CHAPTER-V

IMPLICATION FOR METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION

INTRODUCTION:

Metaphysics may be briefly characterized as an attempt to discover the most general and pervasive facts about the world. No science is a subject to such contrary as metaphysics. Many philosophers have supposed that one could discover such facts through a consideration of fundamental feature of language we use to talk about the world. The term “metaphysics” has different connotation in the history of philosophy. Traditionally, it has been regarded that metaphysics deals with the essential and absolute nature of reality a whole or of the nature of being as such i.e. the search of ‘first principle’. However, its evaluation has changed several times even since Kant. What is most perplexing is that one cannot find any single definition and also correct valuation of metaphysics. Here I would like to discuss the views of logical positivist’s at any rate on the concept on metaphysics and to observe how they attack on traditional metaphysics.
The term metaphysics is derived from the Greek term “ta meta to phusica”, which describes the first philosophy as a set of principles which comes after physics. This is originally means “what comes after physics” and generally refers to the works of Aristotle that followed his physics in the collection made by Andronicus. Aristotle defines metaphysics “as a science which investigate being as being and the attributes which belong to it in virtue of its own nature”\(^1\). According to Aristotle, these first causes or principles need not exist in some world other than we live but are very much part and parcel of this phenomenal world. Being a natural philosopher, his intensions in introducing the term ‘metaphysics’ were something different as otherwise thought to be. His first philosophy was rather concerned with the causes of phenomena, which could be unraveled by scientific investigation. Such causes, for Aristotle, constitute the essence of reality. There are large but number of things that for the most part belong to definite species, i.e. of plant and animal kingdoms. Eventually, however, the term metaphysics become popular in history of philosophy as signifying that branch of philosophical enquiry which goes beyond physical events or substances.
The medieval and modern philosophers interpreted metaphysics in their own way. According to some interpretations, metaphysics deals with super-sensible reality. To some it deals with the reality that transcends the limits of sensory observation and to others it deals with the status of ultimate reality. In all these three cases, more than anything, the term “reality” is in need of clarification. If one would like to interpret metaphysics as a doctrine that deals with super-sensible reality then there are several scientific entities which are not apprehended by ordinary sense-perception. For example, none of the senses could provide us with any clue about the structure of atom, energy, time, consciousness etc. In spite of their imperceptible nature these entities are very much part and parcel of this physical world. Physicists say that matter can be converted into energy but energy is not seen or touched. We can only feel the manifestations of the energy. Though these scientific entities are imperceptible, they do not transcend the limits of empirical investigation. Still they are metaphysical entities in one sense of the term.

There are another set of entities which are neither perceptible nor empirically verifiable. They are entities like Brahman, Atman, Absolute spirit God, soul etc. If one were to consider the view
that metaphysics is concerned with the status of ultimate reality then what science views as ultimately real can also be called metaphysical. Unless one makes it clear as to how one interprets the term metaphysics, it is very difficult to derive the exact meaning from it. Keeping all these difficulties in mind, we would like to interpret metaphysics as the science or doctrine, which deals with the status of ultimate reality. It is immaterial whether reality is perceptible or imperceptible but must be knowable. Anything that is knowable must be provable, hence accessible to all. As pointed out by Hegel, anything that is not knowable does not exist. Therefore, we have every reason to conclude that there are a knowable world, i.e. the world in which we live. For a finite being it is this material world which is ultimately real. This is the point where the differences between physics and metaphysics disappears if we view it properly.

Logical positivists hold that metaphysics is a doctrine, which deals with the entities that do not come under the preview of sensory experience; they want to eliminate metaphysics from the sphere of philosophy. But the consequences of the project, namely, the elimination of metaphysics proves too costly for logical positivists. However, the project undertaken by the logical positivists is not all
that new in the history of philosophy. Hume consigns all "metaphysics" to flames for it can contain nothing but "sophistry and illusion". Even Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) at least in one phrase of his critical world (Critique of pure Reason) attempts to show that 'metaphysics' of a certain sort was impossible. According to Kant, the human understanding can grasp only what can be experienced. For Kant, the term "experience" includes both formal element (categories of understanding) and material element (the information supplied by senses). But the reason, Kant holds, strives to go beyond the confines of the understanding to conceive the super-sensible for which we have no object in perception. To quote Kant's remarks on the transcendental kind of metaphysics:

"Metaphysics is a completely isolated speculative science of reason, which soars far above the teaching of experience, and in which reason is indeed mean to be its own pupil." ²

Thus, Kant argues that we cannot have knowledge of the super-sensible, because our knowledge is confined to the world of phenomena only, while the neumenal entities transcend our sphere of knowledge. This is what Kant says about the impossibility of a certain
sort of metaphysics. In the early 20th century Auguste Comte (1798-1857), a well-known French positivist attempted to show that “metaphysics” is one of the stages of man’s intellectual development. It is, according to Comte, a speculative doctrine concerning the ‘essences’ and ‘causes’ of phenomenon. Comte claims to reject metaphysics as a stage on the way to positive knowledge and it is the stage from which the world has outgrown. Comte envisages that positivist’s stage in the culmination of the evolution of human thought, which has passed from ‘theological stage’ to the ‘metaphysical stage’ then to the ‘positive stage’. At the first stage, Comte assumes that reality is made dependent on divine beings; at the second stage these religious ideas have been replaced by speculative thinking about natural phenomena and the third stage the human mind recognizes the impossibility of acquiring absolute knowledge and gives up the idea of investigating the origin and the purpose of the universe. Comte considers that the sole object of science is to discover ‘natural laws’ or the constant relations existing between the facts and these can be done only by observation and experience. Knowledge, thus Comte says acquired, is the positive knowledge and only such
knowledge can be successfully applied to various fields of human practice as is verified by positive sciences.\textsuperscript{3}

