After careful examination of logical positivism approach it is found that the Logical Positivism is a Logico-linguistic approach to natural and social sciences. It is an attitude rather than a creed, a method rather than a dogma. It is to say; the Logical Positivists adopt a logico-linguistic approach to knowledge and promote knowledge through analysis and specification, elucidation and specification of written and spoken word or indeed, wherever the use of language in the widest sense is involved. They are not interested in theorizing in the sense of building up a priori system or philosophizing in the sense of engaging inwardly windy duels. In short, they were interested in the promotion of knowledge through promotion of communication.

For all Logical Positivists, philosophy is not a theory but an activity. After careful considering the concept of philosophy put forwarded by the proponents of studied positivists and Wittgenstein’s influence on the subject the following conclusions can be drawn-
1. It has been found that the chief aim of all the positivists was in identifying philosophy with analysis is to dismiss all those aspects related to objective material world as irrelevant. Philosophy is a synthetic unity of various forms and levels of human experiences. It deals with the most general accounts of nature and our place in it. But Ayer and the other positivists are under the impression that there is no integral philosophical system that is embraced by one and all. A philosopher creates its own system. They believe that philosophy occupies an intermediary position between science and metaphysics. Logical positivists believe that, in between there is a third line exposed to attack from both sides. This third line is philosophy. It is also found that logical positivists assigned a special function to philosophy, i.e., to undertake the business of clarifying the philosophical muddles that often appear due to loose correlation of our language. Therefore, they assigned a special function to philosophy.

2. Wittgenstein while discussing about philosophy applied many philosophical words e.g., thinking, speaking, understanding, meaning, consciousness, self, sensation, feeling, imagination, simple, composite and so on. Those are the descriptive collection of the innumerable examples of the use of such words in
diverse contexts and appreciation of many thought of alternative possibilities on issues at stake. Everywhere we are reminded that rather than asking what a thing is, we should try to find out what the word means in everyday use. Wittgenstein is not always describing grammatically the use of problem words but often trying to ascertain the meaning of words and validity of theories in the light of empirical facts and contingencies as well, stepping freely beyond the domain of language.

Logical positivists consider metaphysics to be nonsensical since it consists of statements, which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a statement can be literally significant, following reflection can be cited regarding their concept of metaphysics-

2.1. The logical positivist’s campaign against metaphysics and to eliminate it from philosophy has both positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect of their campaign is that traditional speculative philosophy showed little interesting concrete problems of human life and scientific cognition. In other words, it laid too much emphasis on idealism and religion.
II. The negative aspect of their campaign is that they reject all traditional problems of philosophy, as they are unrelated to science. Instead of giving new scientific impetus to these problems, they discarded all the fundamental problems of philosophy, as they are metaphysical. Like Berkeley and Hume, logical positivists also, abolish the distinction between appearance and reality. They consider that every appearance is real. In fact the legacy of Hume is well maintained by them by giving a new colour to it. However, the negative attitude towards metaphysics is so strong as to make it a characteristic feature of their thought.

III. The ground of positivist attack on metaphysics was not an objection to its methods, but an objection to its subject matter. If they had recognized that all thinking involves absolute presuppositions they would have been eager to find out what, on that kind of occasion, was being thus presupposed. But, owing to their too hasty analysis of scientific thought they fail to recognize the logical function of presuppositions in general, and never discovered that there were such things as absolute presuppositions at all.

IV. The elimination of metaphysics does not mean for the logical positivist the abandonment of philosophical activity. They
allow all philosophical questions about superphenomenal reality on the ground of their meaninglessness. On the other hand they also regard all questions regarding the properties of empirical objects as falling properly within the domain of science. Yet philosophy has its own field within the empirical sphere. It is not, as it may be supposed, the function of philosophy to piece together or synthesize the empirical results of different branches of science into a world view, and thus play the proud role of the science of all sciences. These synthetic views are the work of poetic and aesthetic imagination, and do not admit of empirical verification and do not deserve to be called scientific or philosophical. Logical positivists show that though philosophy is deprived of its metaphysical quest, and is also prevented from the construction of the worldviews, it is not deprived of occupation. On the contrary, the clarification, interpretation and coordination of the results of the sciences through logical analysis constitute a very useful and worthy programme which philosophy can legitimately pursue.

Thus it can be said that metaphysics cannot be condemned without postulating a counter theory of metaphysics. Indeed, the principle of verification in which metaphysics is
condemned is not empirical but a non-empirical statement. Therefore, it cannot be validated in terms of its own theory of validation. God, soul etc., are not empirical entities but are presuppositions of all experience. These are beliefs having pragmatic value. To condemn them is to condemn life itself.

