INTRODUCTION:

In this chapter my concern is to discuss the "verification theory of meaning" put forwarded by various positivists and also to discuss Wittgenstein’s concept of meaning. To understand the conception of meaning given by different positivists, it is necessary to consider their conception of meaning. This conception was first developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) through the logical analysis of language and experience in his celebrated earlier treatise “Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus”. Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning may be summed up by the dictum “The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification”, which means a pictorial representation of experienced facts.

The Logical Positivists put forwarded the most satisfactory theory of meaning. Their theory of meaning is the
‘verifiability theory of meaning’, which appears in several forms, which mainly tries to eliminate metaphysics and give foundation of factual meaning. In brief, this theory or criterion simply states that to be cognitively meaningful a sentence must be verifiable, and that purporting to assert matters of facts. But, those propositions, which are not verifiable, are not genuine propositions, because they does not come under experience. Those statements which are cognitively meaningless are most of the statements of metaphysics, and positivists consider it as meaningless.

The logical positivist’s main concern was about meaning and its desire to produce a theory of meaning. Generally their “verifiability theory” is regarded as one of the standard options, and a standard point of departure in the discussions of meaning in philosophy. In the verification theory the positivists mainly concerns about the question as “What does P mean?” instead of discussing the fundamental question of philosophy as “How do we know?” According to them to know what ‘P’ means, is understanding it in what way come to know ‘P’ and ‘P’ is nothing but the way in which one would come to know that ‘P’.
This is only what does the meaning of a proposition is the method of verification” means.

The Logical Positivists recognized two and only two kinds of meaningful statements. Firstly, the empirical statements which are verifiable by observation. Secondly, there is a kind of statements, which are called ‘analytic’ in which truth and falsity can be ascertained by merely reflecting on the meaning of relevant words, for example the statement that, “Cow gives us milk” reflects the meaning of the words. Unlike the statement that “there is cow outside the gate,” require empirical observation. The mathematical statements are also treated as analytic statement, the statements of metaphysics and theology are those, which does not belong to these groups and are treated as meaningless. The ‘metaphysical’ statements are essentially unverifiable. They are not so, not merely for technical reasons, such as the lack of a sufficiently powerful telescope, but because ‘in principle’. But of course not every unverifiable statements are metaphysical, there are some of the rhymes in which there are many statements which, one would not know how to verify, but that does not make them metaphysical. Something needs to be said about the contents and purports of
metaphysical statements in addition to the negatives points about verification. Unlike the writers of nonsense poems, the metaphysician wants to say something that is both meaningful and of great importance. He is talking about “ultimate realities”, about how things really are, thus they go beyond the reach of ordinary observation and science. It is because of the fact positivist's rejects metaphysics.

Experience, according to positivists is wholly private. The privacy of experiences creates a problem in the epistemology of the logical positivists. A sentence like “There is a table in the room” does not apparently present a problem to the user of a common language; because, the object referred to are publicly observable. But, the ultimate validity of a sentence, according to the empiricists, is linked with more basic statements describing our experiences. And yet these basic sentences like ‘I have a pain’ or ‘I see a green patch’ become incomprehensible if they are referring to a private experience of individuals. The object of reference does not observe publicly, consequently, these sentences became unintelligible to others. Either one has to hold that they do not speak our private experiences or deny that basic empirical sentence
are intelligible. The logical positivists choose the former view so far as experiences are concerned.

3.1. WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEW:

The distinguishing character of logical positivism was the principle of verification; namely that the meaning of a proposition is the method of verification. It was the basis for the Circle to give the criteria of meaning i.e. verifiability. Accordingly, a sentence or proposition is meaningful if it can be verifiable. This criterion played a major role in the circle's anti-metaphysical opinion. This principle of verification was attributed to Wittgenstein, whose *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* has been the starting point for the Vienna Circle's theory of meaning and meaninglessness. In his analyses of meaning, Wittgenstein wishes to clarify "what meaning is?" to this end he states out from a concept of meaning such is used in our ordinary language like, "having the same meanings" etc. His investigations are directed against a series of theories that purport to give an explanation and interpretation of this ordinary concept of meaning.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* influenced the logical positivists considerably and interpreted a logical trend to their
thinking quite distinct from that of the older empiricists. The conception of meaning was first developed by Wittgenstein through the logical analysis of language and experience in his celebrated earlier treatise "Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus", where he employed different slogan about meaning: that a proposition has meaning in virtue of being a picture, that meaning of a proposition is mode of its verification, that the meaning of an expression is its use. Wittgenstein tried to demonstrate there is an inherent logic in language and in doing so, he finally arrived a set of significant propositions which he called ‘elementary’, which can be proved by logical technique that sense is linked with experience.

Wittgenstein first of all discusses an interpretation of meaning which he had himself maintained in the *Tractatus*, namely the assertion that the meaning of a word is identical with the object for which he stands. Wittgenstein refers to this interpretation at the beginning of the investigations, where he says with reference to the Augustine quotation: "In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands". ¹
Wittgenstein discusses the conception of meaning with the example of proper names, the reason being that of theory of meaning of his *Tractatus* is fundamentally oriented on the function of proper names. Proper names stands for specific individual objects. The assertion is so modified that, in case of names meaning is identical with the name bearer. In the *Tractatus*, the ‘simple signs’ corresponds to real names, and the ‘objects’ in the “state of affairs” corresponds to the logical atoms. The objects are thus the meaning of the names; “The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. A name means an object. The object is its meaning”.

Wittgenstein discusses the theory of names in detail in the *Philosophical investigations*. In doing so he sets himself against his own view in the *Tractatus*, and this helped him to form the theory of Logical Atomism. Logical Atomism tries to maintain the thesis that the meaning of a name is identical with the object named, the name-bearer. It admits, it is true, that meaning of the pseudo-name is not identical with the name-bearer, e.g. like ‘Socrates’, with the real Socrates. But in the case of real names, meaning and name-bearer are once more identified, for the
meaning of real names, according to Logical Atomism, consists in the logical atoms, name bearer of simple name. Thus they used the concepts 'meaning' and 'name-bearer' unchanged their ordinary sense.

The representatives of Logical Atomism held entirely different views about what was to be understood by real names and logical atoms. In the Tractatus, for example, the 'simple signs' of the completely analysed proposition correspond to real names, the 'objects' in the 'state of affairs' to the logical atoms. The objects are thus meaning of the names: "The simple signs employed in proposition are called names. A name means an object. The object is its meaning". As a counter-move against Logical Atomism's theory of means and consequently by way of criticism of his own views in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein draws up a theory of names and meaning that start from entirely different presuppositions; Wittgenstein begins by attacking the conception that underlies the whole theory of Logical Atomism, that the meaning of a name must be identical with the bearer of the name.

According to Wittgenstein, if the meaning of a simple name were identical with the name-bearer, then the words
‘meaning’ and ‘name bearer’ would have to be used synonymously. But, there is not the case, as the following consideration shows; the example of Wittgenstein uses, that, if the man with the name N.N. dies, it is possible to say: “The man who bore the name N.N. has died”, but one could not say: “The meaning of the word has died.” The words ‘meaning’ and ‘name-bearer’ are, therefore, not interchangeable and consequently not synonymous either. “It is important to note the word ‘meaning’ is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that ‘corresponds’ to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N.N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say so, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say “Mr. N.N. is dead”.  

The meaning of signs is thus obviously most intimately connected with their application of rules with the nature and the modes of their usage, i.e. the meaning of a sign is determined by the rules of its application. This can be better explained by the example, the name ‘Socrates’ even after the death
of the name bearer exist, even in the contingency of the name-bearer's no longer really exist.

He further says that "Every sign by itself seems dead, what gives the life? — In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? — or is the use its life?" Wittgenstein is using the word 'use' somewhat as the pragmatists used it, which is to say that the meaning of a word is what we can do with the word. Wittgenstein identifies meaning is identified with an activity, and activity is somewhat overt.

Wittgenstein holds that language, in its simple forms, derives from "activities; reactions, which are clear - cut and transparent."

He also says that his characterization of language in terms of language-game "...is meant to bring in to prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life." Thus Wittgenstein's effort to reduce language to 'simple forms' gives an account of consideration of language in terms of speech acts. And this gives some indication of one of the ways in which Wittgenstein uses 'use'.

