CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF EMOTION

The nature of emotion plays a significant role in guiding and directing our behaviour. Philosophers and psychologists discuss the nature of emotion. Etymologically, the word emotion is derived from the Latin word 'emovere' which means 'to stir up' or 'to excite'. Thus emotion can be understood as an agitated or excited state of our mind and body. According to the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Psychology, "Emotion is a total state of consciousness considered as involving a distinctive feeling-tone and a characteristic trend of activity aroused by a certain situation which is either perceived or ideally represented". Emotions play a key role in providing a particular direction to our behaviour and thus shaping our personality according to their development.

Philosophers and psychologists debated the nature of emotions. Different philosophers at different times give the different conceptions of the nature of emotion. Plato and Aristotle argued about the nature of emotion. Aristotle discussed emotion in the Rhetoric, in De Anima, and in his Nicomachean Ethics in which correct emotion is regarded as equivalent to a large part of virtue. In De 'Anima' Aristotle characterized the human 'Soul' or 'Psyche' which is best translated as "Life Principle." Thus according to him, plants have souls because they grow and reproduce and animals have also souls because they can feel move and desire.

Like Plato, Aristotle divides the human soul into a rational and an irrational part.

---

55 Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Psychology, edited by James Mark Baldwin, vol II
But unlike Plato, Aristotle doesn't make a sharp division between the two parts. He argues that they necessarily form an unity. Emotion involves a cognitive element including beliefs and expectations about one's situation as well as physical sensations.

Aristotle recognizes that emotions can be used in varying degrees of complexity. In "Nicomachean Ethics", Aristotle argues that virtue (e.g. courage and generosity) is largely a matter of feeling the right thing. Thus the courageous individual is neither fearless nor overwhelmed by fear in a dangerous situation. Aristotle admits that we can mold our emotions through education and habit. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that many emotions is strong moral belief about how others should behave. Aristotle mentioned 'On the Soul' that most of the soul's conditions anger, courage, desire and any sensation - neither act nor are activated without the body. The act of thinking perhaps belongs to the soul alone, but if even this thinking happens to be some sort of imagination or connected with imagination then it too, can belong to the body as well as the soul. Apparently all the conditions of the soul are connected with the body including anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, hating etc. In the 'Nicomachean Ethics' Aristotle said that the analysing states connected with anger, mildness is a mean between the extremes. The middle emotion has actually no name, as is almost true for the extremes. Aristotle in his Ethics, insists that the 'good man' should feel the right emotions at the right times and not feel the wrong ones.

Rene Descartes advanced a theory of 'passions' as part of his overall theory
of mind and body, with the emotions occupying an awkward middle position. The key to Descartes' theory of emotion is his metaphysical distinction between two kinds of substance—mental and physical. He said that the mind is 'unextended substance', defined by its properties of thought and free-will. On the other hand, bodies are extended in space and subject to the mechanical laws of physics.

Descartes was a follower of the feeling theory of emotions. Descartes' account of the emotions or passions is contained in his work the passions of the soul, parts I and II. Passion is the reflective awareness of the commotions going on in the body. For Descartes, emotions are passive or passions. For him, distinguishing the emotions become a matter of distinguishing the different external objects or different internal temperaments of the body. Emotion is like an epiphenomenon to the basic causal nexus from perception to bodily reaction and purposive action. The dualistic view of mind and body raises special problems in emotions. Descartes thinks of emotions as feelings of physical agitation and excitement. He thinks of emotions as sensations. His theory of emotion sets the stage for many later theories such as Hume's (part-I) and James' (part-II), which treat emotions as nothing but sensations of agitation. But Descartes doesn't confine himself to this physiological analysis of emotion. He also describes emotions in straightforward mentalistic language, speaking of the perceptions, desires and beliefs associated with different emotions. In recognizing the conceptual dimension of emotions, Descartes appears to be struggling toward a more cognitive picture of emotions, a picture characteristic of many contemporary theories of emotion.
Descartes listed six basic emotions such as wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. He said that all other emotions are composed of these six basic emotions.

The Scottish philosopher David Hume gave a particularly sophisticated account of emotions in his theory of human nature. In his book 'A Treatise of Human Nature', Hume defended a radically skeptical view of human knowledge. Hume is best known for his work on moral sentiments. But his theory of moral sentiments fits within a general theory and classification of emotions. His work "Of the Passions" is devoted to his theory of emotion.

Following Descartes' footsteps Hume defines emotion as varying degrees of physical and mental agitation. For Hume, passions are impressions and reflection, unique kinds of experience which arise as a result of sense perceptions (including sensations of pleasure and pain) and thoughts. Hume tells us that the emotions or passions are 'secondary or reflective impressions' or imprints on the soul which proceed from some of these original ones. Emotions or passions are second-order impressions. They can be divided into two kinds 'the calm and the violent.' Calm emotions are the aesthetic ones, the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition and external objects. But the violent emotions are the passions proper and include 'love and hatred', grief and joy pride and humility, though he warns us that these so-called emotions 'may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become in a manner imperceptions'.

