CHAPTER - VII
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AN ANALYSIS OF RYLE'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S ACCOUNT OF MIND

Both Ryle (1900-1976) and Wittgenstein (1889-1951) are the dominant figures of the twentieth century philosophy which is known as "Linguistic Analysis." Ryle's Major work "The Concept of Mind" (1947), because of its style and content in the field of philosophy of mind has become one of the modern classics of philosophy. In this work Ryle attacked what he calls, Cartesian dualism or the myth of the ghost in the machine, arguing that philosophical troubles over the nature of mind and its relation with the body arose from a 'category mistake' which led erroneously for treating statements about mental phenomena in the same way as those about physical phenomena. Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigation" (1953) occupies a very important place in the philosophy of mind. In "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein talks about different mental concepts specially about the concept of 'pain'. According to Wittgenstein meaning and understanding is neither to name nor to describe mental occurrences. In his book Wittgenstein was mainly motivated by the relationship between language and the mind. Both Ryle and Wittgenstein criticised Descartes' theory of mind. They liberate the mind from the Cartesian conception of the inner world and put more importance to linguistic activities.

Both Ryle and Wittgenstein believe firmly that linguistic analysis is the
sole aim of philosophical enterprise. It is so because philosophy connot profitably engage itself with the task of considering facts. The study of facts is exclusively the concern of science. So, the world of facts remains outside the scope of philosophical enquiry and philosophy should concentrate on the analysis and examination of language. The followers of the logical positivism saw that the business of philosophy was clarification, not discovery; its concern was with meaning not with truth, its subject matter was language, not facts. Ryle is a leading member of the present day analysts. He admitted this notion of the positivists. Wittgenstein asserted that all philosophy is the critique of language. He also admitted the fact that "Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". \[123\] Ryle was also so much convinced of the muddle created by the philosopher's mishandling of language that he believes that "The proper business of philosophy is the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent misconceptions and absurd theories." \[124\] Both Ryle and Wittgenstein felt the need of analysis to the use of faulty language. They began to examine the language with the aims of halting improper use, exposing absurd theories, dispelling confusions, overthrowing idols and securing clarify. They wanted to replace the defective language and established a non-defective language and as a result we find their conception regarding the philosophy of mind.

Both Ryle and Wittgenstein supported the behaviourism. Their view on

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123 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, Sec. - 109, (P. 47)
behaviourism is known as philosophical behaviourism or logical behaviourism or analytical behaviourism. According to this behaviourism we can give an account of all mental processes in terms of the physical behaviour and tendencies to behave. Ryle's book "The Concept of Mind" is a defence of analytical behaviourism. He identifies mental states not with actual behaviour but with the dispositions to behave.

Logical behaviourism or analytical behaviourism holds that the psychological statements whether they are about other minds or about one's own are translatable into statements about physical occurrences or physical states. Here the viewpoint is one not of science but of logical or conceptual analysis. It says that the meaning of mental statements is analysable about behaviour and about the observable circumstances in which such behaviour occurred. Thus we can say that Ryle is an exponent of logical behaviourism. Some readers of Wittgenstein allege that he advocates an extreme form of philosophical behaviourism in his Philosophical Investigations. For example, J. J. C. Smart in 'Materialism' says, "In spite of his own disclaimer Wittgenstein is in fact a sort of behaviourist". Of course, here the term 'behaviour' is used to refer to not only the present behaviour but also the future and past behaviour. Wittgenstein's concept of mind leads inevitably to philosophical behaviourism which reduces mental states to behavioural activities. However, Wittgenstein does not reduce mental phenomena to behaviour in the sense behaviour ourists do. He only holds, "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria." When Wittgenstein speaks of 'outward criteria' he means that

125 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec - 580, (P. 153)
mental processes need outer criteria in order to be identified as such. The phrase in saying that inner processes stand in need of outward criteria, Wittgenstein seems to be saying that there is a logically necessary connection between inner and the outer. What Wittgenstein meant by ‘criteria’ is much debated. But his remark certainly emphasizes the necessity for a public context if the idea of an inner process is to be intelligible. This statement of Wittgenstein is in contrast to Cartesian tradition in which one has to start, in one’s account of the world from one’s own case i.e. one’s own inner processes. Ryle says that mind is only the disposition of the body and there cannot be anything private about mind.

But there is one difficulty in interpreting Wittgenstein and Ryle as behaviourists. They took behaviourism to be the doctrine and hold that there are no such things as minds. They did not want to deny the existence of minds, but simply wanted to give an account of the mind in terms of behaviour. Both of them denied that they were behaviourists. But D.M. Armstrong remarks, “I think, these philosophers wrongly persuaded themselves that they were not Behaviourists. However, where this piece of interpretation is right or not does not really matter. The accounts of mental processes given by these philosophers were certainly very close to Behaviourism, and it is useful to consider them as Behaviourists. If they are not Behaviourists, we may challenge them or their followers to tell us in what way their view differs from Behaviourism.”