Wittgenstein is denying that meaning is some kind of mental entity. Wittgenstein does not deal with the objectivity
which is the commonality of meaning. His description of language presupposes that a common meaning has already been established in the language, and thus by the time we are able to use language, we already understand what words mean. He says that understanding and bearing the ‘meaning’ of a word is not a mental act, but consists of understanding a pattern of behaviour. And Wittgenstein interpreted in behavioral terms not only the concept of meaning but even mental concepts like ‘pain’. Within the framework of behaviourism, he argued that our mental concepts do not refer to the conscious subjective status. Therefore, all mental concepts, without residue, are reducible to a collection of behavioral patterns.

3.2. DISCUSSION ON WITTGENSTEIN’S VIEW:

Wittgenstein did recognize that “the use of meaning” is not applicable to all instances of meaning without exception. He believes that in the *Philosophical Investigations*, he defined ‘meaning’ in terms of use in a language without exceptions. In the *Investigations* “naming theory of meaning” is propounded in a modified form. He advocated that though words stand for facts
which correspond to them, such a correspondence is made possible because of the rules of that specific 'language-game'. In the *Tractatus* a name has meaning not in isolation but only in the context of a proposition. But in the *Philosophical Investigations* this context is not just a proposition but the totality of a specific 'language-game'.

Another aspect of the 'theory of meaning' to which Wittgenstein devoted quite some space in the *Investigations* is the question of what understanding and learning in a language consists of. There he says that understanding and learning the "meaning" of a word is not a mental act, but consists of understanding a pattern of behaviour. And Wittgenstein interpreted in behavioral terms not only the concept of meaning but been mental concepts like 'pain'. Within the framework of behaviouralism, he argued that our mental concepts do not refer to the conscious, subjective status. Therefore, all mental concepts without residue are reducible to a collection of behavioral patterns. Thus, a mental concept is not a 'name' of an inner phenomenon but refer to 'publicly' observable situation. He used his arguments against the possibility of a "private language"
to prove that the mental concepts are equivalent to a collection of behavioral situations.

No where in the *Tractatus* does Wittgenstein give an example of an object or of a name, so that it is a matter of interpretation what is to be understood by these terms. The functions of name can perhaps best be explained by means of certain demonstrative pronouns like, for example, ‘this’ or ‘that’ etc. which stand immediately for an object and become meaningless if the object disappear. The proposition for e.g. ‘This is red’ only has sense as long as the word ‘this’, refers to a definite actually present object; if it no longer does this, the proposition becomes meaningless.

The word has a definite meaning independently of the real existence of the name bearer, and the meaning is attributed to it on the basis of definite modes of application. It can be said here, too, that the meaning of the word ‘Socrates’ is determined by the rules of its use, and this has been said by Wittgenstein that, “For a large class of cases though not for all - in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined; thus: “the meaning of a word is its use in language.” 11
Wittgenstein presents the reasoning of 'Logical Atomism' by means of following example:

... "For one is tempted to make an objection against what is ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this; a name ought really to signify a simple. And for this one might perhaps give the following reasons: The words "Excalibur", say, are a proper name in the ordinary sense. The word Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or broken up. But if "Excalibur" is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But, then the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words which it consists. So the word "Excalibur" must disappear when the sense is analysed and its place taken by words which name simples. It will be reasonable to call these words the real names."
When we ask "What do you mean?" we must presuppose that there is something one can point to i.e., a table, or some kind of activity, like walking to indicate the meaning to the satisfaction of our questions. But we must also presuppose that both the speaker and the hearer in such a situation understand what is being pointed to, and that they understand the significance of the activity in the same way.

According to Wittgenstein, meanings are mere activities and reaction. And they are not simply convention decided upon by the member of a group. That is why Wittgenstein's statement "A word has the meaning someone has given it" may prove misleading and this statement cannot stand without a considerable amount of qualification.

According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of an expression is determined by the way in which an expression is actually used in a specific context. He argued that meaning possibly cannot be the 'name' of an 'object'. Meaning of a concept cannot logically be the 'name' of an object: The improvement in the theory of meaning in the *Philosophical Investigations* over the one propounded in the *Tractatus* was brought out by Anthony
Kenny as “In the *Tractatus* meaning is conferred by pure will, the pure will of the extra mundane solipsistic metaphysical self; in the *Philosophical Investigations*, it is conferred by the active perception of the human being in the social community in the empirical world”.

It seems that in the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein did not reject the “picture theory” of meaning in total. But he made a departure from his position of the *Tractatus* in two very important aspects. Firstly, he rejected “ostensive definition” as a means of ascribing meaning towards, and secondly, he no longer thought that description of ‘atomic facts’ is the only function of language. In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein held that there is not just one but a multiplicity of language-games and all of them are equally legitimate.

Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* gives us a truth-conditional account of the sense of molecular propositions. He says given the sense of the constituent elementary propositions, the sense of a molecular proposition is given by the conditions under which it comes out true in its truth-table. But elementary propositions have no truth conditions than does a tautology or a contradiction has.
3.3. SOME REACTION AGAINST WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEW:

Strawson, in his review of the *Philosophical Investigations*, he drew attention to the fact that Wittgenstein's analysis fails to take account of a definite linguistic fact. Strawson says:

"Wittgenstein here gives the wrong reason for objecting to the identification of the meaning of a proper name with its bearer, or one of its bearers. If we speak at all of the meaning of proper names, it is only in quite specialized ways as when we say that 'Peter' means a stone or 'giovanni' means 'John'. This is not an incident of usage, but reflects a radical difference between proper names and other names. But here, as elsewhere, Wittgenstein neglects the use of 'meaning'."  

Herbert Feigl described about the *Tractatus* "Wittgenstein emphatically told the few of us ....with whom he occasionally met [between 1927-29]...... That he was no longer interested in philosophy". He felt that he had said all he could in
the *Tractatus*. Moreover, only relatively rare occasion could we get him to clarify one or another of the puzzling or obscure passages in his work. He seems himself rather unclear on the ideas he had developed during the First World War.

There is no sign of his having radically changed his views nor of his having rejected any fundamental aspect of the ideas he had expanded ten years earlier. Certainly the one thing that Wittgenstein seems not to have done was to seize on the ideas of the Vienna Circle as a basis for making far-reaching modifications in his earlier views. Surprisingly, this attempt to explain the source of Wittgenstein verificationism does have to be rejected.

The *Tractatus* is an extraordinary powerful and penetrating crystallization of central tenets of views, which they had arrived independently. One very noticeable feature of the *Tractatus* is the absence of any explicit reference to verificationism or any other sign of empiricism. What is more, has been apparently convincingly argued on the basis of things that the *Tractatus* does say that we can rule out the possibility that verificationism is implicit in the *Tractatus* at any level. For these reasons it is important to discover how Wittgenstein came to adapt
verificationism since this appeared to make a radical change in his views at the most fundamental level.

Unfortunately, Vienna Circle interpretation did badly misrepresent in the *Tractatus* on many issues, the nature of philosophy. It has undoubtedly been one of the major achievements of recent works on the *Tractatus* to make this very clear that stems from Friege, Hertz, Schopenhauer and elsewhere, and had nothing to do with Vienna Circle or radical empiricism. It was precisely all the aspects of the *Tractatus*, which the Vienna Circle were completely avoided tactfully. We can perhaps take a second thought at Vienna Circle’s interpretation and realize that while this interpretation is not the whole truth about the *Tractatus*, it is not wholly mistaken either, and on one point of some importance it does contain a genuine insight. So Vienna Circle’s interpretation is not without shortcomings. It is certainly an exaggeration to claim that this interpretation fails not “from any minor defects but because it comes from entirely wrong philosophical tradition.” 16

The meaning of the word ‘*use*’ give us vagueness pertaining to the word itself. Because of there fact that ‘meaning’ and ‘*use*’ are hardly co-extensive. A meaningless word can be used
without being meaningful in the accepted sense, viz., the way the
words 'table' and 'man' are regarded as meaningful. Moreover, the
uses of words are never completed and that takes away an
invariance from the meaning of any words including the word 'use'
itself. Meaning does not presuppose use, and if we specified uses
by saying 'cognitive-uses' - we already presuppose the term we are
going to consider.

