Chapter V

THE ROLE OF INSTINCTS IN ETIOLOGY

I

Exposition

Abection is a key term in Freudian scheme. It means the release of one's pent-up emotion which is basically associated with instincts. A systematic theory of instincts was to be developed naturally and Freud attempted to do so.

Freud's theory of the instincts was a dualistic one from the beginning and it remained so, in spite of all the changes that it suffered. The change took place only in the nature of instincts or rather in the groups of instinct that were to be distinguished. The theory of instincts developed in the steps as specified below.

The first step was the setting up of two groups of instincts into the sexual and the ego instincts. The former was closely studied whereas the latter remained to begin with a relatively unknown quantity.

The second one was an addition to the theory. The introduction of the concept of narcissism into the libido theory led to the postulation of the libidinal component of the ego instincts. All the same, Freud held firmly to the view that, in addition to the libidinal component, there must exist a primary, non-libidinal component. This was called "interest" in a non-committal way, rather in the sense of non-
libidinal egoism.

The third one - a step overlooked for the most part in psychoanalytical writings - was that aggressive trends were ascribed to the ego instincts as being among their essential constituents. This view was formulated by Freud in the last section of his paper, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes"\(^1\) and it was based upon a discussion of the relation between love and hate, in which he arrived at the conclusion that hate was to be regarded as a non-libidinal reaction of the ego.

The fourth one was due to the increasing knowledge of the structure of the mental apparatus as a whole and its division into a vital stratum (id) and an organized part (ego) and to a study of the unconscious region of the ego, the super-ego. The substance of this view was that the aggressive trends were no longer regarded as primary attributes of the ego instincts but as independently existent instincts of aggression and destruction existing side by side with the sexual instincts in the vital strata of the mind. The ego instincts ceased to be independent entities and were derived partly from the aggressive instincts.

To this last one was new added another theory. It postulated the existence of the primal instincts, which are known as the instincts of life and death. This postulate served to extend the theoretic basis that underlay the fourth step, to solve certain unexplained problems and to bring

\(^1\) Instincts and their Vicissitudes - S. Freud, pp. 60-85
together and simplify the various theoretic hypotheses that
had been so far set up.

What then is instinct? According to the most general
definition, instinct is an energy arising from the vital stratum
of the mind and having a direction which is determined inherently.
Since many facts seem to indicate that instinct originates in
organic phenomena it can be explained as being a border line
concept between the mental and the organic spheres. Thus the
concept of instinct comes to be classed under the concept of
stimulus. Instinct is a stimulus of the mind, distinguishable
from other kinds of stimuli in that its operation is constant
and comes from the interior of the body and not from outside.
In this way, one can also regard it as a measure of the demand
for work imposed upon the mind in consequence of its connection
with the body.

In accordance with this view, instinct, whatever may
be the form in which it becomes a tension of psychical energy,
is always, as being a stimulus, contrasted with the mental
apparatus with its postulated method of functioning. Regarding
those methods of functioning themselves some assumptions are
necessary and that necessity has led to the laying down of
certain principles of mental happening and certain fundamental
trends of the mental apparatus. We must bear in mind that the
principles or regulative mechanisms regulate the mental
apparatus, which the instincts continually impose fresh demand
for work upon that apparatus, so regulated. This contrast
between mental activity and instinct is perhaps most clearly
expressed in a passage in "Instincts and their Vicissitudes."? In that the distinction between sexual and ego instincts is described as an auxiliary construction of a provisional kind, while the thesis that there is a basic trend of the mental apparatus to abolish stimuli which reach it, or to reduce excitation to the lowest possible level, or, even to maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition is formulated as a necessary postulate.

As the instincts spring from the organic field, the question of their source becomes an important one in their classification. The three characteristics of instinct as emphasised by Freud - its source, aim and object - can be employed as criteria. Of these, the object is most variable; the aim is variable; but the source is relatively constant and, therefore, the best qualified to serve as a basis for classification of instincts. The source of an instinct, being the site of its inception, is from its very nature thought of as linked to an organic event. Such an organic event is in its turn hypothetically regarded, in keeping with the theory of hormones, as a kind of chemical process - as being possibly, an accumulation of sexual substances or a concentration of chemico-sexual substances which then undergo a fresh distribution or are perhaps dissolved. The organ from which an instinct arises generally coincides with the place at which it obtains satisfaction; or else the place of satisfaction is an organ from which some other component instinct originates.

2. Ibid.
The differentiation of the separate component instincts is based upon the several organs from which they spring. The zones may be called erotogenic zones. The aggregation of the component instincts into the homogeneous group of the sexual instincts is based upon their common characteristics and regular relationships. The concept of erotogenic zones is in the first instance descriptive and derived from the oral, anal and genital zones of the body. Their distinctive signs are experimentally verifiable, and are excitation, action and satisfaction. The last of these takes the form of characteristic pleasure process that is different in the case of the oral and anal zones from those in the genital zone.

Instinct, then, is an energy which arises from the vital stratum of the mind that has a direction which is determined inherently. It presses forward towards a particular aim and is directed somewhat loosely towards things and persons as its object. It is connected with an organ of origin as its source and to a terminal organ as the site of its satisfaction. Its satisfaction consists in the removal of these changes in the zone of excitation which accompany the instinental tension.

By the time when the component instincts had been aggregated into the homogeneous group of the sexual instincts and had been assigned to predetermined biological stages within the framework of the sexual development, it becomes necessary to set up the libido theory to provide a basis and amplification. In accordance with that theory instincts are to be regarded as purely quantitative amount of energy that can be variously localised (displaced) and concentrated. The qualities of the
component instincts do not belong to the instincts themselves but are derived from their sources. This hypothesis made it possible to explain in comparatively simple way the inter-relationship between the erotogenic zones, the transformation of one component instinct into another etc.

