CHAPTER-II

CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION:

Logical positivism is an extreme and radical version of the analytical approach to philosophy. It analyses philosophical statements in order to ascertain the type of discourse to which they belong. Explaining the proper function of philosophy, Rudolf Carnap states that the proper function of philosophy is to analyse the statement asserted by scientists, to study their kinds and relation. The logical positivists deprived philosophy of its traditional function of being surveyor of all knowledge and determiner of what should constitute valid knowledge and to reveal to man the hidden laws of the universe. They have restricted philosophy to a narrow and technical function of evaluating the scientific assertion. According to the logical positivists, philosophy is to science and grammar is to language. The knowledge of grammar does not enable us to create the language but equips us only with the rule which any linguistic expression must follow, similarly, philosophy frames the rule whereby it can be determined
if a particular scientific assertion is correct or incorrect. Thus almost all philosophers of the logical positivism held that philosophy is not a theory but an activity. They held that philosophy does not produce propositions, which are true or false; it merely clarifies the meaning of statements showing some to be non-sensical. I propose in this chapter to depict a brief description of various positivists’ views on the concept of philosophy and to discuss them whether they are really successful in attempting to describe philosophy scientifically over the traditional philosophical concepts or not.

2.1. WITTGENSTEIN’S CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY:

Every ‘revolution’ in philosophy involves essentially a radical change in the conception of philosophy itself. If there has been a revolution in philosophy in recent years it is largely due to Wittgenstein’s perceptions into the nature of philosophy. According to G.E. Moore, “Wittgenstein claimed that what he was doing was a ‘new’ subject, and not merely a stage in a ‘continuous development’ that there was now, in philosophy, a ‘kink’ in the development of human thought comparable to that
which occurred when Galileo and his contemporaries invented dynamics; that a ‘new method’ had been found, as had happened when chemistry was developed out of alchemy.”

Wittgenstein’s intellectual life is divided much more definitely into two distinct major periods. *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, and the second by *Philosophical Investigations* represent the first. The *Tractatus* follows the methods of traditional theoretic construction while the *Investigations* employs what can best be described as the method of dialectic. However, there is an important continuity in Wittgenstein’s conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy. The views of the *Tractatus*, that, philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of logic of our language, that philosophy is no science but an activity of elucidation and clarification etc. also continued to serves as the leading thread in Wittgenstein’s later works.

The *Tractatus* repudiated the three main prevailing conception of Philosophy, namely – (1) as a mental science which studies the cognitive working of the mind, (2) as an extension of non-psychological, empirical sciences, differentiated them
primarily by generality, and (3) as a metaphysical investigation. In their place Wittgenstein advocated an unprecedented, radical, non-cognitive conception of philosophy. According to his view the task of philosophy is to analyse the proposition of science and to expose the pseudo-proposition of metaphysics. This conception was deeply appealing to the Vienna Circle. The *Tractatus* put metaphilosophical question at the heart of the agenda of the circle.

According to Wittgenstein, “Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences”. He continues in *Tractatus*, the word ‘philosophy’ must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them”. 2 “The totality of true proposition is the whole of natural science”. Wittgenstein further says that, “Philosophy gives no pictures of reality, and can neither confirm or confute scientific investigations. It consists of logic and metaphysics, the former its basis”. 3 Thus it is apparent that Wittgenstein had very definite ideas about philosophy quite early but those ideas were not given a rationale until the ‘picture theory of propositions’ was clearly formulated.
Regarding the task and function of philosophy Wittgenstein wrote in the *Tractatus* as follow:

"Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts; Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct; its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries". ⁴

"Philosophy settles controversies about the limits of natural science". ⁵

"It must set limits to what can be thought; and in doing so, to what cannot be thought.

It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought." ⁶
“It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.”

Philosophy according to *Tractatus* contained propositions, which are nonsensical because philosophers were misled by the surface similarity between their ‘propositions’ and the propositions of natural sciences— they fail to understand the logic of our language. Philosophy thus in *Tractatus* is an activity of clarification and elucidation. It shows the logic of our language by presenting clearly what can be said. Regarding philosophy in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein further says—

“The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science - i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he has failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not to satisfying to the other person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – this method would be the only strictly correct one.”
According to Wittgenstein all philosophy is 'critique of language'. Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. He does not accept the traditional definitions of philosophy according to which it was an inclusive system of the departmental enquiries into all the aspects of life – mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, economics, politics, law and so on. Nor does he accept the definitions of philosophy as a system of beliefs, as a set of principles, an attitude to life or a "way of life". To him philosophy is a grammar or logic of sciences, and the task of logic is to make possible, clear, consistent and meaningful use of language. In other words, it must promote science through promotion of communication. Philosophy according to Wittgenstein is a pursuit of meaning and sense, and not of truth. Thus for him philosophy has two fundamental characteristics, first of all, it is an activity, and not a set of propositions, secondly, this activity is directed not to search for truth, but to make our language clear.

