CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER (I)

Nature of Mind, Different Theories of Mind

One of the most important problems of philosophy is the problem about the nature of mind. There are different explanations regarding the nature of mind but none can explain it clearly. The nature of mind centres round the relation between mind and body. Bruce Aune Says, "The mind-body problem has been called a world knot, where all the problems of philosophy ultimately come together."

To explain the nature of mind we have to be clear about the mental words, mind, soul and spirit. Of course, they are not synonyms because the word mind suggests intellectual activities while the soul and psychical are called emotional and vital elements. On the other hand when we think of the mind as separable from the body, we use the word spirit and the adjective spiritual suggests moral and religious values. Man is differentiated from other animals because of his possession of mind and different mental capacities, i.e. his capacity for thought, feeling and deliberate actions.

In order to understand the nature of mind clearly we have to analyse the different formulations of mind. According to Oxford Dictionary, mind means a seat of consciousness, thought, volition, feelings, attention and concentrations. According to the Encyclopaedia Dictionary of Psychology 'the mind' is taken to include, everything one is inclined to call 'mental'. Historically the term succeeded and supplanted the Aristotelian notion of psyche, which denotes all the func-

1. Aune, Bruce : Knowledge, Mind & Matter, P.- 225
tions that distinguish the animate from the inanimate. Hence psyche includes metabolism, nutrition, growth and locomotion as well as the mental phenomena......thoughts, feelings, perception, sensation, moods; but intellectual activity has always been most central elements.

According to Dictionary of Philosophy mind is used in two principal senses:-
(i) The individual mind is the self or subject which perceives, remembers, images, feels, conceives, reasons, wills etc. and which is functionally related to an individual bodily organism.
(ii) Mind is generally considered as a metaphysical substance which pervades all individual minds and which is contrasted with matter and material substance.

According to the Encyclopaedia Dictionary of Philosophy, "The mind - body problem is the philosophical problem of how the mind is related to the body, and of what properties, functions, and occurrences, should be regarded as respectively, mental or physical. This problem is central to both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology".

The problem of the relation of body to mind is usually interpreted to mean the relation of matter to mind. These two problems are identical. Primitive men thought of the soul or mind as a kind of shadowy image or replica of the body, perhaps like a vapour or breath, capable of leaving the body during sleep and surviving it after death. Primitive men did not have any clear idea about self. But he did have certain beliefs about himself and his fellow beings. He thought that the shadowy duplicate of body had a separate and independent existence and that is
why it was not subject to any limitation as human body. The belief most widely current among the peoples of lower culture is that each man consists, not only of the body which is constantly present among his fellows, but also of a shadowy vapour-like duplicate of his body; this shadow-like image, the animating principle of the living organism is thought to be capable of leaving the body, of transporting itself rapidly, if not instantaneously, from place to place and of manifesting in these places all or most of the powers that it exerts in the body during waking life. They explained sleep as a temporary separation of this ghostly duplicate from the body, and by death they meant its permanent separation. In this way the primitive man explained himself as mental. This concept was found in ancient Hebrews, one of the earliest tribes. They took the soul to be whatever that resides in a body and which made body alive and which made it living something rather than dead one.

This tribe used the word 'Hebrew' for 'breath' which is a sign of life and soul.

Greek philosophy and literature are permeated with the idea of the soul. Greek thinkers did not accept the primitive concept of matter and mind. Mind for them was a sort of subtle matter. They drew no sharp distinction between mind and matter. The Greek word 'psyche' signifies soul and consciousness. The distinction between soul and body was not a distinction between substances one of which was material and the other spiritual. The earliest Greek thinkers believed in a 'divine and animate essence, immanent in nature, appearing in man as the soul, the source of life and intelligence. This view is found in the doctrine of Heracleitus, who thought that the soul is a fiery vapour, identical with the rational and vital fire.
soul of the universe. Greek Science, however culminated in Democritus, who believed that all physical things are composed of material atoms in mechanical interaction. According to him, the soul or mind also consists of smooth round atoms permeating the body. Democritus admitted the soul or the mind as a mobile substance pervading the whole body. Permenides explained all psychological phenomena by the mixture of substances in the body and drew no distinction between the mental and the corporeal.

The Sophists draw the philosophical thinking toward knowledge. According to Democritus, knowledge is due to the motion of the atoms, specially impinging on fire atoms. There is only a difference in degree between perception and thought. In perception motion is coarse and rough, and in contrast in thought the motion is fine and gentle. So there is no real distinction between sense and reason or matter and mind. Therefore, Protagoras holds that knowledge is perception. Again Gorgias points out that thought is not identical with being. We can think of things both real and unreal. Since what we think does not necessarily exist and we have no means of distinguishing real things from unreal ones. Thus he concludes against Permenides' identification of thought with its object.

According to Socrates, the fundamental mistake of the Sophists was that they denied the role of reason, which constitute the knowledge and morality. They did not distinguish between reason and perception. But Permenides and Heraclitus draw the distinction between reason and perception and Socrates accepts this distinction. For Socrates, perception can yield only what is relative with regard to
the realm of becoming. Reason or Thought or Mind can give us what is universal and valid for all persons. Socrates maintained that virtue is knowledge of the good through concepts, and concepts are formed by reason. Socrates believed in the immortality of soul and its pristine knowledge. Concept is formed by a glimpse or intuition of the universals. Socrates maintained that morality or virtue is knowledge of the good through concept and since concepts are formed by reason, so morality issues forth from rational insight into the good. "Socrates speaks of reasoning or thinking, temper and desires as the three parts of the soul. The function of reasoning is wisdom; wisdom commands, while temper assists in the execution of these commands, and desire furnishes the material basis of action."3 Thus Socrates uses the term reason or thought as the function of soul to control all the activities.

The popular modern ideas about the soul or the mind is largely Platonic. According to Plato the soul is a distinct immaterial essence imprisoned in the body. Its home and destiny is the world of eternal Ideas and its nature has little in common with the earthly things. Plato's teaching clearly shows the personality, individuality and immorality of the soul. The soul has intuitive knowledge of the world of Ideas and it has higher values because it possesses inner divine nature. The soul brings with it a kind of reminiscence of its former exalted home, prior to its life in the body. It is the source of motion in the body as well as the fountain of knowledge and aspiration. Plato attempted to give us a psychological analysis.

3. John Burnet J.: Greek Philosophy, PP.-144-145
about the soul but ultimately he was not successful in doing so and his psychology is largely coloured with metaphysics. The Platonic conception of soul is not systematically worked out. It is scattered through a number of dialogues which are written at a long interval of time. Again his views have undergone considerable changes from time to time.

Plato's explanation of the connection between soul and body is never precise. He expounds it in the form of myth. He believes that it is not possible to give any exact account of the soul but only pictorial one which is something like the actual truth.

