make an inferential leap-from analogy with my inner case - to "the private world of its own", and so to the person confined to it. Ayer seems to say that mind, which is having consciousness, and body, which is extended, are both equally public and therefore, both can be
kept in the same status. But it is a fact that consciousness is the essence of mind, which is absent in physical bodies. It is human mind who is thinking about the relation between mind and body. On other hand, physical bodies do not think about us and they do not make any philosophical investigation. Descartes' metaphysical theory of consciousness cannot be removed by analysis and it should be understood consciously through metaphysical enquiry.

Bertrand Russell expresses his concept of consciousness in his famous work "The Analysis of Mind". He denies the concept of consciousness as the essence of Mind. He is against Descartes' concept that consciousness is the essence of mind and bodies are extended. He does not accept Freudian unconscious as mysterious state, which is censored by a 'metaphysical entity.' He says that mind is not completely different from physical body and from other animals as Descartes thought of, for there are similarities between them. As Russell writes: "Mystery is delightful, but unscientific, since it depends upon ignorance. Man has developed out of the animals, and there is no serious gap between him and the amoeba. Something closely analogous to knowledge and desire, as regards its effects on behaviour, exists among animals, even where what we call "consciousness" is hard to believe in; something equally analogous exists in ourselves in cases where no trace of "consciousness" can be
found. It is therefore natural to suppose that, whatever may be the
correct definition of "consciousness", and "consciousness" is not the
essence of life or mind."21

Here Russell maintains that animals are not automatons but
they have awareness for, they responds to and also react against
stimulus. He differs from Descartes in treating about animals and other
bodies. Further he insists that consciousness is a complex and far from
universal characteristic of mental phenomena. In other words, we
cannot regard consciousness as the sole or as the common aspect of
all mental events. For him, Consciousness is too narrow to
classify mental phenomena. Many things, which seem essentially
mental, are really neural. Perhaps it is the nerves that acquire
experience rather than the mind. Like a phenomenologist Russell says
that consciousness must be of something. In view of this
consciousness should be defined in terms of that relation of an image
or a word to an object. Up to The Analysis of Mind, Russell believed
that there was a fundamental difference between mind and matter. But
later he abandoned this belief and said that just as one ought to identify
the material object with the set of its aspects, so one ought to identify a
mind with set of those contents of consciousness, which belongs to
that mind.
According to Russell, the stuff of which the world of our experience is composed is neither mind nor matter, but something more primitive than either. Mind and matter alike are logical constructions. The particulars out of which mind and matter are constructed, or from which they are inferred, have various relations, some of which are studied by physics, others by psychology. Mind is a matter of degree, chiefly exemplified in number and complexity of habits. For Russell, exactly the same building blocks can occur both in a material object and in a mind. With regard to the distinction between mind and matter, these building blocks are therefore "neutral". He thinks of 'aspects' or 'events', as "neutral stuff" out of which the universe is made.

It seems that Russell fails to formulate an analysis of consciousness, which is the central element of mind. While denying consciousness as a metaphysical entity he himself created a metaphysical entity i.e., "neutral stuff" out of which the universe is made. He has created a new type of monism different from materialistic and idealistic or spiritualistic monism. Here a question arises - if mind and matter are logical constructions then "who makes the logical constructions?", "who thinks or infers them from particulars?" There must be a thinker whose essence is thinking or consciousness, which is proved by Descartes. (Meditation - VI)
Ludwig Wittgenstein's views on consciousness and mind are depicted in his famous work Philosophical Investigations. Actually, he has not advocated any theory of consciousness but has carefully examined the uses of words for describing mental phenomena. For him, consciousness is not the essence of mind or mental phenomena. There is nothing in common underlying mental phenomena. His concept of family resemblance can be applied to it. In case of mental phenomena we have a vast range of phenomena overlapping in various ways without having any one essence in common. We may say that we have here a "family" of items in which the members bear a "family resemblance". It is just like the members of a family who may all resemble one another, even though they have no one feature (e.g., the shape of the nose) in common. All conscious processes resemble to one another but nothing in common which is to be called consciousness.