For Wittgenstein, philosophy begins with puzzlement – the so-called philosophical problems are not problems, they are language puzzles (or pseudo-problems). This is because "language
is an imperfect means of communication and philosophers happens to be dupes of such language.” Philosophical questions are tormenting questions arising from our language; they are ‘vexations’ or ‘intellectual discomfort’ comparable to some kind of mental disease. In a lecture, Wittgeinstein said that philosophers were ‘in a muddle about things’; that they follow a certain instinct which leads them to ask certain questions without understanding what those questions mean; that the asking those questions results from ‘a vague mental uneasiness’, like that which leads children to ask ‘why’?

Hence according to Wittgenstein, ‘A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I donot know my why about”. He further says, a philosophical problem is compared to a ‘mental cramp’ to be relieved or a ‘knot in our thinking’ to be united. And a person caught in a philosophical perplexity is compared to a man in a room that wants to get out but doesn’t know how, or a fly caught in a fly-bottle.

According to Wittgenstein, “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness”. Just as
there is not one conclusive therapy for all mental illness. "There is
not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like
different therapies". 16 Which therapy should be used depend on the
illness of the person who is afflicted by it. Nevertheless, like
psychotherapy, the first step is to look round for the source of the
philosophical puzzlement. 17

To Wittgeinstein, philosophy is not to propound
theories, but to cure, "deep disquietitudes" originating from
perplexing problems. 18 these problems are found on analysis,
which arises from wrong application of words in senses other than
what they bear in their original contexts in daily life. Philosophical
problems are not solved by empirical observation, but rather
dissolved by looking into and describing all kinds of uses of the
trouble making words in the various contexts where they are
ordinarily applied. Thus Wittgeinstein says, "We must do away
with all explanation, and description alone must take its place". 19
We must describe uses and tabulate rules as in grammar, so
philosophy becomes a kind of grammar.
In another definition Wittgenstein says, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." The task of philosophy is to see that all discourse complies with two conditions; (a) that it contains only the terms which have unique and unambiguous meaning assigned either by explicit definitions or by pointing and (b) that its propositions should be constructed according to the rules of our language, so as to make determinate sense.

Wittgenstein criticized the traditional views of philosophy. According to him the main mistake made by traditional philosophers (including *Tractatus*) are that 'when language is looked at what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words'. He further states that, "we remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike." This is a very important point, which Wittgenstein wants to remind us of over and over again in the Investigations. He distinguishes 'surface-grammar' from the 'depth-grammar' in the use of words. The 'surface grammar' is 'what immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a
Wittgenstein points out that when we use words in their original contexts in everyday life there arises no problem. It is only when we speculate it in philosophy about things meant by the words then we begin to be puzzled. So he says "Philosophical problems arises when language goes on holiday." Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* shows that he is not always describing grammatically the uses of problem words but often trying to ascertain the meanings of word and the validity of theories in the line of empirical facts and contingencies by stepping freely beyond the domain of language.

In the *Notes on Logic* published in 1913 Wittgenstein sketched an account of the nature of philosophy. He wrote that, it is not a deductive discipline; it cannot be placed side by side with the natural sciences. He continues, "Philosophy gives no picture of reality and can neither conform nor confute scientific investigation". Philosophy thus teaches us the logical form of propositions, which are its fundamental tasks. This conception of
philosophy he was to deepen and modify, but never to abandon. He wrote that in philosophy there are no deductions it is purely descriptive. The word philosophy ought always to designate something over and under, but not beside the natural sciences. It consists of logic and metaphysics and logic is the basis of philosophy. Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions.

In the *Investigations* philosophy is sharply separated off from formal logic; but it is identified with the study of language-games, which is also called ‘logic’, especially in his book ‘On Certainty’. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein considers the term “metaphysics” for misleading philosophy; he says, “Metaphysics is philosophy misinterpreted as natural science.” 26 He continued to argue “The characteristic of a metaphysical question is that we express an unclea

He continued to argue “The characteristic of a metaphysical question is that we express an unclearness about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific question”. 27 The right method in philosophy, in both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, consists in putting a stop to metaphysics, because in both he has not correlated the elements of reality and also does not fit it to the language-game.
Wittgenstein holds that philosopher must be critic of language and philosophy a critic of it. Evidently, he does not accept the traditional definition of philosophy according to which it was a departmental inquiry into all aspects of life—mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, economics, politics, law, sociology, and so on. "A philosopher is supposed to look at life as a whole and look it steadily, according to Plato". Nor does he accept the definition of philosophy as a system of beliefs, a set of principles, an attitude to life or a 'way of life'. To him, philosophy is a grammar (or logic) of science; and the task of logic is to make possible the correct usage of language. Wittgenstein states that the so-called philosophical problems are not problems; they are language puzzles (for pseudo-problems). This is because language is an imperfect means of communication and philosophers happen to be dupes of such language. Whether the defects and ambiguities arise from the defective and ambiguous use of language by philosophers is immaterial as long as the defects and ambiguities continue to plague communication. According to Wittgenstein, the chief source of nonsense (meaninglessness) in the traditional philosophy has been addressing oneself to meaningless (or pseudo)
questions, trying to answer false (pseudo) doubts and resolve imaginary (pseudo) disputes. The right way of doing away with such pseudo-doubts, disputes and questions as well as doing service is to ask meaningful questions and answer meaningfully. And this brings in the fundamental question of meaning fundamental not only in regards to Wittgensteinian school, but also in consideration of any natural or social science, so much so that science may stand or fall with a particular definition of meaning that underlies it explicitly or implicitly. This is not an exaggeration at all. A science can be so defined that it becomes pseudo-science of course; the definition, which reduces science to pseudo-science of course, the definition, which reduces science to pseudo-science, may not win the assent at all. Without going into details, it is sufficient here to emphasize the point that almost everything turns upon a definition; most of the disagreements would disappear if the disagreeing parties agreed on the definition of the words and assumptions they use.