5.1. WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT:

Wittgenstein declares in the \textit{Tractatus} that metaphysics was meaningless and metaphysicians talked nonsense. He held that metaphysicians has no warrant to speak as they did: they had warrant to proceed with the discussion of ‘God’, ‘Reality’, ‘Whole’, ‘Nothing’, ‘Being’, ‘Organism’ and so on, because these did not fall within the limit of the sayable or the expressible. He maintained that what could not be meaningfully said could not be fruitfully studied; one must refrain from proceeding with the study of that which fell outside the scope of the sayable or the expressible. He clinches the issue into what has becomes to-day a slogan in the logical positivist circle, that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” \textsuperscript{4} and if one treads in where one should not, then one would get into meaningless muddles.

In the \textit{Tractatus} he had argued that any attempt to articulate metaphysical propositions must unavoidably transgress the bounds of sense – all metaphysical assertions are nonsense. This
negative claim was a guiding light for the Vienna Circle’s anti
metaphysical crusade. Wittgenstein laid down the bounds of
knowledge to make room for ineffable metaphysics, which is shown
by the form of language, but cannot be said. Thus he did not despised
metaphysics. He remarked to Drury that he regarded some of the great
metaphysical systems of the past as among the noblest productions of
the human mind. But he added, “For some people it would require an
heroic effort to give up this short of writing”. 5 The “heroic effort ”is
precisely what is needed by those who are tempted by the mysteries of
Platonism in mathematics (such as Frege), the wonders of mental
substances (such a Descartes), the vision of logic as the mirror of the
logical structure of the world (such as Wittgenstein). It involves
abandoning certain combination of words as senseless (e.g. ‘abstract
objects’, or ‘immaterial substances’, ‘constituents of facts’, and that
itself may necessitate a painful resignation.

Wittgenstein has never said and would never have said
‘metaphysics is non sense’ or the ‘inexpressible (what cannot be said)
is just nonsense. What did he say was to: ‘Most of the questions to be
found in philosophical works are not false but non-sensical’. 6
The interpretation of the *Tractatus* contends that it is not anti-metaphysical. On the contrary, he was defending metaphysics in a way similar to theologian’s attempt to defend religion by saying, ‘All attempts to prove the existence of God are nonsense, for it is not a question of proof at all - it is a matter of faith’. ⁷

In his “*Philosophical Investigations*” he maintains that, though most of the metaphysical propositions are verbal, some of them are “verbal or notional recommendations”; they cannot have the merit of being peculiarly illuminating or penetrating. Wittgenstein further says that, they have the commendable quality of ‘Linguistic penetration’, which shows that the metaphysician is not only a dupe of language but also an occasional reformer of language.

According to Wittgenstein a metaphysical pronouncement is like…. “A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, it is not part of the mechanism”. ⁸ Its main cause is precisely due to the difficulty in understanding the ‘depth grammar’ of some sentences. The form of a metaphysical utterance makes it look like an empirical proposition but it is really a ‘grammatical’ or conceptual one. As Wittgenstein puts it, ‘the essential thing about metaphysics: it
obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual investigation'.

Wittgenstein says that 'metaphysical proposition hides a grammatical rule. That is to say, we destroy the outward similarity between metaphysical proposition and an experiential one'.

Proposition such as 'Every rod has length', 'Sensations are private', 'Time has only one direction' etc. are 'A full-blown pictorial representation of grammar'.

To free us from the misleading forms of metaphysical expressions, Wittgenstein suggests that instead of saying 'one can't' we say "There is no such thing as ...... in this game". He gives examples, 'Not: one cannot castle in draughts' but "there is no castling in draughts"; and instead of "I cannot exhibit my sensation" -- "in the use of the 'sensation', there is no such thing as exhibiting what one has got"; instead of "one cannot enumerate all the cardinal numbers" -- "there is no such things as enumerating all numbers".

Thus according to Wittgenstein, 'grammar tells what kind of object anything is'. It expresses the essence of a thing. When Wittgenstein says in his later writings that the metaphysical propositions are 'nonsense', 'senseless', or 'without sense', he means
that 'Nonsense is produced by trying to express by the use of language what ought to be embodied in the grammar.'  

Wittgenstein explained in his lectures that it was in his peculiar sense that he thought both the realist and the idealist were "talking nonsense". In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein considers attempting to say what cannot be said produces nonsense. Thus in both earlier and later philosophy his view of metaphysics is obvious. As in *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein opposes the typical metaphysical way of expressing certain 'fundamental things' in the empirical form. If we, therefore, think Wittgenstein against metaphysics per se, we should mind his remark about poetry: "Do not forget a poem; even though it is composed in the language of information, it is not used in the language-game of giving information".  

According to Wittgenstein different language-games are like houses of which are built for different purposes. A metaphysical proposition is, as it were, a pretence use of language. Metaphysics pretends to be a kind of science. In this respect Wittgenstein continues to adhere to his earlier insight: 'Philosophy is not one of the natural
Wittgenstein suggested some positive way of looking at metaphysics. He emphasized that although metaphysical statements, taken at their face value, are absurd: the "idea expressed by them is of enormous importance: they exhibit clearly the grammar of certain important words in our language. Our ordinary language 'holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were. And in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions a well." A metaphysician invents a notation, which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious than ordinary language does. A metaphysician in that sense discovered "a new way of looking things. As if he had invented a new way of painting: or again, a new metre or a new kind of song." All of these require great talent and insight. No wounnder he regarded 'the great metaphysical writings of the past as among the noblest production of human mind.'

