INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Mind is the greatest enigma of all times. What is the mind? - is an important question of the philosophy of mind. Some say that mind is thing, a substance; others say that it is merely a complex states, attributes and dispositions of living human bodies. Some philosophers again claim that the mind is a form of energy, a kind of force. The philosophers, who say that the mind is substance, say that it is a spiritual or immaterial or non-physical substance. Others say that mind is a material substance made up of organic matter and found inside the skulls of living human beings. Each individual human being has one mind which is inseperably attached to him. Again, sometimes the mind and the soul are treated as one and the same entity. But in other times, the mind is said to be a part of the soul and some thinkers again seperate mind and soul entirely. They deny the existence of the soul while maintaining the reality of mind. Thus we see that philosophers are conflicting among themselves about the nature of mind. The concepts of mind and soul are closely linked and overlap but they are not identical.

Philosophy of mind is a philosophical study of mind. Here an attempt is made to analyse and examine those concepts that involve mind including the very concept of mind itself. It constitutes a very important branch of philosophy mainly with the various problems related with mind. In a sense it is defined by a group of problems. The first problem of the philosophy of mind is the problem of clarifying the concept of the nature or structure of the mind or mentality. There are also
problems concerning specific mental properties or kinds of mental states and events
and their relationship to one another. The most important problem of the philosophy
of mind is the problem concerning the relation between mental and physical
properties. They are called "The mind - body problem." It is the central problem of
philosophy of mind. This is the problem of clarifying and making intelligible, the
relation between our mental and the physical nature of being or more generally,
the relationship between mental and physical properties.

The philosophy of mind includes different mental states within its subject
matter which can roughly be classified under the following six headings --

(i) **Sensations** :- Pains, aches, tickles, itches, throbs, tingles, etc.
(ii) **Cognitions** :- Believing, knowing, understanding, conceiving, thinking,
    reasoning etc.
(iii) **Emotions** :- Fear, jealousy, envy, anger, grief, indignation, enjoyment etc.
(iv) **Perceptions** :- Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching etc.
(v) **Quasi-perceptual** :- dreaming, imagining, seeing in the minds eye,
    hallucinating, seeing after images etc.
(vi) **Conative states** :- acting, trying, wanting, intending, wishing etc.

Among these mental states it can be said that sensations have more or
less definite bodily location whereas all the other states donot. Thus the philosophy
of mind has different mental phenomena. In this regard, a survey of the full range
of views on philosophy of mind have been influential in the history of philosophy.
The most important theories of mind have been variants of one basic views like
Platonism, Aristotalism, Conceptualism, Imaginism, Psychological Nonimalism and Behaviourism.

The mind-body dualism is formulated by Descartes over 300 years ago. Descartes argues that the mind or soul is separate from his body. A view like this is called "Substance dualism". According to this theory, a composite being is made up of two distinct substances, an immaterial mind and a material body. The core idea of a substance is that of something that can "exist independently" and have properties and enter into relationships with other substances. By "thinking" Descartes meant a full range of mental states and activities, such as sensing, feeling, perceiving, judging and doubting. Further, minds necessarily lack spatial dimensions and matter necessarily lacks consciousness, which on Descartes' view does not prevent them from causally influencing each other. For example, in perception the physical stimulation of our sensory surfaces causes us to perceive objects and events around us and in voluntary action our wants and beliefs cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways. According to Descartes both mind and body interact upon each other on the pineal gland of the brain which is known as interactionism.

Analytical behaviourism challenges and rejects the dualistic theory of Descartes. It maintains that statements about the mind and mental states turn out to be equivalent to statements that describe a person's actual and potential public behaviour. Analytical behaviourism has a number of strengths ----

(i) Avoidence of mind and body interaction problem :-
Firstly, it makes the nature of the relationship of the mind to the body perspicuous, i.e. The mind just is the behaviour, actual and potential of the body. The mind does not cause the behaviour. But it is the behaviour itself.

(ii) The non-mysteriousness of the mental: There are no mysterious element in mental properties. Internal processes are the cause of the external stimuli and the behaviour. The analytical behaviourist insists that statements describing mental or psychological states can be translated into statements describing possible and actual behaviour.

In the English speaking world, the two prominent trends in philosophy of mind since 1945 are the materialism, which takes various forms and the philosophy of linguistic analysis. Materialist philosophers like to see themselves as sharing the aim of science, which they perceive as a search leading to the discovery of general laws. Thus they seek wide and simple general accounts of the nature of the mind. Materialist theories are 'nothing but' theories. For instance, behaviourism is the theory that the mind is nothing but the body in action and physicalism is the theory that mental events are nothing but brain events. In other words, materialist theories are both scientific and reductive.

Linguistic philosophy takes more than one form. One variety consists of constructing theories about language, as Wittgenstein did in Tractatus - Logico-Philosophicus. Another type takes the form of searching for a logical solution to a particular problem or set of problems. This kind of linguistic philosophy leads to the recognition of previously unnoticed distinctions and may involve inventing new
logical terms. Russell's Theory of Descriptions is an example of this kind. Again, some linguistic philosophy seeks to solve problems by undertaking detailed but non-formal analysis of ordinary language. Linguistic philosophy has roots in logical positivism in so far as the vienna circle and sometimes Ludwing Wittgenstein Wittgenstien constructed influential philosophical theories about language

Gilbert Ryle, published his celebrated book "The Concept of Mind" in 1949 in which he said that behaviourism is a method of research used by experimental psychologists, not a philosophical doctrine. But inspite of this disclaimer Ryle is widely regarded as an exponent of behaviourism. Whether or not Ryle is a behaviourist he is certainly a 'linguistic philosopher' in the sense that he uses logic and facts about language to solve philosophical problems. Ryle's book The Concept of Mind is regarded by some interpreters as making a strong case for philosophical behaviourism. But others see his work as a prime example of linguistic and even Wittgenstienian philosophy. But actually Ryle is essentially interested in solving philosophical problems through language. On the other hand his analysis appear to push him towards behaviouristic conclusions at least in some degree.