Meanwhile the ego instincts were being somewhat neglected. The concept of it was only a provisional one, as can be seen from Freud's formulation of it at the time. They were purely of a tentative nature and so, at bottom, was the whole classification of the instincts. This was because of historical and practical factors. On the one hand, it was necessary, first of all, to solve the problem of the structure and development of the sexual instincts - a matter which was the first to offer itself for investigation. On the other hand, the manifestations of the ego instincts were much more difficult to recognize. The trends emanating from the ego and their modes of expression were much more complicated and subsequently harder to understand. But the main ground was that before anything could be learned about them, a certain portion had to be known about the libidinal instincts.

It is important to note that the ego instincts were not regarded as on the same level as the sexual ones. In "Instincts and their Vicissitudes", Freud formulated the psychological conflict that can be discovered at the root of every neurosis as a conflict between the demands of the ego and that of sexuality. So we see that the ego instincts then

3. Instincts and their Vicissitudes - S. Freud
stood for the ego, not as yet accessible to investigation, which was governed by certain tendencies. The criterion of sources that had been used for the classification of the sexual instincts was carried over to the ego instincts, of which the nutritional instincts served as the typical example. They too could be linked with organs of origin and termination, once more with the help of hypothetical chemico-physiological process.

The motive for taking the second step in the development of the instinct theory came from the field of psychiatry. New facts appeared that could not be explained by any of the existent ideas. The necessity for a new addition to the libido, namely, the concept of narcissism was also felt.

The concept of narcissism made the first break in the independent existence of the ego instincts. It included three component parts. First, a stage was introduced at the beginning of the life of the individual in which his instincts had no object. The stage was called primary narcissism. In it the object-libidinal attitude has not yet been differentiated off, just as there was no proper differentiation between the ego and the external world. The libido is either stored up in some way or other, as it is in sleep or in the embryonic state and is quiescent and perhaps not roused to function. Or it cannot as yet be distinguished or detached from the energy functions of the ego, i.e., it is only operative, to use Fedoren's word, in a "medial" way. Second, the libido, after the separation

4. Die Wirklichkeit des Todestriebes, Almanach des Psychoanalyse, 1931
between the ego and the external world has occurred, can take the subject's own person as its object just as well as anything belonging to the external world. Third, by means of identification in the ego or ego-ideal the instinctual energy can be transformed into narcissistic energy. In this case also, it will set "medially" in a secondary way.

The postulation of a libidinal energy operating in the ego necessitated a revision of ideas about the ego instincts. It implied that the energy of the ego instincts was libidinal in origin and that their aims were derived from the aims of narcissistic libido directed to the subject's own self and acting within and upon it. The ego instincts were nothing more than libidinal instincts directed to the ego and so somewhat differently organised. Just as the reality principle, for example, was merely a modification of the pleasure principle and yet could turn against it, so the ego instincts seem to be libido modified in its aims, which was, all the same, able to turn against the true libidinal instincts. This hypothesis is connected with a particular view of the origin of the instinctual aims. In accordance with it, the general aim of libido appears to be pleasure, but its particular aims are derived from the particular object to which it is directed. Mutual conflict is no longer a conflict between sexual and ego instincts as between parts of the sexual instinct that are directed to the ego - between object-libidinal and ego-libidinal trends. (The explanation of conflict in this way as a clash between different interests was a possible one, but not easy to maintain).
It seemed inevitable that this undermining of the independent status of the ego instincts should throw doubts upon the dualistic character of the instinct theory. There was now only one group of instincts - the libidinal instincts. Instincts were no longer classified with reference to their source but primarily with reference to their relations to various objects, which, in their turn, seemed to modify the instinct's aim. In essentials this already implied the view that sexual and ego instincts were only different products of a common "primal libido".

However, Freud kept firmly to the idea of the autonomous nature of the ego instincts. That may to a large extent have been because he had classified the instincts according to the biological considerations which were not at first upset by his new discovery of narcissism. The life of the individual seems to have quite different interests from those concerned with the preservation of the species. So it was natural to suppose that different forces were at work. Besides, the phenomenon of sadism in its wider aspects had not as yet been explained. Consequently, Freud introduced the notion of ego interest in the sense of non-libidinal egoism; or more correctly, he asserted that what was known as egoism had two components - a libidinal narcissistic component and a non-libidinal component. As he wrote, narcissism is only the "libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be
attributed to every living creature. Originally these two components were undifferentiated.

In this way, Freud still upheld the view that the nature of the ego instincts was originally non-libidinal. This view was supported in the first instance by consideration of a theoretical and heuristic kind.

Afterwards, on the strength of empirical observation and theoretical arguments, the non-libidinal portions of the ego instincts were conceded some additional attributes that tended to confirm their independence of the libido. This constituted the third step in the development of the instinct theory which gave the aggressive trends an independent status vis-à-vis the libidinal currents and classed them as belonging to the ego instincts.