5.2. DISCUSSION ON WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEW:

In both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein regards metaphysical statements as non-sensical. He is
not attempting to eliminate metaphysics or to end all philosophy; his task is to understand their nature. Wittgenstein had certain sympathy for metaphysical philosophers and that he told one of his students: "Don’t think I despise metaphysics or ridicule it, on the contrary, I regard great metaphysical writings of the past as among the noblest production of the human mind".  

Hume's critique of metaphysics had relied upon the empiricist thesis that all ideas must be derived from experience — a confused principle at best. Kant condemned transcendent metaphysics on the grounds that it wrongly attempted to apply the categories beyond the bounds of possible experience, but took synthetic a priori truths to be descriptions of the conditions of possible experience — truth of the world, but antecedent to experience and derivable from reflection alone. The Vienna Circle condemned transcendent metaphysical assertions on the grounds of their unverifiable, and held mundane necessary propositions to be analytic truths — true by virtue of the meanings of words. Wittgenstein took none of this path. Metaphysical question are indeed misleading, for they express unclarity about the grammar of words (e.g. of the use of ‘I’, ‘mind’, ‘space’, and ‘time’) in the form of scientific question.
Wittgenstein’s point is simply that, philosophical propositions are not false, they do not mis-state facts, which could be correctly stated, they do not state or mis-state any facts at all, they are merely look like propositions but in reality not propositions in the strict sense. The attempt to say something about what transcends the world results in nonsense. In other words, to present a pseudo-proposition in the light of a genuine proposition results in nonsense. In other words, this does not mean that Wittgenstein was anti-metaphysical, although he was certainly critical of the traditional metaphysical philosophers who presented their sentences as ‘propositions’. It is significant that Wittgenstein made it a point of saying that most traditional ‘philosophical propositions’ are nonsensical. But he did not say that poetry consist of nothing but nonsensical propositions, although sentences in most poems would clearly fall under that category if they are treated as ‘propositions’. The reason behind this is that, poetries unlike metaphysics treatise are not usually presented as consisting of ‘propositions’ which state some truths about the world. Thus he criticizes metaphysics because it has been presented in empirical form, not because it deals with unimportant matters. Metaphysics deals with very important matters—
it is concerned with the ground of language, and consequently, of reality.

For Wittgenstein, metaphysics, ethics, religion and art all belong to the realm of the transcendental, which cannot be said but only shown. It would be nonsense to contend that, 'what is impossible is just nonsense and nothing else'. The inexpressible is everything hit is important in life. The whole point of *Tractatus* is precisely to show the inexpressible by exhibiting clearly the expressible.

Wittgenstein later philosophy is not anti-metaphysical; although it is non-metaphysical. His main task is to understand the nature of metaphysics and his contribution, above all, lies in suggesting a new way of looking at philosophy.

His positive attitude towards metaphysics and religion is clearly shown in Carnap's report: “Once when Wittgenstein talked about religion, the contrast between his and Schlick's position became strikingly apparent. Both agreed, of course, in the view that the doctrines of religion in their various forms had no theoretical content. But Wittgenstein rejected Schlick's view that the religion belonged to the childhood phase of humanity and would, slowly, disappear in the
course of cultural development. Whereas Schlick, on another occasion, made a critical remark about a metaphysical statement by a classical philosopher (I think it was Schopenhauer) Wittgenstein surprisingly turned against Schlick and defended the philosopher and his works." 25 Wittgenstein’s positive attitude towards metaphysics is abundantly substantiated by some publication of Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’ and Waismann’s ‘Notes on talks with Wittgenstein’. 26 He is reported to have said in 1929, “Man has the urge to thrust against the limits of language. Think for instance about one’s astonishment that anything exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question and there is no answer to it. Anything we can say must, *a priori*, be only nonsense. Nevertheless we thrust against the limits of language..... But the tendency, the thrust, and points to something.....I can only say: I don't belittle this human tendency. I take hat off to it... For me the facts are unimportant. But what men mean when they say that “The world exist” lies close my heart” 27

Regarding ethics Wittgenstein said in his lecture: “My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of
language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help – respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.” 28 Thus from the above account there is no doubt that his attitude towards metaphysics is the same.

It is significant that Wittgenstein did not formulate metaphysical theory as a result of an inductive survey of history of philosophy. His samples were taken from his own philosophy or of some selected philosophers, like Russell and Ramsey. It was a pure coincidence that he came across numerous paradoxes and was thus led to generalize about the nature of philosophy.

Wittgenstein theory of metaphysics did not impart justice to the element of ‘linguistic penetration’ which Wisdom finds in metaphysical statements, besides the elements of linguistic confusion. Wittgenstein would have used to be cured of metaphysics while Wisdom might conceive at our being lured into it. Wittgenstein seems
to have missed or overlooked the positive functions of metaphysical theories and worldviews, namely, an existential unification of the basic features of human experience. Though he analyses the various functions of words and expressions, he does not analysed the function of the world view like Theism, idealism, Humanism etc.

In spite of these Wittgenstein made the outstanding contribution of our times to the growth and enrichments of metaphysics. Philosophical problem that do respond to Wittgenstein’s linguistic therapy are so many and so scattered, that we must be grateful to his analytic technique.

5.3. AYER’S VIEW ON MEAPHYSICS:

Ayer in defense of logical positivist tenets proclaims that the reason to oppose metaphysics is that metaphysician always tries to explain reality as a whole and attempted to describe super-sensible world in such a way as if it were given to sensory experience. In this sense, holds Ayer, metaphysics is not only speculative but also nonsensical.