In the introduction to his book, Ryle states that his aim is to determine the logical cross-bearing of the mental concepts. Ryle aims to demolish the Cartesian conception of the mind as a ghostly non-physical entity existing over and above the familiar flesh - and - blood living human being, an entity whose states are supposed to be logically private.

Ryle's first aim is to repudiate utterly the Cartesian concept of mind as an
immaterial substance linked in life to a corporeal machine, the body. Ryle characterizes this as "The Dogma of the Ghost in the Machine". Dualism, Ryle says, embodies a category mistake. This concept of a category mistake is a powerful philosophical tool which Ryle explains by means of examples. Ryle argues that mistakes about the mind come from wrongly believing that mind like matter belongs in the category of substances. The Cartesian dualists believe in the existence of two substances material and mental. But Ryle says that a person does not live through two collateral histories, the one consisting the outward public physical doings and the other consisting in ghostly happenings on a private mental stage. Ryle argues that the supposition that there are special non-material mental events and actions which take place in a non-material substance is 'an unfortunate linguistic fashion' which traditionally belongs to the two-worlds story, the story that some things exist or occur "in the physical world", while other things exist or occur not in that world, but in another metaphorical place".

Ryle shows that there are no such things as mental acts by examining 'a whole battery' of psychological concepts, with the aim of proving that none of them fits into our action of an action or an event, but rather each falls into one of the three broad classes -

(a) dispositional concepts (b) adverbial concepts and (c) achievement concepts.

Dispositional concepts include liabilities, tendencies, abilities, capacities, habits etc. The things like inclinations, motives, moods and agitations which are sometimes called mental states, are not really states at all, but propensities. There
are distinctions between dispositions and actions. Actions take place in time (when) and take time (how long). But dispositions do not occur at specific times and do not take time in the way that actions and events do. According to Ryle, states such as knowing, believing, wishing, hoping, fearing are not deeds but dispositions.

The idea of an adverbial concept is explained by Ryle as follows:

In describing a person's mind we are describing the ways in which parts of his conduct are managed. Thus in saying of someone that he is aware of what he is doing, or is paying heed to what he is doing, we do not refer to a mental act which is being performed by him simultaneously with his physical performance, for example, writing a letter, or driving a car or reciting a poem. But rather to such facts as that he can later say what he was doing. But adverbial concepts do not reduce to dispositional concepts. Thus according to Ryle, the meaning of 'attention' is derived from the meaning of 'attentively', the meaning of 'heed' from the meaning of 'heedfully' and the meaning of 'awareness' from the meanings of such adverbs as 'carefully', 'knowledgeably' and 'deliberately'.

Ryle says that achievements are not actions because they do not take time. They are not doings, but end-points. Ryle also calls them 'success-words'. Verbs, which refer to achievements and end-points include 'win', 'conquer', 'unlock', 'prove', 'deduce', 'solve', 'see' etc.

In his book "The Concept of Mind", Ryle analyses the different mental concepts and upholds the dispositional analysis of mind. In the thesis, my main objective is to analyse the different mental concepts and Gilbert Ryle's analysis of
the dispositional theory of mind. In the thesis, I shall try to make critical analysis of
the traditional conception of mind, specially Descartes' dualistic theory of mind.

For this purpose, I shall offer Gilbert Ryle's opinion on the various concepts. My
main objective is to offer a critical exposition of Ryle's philosophy of mind.

In the chapter I, I will describe the nature and theories of mind given by the
different philosophers at different times.

In the chapter II, I shall be concerned with the nature of dispositions. Here
I will describe the different views on dispositions and will examine Ryle's
dispositional account of mind. In this chapter an analysis will be devoted to the
distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' which is an essential part of
Ryle's philosophy of mind.

In the chapter III, I shall be concerned on the nature of will. Here, I will
describe the nature of will analysed by the traditional philosophers as well as
Gilbert Ryle's analysis of will.

In the chapter IV, I shall be mainly concerned with the nature of emotion. In
this chapter first I will deal with the definition and theories of emotion given by the
traditional philosophers and the last part will be devoted to Gilbert Ryle's account
of emotion.

The chapter V deals with the nature of sensation and observation. Here I
will describe clearly the traditional account of sensation and observation and
ultimately will examine Ryle's account of it.

In the chapter VI, I shall be concerned with the nature of consciousness.
Here I will discuss the different psychological and philosophical account of consciousness and will examine how far Ryle's view of consciousness is tenable.

The chapter VII deals with Ryle and Wittgenstein. Here I will examine the dominant figures of twentieth century philosophy which is known as 'Linguistic Analysis' and will compare the logical behaviourism of Ryle to that of Wittgenstein.

The last chapter will be the concluding chapter. In this chapter a critical exposition on some of the mental concepts of Gilbert Ryle will be analysed. Here I will sum up my findings and will try to show whether Ryle's account of mind is tenable to us.