CHAPTER FOUR

Theory of Causation in the Mimamsa Philosophy
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The Mimāṃsā is called Karma Mimāṃsā. Jaimini attempts the work of systematizing the rules of Mimāṃsā and establishing their validity in his Mimāṃsā Sūtra. The aim of the Purva Mimāṃsā is to examine the nature of dharma. Its interest is more practical than speculative. The philosophical speculations found in it are subordinate to the ritualistic purpose. For the sake of the integrity of dharma, it is obliged to affirm the reality of the soul and regard it as a permanent being possessing a body, to whom the results of acts arise. Its importance for the Hindu religion is great. The scriptures which govern the daily life of the Hindu require to be interpreted in accordance with the mimāṃsā rules. Modern Hindu law is considerably influenced by the Mimāṃsā system.

The Fourth century B.C. is the earliest period we can assign for Jaimini’s work, which is familiar with the Nyāya and the Yoga sūtras. Sabara is the author of the chief commentary on the work of Jaimini. Kumārila is the exponent of Brahmanical orthodoxy which assumes the authoritativeness of the Vedas and the supremacy of the priest, commented on the sūtra and the Bhāṣya, and his work is in three parts. Prabhākara also wrote his commentary, Brhati on the Bhāṣya of Sabara, which it closely follows.
The Mīmāṁsā view of causation is similar to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika causation. But there is a minor difference between the two. The doctrine of potency (Sakti) is described by them differently. Mīmāṁsā accepts the doctrine of potency but Nyāya-vaiśeṣika rejects the idea of potency. Mīmāṁsā-kas define cause in the same way as the Naiyāyikas do. According to Gaga Bhatta, a cause is “an invariable and unconditional antecedent.”¹ The word ‘adjectives of antecedent’ are also justified is the same way which is done by Naiyāyikas. Again the word ‘invariable’ is added to ward off a condition that is accidentally present in the causal relation. For example, a donkey in the production of a pot. The word ‘unconditional’ (ananyātha-siddha) is combined to ward off a particular donkey in respect of a particular pot.²

In the metaphysics, the Mīmāṁsā philosophers are realists and pluralists. According to them, the world is constituted of three types of elements –

1. Body in which the self enjoys the fruits of its actions.
2. Sense organs and motor organs as the means of experiencing pleasure and pain.
3. External things as objects of enjoyment. Besides the objects of perception, there are many realities. Such as heaven, hell, soul, gods

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¹ TP, P. 34
² Ibid
etc., which are not subject to perception. The creation is based on karmas. The Mīmāṁsā philosophers, therefore, do not admit any purpose of God in creation. According to their atomic theory of the creation of the world, the atoms are not activated by God as they are held to be in the vaiśesika view. The atoms are constantly activated due to the natural law of Karma so that the world is constituted in order that the selves may experience the consequences of their karma. The world is external. There is no origination or final destruction of the world. The self is atomic, eternal and imperishable. Besides the nine elements postulated by the vaiśesika philosophers, some Mīmāṁsā philosophers also admit darkness and sound as elements. They also admit the existence of substance, genus quality, activity, and absence.

Classification of causes:

According to Mīmāṁsākas, there are two types of classifications of causes. According to one the cause is of two kinds. These are –

1. Svarupa – Yogya and

2. Phalopahita.

Svarupa-Yogya means that which has the capacity to produce an effect. For example, a stick in a forest, and phalopahita means that which has actually produced, or, is producing the effect. The first is defined as that

3 IP, PP. 180-181
which does not produce its effect due to the absence of other helping and the second is that which is aided by assisting others.4

Another classification is equal to the three fold classification of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. For example, inherent cause (Samavāyi Kāraṇa), non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) and instrumental cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa). Prabhākara accepts the category of inherence (Samavāya) and speaks of two types of causes specially inherent (samavāyi) and non-inherent causes (asamavāyi).5

The non-inherent cause embraces all the conditions, which, in conjunction with an inherent cause, result in an effect. It may subsist either in the inherent cause, or the non inherent cause, of that cause. For example, when it is generated in a substance by connection with fire. A non-inherent cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) is generally defined as “that which present in the inherent cause and is able to produce the effect.”6 It is said that, conjunction of threads with respect to cloth.7 Threads are inherent cause and cloth is its effect. Prabhākara accepted this classification of causes but Kumārila does not accept the category of inherence. So he concludes that the definition of inherence and non-inherence cause are meaningless.