In "Republic", Plato give us a detailed analysis about the soul. Plato distinguished three parts or functions of the soul which correspond with reason, will or feeling. In the fourth book of the Republic, Plato speaks that the parts of the soul differ from one another. Will and feeling are connected with the physical body and evidently they are not immortal. The reason is the 'divine' part of the soul and it is separate and independent from the body. Thus the words seperateness, divinity and immortality of the soul, Plato probably had in mind the 'divine' or the 'reason' part of the soul. In this point we find a clear distinction between soul and body. His sharp distinction between the body and the soul was the source of the dualistic theories. In addition to these parts Plato further speaks of a third principle, namely passion of the Soul. Plato's theory of soul enabled him to account for motion. Plato was the first to attempt a scientific justification of the soul. He distinguishes ten kinds of motion. Among them the nineth is the motion that can move other
thing but cannot move itself, and the tenth is that which can move both itself and other things. This tenth kind of motion is never found in earth, fire or water but only to that which lives or which has a soul. He says that by soul he means that motion which of itself can move itself. The other motions all belong to body. Therefore, the soul according to Plato, is prior to body.

Aristotle mentions that the soul is the organization of the body. But Aristotle forbids us to identify the soul with bodily organization. He says that the soul is non-bodily principle within the body. It is the 'form' within the matter. Aristotle mentions three kinds of soul which corresponds to three forms of life - the vegetative, the animal and the human soul. The soul of plants is the vegetative soul which corresponds to the phenomena of nutrition and reproduction. Animal souls are sensitive and appetitive. Sensations and locomotion are the functions of the animal body. Human souls are characterised by reason and intelligence. Thus the soul was regarded not as something independent of the body but an immanent influence without which there could not be any unity nor bodily organisation. Aristotle's conception of mind is biological, though it is different from modern biology.

The evolution of mind created by Aristotle made a great contribution in the classical western philosophy and remained a very influential theory throughout many centuries. Pointing out this point Prof. E. Harris writes: "Aristotle is indeed, one of the great figures in the history of philosophy whose thought, though inevitably a product of a period, rises .......... the special view points of the time comes look nearer to grasping the eternal truth which is the goal of the whole historical..."
development." In his book "On the Soul", Aristotle shows that there is a distinc-
tion between soul and mind. He says that the mind is higher than the soul and soul
is bound to the body. Aristotle writes, "The case of mind is different, it seems to be
an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being
destroyed ..................... The mind is the part of us that understands mathematics
and philosophy, its objects are timeless, and therefore it is regarded as itself time-
less. The Soul is what moves the body and perceives sensible objects: it is
characterised by self-nutrition, sensation, feeling and motivity; but the mind has
no relation to the body or to the senses. Hence the mind can be immortal, though
the rest of the soul can not." Aristotle maintains that body and soul are related as
matter and form. Thus it followes that soul is inseperable from its body. Aristotle
regards mind as the higher part of the soul. According to the Encyclopaedic Ge-
nius, Aristotle holds that the faculty of thought is the one part of the soul and is
separated from the body. In Aristotle's philosophy the word 'Nous' or reason is
responsible for thinking and it is related with the soul. When the body dies, its
function in the form of the soul disappears and active reason returns to God. The
words sensation, perception and memory, all belong to the body. Therefore, with
the destruction of the body, all of them are lost. Aristotle believes that man is
distinguished from other animals by the possession of reason. Reason is the func-
tion of the soul. Human souls resemble the soul of plants and lower animals. Like
the soul of plant, the human soul controls the lower vital functions and like the

animal soul, it is responsible for the possession of perception, desire, pleasure, pain etc. For the possession of reason, the soul of man has the power of conceptual thought. With the perception the soul can apprehend the sensible object and with the reason the soul apprehends the concepts.

In the seventeenth century dualism as a philosophical method was established by Descartes. Descartes was the most significant dualistic philosopher. His concept of mind and its relation to body is a revolutionary one. 'Substance' according to him, is a thing that exists. It exists by itself and requires nothing for its existence. Descartes believes in the existence of three substances, namely God, mind and body. He defines these three substances thus, "That substances in which thought immediately resides, I call Mind ...... that substance, which is the immediate subject of extension in space and of the accidents and pre-suppose extension, e.g. figure, situation, movement in space, etc. is called Body ............ that substance which we understand to be supremely perfect and in which we conceive absolutely nothing involving defect or limitation of its perfection is called God." But although Descartes believes in the existence of three substances, he never gives them equal status. He says that mind and body are created by God and as such they are dependent on God for their existence. It is only God who never depends on anything else for his existence. Both mind and body are independent of each other.

In his famous work "Meditation" Descartes establishes a rigid dualism between mind and body. Descartes tried to show that mind and body are two distinct,

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separate and independent substances. Matter or body for him, is extensive, inert subject to mechanical laws, having no desire, purpose, or power of spontaneous motion. The soul or mind for him is a substance with no extension, whose essential nature is to think. By 'thinking' Descartes meant all those activities, which we commonly associate with the mental, namely desiring, feeling, judging, willing and so on. Descartes admitted that both mind and body are two antagonistic substances. What is there in the mind is never found in the body and what is present in the body is absent in the mind. Consciousness or thought which is the essence of mind is opposed to extension of bodies. Descartes' view is that like all other bodies, human body is a machine. But he makes a difference between artificial bodies and human bodies only on the ground that the artificial bodies are made by the hand of man whereas the human bodies are fashioned by God, the most perfect being.

In his Meditations, Descartes thoroughly examines all the categories of knowledge and tries to find out whether any assertion in any one of them is free from doubt. Descartes wanted to doubt whatever was capable of being doubted and reconstructed his philosophy with some self-evident principle. He maintained that the single, certain truth can be systematically sought by deliberate doubt. In order to discover the indubitable intuition, Descartes doubts everything in this world. The things like tables, chairs, desks, benches etc. which we use in our daily life and know through the senses can also be doubted. The senses, can deceive us as illusions and hallucinations. According to Descartes even the truth of science can be doubted.
Thus Descartes started his philosophy by doubting everything in this world. But his doubt could not continue infinitely. He had to stop somewhere and to believe the existence of something. He says that he may doubt any thing but he must believe the fact that he is doubting. His doubting may be a dream or a real consciousness, but he must exist as doubting being. He further says that if he thinks that there is a demon that deceives him then he must believe that he exists as a thinking being to be deceived. Thus from the knowledge that he is thinking, Descartes concludes that he exists. "I doubt or think, therefore I exist" i.e. "Cogito ergo sum". This Cogito ergo sum is the one certain truth and is taken by him as the foundation of his entire philosophy. "To doubt or to think all opinions as false, necessitates the existence of the doubter. If I doubt, I think, if I think then I exist 'Cogito ergo sum.' Thus in his Cogito ergo sum, Descartes discovers the indubitable existence of I. But this 'I' is not the empirical 'I', instead it is the thinking 'I'.

After proving his own existence Descartes did not stop his enquiry. By applying the same method he proved the existence of the external world, God etc.

According to Descartes, the self or mind is not related with the external world directly, but it possesses the peculiar quality of consciousness by virtue of which one can be aware of the external objects. Descartes takes the help of 'ideas' and these 'ideas' are copies or representations of physical objects. Hence he is called the founder of the famous doctrine of representationalism. His representationalism is thus the logical counterpart of the dualists' metaphysics. For Descartes mind is a qualified existent. There are some qualities such as colour, smell, taste
etc. which are changeable, while other qualities, such as extension, figure and motion are unchangeable. Descartes says that the former qualities are ideas of our mind and the later qualities correspond to the physical world. In his earlier view we find that he believes all ideas as innate. But afterwards he draws a qualitative distinction between ideas and extension, figure and motion as understanding or thought and the idea of colour, taste, smell, etc. as sensing. All the objective faculties as feeling, emotion, imagination etc. except thinking or understanding are called by imagination.

