CHAPTER - IV

ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

INTRODUCTION

The ‘logical positivists’ have given importance to the investigation of language largely due to the importance exerted by Wittengenstein Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus. The central thesis of the book is summarised in the statement that “all philosophy is critique of language”\(^1\) The critical examination of the language we use is no longer to be regarded as a precautionary measure against ambiguity, vagueness, and rhetoric, but a mere preliminary to the serious business of philosophy. Carnap, a leading member of the group urges “once philosophy is purified of all unscientific elements, only logic of science remains.”\(^2\) The ‘logic of science’ would not commonly be thought to mean the same as “the Critique of Language”. But Carnap explains that by the “Logic of science” he means “The syntax of language of science.”\(^3\) By the “Language of Science” again he means that not the technical vocabulary of scientists but the ‘universal’ language in terms of which every fact, whether of common knowledge or of scientific knowledge in a
narrower sense, can be expressed. Thus both Carnap and Wittgenstein agree with the fact that language is the whole subject matter of philosophy. A similar view implicit in Ayer’s remark “that philosophy provides definitions.” ⁴ Schlick, a positivist expressed the importance of language in philosophy, “The whole history of philosophy might have taken a very different course if the minds of great thinkers has been more deeply impressed by the remarkable fact that there is such a thing as language.” ⁵ Here I am going to emphasize different views on language put forwarded by various logical positivists time to time and to discuss it in a brief manner.

4.1. WITTGENSTEIN’S VIEWS ON THE CONCEPT ON LANGUAGE:

Wittgenstein’s theory of Language in the ‘Tractatus’ has two components: the ‘picture theory’ and the ‘Truth Function Theory’. These two theories are designed to answer the questions “What is the function of language? “And what is the structure of language?” Since language is conceived as ‘the totality of propositions’, the two questions are transformed to the matter that “How are propositions related to one another? This is why Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebook “My whole task consists in
Wittgenstein assumes that if we can see language to talk about the world there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth and falsities are not determined by the other propositions but by the world; these he called "elementary proposition". Elementary propositions understand non-elementary ones, and their truth and falsity are determined by the elementary propositions. Accordingly the two questions above now take the following forms: that "How are elementary propositions linked with the world? And how are the complex propositions related to elementary ones? His answer is that, elementary propositions are 'logical pictures' of atomic facts - the basic kind of facts, which cannot be further analysed; and all complex propositions are 'truth functions' of the elementary ones.

"All propositions of our everyday language just as they stand are in perfect logical order." He further states in his *Notebook* "I only want to justify the vagueness of ordinary propositions, for it can be justified." In the *Tractatus* he employs a purely *a priori* method to show that vague propositions are really not vague at all as their logical structure is revealed by analysis. He
says in the *Investigations*, "We ask: What is language? What is proposition?" And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all; and independently of any further experience." \(^9\) It is precisely in this a priori search for the once-for all solutions to philosophical problems that the *Tractatus* contrasts most sharply to the *Investigations*.  

Wittgenstein wrote in his *Notebook*, "In all the propositions that occur to me there occur names, which, however, must disappear on further analysis. I know that such a further analysis is possible, but am unable to carry it out completely. In spite of this I certainly seem to know that if the analysis is completely carried out its result would have to be a proposition which once more contained names, relations etc. In brief it looks as if in this way I know a form without being acquainted with any single example of it. I see that analysis can be carried further, and can, so speak, not imagine its leading to anything different from the species of propositions that I am familiar with." \(^10\) Thus although he was not able to carry out in practice a complete analysis and gives examples of elementary propositions and what they must be like. In
the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein says that, the actual process of analysis belongs to the application of logic; it is an empirical matter, which is of no concern to Wittgenstein's 'logical' investigation.

The *a priori* nature of Wittgenstein's method is clearly indicated in his conclusions about 'elementary propositions'. He says "If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions, then everyone who understands proposition in their unanalyzed form must know it."11

"It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consists of names in immediate combinations."12

The *a priori* character of Wittgenstein's method is most clearly manifested in the way he arrived at the notions of elementary proposition and atomic fact. An elementary proposition is simply one that can't be analysed any further, more basic propositions. All ordinary propositions are complex, they can be analysed into other, simpler propositions, and these, in turn, could be further analysed into a class of absolutely basic propositions of which no such further analysis is possible - these are elementary proposition.
“An elementary proposition consists of names,” 12 “It is a nexus a concatenation of names.” 13 He further says “A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.” 14 A name must refer to something simple something without parts. If a name referred to something complex, it could be defined in terms of its constituents, and hence would not be a name. And if a term in a proposition refers to a complex then if a term in a proposition refers to a complex then the proposition, by definition, cannot be elementary.

‘That which a name refers to is called an object’. “A name refers to an object” 15 “Objects are simple.” 16 In the Notebook, Wittgenstein made his point clear by saying that “it seems that the idea of SIMPLE is already to be found contained in that of the complex and in the idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to this idea quite apart from any example of simple objects, or of propositions which mention them, and we realize the existence of the simple objects a priori as a logical necessity.” 17

Wittgenstein further contends that “the objects make up the substance of the word” 18 “Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects.” 19 It would not be difficult now to see how the
world is structured; it is made up of objects, which hang together in a determinate way to form 'atomic facts', which in turn, make up 'facts' of whatever complexity. It is obvious that each of these, object, atomic fact, and fact alone has its linguistic counterpart called name, elementary proposition, and proposition.

"The configuration of objects produces atomic fact"

20 "In an atomic fact objects fit into one another like the links of a chain." 21 "A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it." 22 Similarly, a picture represents or misrepresents a situation by virtue of the arrangement of dots, lines and color patches on a paper. "In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects." 23

In the same way, according to Wittgenstein, "What constitutes a proportional sign [the sentence] that its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another" 24 But for a proposition to be a proposition about a certain situation it must have what Wittgenstein says "...exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents." 25 otherwise it would not be a proposition about the specific situation.
Another important feature of Wittgenstein theory of language is the truth-functional theory of the proposition. According to it, ordinary propositions can be clarified by analysis, i.e. their sense can be completely spelled out by means of elementary propositions. Language consists of propositions and propositions can be analyzed into elementary propositions. Hence according to Wittgenstein, “Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions: then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all propositions, and that fixes their limits.” What, however, is the exact relationship between ordinary propositions and elementary proposition? Wittgenstein’s answer is that all non-elementary propositions are truth functional compounds of elementary proposition. He says, “A proposition is a truth function of elementary proposition.” This is one of the central theses of the *Tractatus*.

In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein criticizes the Augustine concept of language. Augustine assumes that the mystery of language consisted in learning the names of the objects. Wittgenstein criticizes this conception by saying that; Augustine fails to recognize any difference between kinds of words. He says
that if we describe the learning of language as essentially a naming activity, then we are thinking primarily of nouns like 'table', 'chair', 'apple' and people's names, and secondarily we refer to the names of certain sensations, actions and properties, but not of words as 'five', 'soon', 'or', and innumerable other kind of words. This he explains by giving example of 'five red apple'. Here we can point to real objects i.e. 'apple', and 'red' can be refer to real objects and colour samples, but the word 'five' says Wittgenstein "No such thing was in the question here, only how the word 'five' is used. Thus use of the word 'five' is clear though the meaning of the word has no sense in that context. The urge to ask for the meaning of a word even when its use is perfectly clear arises from the 'philosophical concept of meaning', which has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions."  