The another type of cause is known instrumental cause or (Nimitta Kāraṇa) seems to be acceptable to Mimāṁsākas though it has neither been

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4 TP, P. 35
5 Prakarana - Pancika, P-52, Karma Mimamsa, P. 23
6 SP, P. 72
7 TB, P. 36
advocated anywhere nor refuted. Mimāṃsākas do not regard all types of causes to be necessary in the production of a thing. Mimāṃsākas says that an effect is sufficiently explained by having a cause, it need not have all kinds of causes.

Nyāya admits three kinds of causes viz. – the material cause (Upadāna), the non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) and efficient or instrumental cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa). According to Mimāṃsākas, these three fold causes are not equally important to produce an effect. The production of an effect would be justified only if there were no cause at all. Mimāṃsākas says that an effect can be produced in the absence of any of them.

A cause is the aggregate of the principal or material cause and auxiliary causes which render an aid to it. If they are present, then an effect is produced, if they are absent, effect is not produced. There is no causal power in addition to them. Straw fire, and blowing together are the cause of burning, each of which singly is not its cause. But they are its positive conditions only, which can produce its effect when its negative conditions are absent. A fire extinguishing gem is its negative condition, which must be absent in order that burning may be produces presence of the positive conditions is a cause, and absence of the negative condition is a cause. The absence of any member of the aggregate of causal conditions – the principal cause and the auxiliary
causes – is the main counteracting cause. The entire collection of positive causal conditions must be present and the counteracting causes or negative conditions must be absent in order to produce an effect.

The Nyāya rejects plurality of causes. The causal relation is reciprocal. The same cause produces the same effect, and the same effect is produced by the same cause. But sometimes it is found that the same effect is produced by a variety of causes, for example, burning is produced by straw, fire and blowing together, or by two pieces of fire-wood and intense friction together. Diversity of effects requires diversity of causes.

An effect is a new creation. It is non-existent in its material cause, but it is produced a new out of its material cause possessing owing to the rearrangement of its atoms. As a pluralist, Mimamsakas believe that variety is at the root of the physical universe. The school of Kumārila accept all the nine dravyas known to the Nyāya-Vaiśešika and its conception of them is more or less the same. It adds two more to them, viz. – ‘tamas’ or darkness and ‘sabda’ or sound. Time is perceivable. Darkness should be regarded as a positive dravya in preference to the Nyāya-vaiśešika view, which is Prabhākara’s of equating it with the absence of light.

There is a little difference between Mimamsakas and Nyāya-Vaiśešikas. According to Nyāya-Vaiśešika, non-existence of a counteracting agency is regarded as a Nimitta Karana but Mimamsaka says that non-

8 NM, PP. 10, 18 & 47.
existence can not be a cause. It is clear in the concept of potency (Sakti). The Mimamsakas accept a potency in cause through which it produces its effect. Potency is distinct from the causal substance if potency is obstructed then causal substance can not produce its effect. A Mimamsaka says that the power of burning in fire is a potency distinct from fire. But Naiyayika says that it is a nature of fire.

A causal relation is like the relation of genus to species. It is a natural relation of concomitance, that can be determined only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence and absence, and not by a deduction from a certain a priori principle like that of causality or identity of essence. Certain general conditions such as relative space (dik), time (kala), the will of Isvara, destiny (adrsta) are regarded as the common cause of all effects (Karyatva-Prayojaka). Those are called Sadharana Karana (common cause) as distinguished from the specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called asadharana Karana. While Nyaya repudiating transcendental power (Sakti) in the mechanism of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of metaphysical conditions like merit (dharma), which constitutes a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical systems and order of nature.9 Jaimini defines Dharma as a good which is of the nature of a command (codanalaksano’rtho dhammah).