Thus Ayer holds metaphysics as: “The positivist flavour of their thought comes out most strongly in their hostility to
metaphysics. Metaphysics, which they construed as covering such allegedly philosophical enterprises as the attempt to describe reality as a whole, or to find the purpose of the universe, or to reach beyond the everyday world to some supra sensible spiritual order, was condemned by them as being unduly speculative, or even as being false, but as a being literally non-sensical". 29

Ayer asserts that, it is impossible to go beyond sensory experiences. Ayer questions the veracity of metaphysical statements. What are the premises from which the statements of metaphysics are deduced? What kind of reasoning does lead metaphysicians to arrive at such a conclusions? Ayer remarks that there is no other way for a metaphysician except empirical verification to infer anything about the nature of the reality. But a metaphysician might say, “that he was endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which enabled him to know facts that could not be know through sense-experience”. 30 A metaphysician might think that it is a legitimate method to approach the reality of transcendental kind. Perhaps Ayer felt that it is not an easy task to overthrow his claim that the transcendental nature of reality is derived from the premises supplied by intellectual intuition. The only alternative left for Ayer is to attack metaphysician on logical
ground. This is where Ayer and other logical positivists claim to add logical rigour to the traditional empiricism of Hume.

Ayer argues:

“Our charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a field where it can’t be profitably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant”.31

Ayer considers existence as the empirical existence and transcendental existence. A thing which is experienceable through sense organs is called empirical and all assertions about facts so experienceable are verifiable in experience. The reality which is not within the field of anyone’s observation and whose knowledge is said to be due to some faculty other than the sense organs are transcendental and they are beyond experience. So they are not empirically verifiable. According to Ayer, “There is no place in the empirical world for many of these entities (Metaphysical concepts). A special non-empirical world is involved to house them.”32
Ayer makes a distinction between metaphysics and philosophy. According to him philosophy and science are closely linked. He says that metaphysics has no relation to philosophy because metaphysics is said to about a region, which has no connection with the observable facts, and none of metaphysical statements are verifiable scientifically. He also says that if we try to verify the metaphysical proposition by an empirical test we find them intractable, i.e. unverifiable by any empirical means. And if here unable to verify a statement by these means we must reject it, and so they are meaningless. For example, the concept of God is interactable of being empirically verified. We cannot know anything about God through intuition; the intuition is undeterminable by any scientific means. Therefore, there are no criteria to distinguish between intuitive knowledge and hellucination.

5.4. DISCUSSION ON AYER'S VIEW ON METAPHYSICS:

Ayer provides a linguistic turn to the problems related to metaphysics. Even in this case Ayer’s interests do not seems to be safe because a metaphysician might claim that the statements of metaphysics conform to the conditions supplied by him. So it is not a
happy hunting ground for an avowed empiricist like Ayer to venture into the field of metaphysics. In spite of all these impediments, Ayer put forwarded the 'Principle of Verification', which would enable him to distinguish meaningful statements from the meaningless assertions of metaphysics. In an attempt to justify his claim, Ayer introduces 'the principle of verification' as criteria of meaning.

In his first edition professor Ayer undertook to demonstrate the validity of the verification principle i.e. that only verifiable statements are meaningful. He also said of the metaphysician "he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant." Further he argued that "one can't overthrow a system of transcendent metaphysics merely by criticizing the way in which it comes in to being." i.e. presumably, merely by refuting the arguments its author brings forward for it. In the new introduction to his second edition he realizes that the metaphysician can say: "Of course metaphysical statements are meaningless on your arbitrary definition of meaningful as verifiable. One ever thought they were verifiable. But this leaves quite unaffected the question whether, in some ordinary sense of the term, they are meaningful." And indeed one can
imagine an adherent of common sense, and as like Malcolm saying:
"That is not the way we speak. We say metaphysical statements are
deep or profound or obscure; we do not say they are meaningless."
Thereafter, Ayer reduces his claims. There is, he reduces, "at least one
proper use of the word 'meaning'". in which the principle of
verification is true; and only if they have meaning in this sense
statements can be true or false. The principle itself is a definition of
meaning, which "is not supposed to be entirely arbitrary." But "It is
indeed open to anyone to adopt a different criterion of meaning and so
to produce an alternative definition which may very well correspond
to one of the ways in which the word 'meaning' is commonly used."
Moreover, "for the effective elimination of metaphysics it needs to be
supported by the detailed analysis of particular metaphysical
arguments."

The first and most influential deduction, which Ayer
draws, is that metaphysical statements are literally meaningless. He
wrote "If a putative proposition [i.e. an utterance which purports to be
true or false] fails to satisfy this principle [the VP], and is not a
tautology, then that is metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, it is
neither true nor false but literally senseless." He continues about
metaphysics. "We may accordingly define metaphysical sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypotheses from the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical". This argument is a deduction from Ayer's eccentric definition of "metaphysical sentence", and from his VP, which he presented, in 1946 though not in 1936, as a definition of "meaning".