Direct passions, such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security result from the direct association of pleasure and pain, good and evil

56. Hume, David- Of Passions, P. - 276
with some aspect or quality of some object. Indirect passions, such as pride, humility, ambition, vanity love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity arise in a more complicated matter. They result from associating in a special way some pleasure or pain, which results from some particular quality of some object with some quality of some other object. It is in connection with these indirect passions or emotions that Hume is able to point out that the object of the passions often differs from its cause.

Thus Hume's theory of emotions (part-I) clearly illustrates a pure sensation theory. Unlike physiological theorists Hume ignores the physiological attendants of emotion. In his view, emotions differ from physical pains and pleasures because emotions need not be accompanied by definite, localizable physical sensations. Emotions have a characteristic feel. They are sensations and we may distinguish one emotion from another in part by determining how it feels. Hume introduced the phenomenon of intentionality into modern discussions and pointed out the awkward relationship between an emotion and its intentional object, and the difference between the object and the psychological cause of the emotion. Hume insisted that emotion, not reason was the heart of ethics.

Thus according to the traditional philosophers emotions are internal or private experiences. They are the internal processes taking place in one's secret mental world. As opposed to this traditional view of emotion, Ryle holds a dispositional account of emotion, according to which emotions cannot be the feelings of the internal mental world, but they are the reasons of predicting the overt behaviour.
Anthony Kenny in his book "Action, Emotion and Will" gives a philosophical account of emotion. He criticises the traditional view of emotion that emotions are purely private mental events. On the other hand, he holds that emotions are not internal impressions or purely private mental events. According to him, sensations, feelings and experiences are not internal impressions or purely private mental events. He holds that emotions are feelings or at least are sometimes feelings.

The difference between sensations and emotions is that emotions are not localised whereas sensations are localised. Any pattern is accidental to a sensation, while some pattern is essential to an emotion. Kenny says that an emotion has a characteristic history behind it. But it is not essential for a sensation or feeling to have a characteristic history. Moreover, emotions unlike sensations are essentially directed towards objects. There must be an object for an emotion. It is not that the object of emotion has to be a physical object only. It can even be non-physical. However, there is a difference between object and causes of emotion.

In his book, by the object of emotion Kenny means "The sense of 'object' which I have hitherto employed and wish now to discuss is one which derives from the grammatical notion of the object of a transitive verb. The object of love is what is loved, the object of cutting is what is cut, the object of heating is what is heated. In discussing the nature of objects we are simply discussing the logical role of the object - expressions which complete the sense of intentional and non-intentional verbs." 57

_______

However, I think that having of an object is not an isolated fact about emotion. That is emotions do not differ from sensations or feelings only in the sense that emotions have objects whereas sensations or feelings do not.

Kenny criticises Hume's view that the relation between an emotion and an object is a causal one. Hume wants to say that the connection between pride and the object of pride is contingent and not apriori. He makes a distinction between the object and the cause of an emotion and then holds that the relation between an emotion and an object is a contingent one.

Now let us discuss the psychological conception of emotions. The nature of emotion will be incomplete without Sigmund Freud's analysis of emotion. Actually, Freud did not develop a theory of emotion. But his psycho-analytical theories radically changed the whole idea of emotions and sorts of phenomena that theories of emotion are supposed to explain. With his concept of "The unconscious", Freud react our entire "topography" of the mind. According to him mental events, including emotions were no longer assumed to be "in consciousness" they could also undergo a variety of dynamically caused "vicissitudes", which sometimes prevented us from being aware of them. In all of Freud's theories of the mind, there were the same assumptions: the ultimate cause of the emotion is "psychic energy". There are unconscious processes of which a person may not or cannot be aware; the mind is separated into different parts of "agencies" which came into conflict; and infantile experiences, especially those of a sexual nature, profoundly influence adult behaviour and psychology. In the first part of his career, Freud divided the
mind into three components, which he sometimes described as "chambers". There is the conscious, a pre-conscious, which can emerge into consciousness at any time, and the unconscious which cannot become conscious because of repression. After 1923, Freud developed his view of the mind, dividing it into the Id (the source of instincts), the Ego (the rational self) and the Superego (the internationalization of the rules and restrictions learned from one's parents and other authorities). But in both theories, the notion of unconscious emotions played an important but ambiguous role.

In fact Frued never develops an adequate or consistent view of emotions and the unconscious. He often referred to emotions as "affects" by which he usually meant a sensation, a "felt feeling" or "the conscious subjective aspect of an emotion"; as such he denied that an emotion can be unconscious. But throughout his career, he referred without hesitation to such emotions as "repressed hostility". Thus Freud ambiguously describes an emotion as just a "feeling tone" or as a complex that includes not only a feeling (an affect), but also an instinct that motivates it and an idea that directs it towards an object. From Frued's analysis of emotion the following nature of emotion can be derived-

I. An emotion is itself an instinct or an innate drive which is essentially unconscious.

II. An emotion is an instinct plus an idea - a drive from within the unconscious, but aimed at a conscious object. In this analysis, an emotion becomes unconscious when the idea is separated from its instinct, so that one might experience it without
knowing how and why.

III. An emotion is just an effect or feeling or what William James called an 'epiphenomenon', a by-product of the processes of the mind. In this analysis, an emotion cannot be unconscious, although its causes may be.