Wittgenstein had not positively spoken much on the concept of mind. While
discoursing on the philosophy of mind, Wittgenstein is concerned with the language that is used when one talks about mental acts and states. The linguistic philosopher deals with what it is to say that someone is thinking, understanding, willing, feeling, remembering etc. Here we may quote the definition of a private language:

Wittgenstein defines 'private language' as follows, "Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man's behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a word, that it means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his 'thinking' be understands, attaching some meaning to the word, criteria for his understanding the word right. In the second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a private language." 127

According to Wittgenstein, the language in which we have words like "thinking", willing etc. has a logic of its own which is different from the logic connected with words like walking, sneezing, running etc. The statement "I am in pain" is not a descriptive statement i.e. it does not describe a mental state. It is an expression of a mental state. It does not describe what is happening in mind. Mind does not contain mental states which can be described in the way we can describe the contents of a room.

According to Wittgenstein, though mind does not refer to an entity yet it is real. Mind is real in the sense that we play language game involving mind. Our language game are rich with mental words and statements.

Wittgenstein was interested in the analysis of language and through that

127 Ibid, Sec 306 (P-102)
he explained away the mind. He tried to dissolve the issue instead of solving it. But the issue was insoluble although not insolvable. It can hardly be said that Wittgenstein really brought about a dissolution.

Wittgenstein clearly saw that the reason behind philosophical difficulties lay in the violation of ordinary language. He suggested us for bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. His objection was that the metaphysicians operated with ordinary words but deprived them of their ordinary functions. He complained that the metaphysicians had distorted the ordinary language. Wittgenstein as well as his successors believed that it was philosophers' misconstruction and misdescription of ordinary language that led them go astray. They argued that if philosophy was to succeed, it must determine how our language is in fact used - what we mean when a word or a sentence is used in everyday discourse. Therefore, the analysts said that clarification based on common use can solve or dissolve a philosophical dispute. The followers of Wittgenstein took common or ordinary use to be the only proper use and what they wanted to clarify wasnot the knowledge of facts but the meaning of statements. Their clarificatory philosophy aimed at clarifying puzzling sentence. By doing so, they hoped to remove the darkness of perplexity and cure philosophy of its muddles or headaches. Thus the linguistic conception of philosophy and the notion of ordinary language are the philosophical touchstones in Wittgensteinian philosophy.

Ryle is one of the most influential proponents of this new concept of philosophy. His book "The Concept of Mind" is a fine example of the ordinary
language philosophy, where he points to analyse the psychological concepts in order to show the hollowness of mind body dualism. Ryle contends that the cartesian concept of the mind is essentially private. Ryle strongly rejected the notion that there exists two kinds of stuff. Viz, the physical and the mental. According to Ryle, "To talk of a person's mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to house objects that something called 'the physical world' is for bidden to house, it is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world." 

According to Wittgenstein, "The mind world certainty logically available is metaphysical certainty which involves the certainty about our language game." Wittgenstein wants to emphasize on the certainty of the existence of the world as its existence is a part of the framework of our thinking and using language and so there could be no place for the universal doubt about the existence of the world. Language itself presupposes that the world exists and that the world being exist it makes language use possible. By this Wittgenstein admits the metaphysical certainty to the existence of the world and the mind. In this sense thought and language are part of the world. He also argues for the mind in the world rather than for the mind that is outside the world.

Thus philosophical activity is linguistic. He maintains that the problems of philosophy arise because the logic of our language is misunderstood. He says in the "Philosophical Investigations" that we are misled by grammer, by the apparent

128. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, P.- 190
form of language. Philosophical problems are products of the linguistic illusion. Hence, the philosophical activity consists in clarification. Philosophical problems can be solved by a careful study of language. All philosophy is a critique of language. Wittgenstein maintains that an important business of philosophy consists in diagnosis. Philosophical methods are like 'different therapies'. It is the job of philosophy to cure the conceptual diseases. Wittgenstein writes, "When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it".129

Thus Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is entirely related with his conception of psychology. In his book "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein connects his conception of mind with language. Mind is not something inner or private as held by Descartes. According to Wittgenstein, the mental words such as 'thinking' and 'meaning' do not designate any inner process. It is essentially a public phenomenon as observable by others as by the subject himself. But we have to engage ourselves in searching on which ground Wittgenstein maintains that mental phenomena or mind in not an inner process, but a public phenomenon. It is not an inner process because various mental concepts are meaningful only in the light of forms of life, and thus all mental concepts are connected with language. Thus language is intimately related with mind. We can express our feelings, thoughts, etc. through language. Ryle in his article "Ordinary language" 130 says

129. Philosophical Investigation, Sec. 194, P-79
that we donot speak of the 'use' of sentences. Only words are used. But there is nothing absurd to talk of the 'use' of sentences. We certainly use them. In the “Philosophical Investigations”, Wittgenstein says that the tendency to sublime the logic of language leads us to essentialism. But essentialism cannot be completely eliminated from language. What Wittgenstein is rejecting is the claim that all name-words function in the same way, or that all descriptive sentences describe in one fixed way. These are only one kind of language game. They cannot be models for others. Wittgenstein's main purpose is to make us realize that language has no fixed use.