A point, which Ayer seems to overlook, is that this deduction from his own statement implies not only that all metaphysical statements are nonsensical but also that all nonsensical statements are metaphysical statement. Presumably he did not really wish to classify as metaphysical such utterances as "potatoes are lazy" or "the mome raths outgrabe". So there is something indistinct with Ayer's definition on "metaphysical statements", even for his own polemical (verbal attack on a statement) purpose. This point does not seem to have been cited by early critics; probably because they judge Ayer's conception on metaphysics not by his formal definition, but by the examples and arguments which he used when discussing what he
classifies as metaphysical statements; and which suggest that his target
was really a more limited one—not any kind of nonsense, but
statements which assert or assume the existence of unobservable
entities. That this was Ayer's intention seems to be confirmed in the
Introduction to Revised Edition: 'I take it to be characteristic of the
metaphysician, in my somewhat pejorative sense of the term, not only
that but also that no dictionary is provided by means of which they can
be transformed into statements that. . . Verifiable' 40

Now whether it is safe to define "metaphysics" as
statements (or theories) about unobservable? Surely not. If we are to
do justice to the long tradition of philosophy, any account of
metaphysics must acknowledge that it is concerned with ontological
questions, questions about what exists, what purported entities are
real, fundamental, not analyzable into more basic entities; such
questions as whether minds exist as well as bodies, whether there exist
unchanging abstract entities, 'universal', as well as spatio-temporal
things and events, 'particulars', and so on. If it is granted that
metaphysics is or involves, making claims about what exists, what are
the basic entities in the world and how they are related to each other,
Ayes LT philosophy is metaphysics per excellence. Ayer adopts
what he describes 'a thorough going Phenomenalism', He claims that both mind and bodies are logical constructions out of 'sense contents' (his 1936 synonym for “sense-data”). He says that in asserting only that a physical object exists one would be asserting only that certain sense-contents would occur if certain conditions were fulfilled (p-141). According to Ayer’s account, all of the empirical statements that a person makes must be analysed in terms of (and therefore, really about) his own sense data! If this is not a blazer metaphysical theory, in the normal sense of “metaphysical”, what is? What Ayer did was to use a persuasive definition. He re-defined “metaphysics” so as to make it applicable only to metaphysical theories other than his own. Not a few philosophers were persuaded to accept his eccentric definition. How odd that they should have failed to recognize immediately as metaphysical theory that pre-supposes that nothing (really) exist except sense data. Ayer did not of course say ‘Nothing exists except sense-data’ or ‘Nothing exists which is not observable in principle’. These statements, like their contradictions, are meaningless according to Ayer’s verification principle. But his position involves outlawing as meaningless all ontological theories except the kind of
Neutral Monism which is pre-supposed by Ayer's Phenomenalism and which he had inherited from Hume.

R. Collingwood points out that Ayer's attack on metaphysics are an attack on pseudo-metaphysics. The proposition that 'Metaphysical propositions cannot be verified by appeal to observe facts express characteristically the characteristic positivistic error as to what metaphysics is: the error which converts metaphysical propositions (i.e. propositions about the history of absolute presuppositions) into pseudo-metaphysical rubric. This comes from a blunder of mistaking suppositions for propositions.

Regarding Ayer's use of some metaphysical propositions like 'that there is a non-empirical world of values', 'that men have immortal souls' and 'that there is a transcendent God'. Ayer is repeating the familiar Kantian definition of the subject matter of metaphysics; 'God, freedom and immortality', with the implication that metaphysicians, when they speak of these things, profess to be asserting the existence of what Ayer calls 'empirical matter of fact'.

In the chapter 'The Elimination of Metaphysics' on the same book, Ayer further gives the example of Bradley's sentence 'the
absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress.’

42 According to Collingwood, here Ayer evidently makes the statements which is not of an absolute presupposition made on occasions of a certain kind but of a would be proposition about an empirical matter of fact, which is ‘not even in principle of verification’ and therefore, ‘has no literal significance’. 43 Ayer does not say the assertion was made by whom and in what context, ‘that the world of sense-appearance was altogether unreal’. 44

Ayer except from quoting Bradley’s sentence, he never gives a single example of propositions he is attacking: only he is attacking people who think that they are true (or, for that matter, false) whereas in fact, not being verifiable, they are neither true nor false and are therefore, not propositions but pseudo- prepositions, or as he calls them as ‘putative proposition’. 45

5.5. SCHLICK’S VIEW ON METAPHYSICS:

Moritz Schlick, the chief of the Vienna Circle, and the ‘founder of logical positivism was one of the exceptional positivists who have dealt with the concept of metaphysics seriously. In his early treatise “Erlebnis, Erkenntnis, Metaphysik”, Schlick took up first for
investigation of metaphysics as indirect knowledge of transcendent beings through concepts. According to him, this is in fact a characteristic knowledge in general not peculiar to metaphysics. All knowledge, he says is indirect and is medicated with symbols. Therefore, if metaphysics were so interpreted, it is only, too, evident and metaphysics were possible. But according to Schlick, the suitable definition of metaphysics is “intuition of transcendent objects”.

According to Schlick, the transcendent is the object of knowledge rather than the content of experience, while intuition is a kind of experience rather than knowledge. It follows, therefore, that metaphysics, as intuition of transcendent is impossible. But it is doubtful whether we distinguish intuition from knowledge so strictly.

Schlick further took up the problem of metaphysics in a short treatise called “Positivism and Realism”. In this treatise, he says that he is a positivist insofar as positivism signifies the negation of metaphysics.

On the other hand, however, Schlick explained the usual meaning of metaphysics adapted by the Eleatics, Plato and every later metaphysician. He defines metaphysics as the theory of “true being”,
of "reality in itself", or of "transcendent being". Now, these beings are opposed to spurious, less and apparent being respectively. Apparent being is phenomena, but real and transcendent being is to be attained only by the effort of metaphysicians. 'Special sciences', on the other hand, only undertake the investigation of phenomena, which are acceptable to them.

