CHAPTER –I

INTRODUCTION

Philosophical questions and problems are situationally evoked and are not the product of a philosopher’s ingenuity or reasoning alone. The latter, however, are necessary for articulating his response to the evocative stimulus of the concrete historical situation of the philosopher. Depending on varying life situations lead to the formulation of varying problems. The situations determine the thought. The significant features of situation hamper the attention of the sensitive philosopher, while others fail to notice them or grasp their significance. People are thus not determined by the situation to adopt certain mode of thought or conceptual field. They are stimulated by the situation as also by their own sensitiveness. What type of problems engage the philosopher depends on his ability to detach himself from the conceptual field, then his philosophy does not grip the contemporary mind.

The word ‘philosophy’ has been from the beginning used very loosely. The word ‘philosopher’ was apparently coined,
or at least first given publicity by the Greek philosopher Pythagoras, in the sixth century B.C., who spoke of himself as a ‘philosopher’ or lover of wisdom. After that, we find the term and its derivatives knocking about in everyday Greek to indicate a love of thinking about things and the possessions of a thoughtful and reflective attitude towards life in general. This incidentally is the popular significance of “philosopher” and “philosophy” today. It was Plato, however, who gave a specific and technical meaning to the words of this group, when he described the “philosopher” as one of whose attention was fixed on reality rather than appearance and whose characteristic interest lay in grasping the essential being and the nature of things. Since his time “philosophy” in its widest and broadest sense has meant a reflective and reasoned attempt to infer the character and content of the universe, taken in its entirety and as a single whole, from an observation and study of the data presented by all its aspects.

The twentieth century has been an era of rapid change. Science has progressed at a rate barely conceivable to most people prior to our century; new nations have arisen, and the map of the world is redrawn. Every decade brings new and important changes
in technology, art, and even manners and morals. Philosophy has not been an exception to this general characteristic of our age. Around the turn of the century a movement also began in philosophy. This philosophical movement is that of a group of philosophers, active and influential over at least one or two generations, who more or less share a style, or an intellectual origin, and who have learned more from each other than they have from others, though they may, and often do, quite vigorously disagree among themselves. Logical positivism is the current name of that movement. The common source of the movement is the writings and teachings of G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein during the first quarter of the century. However, two of these founding fathers, Moore and Russell, do not themselves belong to the movement. The Logical positivists have also greatly influenced each other; but there are still disagreements among themselves, which were more prominent. Vigorous disagreement persists on the fundamental matters, such as the nature of philosophical enterprise. The very name, Logical Positivism, is by now, unwelcome to some, though it is still and quite reasonably applied to all from the outside. Reasonably
because they share a common philosophical style and also because all accept the linguistic turns, Wittgenstein initiated in the Tractatus. The disagreements were due to their interpretation in several ways; yet they are all under its spell, hence the common style. Thus, if names in themselves were important, it might be better to choose linguistic-philosophy or philosophy of language, which places its greatest emphasis upon the study of language and its complexities. Here an attempt is made to depict a brief survey of ‘logical positivism’.

1. LOGICAL POSITIVISM-ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

The term “logical positivism” has been used widely to include any kind of analytic philosophy. The terms “Logical Empiricism” and even “Consistent Empiricism” has also been used to signify this kind of philosophy. Ayer says “The term “Logical positivism” is coined some thirty years ago to characterize the standpoint of a group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians who gave themselves the name Vienna Circle”.

The group of thinkers of the “Logical Positivism” included thinkers from a wide range of fields -
mathematics and sociology, law etc. Yet the nucleus of this school of thought developed from the so-called "Vienna Circle". H. Feigl gives a description of the origin of this circle in his article "Logical Empiricism". According to this report the circle began in 1923 under the leadership of Professor M. Schlick with F. Waisemann and H. Feigal and among many others. Active members of the group were Hans Hahn, a mathematician; Otto Neurath, a sociologist, Victor Kraft, a historian; Felix Kaufmann, a lawyer; and Rudolf Carnap- a physician. Gradually many others started participating in the discussion of the circle.

Besides, persons from the other countries like Kaila the Finnish psychologist, A. Petzall from Scandinavia subsequently participated in the discussion of the circle. Many like-minded philosophers such as A.J. Ayer, A.E. Bloomberg, C.G. Hempel etc. visited the philosophers of the circle from time to time. K. Popper, B.Von Juhos, E. Zilsel, H. Gomperz were loosely affiliated with the circle.