2.2. DISCUSSION ON WITTGEINSTEIN’S CONCEPT:

The traditional philosophy is characterized as different attempts at answering various philosophical questions, and
Wittgenstein's philosophy may be characterized as a systematic questioning of the questions themselves. He was reported to have said that he did not solve philosophical problems but dissolved them. This is clearly shown by his statement: 'for the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.'

The only function of philosophy according to him is a negative one, i.e. to demonstrate to someone whenever he wanted to say something metaphysical that his 'propositions' are nonsensical. This procedure still followed in the *Investigations*, although the method he employed in *Investigations* was quite different. The method of analysis demonstrates that 'metaphysical propositions' are nonsensical, and this is applicable only when someone wanted to say something metaphysical – i.e. to try to pass off a string of word as a factual statement, which is capable of truth or falsity. If he had uttered the same string of words as a poem than to how that it does not convey any factual - information is quite irrelevant.
In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein's views on philosophy were seen as the logical consequences of his theory of language. Similarly, his later conception of philosophy in *Investigations* follows from his new way of looking at language. There is continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy. He continued to regard philosophy as an activity, rather than a theory, as the activity of clarifying propositions and preventing us from being led astray by misleading appearances of ordinary language. According to him philosophical problems arise mainly through a misinterpretation of our forms of language, they are 'linguistic' or rather 'conceptual' problems. According to Wittgenstein they "have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep as in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language." 31

In saying that in philosophy there are no deductions, Wittgenstein set himself against the type of philosophy which offers proofs, e.g. of the existence of God or immortality of soul, or which attempts to explain and predict the course of history. Throughout his life he remained skeptical of and hostile to
philosophy of that kind. Thus he wrote - "We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place. The point of description is the solution of philosophical problems; they are solved not by amassing of new empirical knowledge, but by the rearrangement of what we already know." 32 He further says, "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. 33 Thus he claims that philosophy is descriptive.

Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy is analogous to psychological therapy in another respect. The goal in both cases is to get rid of illness. "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. - The one that give philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by question." 34 In a sense, he is exactly where he started for philosophy 'leaves everything as it is.' 35

The whole task of philosophy is confined to the task of eliminating confusion in language, whenever and wherever such confusion arises. But this task is endless, because we constantly create new terms and new propositions, and there is no limit to our
future experience and therefore, to our propositions about it. Moreover, we need not take any of the results of our clarification as final; it is possible that on further investigation we can clarify and sharpen our language still further. But the unchanging purpose of all philosophizing is to make our language clear and unambiguous, i.e. to reject all the meaningless statements for which we cannot find any determinate meaning, and make clear and precise those statements which are vague and ambiguous. In philosophy, we deal with the rules of our and not with what this language is about. In philosophy we can only make clear to ourselves to which rules we want to follow.

Wittgenstein argues that fundamentally there is no other way of obtaining truth than the way science do, i.e. by observing facts and reflecting upon the data so obtained and philosophy has no special and superior methods of obtaining truth. In this point he agrees with Russell, but he disagrees with Russell’s view that philosophy is a science with a special non-empirical domain. According to Wittgenstein, science is a systematic search for truth in any domain, and we cannot consider philosophy as a separate science fundamentally distinct from all other sciences
merely on the ground of the peculiarity of its subject matter. Thus, if philosophy is fundamentally distinct from science, either it is not because it is not a science at all or it is not a pursuit of truth. Philosophy and science are not both as a system of true propositions.

There can be no philosophy as a science if philosophy is an activity of clarifying meaning and senses, because, in order to arrive at the meaning of terms and senses of propositions, we can’t go beyond the language activity and evaluate it by comparison with external facts. And if that other proposition is itself not clear, than we must proceed with its clarification by some other propositions and so on. But ultimately, our clarification must stop. Clarification cannot be ultimately clarified: Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* says that which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language. Thus, our clarification ultimately does not itself consist of propositions. Philosophy for him is not a system of proposition; therefore, it is not a science.
2.3. SOME REACTION AGAINST WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT:

Wittgenstein concept of philosophy is strikingly original. Yet his admirers sometimes gloss over these remarkable doctrines. Professor Malcolm's article on Wittgenstein in the 'Encyclopedia of Philosophy' does not even mention the bold claims about philosophy made in either the *Tractatus* or in the *Investigations*. It is, of course, scarcely in the interests of professional philosophers to represent the task of philosophy as the elimination of nonsense produced by philosophers.