Wittgenstein invites us to compare words in language with tools in a toolbox. He says, "think of tools in a tool box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screw. - The function of words is as diverse as the function of these objects."  

A word is characterized by its use just as a tool is characterized by its function. Wittgenstein says, to
understand a sentence is to be prepared for one of its uses. If we can’t think of any use for it at all, then we don’t understand it at all. The use of language ordinarily has a point just as instruments are usually made for same purposes. But there is no single point of the practice of a language as a whole. Wittgenstein lists a few of these purposes in the *Investigations*......

- Giving orders, and obeying them-
- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving the measurements
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)-
- Reporting an event-
- Speculating about an event-
- Forming and testing a hypothesis-
- Making up a story; and reaching it-
- Play acting-
- Singing catches-
- Guessing riddles-
- Making a jock; telling it-
- Solving a problem in practical mathematics-
- Translating from one language to another-
Asking, thinking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. 31

Thus according to Wittgenstein, it is not one practice or one instrument, having one significant function and serving one essential purposes. "Language is not defined for us as an arrangement fulfilling one definite purpose. Rather 'language' is for us a name for a collection." 32 Thus for Wittgenstein language is like a working machine, which gets jobs done-namely everyday activities of life. This conception of language is the pragmatic nature of language.

Wittgenstein was also interested in another feature of language, which he called the social nature of language. This point he made whenever he compares languages with games or whenever he speaks of, and constructs different 'language-games'. Wittgenstein compares language with a chess game and to look at a word as a piece in chess and an utterance with a move in chess. He says, "What is a word really'? Is analogues to "what is a piece in chess"? 33

To understand what a piece in chess is one must understand the whole game, the rules defining it, and the role of the piece in the game. Similarly, we might say the meaning of a word
is its place in a language-game. This also means, the meaning of any single word in a language is 'defined', 'constituted', 'determined', or 'fixed' by the 'grammatical rules' with which it is used in that language. Using a sentence is, thus, analogues to making a move in chess following the rules.

Regarding the following of a rule Wittgenstein says that it is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone followed a rule. Wittgenstein is talking about the practice of following not this or that particular rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion which an order was given, a promise made, a question asked, a debt procured, or a game played. Following a rule, making a promise, giving an order and so on, are customs, uses, practices, on insitutions. They presuppose a society, a form of life. To understand rules it is necessary to understand the whole institution of 'following rules'. If the background of custom is removed, the rules, embedded in this custom would also disappear. Wittgenstein shows this by the following example: "What has the expression of a rule say a sign post- got to do with my actions? What short of connection is there here? well, perhaps this one: I have been
trained to react to this sign in a particular way... But that is only to give a causal connection: to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary, a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.\textsuperscript{36}

In this context Wittgenstein gives another example of an arrow. He asks, 'How does it come about that this \(\rightarrow\) points? Does not it seem to carry in it something besides itself?' "No, not the dead line on paper; only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that," Wittgenstein says that this answer is both true and false. It is true that the line in itself is totally dead; however, what makes it alive is not the 'psychical thing'. He says that "This pointing is not a hocus pocus which can be performed only by the soul. The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes it." \textsuperscript{37} But the question arises, suppose no application were made of the arrow, still it would point something? Suppose there were no regular use of sign-posts and no conventions as to how a sign-post is to be interpreted, each individual interpreted it in his own way. Would the sign-post still function as a guide? Wittgenstein answers the above points by saying that there cannot
be logically 'private rules'. He says that ‘following a rule’ is a practice. “And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. Hence it is not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’. Otherwise thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.” 39 Rules are ‘public’, and consequently it must be possible for more than one person to learn to follow the rule.

Wittgenstein brought out other characteristics of a rule by saying that if it is impossible to train a person to use an alleged language we cannot say that it is a language. More generally, if there is to be practice defined by rules, there must be some way of learning how to engage in the practice or to follow the rules. Thus, Wittgenstein in contrasts acting according to a rule with acting according to inspiration.

According to Wittgenstein, “To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language to be a master of a technique.” 40 When we learn a language, however, we learn not only in one technique but a whole complex set of techniques. To speak a language is not just to engage in one practice, but to engage in many different practices. One might say that a language is a composite practice made up of a number of
practices. The multiplicity and variety of the practices, which constitutes our language, are emphasized by Wittgenstein in the series of "Language-games" which he constructs in his later writings.

After giving much discussion about 'language-games' Wittgenstein now admits that he has not stated the absence of language. He says "Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all 'languages.' 41 He tries to explain this by comparing the concept of a language with that of a game. He says.....

"Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games'. I mean board-games, card-games, ball games, Olympic Games and so on. What is common to them all? -Do not say: There must be something common or they would not be called 'games'- but look and see, whether there is anything common to all -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common
to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think but look! - Look for example at board games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here we find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass to next ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost... And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear”.

And the result of this examination is: We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterized these similarities than ‘family resemblance’, for the various resemblances between members of a family ..., overlap and criss-cross in the same way... And shall say: ‘games’ from a family.” 42

Thus by the same token, in various language-games have not one thing in common but they form a family. We can extend out concept of language by adding and inventing new language-games just as in spinning a thread we twist fiber on fiber.
'And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fiber runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.'

4.2. DISCUSSION ON WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT:

Wittgenstein contends that any ordinary proposition can be analysed into a set of elementary propositions, which consists of nothing but simple terms (or names). He concludes, furthermore, that there must be simple things - i.e. objects which correspond to the names. He shares the assumption of traditional philosophers that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. "A name refers to a object. The object is its reference." If objects do not exist the elementary propositions would consist of terms without reference and would thus be senseless. But, since the sense of all propositions depends ultimately on that of the elementary ones, no proposition would have any sense, which is patently false. Hence there must be objects.

The linguistic counterpart of the atomic fact is that -

The elementary proposition "asserts the existence of an atomic fact." to assert the existence of an atomic fact are to describe the configuration of objects. Hence, the general form of proposition is:
"This is how things are. If an elementary proposition is true, the atomic fact exists; if an elementary proposition is false the atomic facts does not exist." 46 But an elementary proposition is a concatenation of names. The elementary propositions are possible because it is a picture of the atomic fact.

How is a picture possible? Wittgenstein explains that "What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way." 47 He further says that "The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way." 48 A picture of a situation, say X, is a picture of X and not Y because the way the elements of the picture are related in the same way the elements of X are related. Thus according to Wittgenstein, the logical structure of the picture and the situation pictured is identical. This identity makes it possible for two-dimensional picture to depict reality, which has more than two-dimensions.

There must be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a proposition and those of the situation it describes. This requirement can only be met by elementary prepositions, which alone consists entirely of names, each referring
directly to an object. An elementary proposition is not merely a medley of names—(just as a theme in music is not a medley of notes). What makes it a proposition is that names are arranged in a determinate way i.e. it have a logical structure, which is identical to the way the objects of an atomic fact are arranged.

If an elementary proposition matches the atomic fact it describes, then it is true; otherwise, it is false. But a proposition need not be compared with reality, because it is a picture of reality. Like a picture, “A proposition shows its sense. [It] shows how things stands if it is true.” Hence, “To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true (One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true).”