9 AHIP, (Vol-I), P. 322
Dharma can be revealed by the vedic prescriptions. It is not apprehended by perception, inference, comparision or any other means of knowledge. The vedic prescriptions reveal past, present, future. Dharma is non-temporal and super-sensuous Duty or Moral law. It is revealed by the Vedas, and impels the self to obey it. Kumārila regards the Moral law as a vedic prescription or command which impels the self to act. The performance of sacrifices and other rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Vedas is conducive to its happiness. Certain substances, qualities and actions are the material of these rites. Kumārila regards the acts enjoined by the Vedas and all the ingredients necessary for them as dharma.

External acts (Kriya) prescribed by the Vedas and the substances, qualities and actions which are required for them constitute dharma. The latter are regarded as dharma, because they are means to the performance of duties, though they are perceptible. The conduciveness of the acts and the auxiliary substances, qualities and actions to the highest good is always known from the Vedas. Right actions are enjoyed by the Vedas, and wrong actions are prohibited.

10 SDS, PP. 288-289
11 SV. 1-7. codanasutra NR
12 Ibid 3.11
13 sreyo hi purusapritih sa dravyagunakarmabhīh codanalaksanaih sadhya tasmat teṣeva dharmata. Ibid 191 ibid 13,14,192 CF. I.P. J. Sinha.
14 dravyakriyagunadīnasm dharmatvam sthapayisyate. sreyahsadhanata hyesam nityam vedat pratiyate. Ibid – PP. 190-91. CF I.P. J. Sinha
15 dharma dharmavabodhaya tenayukta numanagih S.V. codanasutra – 243.
Prabhākara admits eight categories of substance (dravya): quality (guna), action (karma), generality (sāmānya), inherence (paratantrata), force (śakti), similarity (sadrśya) and number (sāṅkhya). Substance, quality and action are explained in the light of the Nyāya theory. According to Prabhākara, sāmānya is real. It exists in each individual and is an object of sense-perception. It has not a separate existence apart from individuals. Prabhākara does not admit the existence of the highest genus, on the ground that we have no consciousness of it. Viśeṣa of the Naiyāyika is not recognized, since it denotes a particular kind of quality. Abhāva, or non-existence, is nothing apart from its basis in space where it is supposed to exist.

Kumārila divides all categories into positive (bhāva) and negative (abhāva). Abhāva are of four kinds viz. – prior, posterior, absolute and mutual. Bhāva are also of four kinds namely – substance, quality, action and generality. Force (Śakti) and similarity (Sadrśya) are brought under substance. Potency is a property of objects which we infer but do not perceive. It is brought into existence along with things. Number is a quality. Force is natural. Similarity is only a quality consisting in the fact that more than one object has the same set of features. According to kumārila, inherence is not something distinct from the things themselves in which it exists. Like Prabhākara kumārila holds that generic nature is perceptible. Relation subsists between things which are distinct, but inherence is said to
be a relation between things which are inseparable, like the class and individual, so it is an impossible conception.\textsuperscript{16}

A substance is the substratum of dimension and quality.\textsuperscript{17}

Substance is that in which qualities exist. There are nine substance in \textit{Mīmāṃsā} philosophy viz. – earth, water, air, fire, akasa, self, mind, time and space. Kumārila adds another two substances namely – darkness and sound. Darkness, according to Prabhākara, is mere absence of light. If it were a substance or a quality, it must be perceptible by day also. Kumārila argues that darkness is a substance, since it has the quality of blueness and is capable of motion.

The Bhatta \textit{Mīmāṃsā} defines substance in a deferent way. There is a deference between kanada and Bhatta \textit{Mīmāṃsā} regarding their substances. Kanāda defines a substance as the substratum of qualities. The Bhatta \textit{Mīmāṃsā} admits that a substance and a quality are produced at the same moment, and non-different from each other, since both of them are produced by the same causal conditions taken together. They are produced at the same moment, and found to the related to each other as cause (upādāna) and effect (upādeya). This perception is not illusory, because it is not borrowed. Therefore, a substance is the substratum of dimension and quality.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} SBh I, 1.2. IP, (Vol-II), PP. 115-116.
\textsuperscript{17} Pariṇanaguna dharam dravyam dravyavido viduh. MM P. 149
\textsuperscript{18} MM. PP. 149-150
According to Bhatta Mīmāṃsāka, earth, water, fire, air and darkness are composed of atoms. The whole is distinct from the parts. The perception ‘this jar is one and gross’ which is valued and un-contradicted, proves the existence of the whole distinct from the parts. The whole does not inhere in the parts, since there is no inherence. It is different and non-different from them. There is identity-in-difference between them. The whole is not a different substance from its parts. It is a different condition of them.\(^9\) The manas is the internal organ through which cognition, pleasure and other qualities of the self are perceived. It is all pervasive and motionless.\(^20\)