Mixed feelings and even paradoxical attitude towards philosophy characterize Wittgenstein's thinking. He maintained, on the one hand, a profound skepticism with regards to philosophy and often for that reason gives quick and harsh dismissal view to traditional philosophy- but he tempered that attitude at the same time with a genuine appreciation for the depth of the philosophical problems. In the *Tractatus* he maintained, for instance, that the whole of the philosophy is full of fundamental confusions, and that "most of the propositions and questions to be found in
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical". 36 But, this critique is modified by his appreciation of the truth contained in these confusions and mistakes. He says, “In a certain sense one cannot take too much care in handling philosophical mistakes”,... “They contain so much truth”. 37 In consequence he was critical not only for traditional philosophy, but also of those who in his opinion failed to appreciate the complexity of the philosophical problems. This attitude towards philosophy is reflected in Zettle: “How does it came about that philosophy is so complicated a structure? It surely ought to be completely simple, if it is the ultimate thing, independent of all experience, that you make it out to be - philosophy unites knots in our thinking; hence its result must be simple, but philosophizing has to be as complicated as the knots it unties”. 38

Though Wittgenstein dismissed traditional philosophy, he did so always for philosophical reasons. He was certain that something important could be rescued from traditional enterprise. In the Blue Book he spoke of his own work as “One of the heirs of the subject that used to be called phiolsophy”. 39 This shows that traditional philosophy is now dead, but that it has left an
inheritance to be disposed of: it also suggests that there are a number of heirs to the philosophical heritage and that Wittgenstein's own work should be thought of as just one of them.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein's views on philosophy were seen as the logical consequences of his theory of language. Similarly, his later conception of philosophy in *Investigations* follows from his new way of looking at language. There is continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy. He continued to regard philosophy as an activity rather than a theory, as the activity of clarifying propositions and preventing as from being led astray by misleading appearances of ordinary language. According to him philosophical problems arise mainly through a misinterpretation of our forms of language, they are — 'linguistic' or rather 'conceptual' problems. According to Wittgenstein they have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language.
2.4. AYER’S VIEW:

A.J. Ayer, the leading British exponent of logical positivism expressed similar views. Trying to clarify the stand of logical positivists Ayer says that the function of philosophy is philosophical analysis. The most useful function of philosopher according to Ayer:

"But where in that case does the philosopher come in? One thing he can do, of course, is to act as a short of intellectual policeman, seeing that nobody trespasses into metaphysics. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein seems to think that this was all that he can do.... The Vienna Circle, however, was not content with quite so negative a conception of philosophy as this. They thought that the philosopher still had a useful function to perform, in analyzing and clarifying the concepts, which figure in the everyday, and also in the scientific use of language, but chiefly in the scientific use, as this was held to be the more important. Philosophy was to become the logic of science. In a sense, philosophy was to merge with science. There would not be a set of philosophical statements
embedded among the scientific ones, but the scientific statements themselves would be refined by logical analysis". 40

Analysis according to Ayer is the analysis in which composites are divided into various simples. This activity is quite common in science. For instance, physicist’s analysed ‘matter’ into atoms and these atoms are further analysed into sub-atomic structures like electron, protons and neutrons etc. This type of analysis is chiefly practiced in science in order to know the inner structure of various elements. But, philosophical analysis, according to Ayer, is different from scientific analysis. Philosophical analysis, says Ayer, concerned with the use and function of language. This analysis consists in rewriting sentences of everyday language and science in such a way that these sentences will exhibit their proper logical form. When they are put in to their proper logical form their meaning will become clear. And philosophical perplexities will be cleared. As a result of this approach, maintains Ayer, the traditional problems of philosophy are found to disappear.
The activity of philosophizing, according to Ayer is essentially analytic. He says, "that all those who are commonly called philosophers have actually been engaged in carrying out analysis.\textsuperscript{41} this statements of Ayer suggests that to be a philosopher one has to be analyst. Not only that "it can be shown that the majority of those who are commonly supposed to have been great philosophers were primarily not metaphysicians but analysts.\textsuperscript{42}

Ayer goes on argue that all his empiricist pioneers like Locke, Berkley and Hume are great because they were involved in the activity of analysis. Thus Ayer says:

"Locke is generally regarded as being one who put forward a philosophy of common sense. But he does not, anymore than Moore, attempt to give an a priori justification of our common sense beliefs. Rather does he appear to have seen that it was not his business as a philosopher to affirm or deny the validity of any empirical propositions, but only to analyse them... Nor is it fare to regard Barkley as a metaphysician. For he did not, in fact, deny the reality of material things, as we are still to commonly told."\textsuperscript{43}
For Ayer, Locke and Berkeley had merely analysed the contents of our sense experience not to prove or disapprove anything but to know how effective the activity of analysis would be. In that case, whatever they advocated should be taken not in a true sense but in a pejorative sense. Regarding Hume's analysis, Ayer holds that Hume is opposed to metaphysics. He says:

"Of Hume we may say that merely he was not in practice a metaphycian, but that he explicitly rejected metaphysics...... It is true that Hume does not, so far as I know, actually put forward any view concerning the nature of philosophical propositions themselves, but those of his works, which are commonly accounted - philosophical, are works of analysis. If this is not universally conceded, it is because his treatment of causation, which... is often misinterpreted. 44

Ayer claims that the activity of analysis is the characteristic features of British empiricism. Having satisfied with his conviction that all the great philosophers in the past were basically analysts, Ayer puts forward the following views with
regard to the analysis practiced by philosophers in general. He asserts:

...."For the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned with only the way in which we speak about them. In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character- that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical or even mental objects; they express definition, or the formal consequences of definitions... the possibility of philosophical analysis is independent of any empirical assumptions". 45

Ayer further argues that philosophy is not a search for ‘first principles’. As a matter of fact, Ayer attacks indirectly to Aristotle and Rene Descartes. The celebrated Greek philosopher and scientist envisaged that ‘metaphysics’ is the first philosophy. It always aims at finding the specific causes of philosophy. These first principles, according to Aristotle lead us to certain knowledge of reality. Similarly, Rene Descartes arrived at his first principles of philosophy ‘cogito ergo sum’ with his doubting method in order to
construct a profound and consistent system of philosophy. Ayer holds the view:

"The function of these first principles is to provide a certain basis for our knowledge, it is clear that they are not to be found among so called laws of nature. For we shall see that the 'laws of nature', if they are not mere definitions, are simply hypotheses which may be confuted by experience". 46

Ayer distinguishes science from philosophy. Science according to him is the systematic knowledge of reality, and "there is not, there can't be a philosophical brand of knowledge which would compete with science in this field". 47 Moreover, says Ayer, the distinction between philosophy and science or any other subject is made not on the basis of formers subject matter but by its methods.

According to Ayer philosophical analysis consists of providing definitions. He says that the definition provided by philosophy are not 'explicit definitions' but 'definitions in use'. Trying to bring out the distinction between the definition of lexicographer and the definitions of philosopher. Ayer writes; "a
lexicographer also seeks to give information about the usage of words, but the philosophers differ from him in being concerned...not with the use of particular expressions but with classes of expressions; and whereas the propositions of lexicographer are empirical, philosophical propositions, if they are true, are usually analytic." 49

Ayer says:

"We may explain the nature of logical constructions by saying that the introduction of symbols which denote logical constructions is a device which enables us to state complicated propositions about the elements of these constructions in relatively simple form". 49

Ayer states that reasons for adopting the reductive analysis is "....that certain types of entity are philosophically suspect, and the purpose is to show that references to such entities are nevertheless innocuous; they can be constructed as disguised references to entities which are relatively less problematic." 50
2.5. DISCUSSION ON AYER'S CONCEPT:

Ayer brings out the true spirit of logical positivism. Unlike Wittgenstein, logical positivists were not contented with the role of philosopher as an "intellectual policeman" to prevent people from indulging in speculative thinking, but assigned a new job to the philosopher. The new job of the philosopher was to clarify the concepts of every day language and science. Thus philosophy, for logical positivists, becomes logic of science. This does not mean that propositions of philosophy consists of scientific element in them, philosophy, thus, is regarded as a method rather than a discipline with a definite subject matter. Such method is identified with analysis.

Like Wittgenstein Ayer maintains that the problems of philosophy appear due to muddled thinking, but this muddled thinking is itself largely the product of lack of accurate use of language. The analysis practiced Wittgenstein is called 'world analysis', whereas the analysis practiced by Ayer is 'word analysis'.
According to Ayer, the activity of philosophizing is essentially analytic. He says, “It can be shown that the majority of those who are commonly supposed to have been great philosophers were primarily not metaphysicians but analysts.” This statement of Ayer is quite misleading, as because the history of philosophy reveals us that the philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx etc. contributed so much for the development of philosophy. They have been rated as most original and influential thinkers of their respective times. Plato provided us with a comprehensive account of reality; Aristotle's entire philosophy is centered around on his 'metaphysics'. And it is wrong to think that metaphysicians do not involve any kind of analysis. A thinker cannot propound his theory without giving a proper analysis.

Ayer says that the philosopher as an analyst is more concerned about the language that we use in describing the nature of things. Therefore, the statements of philosopher are not to be taken as factual information about the nature of things. The statements of the philosophers are mere linguistic expressions about an object or thing in question. For example, “... To ask what is nature of a material object is to ask for a definition of material
A philosopher then, is different from all other human beings. He can define anything according to his whims and fancies without taking facts into considerations. Only another philosopher with similar testes understands the language used by the philosopher. According to Ayer a philosopher does not, or should not, as he has been commonly understood to do, analyse ‘facts’ or notions or even ‘things’. It is only is, regardless of their actual or literal sense, that ‘facts’ or ‘notions’ or ‘things’ can be said to exist to be analysed. In this way, Ayer, a professed empiricist, discarded all empirical facts irrelevant to philosophy. For he considers that a philosopher should be concerned only with the speculative definitions of his own invention.