But though it appears that Cartesian philosophy is a dualistic one, it is found that this is not the case. His philosophy is really "Trialistic" because Cartesianists believe in the existence of three substances—mind, body and God. The concurrence of the God is urgently necessary for mind and body. In his Meditations VI, Descartes says "God can effect whatever we clearly perceive just as we perceive it. But we clearly perceive the mind, i.e., a thinking substance, apart from the body, i.e., apart from any extended substance, and vice-versa, we can perceive body apart from mind." Hence, at least through the instrumentality of the Divine power, mind can exist apart form body and body apart from mind. In his Meditations Descartes says that the sensation of 'hunger', 'thirst', 'pain' etc are confused modes of self consciousness which arise from the union of mind and body. Cartesianism is blended with the elements of pantheism, materialism and idealism. If it thinks that mind and matter are co-ordinate aspects of God who becomes the indwelling substance of all things, we find it to be like the pantheism.

6 Ibid, P.-59
of Spinoza. Again, if we abolish mind as a thinking substance and think that thought is nothing but the function of a bodily machine, then we have the materialism of Hobbes. Again if we abolish matter and absorb it into spirit as a thought in the Divine mind, then we have the idealism of Malebranche and Berkeley. But Descartes forbade us to think in such ways. It is true that he is a typical dualist.

In his Third Meditation Descartes deals with "The Existence of God". According to him, God is free from all kinds of errors. Thus in order to make him free from errors he imposed it on the shoulder of man. This leads him to a second dualism within his dualism of mind and body, viz. intellect and will. In respect of intellect man is less than God, but in respect of will man is God. "The intellect is limited in its perception of truths; in this respect man is less than God. But the will is unlimited, it is wholly free; in this respect man is like God". Descartes believes the ontological proof as the existence of God. The ontological argument consists in inferring the existence of God from the idea of God. According to him the existence of God follows from the idea of a perfect being for perfection implies existence. Descartes advanced another argument to ontological argument i.e., The idea of an Infinite being. The idea of God is the idea of an actually Infinite being. Thus Descartes inferred the existence of God as the cause of the idea of the Infinite being.

Descartes in his sixth Meditation deals with "The Existence of Material Things and the Real Distinction between Mind and Body." Thus he repeatedly declared that mind and body are two independent entities and each have its own character.

7. Quoted from R M Eaton's (ed.) : Descartes Selection, P.- 3
istics. But it is very difficult to stick on this hard and fast distinction between mind and body. Thus according to Descartes, there is an interaction between mind and body. They interact upon each other in the pineal gland of the brain. He says that sometimes mind causes bodily changes and sometimes body causes mind's changes. It is an experience of daily life that if there be any kind of diseases in the body then it affects man's life and thinking. If there be a blow on the head it may cause our loss of consciousness. It is well known that the uses of drugs, alcohol and coffee cause mental affect. There is a common experience that with the development of brain and nervous system thinking power of mind also increases. These examples prove that physical conditions affect mental condition. Thus though Descartes believes that there is a well-known distinction between mind and body, yet at the same he firmly asserts their intimate union in man's nature. This is known as interactionism or the mind-body relation in Descartes' philosophy. In his sixth Meditation, Descartes says, "I here show that the mind is really distinct from the body, and at the same time that the two are so closely joined together that they form so to speak, a single thing."

In his later work, "The Passions of the Soul" Descartes depicted a thorough going causal account of the relations involved between the mind and body. But Descartes emphatically says that my soul is not in my body as a "pilot in a ship". Descartes concludes that the soul or mind is a permanent substance since we have found its essence called thinking whichever the worst of doubt cannot demolish. Thus Descartes by his first principle, 'Cogito ergo sum' he had proved his
own existence with certainty.

By 'Cogito ergo sum' he does not logically deduce 'sum' from 'Cogito' but rather perceives intuitively the self-evident of 'sum'. Descartes tried to establish not an inference but a simple fact of primitive knowledge or self-evident axiom. If it is an inference, then it would be merely dependent on premises for its certainty and then again these premises on other premises for their certainty. This would lead to infinite regress without reaching the indubitable truth. Moreover, the certainty of the Cogito is clear and distinct and nothing close can be perceived with the same certainty. Cogito ergo sum means that my consciousness is the means of revealing myself as something existing. There is the indubitable truth of the inseparability of thought and thing.

The English philosopher John Locke developed his theory of mind in the later Seventeenth Century. His chief work "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" deals with the nature of mind. He tried to determine the nature, function, origin and limits of knowledge by his theory of mind. The use of the term 'idea' is very important for understanding his philosophy of mind. The 'idea' may mean the mode of individual consciousness or a representation of something other than itself. Locke uses the term in both the senses. If we say that we have an idea or thought of the table then ordinarily we mean that we are conscious of something before us. Again we find that the idea of table consists of some images, sensations and feeling which stand for something independent of the mind. Thus it can be said that each idea is a modification of an individual consciousness pointing out and
representing something in the extramental world. Again, idea as an event in individual's consciousness can be studied from psychological and logical standpoint. The idea in one's consciousness can be analysed in terms of sensation, images and feeling from the psychological standpoint. Moreover from the logical standpoint, an idea involves the fundamental, timeless and logical content in it. It is true that Locke is realist. But he believes in an extramental world to which our ideas refer. Locke understands by innate ideas that ideas which the mind simply finds in itself, as distinguished from those ideas which it receives from outside.

Locke refutes the doctrine of inbontruth or innate ideas. There is not any speculative principles present in the minds of men. They are also acquired in the same way as other truths. In its first state, the mind is a 'tabula rasa', a 'dark chamber', an 'empty cabinet', 'white paper', void of all characters, and without any ideas. The two sources of all our ideas are sensation and reflection. By sensation the mind is furnished with sensible qualities and by reflection the mind operates on perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing and willing. The primary capacity of the human mind is intellect's ability to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects or by its own operations when it reflects on it. By idea, Locke means that ideas which the mind directly apprehends or which is the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding. Thus the mind receives the simple ideas and has the power to repeat, compare and combine in endless variety and thus to make new complex ideas. Some simple ideas enter our minds by one sense only. For example the ideas of
Some ideas are conveyed into the mind by more than one sense. For example, the idea of space or extension, figure, rest and motion etc. enter through sight and touch. Again, some ideas are received by reflection. For example, the mind notices its operations of perception, retention and recall in memory, discerning, comparing, compounding, naming and abstracting. Locke distinguished between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are those qualities which belong to the objects themselves and utterly inseparable from them. Among primary or original qualities are solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number. On the other hand, secondary qualities are those which are nothing in the objects themselves except powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. For example, qualities such as colours, sounds, tastes etc. are secondary qualities. The primary qualities are constantly found in the bodies. Thus the "primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all". Locke points out that primary qualities are really existent whether there be any person to perceive them or not. But secondary qualities are totally dependent on human subjects and their various sense-organs. Without eyes there are no colours, without ears there are no sounds. Secondary qualities are relative. For example, the same bucket of water may be cold or hot according to the different arrangements.