Thus the nature of emotions play a large role in human experience and behaviour. There are certain emotion terms such as fear, anger, indignation, remorse, embarrassment, grief, distress, joy, craving, disgust etc. Emotions are what are designated by such terms in some of their use. We must distinguish an emotion as a kind of temporary state of a person from more or less long-term dispositions to various states, including emotional states, and activities. Such dispositions include:

I. Attitudes toward particular objects admiration, contempt, gratitude, resentment, jealousy, hate, sympathy.

II. Dispositions to act and feel in certain ways toward objects of certain kinds under certain kinds of circumstances, generosity, friendliness, benevolence, humility etc.

III. Dispositions include liabilities to emotional states irritability, excitableness, fearlessness, etc.

The psychological factors of all these three sorts can be mentioned under the heading of 'emotion' or 'passion'. Many emotion-terms can be used to designate dispositions as well as temporary emotional states. Emotional attitudes like hate and gratitude constitute an important and complicated problem of analysis.
According to many thinkers, the following factors are essential for emotion -

I. A cognition of something as in some way desirable or undesirable

II. Feelings of certain kinds

III. Marked bodily sensations of certain kinds.

IV. Involuntary bodily processes and overt expressions of certain kinds.

V. Tendencies to act in certain ways.

VI. An upset or disturbed condition of mind or body.

Thus emotion is not a simple or primary state of consciousness, but is a compound state of mind. It is generally said that emotion is made up by the interaction of two aspects of the self - desire and intellect. The play of intellect on desire gives birth to emotion, and shows some of the characteristics of its father, Intellect, as well as of its mother, Desire. A continuing desire for union which the same object becomes an emotion. Emotions do not form a mere jungle, but that all spring from one root, dividing into two main stems, each of these again sub-dividing into branches. This fruitful idea, is due to an Indian author, Bhagawan Das, who has for the first time introduced order into this confused region of consciousness.

Students of psychology will find in his science of the emotions a lucid treatise setting forth this scheme which reduces the chaos of the emotions into a cosmos and shapes therein an ordered morality. Thus the nature of emotion is important for both philosophy and psychology.

William James offers the physiological theory of emotion. His account of emotion is contained in his classic "Principles of Psychology" vol. II chapter XXV.
James argues that the feel of emotion, which equals the emotion itself, is, in fact, nothing but the perception of these physiological disturbances. James asks us to imagine what an emotion would be like if we remove from it all feeling of agitation, clamminess, trembling, flushing etc. Physiological disturbances do not seem to be necessary to what philosophers call "dispositional" emotions. That is, we sometimes ascribe emotions to ourselves without implying that at each moment we are actually feeling or experiencing the emotion. James also said that emotions must be clearly distinguished from instincts to behave in certain ways. The core of his theory of emotion is that 'bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. For James, emotions are really just internal bodily sensations that is the feelings or subjective sensible aspects of physiological occurrences caused by perceptions. Ordinarily, says James, Sensation is 'an object simply apprehended, emotion is an object emotionally felt.' (James 1890, p. 474). With James, Gilbert Ryle is prone to believe that feeling refers to bodily sensations. There is nothing secret or mysterious about it.

Anthony Kenny in his book "Action, Emotion and Will" holds that William James identified the emotions not with bodily processes themselves but with the perceptions of these processes. For James the emotions are states so private that the conclusive verification of his theory can come only from introspection. In order to account for the great variety of emotional states, James insisted that there was hardly any limit to the permutation and combinations of possible minute
bodily changes. Moreover, he had to claim, "The every one of the bodily changes whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs." Here a question arises - What is the criterion for the occurrence of such a feeling minute bodily change? If it is the non-verbal behaviour of the subject, then it must be his display of emotion. But if so, then James is merely renaming the emotions "perceptions of bodily changes" and his theory has no explanatory force. If the criterion is the verbal behaviour of the subject then the theory of James is obviously false. One of the bodily changes in fear is the increases secretion of the adrenal glands. On James theory, fear consists partly in the perception and of secretion. But people felt fear long before the adrenals and if now-a-days we can sometimes infer the state of our adrenals from the state of our feelings, we infer the secretion from the fear, not the fear from the secretion. In fact, James suggests no criterion. The feeling of a bodily change is clearly for him an internal impression, which carries its specification on its face. In support of his theory James suggests that it is impossible to have any strong emotion without having the appropriate bodily sensations. But if this is true, no one proves that an emotion is identical with bodily sensations.

J.B. Watson, the founder of "Behaviourist Psychology" was one of the notable exponent of the theory of emotion. In his book "Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist", he writes the following: "Psychology is that division of natural science which takes human activity and conduct as its subject matter. It attempts to formulate through systematic observation and experimentation the
laws and principles which underlie man’s reactions.” 58 Watson placed the emotions among those behaviour patterns which he believed were inherited rather than acquired and the desired to establish this by conducting experiments on newly born babies. According to Watson, “An emotion is an hereditary ‘pattern - reaction’ involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems”. 59

Here by pattern reaction we mean that the separate details of response appear with some constancy, with some regularity and in approximately the same sequential order each time the exciting stimulus is presented. Thus an emotion differs from an instinctive reaction in that ‘when the adjustments called out by the stimulus are internal and confined to the subjects body, we have emotion, e.g. blushing; on the other hand when the stimulus leads to adjustment of the organism as a whole to objects, we have instinct, for example, defense responses, grasping etc.