Wittgenstein rejects the first person account of consciousness, which led to give a private ostensive definition of consciousness. He argued that if one holds that the initial application of expressions involving consciousness is to one-self, if one learns the meanings of these expressions by a private ostensive definition, then insoluble difficulties arise concerning the application of such expressions to others. Here Wittgenstein's beetle-in-box objection can be raised
against privacy of conscious acts. As he says, "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it, we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. No one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever is."\(^{22}\)

Wittgenstein criticizes the Cartesian theory of consciousness, which regards consciousness to be a private inner essence. For him, the "paradox" of the Cartesian theory of consciousness is that by giving pre-eminence to the private sensation, the theory eliminates sensations (PI, 304). His "beetle-in-the-box" passage displays this self-defeating character of the Cartesian position. Wittgenstein denies the truth of a private, inner account of consciousness. But he did not want to deny the obvious truth that people have a 'private' mental life. It is in the sense that they have, for example, thoughts they do not utter and pains they do not show. He did not try to analyze away this truth in a neo-behaviorist fashion. Wittgenstein wanted to deny the possibility of giving them a private sense e.g., of giving sense to the word "pain" by
just attending to one's own pain - experiences, a performance that would be private and uncheckable. He also rejects the view that such relations as that between a pain and its symptoms or a thought and the words expressing it have nothing to do with our concept of pain or thought and are just established inductively.

Wittgenstein, like Hume rejects the idea that the self or subject is an entity, which is the subject of consciousness. He also denies that our relation to our mental states is one of possession of ownership. Wittgenstein attacks the idea of the self as an entity. In his reputed work Tractatus he says that there is no such thing as the thinking, presenting subject. If I wrote a book, 'The world as I found it', I should have there in to report my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention not be made.” (5.631/WR25)

Wittgenstein mounted one of the most effective attacks against the idea that life consists of two parts: a mental part and a physical part. On the other hand, he did not even accept behaviorism or materialism. He is not denying mental phenomena. For him, there is a significant asymmetry between first and third personal relations to the mental. When I attribute mental states to other people, I do so on the
basis of behavioral criteria. But I do not discover my own mental states by considering evidence or applying criteria. I neither observe the contents of my mind, nor infer what they are. We cannot have proper knowledge of our own mental states.

In Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness and mental processes we observe some elements of logical behaviourism. Wittgenstein seems to say that mental processes are of the sensory kind like sense-impressions, sensation of pain etc. he denies the non-sensory intellectual kind of mental processes. For him, many so-called psychological statements assert not only the occurrence of mental processes, but also something about overt behaviour. He maintains that there must be observable, behaviouristic "criteria" for the application of psychological concepts. If we remove the physical behaviour from an action nothing remains to be called mental or intentional. As he writes: "And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?" Wittgenstein does not find any difference between a physical movement of my arm and my intentional action of moving my arm. He wants to make clear the place of the inner in the outer. What we can utter and share and convey certainly exists and is there to be seen: what we cannot, does not and is not.
Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness seems to be an attempt to dissolve the problem of consciousness. For him, the problem of consciousness and body arises out of conceptual confusions. If proper attention to the way in which we use mental and physical terms in ordinary language will relieve us of the vexatious problem. Here Wittgenstein's approach is therapeutic rather than constructive. He aims to exorcise philosophical confusions rather than to build new theories about ourselves. But such an approach can be appropriate or not, that is difficult to say. It is a fact that the nature of consciousness is complex but it is a genuine problem of philosophy. Human mind cannot rest idly without speculation by simply dissolving the philosophical problems as suggested by Wittgenstein. A philosopher has to enquire the mental concepts until the mystery of the mind is disclosed.