Kumārila denies the category of inherence (samavāya). It is said to be a relation between two inseparable entities, substance and quality, substance and action, the whole and the parts, and the universal and the individual which is the cause of motion. Kumārila regards inherence as identity (tadatmya). Again he rejects the categories of potency, number and similarity recognized by Prabhākara. Potency (Sakti) is an unperceived quality in a substance, which is inferred from its effect. Prabhākara recognizes the eight categories of substance. Quality, action, community, inherence, potency, number and similarity.\(^21\)

Prabhākara maintains that the reality of substance (Paratantrata) or inherence (samavāya). It is the relation between two inseparable entities. It is

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\(^9\) Vayam tu bhinnabhinnatvam avayavānām evaivaśtāntaram avayavī na dravyantaram. SD. P. 106, MM P. 163

\(^20\) Antarindriyam vibhuparinamam aspandaḥ ca manah, MM P. 214

\(^21\) Dravyagunakarmasāmanyasānavāyasaktisamkhyāsyādsṛsyantar. TNR, P. 20
eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in non-eternal substances. Inherence is produced and these are many. It is not perceptible but only inferred.\textsuperscript{22}

Prabhākara admits the category of potency or power (śakti). It is the imperceptible energy which produces an effect. It is inferred from its effect. It is the energy by virtue of which a substance produces an effect. The potency or (śakti) is eternal in eternal substance, and non-eternal in non-eternal substances. Potency differs from velocity (samskāra), and dependent on other causes in transient things.\textsuperscript{23}

Gangesa denies the category of similarity. He regards similarity with an object as being endued with many qualities of it, which are not its common qualities.\textsuperscript{24}

Both kumārila and Prabhākara admit the reality of the external world independent of our cognitions. The Mīmāṁsā does not believe in the periodic creation and dissolution of the world by God. Production and destruction of things are constant. The part of the world have an origin and an end, but the world, as a whole, has an origin and an end in time. There is no creator or destroyer of the world.\textsuperscript{25}

Prabhākara and Kumārila are obliged to the vaiśeṣika regarding the statement of qualities and their assignment to substance. Kumārila

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{22} TNR, P. 23
\textsuperscript{23} PP, PP. 81-82, PSPM, PP. 89-91
\textsuperscript{24} PSPM, P. 90, PP. 110-111
\textsuperscript{25} sambandhaksepaparīhāra, Indian Realism. Cf. J. Singha. Ch. Vi, SV PP. 113-116
\end{footnotes}
enumerates the twenty four qualities after Prasastapāda, only substituting tone (dhvani) for sound, and manifestation and potency for merit and demerit. While Prabhākara asserts that individuality applies to eternal things alone, Kumārila hold that it applies to products as well as eternal things.

Action is of five kinds mentioned in the vaiṣeṣika philosophy. While Prabhākara holds that it is only an object of inference. But Kumārila maintains that it is perceived. According to Prabhākara when we see motion, then we see conjunction and disjunction with points of space. These contacts are in space while motion is in the object. Kumārila holds that if motion is inferred, it can only be inferred as the immaterial cause of the conjunction and disjunction of an object with points in space and this would imply that it subsists both in the object and in space, whereas it exists only in the object. So he argues that we see motion which is in the object and which brings about conjunction and disjunction in space. While Kumārila admits the existence of generalities of substance, quality and action, Prabhākara does not accept the quality and action. The Purva Mīmāṃsā does not accept the doctrine of original creation or total dissolution.26

Sahara says that when a certain fixed relation has been known to subsist between two things, so that if we perceive any one of these things we have an idea of the other thing, this later cognition is called inferential. According to Sabara there are two types of inference (1) Pratyaksatodrsta (2)