According to Madden and Kiteley "There is a two-fold difficulty with this 'meaning in use' talk. First one must not
conflate 'meaning' and 'use' since it is perfectly possible for an
expression which means nothing at all to have a use even a correct
or incorrect use. 'Abracadabra' does not mean anything at all; it is
just something magicians say before their tricks"....

"Second when one explicates 'use' in 'a term is
meaningful if it has a use, the contention collapses .The explication
of 'use' in this contention is involved since different writer have
mean quite different things by it." 17

The word 'use' implies a sort of ambiguity and
vagueness. The word 'meaning' itself is a vague enough and try to
reduce it 'use' is to make a concept of meaning still vaguer. The
word has a use, no doubt but they have a different kind of use from that of sentences. To find out the meaning of a word we look it for a context that is its occurrence in sentences and when it comes to the meaning of sentences we should have an additional role in our language that is the role of an assertion. But, the use of a sentence in a language and the use as of words in sentences seem to be very different. As a matter of fact, sentences, except in a very strange sense of 'use' are not used in our language there made formed asserted believed, withdrawn etc. Thus whereas in some sense it is legitimate to speak of the uses of the words, it seems odd to speak in the same way of the uses of sentences. If this is so, then even if use - semantic explains the meaning it fails to give us any clue as to the meaning of sentences. In the case of logical positivists these difficulties doesn't arise so much, for them meaning of both sentences and words may be said to be dependent on a short of applicability to objects and facts.

3.4. AYER'S VIEW ON MEANING:

A.J. Ayer was another positivist philosopher who redefines the 'verification principle'. He wrote:
"We say that a sentence is factually significant to any person if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - that is, if he knows what observations should led him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject is as being false." ¹⁸

Thus this verification principle Ayer attempted to drew a logical distinction between those statements that are verifiable, and therefore ‘meaningful’ and those statements that are not verifiable, therefore, ‘meaningless’. All those unverifiable statements are supposed to be metaphysical in nature.

In order to produce a detailed account of verification principle which supposed to furnish a criterion through which the meaningful statements are separated from the meaningless one, there is every need that we should mention Ayer’s classification of proposition in to analytic and synthetic division. Like Hume, he says that the analytic propositions of Logic and mathematics, which are a priori in nature. The synthetic propositions are the empirical propositions of everyday science and are a posteriori. The propositions of Logic and mathematics are tautologies because, "they are independent of experience in the sense that they
do not owe their validity to empirical verification. We may come to discover them through an inductive process, but once we have apprehended them we see that they are necessarily true, that they hold good for every conceivable instance. 19

By classifying the propositions into analytic and synthetic, Ayer was trying to show that metaphysical statements are meaningless. According to him metaphysics always try to explain reality as a whole and attempt to describe supersensible world in such a way as if it were given to sensory experience. In this sense, Ayer holds that metaphysics is not only speculative but also non-sensical.

Ayer provides a linguistic turn to the problems related to metaphysics. He puts forward a criterion which would enable him to distinguish meaningful statements from the meaningless assertions of metaphysics. In an attempt to justify his claim, Ayer introduces "Principle of Verification" as a criterion of meaning. Ayer defines verification principle in the following manner...

"The principle of verification is supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful. A simple way to formulate it would be to say..."
that a sentence has a literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable.” 20

The principle of verification is the touch-tone whereby we can verify a peculiar statement and also determine whether the same is true, false or meaningless. Any statement which is neither true nor false, that is, which is beyond the scope or applicability of the verification principle is a meaningless statement. According to Ayer the proposition “God is in the heaven” is a meaningless statement, as the principle of verification finds that there is no observable reality and experience and there can be none which is being symbolized by the expression God. Therefore, we must regard it as meaningless proposition. Such propositions in the true sense are pseudo statements and are not literally significant. On the basis of the principle of verification, A.J.Ayer has classified propositions into three categories –

(1) Those statements which are in fact verifiable. For example, we can verify that whether water consists of two atom of Hydrogen and one atom of Oxygen.

(2) Those statements which are not in fact verifiable but by suitable apparatus they can verify e.g. “There are mountains
on the farther side of the moon". According to him this proposition is theoretically conceivable and verifiable in principle, if not in practice and thus significant proposition.

(3) Those sentences which are impossible to verify. According to Ayer proposition, for example, "the Absolute enter into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress" is not possible to verify in principle, as one can be capable of observe whether the Absolute entered or did not entered in evolution progress. These kind of propositions does not express a tautology or a proposition which are capable of verification and thus has no literal significance.

Ayer also makes a strict distinction between the 'strong' and 'weak' sense of the term variability. According to Ayer:

"A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of term, if and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable".21

The statements which are practically verifiable are the cases of 'strong' verifiability. Verifiability in the strong sense are
also refers to the conclusive verifiability. Ayer maintains that there are some empirical propositions that can be verified conclusively, in the sense that they are directly given in the sense experience. Thus according to him anything that is given in one's own sense-experience is conclusively verifiable. For example, "There is a man in the next room" can be verified conclusively in Ayer's sense we can prove the statement and can confirm whether it is true or not, and thus can verify the statement, because we can confirm its truth through sense-experience, they comes under the conclusive verifiability. But this conclusive variability does not solve our problem regarding universal generalization.

According to 'weak' sense of verification says Ayer, a statement which is not immediately at present verifiable but may become verifiable tomorrow is said to be 'weakly' verifiable. Thus in the weak sense of the term a proposition is literally meaningful if there are some observations that would be relevant to its truth or falsity. Thus for e.g. "There is life on Mars", is not directly or practically verifiable, but it is possible that in future we may be able to land man on Mars then would know whether or not there is life on Mars. This criterion, feels Ayer, would allow significance to
the general propositions as it is clear that we can at least find evidence for or against them. Thus, Ayer identifies the ‘strong sense’ of the term verification with “verification in practice”, and ‘weak sense’ of the term verification with “verification in principle” also follows that the ‘weak sense’ of the term verifiability allows every proposition to be meaningful irrespective of their status. Ayer also states that the ‘weak sense’ of the term verifiability not only allows the statement of natural sciences as meaningful but also the statements of metaphysics.

Ayer tried to refute the position of Wittgenstein of denying the possibility of private language. He points out an important fact that there is an equal difficulty of recognizing an object in public language. Thus he says:

... “By a ‘special situation’ I simply mean a case or similar case as given below! When someone says “I have a pain” I can ask him “Have you really?” This is a very sensible question to ask. He will not at all be surprised to hear this question and retort “Well, what do you mean?” Sometimes he may, if he is in a bad
mood; but normally he will say “Oh, yes a sort of nagging pain in my stomach”. This gives us a clue to go beyond his words and physical behaviors to identify the kind of experience in me, by an act of imagination”. \(^{22}\)

For Ayer, both our knowledge of the past and our knowledge of other minds rest on inductive reasoning. It is logically impossible for us to have direct knowledge either of the past or of the other people’s experiences. In both cases our knowledge rests on inferences from what we observe. In case of our knowledge of other people’s experiences, it rests on our observation of the behaviour, the displays of feeling, the manner of acting of other people.

3.5. DISCUSSION ON AYER’S VIEW:

According to Ayer ‘verification principle’ is the ‘method’ through which ‘meaningful’ statements are separated from ‘meaningless’ assertions. It would ascribe the ‘literal’ meaning of those statements which are self evident truth or empirically verifiable.

It also follows that the statements expressed by any sentence is held meaningful in so far as one knows how to verify it
with his sense experience. The statements which do not follow this sense are regarded as meaningless and consequently they are the metaphysical statements. Thus he has made an attempt to eliminate 'metaphysical' statements as they are non-sensical. This principle is, according to him is not applicable to the analytic statements since they are self-evident truth.