Introducing the term 'Language game', Wittgenstein wanted to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity or of a form of life. Therefore, with the analysis of Wittgenstein's concept of mind the analysis of language and analysis of forms of life go side by side. In his later work Wittgenstein replaces the picture theory of meaning by the tool theory of language. He holds, "The Philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours."131 Language is an instrument and its concepts are also instruments. He asks to think of the tools in a tool box. There is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, mails and screws. "The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. And in both cases there are similarities. Wittgenstein says that we find only similarities among the games, such as board games, card-games, ball games, olympic games and so on. We

131. Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigation, Sec 2, P.-3
see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:

Sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.\textsuperscript{132} In his opinion, although things have no common essence, they have "family resemblances". Games form a family. We use a term for a number of things not because they have some essence in common, but because they have certain similarities. Wittgenstein thus exposes the traditional theories about things and destroys them completely.

Philosophers have disagreement regarding the essence of mind. Some philosophers have concluded that the essential feature of mind is rationality. Some others maintain that it lies in the contemplative awareness and according to some it lies in its ability to symbolize, form, abstractions and use language. All these explanations of the essences of mind imply that mind has some kind of power and through this power various successive experiences are organised into a systematic whole of experiences. But Wittgenstein takes a completely different position regarding the explanation of mental phenomena or mind. According to him mental phenomena are not characterized by the hidden essence or hidden power. It is characterized by discrete and manifold forms of life.

Wittgenstein believes that language is almost inseparably connected with life and mind. A language game is an use of language for some purpose. Language is not something artificially constructed for the use of philosophers. Language is rather an instrument. That is to say speaking a language and understanding is a matter of being able to do a variety of things, to act or behave in certain ways and to do so under the appropriate conditions. Thus speaking a language is engaging

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, sec. 66, P-31
in certain modes of behaviour. It is to engage in forms of life and to "imagine a language means to imagine a form of life". We express our feelings and emotions through words and words are pieces used in various language games. The meaning of a word is determined by its roles in the various language-games in which it occurs, the kind of behaviour in which its use is embedded. It gets its meaning from these modes of behaviour. Wittgenstein said, "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life". It should be maintained here that under the notion of language game, Wittgenstein includes both linguistic and non-linguistic activities. G. Pitcher calls the linguistic activities as pure and non-linguistic activities as impure. According to Pitcher, Linguistic behaviour is not entirely independent of the other modes of behaviour. On the contrary, Wittgenstein believes that in a certain sense, impure language games are basic and holds that "Pure language games are parasitic upon them in a crucial way". Thus both purely linguistic behaviour and non-linguistic behaviour are essential to Wittgenstein's conception of language-game. But it seems that for him impure language games "i.e in the background". But we have to assert that whatever may be the case, Wittgenstein admits emphatically that words derive their meanings from the language-game which are their 'original homes'.

Thus in Wittgenstein's philosophy, mental phenomena are related with language. When Wittgenstein says that language is related to human behaviour and to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life, he uses the term

133. Ibid, Sec. 19, P. 8
behaviour in a very wide sense. He writes, "Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing".\textsuperscript{135}

Wittgenstein describes the tendency to search the life of meaning in the mental activity as a disease. This disease is based on a generally correct premise from which a wrong conclusion is made to follow. As words are lifeless in themselves there must be something to give them meaning. But it is wrong to assume that it is a mental activity or process that gives meaning to a word. It is rather the use of a word in language which makes it meaningful. In other words it is the stream of life, not a mental activity or process that makes an expression significant. According to Wittgenstein, following a rule is as much dependent on "Practice" as playing a game is. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. He writes, "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)"\textsuperscript{136}. That means rules are not enough for understanding language. To understand the language one should clearly look at the actual cases. Wittgenstein writes, "And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." \textsuperscript{137} Whether a rule is obeyed or not is decided by reference to what Wittgenstein describes in the "Blue Book" as "conventions" and in the "Philosophical Investigations" as "forms of life"

\textsuperscript{135.} Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation Sec. 25, P-12  
\textsuperscript{136.} Ibid, Sec. 199, P-81  
\textsuperscript{137.} Ibid, Sec. 202, P-81
which is related to our mind. Thus conventions or forms of life are for Wittgenstein the highest court of appeal, not rules. Even an unknown language is interpreted by reference to our common behaviour.