26 IP, (Vol - II), P. 417
Samanyatodṛṣṭa. Where the invariable relation holds between objects which are perceptible, for example smoke and fire, and where the relation is not apprehended by the senses, and known only by the Abstract. For example, the Sun’s motion and its changing position in the sky. But according to Prabhākara, the relation must be unfailing, true, and permanent, which subsist between the cause and its effect, whole and part, substance and quality, class and individual.27

The Mimāṃsākas accept the Nyāya theory of causation. Gaga Bhatta defines cause as “an invariable and unconditional antecedent”.28 The word ‘antecedent’ defines in Nyāya philosophy in the same way. Similarly, the word ‘invariable’ is added to ward off a condition that is accidentally present. For example, a cow in the production of a cloth. The word ‘unconditional (ananyātha-siddha) is added to ward off a particular cow in respect of a particular cloth.29

The concept of Ananyātha-siddha is very important in Mimāṃśa philosophy. Mimāṃśa includes three types of conditional antecedents: Quality which in itself can not be established as a cause by means of co-presence or co-absence.30 For example, stickiness in respect of a pot. Another conception is that in which the antecedence is established due to its being a

27 IP, (Vol – III), P. 386
28 TP, P. 34
29 Ibid
30 Ibid

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causal antecedence of some other effect.\textsuperscript{31} e.g. either in respect of a pot. The third is that which is devoid of determinate co-presence and co-absence.

Anyathāsiddha is an antecedent though it is not causally connected with the effect. But conjoined with it. Visvanātha accepts different kinds of such causal antecedents. According to Mīmāṁsā philosophy there are three types of conditional antecedents –

1. Quality in itself can-not exist as a cause by means of co-presence or co-absence, for example, stickness in respect of a pot.

2. In which the antecedent is established due to its being a causal antecedence of some other effect for example, ether in respect of a pot.

3. Which is devoid of decisive co-presence and co-absence. Besides these, other causes specially plurality of causes will not become conditional.

\textbf{Asatkāryavāda in the Mīmāṁsā Philosophy –}

Mīmāṁsākās accept asatkāryavāda. According to asatkārya-vāda effect is non-existent before its production. In that case Gitā also says that “there is no being, of the existent there is no non-being”. According to Sāmkhya philosophers the non-existent cannot be the object of any activity. It exists before it comes into being in the shape of the material. If it is not so, then

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid
anything can come out of anything. Causal efficiency belongs to that which has the necessary potency and effect is of the same nature as the cause.

**Concept of Av̄ayavin (Whole):**

The theory of causation in Nyāya philosophy plays most significant role. According to Nyāya, the concept of avayavi (whole) is different from the concept of avaranas (parts). But Buddhist philosophers denies this conception and conclude that there is an identity between parts and whole. Mīmāṁsākās hold that the constituent parts of the whole partly different and partly not different from the object. On the basis of perception the Buddhist view is refuted. The followers of Kumārila do not accept the category of inherence (samavāya), they accept an identity among those things where Nyāya relates them by inherence. According to Nyāya, the relation between parts and whole is due to inherence. But Mīmāṁsākās of Kumārila’s school reject this view and holds that identity is the only concepts in that relation. Prabhākara accepts the relation inherence and ‘whole’ because according to him, it would not be both different and identical with its parts, but would only be different.

Regarding the question of ‘whole’ (avayavi) and part (avayava), Prabhākara believes that the whole is an object of perception. Objects as wholes exist. It is not necessary for us to perceive all the parts before the whole is perceived. If we take any physical object, atoms are the material

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32 TKM, P. 51
cause of it, and their conjunction is the immaterial cause which gives the whole its uniqueness. Kumarila believes that the whole and the parts are identical and it depends on our standpoint whether we regard an object as a whole or a number of parts.\textsuperscript{33}

Metaphysically Mīmāṃsākas are realist and pluralists. According to them, the world is constituted of three types of elements:

1. Body in which the self enjoys the fruits of its actions.
2. Sense organs and motor organs as the means of experiencing pleasure and pain.
3. External things as objects of enjoyment. Besides the objects of perception there are many realities such as heaven, hell, soul, gods etc. which are not subject to perception. The creation is based on Karmas.