Ayer believes that the ‘first principles’ are not deduced from an intuitively perceived truth upon which a philosopher proceeds to construct a deductive system. They are contests Ayer, no objects of speculative knowledge, which lies beyond empirical investigation. Ayer argues that if at all any one wants to deduct all knowledge from ‘first principles’ without making any inroads into ‘metaphysics’ he must take a priori truths as his premises. But, Ayer asserts that, all the a priori truths are tautologies. From a set
of tautologies we can deduce another set of tautologies but not empirical truths. Thus Ayer claims to arrive at the view that it is not possible to deduce all our knowledge from the 'first principles'.

The argument of philosophers, according to Ayer, has some peculiar character. They are not tested by observation. The theories of philosophy are neutral with regard to particular matter of fact. Thus, according to Ayer all philosophical formulations are deprived of empirical content. They are mere mumbling of the philosophers without any seriousness.

A lexicographer, in view of Ayer, is an empirical scientist, who uses the terms according to their usages. Therefore, his definitions have empirical contents. But the definitions of philosophers, says Ayer, are analytic in their nature. Ayer supposes that the definition in use show, "how the sentences in which if a symbol significantly occur can be translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the definition itself, nor any of its synonyms". 53 Thus Ayer argues that every sentence which consists of a symbolic expression can be translated into a sentence which does not contain any such expression, but does contain a sub-
sentence asserting that no one and only one object possess a certain property, or else that no one subject possesses a certain property. He has given examples to explain the statement that 'the round square does not exist', is equivalent to 'No one thing that can be both square and round', and the sentence 'The author of Waverlay was Scotch' is equivalent to 'one person, and one person only, wrote Waverlay and that person was Scotch. This analysis of Ayer reveals to us that a statement of equivalence is, if correct, a tautology if incorrect, and a contradiction. Ayer claims that this example is given to show how certain class of expressions can be explained in our ordinary language. Accordingly, Ayer believes that if a philosopher sticks to such analysis he will avoid either interfering in the sphere of natural science or involving himself in 'metaphysics'. But one does not understand as to why a philosopher should not indulge in the analysis of statements of metaphysics. If the statements of philosophers do not have any empirical content, then statements of metaphysics also do not have any empirical content.
Ayer further tries to define an ambiguous symbol that 'symbol' is reducible to 'signs', which are identical in their sensible form, thus he uses the reductive analysis.

Ayer considers that the propositions about material objects are complicated and can be translated into propositions about sense contents or sense data, which are supposed to be simpler units of our experience. It implies that the propositions expressing facts of ordinary perceptual knowledge contain such expressions like 'table' etc; but such objects and their properties and relations are not simple, and so are not the ultimate constituents of our sensory knowledge. This is precisely what Ayer means by 'some entities are problematic'. And when the propositions containing such expressions are analysed, they will be expressed in terms of ultimate constituents. In other words, ordinary unanalyzed knowledge seems to be about such things as 'tables', 'chairs' etc., but analysis will make it clear the ultimate constituents of the knowledge. Thus Ayer identifies philosophy with analysis and emphasizes, "that the only positive contribution that philosophy can make to knowledge is in the field of analysis".56
2.6. SCHLICK’S CONCEPT:

M. Schlick in meaning and verification is connected with the concept of philosophy of Wittgenstein that philosophy is not a doctrine of a theory but an activity. Schlick wrote, "Philosophical activities can never be replaced and expressed by a set of propositions. The discovery of the meaning of any proposition must ultimately be achieved by some act, some immediate procedure; for instance, as the showing of yellow; it can’t be given in a proposition. Philosophy the 'pursuits of meaning', therefore, cannot possibly consist of propositions; it cannot be a science. The pursuits of meaning consequently are nothing but a short of 'mental activity'. " 57

Schlick believed that philosophy is concerned with the meaning and science with truth. As an empiricist, he could not forget that these two concepts are intimately connected. According to Schlick "Everything is composed of a network of conceptions and judgments is correct or true if the system or judgment indicates the world of facts uniquely. For, if such a unique correspondence exists between conception and reality, it is possible, with the
existence of a network of judgment in the theory, to deprive successive steps in the phenomena of nature, e.g. to predict occurrences in future. And the fulfillment of such prophecies, the agreement between calculation and observation, is the only means of proving that a theory is true". 58

Philosophy according to Schlick is not a series of assertions but an activity-an activity to clarify the meaning of a sentence. Schlick maintains that—

...."The great contemporary turning point is characterized by the fact that we see in philosophy not a system of cognitions but a system of acts; philosophy is that activity through which the meaning of statements is revealed or determined. By means of philosophy statements are explained, and by means of science they are verified". 59 If philosophy is finding out the meaning of statements, this can’t result in another set of statements: Schlick continues:

.... "Bestowing meaning upon statements cannot be done in turn by statements. The final giving of meaning always
takes place therefore, through deeds. It is these deeds or acts which constitute philosophical activity". 60