Gilbert Ryle's concept of consciousness is expressed in his famous work "The Concept of Mind" where he has tried to modify the logical geography of the concepts, which are known as mental concepts. He regards the official theories of consciousness and introspection as logical muddles. He has sought to dismiss the age long notions of consciousness. According to Ryle, ordinarily the word 'consciousness' is used in different senses but in none of these senses
consciousness has the meaning attributed by philosophers. The following senses of consciousness are used in ordinary language:

a) Consciousness may mean 'to find out or discover', as when we are conscious of some changes in the arrangement of the room.

b) Consciousness can be used to relate the youthful person's embarrassment or puzzlement before elders, as when he starts becoming conscious of his changed physiological features.

c) Consciousness can again mean being aware of one's particular likes and dislikes, tastes and aversions.

d) Sometimes consciousness means 'sensitive' or 'sentient' where unconscious means 'insensitive' or 'anaesthetized'.

e) Consciousness also means 'heeding' as when a person pays no heed to a sensation he can be said to be unconscious of it.

Ryle says that the philosopher's concept of consciousness has relatively little affinity with any of the concept described above. For they invariably use it in the sense of an essence of the mental as opposed to the physical. The concept of consciousness as described by Descartes and his followers is a myth. Ryle criticized Descartes by saying that he has made us to believe in a second status world of consciousness. But there are no occurrences taking place in a second status world, since there is no such world and consequently no need for special modes of acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such a
world. Hence we need not to regard consciousness as a part of the definition of the mental. In other words, consciousness is not the essence of mind. We cannot accept that mental states must be conscious states. Ryle says that if we accept that mental processes must be conscious states then there would be no stopping place; there would have to be an infinite number of onion-skins of consciousness embedding any mental state or process whatsoever. If this conclusion is rejected, as he says, then it will have to be allowed that some elements in mental processes are not themselves things we can be conscious of, namely, those elements which constitute the supposed outermost self-intimations of mental processes; and then, 'conscious' could no longer be retained as part of the definition of the 'mental'.

Moreover, Ryle maintains that mental processes do not refer to mind or consciousness but they refer to the disposition of some kind of behaviour. For him, mind is nothing but a disposition of a person. There is no such entity, which is called mind. Mind is not a substance at all. When we apply mental concepts we point to body not to mind. We talk about the disposition of some kind of behaviour when we talk about mental process. We cannot enter into one's mind so we have to rely on his behaviour. The mind is what man does. There is not a single activity, which is not related with body. Human behaviour may be in some perspective mind-behaviour and in some perspective bodily
behaviour. We are concerned with the explanation of difference of
behaviour.

Although Ryle declares that he is not to give new information
about minds, he in fact has sought to advance a new theory of mind
and mental events. Ryle's theory of consciousness suffers from a
number of difficulties. While going to denounce that the philosopher's
sense of using consciousness has any affinity with the ordinary use he
fails to do so. It is difficult to see how the everyday uses of the term 'consciousness' are fundamentally different from the philosopher's use
of the same. The different uses, as shown by Ryle above, mean
awareness. The term 'conscious' though used in different contexts is
always used in the sense of awareness on the part of the person for
whom the term 'conscious' or 'consciousness' is predicated. In this
sense consciousness is to some extent private for, one's awareness
cannot be shared by others. Ryle identifies consciousness or
awareness with disposition of behaviour. But consciousness or
awareness cannot be identified with behaviour. If a robot behaves like
a man, it cannot be said to be conscious. On the other hand, a
paralyzed man cannot behave but still be conscious. Ryle fails to find
out the difference between consciousness and behaviour.
Consciousness is the presupposition of all assertions and denials. We
can doubt everything but we cannot doubt the doubting authority as
Descartes showed in his cogito-ergo-sum. To deny consciousness is to commit the philosophical error of denying the obvious. By denying consciousness, Ryle has only strengthened the belief that dispute about what is most evident is the characteristic of philosophical problems. The concept of consciousness is fundamental and cannot properly be defined. If we look into our own being without any materialistic bias we can grasp the non-bodily distinct awareness. Ryle says that consciousness cannot be understood without physical disposition of behaviour. Here we can say that it is difficult to grasp why Ryle pretends to be ignorant of what is fundamental to his own existence while talking about awareness distinct from physical body.

