CONCLUSION
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In this concluding chapter, I shall try to see how far Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind is teneable to us by making a critical exposition on some of the most important mental concepts.

We see that Ryle's philosophy of mind is anti-cartesian and anti-dualistic. It leaves no room for inherent privacy in the life of an individual. But it can be said that there are some statements in his book to support the inner life theory. We may take an example in support of our contention. Ryle says:

"Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery". 155

In this statement Ryle accepts that there are silent thoughts and imaginings which support inner life. Ryle accepts that if the agent is unwilling to reveal them they may not be known. Now the point is - are not these confessions sufficient to establish that Ryle is also subscribing to the view of dualism, knowingly or unknowingly? Some of the statements of Ryle speak of his acceptance of silent deliberation and calculation, silent imagining and recollecting in one's head. Thus we may ask: when Ryle accepts such silent deliberations, is he not talking of mind which he obhors? such statement of Ryle's philosophy of mind is inconsistent and paves the way for the revival of dualism. Thus while remarking on dualism, Prof. A C. Ewing writes,

155. Ibid, P.-28
"That Ryle is trying the tactics of the woman who excused herself for an illegitimate baby by saying that it was a very little one." 156

There are also criticisms against Ryle's somewhat inappropriate use of the concept of 'category'. With regard to his thesis that the ghost is born of the illegitimate mining up of the different categories, we may point out that Ryle does not give us any criterion to distinguish such categories. The rejection of the ghost on the basis of category mistake should have been preceded by a precise definition of category. One ought to be equipped with an adequate criterion to determine the category difference. Ryle uses expressions like the 'same category' and 'different category' without being at all prepared to say which category or categories are in question. In his "Dilemmas", Ryle has admitted that the word category is used not in its usual, professional sense, but in its amateurish, inexact sense. Thus G. J. Warnock has rightly objected:

"If one is not prepared, and indeed is deliberately unwilling, to say just what a category is, and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term 'category'?'" 157

Ryle rejects the Cartesian dualism on the ground that it commits category mistake. As against Descartes, Ryle holds that although body has extension and it is a physical entity, mind is not an entity but it is simply a disposition of a person. Therefore, when we make a conjunctive statement like - There exists body and

156. Ewing, A C.: "Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism, Reprinted in Clarity Is Not Enough, P. 338
157. Warnock, GJ. English Philosophy Since 1900, P. 96
there exists mind, according to Ryle by this conjunctive statement we make a mistake by putting 'mind' in the same category with the 'body'. For Ryle statements about body are statements about an entity called body but statements about mind are definitely not statements about an entity called mind, because mind is not an entity. When two things belong to the same category it is possible to make conjunctive or disjunctive statements out of them. Therefore, for Ryle by the conjunctive statement "there exists body and there exists mind" we are placing both of them in the same category and thereby commit a mistake. However, though Ryle has talked about category mistake, he was not at all interested to define a "category."

Moreover, as against Ryle one can always ask a question - Did Descartes really commit a category mistake? Descartes' theory of mind is an ontological theory. He is concerned with the actual existence of mind. Where as Ryle being an ordinary language philosopher, was interested in the logic of ordinary language. Therefore, one can always raise a question like - how far Ryle is justified in attacking Descartes' ontological or metaphysical theory of mind from quite different standpoint?

Karl Popper, the Austrian philosopher in his book "Conjectures and Refutations" disagrees with Ryle's view against Descartes. Popper tried to show that the theory of category-mistakes is untenable. According to him, ordinary English very often treats mental states and physical states on a par with each other, not only where it speaks of a 'mental disease' of a 'hospital for the mentally sick' of a man who is both physically and mentally well balanced ' etc. These cases might
be dismissed as driving from a philosophical dualism. But Popper says, "'Thinking of sheep always helps me to fall asleep' or 'Reading Mr. Smith's novels always helps me to fall asleep.' There are countless similar examples. They certainly do not establish that ordinary English words describing mental states and physical states always belong to the same 'Category.'"¹⁵⁶

Thus in many places Popper criticizes Ryle's concept of category mistake. Popper says that the example of the colleges and the university is precisely analogous; the foreigner who wants to see the university asks, of course, for a university building and this building would be of the same category as the college buildings. Is it not therefore a category mistake to suggest that he has made a category mistake?

According to Ryle, psychology deals with mental incompetences and proves into man's unconscious in order to find out the hidden cause. But here we may ask: Is not Ryle equating psychology with psycho-analysis? Now-a-days the two cannot be so easily equated because psycho-analysis differentiates itself from psychology and claims to be an independent science. Psycho-analysis as we know concentrates more on the sub-conscious than on the conscious.