The Mīmāṃsā philosophers, therefore, do not admit any purpose of God in creation. According to their atomic theory of the creation of the world, the atoms are not activated by God as they are held to be in the Vaiśeṣika view. The atoms are constantly activated due to the natural law of Karma so that the world is constituted in order that the selves may experience the consequences of their Karma. The world is external. There is no origination or final destruction of the world. The self is atomic, eternal, and imperishable. Besides the nine elements postulated by the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, some Mīmāṃsā philosophers

\textsuperscript{33} IP, (Vol -II), P. 385
admit darkness and sound also as elements. They also admit the
existence of substance, genus, quality, activity and absence.

The Mimamsaka believes that variety is at the root of the physical
universe. The school of Kumarila accepts all the nine dravyas known to the
Nyaya Vaisheika and its conception of them is more or less the same.
Kumarila considered the self to be merely the potency of knowledge
(jnana\'akti). Cognitions of things were generated by the activity of the manas
and the other senses. This self itself can only be congnised by mental
perception. At the time of Salvation there being none of the senses nor the
manas the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge without
any actual expression or manifestation. The self being divested of all its
senses, remains as a mere potency of the energy of knowledge, a mere
existence. Mimamsa did not consider all activity as being only of the nature
of molecular vibration. It admitted the existence of energy (\'akti) as a
separate category which manifested itself in actual movements. The self
being considered as a \'akti can move the body and yet remain unmoved itself.
Manifestation of action only means the relating of the energy with a thing.
Nyaya strongly opposes this doctrine of a non-sensible (atindriya) energy and
seeks to explain all action by actual molecular motion.34

34 AHIP, (Vol-I), P. 402
**Doctrine of Potency:**

Kumārila and Prabhākara both accepted that substance is distinct from potency. Prabhākara considers it to be a distinct category. He says that it is proved by inference. It is seemed that fire normally burns the object. But under the influence of a fire-extinguishing gem it does not burn. It implies that there must be a power or potency behind this fire, it is distinct from itself, which causes burns and which is obstructed under the influence of gems. All substances have such potency. Words have also potency. Every word denote a meaning. This potency is eternal in eternal things and transient in transient things.\(^{35}\)

Kumārila holds that potency is not a separate category but only a quality. According to Kumārila, through inference it is not known, it is known only by the presumption or arthapatti and vedic testimony. There are two kinds of potency one is worldly or loukika and other is scriptural or vedic. Worldly potency is known by presumption. For example, power of burning in fire. Scriptural potency is known by vedic injunctions. For example, the potency of sacrifice. Kumārila holds that potency resides in the substances, qualities and actions.

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\(^{35}\) TKM, P. 55
Kumārila considered the self to be namely the potency of knowledge (jnanaśakti). The self being divested of all its senses at that time and remain as a mere potency of the energy of knowledge, a mere existence.36

Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from the performance of Kāmya-karmas (sacrifices) and guarantees himself against the evil effects of sin by diligently performing the nitya-karmas (prayers, sandhya) etc. This state is characterized by the dissolution of the body and the non production of any further body or rebirth. Mīmāṃsā does not admit the existence of any God as the creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the universe had ever any beginning in time or that any God created the world. Animals and men are coming into being by the action of the parents without the operation of any God. So, Mīmāṃsā philosophy holds that the world has ever been running the same, without any new creation or dissolution.37

The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is already supported by the other Indian philosophical system that is rejected by the Mīmāṃsākas. It would have creates a problem regarding the eternity of the Veda.

36 AHIP, (Vol-I), P. 402
37 Ibid, PP. 402-403
The law of Karma is linked with the law of causation. Moral actions and non-moral action are responsible for all good or bad actions. It is believed that right actions or good Karma leads to a good and responsible life. Happiness is the goal recognized by the Purva-Mimāṃsa. Activities which result in loss or pain are not dharma. Dharma means what is enjoyed and it leads to happiness. In the Vedic sacrifices, the injunction by its verbal power (Sabda-bhavana) tends to produce action in the agent towards the end indicated in the injunction. The Mimāṃsa assumes human freedom otherwise the human individuals cannot be held responsible for their acts.

Concept of Apurva:

The Acts enjoined by the Vedas produce their fruits. There is a necessary connection between the act and its result. Jaimini assumes an unseen power that is known Apurva. Apurva is the metaphysical link between work and its result. The Mimāṃsākās are unwilling to trace the results of actions to God’s will, since a uniform cause cannot account for the variety of effects.