According to Locke, the self is conscious of its own existence. Locke writes,
"We have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence; a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God, of the existence of anything else, we have no other but a sensitive knowledge." Thus according to Locke, the existence of self is intuitively and immediately known because it accompanies every act of our sensation and perception. In this point Descartes is similar to Locke. But with regard to the nature of mind there is a fundamental difference between Locke and Descartes. Locke disagrees with Descartes on the ground that consciousness or thought is the essence of mind.

Thus from the above analysis we get the knowledge of mind through reflection. The mind has the qualities of perceiving, thinking, memory and witting with the idea of an unknown substratum. Hence the nature of mind is unknown, though its qualities are known. By its own power, the mind can put together the simple ideas and make new complex ideas. The complex ideas are divided into modes, substances and relations. Modes are those complex ideas which contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves but are considered as dependences on substances. For example, the ideas of number, duration, triangle and gratitude. A substance is the substratum or support underlying a number of simple qualities experienced together. A substance is not given in sensation or reflection and it is not experienced by us. Hence it is an unknown substratum of qualities. The mind also gets certain ideas of relation by comparing one thing with another. The idea of cause and effect is the most comprehensive relation subsisting among ideas. It is a relation derived from sensation and reflection.

8. John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. II P. - 280
Thus in offering his nature of mind Locke vehemently criticised the innate ideas of Descartes. The laws of contradiction and identity and the like are supposed to be innate but no such ideas are found in the mind of the insane, idiots and children. Locke maintains that no ideas are innate as none are universal. But again from the universality of any idea we cannot prove its innateness. Ideas may be universal without being innate. For example, everybody has the idea of the sun, fire and heat and yet no body regards them innate. Locke's method of ideas is primarily psychological for he wants to analyse the process in which we do come to have our actual experience.

Another English empiricist George Berkeley (1685-1753) occupies an important position in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy which Berkeley inherited was mainly that of Locke. Berkeley tried to be a more consistent Locke. According to him, things cannot exist without some mind to perceive them. When there are no human minds, things are sustained by the divine mind. In his view mind is a thinking and active being, "a real thing which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas and wills and reasons about them." Regarding ideas Berkeley says, (a) Ideas actually imprinted on the senses, (b) Ideas perceived by attending to the positions and operations of the mind (c) Ideas formed by help of memory and imagination. He admits that there is some thing which knows or perceives them and excercises diverse operations - as witting, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving active being is what Berkeley calls mind, spirit, soul or myself. Berkeley is confident of the capacity of the human
mind to cope with the problem of knowledge. He believed that though we donot have any idea of the self yet we have a notion of it.

Berkeley rejects the abstract ideas. The mind is incapable of forming abstract ideas. The idea of a world without the mind, is an abstract idea. Our thoughts and passions and the pictures of the imagination donot exist outside the mind. They are all in the mind, their existence consists in their being perceived or known by the mind. Hence to exist means to be perceived, to be in the mind. The famous doctrine of Berkeley's philosophy is "Esse est percipi". By this he means that if anything exists it must be thought or perceived by the mind. Nothing can exist which is not known by the mind. Berkeley's system is idealistic, since it teaches the reality consists of spirits and their ideas only. A body is solid, extended, figured substance having the power of motion, a certain colour, weight, taste, smell, and sound. The primary qualities are inseperably united with the secondary. The so-called primary qualities are also ideas. Ideas are mental. Therefore, even the primary qualities are mental.

According to Berkeley there must be some cause of the sensations or ideas in my mind. This cause must be an active substance. It cannot be a material substance. Hence it must be an incorporeal, active substance or spirit. A spirit is one undivided, active being, which is so far as it perceives ideas is called understanding; in so far as it operates upon them, it is called will. Berkeley says that he has notions of his own mind and its operations, of other finite kinds and of God's mind. The uniform rules in conformity with which the supreme mind excites in us,
are called the laws of nature. The ideas imprinted on the sense by God are called real things and those excited in the imagination, beingless, regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed as ideas or images of things which they copy or represent. But our sensations are ideas. They exist in the mind. Thus matter does not exist and Berkeley is a founder of immaterialism.

But Berkeley's philosophy is not free from criticism from the leading and recent philosophical point of view. Berkeley's emphasis on the conative aspect of human mind is admitted by modern psychology. Modern psychology no longer recognised conation and cognition as two different faculties of mind. Thus according to Stout, cognition, feeling and conation are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in any concrete psychosis, but they are not separable. They do not occur in isolation from each other.

David Hume (1711-76) strongly criticises the mind or self as a spiritual substance. Hume said that we have no experience of any such thing as a soul and there is no evidence for its existence. According to him, experience gives us nothing but a lot of impressions or perceptions and ideas or memory images and we have no way of reason for believing that the mind is anything more than the collection of these impressions and ideas. He maintains that consciousness is nothing but numerous experiences, which he calls "perceptions", of pleasure, pain, sights, sounds, thought, desire and the like. There are some philosophers who imagine that in every moment we feel about some kind of consciousness or self. But Hume says, "......... For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for anytime as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truely be said to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non entity.9

Thus according to Hume there is no entity as self or permanent substance. Consciousness is a constantly changing and shifting flow of experiences. He forbids us to identify these continuous changing experiences with any underlying permanent principle. He says that belief in the existence of a permanent self is a mythological conception. Hume maintains that the fiction of personal identity is the work of imagination. The succession of pleasure, pain, sensations and images are connected together by resemblance, contiguity and causation. For Hume, our notion of personal identity proceeds entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought according to the principles of resemblance, contiguity and causation. This resemblance is sustained by our memory. Again, causation also produces the notion of personal identity. According to Hume, the human mind is "a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other. Our impressions rise to their correspondent ideas; and these

ideas in their turn produce other impressions."

Thus the self or mind for Hume, is just a construct of sensations, feeling and images. The so-called self is nothing but a heap or collection of passing sensations. Hume advances his own theory of mind. In his own words: "The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearances: pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity at different, whatever natural propension we have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind."10

Thus what is meant by self, according to Hume is simply the totality of experiences and nothing more. He analysed the furniture of the mind in terms of fleeting impressions. Hume, after a careful analysis of the main categories of thought comes to the conclusion that there is no substance, neither matter nor self. We are left with passing impressions only. Hume had a constructive philosophy of empiricism with these four principles: (i) The doctrine of impressions and ideas, (ii) The laws of association, (iii) The imagination and (iv) His theory of relations. By these principles Hume shows that real knowledge is habitual and not cogitative. Thus according to Hume there is no permanent substance like mind or soul or self. Mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations.

The German Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attacked the tradi-

10. Ibid, P.- 253
tional theory of Soul. Kant himself maintains that Hume aroused him from his
dogmatic slumbers. Kant agrees with Hume in saying that the self is never re­
vealed in experience. Modern philosophy begins with faith in the power of the
human mind to attain knowledge. Kant maintains that the senses furnish the ma­
terials of our knowledge and the mind arranges them in ways made necessary by
its own nature. Hence we have universal and necessary knowledge of the order of
ideas, though not of things-in-themselves. The contents of our knowledge are
derived from experience (empiricism) but the mind thinks its experiences, con­
ceives them according to its native a priori, that is, rational ways (rationalism).
Kant claims that knowledge consists of synthetic a priori judgements. There can
be no synthetic judgement without a synthetic mind, no causal judgement without
a mind thinking in terms of cause and effect. Here Kant is employing human rea­
son with all its categories. Knowledge presupposes a mind. Moreover, we cannot
think without having something to think about, and we can have no object of thought
unless it is given through the senses or unless the mind is receptive or has sensi­
bility. Percepts and concepts constitute the elements of our knowledge. Percepts
without concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty.