The philosophers of the Vienna Circle tried to make their philosophy internationally known by preaching and establishing-friendly contact with the Berlin Group of people which
included Reichenbach and Upsala School of Sweden which numbered among others Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was still living when the Vienna Circle was formed, was not a member of the circle, but he had close personal relations with Schlick and Waismann. This relationship still continued after he had gone to teach at Cambridge. Members of the Vienna Circle were very much influenced by the ideas of Wittgenstein. His famous Logische-Philosophische Abhandlung, a work whose English translation is known as "Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus", appeared in 1921, and Vienna Circle during its early days followed the ideas of the Tractatus. Schlick already written most of the prominent ideas, which were considered as the characteristics of Logical Positivism were by in his book on the theory of knowledge called "Alleghenies Erkenntnislehre" which was published in 1918. In addition to having some familiarity with the thought of Wittgenstein, Schlick had he been developing independently, some of the ideas similar to those of the ideas express by Wittgenstein.

In 1926, a prominent figure by name Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) became a member of the circle. On the one side Schlick and on the other side Carnap established themselves as two
chief pillars of the circle. The group led by Schlick was known as “right wing” because of their moderate views on various issues while the other group led by Carnap was known as “Left wing” for their radial approach towards various issues. Before joining the circle in 1926, Carnap worked independently on his own on the issues related to logic and Science. Carnap was more interested in the problems of syntax rather than in the problems of semantics. Carnap’s taste for syntax is seen in his work “The Logical Syntax of Language”. Though Carnap claims that he was more influenced by Russell and Frege, there were many who said that Vienna Circle received all inspiration from Wittgenstein (1889-1951). But Carnap was not in complete agreement with this statement. He feels that Wittgenstein's influence on Vienna Circle is often exaggerated. To a greater extent, says Carnap, Wittgenstein, but not himself and Neurath influences Schlick and Waiscmann influenced Schlick and Waismann.

In England A.J. Ayer was the leading exponent of Logical Positivism: his “Language, Truth and Logic” (1936). As a young man’s book, which is lively, uncompromising and belligerent, expresses most readily accessible defense of classical,
phenomenalistic logical positivism. Ayer holds that metaphysics is impossibility by expending the verifiability theory of the meaning.

Having attracted circles of adherents in Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, Berlin, England, and America, this movement claimed to engage in an analysis of the problems created by the development of modern science and aims at their logical analysis. Between 1922 to 1929, this movement gathered so much momentum that the members of the circle used to have frequent philosophical deliberations. Though Wittgenstein and Karl Popper were not the members of the circle, they used to take part in the deliberations of the Circle. In the meantime a similar but less influenced group surfaced in Berlin under the leadership of Hans Reichenbach. Both the groups have one thing in common, that was their disliking for philosophers who have antiscientific attitude. However, these groups worked independently. Ultimately in 1929, the members of the Circle felt that there was a need to identify them with a specific name and also to draft a definite programme of the group.

In the German-speaking countries, the Vienna Circle was a small minority group. For the most part, German-
speaking philosophers were still committed to some variety of “German idealism”. Nourish, with his strong socio-political interests was particularly insistent that the circle should act in the manner of political party, setting out to destroy traditional metaphysics, which he saw as an instrument of social and political reaction.

In 1928 the significantly named Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Society) was set up by members of the Circle with avowed object of “Propagating and furthering a scientific outlook” and “creating the intellectual instrument of modern empiricism”. To welcome Schlick back to Vienna in 1929 from a visiting professorship at Stanford, California, Carnap, Hahn and Neurath prepared a manifesto under the general title of “The Scientific World View: Vienna Circle”. This manifesto traced the teachings of the Vienna Circle back to such positivists as Hume and Mach, such scientific methodologists as Helmholtz, Poincare, Duhem, and Einstein, and also such logicians as Leibnitiz to Russell, utilitarian moralists from Epicurus to Mill, and such sociologists as Feuerbach, Marx, Herbert Spancer, and Karl Menger.
In order to make its conclusions familiar to a wider world, the circle organized a series of Congresses. The first of these was held in Prague in 1929 as a section of mathematical and physical, but not a philosophical congress. Ernst and Mach Society along with Society for Empirical Philosophy, a Berlin group under the leadership of Hans Reichenbach jointly sponsored it.

Meanwhile, the international affiliations of the Circle were increasing in its importance. American philosophers like C.W. Morris emphasized the link between logical positivism and American Pragmatism: Ernest Nagel and V.W. Quine visited Vienna and Prague. In Great Britain, Logical Positivism attracted the interest of such Cambridge-trained philosophers as L. Susan Stabbing and John Wisdom and the Oxford philosophers like Gilbert Ryle and A.J. Ayer. In France such philosophers of science as Louis Rougier were attracted by logical positivism, as were a group of Neo-Thomists led by general Vouillemin, who welcomed the positivist critique of idealism. In Scandinavia, Hagerstraw lead this anti-metaphysical philosophy and Eino Kalia, Arne Naess, Ake Petzal and Jorgen Jorgensen were the prominent representative of the international movement centering on logical positivism. The
Polish logicians, especially Alfred Tarski, exerted a considerable influence on members of the Circle, particularly on Carnap.