But Watson’s behaviourist account becomes self-refuting. Watson has told us that an emotion is ‘pattern - reaction’, chiefly of physiological changes, which is found in its unadulterated form only in the new - born child, but it is difficult to get clear evidence of this emotions.

There are two difficulties about accepting Watson’s account of emotions. The first concerns the description of the response itself. There are many adult expressions of fear and love which correspond in no detail to the behaviour...
described by Watson. An executive who drops into a pillar-box a cheque to a
blackmailer and a love-letter to his mistress is performing at the same time two
actions, one out of fear and one out of love; yet he need not be crying, starting,
smiling, holding his breath, cooling, gurgling or suffering visceral commotions and
indeed he can hardly be doing all these things at the same time. The adult behaviour
is not merely 'an addition and modification to the infant pattern described. It is
considered just as a piece of behaviour, a totally different response. Watson admits
that the stimuli in the adult case may be very dissimilar to the unconditioned stimuli.
But where stimulus and response are both totally different, what grounds have we
for talking of the same behaviour pattern at all? Watson does indeed feel misgivings.

B.F. Skinner, another psychologist also offers the behavioural analysis of
emotion. In his most theoretical book 'About Behaviourism', Skinner tells us
"The environment performs the functions previously assigned to feelings and
introspectively observed inner states of the organism", and 'what an organism
does will eventually be seen to be due to what it is, at the moment it behaves, and
the physiologist will some day give us all the details." 60 In other words the
explanation of behaviours is to be found in terms of two factors alone, physiology
and the environment or external stimulus. But Skinner's behaviourism in the area
of emotions differs from Watson's account. Skinner looks not to physiological
changes and reflex behaviour for the pattern reactions which are the emotions.
But he operates behaviour.

60.  Skinner: About Behaviourism, 1974, PP-248-9
But it should be maintained here that both the psychological behaviourists like John Watson and B.F. Skinner as well as philosophical behaviourists like Gilbert Ryle flee from the idea that behaviour merely expresses or signals some inner private emotional phenomenon. They argued that instead that behaviour and the disposition to behave actually constitute the emotion itself. In “The Concept of Mind” Ryle argues that all mental terms (e.g. ‘feels angry,’ ‘believes’, ‘suspects’) can be defined solely in terms of behaviour and that all ascriptions of mental states or events to ourselves and other can be fully justified by appeal to a person’s behaviour or disposition to behave in characteristic ways. This means that because mental terms refer to behaviour and dispositions to behave, mental states and events, including emotions, are no more private than physical states. Thus Ryle admits emotions as physical states.

Thus emotions typically involve a ‘perturbation’, ‘disturbance’ or ‘agitation’ of person. Physiological studies have revealed certain disturbances in normal bodily functioning as regular features of emotional states. These include increased adrenaline secretion, increased heartbeat, alternation of the distribution of blood to various parts of the body, changes in the pattern of respiration, suspension of digestive activities and increases in red corpuscles in the blood. These changes are manifested in the involuntary overt expressions of emotion Ryle takes it as a criterion of what he calls ‘agitations’. A person can be too grief-stricken to think about what he is doing, too overjoyed to concentrate on his work, or too frightened to notice what is happening around him. Psychologists seeking an objective criterion
for the term emotion have tended to identify emotion with bodily states which are
disturbances in this double sense. Thus "Emotion is activity and reactivity of the
tissues and organs innervated by the automatic nervous systems." 61

Thus we find different conceptions of emotions given by different
philosophers and psychologists. From these definitions of emotion we can derive
that emotion, is an experience of turbulences going on in the private stream of
consciousness. Due to certain situations in the environment the normally of the
internal stream of consciousness is disturbed. The feeling or experiencing of this
disturbance is called emotion. So, according to the traditional philosophers emotion
is necessarily connected with a ghostly world of mind where turbulences are said
to occur. But Gilbert Ryle rejects this explanation of emotion.

Now let us explain Ryle's analysis of emotion from his book "The Concept
of Mind". People are said to be in emotional states when they are inclined to act in
certain ways as well as when they act in particular disturbed states of mind. Gilbert
Ryle offers a dispositional account of emotion. He says that the word 'emotion' is
used in two quite different senses in which we experience people's behaviour by
reference to emotions. In the first sense we are referring to the motives or
inclinations from which intelligent actions are done. In the second sense we are
referring to moods, including the agitations of which some aimless movements
are signs. In neither of these senses we are asserting that the overt behaviour is
the effect of a felt turbulence in the agents stream of consciousness. In the third

61 Morion A. Wenger, as quoted in Robert Plutchik, The Emotions: Fact,
Theories and a New Model, P 175)
sense of emotion, pangs and twinges are feelings or emotions, but they are not things by reference to which we explain behaviour. In this regard Ryle says, "Inclinations and moods, including agitations aren't occurrences and don't therefore take place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts or states. They are, however, propensities of different kinds and their differences are important. Feelings, on the other hand, are occurrences, but the place that mention of them should take in descriptions of human behaviour is very different from that which the standard theories accord to it."  