Again, Ryle has attacked 'mind as a cause' theory. Following Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophy can only describe linguistic usage, he has felt satisfied with descriptions alone. But descriptions cannot be a substitute for cause. Description and explanation are two different things concerning an event and both have their

own functions. The Cartesian theory of mind cannot therefore be thrown completely

When we try to understand the nature of mind in Ryle's sense, that if the
mind is explained as a disposition or a complex of dispositions it cannot be explained
as occurrent at the same time without involving the type-confusion. Because in
that case again we shall be committing the category mistake of attributing two
different categories or logical types in explaining the mind or the mental. If one
commits a category mistake in the way described by Ryle, it is clear that some
mental concepts are fundamentally dispositional while others are fundamentally
occurrent i.e. a concept while being dispositional cannot be occurrent at the same
time. The concepts of heeding, concentrating, thinking one's thought are partly
episodic and partly dispositional which is described by Ryle as 'mongrel categoricals'
or 'seme-hypotheticals'. Does it mean that he committed the same category mistake
in another form against which he himself has raised objections? Or did he mean
to say that dispositions after all belong to the same category or logical type as
occurrences.

According to Ryle, mind is inherently open or public. It is only by training or
'special artifice' that we keep it secret. Ryle seems to admit that unless mind is
basically public, we cannot know about the mental qualities of others. But the critic
may argue that unless mind is private, how is that we are deprived of sharing one
another's experience? Whatever kind of privacy Ryle ascribes to mental
phenomena, he does not seem to be consistent about it. Ryle thinks that mental
privacy is analogous to the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key. A natural
corollary of this comparison is that mental privacy is a matter of physical or physiological accident. But there are also lines in Ryle's book which state that mental privacy is only a verbal matter.

Mind-body dualism reflects itself in the speech habit of the people. When we speak of 'mental disease' or of a 'hospital meant for mentally sick', or of a man who is both 'physically healthy and mentally healthy', we are certainly contrasting mind from body. It is difficult to overcome the psychic phenomena of dreams, images, pleasure, unpleasure etc. from the mind. We have seen how Ryle has almost avoided discussing dreams. We do not know how to disbelieve the inherent privacy of dream experiences. We do not also know how Ryle's one-world theory is competent to account for the fantasy worlds that dreams create. Dreams are not public events. Of course, when we communicate or make statements about them, they are, in that way, made public. But to say that dreams are made public is not to say that dreams are dreamt publicly.

According to Ryle pleasure and pain are not anything beyond physical behaviour. Enjoying digging is not digging plus enjoying. Certain ways of digging are themselves enjoying. Similarly, pain is some such visible behaviour as groaning, screaming, shouting and the rest. But here also Ryle's conception of pleasure and pain is in conflict. Pleasure and pain cannot be understood in terms of physical categories alone as Ryle says. We must distinguish physical pains and the pains of the heart. For example, the pains of tooth-ache are not of the same kind as the pains of disappointment.
Ryle has attempted to dispense with the ghost. This has clearly led to the revival of behaviourism in a new form. The one general remark made against The "Concept of Mind" is that it is a book on behaviourism or even a thinly disguised form of Materialism. C. A. Campbell, referring to the last section of the book remarked that "The Concept of Mind" is, at bottom, a thinly disguised form of materialism comes out most clearly in the final chapter, where Ryle devotes a short section to the relation of his view to behaviourism. It is surely materialism, though not mechanistic materialism. As Ryle himself has observed, it may be said to be 'Polymorphic Materialism' Polymorphic materialism would still be materialism having varied characteristics or manifestations.

However, Ryle’s behaviourism is not naive or psychological behaviourism. It is logical or analytical. By logically analysing the meaning of mind-involving sentences, he comes to maintain that mind is only a manner or a style or way of behaviour. Ryle’s analytical behaviourism is based on the consideration of linguistic data.

But Ryle’s behaviourism, though dressed in logical role, lacks the charm of appeal. This is primarily so because he has failed to distinguish the essence of mental qualities from those that are only their evidences. Behaviours are the criteria or the evidences that enable one to determine mental qualities in others.

Ryle agrees and equates mind with behaviour, a doubt arises whether he is not also guided by the problem of other minds than by the problem of mind as such. This doubt is strengthened if we look into the beginning of his introduction to
"The Concept of Mind*. Here he explicitly seems to be concerned about other minds. Ryle observes.