Where the sexual instincts were concerned, it was primarily the position of their sadistic components that still lacked a sound theoretical basis. At first it had seemed as though sadism was erotogenetically bound. Sadistic impulses were to be found on every level, though in a form that varied apparently with the nature of their source or the erotogenic zone. The oral, anal and phallic levels - each had their sadistic constituents. With the widening of the field of observation, it seemed more and more probable that sadism was an independent component instinct that permeated every level, able to ally itself to any other component instinct, having

its own vicissitudes, claiming itself to be regarded in accordance with the dominant criterion of that time, as linked to the striated muscular system as its "source". Viewed in this way, sadism occupied a more curious position than ever in contrast to the purely libidinal instincts. What was particularly difficult to account for was the contradiction between the aims of these two. The contradiction seems to call for a different genetic history for each. The term "Sadism" undoubtedly included all sorts of phenomena, some of them not of an erotic kind, ranging from sexual perversions to impulses of cruelty and harshness which were devoid of any manifest eroticism. Finally, it was also employed for certain ego instincts.

Regarding the ego instincts, too, various component instincts could be distinguished. In connection with the criterion of source, hunger and thirst appeared to be the appropriate representatives of the ego instincts. However, in course of time they came to less that position.

Closer inspection of the ego instincts made it possible to introduce a more fundamental classification of them. Impulses to control could be distinguished from defensive impulses and instincts of power as well as of self-assertion could be added to them. Control impulses appeared to be connected with trends of power and neither differed very much from many sadistic manifestations of instinct. The defensive trends also with its possibility of being divided into impulses to fight and attack (destruction impulses) exhibited an unmistakable streak of
aggressiveness. In this way, most of these ego trends had to be credited with an aggressive character. It becomes necessary to suppose that, in addition to sexual sadism, there was a sadism of the ego instincts, while they in turn entered into the service of the libido in the form of instincts of dominance. All that made the situation quite complicated. It was precisely this concept of sadism of the ego instincts that showed clearly what an undue extension this notion of sadism had undergone. The terminology used at that time was the consequence of the absence of any distinction between the relation, on the one hand, of sadistic phenomena to libidinal phenomena and, on the other hand, of aggressive phenomena to sadistic ones.

As the idea of sadism embraced facts of a disparate kind, the question was how could the relationship be cleared up between two sets of instinctual components - one with aggressive and another with libidinal aims? There is only a limited number of ways in which the relationship can be imagined. Either the libidinal and aggressive instinctual phenomena start from something which is primal and common to both and only become differentiated in the course of development. Or they each have a different origin and follow separate, though at times, intersecting ways of development.

The first possible view that they have a common origin is a monastic one and seeks to regard the libidinal and aggressive phenomena of instinctual life as products of differentiation or modes of the manifestation of one and the same instinct-bipolar phenomena that can replace each other.
The second view of the relations between two sets of instinctual impulses is purely a dualistic one. It assumes the existence of two qualitatively different instincts and attempts to subsume all the relevant phenomena under them. The first draws its support from the existence of phenomena that contain both sets of trends in an undifferentiated state and is faced by the problem of accounting for their emergence in a differential form, while in the second the undifferentiated phenomena constitute a stumbling block and have to be accounted for with the help of the theory of fusion.

Before committing himself to the dualistic theory, Freud, in a passage in "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" put forward the possibility of bipolarity of instinct as its ordering principle. However, after having compared the aims of the two groups of instinctual trends and established their disparate character and discussed the question of the "Transformation of love into hatred" and denied the possibility of such a thing, he rejected the idea that there was a genetic relationship between the two sets of phenomena.

Thus aggressiveness (including hatred and sadism) and libido have their differences in regard to aim and origin. This, however, still left aggressiveness in an uncertain position in the framework of the instinctual theory. Freud's next attempt to solve this point was to ascribe the characteristics of aggressiveness (or "sadism") to the ego instincts and to assume

6. Instincts and their Vicissitudes - S. Freud
that, side by side with the opposition between the sexual and ego instincts (aggressive) that expresses itself, among other things, in conflict, certain states of fusion also take place between them.

It is noticeable that in this connection Freud did not as yet take about instincts of aggression as independent entities but only about the aggressive elements of the ego instincts. It appeared to offer a provisional answer to the question of the relationship between aggressiveness and ego instincts — question of whether there are any phenomena of aggression at all outside the field of the ego-preservative functions. This question goes back to the empirical fact that aggressiveness appears only or mostly only when the life instincts or ego instincts are exposed to harm. This third step, then, furnished provisional solutions to a number of problems. First, sadism was taken out of the category of the sexual instincts and placed among the ego instincts, and so the independent character of the ego instincts was pinpointed. However, this amounted to a reshuffling of the two large groups in instincts and no new classification of them. Second, the idea of states of fusion threw a little more upon the situation. The sadism of the sexual instincts could arise from the aggressives of the ego instincts and would emerge “when the sexual function is governed by the ego instincts” — the latter would “impart to the instinctual aims as well the qualities of hate.” Freud attempted to trace the evolution of the influence that the ego instincts have over the sexual instincts, starting from the ambivalence of the oral stage and
passing through the sadism of the anal stage to the love belonging to the genital stage, at which love and hate come into direct collusion for the first time. Conversely, the ego instincts might themselves receive an admixture from the libidinal side, as in narcissism. Third, an alteration in the criterion of the classification of instincts was thus effected. The notion of instinctual source gave way to that of instinctual aim. The typical example of the ego instincts was no longer hunger but "hatred" via aggression.