Regarding meaning, Wittgenstein says, "And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private. It is the intangible something, only comparable to consciousness itself." Meaning and understanding are not determined by what goes on in the 'speakers' and hearers' minds. They are rather matters of how they are used. What gives life and significance to words is their use, i.e. the way they are used in various language games. Wittgenstein maintains that the mental words such as 'thinking' and 'meaning' do not designate any inner process. If there were inner processes running along concurrently with the physical processes of speaking, we should be able to recognise and identify these alleged processes by introspection. But we fail to trace out anything like that. Certainly it is possible to say something and to mean something else, but generally it is gestures, tone of voice, facial expressions and a variety of actions and experiences of different kinds before and after, which distinguish meaning what we say from not meaning its. Thus according to Wittgenstein, meaning and understanding are not mental activities. Their function is neither to name nor to describe mental occurrences. Wittgenstein has tried to show with extra-ordinary brilliance that generally there is no mental content designated by mental words and that even in the situations where a mental content seems to be present, the meaning of a word is not

138. Ibid, Sec. 358, P-113
determined by its occurrence. What gives meaning and life to words and sentences is their use in language and life.

Wittgenstein takes an opposite position of Descartes regarding the nature of mind. Descartes maintains that we may doubt the existence of everything as illusory, but we cannot doubt the very fact of doubting and this implies the mind that doubts. But according to Wittgenstein, Cartesian dualism concerning mental concepts is untenable. It is simply irrational to doubt if there is no positive ground for it. Doubting is a form of life, apart from which it has no significance. Doubting cannot just consist in saying "I doubt". There must be something in the situation itself which justifies our doubting. To imagine a doubt is not to be in doubt. Doubting has an end. The expression of doubt has no place in language game. Without arranging in situations or forms of life 'Doubting' is an abstraction. Wittgenstein says that there is nothing that the Cartesian mind can do in the linguistic picture of the world. Mind is a thinking substance and it merges itself in the language centred activities, which called the language games, and the mental activities involved in the language games. Mind and the mental activities become one. On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein mental representations merge with the linguistic representations which themselves are nothing but language games. Therefore, Wittgenstein says that the mind is not the central concepts. It is the activities of playing language games that make the central idea. It makes mind as transparent as the world in language itself. Wittgenstein liberates the concept of mind from the Cartesian conception of the inner world and puts it back in the outer world of the
linguistic and other activities.

Both Wittgenstein and Descartes admit that mind is a central feature of the world because the human language and actions are intimately related to each other. Descartes posits the mind as the metaphysical centre of the world. Wittgenstein also takes it a metaphysical truth about the human being. Descartes says that mind is completely independent of the world and body requires for the manifestation of the mind. On the other hand, Wittgenstein rejects Descartes' dualism and makes it clear that though mind is irreducible, yet mind is co-partner of the body.

Like Wittgenstein, Ryle also rejects Descartes' dualism. According to Ryle mind is simply the disposition of the body, and mental predicate does not refer to anything private. Ryle while building a theory of mind goes to see the logical character of certain model sentences containing imaginations, perception, thought, emotion and so on. Therefore we can define Ryle's philosophy of mind as a theory of logical character of certain sentences. Thus Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind shows that mental concepts can be constructed as essentially behavioural. According to Ryle mind does not refer to any entity or substance. Ryle is against the Cartesian dualism and advocates that such a co-existing substance as mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body-machine. The mind is a myth. Throughout "The Concept of Mind", Ryle tried to explode the myth. But he is not negating the concept of mind. What he is negating are the idioms in which mind was conceived and
described by the dualists. Ryle has his own theory of mind. So in practical life we all use mind-involving concepts correctly. But Ryle wants to avoid the mystical account of the mind as given by the dualists, particularly by Descartes. Wittgenstein indicates that mind does not refer to any separate substance or entity. Thus there are outward criteria connected with mental processes. He says that if people only inwardly feel pain and shows no sign of them then the word pain would not be there in language.

Wittgenstein proceeds to examine those words of language which are generally supposed to refer to essentially 'private experiences'. Words like 'pain', 'itch', 'ache', 'anger', 'mood' and others are used to signify private experiences. It is believed that only I know my pain, others can only guess. Similarly I can never know certainly that somebody is in pain. Thus sensation and feeling words name and describe private experiences. G.E. Moore\textsuperscript{140} reports that in the early 1930's Wittgenstein accepted the popular view that sensation words describe 'primary experience'. He also maintained that both first person and third person words describe the same sensation. For example, The propositions "I have toothache" and "He has toothache" mean the same. But Wittgenstein realised soon that these propositions have different meanings. Wittgenstein gives another strong point is that: If 'pain' is the name of a sensation which I experience only in the privacy of my own consciousness, then I cannot even understand what it mean to say that another person has a pain. If the word "pain" only denotes for me, an item in my

\textsuperscript{140} Moore, G.E. "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33" reprinted in Philosophical Paper PP. 307-308.
consciousness, then 'pain' can exist only when I am aware of it. Wittgenstein believes that mind is real and mental states are logically connected with the behaviour of the human beings and what is true of "pain" is true of all mental predicates. Wittgenstein has neither denied the existence of sensations, feelings etc. nor has he formulated any theory about language. His claim is very modest, namely to describe the logical grammar of sensation - expressions. Wittgenstein introduces a powerful attack on the view that sensation word stand for private sensations by examining the possibility of a private language. The meaning of 'pain' and other sensation words is necessarily tied up with our private sensations. Consequently, the meaning of 'pain' is determined independently of pain behaviour and other publicly observable characteristics of the situation in which 'pain' is used. But a private language is an impossibility. Wittgenstein makes two observations in this connection. First, a man could not make himself understood when he used these words and secondly we cannot say that these words are names of sensations.