Schlick further made a distinction between the two meanings of the term "outside world". The one is the outside world in its usual sense, which is the same as what is called 'nature' by physicists. The other is the outside world of the metaphysicians which signifies transcendent being per excellence, viz., that which is over and beyond the empirical world.

5.6. DISCUSSION ON SCHLICK'S VIEW ON METAPHYSICS:

Schlick pointed out two views of metaphysics, via, that which takes it as the conceptual knowledge of transcendent objects and that which takes it as intuitional experience of the same objects. Schlick rejected the former because, it is rather appropriate to science in general, while later was rejected because it involves that contradiction and is, therefore, impossible. Thus task of
metaphysicians was assumed by him to be a kind of experience like poetry.

Intuition usually understood as a direct perception of object; as for Schlick, it is unlikely that he restricted intuition to the sensors. He rather maintained that metaphysics as a science is impossible on the ground that if metaphysical objects were perceived directly, they would form experience rather than thinking. For thinking, according to Schlick, has to be mediated by symbols. This inference by Schlick, however, does not follow of necessity, because there is room for metaphysics to be formed through the combination of intellectual intuition and conceptual thinking through symbols. All traditional metaphysics was constituted of these two kinds of faculty, not of either intuition or thinking exclusively.

The meaning of metaphysics, according to him, is different from that which is generally used in philosophical literature. This amount to saying that he did not deny metaphysics in its ordinary sense, and that, therefore, he was not a positivist in the usual sense. But as to the special meaning of metaphysics in which he denied metaphysics Schlick gave no explanation. Thus he says:
"What the definition of metaphysics is, that would have to be made basic here, does not need to interest us at present; but it scarcely accords with the formulations that are mostly current in the literature of philosophy: and closer definition of positivism that adhere to such formulations lead straight into obscurities and difficulties". 47

Schlick himself admits that his philosophy belongs to positivism, but he distinguishes it from old positivism calling him as 'logical positivist' or 'consistent empiricist'. According to his explanation, it never makes such an assertion as that only what is given is existent, for such an assertion is nonsense. A consistent empiricist does not deny the existence of the outside world, he only points out the empirical meaning of existential propositions. Schlick calls metaphysics is an assertion with regards to the existence of an object rather than the knowledge of transcendent beings. In this point, Schlick resembles Heidgger; both of them regard traditional metaphysics as having been concerned with existence and non-existence of things.

The distinction made by Schlick regarding 'outside world', is due to past philosophers' view that required direct
perception in order to recognize an object. Those philosophers regarded that what cannot be directly experienced or perceived remains unknowable, incomprehensible, transcendent, and belong to the realm of thing-in-themelves. Schlick considered that the error in this conception lay in the confusion of knowledge and acquaintance or experience in his special terminology, according to which experience was equivalent to *Erebnis* (acquaintance) distinguished from *Erfahrung* (consciousness). But this conception of Schlick's inconsistent because as an empiricist he identifies knowledge with experience.

Schlick considers that, it is doubtful, whether most of the past philosophers required immediate perception in order to know an object. As far as perception is literally taken as sensuous faculty, this was not the case. Again, if the notion of perception contains intellectual as well sensuous intuition, most of philosopher did not admit that there is anything, which cannot be perceived by this faculty. Schlick himself mentioned Schopenhauer and Bergson as representatives of the metaphysician who considered that the object of metaphysics was to be perceived by this kind of intellectual intuition. The metaphysical outside world is transcendent of sense-experience, but this does not amount to saying that it transcends experience in
general, but it may mean that it is inconceivable. Therefore, it was Kant and his empirical followers who regarded transcendent being as utterly inconceivable.

5.7. CARNAPE'S CONCEPT ON METAPHYSICS:

Carnap in his book *Elimination* also attacked metaphysics, he says, the development of modern logic made it possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the validity and justification of metaphysics. Carnap argues:

... “The researches of applied logic or theory of knowledge, which aim at clarifying the cognitive content of scientific statements lead to a positive and negative result. The positive result is worked out in the domain of empirical science; the various concepts of the branches of science are clarified; their formal logical and epistemological connections are made explicit. In the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless. There with a radical elimination of metaphysics is attained, which was not yet possible from the earlier anti-metaphysical standpoint”.48
"The metaphysical" concept of reality, according to Carnap is the issue in which dispute between ‘realism, idealism and phenomenalism’ arises. He characterized metaphysics as independence from the cognizing consciousness. Carnap argues in sec 176 that this concept “does not belong within (rational) science”. Because no notion of “independence from consciousness” suitable to needs of the dispute “can be constructed”.

Carnap also adopts the verifiability theory of meaning in 1928, and he employed the verifiability principle to attack traditional metaphysics: And this, of course, is the basis for more straightforwardly empiricist interpretations of Carnap’s underlying anti-metaphysical attitude.

....“The view that metaphysical sentences and questions are non-cognitive was based on Wittgenstein’s principle of verifiability. This principle says first, that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions of its verification and, second, that a sentence is meaningful if and only if it is in principle verifiable, that is, if there are possible, not necessarily actual circumstances which, if they did
occur, would definitely establish the truth of the sentence. This principle of verifiability was later replaced by the more liberal principle of confirm ability".  

Carnap's introduction of 'Logical syntax' makes it possible a peculiarity philosophical vantage point from which rest of knowledge surveyed. Thus he says:

...."Metaphysical philosophy tries to go beyond the empirical scientific questions of a domain of science and to ask questions concerning the nature of the objects of the domain. These questions we held to be pseudo-questions. The non-metaphysical logic of science, also, takes a different point of view from that of empirical science not, however, because it assumes any metaphysical transcendency, but because it makes the language-forms themselves the objects of a new investigation. On this view, it is only possible to speak either in or about the sentences of this domain and thus only object sentences and syntactical sentences can be stated".  