As is known, the fact of there being different instinctual aims had already led to the problem of sadism in its position. In the meantime, the question arose whether along with the alteration of the criterion from source to aim there was an alteration also in the concept of instinct. It is well to remember that instinctual source still retained its importance as a criterion. So also the theory of energetic tension with its chemical foundation. Even if no chemical hypothesis could be formulated for the ego instincts, the general concept of instinct which was gained from the sexual instincts could all the same be carried over to them. They also could be regarded as demands for work imposed upon the mental apparatus as tension that set going certain activities to procure satisfaction by the attainment of their aim - hunger, for example, and its resultant impulse to control - as stimuli which impinged upon the mental apparatus and produced energy. In this way, the third step apparently solved a number of problems.
The necessity to remodel the theory of the instincts and take another step was felt as a consequence partly of research into sado-masochistic phenomena in their widest sense and partly of the fuller knowledge of the structure of the mental apparatus thus obtained as a result of the advanced study of the repressed forces to that of the repressive forces as well.

The need for assuming the existence of an unconscious sense of guilt led to a new conception of the structure of the personality. The ego and the id were contra-distinguished and the former was looked upon as having arisen out of the id and also being an organised part of it. The id comprised (1) the vital stratum in which the instincts had their place of origin and also having free contact with the ego, (2) the repressed portion of the instincts which is prevented from having free contact with the ego by anti-oathesis and (3) the unconscious part of the ego, i.e., the super-ego.

The fourth step in the development of the instinct theory was to remove aggressiveness from the ego instincts, i.e., no longer viewing it as a component instinct or as a characteristic of the ego instincts and instead putting it as an independent instinctual group with aims of its own in the vital stratum of the mind.

Thus the new theory asserted that there are two groups of instincts in the vital layer - the libidinal and the aggressive (or destructive) group. Each instinctual group moves forward towards satisfaction on its own account. And
partly through a free struggle to obtain it, partly through influence of the ego that is subjected to the pressure of the external world and of the super-ego each enters into a great variety of relationships with the other, either of an associative or an antagonistic kind. Both can easily come into opposition with the trends of the system which operates in a self-preservation sense and are represented in the ego (the instincts). In contradistinction to the instincts of sex and aggression, which work in the vital layer and are directed to objects, are the ego instincts whose field of operation is the ego.

At this stage three questions arise. Why did this fourth step have to be made? What is the advantage of an instinctual theory which is dualistic from the genetic point of view, but recognises three sets of instinct? Have the concept of instinct and the criterion of its classification undergone any change?

Since we saw the reason why taking the third step, it was found necessary to take away the aggressive trends from the sexual instincts and ascribe them to the ego instincts, but the whole problem of establishing an instinct of whether aggressive trends of a non-libidinal nature play any role outside the function of the ego remains.

It seems to have no doubt that there are, in fact, aggressive trends which, without having any sexual characteristic worth-mentioning, operate outside the field of the self-preservation functions of the ego. Further, to put
aggressiveness completely under the ego instincts is a doubtful proceeding in such cases where its action comes to opposition to these instincts. Manifestations of sexual sadism might possibly be accounted for on the theory of an admixture of the ego instincts. But this is not so easily done with masochistic manifestations. The ego instincts are representatives of the instinct which constrains every living thing to cling to life. That pain, which could only be regarded as a signal acting for the life instinct, should itself become the aim of a masochistic seemed contrary to the laws of biology, even though the idea of sexualization might offer a possible explanation.

However, the difficulty becomes still greater where melancholic depressions exerted a self-destructive power which Freud described as characterized by "an overthrow, psychologically very remarkable" of the self-preservative instinct. The same is true of those trends of the super-ego that are turned against the self, say for example, in the need for self-punishment which seems to act like an independent instinct. These manifestations, against which the ego has to defend itself, just as it has to defend itself against the libidinal impulses, cannot easily be explained as being due to the aggressiveness of the ego instincts. And it is quite clear that Freud very soon dropped this view. He does not mention it except in the passages from "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" already quoted. All the same, the problem of whether

7. Ibid.
manifestations of aggressiveness appear outside the defensive functions of the ego remain in a sense unsolved and to that problem belongs also the question of the relationship between the intoxication of omnipotence felt by the ego and the degree of intensity attained by the gratified instincts of aggression.

It was only logical that when the contrast was made between the ego and the id and it was shown that the ego had to defend itself against the id's instincts, the aggressive trends should have been placed as autonomous instinctual forces, in the vital layer of the mental apparatus. This was not, as Freud says in the sixth chapter of "Civilisation and Its Discontents", to make any fresh change in the theory of instincts but was "merely a matter of coming to closer quarters with a conclusion" to which Freud long ago committed himself and following it out to its logical sequence.

The postulation of the existence of an independently subsistent aggression undoubtedly facilitated explanations of the facts in question. The ego was now thought of as living obliged to struggle with libido. It could give way to it, sublimate it, repress it, alter it by means of reaction formation, mitigate it by adding libidinal elements to it or offer itself as an object and so direct aggression on to itself. However, the mere establishment of such an instinct did not solve everything. The problem becomes not so much one of destructiveness in its outward operation as of destructive
trends turned in upon the self, as they could be observed in melancholia, the need for punishment and the neurosis of fatality or Schicksals neurose. Here it appeared to be a matter of a destructive instinct at work inside the subject himself and this was still more difficult to account for an biological basis than was the existence of pleasure obtained from pain in the narrower field of sexual theory. It appeared as though the first investigations of the ego had revealed the existence of what was, phylogenetically speaking, the most recent instinct - one which might have arisen along with the civilization of man.