According to Kumarila, Apurva is a capability in the principal action or in the agent, which did not exist prior to the performance of the action and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures. The positive force created by the act and leading to the attainment of the result is the Apurva. Arthāpatti or implication proves the existence of Apurva. A sacrifice...
performed by an agent produces directly a certain potency in the agent which resides in him like many other powers throughout life, at the end of which it gains for him the promised reward. According to Prabhākara, Apurva cannot be in the self, since by its very omnipresence the self is inactive. He does not accept the view that the action tends to produce in the agent a certain faculty, which is the immediate cause of the final result.

Srikrsna miśra describes the sacrificial Lore personified in the sixth Act of his book Prabodha Condrodaya. He refers that Goddess upanisad in the Mimāṃsa system recognizes a purusa (self) who enjoys the results of his action in the other world. The Mimāṃsa system is associated with the sacrificial Lore and it is said that sacrifice is necessary in order to attain beneficial results in the other world Goddess upanisad believes that the self enjoys the results of the meritorious deeds performed in this world.39

Goddess upanisad says that Kumārila Bhatta, who was one the greatest preachers of the Mimāṃsa system, did not agree with the above view. Kumārila Bhatta said that Purusa is never involved in any activity (nihsangah purusah) and hence he is not an agent.40

Śaṅkara in the Advaita Vedānta concludes that the Supreme being is not an agent but a mere observer (Śaksin). The sacrificial Lore personified did not accept this standpoint. She said to upanisad that a non-agent can not

39 tato mimāṃsāyā .... lokantaraphalo pabhogyapuruṣopanayahe no payogah. tat kriyaṃ esāṃ karmopayuktam. PC, P. 223
40 aparena tu ... kumarilasvāmiṇaivam proktam na cāsāvisvarah karmāpayuyjyata. Ibid, P. 224
be the Lord of the universe. Kind Viveka refutes the view of yajna-vidyā or sacrificial Lore personified with appropriate arguments. Viveka blames yajña-vidyā for trying to remove the darkness of ignorance with darkness by propagating a wrong view.\textsuperscript{41}

The causal relation between the prescribed act and its fruition can not be explained without such an intervening potency, which is generated by the act in the self, and is the immediate cause of the final result. Kumārila regards Apurva as an objective potency of the prescribed act itself.\textsuperscript{42}

In the \textit{Tantravārtika}, it is found that Apurva is an imperceptible potency in the principal action, or the self, which did not exist before the performance of the action.\textsuperscript{43}

Prabhākara rejects Kumārila’s view and hold that a prescribed act which in momentary that cannot be the final result and it never leads to attainment of Heaven. The Apurva is different from the transcendent act, it is associated with volition and generates the fruit. This volition is known by bhāvanā, it generates the voluntary action which performs the right. Kumārila mentions two types of bhāvana viz. sabda bhāvanā and arthabhāvanā. A moral law which impels the self to exert its volition is called sabda bhāvanā. The volition of the self by which it executes the injunction is known as arthabhāvanā. Sabdabhāvanā and arthabhāvanā accomplish the result which

\textsuperscript{41} abodha prabhavam .... Yajñā vidyā nūnam andhatamasam andhakarenāpi nīnasati. Ibid, P. 219
\textsuperscript{42} PSPM, PP. 166-167
\textsuperscript{43} TV (Et), P. 504
is conducive to the agent’s good. Sabda bhāvanā is also known abhidhā bhāvanā.44

Uddyotakara criticizes the doctrine of Apurva.45 The doctrine of Apurva can not be eternal. On such a view there would be no possibility of death, as merit and demerit would be eternal. If Apurva is one, then the happiness and the misery of all persons should be same. It is not easy to say that though Apurva is one, the manifesting agencies are many, it is not known that what the manifesting agencies is, whether it is the capacity to bring about the result or a property belonging to Apurva. We cannot say whether the Apurva is one with the capacity or different from it. If the hidden Apurva is made manifest, then we must explain how it is first hidden. If the eternal Apurva be different for different persons then the difficulties of manifestation are not avoided.