According to the truth-functional analysis the truth-value of a compound proposition is completely determined by truth-value of the components i.e. once the truth-values of its components are given, the truth-value of the compound proposition can be calculated. Wittgenstein claims that all propositions are related to elementary propositions truth-functionally. A proposition, which is true for all truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions, is called a tautology. A proposition which
is false for all truth-possibilities is called a contradiction. Thus he says "Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show what they say nothing.... (For example, I know nothing about whether when I know that it is either raining or not raining)." Any ordinary propositions which, when analysed, turn out to be tautologies or contradictions are not 'propositions' in the strict sense: they may be called 'degenerate' propositions. Any other ordinary propositions, which, under scrutiny, turn out to be incapable of being subjected to truth-value analysis, they are considered as 'nonsense': they are not propositions at all, but they are pseudo-propositions.

Wittgenstein's analysis of language, according to Russell, "is concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language." For Wittgenstein "ordinary language is inaccurate, because it allows nonsensical combination of symbols and moreover, ordinary language according to him contains symbols which are vague and ambiguous. The function of philosopher, according to Wittgenstein is to construct a new language in which these defects have been
repaired by the provision of precise symbol and explicit rules for their combination.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein expressed the view that, language is a faithful picture of reality, and every elementary proposition is a picture of some simple atomic fact. Here he was influenced by Russell’s doctrines of logical atomism, which asserts that “in a logically perfect language the word in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact.” 55 Wittgenstein assumes in the *Tractatus* that structure of language is revealed by logic and that the essential function of language is to depict or describe the world. For he thinks that while talking about the world there must be something common between language and the world. The common element must lie in their structures because the structure of one is the structure of the other. Since logic reveals the structure of language it must also reveal the structure of the world. Thus it is quite clear that from the nature of logic to the nature of language, and then nature of the world. Thus he wrote in his *Notebook* “My work has extended from the function of logic to the nature of the world.” 56
Language consists of propositions, and all propositions can be analysed into elementary propositions. The elementary propositions are immediate combinations of names, which directly refer to objects: and elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts, which are immediate combinations of objects. Atomic facts combine to form facts of whatever complexity, which constitute the world. Thus language is truth-functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world. Here we have the limit of language and what amounts to the same, the limit of the world.

Thus according to the above theory, 'language' is identical to 'descriptive' language and to 'say' anything is equivalent to 'describing' something. Thus "totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science." 57 and "what can be said" is identified as "propositions of natural science." 58 or "empirical propositions". According to him proposition of logic, mathematics, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics etc. do not say anything. They are senseless or nonsensical because they attempt to transcend the limits of language, and so also the world. Wittgenstein contends that there are important things in those
sentences, although they cannot be said, but can be shown. The philosophical propositions according to Wittgenstein are neither 'empirical' nor 'logical', they are, attempts to say things, which cannot be said.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein believes that analysis of ordinary propositions must lead to elementary propositions. But in his later works he abandoned the basic doctrines of the *Tractatus*, especially the picture theory. The whole procedure of the *Tractatus* was to deal with the *a priori* nature of elementary propositions. But, in his later works he says,... “We can only arrive at a correct analysis by what might be called the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about *a priori* possibilities. One is often attempted to ask from an *a priori* standpoints: What after all, can be the only forms of [elementary] propositions....An [elementary] form can be foreseen. And it would be surprising if the actual phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure.” 59

Since the purely *a priori* method of the *Tractatus* is under attack and he now recommended the *a posteriori* method of investigating the actual phenomena of language. This shift of
method is what constituted the break between the early and later Wittgenstein. The later Wittgenstein's came to regard the method and the doctrines of the *Tractatus* as a paradigm of traditional philosophy. Throughout his later writings the presupposition and views of the *Tractatus* served as the main target of his attack.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein was concerned with explaining 'How language is possible?' According to early Wittgenstein, ordinary propositions are vague but they serve our purposes because, they are really quite clear and distinct. This view he analyzed by showing that, every proposition can be analysed into a set of elementary propositions, which are composed of names signifying simple objects. It was believed that there must be a "final analysis" in which all propositions are resolved into elementary propositions. This view came under attack shortly after his return to philosophy.

According to Moore, Wittgenstein said in one of his first lectures that it was with regard to elementary propositions and their connections with truth-functions that he had to change his most of the opinion. He began by pointing out that he had produced no examples of elementary propositions and that there was
something wrong indicated by this fact, though it was difficult to say what. His view at that time was that it was senseless to talk of a ‘final’ analysis. But specific criticisms were not given until the composition of Investigations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein, not only criticizes the basic assumptions of the Tractatus, but also discusses the sort of consideration that led to those assumptions. In the ‘Investigations’ he realizes that his earlier view of the proposition was “not a result of investigation; it was a requirement.” 60 His conception of language had required that every proposition should have a definite sense and the process of analysis makes the sense of the proposition explicit and clear. Wittgenstein has clearly rejected the meaningfulness of talking about the absolutely simple ‘objects’, the existence of “elementary propositions” and the notion of a ‘final analysis’. ‘Analysis’ is no longer the main philosophical method for him. Elsewhere he criticizes the analysts as someone who “tried to find the real artichoke by stripping it of its leaves.” 61 It is puzzling to see that, in spite of his rejection of analysis; Wittgenstein is generally classified as an ‘analytic’ philosopher. Whatever may be, but in his
later philosophy it is seen that Wittgenstein is no longer an analytic philosopher.

The questioning of the existence of elementary propositions and the abandonment of the possibility of a final analysis meant nothing less than a complete repudiation of his earlier conception of language. The early Wittgenstein assumed that the function of language was to depict or ‘picture’ facts. In the ‘Investigations’ Wittgenstein came to realize that the doctrine of the *Tractatus* rested on a “particular picture of the essence of human language”. It is the correspondence theory of meaning, according to which is that, the individual words in language name object for which a word stands in its meaning.

According to Wittgenstein, thus we cannot call anything a word or a sentence unless it is part of that kind of a rule-governed activity, which we call a language. A language thus is a set of activities (or practices) defined by certain rules, namely the rules that govern all the various uses of words in the language.

Wittgenstein’s later view of language is indeed the antithesis of his earlier doctrine. Most characteristic of the later work is its opposition to what he considers the preoccupation of
philosophers with linguistic form as distinct from function. The early Wittgenstein believed that he had discovered the essence of language, and revealed the limit of language. The boundary between sense and nonsense was set once and for all according to a definite criterion of meaning. The later Wittgenstein however, no longer speaks of the language but of different uses of language or language-games. Consequently there is no such thing as 'the limit of language' but only 'limits of language'.

4.3. SOME REACTION AGAINST WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT:

Wittgenstein's later work must be understood in contrast with his early view. Although at a time he says that he is trying to show the shortcoming of a "traditional" view of language, he makes it clear that his main criticism is directed against the "author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations he says:

"Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (The Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together; that the later could be seen
As G.J. Warnock points out that: “When Wittgenstein thought of philosophy in the old style, he tended always to think first of philosophy in his old style; and certainly much of his more sweeping condemnation is primarily addressed to himself”. 65

The important feature of Wittgenstein’s early work is the picture theory of language. “In the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein argues that language is a picture of reality. This means there must be a similarity of structure between that which pictures and that which is pictured. The form of language must be the same as that of reality.” 66

It is pertinent to note that Wittgenstein not only emphasizes the essential form of language, but also held that language is made up of simple elements.