Unlike Hume, Kant argues that the traditional view on the soul is self-con­
tradictory. Self, according to Kant, is that which does knowing. It is always the
subject of knowledge and as such it can never be made an object of knowledge. "I
cannot know I but only me; myself as subject I cannot know but only myself as
object." But the solution to the problem of the nature of mind given by Hume is not accepted by Kant. Kant says that Hume failed to prove the unity of mind. Kant concludes that Hume's view of mind as a collection of experiences bound together by the laws of association does not solve the problem. Kant insists that there is more of unity within mind, than Hume admits. In his 'Critique of Pure Reason', Kant refers to this unifying function as the 'Synthetic unity of Apperception'. By this he means some kind of capacity within the mind to organise different experiences into meaningful wholes either by way of memory and association or by way of inference. Hence according to Kant mind is not a 'bundle' of experiences as Hume said. The mind is rather an 'organization' of experiences, and this organization is made possible by an actually existing principle or agent of organization. Thus Kant insists on the necessity of an organizing principle of experiences which Hume denies. Kant emphasizes the essential unitary spiritual character of the mind, of which nature is hardly more than the phenomenal product. Form is a principle of unity in experience and matter is a principle of manifoldness or multiplicity. Kant says, "That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of apperance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations I term the form of appearance." Thus according to Kant knowledge or judgement would be impossible without a synthetic, thinking mind, that is, without understanding or intelligence. Sensibility is receptive, but understanding is active and spontaneous. The forms of sensibility are intuitional.

11. Quoted from G.W. Cunningham's, Problems of Philosophy, P. - 255
12. Quoted from Frank Thilly's: A History of Philosophy, P. - 418
and the understanding is conceptual: it thinks in concepts. Thus knowledge is possible by the union of the two-mind and matter.

Several theories have been advanced to describe the nature of the relation between mind and body. As a result we have different theories of mind such as Interactionism, Occasionalism, Pre-established harmony, Parallelism, Epiphenomenalism, Emergent evolution etc. Besides some philosophers again offer different theories of mind under the headings of Dualism, Mentalistic Monism, Materialistic Monism, Neutral Monism etc. But during the last century the foundations of the philosophy of mind were laid on experimental science and in empirical psychology. Thus we have also some principal theories of mind held by philosophers during the nineteenth century. We can distinguish these theories under four classes such as Materialistic theories, Idealistic theories, Double aspect theories. A comparative analysis of these theories are discussed in the following.

The materialistic theories of mind maintains that mentality is merely of many possible attributes of certain more or less complex material bodies. Materialism admits that there is no other reality than matter. Mind is either a form or function of matter. Consciousness arises in the transformation of energy in the highly complex mechanism of the nervous system, but is not itself a distinct form of energy nor a distinct form of being of any kind. In the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy we find Democritus who admits the materialistic theory of the mind. Democritus considers the soul to be composed of atoms, like the body. The chief exponents of this theory of mind were members of the associationist school like Spencer, Lewes and
Huxley. Some of the German materialists of the eighteenth century speak of thought or consciousness as being a secretion of the brain. Hackel in his "Riddle of the Universe" maintains that the mind is a function of the brain.

Epiphenomenalism is a theory of mind advocated by a group of materialists. This word was first used by Huxley. It indicates that mind is not a factor in natural processes. Mind is a name that we give to certain phenomena that merely accompany types of processes and changes in the nervous system. Mental states are like a kind of aura, hovering about cerebral processes without themselves having any function. They effect no changes and have themselves no significance in the world of movement. The materialists take mind as different from body and believe in a causal relation between body and mind. But this relation holds only in one direction. Mind is an offshoot of brain activity and so is caused by it. But mental processes cannot cause brain processes. Mind is an epiphenomenon, i.e., of phenomenon of secondary importance only. Mind is a kind of functionless attendant upon certain forms of cerebral activity—a sort of shadow thrown by the body.

In Russia, Pavlov, admitted the old mechanistic theory under the title of behaviourism. Ryle, in his book "The Concept of Mind" has accepted (with minor reservations) a thorough going behaviouristic standpoint and has begged psychologist once and to discard the 'theological notion' of a mind or soul-temporarily lodged in the body like 'a ghost berking in the neurological machine. Behaviourism continues the mechanistic trend in psychology, reducing psychic
phenomena to the relations of the organism. Behaviourism identifies consciousness and behaviour the main unit of which it considers to be the stimulus reaction correlation. Knowledge, according to behaviourism is entirely a matter of the conditioned reactions of organisms (including man). Thus behaviourism is a science which studies in a wholly objective way the conduct or behavior of living beings and considers human psychology to have just this behaviour to men as its subject matter. Behoviourism commands our highest respect because it is the method of advancing the science of psychology free from doubtful assumptions. But it can make no lawful claim to furnishing a philosophy of mind.

The dualistic or animistic theories of mind is an important theory coming from Plato and Descartes. Dualism as a metaphysical theory taught by Descartes and accepted by Locke and popularized in America through the influence of the Scottish School. According to this theory mind and body are quite distinct and represent the two universal realities. At the close of the nineteenth century William James in America and most of the leading psychologists in Britain such as Ward, Stout, Mc Dougall and their disciples clung to this dualistic theory of mind. Stout held that conscious processes ran parallel to neural processes. The others held that there was a causal interaction between the immaterial mind and the physical brain. Descartes advocated the theory of interaction between mind and body. Mind and body are two separate and independent substances created by God. He maintained that these two substances interact and there is a causal relation between the two. Mind, which is a spiritual substance, has a definite location in the pineal
gland of the brain. It exerts influence upon the body and is affected by the brain process. Thus according to interactionism bodily processes are at times supposed to cause mental experiences and at other times are caused by them. Thus according to Descartes consciousness and extension or mind and body are independent of one another and do not involve each other's existence. As such there are two independent substances called mind and body.

Descartes' doctrine of man is equally dualistic. He contended that a souless and lifeless bodily mechanism combined in man with rational soul. Body and soul, which are heterogeneous interact by means of a special organ. In contrast to the body, whose essence lies in extension the essence of the soul lies in thought. Descartes considered animals to be no more than elaborate automata devoid of soul and mental capacity. Like F. Bacon, Descartes defined the ultimate end of knowledge as man's mastery of the forces of nature, discovery and invention of technical devices, perception of causes and effects and improvement of the nature of man. In epistemology, Descartes was the founder of rationalism, which sprang from his onesided understanding of the logical nature of mathematics. Descartes believed that the universal and necessary character of mathematical knowledge derived from the nature of the mind.

However this vague formulation of the mind and body relationship is very inadequate. That mind and body do interact seems to be inconceivable. If two substances are entirely different and heterogeneous, as supposed by Descartes, how can the one act upon the other causally relate? A nervous process can cause
another similar nervous process but not a mental one. If they are essentially different, one could never give rise to the other; it is simply impossible that a change in brain cells could produce a thought or vice-versa. Causal connection is possible between two things of the same quality.