Like Wittgenstein, Ryle is also a constant supporter of ordinary language. Bertrand Russell while commenting on Ryle's "Concept of Mind" has criticised him for preferring the language of the 'uneducated people' and condemning the 'sophisticated language of the learned'. But Ryle in his book "The Concept of Mind" analyses mental concepts in order to show that ordinary language does not permit an existential conjunction between mind and body. According to him 'mind' and 'matter' are terms of different orders or categories. They cannot as such be legitimately conjoined or disjoined. For him, the conjunctive phrase 'body and
mind' is a meaningless phrase. Ryle asserts that the psychologists have committed a category mistake by describing mind in terms which are suitable only to the body. But it should be maintained here that though Ryle does not believe in the dualism between mind and body, yet he wants to make a categorical distinction between the mental and the physical. He strongly holds that there is a syntactical difference between the mental and the physical. According to Ryle, mental adjectives are terms of higher order or category. Therefore they cannot sensibly fit with the physical. Here he is talking about the logical category. But subsequently Ryle himself preferred not to take the term 'category' so seriously. In his "Dilemmas" Ryle says that he recommends it "not for the usual reason, namely that there exists an exact, professional way of using it, in which like a skeleton key, it will turn all our locks for us; but rather for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which, like a coal hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us." 141

According to Ryle, 'mind' and 'matter' when conjoined or disjoined make no sense. Mental and physical concepts are freely used together and they convey significant information to us. Ordinary language combines mental and physical terms in its descriptions and explanations of human behaviour. For Ryle, mental concepts always mean some externally recognisable behaviour. Ryle analyses the meaning of mental concepts in order to show that in actual use they do not refer to any ghostly entity called mind. His behaviouristic appraisal of such concepts enables him to say that they primarily mean some bodily behaviour, actual or

141 Ryle, Dilemmas, P. 9
possible. For example, 'Intelligence' for Ryle, is only a manner of doing things in certain ways. Similarly, 'anger', 'fear', 'joy' and the like mean only characteristic behaviour patterns. ‘Thinking’ means silent speech or soliloquy. It is simply saying in a certain frame of mind. Ryle identifies meaning with the method of verification. In his book “The Concept of Mind” we find a lot of examples in support of this thesis. For example, he explicates the meaning of ‘vanity’ (emptiness) in terms of certain behaviours, “namely to talk a lot about himself, to cleave to the society of the emiment, to reject criticisms, to seek the foot-lights and to disengage himself from conversations about the merits of others. We expect him also to indulge in reseate daydreams about his own successes, to avoid recalling past failures and to plan for his own advancement. To be vain is to tend to act in these and innumerable other kindred ways.” 142 Thus Ryle is certainly identifying the meaning of mental concepts with the method of their verification.

Ryle refutes the Cartesian theory of mind because he admits the 'mind' as a descriptive concept. Cartesians, explain the mind as an explanatory or causal concept. Whereas according to Ryle the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour lies in their description, according to the Cartesians, it lies in their causation. The Cartesians donot introduce their theory of mind in order to show how intelligent behaviours differ from non intelligent ones. They introduce mind to explain for such a difference. The Cartesian have advanced a theory of mind of their own. Ryle has attacked 'mind' as a cause theory. Following Wittgenstein’s dictum that philosophy can only describe linguistic usage, Ryle has

142. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, P.- 83-84
felt satisfied with descriptions alone. But descriptions cannot be a substitute for cause. Description and explanation are two different things concerning mind. Thus Ryle's and Wittgenstein's theories of mind cannot completely refute the cartesian theory of mind.

Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" arose logical positivism or logical empiricism and his "Philosophical Investigations" gave birth to a trend which is called 'ordinary language school'. Russell also said something very similar with Wittgenstein, "A logically perfect language would be very likely private to one speaker. That is to say, all names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker."143

Descartes' conception of Pure Ego is a mental substance capable of performing actions. Wittgenstein's self is more like Hume's bundle of perceptions which is not inside but outside the world of "objects" and is incapable of transforming the 'world of experience'.

In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein rejected the solipsist position because he realised that the problems posed by contemporary natural sciences cannot be coped with by a solipsist doctrine. But both in the "Tractatus" and in the "Philosophical Investigations" he advocated that philosophy is confined to language. Wittgenstein's philosophy is not concerned with reality as a whole or the relation of man and nature or with ethical or aesthetic values, etc., but it simply describes the uses of words. He holds, "We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away

143. Russell, Our knowledge of the External World, P. - 198
with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its power of illumination - i.e. its purpose from the philosophical problems."\(^{144}\). But how does language create problems in philosophy? In this context Wittgenstein says, "Language (or thought) is something unique" - this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the problems".\(^{145}\) For Wittgenstein in the "Philosophical Investigations" the job of philosophy is not even to interpret or analyse language but "leave everything as it is". In fact, according to him, there is nothing to explain: "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain."\(^{146}\) Thus in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein held that philosophy does not propound any doctrine nor does it offer any fresh information. It has nothing new to say-philosophising is an activity which follows a technique of describing functions of words with a view to dissolve philosophical problems. Here his position is that the method of philosophy is not analysis but only description of various uses of expressions of our day-to-day ordinary language. Criticising analysis as a method, here he held that in our ordinary day-to-day language there is nothing which can be regarded as simple or complex. What is simple from one point of view may be complex from another point of view.