Carnap suggests that the obscurities and confusions of traditional metaphysics are the questions concerning the "nature" or "reality" of various entities. Such questions results from attempting to
employ the “material mode of speech”, that is, what Carnap says, is attempting to speak in both the object language and meta-language simultaneously? 52 ‘Philosophical sentences’, according to Carnap, in the material mode, are admissible if, and only if, they are fully translated in to the “formal mode”-that is, into the meta-language of logical syntax, otherwise, they should be rejected as meaningless pseudo-sentences. 53 Carnap further denied that theoretical sentences can be translated into observation sentences (“protocol-sentence”) and maintains that no sentence-not even a protocol sentence is free from revision in progress of science. Thus the antimetaphysical attitude of Vienna is not compromised in Aufbau, Carnap says:

... “The syntactical problems acquire a greater significance by virtue of antimetaphysical attitude represented by the Vienna Circle. According to this view, the sentences of metaphysics are pseudo-sentences, which on logical analysis are proved to be either empty phrases or phrases which violate the rules of syntax. Of the so called philosophical problems, the only questions which have any meaning, are those of the logic of science. To share this view is to substitute logical syntax for philosophy”. 54
5.8. DISCUSSION ON CARNAP'S METAPHYSICS:

Carnap argues about metaphysics, but he did not express any explicit definition of metaphysics nor gives any comprehensive classification of metaphysical propositions.

Metaphysical concept actually does not mean, however, that the notion is metaphysical it cannot be constructed within a phenomenalistic system; rather, according to Carnap, it cannot be constructed within any of the systems considered by construction theory. In other words, the metaphysical concept of reality lies outside the boundaries of science, not simply because it has no experiential or verifiable meaning, but because it has no "constructional" meaning at all. Constructional meaning implies metaphysics has no "logical", "rational non-intuitive" or formal meaning.

Carnap standpoint is much general than phenomenalism – or even empiricism. According to him, metaphysical questions of reality is ultimately dissolved not by ruthless application of there verifiability principle, but by the fact that construction theory itself captures the meaningful core, shared by all parties of to the dispute. In particular Construction Theory agrees with "realism", "idealism", 
"phenomenalism" and even "transcendental idealism" on all "assertions."  

The anti-metaphysical dream of Vienna Circle finally stands or falls, not because with phenomenalism, radical empiricism, and the verifiability principle, but rather with remarkable programmed of Logical Syntax itself. And this programmed, in turn, is best seen as a continuation and development of the earlier, and equally remarkable programme of "Der Logische Aufbau der Welt"

In his book on "Elimination of Metaphysics" Carnap's declares that metaphysics seeks to find and express the knowledge that is inaccessible to empirical science. Carnap divides all propositions having a meaning into three classes: (1) Propositions that are true in virtue of their form alone i.e. tautological or analytical judgments: These propositions, according to Carnap, say nothing of reality. Among these he counts the formulae of logic and metaphysics. (2) Propositions containing a logical contradiction; theses are false in virtue of their very form. (3) The remaining propositions are judgments of experience and belong to empirical science and may be either true or false. The propositions, which do not belong to, those
classes, are devoid of all senses, and he mean by such propositions as
metaphysical.

'Metaphysics' Carnap means not only speculative
metaphysics which claims knowledge on the basis of 'pure reason'
and 'pure intuition' independence of experience, but, through special
kinds of inferences, seeks to know what lies behind direct experience.
(the thing itself). Carnap proceeds to enumerate the metaphysical
trends, which he is combating. These are realism and its opponents:
subjectivism, idealism, solipsism, phenomenalism, and positivism in
its old sense.

Carnap tries to overcome metaphysics by thinking that,
although the enemies of metaphysics existed for a very long time, only
the 'latest logic' can give an answer as to whether metaphysics is
possible, this answer being provided by an analysis of language. This
language analysis reveals that there are word combinations, which,
look like propositions at first glance but which actually are not
propositions are meaningless. This is because either the words
appearing in them are meaningless or, they have meaning, they are
combined in such a way as to break the laws of logic.
According to Carnap:

"In order that a word should have a meaning, it must satisfy the following conditions; (1) the form of the simplest proposition in which this word figures has to be determined (e.g. for the word 'stone' the form of an elementary proposition would be 'X is a stone'), (2) For this elementary proposition there must exist the answer to the question from what propositions can it be deduced? And 'what propositions can be deduced from it?'"

With this criterion, Carnap proceeds to the analysis of 'metaphysical words' and discovers that these words are devoid of significance and meaning. As an example, he takes the word 'principle' in the metaphysical sense of 'the principle of being' or 'the universal principle' etc. and the word 'God'. The word 'principle', Carnap declares, had at first the empirical meaning of 'origin'. The metaphysicians, however, use it in some different, super-empirical sense, which they cannot even define themselves. In the same way 'God' used to have, once upon a time, an empirical meaning, which it has since lost, and which used to denote certain beings inhibiting certain empirical places. According to Carnap, this word has lost its
primary, native meaning but failed to acquire any other. The concepts of 'essence', 'thing per se', 'infinite' and 'absolute' are according to Carnap, just as meaninglessness metaphysical words as the word 'God'.