It cannot be doubted that the super-ego exists and that it can, in certain circumstances, carry its punitive trends to the extent of destroying the subject himself. Nor can it be doubted that to explain the latter fact as a turning of aggression against the self does not furnish an adequate theoretical account of the phenomenon. Such an explanation is merely the starting point for a discussion of the true problem. How is it possible that the aggressive instincts should be turned against the subjects' own person to the limit of self-destruction? In other words, how shall we explain such a state of things from the hitherto accepted biological lines? It will be quite in keeping with the psychoanalytic principles of method in case of the existence of some more fundamental thing in virtue of which the turning of aggression against the self can take place. This thing can be nothing else than an instinctual trend which somehow has a destructive effect.
The problem was already present in some way in the sexual theory and Freud stated it when he asked if sadism or masochism was the primary phenomenon, i.e., the older of the two from the biological standpoint. Even at that time he adduced the parallel problems from the development of the purely libidinal instincts and established the point that in sadism, unlike the other component instincts such as exhibitionism, there did not exist nor could be shown to exist a stage that was analogous to the narcissistic stage.

The observation of the clinical phenomena mentioned above as the fundamental methodological need to find an original model in analogy with the parallel hypothesis of the libido theory, necessitated to assume the existence of a "self-destructive" trend which somehow operates in the self. This trend would be a kind of primary destructiveness and be analogous to primary narcissism. Aggressiveness directed on to object would be the counterpart of the object-libidinal trends and the manifestations of secondary destructiveness would correspond to those of secondary narcissism.

This analogy was supported by the observation that similar fluctuations take place between aggressiveness and self-destructiveness, as take place between narcissistic libidinal position and one directed to objects. Aggressiveness can become directed inwards in the same way as self-destructiveness, in case it reaches a dangerous pitch and if it can find a safety valve in this stage by being turned outward it will be in the form of aggression.
Here, again there is the problem. In case the hypothesis of a primary stage of the destructive instinct is theoretically unavoidable, how can a trend of this kind be formulated?

For the purpose of filling in and gathering together the theoretical issues involved in the fourth step and solving the problems raised by it, Freud now introduced theory of primal instincts. They are the life instinct and the death instinct.

The theory was not step up on the grounds of any fresh psychological material or any question of a psychological nature. It was the effect of certain theoretical problems raised by previous hypothesis and also designed to be solved. Thus it could be described as in the line of theoretical superstructure and it differed from instinctual theory so far built up upon clinical-psychological data and problems. It was a biological theory of instincts, as it rested almost entirely upon biological considerations. The instincts of life and death are not psychologically perceptible as such; they are the instincts the existence of which is required by hypothesis alone.

A brief survey of the developmental stages in the concept and function of instincts in the framework of Freudian theory as made in the foregoing paragraphs will be complete with some more ideas of Freud himself. First, the forces which we assume to exist behind the tension caused by the id are
called instincts.\(^9\) Second, "After long doubts and vacillations, we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts - Eros and the destructive instinct. The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish even greaterunities and to preserve them thus, in short, to bind together; the aim of the second, on the contrary, is to undo connections and so to destroy things."\(^10\) Third, there are two classes of instincts "Eros or the sexual instinct which is by far the most conspicuous and accessible to study, and the Death instinct ... fear of death may be external or internal caused by the external world or super-ego."\(^11\) Last, the real driving force in life is libido, whose flow is directed under the impetus of instinct, urge or drive. The sexual instinct is recognised as the most powerful and sexual libido arise from some of prominent parts of the body, which he termed "Erotogenic sense."\(^12\)

While tracing the developmental stages of the instinct theory detail explanation had been made as regards the concept of instinct, how it functions, how it develops along with the changes and modifications in other parts of the Freudian theory as a whole. It was also seen that the classification of instinct was made at one time on the basis of source and at another time on the basis of aim. Thus we could notice many

\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 5-6

\(^10\) The Ego and the Id - S. Freud, p. 54

\(^11\) Ibid., p. 9
transformation of one into another. However it may be, there is one thing constant - the so-called instinct always moves forward and upward. This is for the purpose of gratification.

But gratification is not always possible in all acts of the instincts moving forward and upward. Our concern is with the cases when instincts are not gratified and its after courses. It is generally known that many entities or agents are involved in the act of gratification of an instinct in Freudian theory. They are the unconscious, preconscious, conscious, ego, censor, external world etc. in the topographical theory; in the structural theory, they are the id, ego, super-ego, external world etc.

While it is possible for some instincts to be gratified, it may be asked why others remain ungratified. We may say that it is partly due to the nature of instincts, to be gratified, not fitting in the mental apparatus and the external reality. The mental apparatus is represented by conscious, preconscious and unconscious in the topographical theory but by id, ego and super-ego in the structural theory. For the sake of convenience, the former may be called 'early theory' and the latter 'later theory' as was done in the previous chapters.

The sites of the instincts were different in the early theory. One group of instincts was in the ego and the other was in the unconscious. Inspite of the differences in their origin, instincts were moving upward and forward irrespective of that they may be received well or not in the mental
apparatus and the external world. This phenomenon is true of
the instincts also (now in the id) in the later theory. Perhaps
it will be because of the absolute independence in the nature
of instincts as Freud very often talks in such a way.

For some reasons also attributable to the mental
apparatus and the external world, some instincts are gratified.
This happens, of course, after the instincts come to the
conscious after passing through a series of censors stationed
on the way from the site of their origin or source. The
concept of censorship takes, however, back seat in the later
theory. The instincts are to stay in the preconscious for a
long time after passing the first censor if there is no
opportunity moment for getting in the conscious. On the other
hand, they may go back to the unconscious in case there is no
such chance or they are further censored by the first censor.
Similar fates can be shared by the instincts in the conscious
after passing the second censor, because being in the conscious
does not necessarily imply an instinct's being gratified. The
ego is all there to ensure all the conditions for its
gratification.