J.N. Findley points out this in a comment on “[the *Tractatus]* builds on a foundation not unlike one suggested in the platonic *Theaetetus*, the view that there are certain ultimate atoms of significance, of which no descriptive nor analytic account can be given, which can be named and no more, though it is in terms of
reference to such ultimate simples that all significant discourse, including all descriptions and analyses, may be constructed and reconstructed." 67

Wittgenstein was influenced by Russell's idea that language is made up of simple elements—proposition; and that these linguistic elements 'mirror' the facts of the world. Russell, too, maintained that philosophical problems arise by means of a distortion of everyday language, and hence saw a need for the construction of a new language, which would be more nearly adequate for the stating of facts. According to Russell, philosophical problems arise, because certain kinds of philosophical statements are 'clothed' in misleading grammatical forms. In such cases, we must examine the grammar of the statement, we will find, in some cases, that when we reformulate the statement in terms of its 'logical form', the problem will be resolved.68

J. Hartnack argues that, Wittgenstein was in contrast with the view of Russell, Wittgenstein "...did not think that there was any need to construct a new language because he held that there is only one language". 69 According to Wittgenstein, the
structure, the essence is already there in our everyday language. It is the task of philosophy to lay bare that structure; to discover the 'logic of language'.

The account of language given in the *Tractatus* according to Warnock is "... intended to be ... an exposition of the ESSENCE of language; an account of its concealed foundations; an excavation, so to speak, to its deepest level." 70

According to Mundle, Wittgenstein repudiates the error, which he had formulated in the *Tractatus* by saying: "A name means an object. The object is its meaning" 71 But in his *Philosophical Investigations* he criticizes Augustine thesis, that the meaning of any word is the object for which it stand. 72 Wittgenstein has no difficulty in showing that it is a fallacy, e.g. for words like "five" 73 "here" and "this" 74 "and for explanations" 75 He asserts that different uses of words are "absolutely unlike."

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein assumed that the ultimate constituents of 'fact' and of the 'world' are 'simple object'. This is repudiated in the *Investigations* by arguing that the notion of absolute simplicity is vacuous; that our application of the corrective terms 'simple' and 'composite' varies with the context.
That the use of word ‘composite’ (and therefore... “simple”) in an enormous number of different and differently - related ways. 77

Wittgenstein further repudiates the whole conception of logical analysis of the *Tractatus* that ‘a proposition has one and only one complete analysis,’ 78 that the assumption that all our statements have a hidden structure, that of a logical calculus. In the *Investigations* he describes that ‘it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our form of language... as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light, 79 .....‘we must stick to the subject of our everyday thinking’ and examine ‘actual language.’ 80

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had argued that as if, apart from his own use of it to ‘show’ things that cannot be ‘said’, language is used only for one purpose, making true or false statements, asserting facts. This view was also repudiated, and to wipe out this view Wittgenstein introduced similes between language, tools and games. 81

In his later works, Wittgenstein continued to maintain that everyday language in adequate to its task, but he avoided his earlier idea that there is an essence of language. The view of
language Wittgenstein held in the *Tractatus* was illusory. His view of language in *Tractatus* was narrow. But in his later work, Wittgenstein tried to broaden the concept of language. He did not deny in his later work that there may be sense in the expression ‘a logic of language’. But rather than seeing word and expression merely as elements of a logical calculus, he came to see that words and expressions as tools that gained their significance through their use in various life situations. In his later view he shift away from the pictorial role of language to the functional character.

According to Cora Diamond and James Conent, "language works correctly only in one sense, that is, when it states truths- so that its function, its meaningfulness, its connection to reality when it is doing anything; but stating truths become philosophically problematic – is what the *Tractatus* teaches. Its central thought is that language makes its connection to reality through propositions that mean what they do whether they are true or false, these insight provide Wittgenstein with materials to criticize both the idea in Frege and Russell that there is a logical structure in the world that we appeal to in the justification of inference, and the idea that there must be presupposition of the
sort. Frege accepted that names have reference before proposition achieve the capacity of having truth-value, the sort of presupposition Russell tried to fill in with the idea of knowledge by acquaintance”. Thus they considered that rejection of the idea that language as such needs nods of approval from reality is the essential aim of the *Tractatus*.

In the *Investigations* begins with an examination of a particular picture of the essence of human language. According to Robert J. Fogelin, the criticism of Wittgenstein’s language passes through two stages – first point that, “this conception of language has one sided emphasis upon the use of names to formulate descriptions, gives a distorted image of language through ignoring the wide variety of other ways we use language, naming and describing”. “the second stage of Wittgenstein criticism goes deeper by challenging the account of names itself – is an inadequate account even for names”.

Fogelin further argues, that in order to exhibit the multiple ways that word function Wittgenstein invents a simple language-game of “five red apple”, where the words ‘five’, ‘red’
and ‘apple’ placed role of very different kinds and different functions. The same comparison holds between natural language and the conception of language Wittgenstein attributes to Augustine. An inspection of our actual language reveals a wide variety in the employment of words, whereas Augustine’s view acknowledges relatively few.

According to Wittgenstein we do not know how to use the words of our language, and therefore, misled by surface similarities in to supposing that they all work in the same way. That is however simply word is. Fogelin says that “the fact is, we do know how to use the words in our language, but are misled non the less. The trouble is that our language does not always contain explicit markers indicating difference in use. Admittedly, some of these differences are reflected in surface grammar through mood, inflections, punctuations, and so on”.

Another strongest criticism of “language-game” was made by Smart. He writes: “Only the operation of a symbolic calculus bears some remote analogy to the playing of game, and it may well be said that his early pre-occupation with symbolic logic tended to encourage Wittgenstein in erroneous belief that such an
analogy could be generalized so as to cover all language, and thus justify coining the phrase ‘language-game.’” 85 Smart enumerates various reasons against any significant analysis between language and games. Thus according to him, games in contrast to language have no function whatever important for life. They serve no serious end, nor do they belong to the ‘form of life’ of the society. Games are thus in no way an instrument, whereas language is essentially an instrument.

Rush Rhees also in line with the view of Wittgenstein that language is necessarily a social phenomenon. He explains, “It is because you do not take part in what they do. You do not speak the language they speak. And speaking the language the speak not just uttering the words, any more than understanding the language is just ‘recognizing’ the words. It is carrying on a conversation, for instance, it may be writing reports, or listening to a play in a theatre. It is being someone to whom the rest of us can speak and get an answer to whom we can tell something and with whom we can make a jock and whom we can deceive. All these, and of course immeasurably more belongs to speaking the language. And it belongs to being able to follow words.” 86
We may point out here that though both Wittgenstein and Rhees rightly stressed the social character of language, they left out an extremely important aspect of it, that through linguistic concepts man comprehends the necessary causal connections in the objective reality. Knowledge is acquired and recorded only through conceptual apparatus, concepts or language and knowledge cannot be separated, for it is only through language or concepts that knowledge is acquired. According to Rhees, Wittgenstein was interested in ‘human language’ rather than in the language or languages, which people speak. When he says that language is a family of language games, and that any of these might be complete language by itself, he does not say whether people who might take part in several such games would be speaking the same language in each of them. In fact according to Rhees it is hard to see how on this view they would ever be speaking a language.

Lyotard says, according to Wittgenstein’s language-game investigation:

“Each of various categories of utterances can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to
which they can be put in, exactly and same way as the game of chess is defined by set of rules determining the properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to them."  

Lyotard draws a set of three principles about the idea of language games. Firstly, their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of contact, explicit or not, between players. This does not mean that players invent the rules. Secondly, that if there are no rules, there is no game. And thirdly, every utterance should be thought of as a 'move' in a game. Here Loytard's attempt to present language game investigation as a "general methodical approach", and considered it as a founding principle to understand social relations from a pragmatic point of view.  