Sarṇkara criticizes the theory of Apurva on the ground that it is not spiritual and cannot act unless it is moved by something spiritual. The results of actions cannot be explained by the principle of Apurva alone. It is said that God acts in accordance with the principle of Apurva. But there is a similar view in Vedānta that God acts with references to the law of Karma.46

44 puruṣapreranātmako hi vidhiḥ sabdashāvānā, NM, P. 343
abhidhābhāvanām āhur ānyām eva līnādayāḥ, VDV, P. 15.
45 N.V. i.1.7
46 SB, iii. 2.4
karmapeksad apurvapeksad va yathastu tathastu isvarat phalam
Comparison with other Schools:

Mimāmsā agrees with vaiśeṣika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rupa, rasa, gandha, and sparśa. Kumārila's differences on the points of jati, samavāya etc. Kumārila was influenced by Saṅkhya thought rather than by Nyāya. Saṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics.

The Vedānta protests against the doctrine of mechanical ceremonialism. Ritualism is rather injurious on account of the false trust reposed in it. Kumārila argues that Vedic injunctions have intrinsic validity since they are acceptable to most people. But we may perform any number of sacrifices, though they may not effect much change in the inner spirit. If virtue consists in moral regeneration or transformation of the heart, what is necessary is not the ceremonial sacrifice, but the sacrifice of selfishness. The Vedas speak of sraddha or faith, bhakti or devotion, and tapas or austerity, which are only remotely connected with sacrifices. Some later Mimāṁsākās hold that the theistic views which declare that all work should be performed as a sacrifice to God are in conformity with the spirit of the Veda. Laugakasi Bhāskara tells that when duty is performed in a spirit of dedication to God it becomes the cause of emancipation. The Mimāṁsākās, speak to us of sacrifice but fail to cover the major part of individual life.
The Naiyāyikas also reject the idea of potency as something different from the nature of substance. According to them potency is nothing but the distinctive nature of the substances like fire etc. The Naiyāyikas hold that there are not only positive causes in the origination of an effect but also negative causes are there which is the ground of the absence of counteracting agencies.

The concept of the Mīmāṃśa causation is based on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causation. But there is a difference between them regarding the idea of potency or causal power. This difference does not contribute much to the theory of causation. Causal power is accepted by Naiyāyikas as well, but they hold that it is not something distinct from the nature of the substance. But according to Jaina, this potency is not the nature of the substance. It is something distinct residing in the substance.

The Mīmāṃśa believes in the reality of the perceived world, and of other objects. Depending on the validity of sense-perception the Mīmāṃśa believes in the reality of the world with all its diverse objects. It rejects the Buddhistic theory of voidness and momentariness and the Advaita theory of the unreality of the phenomenal world. In addition to objects perceived it comes to believe, through other sources of knowledge, in souls, heaven, hell, and deities to whom sacrifice is to be performed, according to the vedic commandments. The souls are permanent, eternal substances, and so also are the material elements by the combination of which the world is made. The
law of Karma is thought sufficient to guide the formation of objects. No necessity is felt for admitting the existence of God. Some Mimāṃsākās believe like the Vaisesika in the atomic theory. But the difference is that, according to the Mimamsa, atoms do not require, for their arrangement in the world, an efficient cause like God. The autonomous law of Karma independently regulates the atoms. There is neither creation nor total destruction. The world is eternally there.

It is necessary to say much about the unsatisfactory character of the purva Mimāṃsā as a system of philosophy. As a philosophical view of the universe it is strikingly incomplete. It did not concern itself with the problems of ultimate reality and its relation to the world of souls and matter. Its ethics was purely mechanical and its religion was unsound. The performance of the sacrifice was regarded as the most essential thing, and the devatas disappeared from the sight of the sacrificers. The later Mimāṃsākās openly tell that the deity is that whose name is inflected in the dative case. In the formula “Indraya Svaha”, Indra is the deity. There is little in such a religion to touch the heart and make it glow. No wonder a reaction occurred in favour of a monotheism, vaisnava, saiva, or Tantrika, which gave man a supreme God on whom he could depend and to whom he could surrender himself in sorrow and suffering.

47 Sloka-Vartika, Chap, on Inference Verse-183
48 Sloka-vartika, PP. 72,
49 IP, PP. 428-429