Wittgenstein also rejected his earlier view of the "Tractatus" that ordinary language hides the real form of the propositions and that this real form is revealed

\(^{144}\) Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, Section 109., P-47
\(^{145}\) Ibid Sec-110, P-47
\(^{146}\) Ibid, Sec. 126, P-50
through analysis. In the "Philosophical Investigations" he denied the form itself. He said "We see that what we call 'sentence' and 'language' have not the formal unity that I imagined, but are families of structures more or less related to one another."\textsuperscript{147} Here Wittgenstein did not deny the hidden in the domain of existents. But he denied the concept of essence or the universal common something in the domain of language. In the "Tractatus" he had maintained that the essence of language is the analysed perfect language where there is one-to-one relationship between the form of the perfect language and the form of the fact. It is the essence of language which Wittgenstein rejected in the "Philosophical Investigations". Here he rejected that language has only one functions, i.e. describing "atomic facts", and advocated that there are multiple ways in which language functions. Wittgenstein realised that knowledge must include a content and goes beyond the use of symbols which stand for "immediate objects of experience." To achieve this he formulated another method of interpreting the concept of meaning. This is known as the "use theory of meaning". Wittgenstein writes, "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice."\textsuperscript{148} Thus the use theory of meaning has a significant role in his philosophy of mind. He held that the meaning of an expression is determined by the way in which an expression is actually used in a specific context.

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  \item In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein maintained that language
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\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, Sec. 108, P-46
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, Sec. 340, P-109
cannot be private. According to him, just as the playing of a game is a "public affair because rules cannot be learnt and obeyed "privately", so also language cannot be learned and used "privately." "Private language" as a "technical" philosophical concept, means a language which cannot be understood by anyone except the person who makes use of it. In the "Philosophical Investigations", he rejected the possibility of "private language". We also find that the subjectivity of the "Tractatus" is replaced by a complete denial of subjectivity in the "Philosophical Investigations" because here he presented an objective criterion of meanings. Wittgenstein said, "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique". 149 The technique is to know how to use a word in its proper context. But a question may arise, what is the proper-context? The proper context, according to the "Philosophical Investigations", is not any inner mental experience (the position in the Tractatus) but the social behaviour of mankind. This criterion applies both to the known and inner experience. Wittgenstein held that on the basis of behaviour the unknown language is interpreted. In this reference, he wrote, "The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" 150

In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein advocated behaviourism. There he says that understanding and learning the "meaning" of a word is not a mental act, but consists of understanding a pattern of behaviour. And Wittgenstein interpreted in behavioural terms not only the concept of meaning but even mental

149. Ibid, Sec. 199, P-81
150. Ibid, Sec. 206, P-82
concepts like "pain". Within the framework of behaviourism, he argued that our mental concepts do not refer to the conscious, subjective status. Therefore, all mental concepts are reducible to a collection of behavioural patterns. A mental concept like 'pain' is not a "name" of an inner phenomenon but refers to "publicly" observable situation. This is so because rules cannot be "Privately obeyed because obeying a rule, implied that one is doing the thing correctly. Logically, doing things right implies the possibility of doing them wrong as well. Therefore, one can know whether one is right or wrong only through a public check - when one goes wrong others correct him. And if there is no public check one would not know whether one has obeyed the rules or not. Moreover, since there cannot be any language without rules, therefore logically there cannot be a language denoting inner experiences. Therefore according to Wittgenstein the mental concept like mind cannot be private. But it is a public affair.

Wittgenstein used his arguments against the possibility of a "private language" to prove that mental concepts are equivalent to a collection of behavioural pattern. In this regard Wittgenstein writes, "If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula', it is particular circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go on -- when the formula occurs to me. Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all. For, that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, 'Now I know how to go on' .... In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental
Regarding the assumption that body and mind are two absolutely separate entities, Wittgenstein in the "Philosophical Investigations" denied the existence of mind and accepted the existence of body only which is known as behaviourism. But this position of Wittgenstein is one-sided, and, consequently, they are metaphysical. By metaphysics here is meant taking an aspect of reality and absolutizing it. Wittgenstein, due to his metaphysical approach, failed to grasp the dialectical relation of body (matter) and mind. It should be mentioned here that Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy in the "Philosophical Investigations", actually propounded vulgar materialism. Moreover, Wittgenstein erroneously deduced that all mental concepts are reducible to patterns of behaviour. But he failed to comprehend the fact that being human implies conscious being. And it is consciousness which precisely distinguishes man from nature. Consciousness evolves out of the interaction of man and nature and man and man. Therefore, consciousness which is the subjective side of man cannot be identified with bodily behaviour. Language itself belongs to the conscious activity of man.