For Schlick, philosophy as a discipline is in no way fundamental with respect to the special sciences. On the contrary, it is the special sciences that are fundamental for philosophy. The special sciences - more specifically, the "exact science" - simply are taken for granted as pragmatic of knowledge and certainty. The central problem of philosophy, according to him, is not to provide an epistemological foundation for the special science, but rather to redefine its own task in the light of the recent revolutionary scientific advances that have made all previous philosophies untenable. Philosophy must follow the evolution of the special sciences so as to test itself and, if needed, to reorient itself to reach to the far more certain and secure results of these sciences. At this point, Schlick is viewing in Kant’s philosophical sense with respect to special sciences. For Kant, too, it is philosophy itself rather than the special sciences that is in question and therefore, requires justification. Kant’s aim is not to ground sciences in something firmer and more secure but rather to reform metaphysics in accordance with the already achieved success of the exact sciences.
For Schlick, any meaningful assertions is to be verified by its correspondence with facts; and to understand a sentence one has at least to see that there is such possibility of correspondence. Philosophical utterance, therefore, can hardly perform this function.

According to Schlick, there are no philosophical problems but we can only speak philosophically about any problem. Though the final activity is pointing, there are steps previous to that final act and these steps according to Schlick constitute the philosophical method. According to Schlick it is possible to give the meaning of any statement except by describing the fact, the state of affairs, which must exist if the statement is to be true. In other words, every statement is to be reduced to certain observation or experience. To answer a question we have to follow the method, Schlick attitude to philosophy clearly brings out his uncompromising empiricism with regards to any form of knowledge.
2.8. CARNAP’S CONCEPT:

Like Schlick, Carnap is also perfectly serious about traditional philosophy. According to him, traditional philosophy should be replaced by the new and logically exact enterprise of “language planning”. Only by doing so we can achieve a diagnosis of the true character of traditional philosophical problems and, at the same time we can find a new task for the philosophy of the future.

Carnap thus adapted a deflationary stance towards traditional philosophy, but the stance is characteristically philosophical form of deflectionism. Carnap does not simply leave philosophy behind in favour of the standpoint of the “working scientist.” But rather he systematically articulates a radically new vision of the philosophical enterprise, in which, philosophy is particularly retaining its special status. Thus Carnap says - “Metaphysical philosophy claims to go beyond the empirical-scientific questions of a scientific domain and pose questions about the essence of the objects of the domain. The non-metaphysical logic of science also takes up a different standpoint than that of
empirical science; not, however, by means of metaphysical transcendence, but rather by the circumstance that it makes the linguistic forms themselves the objects of a new investigation.\textsuperscript{62}

In his influential book 'The Logical Syntax of Language' (1934) where Carnap, under the influence of recent developments in logic (Ch -18) explains 'The Principle of Tolerance'. He writes, 'in logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes'. And philosophy, according to Carnap is a branch of logic - he calls it "the logic of science."

Carnap proclaims that 'the logic of science takes the place of the inextricable tangle of problems which is known as philosophy.\textsuperscript{63} A philosophical statement, Carnap concludes, is not fully expressed, even in the formal mode, unless it contains reference to the languages to which it applies. Once that condition is satisfied, he considers, philosophical disputes will vanish. As for philosophical expressions, which ostensively defy restatement in a syntactical form e.g. Wittgenstein statement 'there is indeed the
inexpressible' or Schlick's assertion 'utter able contents' must be rejected as nonsensical.

2.9. DISCUSSION ON CARNAP'S CONCEPT:

Thus, according to Carnap we can obtain a radically new conception of philosophical problems, which can be considered as foundations of logic and mathematics. It is this transformation and reformation of the philosophical debate with which Carnap is most concerned.

Philosophy he argues, does not give us information about transcendental entities, since all sentences containing what purports to be a reference to such entities are senseless: most of its propositions— the propositions of ethics as well as of metaphysics— express and stimulate feelings but tells us nothing whatsoever about the world. Carnap says that the propositions of epistemology belong to the empirical science of psychology, not to philosophy. Those philosophical propositions, according to him are the descriptions of the language the scientists employ.
2.10. SOME REACTIONS AGAINST LOGICAL POSITIVIST'S CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY:

Philosophy is a synthetic unity of various forms and levels of human experiences. It deals with the most general account of nature and our place in it. This is more important because all philosophers are not unanimous on this point. As we have seen that Ayer and other logical positivists are under the impression that there is no integral philosophical system that is embraced by one and all. A philosopher creates his own system. They believe that philosophy occupies an intermediary position between science and metaphysics. According to positivist, all definite knowledge belongs to science and all dogma that supersedes definite knowledge belongs to metaphysics. Between science and metaphysics, logical positivists believe, there is a third line exposed to attack from both sides. This third line is philosophy. It is evident from positivist’s account that the introduction of ‘analysis’ as a method is to prevent the philosopher from trespassing into science and metaphysics. Therefore, philosophy can have an independent branch of knowledge. This attitude of
Ayer towards philosophy is one-sided or even erroneous in the context of modern scientific conception of philosophy.