To avoid the difficulties of the theory of interaction, the followers of Descartes advocate the theory of occasionalism. The two philosophers who advocate the theory are Arnold Geulinex and Nicolas de Malbranche. Mind and body are opposed to each other and hence there can be no interaction between the two. According to occasionalism, this correspondence between mind and body is brought about by God. On the occasion of certain changes in mind or body, God intervenes to bring about corresponding changes in the other. But this explanation is not at all convincing. Explaining the relation between mind and body by a constant intervention of God is an absurd explanation. Closely related to the theory of occasionalism is Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony by which he seeks to explain the relation between mind and body. The theory holds that at the time of creation God pre-adjusted mind and body in such a manner that they always correspond with each other. Like two perfectly adjusted clocks which keep exactly the same time, but there is no connection between them, mind and body also correspond with each other without having any relation of interaction. But the theory of pre-established harmony also is no improvement upon occasionalism. Both occasionalism and pre-established harmony take recourse to divine miracle. The only difference between the two is that while occasionalism supports perpetual
miracle in the form of constant intervention of God. Leibniz admits one miracle only at the time of creation. But how could God establish harmony between two entirely different entities like mind body was not explained by Leibniz.

William MC Dougall’s Psychological Dualism is somewhat similar to Descartes’ dualistic theory of mind. MC Dougall has revived the use of the word Animism as a name for his philosophy of mind, which is nothing other than the usual soul theory. Generally the word ‘Animism’ has been used in anthropology and religion to signify the tendency among primitive people to endow everything with mind, even inanimate things, such as sticks and stones. MC Dugall uses the term in its larger sense merely to indicate belief in mind (anima), as a reality. According to MC Dougall the mind or soul or ego or self is an unitary and distinct psychic being which cannot be identified or confused with the body with which it interacts. The mind possesses certain enduring capacities for psychical activity such as having sensations, relating to them, and guiding the stream of nervous energy in such a way as to neutralize the tendency of physical energy to disseparation and degradation. But according to MC Dougall this emphatic dualism between mind and body does not involve necessarily any cartesian dualism of the world. It is content to affirm the distinction of mind and body in the human personality. The animistic theory of mind has been represented by some other representatives like the German Philosophers, Lotze, Stumpf, Kulpe, and in America, George T Ladd, and James while in France Bergson has defended a somewhat closely related theory of mind.
Thus Descartes and his successors has falsely created the dualistic theory of the mind. To think that there is an extreme dualism and separation between mind and body is to make the solution of the problem impossible. The theory of interactionism as advocated by Descartes appears to be dogmatic. But it is the philosopher who raises the dust and then complains that he cannot see. The absolute dualism between mind and body must be avoided if we are to reach any solution of the problem.

There are many idealistic theories of mind such as mentalistic monism, panpsychic, personalistic and mind-stuff theories. These theories are theories of the world rather than of mind. They interpret the universe in terms of consciousness or will or experience. The mentalistic monism represents the Universe as at bottom essentially spiritual. It is the view held by Plato and his followers.

The mentalistic monism theory of mind is supported by idealist philosophers like George Berkeley, Hegel etc. Berkeley formulated the theory of Subjective Idealism. He maintains that mind and their ideas are only real things and independent of them nothing exists. Mind is a thinking and active being "a real thing which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas and wills and reasons about them." [13] The famous doctrine of Berkeley's philosophy is "Esse est percipi". By this he means that if anything exists it must be thought or perceived by the mind. Nothing can exist which is not known by the mind. But there are many drawbacks in Berkeley's philosophy of mind from the recent

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13. Berkeley G - Principles of Human Knowledge, P - 103
philosophical point of view. But in spite of this, his account of the theory of mind resembles with the findings of recent psychology. Berkeley's emphasis on the conative aspect of human mind is admitted by modern psychology. Modern psychology recognised conation and cognition as two different faculties of mind. According to Stout, "Cognition, feeling and conation are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in any concrete psychosis, but they are not separable. They do not occur in isolation from each other."  

According to the Double-aspect theories of mind, mind and body are simply two aspects of the same underlying reality which is itself possibly unknown. They are not different from each other. They are identical in essence. They are the same realities seen from different sides or the two faces of the same coin. This theory was originated by Spinoza and is held by many modern psychologists. Spinoza maintained that mind and body are not two independent substances but are two parallel manifestations or correlative aspects of the inner and the outer - of one and the same reality. Because mind and body are two attributes or manifestations of the same substance, God and they run parallel. This is Spinoza's theory of psychophysical parallelism. According to this theory every mental process has its corresponding bodily or nervous process, every psychosis has its neurosis. But the theory insists that there is no causal connection between bodily and mental series. The relation is one of mere concomitance in time and they are constantly parallel. Causal connection exists only between one mental state and another or  

between one physical state or another. There cannot be any causal relation between two distinct states. Spinoza takes thought and extension as two attributes of one substance that is God. The double aspect theory of mind attempts to solve the mind-body problem by denying that there are two realities at all. Thus this theory affirms that mind and body are two aspects of the same reality, the living organism, like the concave and convex sides of a piece of curved glass. They constitute one single process observable in two different ways. But the difficulties of parallelism cannot be avoided by double aspect theories.

A subtler form of Monism which has attracted several speculative thinkers is one which rejects both materialism and idealism but attempts to retain the merits of both. One of its keenest champions was the Viennese psychist Ernst Mach. According to him, the primary fact is not the conscious ego or mind, but the sensory elements which constitute the conscious ego. Material bodies do not produce sensations. A similar view is found in a contemporary Viennese physicist E. Schrodinger in his book "Mind and Matter" (1958).

In his famous book "The Concept of Mind" Gilbert Ryle has used the most appropriate method of linguistic analysis to show the hollowness of mind body dualism. Ryle alleges that Descartes initiated the philosophers myth of mind body dualism. Descartes had established the dualism of mind and body as two distinct substances having opposite qualities. For example, Human bodies are in space and are subject to mechanical laws. Bodily states and processes being public can be observed by others. But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject
to mechanical laws. The workings of mind are not witnessable by other observers; its carrier is the privileged operation of the individual himself. One cannot know what is going on other's minds. One can only directly recognise of the states and processes of his own mind. Thus one's mental states and processes are wholly and directly perceivable by him who possesses them. Descartes assumes that there is a basic distinction between mind and matter. But Ryle says that this assumption is a 'category mistake' because it attempts to analyse the relation between mind and body as if they were terms of the same logical category. According to Ryle, Descartes' dualistic theory is an attempt to analyse mental processes as if the mind were distinct from the body. He explains that knowing how to perform an act skillfully is not a matter of purely theoretical reasoning. Knowing how to perform an act skillfully is a matter of being able to think logically and practically, and is a matter of being able to put practical reasoning into action. According to Ryle, mental processes are nothing but intelligent acts. There are no mental processes which are distinct from intelligent acts. Thus an act of remembering, dreaming, knowing or willing is not merely a clue to some hidden mental process, it is how that mental process or intellectual operation is defined. Ryle argues that there is no ghostly, invisible entity called the 'mind' inside a mechanical apparatus called the 'body'. The working of the mind are not an independent mechanism which governs the workings of the body. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body, but are conceptualized as way of explaining the actions of the body. In Ryle's own language,
"A person lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first history are events in the physical world, those in the second are events in the mental world."\(^{15}\)

This is somewhat as the faces of coins are heads or tails or somewhat as living creatures are either male or female, so it is supposed that some existing is physical existing and other existing is mental existing.