Thus by analysis of language, Carnap declares: "All metaphysics is meaningless". But, in his words, while metaphysics is devoid of all cognitive content, it is nevertheless useful as an expression of the 'feeling of life' of those individuals who create metaphysical systems. But even in this, Carnap tries to present himself as an irreconcilable opponent of metaphysics: he declares that whereas art (particularly music) is an adequate means of expressing the 'feelings of life', metaphysics is a quite inadequate one since it lays claim to be something, namely, a knowledge, which it cannot be. 'Metaphysics', Carnap says, are musicians without musical talent.56

5.9. SOME REACTION AGAINST CARNAP'S CONCEPT:

V. Brushlinsky says that, in Carnap's metaphysics, there is no question of an actual overcoming of metaphysics or even any understanding of metaphysics because he restricted his universe of discourse to the logical components of language. According to him, before we 'eliminate' metaphysics, we have to understand it as a
means to support certain way of life, a certain political or religious creed. The purpose of eliminating would be to destroy this undesirable ideology. Carnap, however according to Brushlinsky, attempts to separate theory from practice, ignoring the practical goal of metaphysics and declaring it as meaningless. In doing so he criticizes traditional philosophy which contains terms like ‘God’, ‘principle’, ‘real world’ etc. and replaces it by a new metaphysics, in which the ‘real world’ is eliminated and replaced by a ‘scientific world’, which is a system of symbols from which observable facts can be derived.57 Metaphysics consists in the exaggerated role described to some concepts, Carnap himself made use of three metaphysical creeds—idealism, formalism and mechanism.

John Dorway a pragmatist also pointed out that one cannot overcome metaphysics fully by providing that it is meaningless but by understanding it’s meaning fully and exposing it.

5.10. CONCLUSION:

Logical positivists, characteristically regarded Tractatus as the crystallization of there own anti-metaphysical doctrines. As Carnap reports, year later, ‘when we were reading Wittgenstein book
in the circle, I had erroneously believed that his attitude towards
metaphysics was similar to ours. I have not paid sufficient attention to
the statements in his book about the mystical, because his feelings and
thoughts in this area were too divergent from mine. Only personal
contact with him helped me to see more clearly his attitude at this
point. 58

Positivists considered metaphysics to be simply nonsense
and hence to be eliminated. This tendency remains in recent
interpretation of *Tractatus*. According to Pitcher the statement of the
*Tractatus* implies: “metaphysics to be eliminated.” 59 E. Stenius says
that “On the one hand “inexpressible”.... has a positive ring, but on
the other hand Wittgenstein seems to share the positive tendency to
regard it a non sense which does not deserve our attention.... And....
We have a definite feeling that what is inexpressible is just nonsense
and nothing else.” 60

The ground of positivist attack on metaphysics was not an
objection to its method but an objection to its subject matter. If they
had recognized that all thinking involves absolute presuppositions they
would have been eager to find out what, on this or that kind of
occasion, was being thus presupposed. But, owing to their too hasty analysis of scientific thought they failed to recognize the logical function of suppositions in general, and never discovered that there were such things as absolute presupposition at all. What are in fact suppositions they consistently misunderstood as propositions?

R.G. Collingswood says on this account: “Any positivists stands logically committed to the principle that metaphysics is impossible. But at the same time he is quite at liberty to indulge both in metaphysics and in pseudo–metaphysics to his heart’s content, so long as he protests that what he is doing is just ordinary scientific thinking, as scientific thinking is understood by himself: that is, so long as he finds himself disposed for what I call the ‘heads I win’ attitude of pretending that a given absolute presupposition is a generalized from observed facts”

Thus according to Collingwood, the positivists mistake about metaphysics as the mistake of thinking that metaphysics is the attempt to justify by appeal to observed facts the absolute presuppositions of our thought. This attempt is bound to fail because these things, being absolute presuppositions, cannot stand as the
answers to questions and, therefore, the question whether they are justifiable, are identical with the question whether they are true, and it does not logically arise. To ask it is the hallmark of pseudo-metaphysics.

The philosophical view that metaphysics consists of statements that are devoid of sense is not the view it gives one the important the impression of being. It is only states the fact that metaphysical sentences do not express their necessary propositions. But at the same time it uses a familiar word in a new way, so that it looks to be saying one thing, while it actually says something else. It is this new, and yet to be established, use of ‘nonsense’ that is dispute. Some philosophers wish to call metaphysical utterance ‘nonsensical’, and they attain their end by covertly redefining the word, without being explicitly aware of what they are doing. The sting in what they say about metaphysics is in the selection of word upon which they bestow their special meaning. Undoubtedly their choice of word ‘nonsense’ indicates an attitude of disapproval of anyone doing metaphysics: behind the linguistic screen we can detect the emotional evaluation. ‘Metaphysics is trivial and absurd’. We can glimpse the same thing behind the definition of ‘significant proposition’. And
when other philosophers protest that metaphysics is not nonsense, they are protesting against both the evolution and the philosophical use of 'nonsense'.

Therefore, to conclude in, one cannot simply disregard metaphysics or metaphysical statements, although there contain some confusions to achieve in a right direction as metaphysics is the basis upon which the building of analytically in either logical atomism or positivism lie in. Hence on Frege's context philosophy is a disease of which there is a cure and the disease is metaphysics. Even one can call it as therapeutic, for if the treatment is successful then the patient did not worry about. But, if not, if you please an operation the surgeon must perform. Now it is the case with implicit metaphysics. It is also so lucrative that even when one wishes to express completely original thought, one is allowed neglect the concepts one employed. Metaphysicists is never sure about whether a statement like 'I saw a book' is true. If I saw a book in my self I have perfect reasons for believing the proposition. Clearly, the very difficult philosophical notion of certainty has here under the cover of grammar entered in to supportably ordinary discourse. Clearly, the implicit metaphysics is some sort of realism.
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