By making the classification of the propositions, Ayer tries to distinguish his use of the 'word meaning' from other uses. The word 'meaning' says Ayer, has different meaning in philosophy. In some cases the statement is said to be meaningful even if it does not fulfill the requirements of verification principle. Ayer maintains, however, there is no proper use of the word, 'meaning' in which it would not be correct to say that a statement is 'meaningful' unless it satisfies the verification theory. According to Ayer, "literal meaning" is derived from "factual meaning". A statement is factually meaningful if it is empirically verifiable. Consequently, a statement is literally meaningful if it is factually meaningful. For example, the statement "Arsenic is poisonous substance" has factual meaning since it is empirically verifiable. Here, Ayer's use of term "factual meaning" is identical with
truth'. In other words, if a statement is true then it has "literal meaning". Thus truth is identified with meaning.

Ayer cited the example of a few general proposition viz. "Arsenic is poisonous", "All men are mortal", "A body tends to expand when it is heated", where the conclusive verifiability does not work; as by very definition their certainty can't be established by finite series of observation or not possible to bring every cases in to sense experience. So, these kinds of propositions do not come under conclusive verification. Hence, according to Ayer, these propositions will come to the category of the metaphysical propositions. All generalization becomes non-sensical since they could neither be verified nor confuted conclusively. Again in the same way the principle of verification in its strong sense, also render the "statements about the past" and statements of natural sciences are equally non-sensical as none of them are conclusively verifiable.

Thus Ayer distinguishes a 'strong' verifiability principle, which lies down that a proposition is meaningless unless experience can conclusively establish its truth, and a 'weak' verifiability principle, which requires only that some observation
should be relevant to the determination of a proposition's truth or falsity or even its probability or improbability. Ayer accepts verifiability in the weak sense only, for he is not ready to condemn that universal propositions, laws of nature, truth established by science or the statement about the past are non-sensical. Ayer thinks that 'weak' verifiability principle was sufficient to make all metaphysical propositions meaningless; no observation is relevant to by the nature of the case, to the probability or improbability of the metaphysical statements as, "The soul of man is immortal" or "The ultimate Reality is one or many". Ayer further says the statements about the past i.e. historical judgments can only be weakly verified i.e. it rendered probable or improbable by observation of evidences of historical events; but they cannot be completely reduced to present sense experience.

Ayer distinguishes a 'strong' verifiability principle which lays it down that a proposition is meaningless unless experience can conclusively establish its truth, and 'weak' principle which requires only that some observation should be 'relevant' to the determination of a proposition's truth or falsity. He accepts the verifiability principle only in a weak sense, on the
ground that he does not wish to condemn universal laws or statements about the past as nonsensical, neither of which are reducible to present experiences. In this point he agrees with Carnap because ‘weak’ verification is quite sufficient to destroy metaphysical propositions on observation is relevant by the nature of case to such a metaphysical proposition as that ‘the world of sense-experience is unreal nor could any observation helps us to determined whether the world is a single ultimate substance or a plurality of such substances’.

3.6. SOME REACTION AGAINST THE AYER’S VIEW:

The main objection of verification principle, according to A.C.Ewing\textsuperscript{23} is that-

(1) There are other kinds of experience besides sense experience e.g. the experience of seeing logically necessary connections, and ethical experiences which tells us of values, religious experiences etc., also cannot be ignored.
(2) The sense experience of past or of the other minds are not possible, nor can sense-experience directly establish any scientific laws. Therefore, the strict verificationists will have either to interpret statements about such things in a very extraordinary way to declare these statements as meaningless.

(3) The verification principle is not self verifiable by sense-experience. We cannot tell by sense-experience that there is nothing in the meaning of a statement which could not be verified by sense-experience any more than we could tell by sight that there are no invisible microbes in this room. Therefore, according to Ewing, the principle of verification is on the above grounds is meaningless.

William Quine also objected the verification principle of A.J. Ayer on the point of his distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' classification of propositions. Quine considers that the empiricism of logical positivists is largely conditioned by two important dogmas, namely, belief in the supposed boundary between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' knowledge and reductionism. These two dogmas, according to Quine, are constructed on the vague structures of physical object language. He
argues that the basic concept of logical positivism which regarded language to be the starting point analysis is ill founded, since the so-called physical object language proposed by logical positivists is itself in disagreement with its own demand.

Quine also believes that all the knowledge concerning natural, physical and mathematical science is “a man made fabric”. All knowledge, in one way or the other, is dependent on experience. For he conceives that there are no propositions in Science, natural as well as exact sciences, that are immune to revision. According to Quine, revision and redistribution of certain truth values affect the entire structure of science as it an interconnected network.

Quine also pointed out that the distinction between analytic and synthetic is very superficial in scientific knowledge since knowledge is a synthetic of linguistic conceptual apparatus and experience. Experience in turn represents both theoretical and practical aspects of knowledge. Language and logic are inseparable from reality. The conventional truths of mathematical sciences are in one way the products of experience. They have their origin in reality.
The universal nature of mathematical sciences is designed by men to know the quantitative structure of reality. Although they are the matters of convention, the validity and the utility of mathematics lie in its application to empirical reality. Otherwise mathematics would become a part of metaphysics, if it is regarded as an abstract science that deals with the number of axioms.

Another point of objection raised by John Wisdom regarding the status of the verification principle. He comments: “Shall we accept the verification principle? What it is to accept it? When people bring out with a dashing air of the words “The meaning of a statement is really simply the method of verification, like one who says,” The value of a thing is really simply its power of exchange”, in what short of way are they using words? What is the general nature of their theory? The answer is “it is a metaphysics theory.”

This follows that according to Wisdom, the principle of verification has been formulated in such a way that its purpose and nature is not clear. On the face it, the principle by itself is
neither empirically verifiable nor a tautology. Then it is one of those utterance of metaphysics.

Similar kind of attack also comes from Urmson, pertaining to the status of the principle of verification. He argues that the questions regarding the status of the principle of verification has two possible answers from the stand point of positivist, namely: it is empirical, it is a tautology. But according to Urmson, it is not possible to show that the principle of verification belongs to either of the above categories on the following grounds. For logical positivist, the statement of philosophy is not empirical but only tautological clarification of language. Also, the positivists did not move for an exhaustive study of all the metaphysical statements to show that the principle of verification is an empirical formulation.

G.J. Warnock - on the other hand illustrates that we ordinarily inquire into semantics of the words or sentences. According to him the Principle of Verification, verifies truth and falsity, of a proposition only and cannot verify the meaning of a sentence stands for. To avoid this confusion, Warnock suggests
modifying the epigram. “The meaning of a sentence is the method of verification.”

Warnock further says that when we talk about the verification of a statement, it is somehow connected with its truth and falsity, but he argues that there are certain meaningful sentences which do not have any concern with truth and falsity, which also does not need of the verification principle. He says, “They are imperative sentences, used (mainly) to give orders; and interrogative sentences used (mainly) to ask questions. There are sentences used as prayers; to make promise; to give verdicts; to express decision; to pass moral judgments; or to make proposals. It is non-sensical to ask a question, an order, a prayer, or a proposal, whether it is true or false.” 27

Warnock also envisaged that “The method of Verification” is somewhat misleading. He also argues that the methods adopted by statisticians, chemists and painters differ in their approaches in accordance with their subject matter. There is not one method to suite and satisfies all of them. As there is no fixed method of verification, so the metaphysicians claim that they
have their own method of verification to establish whether the statements of metaphysics are true or false (meaningful).

Waismann, has argued that a proposition about physical object does not in fact entail an observation statement, in the sense that to suppose the first to be true and the second to be false would be self-contradictory statement.

Karl Popper a well known philosopher of science who was often misunderstood as a follower of positivism, introduces the method of "falsification", Popper aims at solving the problem of how to draw the line between the statements of the sciences and all other statements. The line, he says, can be drawn by nothing that a statement of the science is always falsified, if there is a theory which cannot be refuted by any conceivable event, then it is non-scientific. Hence, according to him "scientific-theory" is true only in so far as it is falsifiable or refuted. Thus he was interested in demarcating science from pseudo-science. According to him the statements of metaphysics do not forbid any status of affair, and they are not falsifiable. He introduces the 'falsifiablity' alas a criterion is not only to demarcate science from
pseudo-science, but also to reduce the number of contending hypothesis for explaining a class of phenomena.