"Teachers and examiners, magistrates and critics, historians and novelists, confessors and non commissioned officers, employers, employer and partners, parents, lovers, friends and enemies all know well enough how to settle their daily questions about the qualities of character and intellect of the individual with whom they have to do."

Thus critics point out that Ryle is only concerned with the problem of other minds, not with the philosophy of mind.

Ryle's behaviourism makes him look like a materialist, though Ryle declares that both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question. Still, Ryle's emphasis on bodily behaviour as not merely manifesting but being the working of mind together with his attempt to dispense with all specifically mental happenings can be taken a materialist view. G.J. Warnock very aptly sums up his theory when he says:

"This is the thesis that there really exist only bodies and other physical objects, that there really occur only physical events or processes, and all statements ostensibly referring to minds are really categorical statements about current bodily behaviour, or more commonly hypothetical statements about predicated bodily behaviour; that hence there is really no such thing as private, inner life at all, and that in principle everything about every individual could be known by sufficiently protracted observation of his bodily doings." 159

159. Warnock, G.J. English Philosophy Since 1900-PP.- 100-101
Thus when Ryle reduces mind ultimately by bodily behaviour, it is manifesting an absorption of mind by matter and there we find materialism. Of course, his materialism is not mechanistic. But Ryle’s attempt to get rid of ‘the ghost in the machine’ paves the way to a mechanistic theory of nature.

Ryle seems to hold that while his analysis would clarify the mental concepts of their metaphysical lumbers, it will not increase man’s knowledge of human mind and its various functions. Man will continue to know what he knows as well as is capable of knowing through his everyday experience in life. He will give a more consistent account in the sense that what he understands by the epithet ‘mind’ is not radically different from what he experiences about it in behaviour both in himself and in others. If Ryle were to aim at analysing mental concepts in such a way as to render them more easily understandable by others, he would have maintained the moderate dualism in the two species of experience and contend that all mental epithets cannot be significantly explained in terms of physical behaviour.

Ryle in the form of linguistic analysis tries to emphasize a theory of mind which at many points seems to go quite against the ordinary view of the nature of mind. He resorts to ordinary language to show the philosopher’s myth and yet propounds a theory which is as much opposed to traditional philosophy as it is to the view of the ordinary man.

Bertrand Russell while commenting on Ryle’s Concept of Mind has criticised him for preferring ‘the language of the uneducated people and condemning the
In this regard H.J. Paton remarks: "It is a mistake to suppose that any language, whether home baked or dehydrated, can be used as a standard to which philosophical thinking must conform." 161

Frederick Copleston denies that there is anything as 'fixed ordinary language' and "if there were, it is not at all self-evident that it would constitute a court of appeal in philosophical disputes." 162

In his "Concept of Mind", Ryle advocates the dispositional theory of mind. The dispositional theory of mind does not deny the nature of mind, but denies the status given to it by the traditional philosophers. It does not say that there is no mind; it only says that whatever one can say about mind or the mental one can legitimately say in terms of the actually observed and observable behaviour. Analytical behaviourism is an attempt to explain mind in terms of dispositions, where dispositions would mean to behave and to be capable of behaving in a particular way and not dispositions to reflect on one's behaviour. It means that while man would act he would not reflect on his acts. And even if he reflects he can not know that he does so. For admitting self-reflection on some of our mental actions would mean admitting more than what could be permitted by Ryle's open hypothetical statement regarding behaviour. C.A. Mace points out that analytical behaviourism gives an extended meaning of the term 'behaviour' in such a way as to include mental epithets which otherwise would embarrass him. It seem that the

160. Russell, B: What is Mind, My philosophical Development, P.-250
analytical behaviourist while maintaining the reality of mental experiences, denies the causal explanation accorded to them by Descartes' mind-body dualism.

Ryle's subsequent chapters seem to be concerned with a different kind of dualism, the dualism of two species of experience, the mental and the physical, which he thinks cannot be conjoined or disjoined together without involving logical absurdity in them. For example, Ryle's account of dualism as dealt with in the chapter on Descartes' Myth and as dealt with in subsequent chapters is concerned more with the fact that the individual engaged in a particular mental operation cannot be said to be aware simultaneously of his inner reflection on mental operation - a fact which does not seem to follow from the rejection of the dogma of the 'ghost-in-the-machine.' In fact, to reflect upon our various mental operations we need not presuppose any Cartesian self-illuminating consciousness.