Ryle's attempt to replace consciousness by disposition is untenable. It is because if consciousness is just disposition of behaviour then man becomes a typically behaving body. But even a common man would refuse to be a mere unconscious body, which will deprive him of his interest in life. If we learned today that our own lives from tomorrow morning on would be this sort, the life of a perfectly behaving body but a perfectly unconscious one, we would suddenly cease to be concerned about it and we would not in the least cling to life on these terms. It is because we cannot for a moment identify ourselves with bodies without consciousness. Moreover, Ryle himself would not be agree with the view that his famous work. "The concept of
"mind" is not a creative work but a disposition of behaviour of a particular body called "Gilbert Ryle". Hence creative works of philosophers, poets, scientists etc. are not mere dispositions of behaviour of particular bodies. It is not a ghost but a conscious mind, which is the creator of all human values, art, literature and religion, of all that is beautiful and sublime in and around us. The task of creating and maintaining such human values cannot devolve on our body, however perfect an organism we might conceive it to be.

Further Ryle keeps all the states of consciousness i.e., thinking, feeling and willing under the same name as "dispositions of behaviour" but he fails to show the differences among them. Ryle seems to be wrong while saying that mind cannot have privileged Access in case of self-knowledge. He tries to prove too much as a general logical thesis for the concept of mind when he says that the sorts of things I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find about others, and that the methods are the same. If the "privileged Access" view of the traditional philosophers is not wholly true, then for precisely the same reasons the "open – Access" view of Gilbert Ryle is equally unacceptable.

Ryle advocates the third person account of the concept of consciousness. For him, one can observe from outside what can be reported by the individuals himself. There is nothing in consciousness,
which is not observable in behaviour. Here he seems to overlook the point that even observing behaviour he has continuously to assess them in relation to his own experiences to know whether actions performed are intelligent, well-meaning, thoughtful, imaginative or not. Actually, we observe the behaviour of others and assimilate them to our experiences by reflecting upon them. The third person account of consciousness of Ryle made us to rely on other people's behaviour in order to realize our own consciousness. But we often have doubt about others. Here it is strange that Ryle should have emphasized upon the same method to know ourselves and to know others. It is because we find that in cases where we may have doubts regarding someone else's mental states or operations, we have no reason whatsoever to doubt our own mental states and operations.

Ryle's formulation of ghost-in-the machine argument against Descartes seems to be untenable. Because man is something more than mere flesh and bone, man is more than mere body and that is the ghost as contended by Ryle. But we may say that the ghost is the machine itself, which can appear to itself as an extremely spiritual sort of thing—even as a disembodied mind. The subject of consciousness is always the subject and never becomes an object. Moreover, Ryle's formulation of category mistake is not applicable to Descartes. Ryle says that it is to commit a category mistake if we think that the
"university" exists as the same as its administrative building, the gate, the art's building, the hostel etc. exist. Likewise for him, Descartes committed category mistake while he thought that mental processes exist in the same way as the physical processes exist. But we can say that Descartes has not committed category mistake here. It is because the use of the words 'are', 'occur', 'exist', just do not seem to belong to different logical types when applied to bodies and to minds. Mental processes are real, they 'are' or they go on just as physical ones do. My mind is very different from my body, and to that extent they exist differently, but I mean substantially the same thing when I say that both exist. My thoughts at the moment are as real (they go on) as the movements of my hands. Further we can show that if anyone is a victim of category-mistake here it must be Ryle himself. For, Ryle thought that the "ghost" and the "mind" belong to the same category. But, in fact, they do not belong to the same category because "ghost" is a creation of our 'mind'; it is an imagination of a physical body without reality. On the other hand, mind is the creator of the ghost and it is realized through our immediate experience. So, he has committed a category - mistake by supposing both of them to be in the same logical types.