Ryle makes a list of senses in which the term emotion is used. He explains these words one by one and shows that none of them has any reference to a ghostly world. The words thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings, shocks etc. are feeling words. People ordinarily report the occurrence of a feeling by the phrase, 'a throb of compassion', 'a shock of surprise', 'a thrill of anticipation' and so on. Ryle says that it is an important linguistic fact that the names for specific feelings such as 'itch', 'qualm' and 'pang' are also used as names of specific bodily sensations. If someone says that he has just felt a twinge, it is proper to ask whether it was a twinge of remorse or of rheumatism, though the word 'twinge' isnot used in the same sense in both of the contexts. Similarly, qualms of apprehension are analogous to qualms of sea-sickness. The various feelings are located in the whole body. The feeling of despair can be located in the pit of the stomach. The feeling of anger may be located in muscles of the jaw and the fist.

---

---
Those which cannot be so located pervade the whole body. So, like William James, Ryle also believes that feeling refers to bodily sensations. There cannot be any secret or mysterious about it. Thus according to Ryle emotion cannot be any mental phenomenon. It is a physiological or bodily phenomenon of our life. Emotions refer to bodily sensations.

The theorists confuse that motive terms are names of internal experience as emotion. By emotion they explain people's higher level behaviour. Here we may take the term 'vanity' for example. The theorists believe that there is a feeling of vanity in us. When a man is described as vain, considerate, avaricious, patriotic, or indolent, an explanation is necessary of why he conducts his actions daydreams and thoughts in the way he does and these words act as species of emotions or feelings. The specific feeling of vanity causes the outward behaviour of boasting, day dreaming etc. Thus the theorists admit emotion as internal feeling and it directs our outward behaviour. But Ryle rejects this idea of emotion given by the theorists. According to him, here vanity means nothing more than a muddle and confusion. 'Vanity' means tendencies or propensities to act in certain ways in certain circumstances. It is a motive word. All motive words are again names of propensities or dispositions. Ryle holds, "Motive words used in this way signify tendencies or propensities and therefore cannot signify the occurrence of feelings. They are elliptical expressions of general hypothetical propositions of a certain sort, and cannot be construed as expressing categorical narratives of episodes".  

63 Ibid, P - 83.
'Vanity' signifies a 'disposition'. The tendency of vanity actualises in the various acts of boasting. It is not the register of a feeling. We don't feel the thrills or twinges of a vanity. The vain man would have been first to know how vain he was. Moreover, it becomes almost a habit with the vain man to boast. But habit is not an internal event or process. Therefore, vanity is a disposition and as disposition it cannot be an occurrence because no disposition is an occurrence. So, vanity cannot be felt as occurring internally. Similarly, patriotism is not a feeling. It is a disposition to behave in certain ways. Thus Ryle believes that motive words don't refer to internal feeling and it cannot be emotion in the traditional sense which refers emotion as only internal experience of mankind. Thus while talking about emotion, Ryle is always talking about bodily habits or behaviour.

But there are distinctions between feelings and bodily sensations. All feelings cannot be explained by reference to bodily sensations. Bodily sensations aren't equations for feelings. A man giving an account of his feeling cannot give a parallel account of bodily sensations. James identifies feelings with bodily sensations, but it is enough to show that we talk of feelings very much as we talk of bodily sensations. Ryle says that there is a tinge of metaphor in case of feelings. But the metaphor is absent in case of the bodily sensations. To the ordinary man outside the laboratory the equations of bodily sensations with emotions is simply outrageous. Ryle himself acknowledges the difference between feelings and bodily sensations when he remarks, "I hope to show that though it is quite proper to describe someone as feeling a throb of compassion, his compassion is not to be
equated with a throb or a series of throbs, any more than his fatigue is his gasps; so no disillusioning consequences would follow from acknowledging that throbs, twinges and other feelings are bodily sensation.

Ryle also distinguishes between cause and reason. He maintains that the cause of an action is different from the reason of an action. The theorists object that an act of boasting is one of the direct exercises of vanity. But Ryle says that when we explain why a man boasts by saying that it is because he is vain, we are forgetting the point that a disposition is not an event and so cannot be a cause. The cause of his boasting must be an event. He must be moved to boast by some actual 'impulse' namely an impulse of vanity. So the direct actualizations of vanity are particular vanity impulses, and these are feelings. The vain man is a man who tends to register particular feelings of vanity which impel him to boast. To explain an act as done from a certain motive, in the case from vanity, is to give a causal explanation. This means that in this case the boasters' mind is full of special causes. That is why a vanity feeling has been called to be the inner cause of the overt boasting. Ryle says, "I shall shortly argue that to explain an act as done from a certain motive is not analogous to saying that the glass broke because a stone hit it, but to the quite different type of statement that the glass broke when the stone hit it, because the glass was brittle." Thus motives are dispositions they cannot be the cause of actions. Vanity as such cannot be the cause of boasting. It is the reason of the acts of boasting. The cause is some such event as meeting the stranger. So, in order to explain the acts of boasting, we needn't confuse their

64 Ibid, P - 84
reasons with cause. We needn't take vanity as a cause. Thus emotion is not something ghostly or occult.

Ryle holds that to explain an action which is done from a certain motive cannot be a causal explanation. He says that motives are emotions no doubt, but they are not emotions in which agitations are emotions. He establishes the point that to do something from a motive is compatible with being free from any particular feelings while doing it. To call a feeling or sensation 'acute' is to say that it and to attend to a feeling is not the same thing as to attend to a problem in symbolic logic. Thus Ryle rejects the conclusion that motive words are the names of feelings or else of tendencies to have feelings. He says that we discover the motives of other people. The process of discovering them is an inductive process which results in the establishment of law like propositions and the applications of them as the 'reasons' for particular actions. Here we establish a general hypothetical proposition of certain sort. The way in which a person discovers his own long-term motives is the same as the way in which he discovers those of others.