The ungratified instincts will come back in the
unconscious both in the early and later theory. Subsequently,
they will be separated from the virgin instincts (let us say
so) or driven. By virgin instincts, we may mean those instincts
which were not referred even once to the mental apparatus.
Instincts may be referred a number of times or only one time
to the mental apparatus. In the early theory there will be
separate chambers in the unconscious for keeping the repressed instincts and the virgin instincts. In the later theory, the whole unconscious will be reserved for the repressed instincts and the whole id will be for the virgin instincts.

The process, however, does not stop here. An instinct or one group or groups of instincts, once referred to or imposed on the mental apparatus, will never cease to act as long as it is possible to get out to the external world, i.e., to be gratified. So the repressed instincts in the unconscious may form groups with those in one part of the unconscious or in the id. This is for one specific purpose - to elude the censorships of the censors and the ego in the early theory and that of the ego in the later theory.

When the repressed instincts cannot get themselves gratified in this way also, some defence mechanisms such as wit, humour, fantasy, day-dream, dream, sublimation, etc. will come to the aid of the repressed instincts in the act of gratification so that there may not be neurosis. Thus we see that it may take a long time or a short time for an instinct or a group or groups of instincts to be gratified. If the process of gratification is simple or immediate or both, neurosis will seldom ensue.

We have so far explained the role of instincts in etiology of neurosis from one angle. From another angle, it is possible to explain by regarding instincts as the source of psychic energy. "Except in one brief-period, Freud always regarded the instincts as the exclusive source of psychic
energy.13 On the issue of the source of the instincts, in
the early theory, it was ego/conscious and unconscious, while
in the later theory id is the exclusive source of instincts and
hence energy as well.

To start with, it is necessary to assume that there is
a limited total amount of energy at the disposal of the mind
of an individual. This is in consistency with the "Principle
of the conservation of energy" as applied to psychoanalysis by
Freud. We are to accept also that there is individual
variation in this total quantity of energy, as there is
variation in the individual ego's capacity to distribute this
energy in different fields in an individual. In respect of
physical energy, there is a standard unit by which it is
possible to measure the energy. However, there is no such
standard unit in psychic energy. Due to the subjective
character of the psychic energy it appears that it is not
possible to have an objective common standard unit. Even then,
we can form a very general type of measurement, thereby making
it possible to say which feeling of us is more strong, which
thought is more intense. Still, however, such kind of
measurement is subjective and cannot be used generally.

The above point of measurement unit will be best
explained by an example. In a given situation of passion, a
certain amount of energy is spent in five minutes, whereas the
same amount of energy is spent in an hour's time. A person

13. "Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic theory in Psychological
may spend the amount of energy as noted above in a love situation with his companion in a period of one hour. But this same person may spend this same amount of energy in five minute's time in the height of passion and sexual intimacy with his companion. Though the amount of energy spent in both the situations remains the same, the pattern or character of expression, the intensity of the energy is different. Only the quality of energy spent does not matter, but also the intensity of it.

The problem now is not so simple as we are still talking of the process in the conscious region. In the consideration questions such as unconscious resistance, repression, conflict, are involved. So we find that it is not possible to measure or compare or understand generally whether the amount of energy spent in one situation is larger or smaller than that of energy spent in other situations by the same person or different persons in the same situation.

Complexes, conflicts etc. in the unconscious consume energy in most cases without cognizable productive result or creative manifestations. It is then clear that a person with less complexes, conflicts etc. will have more energy at his disposal. It is also clear that for the utilization of psychic energy the actual fulfillment of a wish in reality is not the main question. The fulfillment of a wish in dream, day-dream, fantasy etc. are good examples in favour of the above view in which also the same psychic energy is invested.
Our main concern is the nature of utilisation of psychic energy in the wish fulfilment. When actually a wish is felt as fulfilled really matters. It is not merely when we get the object or the pleasurable situation we seek. Quite often it is found that the wish remain unsatisfied even when we have it in plenty. It is, then, possible to conclude that contentment or fulfilment of a wish depends not only on getting the objects connected with the wish but on the particular components, manners, duration, possibility of getting it back as and when desired.

The flocked energy will thus be released. Once again, a wish may be very simple or have several components. In the latter case, energy employed in each component must be released to gain satisfaction. In case the amount of energy invested in a wish is not released, the unspent residue of energy is not usually withdrawn from the wish. This kind of energy unspent may create tension in the mind that tries to seek release in one way or other. If a suitable substitute is not found by ego, the tension may create further complexities which under certain circumstances may break out into mental symptoms such as of neurosis etc.

There is also another condition in which the free flow of psychic energy is checked. Instead of all our demands, ideas and fantasies being psychological, yet in some cases the desired quantity or quality of the object or even the object itself may not be available. The energy already psychically invested may thus fail to be fully and effectively utilised and create accordingly a tension. The situation is when we
expect pleasure or something specific from some imaginary object or object not available in reality, i.e., when the demand or the nature of the wish is but a fantasy. In scientific pursuit and in the field of many art-creation, our energy is invested in the ideas and contemplations. However, when these ideas and contemplations cross the limit of probability, the scheme becomes fantastic. Often our abilities are overestimated by ourselves, thus falling into fantasy.