Thus because of the novel nature of his philosophy and the aphoristic and cryptic style of his writings, Wittgenstein's work lends itself readily to all sorts of interpretations and misinterpretations. Many of Wittgenstein's statements are vague and, as he himself pointed out, are sometimes meant to be vague. His most important insights are expressed in analogies, metaphors and parables, this is because of the extreme difficulty of the subject
matter. Nevertheless, this does not mean that he can be interpreted in whatever fashion one wish. It is not uncommon for some of Wittgenstein's remarks to be understood exactly the opposite way what was intended. For example Leslie Paul interprets Wittgenstein's philosophy "Old-style philosophy for him teaches nothing, changes nothing, it leaves everything as it is."\(^{50}\)

And James Feibleman understands Wittgenstein's later view of language, as "The language game is also a logic game. Here Wittgenstein is advancing a thesis not too far removed from the view point of Hilbert; 'If anyone utters a sentence means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rule'".\(^{91}\)

4.4. CARNAP'S VIEW:

Rudolf Carnap a leading member of the logical positivism put forwarded a different theory of language, the theory of protocol sentence, and explains language with the help of this theory. In his book "The unity of science" he says that, every protocol sentences, records a private experience; how then can such sentences serve as a 'foundation' for the public, inter-verifiable, sentences of science? In his attempt to solve that problem, he
begins by maintaining that, 'science is a unity, that all empirical statements can be expressed in a single language, all states of affairs are of the one kind and are known by the same method'.

Now, on the face of it, nobody has ever denied that all empirical statements 'can be expressed, in a single language', say in English; a 'language', however, has in Carnap's writings a special sense, a sense in which 'the language of economics' is a different language from 'the language of physics.'

A language is constituted by the fact that it has a distinctive vocabulary- a set of 'primitive ideas' or 'basic concepts' – and a 'syntax', a set of rules for 'translating' the sentences of the language into other sentences, either within or outside the language. 'All empirical statements can be expressed in a single language' which asserts that, there is a single set of basic expressions into which all other expressions can be translated, and a single method of translation which can be applied to all empirical statements.

According to Carnap, 'To analyze statements asserted by scientists, to study the kinds and relations and analyze terms as components of those statements and theories as ordered systems of
those statements'. The 'linguistic analysis of the scientific statements has been called "logic of science" by Carnap. According to him only science can give us the knowledge about facts. Philosophy has no technique and methodology to access and determine the facts. Philosophy, therefore, must not try to evaluate facts, but accept them on the basis of scientific knowledge. This is why the philosophy should address itself exclusively to the task of analyzing the language of science. The logic of science performs two following functions – (1) Logical syntax and (2) Semantics. In the former we study the forms of linguistic expressions or propositions; it is also called formal logic. In the study of logical syntax we are not concerned with the content or meaning of the propositions but with the reduction of complex forms into elementary forms and the elementary forms into their constituents. It also inquires into the logical relations of consistency and inconsistency, dependence and independence among different propositions. *Logical Syntax* helps us to reach the basic statements of various sciences and realize the logical relations among these.

In the ‘*Logical Syntax of Language*’, Carnap has split up language into two divisions – the primary and the secondary language, and
separately treated the rules of the two divisions. Primary language or language-I has been defined by Carnap as, "it is restricted so as to admit only the definition of those concepts and the formulation of those propositions which fulfill some requirements of constructivism.

Although the scope of language is limited it does not follow that it has definite sentences. The real reason for the limitation of language I is that it consists primarily in the fact that only definite number of properties occur on it. Due to this limitation it is called a definite language. Language-I has been classified into two categories by Carnap - 1. Universal and 2. Existential. Besides, there are five types of preliminary statements - 1. Sentential Calculus, 2. Sentential Operators, 3. Identity, 4. Arithmatic, 5. K-Operator. As there are two sentences, there are two types of operators as well, viz. 1. Universal, and 2. Existential.

These can be limited or unlimited. They are expressed with the help of symbols, which may be defined or undefined. Besides Language - I there is in reference to the rules of inference
and judgments. The logical syntax of language - I is formulated on the basis of these rules.

Contrary to language - I the scope of language - II is wide. According to Carnap, 'language - II is very comprehensive; it makes available sufficient sentential forms for the formulation of everything that occurs in classical mathematics and in classical physics. Whereas language - I is limited in scope, the language - II is comprehensive in scope. Language -I is, however, employed in language - II as a subclass. Though the language - II is more clear and accurate than the language - I, the language -I’s sentences and symbols are appropriate to the language -II. In as much as it is comprehensive, the language - II contains indefinite concepts.

Besides linguistic syntaxes, Carnap has also referred to rules of general syntax. Whereas the rules of linguistic syntax are applicable to the particular language, the rules of general syntax refer to all languages oral as well as gestural. Carnap has related the general syntax with the philosophic discourse. According to him the theory there are two types of questions - (1) Questions relating to subject matter and (2) Questions relating to logic. The contextual questions appertain to metaphysical, ontological and
physical inquiries and the logical questions appertain to Epistemology and logic.

Besides formulating the semantical rules, Carnap has also developed a number of metalanguage systems. He has shown that a metalanguage has four elements. (1) the logical, (2) the sentential syntax, (3) translation, (4) semantical. These elements in metalanguages are interdependent. The semantics is not a science, according to Carnap, because it does not help us to see the fact about the physical world. It is only an instrument for acquisition of knowledge. It determines and regulates modern logic. The modern logic has two chief constituents i.e. the sentential syntax and semantics. According to Carnap the apparatus of modern logic is applicable to and useful not only in philosophy but science as well.

4.5. DISCUSSION ON CARNAP'S CONCEPT:

Rudolf Carnap has propounded his views on Semantics in his three books: ‘Introduction to Semantics’, ‘Foundation of Logic’ and ‘Meaning and Necessity’. In semantics the concepts of meaning and truth are studied and the various theories thereof examined. Semantics consider the relation of linguistic expressions to objects designated by them. The
semantical analysis of the scientific language reveals that a word may represent a particular object (e.g. table) or a certain property (e.g. sweetness) or a relation between the two things (e.g. friendship) or a physical function (e.g. breathing). It is also reveals the fact of synonymity, that is, two words may stand for the same object or same property.

In semantics, Carnap splits language in two parts: the object language and the metalanguages. The object language is that which is the subject matter of discussion and analysis. In metalanguage we say something about the object language. For example, if the teaching Hindi is done through the medium of English Hindi is the object language and English is the metalanguage.

According to Carnap, the simple unit of a language is sign. A series of sign is known as expression. Furthermore, signs are also of two types: sign events and sign design. The semantics, too, is of two types: descriptive semantics and pure syntax. The descriptive semantics studies the historical changes are the form of semantical signs and expressions. The pure syntax analyzes the methods and techniques of semantics. A concatenation of signs
results in a formula. A concatenation is the serial order of signs. The different pattern of concatenation gives rise to different forms of sentential syntax. The various syntactic argument or systems have their peculiar logic. If we know the pattern of arrangement in any concatenation, we can formulate the rules of its syntax. The peculiar concatenation of signs determine the terms, operators, sequence and sentential calculus and techniques thereof. The pure syntax examines the techniques of semantics and this is known as calculus. The semantics technique frames rules for determining the necessary and sufficient truth for every type of sentence.