3.1. Logical positivists consider ‘language’ is the whole subject matter of philosophy. Wittgenstein’s logical analysis of language and experience impressed the members of the Vienna Circle. It becomes the basis of their conception of meaning on which the superstructure of logical positivism was raised. Language is that which is used for stating facts. It is a human creation and is intended to serve human purposes, since the words and sentences have meaning, the basic purposes of language is to convey some information. For Logical Positivists, the meaning of a sentence is essentially based on the information it conveys. Language is a knowledge-acquiring instrument. As a human tool it can be used only for what it is capable of doing. When language is used without conveying meaning it is misused and leads us nowhere. Meaning of a linguistic notion and the laws of logic should determine the use of language so that statements do not become self-contradictory. According to logical positivists a
non-analytic statement would count as meaningful only if it can be empirically verifiable and therefore, not meaningful. It is with the conclusion that the positivists of Vienna Circle stage a departure from the traditional philosophical thinking.

II. The Logical Positivists approach was an attempt to formulate a theory of the types of language. But, instead of starting from an unprejudiced examination of the actual types of discourse in the spirit of exploration and understanding i.e., in a purely inductive and empirical fashion, it constructed a rigid typology after a superficial and hasty acquaintance with the varieties of discourse. Its examination of the concrete and detailed features and peculiarities of statements was not thorough and painstaking. It was unconsciously biased in favour of natural science, whose methods and concepts were taken as the only material leads to a close scrutiny. It was theoretical rather than empirical.

III. The function of linguistic analysis is to put us guard vis a' vis language on general, and to enable us to see through the tricks language plays on us. By clarifying the diverse uses of words it enables us to command a clear view it enables us to command a clear view of the linguistic terrain. It liberates us from the danger of falling
into hidden language traps, and thus serves us from the struggle of trying to get out.

IV. The whole essence of linguistic approach of logical positivism consists in its demand that before one claims anything to be knowable one must be sure of it's being expressible. What cannot be meaningfully said or expressed cannot be fruitfully studied or known. This preliminary demand makes short work of many of the metaphysical problems. By an intensive and thoroughgoing adoption of linguistic approach, some problems are eliminated outright while the remaining ones are sought to be resolved by subjecting them again to the same method. Thus the logical positivists look upon language as a prolific and even inexhaustible source of muddles and problems, they look upon it as an instrument of resolving such muddles and problems for the matter of that.

4. The logical positivists main concern was about meaning and its desire to produce a systematic approach to meaning. Positivists regarded Verifiability theory as one of the standard point of departure in the discussion of meaning in philosophy.

I. The member of the circle claim to have been differing in their formulations of theories such as, principle of verification,
probability, confirmability etc. For example, Schlick demanded for conclusive verification, whereas Ayer and others suggested verifiability in its stronger and weaker sense, as it would be impossible to verify a statement conclusively. Carnap suggested confirmability in place of verifiability. But whatever the differences they have with regard to their approach, their priorities are the same. In spite of their subtle differences, the common claim acceptable to all the members of the circle in that they regard language as the only subject matter of philosophy and its method is analysis. Even types of analysis differ from thinker to thinker. Schlick and his followers were more interested in semantic analysis whereas Carnap showed some negative attitude towards semantic and concentrated more on syntax. But both confirmability and probability theory of meaning are misled by a desire to measure quantitatively the evidences of statements made in science and then from a criterion of meaningfulness in the light of those results. This tendency betrays a logical attitude in formulating the problem of empirical meaningfulness. Though the criteria may be partially helpful in scientific language they can hardly meet the demands of meaning as encountered in ordinary empirical discourse. For empirical statements verifiability works much better than
confirmability because verifiability gives us a common criterion of demarcation and content description whereas the latter only gives us a criterion of demarcation.

II. The logical positivist theory of meaning is designed to eliminate the logic of ethical, religious and metaphysical statements; they are eliminated when the theory is constantly applied. The typology is, as it were, a rigid and artificially constructed frame containing different points into which different statements are fitted together. Those sentences, which do not fit properly, are thrown as either pseudo-statements or meaningless one instead of reconsidering it, although grammatically correct. Obviously these complex statements are maltreated, and not, analysed, or explored, as to how they come to be what they are, and what is their function and criterion of validity etc. In short, the logic of these statements is totally ignored. This lead to a dogmatic elimination of metaphysics and impoverishment of philosophy.