In such cases a satisfactory solution of the comparative amount of energy employed in judging the reality and maintaining the ideas decide the issue. The more of energy used in a given span of time over an area of a mental work, the more strong it becomes, i.e., in case the wish is strong, the investment of energy is more. Persistence in a mental belief, thought or any other mental activity, shows a continuous flow of psychic energy along that line. The strength of the mental activity or work depends on the amount of energy spent in it within a specified time.
II

Discussion

It is quite significant to point out that Freud's instinct theory can be treated as of the same class with similar theory of other psychologists, especially modern. It is in the sense that his theory emphasizes the role of a drive, a need, an urge, an impetus in the individual in his behaviour. But to call them instinct separately or jointly is much against the views of these modern psychologists. Even if the term, "instinct", is to be retained, they minimize its importance to the extent that there cannot be something called instinct.

The grounds and purposes on which the term, instinct is rejected or reduced in its importance by the modern psychologists who are mostly environmentalists, socio-culturalists, etc. are manifold and manisided. First, these psychologists have a firm intention to emphasize their stand points. Generally, an environmentalist is not supposed to advocate or defend the theory of innate drives. So just to make the role of the socio-cultural factors in the limelight, the question of instinct is kept aside. Even neo-Freudians join the camp in a more or less degree. "The position taken several decades ago by Mary S t a c k Sullivan (and by most American social scientists to-day) holds that man, of all creatures on earth, is the one least dominated by instinct. They argue that we must give our attention to the forces that dominate man-culture, society, and inter personal relations."14

14. Ego and Instinct - D. Yankelovich and W. Barrett, p. 353
Second, the term, instinct, is liable to be mixed up with many concepts and traits of the human psyche. With a view to making its concept naked, attempts were made by some psychologists. Dr. Rivers was making attempts to make a clear-cut discussion between instinct and intelligence. Regarding the majority of instincts which are found playing roles in the lives of the child and the animals, he found a principle following the footsteps of B.D. Adrian and others. One of the outstanding characteristics of instinct is that reaction or behaviour produced does not admit any graduation in respect of the conditions that excite the response, thereby rendering the law of relativity of Fechner inapplicable here. Rivers observes that "All-or-none" reaction as trained by Adrian in physiology is applicable to majority of instinctive responses or reactions.

According to Rivers the large body of emotive and instinctive reactions are buried in the unconscious by vast materials of intellectual reactions in adult life. Instinctive behaviour was divided by him into two classes according as they are or are not subject to the all-or-none principle, e.g., protopathic and epioritic.15 He finds some distinguishing marks of one class of instincts. He writes, firstly, the absence of exactness of discrimination, of appreciation and graduation of response; secondly, the character of reacting to the conditions with energy available; thirdly, the explosive and uncontrolled character of the response.16

15. The Instinct and the Unconscious - Dr. Rivers, p. 51
16. Ibid., p. 48
The nature of instinct was discussed by W. Brown mainly with regard to the concept upheld by Modougall. According to him, instinctive behaviours are independent of previous experience. Intelligence, on the other hand, was capable of modifying such behaviours in the light of previous experience of the individual. "Instinctive activity is independent of previous experience. Intelligence is the power of modifying instinctive or purposive activity in the light of previous experience."17

The attempts of the psychologists so far as it goes in this line are alright. But we shall see that it changes its course and takes another turn, laying stress on the nature of instinct being mixed up with neighbouring concepts as mentioned already.

Modougall explains that emotions are closely connected with instincts, by making a list of emotion parallel to that of instinct. These instincts in conjunction with the relevant emotions (as decided by him), both primary and secondary or its derivatives, become gradually modified and highly complicated through experience. In men, particularly, the elements and relations of wholes are mentally separated through conceptual abstraction giving rise to very complicated nature of human behaviour.18 Such instinctive activities are subjected to different processes of specialization and generalization, paving the way for the formation of a cluster of emotional dispositions

17. Mind and Personality - W. Brown, p. 52
18. Personality and Will - F. Aveling, pp. 121-124
Sentiments are habitual attitude of mind towards an object or objects, persons and abstract ideas. It is clear that habit is an important basis for the formation of the desirable sentiments. A sentiment is, in a sense, compounded of a number of potential emotions and impulses, any one of which we may feel according to the circumstances in which we see or think of its objects. In this way, our higher nature, instead of its being rooted in instincts, lower impulses, emotions, are by no means subject to them and human personality enjoys more and more freedom by virtue of intelligence and reason. In the footsteps of A.F. Shand, W. Brown treats sentiment as "an organised system of emotional dispositions,

19. Ibid., pp. 139-140
20. The Bearings of Modern Psychology - C.H. Meredith, p. 72
centred about the idea of some object."\(^{21}\)

It is now enlightening that dispositions are organized through variety of experiences of personal life under the propulsion of the self-assertion instinct leading to self-regarding sentiment. McDougall considers it as the master sentiment, it being at the basis of character-formation. The greater the organization of sentiments and dispositions, the greater the integrity of will and character. The higher we proceed in the scale of personality development, the lesser are the conflicts and strain, and the greater in the freedom we enjoy owing to the integration of personality and character.\(^{22}\)

Character has been defined as a group of dynamic traits (instincts and attitudes) united in a structure which controls unorganized impulses in the interest of ethical standards and other more remote goals of the self.\(^{23}\) One of great importance is the habit in the formation of character. Will is a partial expression of personality and also a conative expression of character. So character, in another sense, may be treated as habit of will. Character is thus the permanent mental structure of dispositions, sentiments, motives expressing itself in a specific conative tendency. Such tendency as expressed outwardly, is called conduct or behaviour. The instinctive factors working in volitional activities help

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22. Ibid., p. 72
23. An Introduction to Personality Study - R.B. Catell, pp. 21-22
the character-formation and personality-growth. "Character of
the finest type is that which is complex, strongly and
harmoniously organized and directed towards the realization of
higher goals ... 24

I think I had gone a bit far from the main topic of
our discussion, only to point out that instinct is involved in
a net-work of several psychological concepts. Consequent on
its being so, a lot of intricacies are invited as soon as we
start talking of what instinct is. Perhaps it is due to this
fact that psychologists are inclined to make the question of
instinct a 'closed chapter'.