Our knowledge of ourselves is never identical with our knowledge of others. In some cases we depend upon others more to know our own states or processes than we depend upon our self-illuminating consciousness or introspection, just as other individuals depend upon us to know about themselves. But that dependence is not based on the fact that there is no difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, but because of the essentially mysterious nature of life itself we depend on more information from self-observation as well as on observation by others to know what we are.

Ryle assuming a more reconciliating position with regard to some difficult mental epithets, particularly the epithets of heeding, attending, concentrating or
thinking one's thought. The episodic concepts is prevalent in his chapters on Dispositions and Occurrences, Self-knowledge etc. Ryle's assertion that a mentalistic sentence instead of reporting some actual episodes of mind, reports an infinite series of possible behavioural episodes, has the effect of making simple things look rather complicated. In this regard Peter Geach comments, "It is really a scandal that people should count it a philosophical advance to adopt a programme of analysing ostensible categoricals into unfulfilled conditionals, like the programmes of the phenomenalists with regard to 'physical object' statements and of neo-behaviourists with regard to psychological statements".  

Again Ryle conceives of 'many track' dispositional word. Such a word, according to him is 'highly generic' i.e. it serves as a genus having heterogenous episodes as its species. But here an important question is raised against Ryle's conception. The question is, according to which principle can a series of episodes, being so heterogenous in character can subsume under a common genus? According to which rule of construction can the diverse hypothetical propositions be grouped together? Such questions may disturb a reader's mind. In this connection Spilsbury remarks:

"I donot understand Ryle's use of the term 'generic' in this context. In any ordinary use it would be absurd to say that hardness was a genus, of which properties of causing pain, resisting deformation, and giving out a sharp sound were species."  

163. Geach, Peter - Mental Acts, P. 7
Against Ryle some philosophers have argued that dispositions on the one hand, and existing states on the other are not mutually exclusive alternatives. They argue that dispositions are necessarily connected to existing states. D.M. Armstrong for example says that the assertion that x has such-and-such a disposition actually entails either the proposition x has a certain structure, or the proposition that x is in a particular state. That some psychological concepts are dispositional is consequently not incompatible with the thesis that there are such things as mental states but rather constitutes a proof of this thesis. As Armstrong is a materialist, the mental state, for him, is a brain state.

Some physicalist philosophers argued that the states and structures of physical objects must be the ultimate realities of the universe. Dispositions and tendencies are derivative and non-ultimate and therefore cannot be fully true. The reason is that the existence of a disposition requires the prior existence of an underlying state of affairs. According to physicalism, the states which underlie the dispositions which Ryle identifies with thoughts, beliefs and so on are brain states. The beliefs themselves are simply states of the brain. Thus it does not follow that the state and structure is identical with the disposition.

In the chapter II of the "Concept of Mind" Ryle says.

“When we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects. We are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves.”

166. Ryle, G. - The Concept of Mind. P.- 26
That is psychological dispositions are dispositions to perform physical actions including utterances. If this were true it would, no doubt, remove the need to posit an incorporeal substance, the soul. But surely Ryle exaggerates here. The possibility of future physical acts and utterances does not exhaust the content of dispositional mental notions. A disposition may be partly a disposition to think certain thoughts, feel certain emotions, have certain sensations. Its manifestations might themselves be hidden things about which only the subject can tell us. An anti-Rylean dualist might say in favour of the soul, conceived as an immaterial and separate substance. He could argue that at least some tendencies and capacities belong to the incorporeal substance just as certain acts and states are its acts and states. A dispositional account of the mind is not incompatible with dualism unless it can be shown of each and every psychological disposition that it is ultimately to be fully cashed in physical terms.

Further to say that dispositions are not actual is to say that there is no actual difference between person and person. It is only to say that a difference would arise when they would act in their own ways. But to say so is to say something very unusual. Ryle believes that if we want to distinguish a soluble thing from an insoluble one, we can do so not by virtue of a property or character, present in the one and absent in the other. We can do so only with the help of certain hypotheticals. But Ryle’s conception of hypotheticals in this regard is somewhat unusual. The denial of the actuality of dispositions also appears to be incompatible with the learning of skills. We know that skills are learnt gradually by practice. But unless
every practice leaves some thing positive to be carried forward in the next, how can we improve and acquire skills?

Again, the rejection of dispositions as something actual leads to queer consequences. It has led Ryle to believe that vain behaviour is not due to an element of vanity present in the agent. It is due to some such thing as meeting the stranger. Thus Ryle's account of dispositions in a way relieves us of our responsibility for our own actions. But this is not the appropriate method.