Ryle admits that this official doctrine is initiated by Descartes in the 17th century. Ryle abuses the Cartesian dualism as an absurd doctrine which involves 'The dogma of the ghost - in-the machine'. Ryle says, "It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another."\(^{16}\) His main aim is to show the logical mistake committed by philosophers in attributing a category or logical type to mental concepts.

Ryle finds that in the dualism of Descartes there is a capital mistake which is termed as "Category Mistake". The nature of category mistake is explained by Ryle with the following illustrations -

(a) If a foreigner visiting the university of Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, and scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks the question, 'But where is the University?' His question is a big category mistake because he misconstrues

\(^{15}\) Ryle, G : The Concept of Mind, P - 13
\(^{16}\) Ibid, P - 17
the University to be a parallel institution like the library or the museum. He does not realize that the University is the way all these institutions function and that it has no separate collateral existence of its own.

(b) A child witnessing the march past of a division commits the same category mistake in expecting to see the 'division' apart from seeing the passing of various battalions, batteries, squadrons etc. His question 'when is the division to arrive?' is a big mistake arising out of type confusion in language.

(c) A similar category mistake is committed by a foreigner witnessing for the first time a cricket match. On showing the functions of various batsmen, fielders, bowlers and umpires, the foreigner wants to know as to who will contribute to the 'team spirit'?

In each of these cases a question of the wrong logical type has been asked. Hence all of these have committed a category mistake. In the introduction to "The Concept of Mind", Ryle indicates that the sentence factors belonging to one type cannot belong to another, i.e. one form of expression that can be fitted in logically in one form of fact cannot be fitted in another without involving a logical absurdity. Ryle points out the logical absurdity in the Cartesian concept of mind having a parallel, non-material existence of its own corresponding to the material existence of body. It is intended that if mind or the mental can be explained adequately in terms of observable behaviour, it can conjoined or disjoined logically with body or the physical. Whereas for the philosopher the mind has an immaterial, substantial existence of its own, not having any common characteristics with body, for Ryle
the mind is a disposition or a complex of dispositions belonging to various kinds of observable behaviour. But for the philosopher the mind has a reality of its own. In the exposition of the logical behaviour of various mental epithets, Ryle has actually shown that they are significant is themselves.

Ryle intended to show that just as in cases of assuming the separate existence of the University, the Division and the Team Spirit, the enquirers commit the mistake of asking for entities. Philosophers commit the same category mistake when they assume mind to have a separate entity of its own apart from body or matter.

The mind is the way of the various mental epithets function, just as the British constitution is the way the British Home Office and the Church of England function. In spite of the analogical explanation provided to illustrate the category mistake, it is not clear whether the relation between the mind and its various physiological behaviour is the same as the relation between the British constitution and its various institutions, or the university and its different functional units. It seems that we can speak of people having mental experiences even when we cannot refer to any episodic behaviour for such experiences, although we cannot legitimately speak of the University of Oxford or Cambridge when it has no parallel institutions to function.

The Cartesian mistake has its origin in the Galilean discovery of mechanics in the 17th century, which led to the mechanical explanation of the entire natural phenomena including human bodies. Descartes agreed in essence with the
mechanical concept of the universe. The mental operations of willing, imagining, thinking, knowing etc. become a mystery to all except the individual himself who can know his own states and operations through the privileged access of self-illuminating consciousness and introspection. Ryle observes that some inevitable consequences follow from such a dual-life doctrine. The upholder of the dual-life doctrine, according to Gilbert Ryle, has mistaken the logic of the problem implied in mental-conduct concepts.

It is absurd to conjoin terms belonging to different categories as in the case of 'She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan chair. In the dogma of the ghost-in-the-machine, Ryle holds this. It conjoins statements belonging to different categories and involves absurd theories.

Ryle observes that once the argument of 'Category Mistake' is successful, it will dispel the hallowed contrast between mind and matter. The mind is not a faculty, not a container, holding its own operations behind the screen; it is a disposition or a complex of dispositions whose sole evidence lies in its observed and observable behaviour. Ewing suggests that one need not admit reality of two substances to admit reality of two different species of experience. To say that there are two qualitatively distinct operations, the physical and the mental, is not to say that they are either one or two substances.

So, separate statements like 'Mind exists' and 'Body exists' are valid, though conjunctive or disjunctive statements like 'Mind and Body exist' and 'Mind or Body exists' are invalid. Thus Ryle makes it clear that mind and body both exist, but they
donot exist in the same sense. The Cartesian dualism took them as existing in the same sense. According to it, mind and body were both substances existing together in human body, having their own proper fields of action. Ryle is against this type of dualism, and advocates forcefully that such a co-existing substance as mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body-machine. This mind is a myth. Throughout his book he has tried to explode this myth. But by exploding the myth, he is not negating the concept of mind. Ryle has his own theory of mind. What he is negating are the idioms in which mind was conceived and described by the dualists. He emphatically asserts in the introduction to his book that his task is only “to rectify the logical geography of knowledge which we already possess.” In practical life we all use mind involving concepts correctly, but when an occasion to give an account of those concepts comes, we describe them in a mythical way. Ryle wants to do away with this mythical account of the dualists, particularly of Descartes.

Through his book “The Concept of Mind” Ryle has a stir in the world of philosophy and a new line of discussion about the philosophy of mind. No philosopher before Ryle gives such thorough analysis about the nature of mind. His chief aim is to refute the myth of the “dogma of the ghost in the machine” and to rectify the notions about the nature of mind. By the word ‘myth’ Ryle does not mean a ‘fairy story.’ But by this word Ryle means, “It is the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another. To explode a myth
is accordingly not to deny the facts but to re-allocate them.\textsuperscript{17} To determine the logical geography of concepts is to reveal the logic of propositions. The main argument of Ryle's book is 'to show why certain sorts of operations with the concepts of mental powers and processes are breaches of logical rules. I try to use reductio ad absurdum arguments both to disallow operations implicitly recommended by the Cartesian myth and to indicate to what logical types the concepts under investigation ought to be allocated.'\textsuperscript{18} Here Ryle Primarily meant for Descartes' theory of mind. The another interpretation of his argument is to re-allocate the philosophy of mind after a thorough investigation. To reach both the purposes he uses the reductio-ad-absurdum method or indirect proof. The reductio-ad-absurdum method is a way of arguing in which a statement is proved to be true because its falsity leads to absurdity. According to Ryle, philosophy is the replacement of category habits by category disciplines. Thus the main aim of Ryle is to show the falsity of the Cartesian dualistic theory of mind and to reallocate the facts of mental life.

Descartes divides person's life into two parts-one is external and the other is internal. All the physical things including human bodies belong to external world. on the other hand, the states and processes of ones own mind are internal. But Ryle maintains that this antithesis of outer and inner world is nothing but metaphor. Because if the spatial existence of mind is denied then it is not possible to speak of the mind as being spatially 'inside' something. Ryle says,

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, P - 10
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, P - 10
“This antithesis of outer and inner is of course, meant to be constructed as a metaphor, since minds, not being in space, could not be described as being spatially inside anything else or as having things going on spatially inside themselves.”19

Ryle is very much conscious about the theoretical difficulties of the influence of mind and body to each other. It is true that there is some kind of influence of mind on body and body on mind. But it remains mysterious how two opposite existents can influence upon each other. In this point, Ryle vehemently criticises the Descartes' theory of interactionism.