Carnap thought he could show, in contrast to Wittgenstein, that the form of a language can be described within that language itself. For Wittgenstein, the form of a language is that which is common to it and to the reality it depicts; for that reason it can never be depicted within language, as it involves a reference to something which lies beyond language. But for Carnap ‘form’ of a language consists of the rules it lays down, the rules are- (1) ‘formation’ rules, which determine whether a sentence is ‘well-formed’ and ‘grammatical’ and (2) ‘transformation’ rules which describes the manner in which one sentence can be derived from
another. Carnap argues, the language of science consists of such rules within itself. Those general rules of syntax, which, refer to the possible forms a language can assume, belong to arithmetic. Carnap writes, “The sentences of logic of science are formulated in syntactical sentences about the language of science: but no new domain in addition to that of science itself is by created syntax, pure, and descriptive, is nothing more than the mathematics and physics of language”. Thus the propositions of philosophy are paralleled out between sciences and philosophy.

One of the difficulties regarding the conception of language shown by Carnap is that he attempts to identify “very narrow and homogeneous class” of basic terms. He gives example of the terms ‘hot’ and ‘cold’, ‘heavy’ and ‘light’, ‘red’ and ‘blue’, ‘large’ and ‘small’ etc. But in what sense do they form a homogenous class? There are all sorts of logical and epistemological differences between them.

Carnap, by contrast to Wittgenstein begins with no philosophical picture. He begins simply with the idea of a syntactically specified formal language given by formation rule and transformation rules. According to him, there is no independent
notion to represent the object of the world or for a sentence to make an assertion or claim about the world. Carnap instead exploits syntactical features of the transformation rules to define a distinction between and descriptic signs, along with distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences. Carnap’s assertion that analytic sentences are empty of factual content and make no real claim about the world; and therefore, he gives an entirely different sense and force from Wittgenstein’s similar sounding assertions. What Carnap means is that if we view language purely syntactically, than we can perfectly describe the logical syntax of such a language, its formation and transformation rules in a syntactic metalanguage.

4.6. SOME REACTION ON CARNAP’S CONCEPT:

Carnap enthusiastically endorses Wittgenstein’s interpretation of Frege’s conception of analyticity, and he is quite explicit about his debt to Wittgenstein throughout ‘Logical Syntax’ and throughout his carrier. Yet at the same time, Carnap radically transforms the conception of the Tractatus and thus this by emphasizing themes that are implicit Wittgenstein’s thought. It is,
here, in fact, that Carnap brings to bear to works of Hilbert and Godel in a most decisive fashion.

Carnap interprets Wittgenstein's explanation of the notions of language, logical truth, logical form, and so on as definitions in formal syntax. They are themselves formulated in a meta-language or 'syntax language', and they concern the syntactic structure either of some peculiar object language or of language in general. The syntactic interpretation of logic was not used by Wittgenstein, but for Wittgenstein, there can be only one language, the single interconnected system of propositions within which everything that can be said must ultimately find a place; and there is no way to get 'outside' this system so as to state or describe its logical structure; thus there can be no syntactic meta-language. Hence logic and all "formal concepts" must remain ineffable in the 'Tractatus'. Yet Carnap takes the work of Hilbert and especially of Godel to refuse Wittgenstein's ideas. According to him syntax can be exactly formulated; and in particular, if our object language contains primitive recursive arithmetic, the syntax of our language can be formulated within this language itself.
Carnap also clearly recognizes that linguistic or "syntactic" conception of analyticity developed in the *Tractatus* is much too weak to embarrass all of classical mathematics or all of Frege's *Begriffsschrift*. Of course the *Tractatus* is itself quite clear on the restricted scope of its conception of logic and mathematics in comparison with Frege and Russell's conception. The *Tractatus* begins with a philosophical picture of nature of meaningful representation. All meaningful claims correspond to subsets of truth possibilities for a given set of elementary propositions - which are entirely independent of one another so that all possible distributions of truth-value assignments are initially possible. Furthermore, the elementary propositions are composite - they consist of names that can be independently varied within given substitution classes - but they nonetheless contain no logical constants. Thus Wittgenstein's conception of the original constants as truth operations on the elementary propositions and his conception of analytic propositions or tautologies as holding for every possible distribution of truth values to the elementary propositions follows directly from his initial philosophical picture of meaningful representation.
Carnap, by contrast to Wittgenstein begin with no philosophical picture. He begins simply with the idea of a syntactically specified formal language given by formation rules and transformation rules. According to him, there is no independent notion, in particular, of what it means for a sign to represent an object in the world or for a sentence to make an assertion or claim about the world. Carnap instead exploits syntactical features of the transformation rules to define a distinction between logical and descriptic signs, and this distinction then induces a distinction between analytic and descriptic science and these distinction induces a distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences— which as it were syntactically represents the notion of meaningful claim about the world. Carnap’s assertion that analytic sentences are empty of factual content and make no real claim about the world has therefore an entirely different sense and force from Wittgenstein’s similar-sounding assertion. What Carnap means is that if we view language purely syntactically, then we can perfectly well describe the logical syntax of such a language—that is, its formation and transformation rules—in a syntactic metalanguage.
Y. Bar-Hillel writes that Carnap's language does not provide any framework in which the ordinary language can be discussed. His language "creates a tool, at least the outline of a tool, which one could efficiently handle constructed language-system of science. But he did not forcefully enough drive home the point that the tool he created was almost equally efficient for the treatment of the vernacular." 94

Carnap is right in maintaining that there are logical connections between the languages used in various branches of knowledge in that sense the unity of language is a fact, which hardly requires argument. But this leaves open the question about the nature of the connections. It does not follow that they must all be one kind of homogeneous class of term to which all others are reducible.

4.7. SCHLICKS' VIEW:

Carnap shows continuity between protocol languages and ordinary public language. He asserts that every protocol language is a sub-language of the general physical language (a technical term which means more than the existing language of physics). Schlick also believes in physicalism but he did not accepted Carnap's concept. To Schlick, the problem of sense or meaning was more important than
anything else in the theory of knowledge. He believed that we just could not assume two different criteria of sense for two different levels of discourse, one individualistic, and the other universal. He thought it best to begin by denying any form of private experiences as meaningful at all. The very idea of sense and understanding are connected only with universal, public aspect of language. It is the formal aspect of language, which gives sense to our statements and makes communication possible. If all sensible statements can be served from their qualitative character, and expressed quantitatively, the problem of communication can be easily solved. Carnap characterized scientific statements as displaying a quantitative character of the concepts, and abstractness, and the absence of qualities. In other words, says Carnap, to understand a language properly we have to talk in terms of the structure or order of the statements rather than their content. This is precisely what Schlick attempted to do in his famous article 'Form and Content'.

An epistemology, which is concerned only with logical analysis of knowledge, has to take in to account an analysis of language. The problem of synonymity, deducibility of one sentence from another etc. depends on a determinate language. Thus by
emphasizing the importance a logical analysis of language the positivists tried to built an epistemology, which they thought, free from the confusion of logic with psychology. And this confusion is often due to the fact that language serves two purposes of representation and expression. It is through this expressive aspect of language that Schlick tried to stabilize epistemology as logic of science. Schlick says that- An epistemology, which is concern only with logical analysis of knowledge, has to take into account in an analysis of language. The problem of synonimity, deducibility of one sentence from another etc, dependent of,

"If language were nothing but a system of signs with fixed signification it would never be capable of communicating new facts.....

The essential characteristics of language, on the other hand, are its capacity of expressing new facts, or indeed any facts...