Our discussion shows that philosophers have given impetus on the problem of consciousness in contemporary philosophy which
was inaugurated by Descartes. We observe many different ideas regarding the concept of consciousness from Berkeley to Gilbert Ryle. It is to be noted that almost all the philosophers have expressed their views on the concept of consciousness referring to Descartes. The famous idealist George Berkeley's concept of consciousness has some similarities with Descartes. Both of them regarded consciousness as the essence of mind. Extension cannot be the essential nature of the mind. Secondly, Berkeley accepted the mind to be a substance like Descartes and advocated a doctrine of mental substance. Thirdly, both of them advocated the first-person account of consciousness. We do not need to depend upon other people in order to know our own consciousness. We can realize consciousness from our own case because we are conscious beings. Finally, both of them regard mind to be the subject of consciousness. Matter, the essence of which is extension, cannot be the subject of consciousness. Moreover, Berkeley agrees with Descartes while saying that the mind can exist even after the destruction of the body. But Berkeley's theory of consciousness seems to be extreme which does not even allow the existence of matter. Following Descartes he found that only consciousness is real and we have direct apprehension of it; matter exist independently of consciousness. But we cannot limit the world only to mind and consciousness. We must accept the existence of matter as well as the mind. Descartes has already mentioned that mind and matter are
independent substances and therefore the existence of matter is as important as conscious mind. Immanuel Kant has tried to interpret the nature of consciousness in the light of his phenomenal idealism. He agrees with Descartes when he says that the mind or soul is the subject of consciousness. He also agrees with Descartes in regarding consciousness as the essence of mind. He accepts the difference between mind and matter although he doesn’t wanted to call mind to be a substance. Like Descartes Kant believes in the disembodied existence of the self but, for him, it belongs to noumena. But he differs in denying the possibility of knowledge of consciousness. For him, we cannot have the knowledge of consciousness. For him, we cannot prove the existence of metaphysical ego. The soul exists in noumena but we cannot know it. Mind is not a substance and it is unknown and unknowable.

Hegel believes in the dialectic unity of mind and matter. He says that consciousness is an organization of bodily functions. He differs from Descartes in not regarding mind or soul to be a separate entity from the body. His absolute idealism is monistic while Descartes advocated a dualistic concept of mind and body. In order to avoid Descartes’ interactionism Hegel advocated that everything is immanent in consciousness. Mind-matter difference is due to the negativity of consciousness. The subject of consciousness is the unifying activity of
mind. The fundamental act of consciousness consists in distinguishing the object to which it was related. Actually there is nothing as matter completely different from mind. Consciousness-in-itself is the Supreme spirit which relates itself to objects. Bradley's monistic idealism regards the concept of consciousness as appearance for, consciousness is always relational. He wanted to avoid the dualism of Descartes and declares experience to be reality. For him, experience or feeling is not co-extensive with consciousness. Bradley wants to go further from Descartes by saying consciousness and the subject of consciousness to be merely appearance.

John Locke refused to follow Descartes in regarding consciousness as the essence of mind. He regarded mind to be like a white paper in which experiences leave deep impressions to form ideas. But he accepts the mind's capacity to receive impressions reflected on it. Therefore, he couldn't maintain the materialistic outlook defended. David Hume does not regard consciousness to be separate from the body and maintained that there is nothing to be called mind or self as the subject of consciousness. Consciousness is the activity of the body. Hume rejected the simple mental substance of Locke and Berkeley and offered an analysis of mind in terms of a bundle or collection of different perceptions. But Hume's concept of consciousness leaves us with a very limited vision of the scope and
potential of intellectual and spiritual experience. D. M. Armstrong rejects the indubitability of consciousness as Descartes has contended and maintained that consciousness is no more than awareness (perception) of inner mental states by the person whose states they are. He pleaded for a concept of consciousness as a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system. But a materialist account of consciousness cannot meet the necessities for the nature of consciousness.