Here we may ask the question: What is mind? Wittgenstein argued that because of a certain "Picture" of language we had formed, we wrongly apply the rules of one language game to another. He said, "Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit." According to Wittgenstein, in this instance we use the model of the "nameing" of objects by

151. Ibid, Sec, 154, P-60-61
152. Ibid, Sec. 36, P-18
pointing out to the language of mental phenomena. Thus, he argued, when we cannot perceive anything outside ourselves in the world we assume that these mental activities exist inwardly. In this way, in Wittgenstein's view, the problem of mind arises because of regarding the mental activities to be analogous to physical phenomena. Gilbert Ryle in his book "The Concept of Mind" called the above misuse of language as "category-mistake". Ryle admits that the dualists confuse the category of mind with the category of body. The dualist forgets that 'mind' and 'body' are terms of different categories. Mind is just the way of the human body and its brain function. Thus, according to Ryle, a dualist makes a big category mistake by confusing the terms of different types to be terms of the same type. Ryle admits that mind and body are terms of two distinct types or categories. He makes it clear that mind and body both exist. But they do not exist in the same sense. The Cartesian dualism took them as existing in the same sense. According to it, mind and body were both substances existing together in a human body, having their own functions. Ryle is against this type of dualism, and advocates forcefully that such a co-existing substance as mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost, and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body-machine. This mind is a myth. Throughout his book "The Concept of Mind" Ryle has tried to explode this myth. According to him, mind is nothing but behaviour of certain sorts. He explains psychological terms as behaviours or dispositions to behaviour. It is not a fact that bodily behaviours are caused by mind. They are occasioned by dispositions or tendencies. Thus Ryle admits that mind is a
dispositional behaviour. Mind-involving concepts mean tendencies leading to behaviour in appropriate circumstances. As behaviour it is nothing secret. It is open and public. By observing our own behaviour, we can have a look into our own minds. By observing the behaviour of others, we can have a look into their minds. There is an open access into the minds of others as well as of our own selves. Ryle, throughout his book on mind wants to establish the fact that mind as behaviour is public, not private.

Thus both Ryle and Wittgenstein advocate behaviourism. Behaviourism is the doctrine which holds that the mind and all mental phenomena are ultimately reducible to some observable or recordable physiological reactions. Ryle's dispositional behaviourism is also called as analytical behaviourism because the analyst here does not deny the nature of mind, but denies the status given to it by the traditional philosophers. It does not say that there is no mind. It only says that whatever one can say about mind or the mental, one can legitimately say in terms of the actually observed and observable behaviour. Analytical behaviourism is an attempt to explain mind and the mental in terms of dispositions, where dispositions would mean to behave and to be capable of behaving in a particular way and not dispositions to reflect on one's behaviour. C. A Mace points out that analytical behaviourism gives an extended meaning of the term 'behaviour' in such a way as to include mental epithets which otherwise would embarrass him. Thus the analytical behaviourist while maintaining the reality of mental experiences, denies the causal explanation accorded to them by Descartes' mind-body dualism.
Thus the philosophical behaviourism of Ryle and Wittgenstein hold that the cartesian conception of mind errs in a fundamental way. Minds are not entities and mental episodes are not private goings on inside such entities. We are attracted to the Cartesian picture only because we are misled by what Wittgenstein calls the grammar of our language. Both Ryle and Wittgenstein were linguistic philosophers. Wittgenstein says that philosophical problems arise “When language goes on holiday.” Ryle supports this point of Wittgenstein. He says that minds are kinds of entity amounts to a “Category mistake”, “It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category . . when they actually belong to another.”153 Ryle says that minds are not entities at all, ghostly or otherwise. But he says that an analogous mistake encourages Cartesian dualism. We begin with the idea that minds are entities, distinct from, but similar to brains or bodies. When we have trouble locating such entities in the material world, we assume that they must be non-material. In this regard Ryle says, “The theoretically interesting category mistakes are those made by people who are perfectly competent to apply concepts, at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they donot belong.”154

An example of Wittgenstein, regarding this analogous mistake, makes us clear. Wittgenstein says that suppose you look into the cab of a locomotive (or thecockpit of a Jetliner). You see levers, knobs, buttoms and switches. Each of these operates in a particular way and each has a particular function in the locomotive’s