In Ryle's explanation of motive, for the every action it is natural to ask "Form what motive was it done?" The possible answer is that it was not done from a motive but from force of habit. The performance of an action from a motive is different from its performance out of habit. But the sorts of things which belong to the one class also belong to the other. But to say of an action that it is done from force of habit is to say that a specific disposition explains the action. No one thinks that 'habit' is the name of a peculiar internal event. Therefore to ask whether an
action was done from force of habit or from kindliness of heart is to ask which of 
two specified dispositions is the explanation of the action. Ryle does not make any 
difference between motive and trait. Thus he holds,

"To say, then, that a certain motive is a trait in someone's character is to say 
that he is inclined to do certain sorts of things, make certain sorts of plans, indulge in certain sorts of day dreams, and also, of course, in certain situations to feel certain sorts of feelings. To say that he did something from that motive is to say that this action, done in its particular circumstances, was just the sort of thing that was an inclination to do. It is to say, he would do that".65

Thus Ryle says that motive is the trait in a person. Again sometimes a particular motive is so strong that it always dominates every other motives. The words 'emotion', 'emotional', 'moved' etc. are used to describe agitations or other moods in which people are liable. By a 'highly emotional person' is meant a person who is frequently and violently distraught, thrilled or flustered. But if the proper sense of emotion is agitations then motives or inclinations are not emotions. In this regard, vanity cannot be an emotion, though chargrin can or being interested in symbolic logic cannot be an emotion, though being bored by other topics can. But these are the ambiguities of 'emotion'. So, Ryle holds that it is better to say that motives are emotions but not in the sense in which agitations are emotions.

The emotional words like 'worried' 'excited' 'embarrassed' etc. are used in different ways. Sometimes they use to signify temporary moods as when we say that someone was embarrassed for some minutes, or worried for an hour.

65 Ibid, P. - 90
Sometimes we use them for susceptibilities to moods as when we says that someone is embarrassed by praise. Similarly 'rheumatic' sometimes means 'having a bout of rheumatism', sometimes ' prone to have bouts of rheumatism'. Ryle holds, 'Susceptibilities to specific agitations are on the general footing with inclinations, namely that both are general propensities and not occurrences.'  

From the fact that a person has been having indigestion for an hour it does not follow that he had one long pain or a series of short pains during that hour, perhaps he had no pains at all. Nor does it follow that he has been feeling sick. 'Indigestion' does not stand for any unique episode. Similarly a sulky or hilarious person may or may not say certain things, talk in certain tone of voice, grimace in certain ways, have certain day dreams, or register certain feelings. To be sulky is to be in the mood to act or react in some ways. This shows that mood words like 'tranquil' and 'jovial' and words for agitations, like 'harassed' or 'homestick' stand for liabilities. But though agitations, like other moods, are liability conditions, they are not propensities to act intentionally in certain ways.

Thus Ryle holds that motives are not agitations, not even mild agitations. On the other hand, agitations are not motives. But agitations pre-suppose motives or they presuppose behaviour trends. Thus motives are the most interesting sort for us. Conflicts of habits with habits, or habits with unkind fact, or habits with motives are commotion conditions. There are some words which signify both inclinations and agitations, some which never signify anything but agitations, and others which never signify anything but inclinations. Words like 'uneasy', 'anxious',

66 Ibid, P - 92
'distressed' 'excited', always signify agitations. Phrases like 'fond of fishing', 'keen on gardening', 'bent on becoming a bishop' never signify agitations. But words like 'love', 'want', 'desire', 'proud', 'eager', and many others stand sometimes for simple inclination and sometimes for agitations which are resultant upon those inclinations.

But we can say that Ryle does not make any attempt to relate motives to emotions, though Ryle says that motives are emotions and they are emotions in a sense quite different from agitations. He holds that motives or inclinations do not signify agitations. Motives cannot be causes. The explanation of motive is the reason explanation. Motive cannot be occurrence or episodic. Thus Ryle's explanation of emotion in terms of motive cannot be accepted.

Now let us discuss moods in relation to emotion. A person's momentary mood is a different sort of thing from the motives which actuate him. Moods monopolize. To say that he is in one mood is to say that he is not in any other. Mood words are different from motive words. Depression, happiness, restlessness and jolliness etc. are some of the mood words. Both moods and motives are disposition. But Ryle holds that moods are liabilities but they are not propensities to act intentionally. This feature of intentionality or purposiveness distinguishes motives from moods. Like moods, motives are not monopolised. Again motives cannot be said as the names for feelings. Feelings in the strict sense, are things that come and go. We feel them all over us or in a particular part. Energy is not a feeling. Ryle holds that names of moods are not the names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood among other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in
certain sorts of situations. He says, moods differ from motive words, not in the term of their application but in their use in characterising the total 'set' of a person during the short term.