Edmand Husserl offered a concept of consciousness from the existentialist point of view and said that intentionality is the only dimension of consciousness. In reply to this we may say that intentionality is only one of the marks of the mentality and it is not the only dimension of consciousness for, there are other dimensions also. J. P. Sartre regards consciousness as nothingness and takes up his stand on a non-ego-logical conception of consciousness. He believes in the embodied consciousness and denies its existence without the body. He regards the body to be psychic and by consciousness he means the self-consciousness. Sartre rejects the Frueidian concept of unconscious. His view is completely different from Descartes because he rejects the consciousness as the essence of mind. He pleaded for the existence and says that existence precedes essence. Sartrean view cannot be accepted in wholesome because Descartes discovered
consciousness as the essence of mind and the mere existence cannot be apprehended without its essential nature. Moreover, it is true that consciousness could be understood only with the body and without the body it is only imaginable. But Sartre could not clarify what consciousness is simply by saying that it is nothingness.

G.E. Moore rejects the Berkelean subjective account of consciousness and maintains that there is a difference between consciousness and the object. He seems to accept the dualism of Descartes. He clearly shows that consciousness and the object are completely different. He differs from Descartes while he says that there is no existence of consciousness without the body. A. J. Ayer's anti-metaphysical concept of consciousness rejects the Cartesian dualism with its notion of consciousness as inhering in a mental substance. He does not believe in the idea of an enduring subject of consciousness as advocated by Descartes. At the same time he also rejects the Kantian concept of self which is transcendental ego standing outside of this world. By rejecting mind as the subject of consciousness Ayer rejects the existence of himself. It is because we must accept the existence of the knower before going to know others. The knower, conscious mind cannot be in the same status with matter. He seems to be ignoring the fact that consciousness is very different from matter and its nature needs more explanation than that of matter. Because only a conscious
investigation can explain the mind-body relation; the unconscious matter cannot investigate the activities of the mind and consciousness. Bertrand Russell does not believe consciousness as the essence of life or mind and maintains that other animals also have some kind of awareness and they are not automatons as Descartes has contended. Further he regards consciousness to be a complex and far from being universal characteristic of mental phenomena. For him, the world of our experience is composed of something more primitive than mind or matter, the neutral stuff. Russell's neutral monism pretends to solve the mind-body problem but in reality he fails to realize that the conscious subject (mind or self) must exist to construct the theory of neutral monism or so, the essence of which is consciousness. Ludwig Wittgenstein denies consciousness to be the essence of mind or as the mark of the mental and rejects the first-person account of consciousness. He criticizes the Cartesian theory of consciousness which regards it to be a private, inner essence and rejects the self as an entity, as the subject of consciousness. Although Wittgenstein did not accept behaviourism he seems to accept some elements of logical behaviourism. He says that the problem of consciousness and the body arises out of the conceptual confusions and advises us to dissolve such problems. But human mind cannot stay idle without speculation by simply dissolving the philosophical problems as suggested by him. Gilbert Ryle maintains that we need not to regard
consciousness as a part of the definition of the mental. For him, ordinarily the word consciousness is used in different senses but in none of these senses consciousness has the meaning attributed by philosophers like Descartes. Attracted by behaviourism Ryle maintains that mental processes do not refer to mind or consciousness but they refer to the disposition of some kind of behaviour. At the same time he declares that he is not to give new information about minds. On the contrary, he has tried to offer a new theory of consciousness. The analysis of Ryle's concept of consciousness and his criticisms against Descartes we have to conclude that these criticisms can be applied against Ryle's theory itself.

The contemporary western philosophers offered their views regarding the concept of consciousness in such a way that they seem to accept the original view given by Descartes. But contemporary discussions have disclosed different facts regarding the concept of consciousness. No final solution is given by any one of them but enlightened various important facts which were not disclosed in Descartes' time. Hence we can expect that more facts would be open in future about the concept of consciousness when our science would develop more than today.
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