Third, Medougall was taking a bold step by making a
list of fourteen different instincts and their corresponding
emotions. A cold reception was given to this step. Other
psychologists as well made many ventures in this field. They
are all defeated as to the question of basic or fundamental
instincts. The prolonged dependence of the child on its
parents or seniors before its final preparation for independent
life on earth gives ample scope for the formation and
manifestation of various traits with which basic instincts are
confused.

Fourth, there is a general trend among the modern
psychologists that accuracy, directness, simplicity,
observableness should be the criteria for treating psychology
as a science subject. It follows that psychology be made a

24. Outlines of Psychology - Medougall, p. 417
subject which can be studied in the laboratory as the natural sciences. The concept of instinct serves as an obstacle and hence its being comparatively deserted.

Fifth, Freud's overriding interest in sex and its derivatives whenever he talks of instinct gives a dead blow, if not final, to the decadent attitude of the psychologists towards instinct. His interest was, however, shifted to aggressive and death facets of instinct. That did not, however, completely loosen the tight hold of sex on instinct. Jung and Adler, gifted disciples of Freud, defected from the master on certain issues of which sex is perhaps the most prominent.

The survey that has been made so far on the issue of instincts losing ground is on the basis of some significant factors as enumerated above. Numerous arguments of such kinds and others cannot, however, confirm the total sweeping out of instincts from the human organism. Most probably it will be that psychologists fail to describe and explain the impetus or need or drive or urge, as we may call any. On the other hand, instinct and their vicissitudes are inseparably linked up with psychoanalysis and its derivatives, to the extent that when the former is eliminated, the latter is reduced to zero entity. Let us now see the relationship between the two.

"Where a little girl is described by her parents as an "affectionate understanding, uncomplaining little thing", the analyst will not the conspicuous absence of the usual greed and aggression of childhood. Where the parents stress
on elder sibling's love for babies the analyst will look for the fact of the absent jealousies. Where a child is correctly described by the parents as "incurious and not interested in matters such as difference between the sexes, the origin of babies, the relationship between the parents, it is obvious to us that an insurmountable battle has been fought which has led to the conscious extinction of normal human curiosity." 25

The battle (let us call so) between Freud and the modern psychologists will be terminated, I suppose, in case we refer to the theory of drive as propounded by Marx. He made a division of the drive into fixed or constant and relative categories. Sex, hunger etc. are fixed drives and avarice is relative drive. In the one case, there is little change in all times and places except in form and duration in different social set-ups. In the other case, form, direction, matter - all changes. This point was discussed in the preceding chapter also.

Advocating the hermio theory and formulating the principle of mental energy, Medougall stood rather close to Freud. In appreciation of the latter's contribution to the understanding of human nature, Medougall was of the opinion that much of value and relative truth had been found in the writings of Freud. He further observed, "And yet I hold that every bit of such truth is mixed almost inextricably with error; or embedded in masses of obscure implications and highly

questionable and misleading propositions.\textsuperscript{26}

Jung enlarged the concept of libido and modified its sexual character in Freudian sense. For Jung, it was the total vital energy of the individual expressing itself in different forms - growth, reproduction, etc. Jungian concept has close boundaries with 'elan vital' of Henri Bergson, 'horne' of McDougall, 'will-to-love' of Schopenhauer. From the clinical findings in his free association tests he made a distinction between two terms (belonging to him) - 'predisposing cause' and 'exciting cause'. According to Jung, the cause of the neuroses could be traced to the present and not to the past. Two prominent types of personality keeping with the theory of libido (Jung's theory) were explained by him - introverts and extroverts. Apart from these two intermediate types, another eight types of personality were also explained by Jung. The postulation of polar forces for Jung was not for explaining conflicts and maladjustments as for Freud but for synthesis in the process of growth and development. According to Jung, four kinds of mental activity - thinking, sensation, perception, intuition and feeling - are seen working in two types of persons, viz., introverts and extroverts, the first and the last forming one group while the remainings form the other group.

On the issue of instincts being treated as the source of psychic energy, it is possible and necessary to ask which instincts or which parts of which instincts are utilised for being converted into psychic energy.

\textsuperscript{26} Contemporary Schools of Psychology - R.S. Woodworth, p. 230
We are prompted to ask this question on the basis that instincts are what is to be gratified, on the one hand. On the other hand, the mental apparatus will work for gratification utilizing the energy derived from these instincts. Two answers are possible. First, it may be supposed that there might be some pending energy left in the mental apparatus. But this energy will not last long and it is certain that it will be so. The problem will be all there for the next batch of instincts and so on. Another defect in this answer is that the wish in question is not cathexed. Second, it may be assumed that one part of the instinct to be gratified is converted into psychic energy and utilized accordingly. But we can ask as to why one part should be converted into psychic energy. Even if taking it as the basic assumption, then there must be certain facts and arguments in its favour. Freud did not advance arguments in this direction.

In the causation of neurosis, the roles of the psychic energy and wish are very crucial. Any of them, where singled out, cannot have enough strength to effect neurosis. It is a 'must' to establish the close relationship in between them and that will largely make the role of instincts in neurosis crystal clear. Freud's views on this are, however, not complete.