Ryle also admits that some times mood words are also confused as the names of feelings. But Ryle argues that moods cannot be taken as feelings. They even cannot designate emotions. Mood words refer to certain frames of mind. Moods unlike motives monopolize. They cannot be called feelings. Feelings come and go, appear and disappear in quick successions. But moods don't do so. Nobody says that his pleasant mood is fast appearing and disappearing. So, not referring to feelings, they refer to the short term tendencies of the individual. They cannot be understood as pointing to the episodes of feeling occurring within the individual. The theory of the traditionalists is therefore wrong.

There are many people who identify emotions with commotions. By a highly emotional person, they mean a person who is often agitated. But Ryle rejects this explanation of agitation. According to him, it is mistake. Words standing for agitation, e.g. 'worried', 'excited', 'embarrassed' etc. are names of moods or states of mind Ryle admits agitations as liability conditions because when one gets into the agitated frame of mind, one is liable or bound to behave in typical ways.

But we can say that moods cannot be equated with behaviour only. In this regard Ryle holds, "So a person's mood during a given period colours all or most of his actions and reactions during that period. His work and his play, his talk and his grimaces, his appetite and his daydreams, all reflect his touchness, his joviality,
or his depression. Any one of them may serve as a barometer for all the others.71

Thus Ryle says that to be in a particular mood is to do certain sorts of things and not others. If a person is in a depressed mood, all his actions will reflect his depression. So, I think that mood cannot be equivalent to action. Actions are the reflection of moods, but they are not the whole of moods. Reflection is always reflection of something. There cannot be any actualization in reflection. Thus emotion cannot be explained clearly in terms of moods.

Ryle explains about the notion of agitations. He argues that feelings are intrinsically connected with agitations and are not connected with inclinations so far as inclinations are factors in agitations. Ryle holds that be 'anxious', 'shoked', 'irritated', harassed' etc. are words of agitations. Agitations differ from inclinations in the sense that inclinations are not disturbances. Ryle says that feelings are intrinsically connected with agitations. Thus he writes, "It is part of the logic of our descriptions of feeling that they are signs of agitations and are not exercises of inclinations." 68 Therefore, the feelings that are causally related are agitations. They are sign of agitations in the same sort of way as stomach-aches are signs of indigestion. An inclination is a certain sort of proneness or readiness to do certain sorts of things on purpose. Ryle says that agitations like moods are only liabilities but are not propensities like motives. For example, to be panic is liable to do certain sorts of things such as stiffen or shriek, or to be unable to finish one's sentence. He says that agitations are not propensities because the things we do when we

67 Ibid. P. 96
68 Ibid. p 101
are agitated are not done on purpose. Therefore, motives are not happenings and are not of the right type to be causes. The expansion of a motive expression is a law like sentence and not a report of an event.

Ryle, by explaining the different senses of the term 'emotion', comes to the conclusion that it has no reference to the ghostly process of internal turbulences felt in the stream of consciousness. Ryle shows that as motive, emotion is a disposition, as mood it is a frame of mind, as agitation, it is a liability condition and as feeling it is nothing more than bodily sensations. Emotions are feelings when they indicate particular excitements or disturbed states of mind. Emotion is used in different senses when it is meant to designate motive words, or words which explain people's higher level operations. When a man is described as vain, considerate, avaricious, patriotic, or andolent, no palpable excitement is supposed to be disposed. A vain man does not have any peculiar feeling of vanity or pride occasionally in between his several acts of vanity. Ryle said "To put it quite dogmatically, the vain man never feels vain. Certainly when thwarted, he feels acute dudgeon and when unexpectedly successful, he feels buoyant. But there is no special thrill or pang which we call a feeling of vanity". Emotions when related as motive words, act more as dispositions leading to various kinds of activities. The motive words of vanity, considerateness, avariciousness constitute the generic dispositions or designate higher order states of human beings. For Ryle, the concept of I and myself, though implied in thinking, visualizing images or knowing what one is doing, are the terms of the same nature. They belong to the higher

69 Ibid, P 84
order dispositional states of the human mind. Ryle denies the individual's experience of feeling vain in his vanity behaviour.

Now we discuss Ryle's radical explanation of emotions. The logical behaviour of emotions where emotions are supposed to act as dispositions is different from the explanation accorded to them by causal antecedents. Ryle uses the routine explanations to overt the privileged access of the individual to know his own emotional states. The word emotion can be used in different senses like inclinations, moods and agitations. The identification of emotion with motives finds the greatest emphasis in the book, "The Concept of Mind". Emotions are regarded as motive words or words indicating the individual’s moods and inclinations can be explained as dispositions to act in certain ways. Emotion in these senses does not mean the individual's active mental state or operation. Our ways to know the motives of other individuals are the same as our way to know our own motives. But Ryle says that the process of discovering them is not free from error. In this regard he holds, "It is or is like an inductive process, which results in the establishment of law like propositions and the applications of them as the 'reasons' for particular actions. What is established in each case is or includes a general hypothetical proposition of a certain sort." 70

Ryle observes that one need not take much heed of the actual feelings accompanying particular motivated actions. He says, "There is a special reason for not paying much heed to the feelings had by a person whose motives are

---

70 Ibid, P-87
under investigation, namely that we know that lively and frequent feelings are felt by sentimentalists whose positive actions show quite clearly that their patriotism, e.g. is self indulgent make believe."71 Ryle also believes that the people’s heart go on sink when they hear that their country’s plight is desperate. But their appetites are unaffected and the routines of their lives are unmodified. It is said that persons having feelings while acting under some motivation, are rather like theatregoers and novel readers, who also feel genuine pangs, glows, flutters and twinges of despair with the difference that they realise that they are making believing.