Ayer misinterprets the function of philosophy by reducing it to mere logical analysis of language. This function of philosophy does not yield any 'knowledge' of reality. In other words, Ayer's notion of philosophy deprives philosophy of any 'epistemological' content. Apart from that, Ayer takes it for granted as if language were a ready reckoner without taking development into consideration. His entire philosophy is centered on his 'metaphysics'. It is wrong to think that metaphysicians do not involve any kind of analysis. A thinker cannot propound his theory without proper analysis of it.

Some main objections comes from Max Black, John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, Maurice Cornforth and G.J. Warnock against he kind of 'analysis' given by Ayer, they are not in favour of analysis as a method of in philosophy but interpret in a different way.

Max Black considered analysis as a method of ostentation, i.e. he gives importance more to the analysis of facts
rather than the meaning of statements. He feels that logical analysis is more semantic oriented. Thus he claims that the analysis practiced by him is different from the logical analysis of the 'Vienna Circle'.

Wisdom is also in line with Cornforth in criticizing 'reductive analysis'. The phenomenalistic interpretation of material objects, hold Cornforth, is "a misinterpretation of character of knowledge." The main aim of such analysis is to distort the whole picture of reality by merely concentrating on the logic of language, as if language were a readymade thing. Philosophy, according to Cornforth, is a method "is to unravel the general laws of motion of all real processes, to elucidate the general principle of all real changes and developments and to explain by what means men are able to gain accurate knowledge of world in which they live".

The above account of Cornforth has brought out clearly the distinction between scientific and pseudo-scientific philosophy of logical positivism.
2.11. CONCLUSION:

Logical Positivists assigned a special function to the philosophy. They consider philosophy should undertake the business of clarifying the philosophical muddles that often appears due to loose correlation of our language. It is by no means a trivial business. Most of the positivists realized that, "it is useful and necessary to eliminate the unclarity and ambiguities from language to improve the functioning of that indispensable instrument of thought. But it is a paltry enterprise to convert this task in to it’s the paramount aim of philosophy". 66

The meaning of a statements according to them, showing some to be scientific, some to be mathematical and some to be non-sensical. They think that philosophy does have a legitimate function what is called analysis. But by “analysis” they does not mean analysis in Russell’s sense, i.e., the translation of statements, which accurately exhibit their logical form. Positivists consider function of analysis is to take any problem, to show which questions in it are capable of being answered by some short of logical investigation.
Logical positivists hold the view that they are, as philosophers not concerned with the truth or falsehood of scientific statements and assert that this is the business of the scientists. They claim that their "proper concern is to enquire into the logical assertions of the concepts and propositions of science, in to how some propositions are deducible from others and the like. It is this kind of enquiry, the logical analysis of concepts, propositions, proofs, hypothesis, theories of science which constitute epistemology, indeed philosophy of general". 67

It is evident that logical positivists are chiefly interested in logical and epistemological problems.

Thus logical positivists consider that philosophical problems arise out of misunderstanding of the meaning of statements in everyday language and science. They assert that propositions of philosophy are not functional but linguistic in their character. According to Waismann, "The analytic method leads us to the view that the questions themselves rest upon misunderstanding. It frees us from them by making the meaning of
our words clear and the way they are combined in language so clear that we no longer feel driven to ask question”.

The chief aim of Ayer and all other logical positivists in identifying philosophy with analysis is to dismiss all those aspects related to objective material world as irrelevant. If all that a philosopher can do is the logical analysis of concepts of everyday language and science, then what kind of knowledge do we acquire about the objective reality. The analysis of Ayer leads us away from the path of knowledge into the path of empty arguments about words or concepts.

According to Ayer philosophy is not a theory, which explains reality in its interconnections but a kind of activity that analyses the concept of everyday language and science. Ayer’s philosophy has functional purpose but no objective enquiry. This analysis of Ayer deprives philosophy of any cognitive activity of reality, confirming merely to the subjective analysis of language.

The whole task of philosophy is to eliminating confusion in language, whenever and wherever such confusion arises is the primary work of philosophy. But this task is endless.
because we constantly create new terms and new propositions, and there is no limit to our future experience and therefore, to our propositions about it. Moreover, we need not take any of the results of our clarification as final; it is possible that on further investigation we can clarify and sharpen our language still further. But unchanging purpose of all philosophizing is to make our language clear and unambiguous, i.e. to reject all the meaningless statements for which we can't find any meaning.

Like Black, John Wisdom, too, holds the view that analysis is an old and very useful method in philosophy; but unlike Max Black, Wisdom identifies 'philosophical analysis' with 'linguistic analysis'. According to him philosophical analysis is nothing but logical analysis, namely, analysis of language. Both Black and Wisdom stresses on the ostensive translation of the sentences, which result in material analysis. To him we normally analyse facts but not sentences.

G.J.Warnock an Oxford philosopher with a considerable reputation feels that the analysis practiced by the contemporary analytic philosophers cannot completely overcome
philosophical riddles. According to these philosophers, the aim of analysis is to remove unclarity of words and expressions that we use in language. This results in finding out certain more 'explicit', but less 'concentrated' use of words, which will be logically equivalent to that, which is analysed.
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