It also becomes difficult to believe with Ryle that a disposition is not existing drive or force. Aaron, while explaining the nature of dispositions observes that a disposition does not signify only a regular behaviour - sequence. Aaron says,

"When ordinary men and some scientists and philosophers speak of dispositions they clearly mean more ; rightly or wrongly they mean drives, forces or powers." 167

It is, therefore debatable if a dispositional statement is not categorical in significance, but hypothetical statements. Of course, the categorical statement is generally made when the hypothetical statements are found to be true. If a sugar-like thing does not dissolve in water, we cannot ordinarily say that it has solubility as its quality. But that is only to make the truth of the categorical statement depend on the truth of hypothetical statements. That is not to deny the categorical significance altogether. Therefore dispositional concepts are not unsuggestive of inner or hidden qualities. Even when mental concepts stand for dispositions, our

inner life is not to be denied.

Though dispositions may seem to be a good substitute for mind, it is necessary for Ryle to distinguish between human and non-human dispositions. Merely to say that mind is a disposition to behave in certain ways will not do. Inanimate objects have their dispositions to behave in their own ways. What is it, then, which makes us classify some dispositions as physical and others as mental? Ryle does not provide a suitable answer to this question. Nor does he seem to think it necessary to explain the criteria that will distinguish the two sorts of dispositions. In this regard Bertrand Russell remarks:

“A plain man would say that ‘brittle’ denotes a disposition of bodies and ‘intelligent’ denotes a disposition of minds - in fact, that the two adjectives apply to different kinds of ‘stuff’. But it is not open to professor Ryle to say this, and I do not quite know what he would say."

Of the dispositions ‘know’ and ‘belief’, one refers to capacity and the other to tendency. ‘To know’ means to be able to get things right; ‘to believe’ means to tend to act or react in certain ways. So, neither the capacity verb ‘know’, nor the tendency verb ‘believe’ refers, according to Ryle to any acts or processes conducted on the private stage of mind. These verbs, Ryle believes, cannot report secret acts or processes because there are no such acts or processes. His main objection against cognitive acts is that certain questions which ought to be answered about them, because they are acts, cannot be answered. Nobody can answer such

questions as: How many cognitive acts did he perform before breakfast, and what did it feel like to do them? Did he enjoy his passage from his premises to his conclusion, and did he make it continously or recklessly? Did the breakfast make him stop short halfway between his premises and his conclusion? Is conceiving a quick or a gradual process, an easy or difficult one?

Now we can say that the answers of these questions cannot be easily given not because there are no cognitive acts but because the question themselves are more or less illegitimate. Such questions can be validly asked about physical or bodily acts. But if someone makes their answer a condition for the acceptance of cognitive acts, we may say that we can answer some of them. We do enjoy drawing certain conclusions. We do at times infer continously or recklessly. Conceiving is sometimes quick, sometimes gradual, sometime easy and sometimes difficult. We generally speak of something (say the breakfast bell) interrupting our thought etc. So, we cannot reasonably deny cognitive acts. Thus mind also cannot be easily replaced by dispositions or semi-dispositions. In this regard Huge R King remarks:

“We cannot reduce ‘my mind to simply ‘my ability or pronenes to do certain sorts of things’. Indeed, ability and proneness may be just those dispositions which allow me to do a thing unconsciously and without heed, to dismiss my ‘mind’.”

It can be said that for his own purpose Ryle has sought to replace consciousness by disposition. The effect of such a replacement has been to present

an altogether new picture of man. Man is now a typically behaving body. Though unconscious, he is thought to do everything that is called intelligent. One may wonder whether Ryle himself believes that he is unconscious. As a matter of fact, man's conscious nature is so dear to him that he may feel completely shocked and disappointed to hear that he is in fact unconscious. As D.S. Miller puts it:

"If you learned today that your own life from tomorrow morning on would be to this sort, the life of a perfectly behaving body but a perfectly unconscious one, you would suddenly cease to be concerned about it, you would not in the least cling to life on these terms. Why? Because you cannot for a moment identify yourself with a body without consciousness."

Ryle has also denied introspection almost on the same lines on which he has denied consciousness. We have seen how unsatisfactory his denial of consciousness is. If introspection be the mental act of scrutinizing the private experiences of one's own, it would mean that we can attend to two things at once.