III. Wittgenstein’s aim of philosophical analysis was to make possible first meaningful sentences and then true propositions. Ayer is not keen on ‘meaning’ as such. He is content with the fact that the sentences which are offered for testing their truth value do have
meaning in one sense or another, since there can be several ‘meanings’ of ‘meaning’. Indeed, in order to distinguish his ‘meaning’ from that of others, he ‘tendentiously’ uses the expression ‘literal meaning’, while for statements which satisfy his criterion of verifiability without being analytic, he uses the expression ‘factual meaning’. Hence, Ayer argues, such a literally meaningful sentences can be true or false on verification. On closer analysis, however, it becomes clear that Ayer sidetracks the main issue of telling us what ‘meaning’ is. This is apparent from Ayer’s quotation.... There is at least one proper use of word ‘meaning’ in which it would be incorrect to say that a statement was meaningful unless it satisfied the principle of verification” (LTL, p.13); here he did not take a positive or affirmative step towards defining meaning. It just leaves meaning undefined. The claim that the statements appeared for verification would have at least one meaning of the several meanings of meaning is clearly unsupported.

IV. Ayer did not accept explicitly the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ as Wittgenstein does. Neither does he make a clear or elaborate distinction between ‘meaning’ and truth of a proposition. He rather takes for granted the ‘meaning’ and goes on to discuss the truth and falsity of a proposition in the light of verification principle.
Wittgenstein's conception of meaning and truth refers to a 'describable situation'.

V. Meaning of a statement is not a thing or a function but a totality of all ways by which we can verify the sentence. But to think that Schlick put forwarded this criterion, as a theory of meaning will be unjust. According to Schlick what he said about meaning was pointing out a truism. It is the attitude we do accept invariably when we come to assert an empirical statement, especially at the primary level of knowledge. At the most, 'verifiability' is a clarification of the use of the concept of meaning – a universal insight explicitly stated. Everything else depends on these insights and to call this primary fact a theory is, according to Schlick, as abuse of this term. Again the principle of verifiability should not be regarded as a great psychological discovery arrived at by eliminating other possible hypotheses. It is the only possible attitude one can adopt as an empiricist. 'What do I mean by meaning?' - is not a request to provide the enquirer with an interpretative report of what actually happens in the mind of the user of the term, but an empirical statement furnish by the presumption that the knowledge is ultimately of the fact in the world, and known only through sense experience. Hence, this
principle is neither an empirical hypothesis nor a theory but express a fact, which is always there.

The greatest thing given by the different positivists was the method of logical analysis, the attempt to analyse a question logically before trying to answer it properly. It is also a great merit of movement, specially the theory of Carnap, to point out the method of determining the meaning of words in the light of the different sentences in which they are used. The benefit of such a method is realized when, for example, we find disputants engaged in deciding whether God exists, without determining first the meanings in which the word 'God' is used in different sentences or contexts, and becoming thus involved in endless controversies most of which arises from verbal ambiguity.

But the great deficiency of the movement is that it forgets its own principles. It does not determine the meaning of the word 'meaning' itself with reference to different contexts or sentences in which it is used. The result is, as we have seen, arbitrary limitation of the word to special senses, which overlook many important aspects of its significance. Only an assertory sentences with existential import and allowing a particular kind of verification can possess meaning
according to the positivist's arbitrarily chosen criterion. Even the positivists own sentences containing the criterion of meaning becomes nonsensical and so also does a general proposition of science, which is interpreted by some positivists as having preservative or regulative, but not existential import. These inherent self-contradictions and arbitrary use of words have considerably discredited the movement, and impaired its prestige even in the eyes of sympathizer.

Logical Positivism stands in glaring contradiction to actual scientific proof, there is no doubt that logical positivism is credited with posing a number of interesting problems that are common to philosophers as well as scientists. It is obvious that the representatives of Logical Positivism have contributed much to the development of logic and scientific method. It is true that this school of thought has joined the issue with science in rejecting the view that speculative doctrines and dogmatism are necessary in the quest for knowledge of reality. Positivism as a school of thought for contradicting on a number of interesting problems that occupied the minds of philosophers as well as scientists. Logical Positivism can be credited with the development of logic of scientific cognition, and investigation of specific problems of logic of science. There is no
doubt that this school of thought attempted to get rid of speculative doctrines and dogmatisms from philosophy to make philosophy as a genuine branch of knowledge. Thus logical positivists approach, always suggests itself as an option to be considered by those who think seriously about the problems of philosophy. If it is so important, then logical positivism is successful as a group, can occupy its own place among the significant philosophers and philosophical movements, which are of profound importance so far as their ideology is concerned.

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