153. Ryle -The Concept of Mind, P. 17
154. Ibid, P.- 19
operation. We should be misled if we assumed that levers or knobs with similar shapes had similar functions. In the same way, the fact that “mind” is a substantive noun or that we speak of “states of mind” should not lead us to assume that “mind” functions to designate a particular entity and that states of mind are states of this entity. Thus Ryle’s contention is that it is a mistake to regard our possessing a mind as a matter of our body’s standing in a particular relation to a distinct entity. And Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that terms used to ascribe states of mind are not used to designate objects of some definite sort. Both of these ideas are independent of the behaviourist’ analytical project, and both survive in accounts of the mind that are self-consciously anti-behaviourist. Thus one might suppose that to have a mind in just to possess a particular sort of organization. And one might imagine that to possess a given state of mind is just to be in some state or other that contributes in a characteristic way to the operation of this organized system. But one point should be maintained here that both Ryle and Wittgenstein were anti-dualistic philosophers and they admit no room for inherent privacy in the life of an individual. According to them, mind is inherently open or public and mental phenomena are public affairs. Ryle thinks that pleasure and pain are not anything beyond physical behaviour. Enjoying digging is not digging plus enjoying. Certain ways of digging are themselves enjoying. Similarly pain in some such visible behaviour as groaning, screaming, shouting and the rest. By logically analysing the meaning of mind involving sentences. Ryle comes to maintain that mind is only a manner or a style or a way of behaviour. He classifies mind-sentences into
three distinct logical types. They are the categorical, the hypothetial and the semi-hypothetical or mongrel-categorical. According to Ryle, none of these types meaningfully refers to any ghostly entity.

But whether or not Ryle and Wittgenstein are behaviourists, they are certainly 'linguistic philosophers'. They uses logic and facts about language to solve philosophical problems. Linguistic analysis and Rylean behaviourism were the dominant trends in English and American philosophy. Wittgenstein often says that language creates philosophical problems. He says that philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. Some commentators take this dictum as embodying the whole of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. But in fact Wittgenstein's later books do not appear to be based on the dictum that language as such is the only cause of philosophical problems. Rather, it is the interplay between language and life. Philosophical understanding must include an understanding of 'forms' or 'patterns' of life. Words and sentences are to be distinguished from each other by their use. Wittgenstein also examines common notions such as understanding, knowing, believing, pretending, dreaming, hating, anger, expectation, remembering, hoping, meaning, perceiving. He also investigates less common notions such as 'the feeling that everything is unreal'. He discusses the experience of seeing a picture or diagram first as representing one thing then as representing another, to which experience he gives the level 'seeing as'. Wittgenstein often asks the question: How do we as children learn what anger is?, what hope is?, what dreaming is? etc. The overall answer of these questions
is that by having our spontaneous non verbal reactions gradually fitted into a linguistic schema by adults, who do this without thinking; and also by our spontaneously imitating the behaviour of adults. But he says, by behaviour he means behaviour in context. 'For words have meaning only in the stream of life.' Some interpreters admit that Ryle's well-known book "The Concept of Mind" is a prime example of linguistic and even Wittgensteinian philosophy. Ryle is interested in solving philosophical problems through an analysis of language. Ryle argues that the supposition that there are special non-material mental events and actions which take place in a non-material substance is 'an unfortunate linguistic fashion' which traditionally belongs to the two-worlds story, the story that some things exist or occur "in the physical world", while other things exist and occur in another metaphorical place. He goes to analyse a large number of psychological notions with the aim of showing that mental items are neither substances nor events. The analyses are intended to show that psychological concepts really fall into one or other of three entirely different categories. These are: dispositions, adverbial concepts, and achievements. Dispositions include tendencies, abilities, capacities and habits. Several features distinguish dispositions from actions. According to Ryle, states such as knowing, believing, wishing, hoping, fearing, are not deeds but dispositions. Any dispositional account of the mind will be incompatible with Cartesian dualism, because according to Descartes the mind is not a disposition; it is known directly and not via manifestations. But we should maintain here that many objections have been raised against Ryle's account of mental notions. Some of these objections misfire. It is commonly said of him that he tried to analyse all
mental concepts in terms of dispositions, which is plainly not true. But what is the relationship between statements about behaviour and statements about mental states? This is a question which Ryle never really answers. He often appears to be analysing the latter in terms of the former, yet he also speaks of feelings and consciousness as if they can exist independently of bodily behaviour.

Wittgenstein further argues that human consciousness cannot be separated from its embodied appearance and, that human consciousness in inconceivable apart from a predominantly human form. In his view, the relationship between mental and bodily states is not contingent but conceptual, the attribution of mental state is logically related to the behaviour of a certain sort of corporeal being. He hereby means to say that mental processes cannot be identified until there are outward criteria connected with them. Wittgenstein says that if people only inwardly feel pain and show no sign of them, the word pain would not be there in language. He wants to show that the idea of the inner arises for a "grammatical mistake" and these are elaborate of the misunderstanding of the language in which we talk about the mental activities. Ryle calls this mistake as "category mistake". But we must admit the point that both Ryle and Wittgenstein want to demystify the Cartesian concept of mind. They advocate the analytical behaviourism. They prefer to deal with the ordinary language. The mental phenomena, according to both of them are public and not private and there is not any ghostly entity. Again Wittgenstein's dictum that an inner process stands in need of outward criteria could be taken as the guiding principle of Ryle's attack upon 'the ghost in the machine'.