Gilbert Ryle\textsuperscript{29} writes that in the epigram "the meaning of a proposition is the method of verification "the word 'proposition' was made to cover not just statements of natural law (scientific statements) but statements of all kind. He tries to differentiate statements of low from conjectural statements. He says that statements of law cannot be proved true or false, while the conjectural statements denotes to any true or false statements. In that case, according to Ryle, the Principle of Verification should be applied only to the conjectural statements, and not the statements of law. He also feels that the statements of science are not put for the test of verification or falsification since they are well established truths. Thus Ryle attacks both verification and falsification.

Sir Isaiah Berlin\textsuperscript{30} in his article 'Verification' states that the criterion provided by 'strong' verification at best applied to a very narrow range of observation propositions; while 'weak' verification either fails to act as a criterion of sense altogether or if made equivalent to 'strong' falsification, then it is a sole arbiter of
meaning, this all entails a brand of phenomenalism which provides unsatisfactory analyses of propositions about material objects and other selves. He also says that the criterion of verifiability cannot act as the basis of classification of empirical propositions into logical categories. For it can neither distinguish statements recording observations from other categories of empirical propositions, nor enable us to distinguish different types of observation statements from each other.

Thus verification theory of meaning of Ayer suffers from the fact that it applies only to restricted sense of 'meaning', to which the verification principle applies. But it says that the moral judgments and aesthetics appraisals have meaning, even if the sentences by which they are expressed do not satisfy the verification principle; it follows from this that their meaning is not the method of their verification. The statement, then, that the meaning of a sentence is the method of verification is misleading, as it is not true of meaningful sentences of every kind so also of the sentences which are of factually meaningful. On the other hand it would seem absurd to deny that the Universal laws of Science have factual meaning, yet if to verify something means to establish or
prove its truth, then it is not clear how one can verify an assertion which is about absolutely all particles of matters.

Verification is not mere sensory experience but a practical activity that involves some interaction between a person and surroundings. It has some short of sensations. These sensations cannot go beyond the appearances. The inner structure of phenomena are not given in sensory experience but known through experimentation. In fact, the principle of verification of Ayer misinterprets the concepts such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’. According to Ayer ‘knowledge’ is acquired through sensing one’s own sensations. This position of Ayer leads to the solipsism. The verification principle of Ayer, in the ultimate analysis, rest on the processes to which all sense giving objects are related.

Sense experience involves a priori elements besides the passively received sense-data. Every immediate experience is linked with a larger content and involves an impulse towards its own transcendence. The impulse is away from fragmentariness and towards totality e.g. an all comprehensive and all-coherent system of experience that finds better expression in the valuationat expressions of man, than in mere sense-experience.
3.7. SCHLICIC'S VIEW:

The positivists even widened the scope of the sayable world and tried to show a relationship between the world of fact and language. Schlick was one of the those positivists who consistently supported the principle of verifiability whereas many others tried to modify this original principle to suit their purposes. The notion of 'verification' given by the 'Logical positivists' cover two view- (1) "The verification theory of meaning" and (2) "The verification principle" The first is the theory about nature of meaning given by Moritz Schlick and can be stated in the form of well-known slogan, "The meaning of a proposition is the method of verification". Schlick adheres to the view that meaning is somehow identical with verification, and the question "What is meaning ?" can be answered by reference to verification. In his *Positivism & Realism* (1932) he spoke of "the identity of meaning and verification". He insisted that "a statement has a meaning only in so far as it can be verified, it is only signifies what is verified and absolutely nothing beyond this". 31 He admitted, however, that
there was no end to the number of items of verification relevant to an ordinary statement.

Meaning, he feels, must ultimately be established in the terms of experience. "All the questions that can in principle be answered (including those that at one time or place be technically insoluble) are always answerable in one way, namely by reference to some observation (be it nature of ourselves) or by any scientific method which always pre-supposes observation; i.e. the occurrence of some sense impressions in short by experience." 32 Schlick held that the factual meaning depends on the actual possibility of verification, that is, of determination by actual experience whether or not the proposition is true or false. Thus he adopted the criterion of verifiability in principle, which was eventually presented as the theory that factual propositions are genuine if the logical possibility in principle of their verification or if they are logically deducible from propositions for which there is in principle the logical possibility of verification. Either a fact or process is logically possible "if can be described, i.e. if the sentence which is supposed to describe it obeys the rules of grammar we have stipulated for our language." 33
The verification principle according to Schlick, is a statement of what meaning is: it identifies meaning with a method. The method of verification according to him is not merely establishing the truth of a proposition, it is the meaning itself. Thus Schlick says:

"...in order to arrive at the meaning of a sentence or proposition, we must go beyond propositions. For we cannot hope to explain the meaning of a proposition merely by presenting another proposition...I could always go on asking, 'But what does this new proposition mean? You see there would never be any end to this kind of enquiry, the meaning would never be clarified if there were no other ways of defining it than by a series of propositions...'

...The discovery of the meaning of any proposition must ultimately be achieved by some act, some immediate procedure, for instance, as the showing of yellow; it cannot be given in a proposition."  

Therefore, Schlick adheres to the verification the 'act' or immediate 'procedure' as one of verification and he gives the
explanation of meaning, which can be seen in the following quotation:

"Stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stating the rules according to which the sentences are to be used, and this is the same as stating the way in which it can be verified (or falsified). The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification. The 'grammatical' rules will consist partly of ordinary definitions, i.e. explanation of words by means of other words, partly of what are called "ostensive definitions".... The simplest form of an ostensive definition is a pointing gesture combined with the pronouncing the word, as when we teach a child the signification of the sound 'blue' by showing a blue object...."^{35}

Schlick in his "Positivism and Realism" (1932) he spoke of "the identity of meaning and verification" of a statement are indefinite. "The meaning of every physical statement ultimately lies always in an endless chain of data". But how, in that case, can we be sure that a given statement is or is wholly, meaningful? Schlick's answer consisted in a challenge. He says - "If anyone thinks that the meaning of a proposition is not in fact exhausted by what can be verified in the given, but extends for beyond that, then
he must at least admit that this surplus of meaning is utterly
indescribable, unusable in any way, and inexpressible by any
language".  

Schlick equates statements about physical objects with
statements about experiences. He mentioned that...“the claim that
a thing is real is a statement about lawful connections of
experiences”.  

Schlick main efforts were directed against the
‘realist’ rather than against the ‘positivist’. According to the realist
Schlick .....  

“The meaning of a reality-statement is by no means
exhausted in mere assertions of the form ‘under these particular
circumstances this peculiar experience will occur’ (where the
assertions, on our view, are in any case multitude); the meaning, he
says, in fact lies beyond this in something else, which must be
referred to, say as ‘independent existence’, ‘transcendent being’ or
the like, and of which our principle [the verification principle]
provides no account.”  

While speaking about meaning, Schlick says that if a
person understands meaning of a sentence, then he must know the
appropriate method of verification. Thus he tries to connect
meaning with truth. This point may be clear from the passage of his writings....

"What criterion has we to find out whether the meaning of a sentence has been grasped? – A person knows the meaning of a proposition if he is able to indicate exactly the circumstances under which it would be true" (and distinguish them from the circumstances which would make it false). This is the way in which Truth and Meaning must be connected (it is clear that they must be connected in some way)."³⁹

For Schlick, the verifiability principle purports to be a method of discovery of a meaning of a proposition, also is the method of defining a word. According to him, meaningful sentences must somehow be connected with experiences. A statement is composed of words. Knowledge of meaning of the word is necessary to understand the sentence. He says that, in philosophy it is impossible to give the meaning of any statement only by describing the fact, which must exist if the statement is to be true. If it does not exist, then the statement is false.
3.8. DISCUSSION ON SCHLICK’S VIEW:

Schlick was trying to make sense of identification of meaning with method of verification. He also identifies explanation of meaning with “ostensive definition”, that we can teach a child the meaning of ‘blue’ by means of a sample, using “a pointing gesture combined with the pronouncing of the word” which according to him is necessary for the explanation of meaning.