Thus the members of the circle were publishing various books and papers. In 1930 it took over the journal called "Annealed deer Philosophie", and renamed as "Erkenntnis". In the period from 1930 to 1940 it served as a "house organ" for members of the Vienna Circle and their associates. In addition, the circle prepared a series of monographs under the general title "Veröffentlichungen des Vereines" Ernst Mach (from 1928 to 1934) and "Einchheitswisenschafl" edited by Neurath from 1934 until 1938.

In 1931, the name "Logical Positivism" as coined by A.E. Bulmberg and Herbert Feigl as a label for the philosophical views of the Vienna Circle. The term "positivism" is derived from Auguste Comte, Saint Simon, Ernst Mach and Karl Pearson for their anti-metaphysical stand and belief in the existence of positive facts; while 'logical' is added because its exponents (Vienna positivists) claim that their philosophy is confined to the logical analysis of everyday language and science. They also suggested alternative names such as "logical empiricism" and "scientific
empiricism”. They used empiricism because the members insist that all our knowledge is confined to sense experience. “Scientific” because they claim to hold the view that it is only in the sciences and by the use of “scientific method” that we can acquire information about the world. However, Carnap and others preferred logical positivism as the right title to any other title. Thus positivists claim to stand for “logical and scientific foundation” of knowledge.

During the 1930s’, however, the Vienna Circle has disintrigated as a group. In 1931 Carnap left Vienna for Prague; in that year Feigl went to Iowa and later to Minnesota; Hahnn died in 1934; in 1936 went to Chicago and Schlick was shot by a mentally deranged student. The meeting of the circle was discontinued. The Ernst Mach society was formally dissolved in 1938; the publications of the circle could be no longer being sold in German speaking countries. Waismann and Neurath left for England: Zilsel and Kaufmann followed Feigl, Carnap, Menger, and Godel to the United States. Erkenntnis moved in 1938 to Hague, where it took the name “Journal of Unified Sciences”; it was discontinued in
1940. Logical Positivism, too, disintegrated as a movement, absorbed into international logical empiricism.

1.2. THE IMPACT OF TRACTATUS UPON LOGICAL POSITIVISM:

The primary influence of the Tractatus was upon a group of philosophers gathered in Vienna around Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), who held the chair of the history and philosophy of the inductive sciences at the University of Vienna. Schlick read the Tractatus, and overwhelmingly impressed by it. He later wrote, "This book in my unshakeable conviction is the most significant philosophical work of our time....". The scope of these ideas is in truth immeasurable; anyone who reads them with understanding must thereafter be a changed man from a philosophical point of view. The new insights are absolutely crucial to the destiny of philosophy." ³ He met Wittgenstein in 1927, and was much impressed by the man. Later he said to Kalia that Wittgenstein was 'the greatest genuine of all time in logic'. ⁴ Although Wittgenstein refused to attend meeting of the Circle, he agreed to regular meetings with Schlick, Waisemann, Carnap, and Feigel. The last two were subsequently excluded from these meetings but he
continued to meet and Waismann, who transmitted them to the circle.

In 1924, apparently at the investigation of Reidemeister, and again in 1926, the *Tractatus* was read line by line and discussed at the weekly meetings of the circle. Jorgensen, in his history of the Circle, later wrote that these ideas 'have on essential points determined by the view of the Circle on philosophy and its relation to the special sciences'; 'the book. ............. contributed essentially to the formation of logical positivism and provoked both agreement and disagreement'.

What the circle abandoned from the *Tractatus* was the picture theory of the proposition, the doctrine of showing and saying, and the bulk of the metaphysics of Logical Atomism. But what was mostly embraced and considered, as greatest importance to the Circle was the account of the nature and limits of philosophy, the conception of logic and logical necessity, and the idea of logical analysis of language. These ideas duly interpreted and to a degree misinterpreted and exercise the greatest influence upon the Circle.
Carnap later wrote: 'For me personally, Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who besides Russell and Frege had the greatest influence on my thinking'.

Ayer, who was attended meetings of the Circle in 1932-33 and introduced Logical Positivism in Britain with the *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), opened the dramatic book with the sentence 'The views which are here put forward derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein'.