This kind of knowledge cannot be described by one's autobiography of inner life. According to Ryle, “They can be inspected neither by introspection nor by laboratory experiment. They are theoretical shuttlecocks which are forever being bandied from the physiologist back to the psychologist and from the psychologist back to the physiologist.”20 Thus the theory of interactionism has some major theoretical difficulties. Descartes says that mind is opposite and independent to body. But sometimes they interact upon each other on the pineal gland of the brain. Regarding the nature of mind, Ryle writes, “The workings of minds had to be described by the mere negatives of the specific descriptions given to bodies; they are not in space, they are not motions, they are not modifications of matter, they are not accessible to public observation. Minds are not bits of clockwork, they are just bits of not-clockwork.”21

19. Ibid, P-14
20 Ibid, P.-14
21 Ibid, P.-21
Ryle denies the fact that minds are merely ghosts put into the machines of bodies rather he believes that minds are themselves ghost-machines. He admits to treat the human body as engine but at the same time warns us to treat it as an ordinary engine. Because some of the workings of this body engine is governed by another engine which resides within this body engine and this is a very special kind of engine. This interior govern-engine is not able to be seen or heard. Again, it has neither shape nor weight. This special engine cannot be broken into parts and it is not possible to know the laws which it obeys. Thus how the bodily engine is governed by it is totally unknown. In the words of Ryle, "Though the human body is an engine, it is not quite an ordinary engine, since some of its workings are governed by another engine inside it ---this interior govern-engine being one of a very special sort. It is invisible, inaudible and it has no size or weight. It cannot be taken to bits and the laws it obeys are not those known to ordinary engineers. Nothing is known of how it governs the bodily engine."\textsuperscript{22}

In his philosophy of mind, Ryle does not deny the occurrences of mental processes. He says that the two phrases, i.e. 'there occurs mental process' do not mean the same kind of thing and thus it is meaningless either to conjoin or to disjoin these two phrases. Ryle says, "It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds, and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'coloured' or 'sexed'. They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different sense in

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. P - 21
'the tide of rising', 'hopes are rising' and 'the average age of death is rising.'

Thus Ryle proves that the cartesian dualism is a futile doctrine and this theory is eliminated by him from the field of the philosophy of mind.

But there are criticism against Ryle's somewhat inappropriate use of the concept of the 'category'. Critics arguing against 'Descartes Myth' have pointed out that the idea of category is vague, slippery and ill-defined. We know more or less where we are with the categories of Aristotle, as well as with the categories of Kant, but not know in the same way the categories of Ryle. The distinction between things, relations and qualities can be described as categorical distinctions, or be the distinctions between facts and events, between elements and constructs, or between dispositions and their actualizatons. It is a categorical mistake to confuse a fact and an event or to treat a dispositional properly as though it were an occurrent actualization or a persistent manifestation of the disposition. In his article on "Categories" Ryle discusses the difference between Aristotle and Kant's use of categories without intending either to complete or make more comprehensive the list of categories. He uses the term for his own purpose of showing the logical powers of concepts and their misuse in philosophical thinking. When Ryle remarks that philosophers commit a category mistake in imputing a real entity to minds where there are no such entities found to exist, he has in mind more Russell's theory of Types than either Aristotle or Kant's notion of categories. Hence it is felt by critics that he could have avoided using the term 'category' in pointing out the logical mistake committed in the philosophers myth. According to Ryle, "It is one

23. ibid, p.-24
big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is namely a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another. The dogma is therefore a philosopher's myth." 24

Ryle uses expressions like the 'same category' and 'different category' without being at all prepared to say which category or categories are in question. In his 'Dilemmas' he has admitted that the word category is used not in its usual, professional sense but in its amateurish, inexact sense. Warnock remarks, "If one is not prepared and indeed is deliberately unwilling to say what a category and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term category?" 25

Ryle's observation is that we commit the category mistake if terms belonging to one category are described in idioms appropriate to another. When we try to understand the nature of mind in Ryle's sense, that if the mind is explained as a disposition or a complex of dispositions it cannot be explained as occurrent at the same time without involving the type-confusion. Because in that case again we shall be committing the category mistake of attributing two different categories or logical types in explaining the mind or the mental. If one commits a category mistake in the way described by Ryle, it is clear that some mental concepts are fundamentally dispositional while others are fundamentally occurrent i.e. a concept while being dispositional cannot be occurrent at the same time. The concepts of heeding concentrating thinking one's thought are partly episodic and partly

24. Ibid, P. 17
25 Warnock, G.J. Philosophy Since 1900
dispositional. Hence they are described by Ryle as 'mongrel categoricals' or 'semi-hypotheticals'. Does it mean that he commits the same category mistake in another form against which he himself has raised objections? Or does he mean to say that dispositions after all belong to the same category or logical type of as occurrences?

Ryle's objection against Descartes' dualism is that Descartes tried to explain mind or the mental by the same category as body. Body is a mechanical system determined by causal phenomena, mind is a parallel non-mechanical system determined by its own causal laws. If it is true that mind has no existence of its own parallel to the existence of body, it is equally true that mind cannot be explained by the same causal phenomena as body. The mind belongs to the category of dispositions rather than having way mysterious existence of its own. Thus Ryle admits that philosophers commit a category mistake in providing the same explanation for mind as for body. Ryle denies the separate existence for mind. It explains the mind as a disposition or a complex of dispositions.

The whole point of analysis of Ryle's theory of mind is based on the assumption that on observing others to behave in certain ways we can know about the mental states of others as well as of ourselves. To the ordinary man the whole point of knowing the nature of mind is that he knows himself and analogically as well as inferentially he knows others. He constantly infers the beyond but in doing so he never thinks that he indulges in some metaphysical assumption. His reference to 'beyond' is as much an empirical fact as his external behaviour in an
empirical fact. It is absurd to ask for the same kind of verification for all species of meaningful statements regarding human behaviour as it is absurd to assume the existence of a substance beyond the mind or the mental.

Thus by analysing the nature of mind given by Ryle we find that his central aim is to explode the traditional as well as the Cartesian account of mind. Ryle gives the dispositional account of the mind. According to him the mind is only a disposition to behave in certain ways. Ryle's study is not a laboratory study based on observation and experiment. It is a study directed towards the re-arrangement of what we have already known about mind. In his philosophy of mind Ryle tries to establish that there is no private inner life at all and mind is just a name for typical human behaviours. According to him all the statements referring to mind are reports about current bodily behaviour. Ryle accepts behaviourism as the theory of mind. It comes into existence on the rejection of the dualistic theory of mind. Behaviourism admits that there are not two substances, one body and the other mind but there is only one substance i.e. the body and mind is nothing but the behaviour of the body. Ryle's behaviourism is known as philosophical behaviourism or analytical behaviourism or logical behaviourism. Philosophical behaviourism holds that meanings of the mind-predicates must be explained in terms of overt behaviour or that statements about a person's mind can be completely analysed in terms of statements about what others people observe. By his philosophical behaviourism, Ryle tries to analyse all mental predicates in terms of dispositions. Thus the next chapter provides an discussion on the nature of dispositions and Ryle's account of mind.