According to Schlick, knowledge of meaning of words is necessary to understand a sentence. To express something through words, it is necessary to use them in a sentence. Being ‘shown’ in the so-called sense of gesture as a matter of fact even all names is not learnt. Schlick never intended to say that either we actually do know meaning of word by ostensive means but only that we adopt this method only we fail to know the meaning by their use in sentences. Thus he says-

“The meaning of a word or a combination of words is determined by a set of rules which regulate their use and which, following Wittgenstein, we may call the rules of their grammar, taking this word in its widest sense.” 40
Schlick was fully aware of the fact that knowing the meaning of the words was not adequate to use a language. The sentences, too, formed out of these words, have their own rules. To know the meaning of word is necessary but not sufficient for knowing the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence according to him is its verifiability. He says—

... "Thus whenever we ask about a sentence, ‘what does it mean?’ What we expect is instructions as to the circumstances in which the sentence is to be used; we want a description of the conditions under which the sentence will form a true proposition and of those which will make it false". 41

In his equation of meaning with verification, Schlick differs on the one hand, from those verificationists who renounced the question “what is meaning?” and on the other hand, from those who tries to answer it by means of a formal and finite analysis. Schlick offers no such analysis, and thereby avoids the difficulties of this enterprise; but he is confident that any additional component of meaning that may be mentioned will be covered by a corresponding item of verification. Schlick’s ‘realism’ felt that a statement about a physical object means more than the relevant
experiences. He says that, the 'data', which make up the verification of physical statements, are 'endless'. Schlick is not denying that the world contains physical objects as distinct from experiences. He emphasized that his view was not the 'positivism', which he found in certain earlier philosophers. He was not claiming that 'only the given exists.' 42 Any one who asserts this principle thereby attempts to advance a claim that is metaphysical in the same sense, and to the same degree, as the seemingly opposite condition: "There is a Transcendent Reality" - i.e. a reality other than experience." 43 The very meanings of 'real' and 'exist' are, according to Schlick, tied to experience; hence it is no less nonsensical to deny then to affirm that there exists anything other than that.

According to Schlick what he said about meaning was pointing out a truism. It is the attitude that we take invariably when we come to assert an empirical statement, especially at the primary level of knowledge. At the most 'verifiability' is a clarification of the use of the concept of meaning - a universal insight explicitly stated. Everything else depends on this insight and to call them primary facts a theory is, according to Schlick an abuse of this
term. Again the principle of verifiability should not be regarded as a great psychological discovery arrived at by the elimination of other possible hypotheses. It is only possible attitude one can take as an 'empiricist'. What do I mean by meaning? – Is not a request to provide the enquirer with an interpretative report of what actually happens in the mind of the user of the term, but an empirical statement (in the sense in which \textit{a priori} proposition is empirical in stating the way we use our terms) furnished by the presumption that knowledge is ultimately of the facts in the world, and known only through sense experience. Thus this principle is neither an empirical hypothesis nor a theory but expresses a fact, which is always there.

Meaning of a proposition according to him consists obviously in the fact that it expresses a definite state of affair, and proposition indicates the state of affair only to the person who understands it. Schlick's attitude to philosophy clearly brings out his uncompromising empiricism with regards to any form of knowledge.

A meaningful sentence for him must somehow be connected with experience. A statement is composed of words.
Knowledge of meaning of the words is necessary to understand the sentence. He says that in philosophy it is impossible to give the meaning of any statement only by describing the fact, which must exist if the statement is to be true. If it does not exist then the statement is false. Thus, according to him meaning have a proposition consists, obviously in the fact that it expresses a definite state of affairs, and proposition indicates the state of affair only to the person who understand it. Schlick asks, “When do I understand a proposition? When I understand the meanings of the words, which occur in it? These can be explained by definitions. But in the definitions new words appear whose meanings cannot again be described in propositions, they must be indicated directly: the meaning of a word must in the end be shown, it must be given. This is done by an act of indication, of pointing, and what is pointed at must be given, otherwise I cannot be referred to it”.

The problem, apparently, regarding the meaning on word is this; if the meaning of a word is designation, then either the words like ‘and’ ‘or’s, are meaningless or we have to change the concept of meaning. Schlick tried to solve this by denying that these two different classes of expressions are really different. These
kinds of expressions acquire their meaning not by completely different processes, but by the same process with different degrees of complexity. To express something through words, it is necessary to use them in a sentence. As a matter of fact even all learnt by being shown in the so-called sense of gesture. Schlick never intended to say either that we actually do not know the meaning of a word by ostensive means but only that ultimately we have to adopt that method, which have their use in a sentence. Thus, Schlick thinks that proper way of learning the meaning of a sentence is either use in sentences.

Schlick seems to think that the question of when to use a sentence is simply a question of verification — that its use is appropriate if one has verified what the sentence says, knowing when and when not to use a sentence requires not merely a knowledge about human interest and situations. Schlick is thus right in connecting the meaning of a sentence with its use; but there is more to understanding the use of a sentence than knowing its method of verification. Thus according to Schlick the verifiability principle purports to be a method of discovering the meaning of a proposition, also is the method of defining a word.
He further says that the only sentences, not propositions, have a meaning; the rules he says, are the meaning of symbols, not of the symbols plus the rules. Schlick defines "meaningless" as that question whether a proposition has a meaning is independent of the state of scientific knowledge at a given time. Thus, he says that a proposition is meaningless, only if it is "unverifiable in principle", and 'metaphysical propositions' according to him are meaningless precisely for this reason only.

Regarding 'Experience', Schlick wrote that to understand a proposition, we must be able to indicate exactly to those particular circumstances that would make it true and those particular circumstances that would make it false. He says that, circumstances means the facts of experience, and so experience decides about the truth and falsity of propositions, experience 'verify' propositions and therefore, the criterion of the solubility of a problem of its reducibility to experience.

Schlick distinguishes between answerable and unanswerable questions. Unanswerable questions are questions like "What is the meaning of life?" they are characterized by the fact
that there is no way of bringing solutions by the 'test of experience'.

Schlick's view on experience is that, an 'experience, for is a state of my mind - on originally given as 'mine', since it itself a construction out of experience - but nevertheless revealed by analysis to be mine and mine only. It makes no sense to assert that other people have or have not minds, and the question whether they had mind is 'unanswerable'. Because such minds, cannot in principle, be reduced to 'experiences of mine'. Thus, 'verifiability by experience' means verifiability by mental states, which I alone can experience. There is in principle, no way of determining whether a proposition is verifiable or unverifiable by anybody except myself. Since meaning and verifiability are identical, we are apparently forced to the conclusion that only I can know what a proposition means, indeed, to say of anybody else that 'he knows what the proposition means' will be meaningless.

Schlick nowhere tried to give ample reason for identifying 'rules of use' and 'verifiability'. The motive is that, it is to make his empiricism as logical as possible. Verification by itself may seem to be purely an empirical fact whereas, to say that this is
nothing other than certain rules of use is certainly to make it sound less arbitrary and more logical. Yet so long as he does not explicitly state a set of rules, which will define once for all the act of verification, it is not right to assume that we will understand what the phrase ‘rules of using a sentence’ stands for.

In some places Schlick discussed the concept of verifiability as a logical possibility, here he assumes to have the traditional rules of thought. But, they are only very general rules of language common to any meaningful expression, and not merely to verifiable sentences.

For Schlick, ‘Logical grammar’ which is the same rules as ‘rules of use’ of a sentence or a word is nothing other than ordinary rules of grammar plus the criterion of meaning and verifiability. This is quite clear from the following:

"We conclude that there is no way of understanding any meaning without ultimate definitions, and this means, in an obvious sense with reference to ‘experience’ or ‘possibility of verification’." 45

J. Passmore refers to this ambiguity of Schlick’s in the following words:
“There is indeed, an unresolved tension in Schlick’s philosophy between traditional positivism for which meaning is verifiability, and the novel ideas – the identification of meaning with use – he had picked up from the later speculations of Wittgenstein.” Passmore is right in thinking that Schlick’s emphasis is merely on the concept of ‘use’; Schlick’s interest is to make his empiricism more logical, hence the emphasis is really on the entire concept, ‘rules of use’.

Thus to Schlick, that when he identified meaning with ‘rules of use’ he meant nothing more than the conditions which will verify the particular sentence.