But can one attend to the act and the object of scrutiny simultaneously? Ryle's attempt to deny both consciousness and introspection, is therefore, debatable. Ryle substitutes mind by person and believes that a person is not the combination of mind and body. According to Ryle, the conjunctive phrase 'mind and body' is as ridiculous as the conjunction 'in tears and sedan-chair.' To say that 'a man is mind and body' is as absurd as to say 'She came home in tears and sedan-chair.' We can say that Ryle's substitution of mind by person really takes us

nowhere. We may ask, What does Ryle mean by ‘person’? ‘Person’ is an ambiguous term. So, unless Ryle defines his concept of person and explains how it can take the place of mind, a mere verbal substitution is not enough. Moreover, Ryle has frequently identified the Cartesian mind with behaviour of certain sorts. In view of this it is difficult to decide what he actually wants to say whether mind is the behaviour of certain sorts or person is the behaviour of certain sorts. We may also ask - Is the conjunction ‘mind and body’ as ridiculous as the conjunction ‘in tears and sedan chair’? It is the unusual nature of objection to the expression ‘mind and body’ that leads Frank Sibley to comment:

“To say that the phrase “Mind and matter is to be avoided seem to be pushing the objection too far.””

Further, Ryle’s version that the question of relation between mind and body is as non-sense as the question of relation between university and its Registrar’s office on the other. But doctors talk of mind affecting the body or body affecting the mind. A doctor conveys a significant information when he says, ‘A fracture in the skull bone has affected the patient’s mind’ or ‘The cause of his disease is mental rather than physical’. Does such of kind observation of the doctor not imply some kind of mind-body interaction?

Moreover, Ryle’s idea is that the mental is private in the same way in which the entries of a diary kept under lock and key are private. Ryle asserts, "I cannot overhear your silent colloquies with yourself, nor can I read your diary, if you write

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it in cipher, or keep it under lock and key.”¹⁷² This observation of Ryle makes it clear that the mental is private not in the sense of its being absolutely private. It is private only in the sense that it is restricted to one and could be made public - not that it is necessarily confined to one and cannot be made public. Thus Ryle believes that the mental is not made or meant to be private. One only manages to keep it private. The mind is open or public in principle, though one can maintain its secrecy if he prefers to do that. But now a question may arise whether the mental privacy can at all be likened with the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key? It is not impossible to break open the lock and go through the contents of one’s diary. But is it in any way possible to enter into another’s mind to get a first hand report of its deliberations?

One of the basic confusions that Ryle has made in the “Concept of Mind” is between mental qualities and their tests. It is his failure to distinguish between the essence and the evidence of mental qualities, between the meaning of a statement and the method of its verification, that has led him to say that mind is just a summary of the different behaviours peculiar to human being. Again, Ryle’s writings give the impression that he has not decided whether mental concepts stand for some behaviour or they are only tested by some behaviour. Critics have invariably found this fault with his theory of mind. Hampshire in his review of The Concept of Mind remarks: “Professor Ryle is not really arguing that all or not statements, involving mental concepts are (or are expressible as) hypothetical statements about overt

behaviour, but (and it is very different) that to give reasons for accepting or rejecting such statements must always involve making some hypothetical statement about overt behaviour.*173* Of course, Ryle comments that it is not in his scheme of things to distinguish between the meaning of mental concept and the method on its verification. On the other hand, it is his theory to identify the two.

However, though Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind underwent severe criticism from different quarters, yet his presentation of dispositional analysis of almost all concepts (minus some occurrences) made him one of the most prominent of those analysts who regarded the use of ordinary language as a philosophical tool. While criticising Cartesian dualism Ryle, contends that intelligent behaviour is a matter of knowing how to do something and once this fact is acknowledge, there is no temptation to explain the behaviour by looking for a private internal knowledge of facts. H.D. Lewis observes "When I write these words there seems to be clearly more going on at the time, than the movement of my fingers and pencils. In my actual writing more is involved than the physical movement and this 'more' is not merely of a dispositional kind. It is a part of what goes on as I have put it. It is my sustained understanding of what I am doing and my continuous propositing to do it. This can not be dissolved into dispositional attitudes". 174

Thus a study of Ryle shows that he has taken help of extra-linguistic consideration in order to uphold his theory of mind. But the way in which Ryle has taken help of logic, language and fact, he has not succeeded in eliminating the

173. Mind, April, 1950, P. - 245.
174. Lewis, H.D. : The Elusive Mind P- 51
bugaboo of the ghost in the machine. A rumour about the ghost is still left in the air of Ryle's anti-ghost philosophy of mind and this gives strength to much-maligned Cartesianism. Cartesian dualism still seems to serve at least as a good hypothesis.