Thus Wittgenstein was never a member of the Circle, though he was in Vienna during much of his time, yet his influence on the Circle's thought was at least as important as that of any of its members. Vienna Circle also took over the theory of truth functions from the *Tractatus* i.e., the theory that all significant propositions, with exception of mathematical and logical propositions, are truth functions of elementary propositions. Since Wittgenstein himself does not cite an example of elementary proposition and leave it open to what kind of objects or states of affair the elementary propositions were extremely varied. Generally in Vienna Circle an empirical basis was assumed, and elementary propositions were so interpreted as to refer to empirical
data, i.e. the data given by sense perception. By choosing an empirical starting point the ‘Logical Atomism’ of the Tractatus was transformed into a “Logical Positivism”. The experimental references of all propositions became in this way a criterion for deciding whether a proposition was meaningful or not. This is expressed in what is known as the “Empirical Verification Principle.” According to this principle the meaning of a proposition consists in the method of its empirical verification. The members of the Vienna Circle thought that the principle could be found in the Tractatus, namely where Wittgenstein says..... In order to be able to say, ‘P’ is true (or false); I must have determined in what circumstances I call ‘P’ true and in so doing I determine the sense of sense of the proposition. 8 Logical positivism interpreted this passage as if the circumstances under which a proposition is called true were empirical data, as if Wittgenstein regarded the meaning a proposition, then, as its empirical verification.

Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics is also interpreted from the standpoint of the verification principle. Starting from the idea that “Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.” 9
the Vienna Circle took the propositions of metaphysics to be of a non-empirical nature and therefore, nonsensical, in the Empirical Verification Principle's sense. This is an idea that is probably not to be found in this form in *Tractatus*.

In the opinion of Vienna Circle, too, the function of philosophy consisted in a critical analysis of language showing, first of all, that all significant propositions are to be reduced to elementary propositions, immediately verifiable through experience, and then in proving that all metaphysical propositions result from misunderstandings about the logical syntax of language.

1.3. OBJECTIVES OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM:

Logical positivists are supposed to have brought a revolution in the circles of philosophy by showing their dissent against speculative thinking that is prevalent in traditional philosophies. According to logical positivists the cardinal features of their philosophy are two: On one hand to promote the reasoning's concerning 'science and mathematics' and on the other hand, to oust 'metaphysics' from the sphere of philosophy.
Accordingly, the attention was directed primarily to logical, epistemological and semantic issues.

As a matter of fact, logical positivism is another form of empiricism. The positivist's turns their back upon the most philosophic endeavour of past, they considered it as speculative, and involves in the value consideration. They aim at the clarification of and elucidation of meaning in the interest of advancing scientific knowledge. They made serious effort to construct the theory of meaning and a theory of knowledge by reconciling the valid elements of rationalism and empiricism and subscribe to the principle of logic and the procedures of the natural sciences. Logical positivism has been characterized by the method of logical analysis of language. They have inherited the empiricism of Hume that requires sensory impressions as the foundation of all factual knowledge, and the rationalism of Leibnitz with its interest in a universal symbolic language and in the achievement of a unity of all knowledge.

Some of the definite problems of logical positivism were to establish an adequate theory of propositional meaning based on empirical verifiability, a critical theory of the syntactical
structure of language and its semantic functions in representing non-linguistic data, and a logically perfect language to which all the propositions of science can be reduced. Thus they aimed at the formalization of logic, the theory of induction, the general theory of symbolization, the problem of truth-value of empirical proposition, the nature of theory of construction and interest in the problem of the unity of science.

Logical positivists assigned a special function to philosophy. They supposed that, philosophy as an enterprise, should undertake the business of clarifying the philosophical muddles that often appear due to loose correlation of language. It is by no means a trivial business.

"It is useful and necessary to eliminate unclearties and ambiguities from language to improve the functioning of that indispensable instrument of thought. But it is a paltry enterprise to convert this task into the paramount aim of philosophy." 10

Thus for logical positivist, philosophy is more an activity rather than a pedagogy with a definite subject matter.

One of the most important priorities of logical positivist is to eliminate metaphysics from philosophy. This
attempt of logical positivists is not all that new in the history of philosophy. Prior to logical positivists, it was Hume who showed his distaste for metaphysics, for it, contains “nothing but sophistry and illusion”. The French Philosopher and socialist Augusta Comte felt that metaphysics is more concerned about impersonal and abstract forces of the phenomena. In that way it is dogmatic. Even Kant, the celebrated German philosopher, revealed that certain sort of metaphysics is impossible as the human understanding cannot reach the domain of metaphysics (thing-in-self). Logical positivist followed Hume to eliminate metaphysics.