Paul Marhenke in his paper “The Criterion of Significance” pointed out the absurdity of such identification of meaning with method. He wrote: “One wonders whether Schlick, and with him many other logical positivists who have repeated the slogan that the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification, was quite clear in his own mind as to the meaning the term ‘method’ when the meaning of the sentence is identified with the method of its verification. A method of verification is a procedure one selects for the purpose of verifying a sentence. Thus
I verify the sentence "This is vinegar" by smelling the bottle or by reading the label. But the sentence obviously does not mean smelling the bottle or reading that label." 47

Though Marhenke is not very fair in interpreting the proper sense of the term 'method' to signify the meaning of a sentence is certainly not very happy. Marhenke's interpretation of method has been very operationalistic; 'smelling the bottle' may not be the meaning, but a particular type of olfactory sensation is undoubtedly a part of meaning 'vinegar' – especially for an empiricist.

The 'method of verification' implies that methods are the ways one can adopt to get something done. The actual ways may from part of verification, but meaning merely indicates these ways. Hence it is said: the meaning of a sentence is the method of verification.

3.9. CARNAP'S VIEW:

Carnap in his "Testability and Meaning" tries to improve the notion of verification. He distinguishes testing and confirmation from verification, the former being is somewhat weaken to the concept of latter. According to Carnap, verification
means a definitive and final establishment of truth, while as Carnap says:

“We shall call a sentence testable if we know such a method of testing for it; and we call it confirmable if we know under what conditions the sentence would be confirmed.” 48

Carnap further says, “A sentence may be confirmable without being testable; e.g. if we know that our observation of such and such a course of events would confirm the sentence, and such and such a different course would confirm its negation without knowing how to set up either this or that observation” 49

According to Carnap, propositions are to be compared only with other propositions; verification or confirmation consists, therefore, not in referring statements to experiential facts but in comparing them with protocol - statements. The protocol-statement is those, which report experience and ‘contain words referring to what is directly observed by the assertion of a proposition’. Such primitive protocols must be present in the structure of a science to guarantee its empirical reference, but theoretically a protocol itself is incapable of a absolute verification and its nature is determined in past by scientific convention. Thus verification deals with
observation itself but with the results of the observation i.e., sentences containing observation words.

Carnap goes on saying that “A universal sentence e.g. a so called law of physics or biology, can be verified. Even if each single instance of law were supposed to be verified, the number of instances to which the law refers - e.g. the space-time-points-is infinite and therefore, can be never exhausted by our observations which are always finite in number. We cannot verify the law, but we can test it by testing its single instances. If in the continued series of such testing experiments no negative instance is found but the number of positive instances increases then our confidence in the law will grow step by step. Thus instead of verification, we may speak, here of gradually increasing confirmation of the law.”

Thus an empirical synthetic sentence for which the decision as to whether it is true or false is difficult, it is meaningful in the sense that it can be ascertained to be probably true or false. The confirmation increases by degrees, but there is no definite point, Carnap explains the point that “supposes a sentence S is given, some test - observation for it have been made, and S is confirmed by them in a certain degree. Then it is a matter of
practical decision whether we will consider that degree as high enough for our acceptance of S... the acceptance and rejection of a (synthetic) sentence always contains a conventional component.” 51

From Carnap’s contention, it does not follow that meaningfulness itself becomes relative and will be entrusted to convention. Therefore, it is at least consistent that in spite of his conciliation, Carnap held the same attitude towards metaphysics. According to Carnap, the principle of empiricism should be established as a proposal of requirement instead of an affirmation in such a form as “All knowledge is empirical” or “All synthetic sentences that we know are based upon one connected with experience. An empiricist should require “that descriptive predicates and synthetic sentences are not to be admitted unless they have same connection with possible observation which has to be characterizes in a suitable way”. 52

Carnap distinguishes two types of statements, i.e. directly testable and indirectly testable, He says-

“We shall speak of ‘directly testable statements’ which circumstances are conceivable in which we confidently consider the statement so strongly confirmed or else disconfirmed
on the basis of one or very few observations that we could either accept or reject it outright. Examples: "There is a key on my desk".... Indirect testing a statement consists in directly testing the other statements which stands in specific logical relations to the statements in question." 53 Thus Carnap substitute verifiability by either testability or confirmability, which turn as verbal. Direct testability, empirically speaking, seems nothing other then verifiability. The two testing operations, according to Carnap are—

1. Confirmation of statement with observation.

2. Confirmation of a statement with previously accepted statements.

Among these operations, according to Carnap the former one is more important since without this there would be no confirmation.

In the Testability and Meaning Carnap further gives an affinity between evidence and meaning of a statement. He says—

"From the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the evidence for a statement and its meaning. If we know what it would be for a given sentence to be true, then we would know its meaning". 54
Carnap divides the confirmability principle into three parts – logical, empirical and suggestion as to how a formalized empiricist language can build up. By empirical and logical Carnap tries to build up an empiricist language. In the logical aspect of confirmation Carnap shows his typical technical skill in clarifying theoretical terms either by explicit definition or by what he calls ‘reduction sentences’, and also develops a method of introducing predicates into a system of ‘reduction sentence’. This method of introduction permits one to allow so-called dispositional terms into the vocabulary of empirical science. Carnap’s main intention here was to broaden the concept of verifiability, which used interchangeably with complete confirmability, by putting up incomplete confirmability as giving meaningless. He subsequently summarizes all the possible attitudes that an empiricist can take towards the criterion of meaningfulness. They are as follows:

1. RCT Requirement of Complete Testability: Every synthetic sentence must be completely testable.

2. R.C.C. Requirement of Complete Confirmability: “Every synthetic sentence must be for every descriptive predicate occurring in S the possibility of our finding out for suitable points
whether or not they have the property designated by the predicate in question”.

3. R.T. Requirement of Testability: – ‘Every synthetic sentence must be testable – R.T. admits incompletely testable sentences - these are chiefly universal sentences to be confirmed incompletely by their instance’-

4. R.C.Requirement of Confirmability: ‘Every synthetic sentence must be confirmable’. Here both restrictions are dispensed with… it seems to me R.C. suffices as a formulation of the principle of empiricism; in other words, if a scientists chooses any language fulfilling this requirement no objection can be raised against this choice from the point of view of empiricism.53

Carnap denies anything ‘private’ in our experience. According to him, every sentence allegedly conveying a private experience can be translated completely and successfully into an objective physical language. This is known as physicalism. Carnap cited the name of any set of sentences which are used to give ‘a direct record’ of one’s experience as ‘protocol language’ Carnap maintained that “In general every statement in any person’s protocol language would have sense for that person alone…. Even
when the same words and sentences occur in various protocol languages, their sense would be different; they could not even be compared. Every protocol language could therefore, be applied only solipsistically: there would be no intersubjective protocol language. This is the consequence obtained by consistent adherence to the usual view and terminology”. 56

Carnap wishes to maintained that people can understands one another's protocol statement if only on the ground that this is a necessary condition for statements made in what we called as physical language to be intersubjectively verifiable. He draws inference that ‘Protocol language is a part of physical language’. That is, he refers to private experiences, which must be logically equivalent to sentences, which describes some physical state of the subject.

3.10. DISCUSSION ON CARNAP’S CONCEPT:

Carnap thus explicitly means that the evidence for an empirical statement not only by their manner distinct cognitively meaningful from cognitively meaningless statements, but indicates as well as the specific meaning of any statements in question. Just as Schlick distinguished “logically possible to verify”, Carnap
likewise starts with a distinction between 'confirmable' and 'testable'; 'confirmable' is a wider class included inside the 'testable', we may sometimes know the conditions that would confirm a statement, without knowing how to set up a method of testing one way or other. So a statement can be confirmable without being testable. Testing may be necessary for actually confirming a statement but not for knowing whether statement is confirmable or not.

Carnap achieves a broadening of the Concept of Verifiability by substituting confirmability, which includes both complete and incomplete confirmability. Carnap abandons the word 'verifiable' in favour of 'Testable' – in the case where a method of experimental verification is actually at our disposal – or 'confirmable' - in the case where we cannot nominate such a method.