.... It is necessary conclusion that the proposition and the fact which it expresses must naturally or essentially correspond to one another, they must have something in common; it is this common feature that we have to discover...." 96
Schlick identifies the common feature of language. It is according to him, is an arrangement and an order in their combination of signs. Thus he says-

“All genuine knowledge is expression. This is, of course, not a mere coincidences, not just an interesting fact, but it constitutes the very essence of scientific as well as everyday language.”

Schlick argues that expression becomes possible through a kind of order or structure imposed on the statements in that language. Language is undoubtedly an empirical fact, especially in respect of its representative function; but once a language is used; the grammar of the language provides certain rules for construction of sentences. These sentences, therefore, not accidentally, but necessarily, have a kind of logical order which we have to grasp in order to solve the problem of communication and meaning; this order is a kind of logical interpreter of any empirical language whether used by the scientists or men in the street. This intrinsic logical order of language can be proved from the fact that whether we speak or write, though physically we are relying on two different orders- i.e. temporal and spatial respectively - this difference is not relevant for the expression; one can be translated into the other with prejudice.
The problem of knowledge and its criteria had led Schlick to a further question, how is it possible to express knowledge linguistically? Scientific knowledge and insights, whether logico-mathematical or empirical, are presented in the form of sentences of some language. The languages employed in sciences are designed to make possible the construction of unambiguous expressions that can be true or false. But this property of language presupposes the choice and establishment of rules according to which the linguistic signs are to be employed and to be strung out into expressions and sentences. If in using a language one does not follow the logical and linguistic rules set up for it, the combination of signs will form sentences, which will have subject and predicates but actually it violets the rules. Consequently, they have no meaning and cannot either be true or false.

Applying this notion to philosophy, Schlick held that the theses of metaphysical system are just such consequences of signs put together in a way that violet the logical rules of language. For this reason metaphysics is denied as the scientific knowledge. Metaphysics disregard the logical rules of scientific language in its logical formulation, because, whereas metaphysics endeavors to know reality,
it does not seek relation between the magnitudes characterizing states of affairs, but strives to obtain knowledge of the content of phenomena.

4.8. DISCUSSION ON SCHLICK’S VIEW:

Schlick admitted that a study of language included the study of vocabulary, the significance of its words. But that was not sufficient; we have to know the grammar as well. We may say that even grammar is a kind of license to contrast sentences, which we learn through the applicability of each sentence. Schlick thinks that it is a kind of psychological approach. He points out that expressions and representations were entirely different and should be kept separate in the context of communication. Though it is undeniable that language is composed of words and that these are symbols for representation of things, yet this alone does not explain the expressive power of language.

In Schlick’s opinion, it is only through an intuitive, emotional experience that we can become acquainted with the actual content of reality. Metaphysics desires to know the ‘content’ of real things, and it, therefore, finds itself compelled to use expressions from scientific language in a manner contrary to the rules. For this reason
the theses of metaphysics cannot have the character of meaningful propositions.

Schlick arrived at these views under the influence of the writing of Russell and David Hilbert, both of them had extensively treated the logical and linguistic foundation of mathematics. They clearly held that in mathematics questions about the logical and linguistic conditions for unambiguous statements must be put with special precession and exactness, but that these questions also affect the foundation of all scientific language system and hence of the scientific knowledge in general. Schlick was the first person to draw on the basis of these insights into the foundations of logic and mathematics, consequences for epistemology as a whole and to undertake, by logical and linguistic means, the demarcation of a boundary between science and metaphysics.

4.9. AYER'S VIEW:

Like any other logical positivist, Ayer maintains that the sole function of philosophy is the logical analysis of language. Accordingly, he conceives that the subject matter of philosophy is language and its professed method is analysis. Ayer hold that philosopher does not indulge in any kind of experimentation; he does
not patiently observe the behaviour of any natural objects, yet philosophy purports to provide us with a definite 'knowledge' which is different from that of scientific one. Ayer makes it clear that philosophical analysis is concerned with the use and function of language. This analysis consists in rewriting sentences of everyday language and science in such a way that these sentences will exhibit their proper logical form. When they are put into their proper logical form, their meaning will become clear and philosophical perplexities will be cleared. As a result of this approach, maintains Ayer, the traditional problems of philosophy are found to disappear. The function of philosophy, according to Ayer is logical analysis of language; it does not yield any 'knowledge' of reality. In other words, Ayer's notion of philosophy deprives philosophy of any 'epistemological' content. Apart from that, Ayer takes it for granted as if language were a ready-made thing without taking its development into consideration.

As Ayer thinks it, the analysis or, more broadly, the clarification of our concepts is the only legitimate business for philosophy. This indeed, is a direct consequence of his criterion of significance. For the only other task which philosophy might hope to
undertake would be to uncover certain fundamental synthetic (non-analytic) truths about the nature of reality. But, according to the criterion, any synthetic truths would have to be empirically verifiable, and this means that there discovery falls within the province of empirical science, not of an \textit{a priori} philosophy. The only truths, which a philosopher can legitimately hope to establish, by \textit{a priori} reasoning, are those, which are already implicit in our concepts, that is, the truths that can make explicit by conceptual analysis and clarification. And this is just another way of saying, what Ayer explicitly claims that philosophical truths are analytic.

Ayer further says that, any genuine proposition (any proposition capable of being true or false) must be either analytic or empirically verifiable, that all \textit{a priori} truths are analytic. In other words, that any genuine proposition must be either a tautology or empirically verifiable. In Ayer’s terminology, a proposition is said to be a tautology if and only if it is ‘analytic’, and it is said to be ‘analytic’ if and only if ‘its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contain.’ Ayer holds that analytic propositions are devoid of factual content, they make no claim about matters of facts, and any factual proposition must be empirically verifiable. When a
sentence is genuinely assertoric, but fails to express a genuine proposition, it is said by Ayer to be ‘non-sensical’ or to be ‘devoid of literal significance’ thus a sentence has ‘literal significance’ if and only if it expresses something, which is either tautologous (analytic) or empirically verifiable.

Ayer recognizes that an assertor sentence which is denied of literal significance may still have meaning in some broad sense in contrast with the sentences which are totally unintelligible i.e. sentences like “Monday pleasure count on”. The distinctive feature of sentences which lack significance in Ayer’s sense is not that they are totally unintelligible, but assertoric sentences are those which do not semantically equipped to say anything true or false, and it is in this sense they fail to express genuine propositions.

Ayer also says about ‘putative’ proposition, which a sentence expresses, or as he alternatively puts ‘purports to express’, can then consider whether this putative proposition qualifies as genuine in either of the ways i.e. being tautologous or as empirically verifiable.

Ayer explicitly defines a ‘metaphysical sentences’ as one, which “purports to express a genuine proposition, but does in fact,
express neither a tautology nor empirical hypotheses." Thus, according to him metaphysical propositions fail to satisfy the criterion. Thus in Ayer's views on 'metaphysical' assertions are nonsensical.

4.10. DISCUSSION ON AYER'S VIEW:

Although Ayer intends this classification of proposition to correct philosophy, he does not intend it, at least to the same degree, to serve as a corrective for common sense. This criterion yields intuitively acceptable results in cases where there is no philosophical issue at trouble. Ayer recognizes the trouble is that, many of our non-philosophical assertions, which are made in the context of ordinary discourse or scientific theory, appears to involve metaphysical commitments, which Ayer tries to eliminate. For e.g. ethical and arithmetical assertions which make factual claims of a radically non-empirical kind; and assertions about the remote past or about the mental states of other persons, which concerns about the character of the empirical world, seems to be beyond the reach of verification. Even the assertions about the current state of one's physical environment, such as "there is a table in this room", are problematic. Because Ayer accepts, the immediate data of sense-perception are purely phenomenal entities lies beyond the perceptual data, and,
therefore, unverifiable. Ayer treats such kind of judgments, as not the empirical one, but is mere tautologies, which makes no claim about the matter of fact.