Following Hume’s arguments, Logical positivists classified meaningful statements in to two kinds – (a) Analytic statements, (Relation of ideas according to Hume) of logic and mathematics, which do not require any confirmation from sense experience for their certainty. In other words they are purely convetional and tautologous, (b) Synthetic statements (Matter of Fact according to Hume) of natural sciences whose truth or falsehood is dependent on sense experience. All those statements, which do not fall under either of these two categories, are metaphysical and consequently meaningless. In this way they claim
to demolish metaphysics completely. In order to judge the
meaningfulness of a statement, logical positivists introduced
“principle of verification” as a criterion of meaning by the use of
which all the statement of science would be proved acceptable and
metaphysics by contrast would be condemned as meaningless. All
the analytic statements are exempted from the principle of
verification, since they are non-empirical.

Logical positivists hold the view that they are, as
philosophers, not concerned with the truth or falsehood of
scientific statements and assert that this is the business of scientists.
They claim that, “Their proper concern is to enquire in to the
logical connections of the concepts and propositions of science,
into how some propositions are deducible from others and the like.
It is this kind of enquiry, the logical analysis of concepts,
propositions, proofs, hypotheses, theories of science which
constitute epistemology, indeed philosophy in general”. 11

The logical positivists are chiefly interested in logical
and epistemological problems. The common claim of all the
members of the school was that they regard language as the only
subject matter of philosophy and its method is analysis, though
their types of analysis were differ from thinker to thinker, Schlick and his followers were more interested in semantic analysis whereas Carnap showed some negative attitude towards semantics and concentrated more on syntax.

Logical positivists further included the problems concerning objectivity, necessity, causation, essence, etc. Such problems, according to logical positivists, are beyond the perview of sense experience. Consequently, they do not comply with the basic tenents of logical positivism. For logical positivist, scientific knowledge is the knowledge of the object of sensation, which is confined to the appearance of things. Like Barkley and Hume, logical positivists too, abolish the distinction between appearance and reality. They consider that every appearance is real. In fact the legacy of Hume is well maintained by logical positivists by giving a new colour to it. However, the negative attitude towards metaphysics is so strong that they made it a characteristics feature of their thought.

Logical positivists conceive that all the philosophical problems arise out of misunderstanding of the meaning of statements in everyday language and science. They consider that
analysis is used as a method to bring out the ‘logical implications’ of concepts and propositions of everyday language and science. They assert that the propositions of philosophy are not factual but linguistic in their character. According to F. Waismann:

"The analytical method leads us to the view that the questions themselves rest upon misunderstanding; it frees us from them by making the meaning of our words clear and the way they are combined in language so clear that we no longer feel driven to as questions".

A.J. Ayer, the leading British exponent of logical positivism has also expressed similar views. Trying to clarify the stand of logical positivists, Ayer says that the function of philosophy is philosophical analysis. The following quotation of Ayer suggests to us the most useful function of philosopher...

"But where in that case does the philosopher come in? One thing he can do, of course, is to act as a sort of intellectual policeman, seeing that nobody trespasses in to metaphysics. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seemed to think that this was all that he can do.....The Vienna Circle, however, was not content with quite so negative a conception of philosophy as this. They thought that
the philosopher still had a useful function to perform, in analyzing and clarifying the concepts, which figure in everyday, and also in the scientific use of language, but chiefly in the scientific use, as this was held to be the most important. Philosophy was to become the logic of science. In a sense, philosophy was to merge with science. There would not be a set of philosophical statements embedded among the scientific ones, but the scientific statements themselves would be refined by logical analysis. ¹³

To conclude, according to Ayer, unlike Wittgenstein, logical positivists were not contented with the role of philosopher as an "intellectual policeman" to prevent people from indulging in speculative thinking, but assigned a new job to the philosopher. This new job for philosopher was to clarify the concepts of everyday language and science, thus philosophy for logical positivist, becomes logic of science.

The downfall of Logical positivism is largely attributed to be the internal contradictions that are prevalent in its own structure and also its inadequacy in understanding the genuine nature of the scientific investigation.
a) 1.4. REVIEW OF LITERATURES:

To carry on an in depth investigation in to the matter I have selected the following a few books, a short account may be cited as follows-

Wittgenstein is the pioneer of two important schools in philosophy, i.e. Logical Positivism and Ordinary Language School. The *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) is influenced the former and the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) is influenced the latter. These are two epoch making books in explaining the new idea of philosophy. In them Wittgenstein brought to the forefront of the connection of philosophy, language and reality. Out of a large number of his writings many of which have been published posthumously, these two books occupy a prevital position in the world of philosophical discourse.