Verifiability principle in Carnap's philosophy is that, a proposition can have meaning even although it is not 'verifiable' in the original positivist sense of that word - even though it is not equivalent to 'atomic proposition' or 'experiences'. The older positivist doctrine, according to Carnap, was 'inconvenient',
because it ruled out as nonsensical all propositions which have unrestricted generality - all physical laws and indeed, all propositions which contain predicates which are not reducible to primitive predicates. Schlick tried to overcome this inconvenience by maintaining that all physical laws are not assertions but instructions for the formation of assertions to, which Carnap replies that physical laws are manipulated by scientists in the manner of sentences not in the manner of rules. His own 'recommendation' is that propositions of unrestricted generality should be admitted into science.

This led him to the conclusion that the most suitable language for science has rules of the most liberal sort: the empiricist need only demand that 'every synthetic proposition must be confirmable'. Such a rule, he thinks, is strong enough to expel metaphysics, since metaphysical propositions do not lend themselves to any sort of empirical confirmation, and yet at the same time it does not restrict the development of science. Clearly, Carnap has moved a long way from his earlier identification of meaning with translatability in to experience; now he is prepared to say is that a proposition is meaningless unless it has some
empirical consequences. Carnap still saw difficulties; however, both in 'meaning' and in 'confirmation', his attempt to solve these difficulties led him still further away from logical positivism into controversies.

Carnap principle of confirmability suffers from a serious misunderstanding of the true nature of meaning in the context of ordinary empirical statements. This confirmability theory of meaning is misled by a desire to measure quantitatively the evidences of statements made in science and then from a criterion of meaningfulness in the light of those results. This tendency betrays a logical attitude in formulating the problem of empirical meaningfulness. Though this criterion may be partially beneficial in scientific language they can hardly meet the actual demands of meaning as encountered in ordinary empirical discourse. This is a serious shortcoming of all logical positivists - though it was least manifest in Schlick's view.

Carnap's confirmability theory of meaning regards degree in the meaningfulness of empirical statements. He explicates the concept of confirmation in the following way:
1. The classificatory concept of confirmation where a relation between two statements is expressed in an imprecise way like 'h' is confirmed or supported by 'e'.

2. The comparative concept of confirmation: 'h' is more strongly confirmed by 'e' then 'h' by 'e'.

3. The quantitative concept of confirmation, the concept of degrees of confirmation where we put a real number of the interval 0-1 for the degree of confirmation. Therefore, if confirmation is not taken in the classificatory sense, it admits in degrees. But meaning is a concept not used in any other way than a classificatory sense. Thus the concept of meaning should not be identified with confirmability. It seems rather odd to say: the sentence, 'there is a book on the table' is more meaningful than the sentence 'there is a table' or some such things. Of course we do sometimes use phrases like 'more meaningful' or 'more sensible'; but in such case they do not connote cognitive content, i.e. meaning is an epistemological sense.

Meaning as we ordinarily understand it is an absolutistic term and does not suggest any difference of degree. In some primary sentences, meaning is just the knowledge of
conditions for identifying a situation or an object in our experience actual or possible. In that case there is no question of 'more-or-less' of such a fact. We are either succeeding in identifying or fail to do so. Incomplete confirmability, therefore, misrepresents the sense of 'sense' or 'meaning'. In the other words, though there may be incompleteness of truth, there is no incompleteness in meaning. Meaning, therefore, may widen, but in each step it is closed and complete in the sense of being decided.

3.11. CONCLUSION:

To logical positivists, meaning and truth are intimately connected. Consequently, in any point contention of truth will change the criterion of meaning will necessarily change. In scientific discourse the demand for precision, make the scientist look for a way to measure truth quantitatively and consequently the criterion of verifiability becomes inoperative. "The use of language in science is specialized and peculiar." 58 and this difference calls for a criterion other than verifiability for determining the meanings of sentences at some levels. The principle of verifiability is an essential meaning criterion for any empirical discourse but not sufficient to account for meaningfulness at all levels. And in this
sense we can say different description of meaning instead of 
superceding, really supplement to one another, though finally we 
have fall back upon the verifiability principle to keep our contact 
with reality so necessary for any empirical system.

The logical positivistic theory of meaning is designed 
to eliminate the logic of ethical, religious and metaphysical 
statements; they are eliminated when the theory is constantly 
applied. The typology is, as it were, a rigid and artificially 
constructed frame containing different points, into which different 
statements are fitted. Those which do not fit properly are thrown 
out as pseudo-statements or meaningless, albeit grammatically 
correct sentences. Obviously, these complex statements are 
maltreated, and not analysed, or explored, as to how they come to 
be what they are, and what is their function and criterion of validity 
etc. In short, the logic of these statements is totally ignored. To 
improve philosophy this leads to a dogmatic elimination of 
metaphysics.

The Logical Positivists approach is unconsciously 
based upon a number of percussive definitions of key words like, 
'statements' 'meaningful', 'meaningless', 'cognitive', 'true' etc.
This is a consequence of implicit assumptions, notably, a rigid dichotomy of types of discourse, and the superior status of factual discourse, especially the language of natural science.

On logical ground it has been charged that the positivistic conception of philosophy is arbitrary, ambiguous, self-refuting and impossible in practice; that the true nature and conditions of experience are ignored in its empiricism, and that the strict formality assumed in its logic is a myth; the repudiation of metaphysics is accomplished by a question—begging and self-refuting argument, and that the positivists have admitted at the back door the metaphysics ejected at the front; that the verifiability theory of meaning is entirely arbitrary. Some critics insist that all knowledge is personal, normative, percussive, and valuational, and that formal analysis deserts the world of real problems for the pseudo-solutions of language. Others argue that positivists' physical reductionism is a major distortion of reality and threatens the progress of science with arbitrary theoretical structures, and that the deal of the unity of science is a linguistics' impractical dream of neither worth nor interest to the scientists. It is, therefore, in brief, declared that Logical Positivists has been a major attempt at
philosophic suicide. Logical Positivist has been its own most severe critic and there are clear signs that in recent years its destructiveness and reductionism have been yielding to a maturing of broad and constructiveness and reductionism have been yielding to a maturity of broad and constructive philosophic endeavor.
REFERENCES:

1. *PI*, para-2,
2. Ibid, para-37-45,
3. *TLP*, 3.202-3.203,
4. Ibid, 3.202 – 3.203,
5. Ibid, 3.202- 3.203
6. *P.I.*, para-40,
7. Ibid, p.40,
8. Ibid, p.432,
9. *Blue Book*, p-17,
10. *PI.*, Sec. 23;
11. Ibid, p. 43;
12. Ibid, p. 39,*
13. *B.B.*, 28,
    Well, New York, 19 p 9),
    *Mind*, Vol.63, 1954,

17. Edward Madan & Murry J. Kitley, Prostulates and Meaning, In Philosophy of Science Vol.29, No.1, 1962, p.68,

18. LTL, p.48,

19. Ibid, p. 100,

20. Ibid, p.7,

21. Ibid, p.50,


27. G.J. Warnock, "Verification and use of Language" in *Problems in Philosophy of Language* Ed. Thomas M. Osishewsky, p. 184, 185 & 188,


31. M. Schlick, *Positivism and Realism*,

32. -, "A new Philosophy of Experience" (College of Pacific Publication),

33. -, "Meaning and Verification", *Phil. Rev.*, vol. 45, p. 349,

34. -, "The Future of Philosophy", *G.A.* p. 128-30,

35. -, "Meaning and Verification", *G.A.* p. 340-450,

36. -, *G.A.* p. 266-269,
37. Ibid, p. 103,
38. Ibid, p. 111,
39. Ibid, p. 240,
41. Ibid, p.147-148,
42. G.A, p.87,
43. Ibid, p.87
44. M. Schlick, "Positivism and Realism", In Logical Positivism Ed. A.J. Ayer, p.86-87,
45. -, "Meaning and Verification", In Reading in Philosophical Analysis, (Ed.) Feigl and Seller, New York, 1949, p. 148,
46. J. Passmore, "Hundred Years of Philosophy", Duckworth, 1957, p.374,
48. R. Carnap, Testibility and Meaning, p.47,
49. Ibid, p. 47,

50. Ibid, p. 48,

51. Ibid, p. 49,

52. Ibid, sec-18 p. 84,

53. Ibid, p. 124,

54. Ibid, p. 47,

55. Ibid, p. 85-86,

56. R. Carnap, *Unity of Science*, p. 76,

57. -, *Logical foundations of Probability*, (London, 1950) p. 21,