Ryle observes that agitations imply particular feelings of individuals. Thus they are essentially episodic. He says, "When people are said to be speechless with amazement or paralysed by horror, the specific agitation is, in effect being described as extremely violent."72 These agitations or feelings indicate a disturbed state of mind, an occurrence which cannot be identified either with inclination or with mood words. When emotion is present as a motive, the individual’s actions need not have any corresponding feeling to them. But when emotion is expressed as agitation it is necessary that the individual actually feels and is conscious that he feels. Ryle’s point is that even in such cases there will not be much difference between emotions as excitements and emotions as motives or inclinations. Ryle observes that it would be absurd to say that a person’s interest on Symbolic Logic or that some one was too patriotic to work for his country. Ryle holds, “Inclinations are not disturbances and so cannot be violent or mild disturbances. A man whose

71 Ibid, P-89
72 Ibid, P-90
dominant motive is philanthropy or vanity; for he is not distracted or upset at all. He is entirely single-minded. Philanthropy and vanity are not gusts or stroms.\textsuperscript{73}

Although agitation implies occurrence of particular feelings, when analysed in everyday language turns out to be similar to mood words like being hilarious or sulky. To be sulky is to be in the mood to act or react in some or other of certain vaguely describable, though easily recognizable, ways, whenever junctures of certain sorts arise. Thus Ryle says, "This shows that mood words like 'tranquil' and 'jovial' including words for agitations, like 'harassed' and 'homesick' stand for liabilities. Even to be for a brief moment scandalized or in a panic is, for that moment, to be liable to do some such thing as stiffen or shriek, or to be unable to finish one's sentence, or to remember where the fire escape is to be found."\textsuperscript{74}

To this Stuart Hampshire replied that the physiological reactions take place, although not necessarily and always. Thus physiological reactions by themselves will not give a sufficient evidence for the occurrence of feelings. Agitations while implying liability conditions function like categorical happenings, with hypothetical pre-supposition of motives or moods. Thus they are episodic whose explanation is possible in terms of law-like liability propositions with particular occurrences at particular times under particular provocations.

A.C. Ewing observes that Ryle seems to take a too episodic view of pleasure and interest involved in activities. Ryle thinks that apart from analysis in terms of overt behaviour these feelings can consist of a very 'short-lived exciting thrills' and

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. P. - 90
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, PP - 93-94
argues that a person may still be interested in or enjoy his pursuit in between thrills. Pleasure is generally believed as one of the most popular words used in everyday talk and is an internal feeling or experience appearing on a ghostly plane. But according to Ryle, pleasure cannot be so conceived. He asks us to look to the different uses of the word 'pleasure'. In one use this term is commonly substituted by the verbs 'enjoy' and 'like'; in another it is replaced by such nouns as 'delight' 'transport', 'joy', 'rapture' etc. In the sense of the verb, e.g. when we say 'this man is enjoying digging' the word enjoying does not refer to a separate experience of pleasure besides digging. Ryle says that 'enjoying digging is not both digging and having a (pleasant) feeling,' but surely as A.C. Ewing observes, "It is both physically digging and having a pleasant experience of the physical process. This experience is not just a feeling of pleasure you cannot have pleasure without having pleasure is in something but a cognitive and conative experience pleasantly toned throughout or so toned with only slight interruptions"\(^{75}\)

Thus enjoying digging is not the physical act of digging and the mental act of experiencing pleasure. It is a act of making digging in itself a pleasure. Thus enjoyment cannot be reduced to physical behaviour plus a few sensations. Emotional states is explained as dispositions to behave in certain ways. Feelings of pleasure, pain, embarrassment etc. continue to be unique experiences of our personal life. Physical digging in certain mood or frame of mind is pleasure, not a vehicle or means of pleasure. Thus there is nothing private about pleasure

\(^{75}\) A.C. Ewing, Prof. Ryles' Attack on Dualism in Clarity Is not Enough, P 337
Again, when pleasure is used in sense of a noun, it signifies moods including agitations. We use the idioms as 'too delighted to speak coherently' or 'crazy with joy'. 'Too delighted to speak' means to be so much delighted that one cannot speak coherently. But we know that there is nothing ghostly about agitations. Likewise there is nothing ghostly about emotions. Thus Ryle tries hard to establish by referring to common usage that the introspective psychology which views mind as essentially private to the agent is defective and false. Ryle's idea of mind as well as emotion is inherently open or public. There is no private inner life at all. Mind is just a name for typical human behaviours. All statements of mind are reports about current bodily behaviour or predicated bodily behaviour. But we cannot accept Ryle's conception of emotion. As a conscious human being we must have feeling about something.