The only philosophical works published during lifetime of Wittgenstein was the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* and *Some Remarks on Logical Forms* which appeared in the supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in 1929. Since his death his literacy executors have published his other books. The *Philosophische Untersuchungen* came out in 1953,
with the German text and its English translation by Miss Elizabeth Anscombe on facing pages, as in the *Tractatus* and the English title of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein's thought were also expressed in two series of notes that he dictated to his pupils. During fertile period Wittgenstein published nothing, but worked for classroom lectures. In 1958 these notes were published under the title of the *Blue and Brown Books*. G.E. Moore also sat in on Wittgenstein's Lectures during the early thirties and later published a summary of his copious notes. What appears in this publication is an emergence of a new conception of Philosophy. The Remarks on *The Foundation of Mathematics* were also written in the year 1937 and 1944 and published in both the German and English language in 1956, a set of fragments dating from 1929 but was written in the year 1945-48 and published in both German and English language under the title *Zettel* in 1967 and some of the notes, *Uber Gewissheit*, translated as on certainty, published in some format in 1969, and representing work on which Wittgenstein was engaged in the last eighteen months of his life. There have been various other posthumous publications, and a number of commentaries both on the *Tractatus*, of which a fresh translation by David Pears
and Mc Guinness, preserving the German text and Russell’s introduction, appeared in 1960 and upon the later tendencies of Wittgenstein are thought in the *Tractatus*. In the *Brown Book* Wittgenstein circulated his lectures and he made extensive use of the concept of a ‘Language game’.

Analysis of language is a new direction of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century was altered not once but twice by the enigmatic Austrian-British Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein by his own philosophical work and through his influence on several generations of other thinkers. Wittgenstein transformed the nature of philosophical activity in English-speaking world. From two distinct approaches, he sought to show that traditional philosophical problems could be avoided entirely by application of an appropriate methodology, one that focuses on analysis of language. The ‘early’ Wittgenstein worked closely with Russell and shared his conviction that the use of mathematical logic held in the better way to the understanding of the world. In tightly structured declarations of the *Logische-Phiolophische Abhandlung* (*Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, 1922), Wittgenstein tried to spell out precisely what a logically constructed language
can (and cannot) be used to say. Its seven basic propositions simply state that language, thought and reality shares a common structure, fully expressible in logical terms. On Wittgenstein’s view, the world consists of entirely facts. (Tractatus, 1.1) Human beings are aware of facts by virtue of our mental representation or thoughts, which are most fruitfully understood as picturing the way things are. (Tractatus, 2.1) These thoughts are, in turn, expressed in propositions, whose form indicates the position, of the facts there are within the nature of reality as a whole and whose content presents the truth-conditions under which they corresponds to that reality. (Tractatus, 4) Everything that is true— that is, all the facts that constitute the world— can in principle be expressed by atomic sentences. Imagine a comparative list of all the true sentences. They would picture all of the facts there are, and this would be an adequate representation of the world as a whole. The tautological expressions of logic occupy a special role in this language-scheme. Because they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies are literally non-sense: they convey no information about what the facts truly are. But since they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies reveal the underlying structure of all
language, thought, and reality. (Tractatus, 6.1) Thus, on Wittgenstein’s view, the most significant logical features of the world are not themselves additional facts about it. The Tractatus major theme as a whole is: since propositions merely express the facts about the world, propositions in themselves are entirely devoid of value. The facts are just the facts. Everything else, everything, which we care, everything that might render the world meaningful, must reside elsewhere. (Tractatus, 6.4) A properly logical language, Wittgenstein held, deals only with what is true. Aesthetic judgment about what is beautiful and ethical judgment about what is good cannot be expressed within the logical language, since they transcend what can be pictured in thought. They aren’t facts. The achievement of a wholly satisfactory description of the way things would leave unanswered (but also unaskable) all of the most significant questions with which traditional philosophy is concerned. (Tractatus, 6.5) Thus, even the philosophical achievements of the Tractatus itself are nothing more than useful nonsense; once appreciated, they are themselves, they are themselves to be discarded. The book concludes with the lone statement:
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must silent.”(Tractatus, 7)

This is a stark massage indeed, for it renders literally unspeakable so much of human life. As Wittgenstein’s friend and colleague Frank Ramsey put it,

“What we can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either.”

It was this carefully delineated sense of what a logical language can properly express that influenced members of the Vienna Circle in their formulation of the principle of logical positivism. Wittgenstein himself supposed that there was nothing left for philosophers to do. True to this conviction, he abandoned the discipline for nearly a decade.

In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein emphasized that there are countless different kind of us of what we call “symbols”, “words”, and “sentences”. The task of philosophy was to gain a perspicuous view of those multiple uses and thereby to dissolve philosophical and metaphysical puzzles. Here he set out to depict how common philosophical views about meaning, about the nature of concepts, about logical necessity, about rule-
following, and about the mind-body problems were all the product of an insufficient grasp of how language works.