Thus Ayer’s claim is that, all \textit{a priori} truths are not merely ones where the sentences expressing them are guaranteed by their meaning to be truth-expressing, but one which are themselves the product of linguistic meaning - the truths of which are created by the linguistic conventions governing the use of symbols we employ. Ayer rejects the view that \textit{a priori} knowledge involves some special faculty of intuition. It is because \textit{a priori} truths are products of linguistic meaning. Our recognition of them is wholly explained by our understanding of language. My \textit{a priori} knowledge that $7 + 5 = 12$ is wholly explained by my understanding of the sentence ‘$7+5=12$’ and my knowledge is implicit in this understanding, that I can correctly assert this sentence irrespective of my empirical evidence. By saying the above point, Ayer admitting with Russell and attempting to reduce mathematic to logic and thinks that, if successful, it would be of value in making the analyticity of mathematical truths transparent. But what he stresses is that the logicist programmed is irrelevant to the main debate, which is evident from the quotation of Ayer - “For even if.....
it is not possible to reduce mathematical notions to purely logical notions, it will still remain true that the propositions of mathematics are analytic propositions. . . . For the criterion of an analytic proposition is that its validity should follow simply from the definition of the terms contained in it, and this conclusion is fulfilled by the propositions of pure mathematics." 101 The proof that mathematical propositions are analytic in Ayer's sense leave the rationalists with a free hand; a successful and sufficiently ouster logicism would keep the rationalist in check.

Ayer thus makes this classification of proposition in order to make philosophy as genuine. He claims that many of the assertions made by philosophers are shown to be non-sensical, being neither tautologous nor empirically verifiable. And many questions, which have formed the traditional subject matter of philosophy, are shown to be pseudo-questions, as they demand non-sensical answers. The suggestion that, there is, or may be, a reality transcending the empirical world of ordinary observation is considered by Ayer as non-sensical. Ayer further says that, there are some assertions, which purports to say something factual, about the nature of reality, but fail to achieve factual significance because they are unverifiable, so they
are non-sensical, being devoid of literal significance. They do not express genuine propositions and, consequently are neither true nor false. List of such assertions given by Ayer are that, the assertion that the empirical world is really an illusion concealing an underlying reality of some quite different character, the assertion that the core of a material object is an in-itself-featureless substance in which the objects empirical properties inhere, the assertion that there is a realm of objective values, to be discerned by some faculty of moral intitution etc. Ayer's view that it would be a mistake to reject these assertions by asserting their negations because, if the assertions are neither true or false, so are their negations. In this way the very questions which these assertions attempting the answer, are dismissed as it, is spurious. It is not the business of philosophy to look into these questions since there are no significant answers to be found.

Ayer intents in his thesis that the entire genuine proposition is divided into analytic and empirically verifiable, i.e., all \emph{a priori} truths are analytic. Strictly speaking, the thesis as such does not have this implication. For to say that a proposition is an \emph{a priori} truth is to say that it can be established by \emph{a priori} reasoning on its own, without appeal to empirical evidence; and the fact that
something can be established by *a priori* reasoning does not entail that it cannot also be verified empirically. Thus the proposition that $97 \times 85 = 8245$ can be established *a priori*; but it can also in a perfectly good sense be verified empirically my means of a calculator, whether or not Ayer overlooked this point is of no great concern in dividing genuine proposition in to these two groups he clearly intense to restrict the memberships of the second groups to propositions which are not only empirically verifiable, but cannot be verified in any other ways. The propositions which are contingent and a posteriori are not established by *a priori* reasoning alone. Given this restriction, the central thesis thus entail quite trivially that all *a priori* truths are analytic.

4.11. CONCLUSION:

In spite of several criticisms of the Wittgenstein’s language there are some positive evaluations also. Gahringer attributed to the similarity between language and game as illuminating in many ways. Language and games are similar to each other in many ways. They similar to each other in that they are activities based on definite and to some extent arbitrary rules; contradictory or inadequate
rules put an in to both language and games; finally language and games are forms of communication between partners.\textsuperscript{102}

Ryle emphasizes another characteristics common to language and games. He says "Even more instructive is the analogy which Wittgenstein now comes to draw between signification expressions and the pieces with which games like chess are played; Ryle draws out in detail the analogies existing here, while not omitting to indicate the differences.\textsuperscript{103}

There are some important aspects of language which Wittgenstein expresses by means of language-game. Some of the important factors he expresses are as follows: (a) that language is an activity connected with the whole form of life of the linguistic partners. He emphasises an indissoluble connection of language with human action; language is an activity penetrating all form of life and is indissolubly bound up with other activities. All the concept of form of life can be considered as ultimate basis of all linguistic communication. Accord to Smart "Form of life" evidently play the role, in Wittgenstein's own language game, of a metaphysical ultimate in terms of which the functioning of a language is to be understood. They must be accepted, and they are given - that is to say, they are
Language has instrumental character, the word and propositions of language are instruments of the activity. Linsky remarks that “This instrumentalist view is the centre of gravity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. We can approach it first form a consideration of the idea of a language-game. A language game the use of language for some purpose.” Linsky gives two examples of language-game and then continues: “In these descriptions the view of language as a tool, an instrument, is prominent. The language game is a whole ‘consisting of language and actions into which it is woven.’” The concept of use of language, which emerges from the tool aspect of language, is one of the most central concepts of the Investigations. The importance of this concept lies, among other things, that it is closely connected with the linguistic rule: the use of linguistic symbols: follows, that are definite rules that are ‘use’ or ‘convention’, in the linguistic community; it is also connected with full form of life of the linguistic community.

Wittgenstein certainly believed that he had produced an important achievement in philosophy. Yet he feared that this
achievement might be exaggerated. This is reflected in his choice of Nestroy's remark for the motto of the *Investigations*. He was characteristically pessimistic about the future of his work. "It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another-, of course, it is not likely." His pessimism is connected with his profound appreciation of the 'depth' of philosophical problems. They are deeply rooted in human mode of life. He says "The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and the sickness of philosophical problem could be cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual." 106

The last but not the least is the linguistic approach, which is so characteristic of the attitude and temper of the logical positivists. Before it was never pursued with sedulously and relentlessly to such an approach and devastating effect on the traditional mode of studying the natural and social sciences. This is not to say that the Logical Positivists are the first to make a study of language. Language has been studied quite often in many different angles; but it has never been invested with kind and amount of significance it receives at the hand
of logical positivists. The whole of essence of linguistic approach of Logical Positivism consists in its demand that before one claims anything to be knowable one must be sure of it's being expressible. What cannot be meaningfully said or expressed cannot be meaningfully studied or known. This preliminary demand makes short work of many of the metaphysical problems. Thus, by an intensive and thorough adoption of linguistic approach of logical positivism, some problems are eliminated outright (on the ground that they are pseudo problems) while remaining ones are sought to be resolved by subjecting them to the same method. In the light of the above discussion, it is interesting, therefore, to note that on the one side the logical positivist look upon language as a prolific and even inexhaustible source of muddles and problems, on the other side, they look upon (the correct use of) it as an instrument of resolving such muddles and problems for the matter of that.
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