In the *Notes* written between 1948 and 1951 was published under the title ‘On Certainty’. He insisted here that every particular belief must always be seen as part of a system of beliefs which together constitute a world-view. The thoughts of ‘On Certainty’ are directed against both philosophical skepticism and philosophical refutations of skepticism. He concludes that it is impossible to refute skepticism by drawing on propositions which are considered absolutely certain such as Descartes' “I think, therefore, I am” or Moore's “I know for certain that this is a hard here.” The conclusion is that all philosophical argumentation is not an absolute, self-evident-truth, that it is rather a certain kind of natural human practice. Further, in the *Blue and Brown* Book he assumes language consists of a number of different sub-structures. Individual language-games, he still thinks of a language-game, and also gave attention to the problems of one's knowledge of others minds, and allows the possibility of both physical descriptions and psychological utterances.
The special achievement of the *Language Truth and Logic* (1936) was remarkable; it is in accordance to its combination of lucidly, elegance, and vigor with an uncompromisingly revolutionary position has made it one of the influential books in the 20th century. It has almost seamless unification of his initial philosophical inheritance with the whole range of the main ideas of Vienna Circle. Where he differed with the orthodoxy of Carnap, Neurath and Hempel, rejecting what he labeled as its 'formalism', it was with ideas developed by Schlick. Where Carnap and his allies denied that statements can be compared with extra-linguistic fact and so look basic statements to be adopted by convention, Schlick saw them as direct reports of the facts of experience.

In the second edition of the book published in 1946 Ayer contains an introduction with certain modification. His attention here is directed chiefly to giving a precise formulation of the principle of verification. His original version is replaced by a much more elaborate and carefully worded formula. Both versions have, however, faulty in admitting as meaningful metaphysical statements of precisely the kind that the principle is designed to outlaw. Indeed, there seems to be a weakness of the principle in
that, it appears plausible only when its expression is left uncomfortably vague.

The *Foundation of Empirical Knowledge*, 1940 is concerned with two group's problems, those of perception and those of 'ego-centric predicament' (privacy and publicity in language and in sense experience and the problem of other minds). The interesting and original feature of the book is Ayer's treatment of the terminology of sense data as a language in which the problems of perception can most appropriately dealt with rather than as a thesis embodying a discovery about the facts of sense experience.

In 1956 Ayer published *The Problem of Knowledge*, his important book since 1936. It is a sympathetic and constructive treatment of the various problems of philosophical skepticism. *The Concept of a Person* (1963) is a collection of essays in which the striking feature is a notable survey of some aspects of body, mind and personal identity.

He wrote some lively pieces of philosophical polemic: defending the sense datum theory against Austin's captious objections, setting ferociously about Malcolm's view that dreams
are stories we are disposed to tell when we wake up and arguing against Wittgenstein's view that a private language is impossible. He expounded Peirce and James, Russell and Moore with thoroughness and distinction. His special kind of clear-headedness proved valuable in his work on probability, a subject often liable to be swamped by fruitless technicalities.

Rudolf Carnap's 'Logical Syntax of Language' shows that a language could significantly be used to express its own syntax, and claimed that philosophy could be a cognitive discipline, which had to consist in the logic of science, which was itself identified with the logical syntax of a scientific language. Carnap here also made a famous distinction between the material and formal mode of speech. He further argued that all statements about the "meaning" or "significance" of statements are of "pseudo-object" type and should be translated to syntactical form. In the Testability and Meaning is one of the shorter works of Carnap appeared first in Philosophy of Science in 1936.

And in 1937 in which he discusses the meaning criteria and the requirements of an empiricist language, the use of reduction sentences for analyzing assertions about dispositional
properties, and physicalism as a basis for reconstruction of the language of science.

Other publications of Carnap on semantics namely the *Introduction to Semantics* 'Formation of Logic' and *Meaning and Necessity* in which he developed a new method of analyzing the meanings of linguistic expressions as well as to lay a semantic foundation for modal logic. In the *The Logical Construction of the World* he adopted the methodological solipsism, that is, epistemological problems which the choice of a solipsistic basis might be thought to raise. Further it is also discuss about the concepts of the experiences and qualities of the individual psyche.

Moritz Schlick was the exception to the general attitude to philosophy. From 1911 to 1917 Schlick served as a Lecturer and Associate Professor at the University of Rostock. In this period he published a series of works, among them his *Allgemeine Eerkenntnislehre* (General Theory of Knowledge) (1918, second ed., 1925). These works were devoted partly to a logically precise critical discussion of traditional philosophical conceptions and partly to an elaboration of new criteria for scientific knowledge, which attracted considerable attention. In
these publications Schlick already presented a first systematic account of his philosophical views. While in Vienna, Schlick published *Fragen de Erfik* (The Problem of Ethicks, 1930) as well as numerous papers, most of which were later collected in various volumes. But his views were disseminated very effectively, perhaps through discussion society which he founded and which acquired a worldwide reputation as Wiener Kreis. In another essay namely, *Meaning and Verification* he gave a detailed discussion on the verifiability theory of meaning.

In his early work *Space and Time in Contemporary Physics* (1917), Schlick presented a critical examination of the synthetic a priory character that Kantian transcendental philosophy attributed to proposition about space and time In the *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* (General Theory of Knowledge, 1918), he made a critical study of all the propositions to which Kant and his followers had ascribed a synthetic a priori character. Schlick concluded that in all cases these propositions, were precisely formulated as logically necessary truths, are analytic in character; when, on the other hand, they are interpreted as statements which deals with real content, they are empirical or synthetic a posteriori.
In the *Positivism and Realism* Schlick is concerned to show that the meaning of statements about physical objects can be fully accounted for the relevant method of verification — that is, by the occurrence of suitable experiences. ‘If we say of some object... that it is real, this means ... that under given circumstances certain data are presented’ (page-98) The ‘realist’, as described by Schlick, is somewhat who thinks that there is more than that to the reality of a physical object. Schlick argues that this idea is meaningless; but he tries hard to do justice to the feeling of the realist something has been left out of account. To some extent he does this by emphasizing that the method of verification is not exhausted by a finite set of experiences, but extends to experiences that would occur in ‘indefinitely many circumstances’.

1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT STUDY:

Like all significant philosophical movements, logical positivism was, also a diverse and complex phenomenon. The central tenant of positivism was that, all metaphysical sentences without exception are meaningless. The positivist agreed with Wittgenstein that metaphysical questions, the attempted answers of
which make up the bulk of the history of philosophy, are pseudo­questions and unanswerable. One of the major figures of positivism, Rudolf Carnap, defined metaphysical propositions as those, which claim to represent knowledge about something, which is over or beyond all experiences. According to positivist what cannot be experienced, even in principle, cannot be known or even spoken about in meaningful language. Second important tenant of positivism was that most of the members of the Vienna Circle intended to identify philosophy with analysis, especially the analysis of language of science. By attempting to identify all philosophy with the analysis of language, positivism left no room for traditional metaphysical investigation in philosophy. Thirdly, positivists were to establish an adequate theory of proportional meaning based on empirical verifiability, a critical theory of the syntactical structure of language and its semantic function in representing non-linguistic data, and a logically perfect language to which all the propositions of science can be reduced. Thus they aimed at the formalization of logic, the theory of induction, the general theory of symbolization, the problem of truth-value of empirical proposition, the nature of theory of construction and
interest in the problem of the unity of science. Logical positivism gets recognition as a school of thought for construction on a number of interesting problems that occupied the minds of philosophers as well as scientists. Logical positivism can be credited with the development of logic of scientific cognition, and investigation of specific problems of logic. There is no doubt that this school of thought attempted to get rid of speculative doctrines and dogmatisms from philosophy to make philosophy a genuine branch of knowledge.

There are several issues which are also involve in logical positivism, which I think need further clarification and investigation. For example, the issues like what kind of knowledge the philosophical activity results in? Or what are the fundamental problems connected with the nature of scientific knowledge? What is the state of meaning? In what does the meaning of sentence, proposition or statement consist? Are the conditions of experience the same as the conditions of experience in language? What is logical analysis of language? Whether the value statements are meaningful or not and so on.
In the present investigation I have focused my attention on some of the prominent Logical Positivist's views on various issues pertaining to the problems of philosophy like the concept of philosophy, the criterion of meaning and experience, analysis of language and its implication in metaphysics and religion. It is an attempt to reexamine the aspects, which are discussed by various logical positivists and also to reexamine —

........whether they are really successful in solving those philosophical issues. The best way to examine their claim would be, therefore, to analyse their own notions regarding the subject matter of philosophy, the notion of meaning and experience, analysis of language and their view on ethical issues and so on. To discuss it in a lucid way the views of a few prominent positivists like Schlick, Carnap, Ayer were taken in to consideration, and also included the views of Wittgenstein as Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* was the main inspiration for those positivists.
REFERENCES


4. Von Wright, *Analytic Philosophy-a historic critical survey*, P-34,


8. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.063,

9. Ibid, 4.003;


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