CHAPTER THREE

Theory of Causation in Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika Philosophy
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The Vaiṣeṣika System takes its name from visesa, which means ‘difference’ and the doctrine is so designated because, according to it, diversity and not unity is at the root of the universe. Vaiṣeṣika deals with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. A category is called Padārtha and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven Padārthas. Padārtha literally means ‘the meaning of a word’ or the object signified by a word. All objects of knowledge or all reals come under Padārtha. Padārtha means an object which can be thought (Jneya) and named (Abhidheya). The Vaiṣeṣika categories are different from those of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. Originally the Vaiṣeṣika believed in six categories and the seventh, that is abhāva or negation, was added later on. The Vaiṣeṣika divides all existent reals which are all objects of knowledge into two classes- bhāva (existence) and abhāva (non-existence). Six categories come under bhava and the seventh in abhāva.

The impulse of the Vaiṣeṣika system is derived from its hostility to Buddhistic Phenomenalism, while the Vaiṣeṣika accepts the Buddhists view of the sources of knowledge, perception and inference, it argues that souls and substances are solid facts, and cannot be dismissed as fancy picture of a fairy tale, supposed to be enacted behind the scenes.
Though the Vaiśeṣika system is mainly a system of physics and metaphysics, logical discussions are skillfully joined into it in the later works. The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya agree in their essential principles, such as the nature and qualities of the self and the atomic theory of the universe, yet the classification and characterisation of the categories and the development of the atomic theory give to the Vaiśeṣika its distinctive interest and value.

Prasastapāda in 400 A.D., Sridhar in 1000 A.D. and Udayana also in 1000 A.D. discuss the theory of creation. According to them, creation of the world out of the atoms and dissolution of it into them.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika for a long time had not been treated as the same. But the later works regard these systems as forming parts of one discipline. The Buddhists thinkers Aryadeva and Hari Barman did not look upon them as a system independent of the Vaiśeṣika. In the Nyāya Bhāṣya of vātsyayana, the two are not kept distinct. Vaiśeṣika is used as a supplement of the Nyāya. Many of the Nyāya sūtras presuppose the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika. There is no doubt that the two systems united very closely yet there is a difference between the emphasis on the logical and the physical side. Nyāya gives us an account of the process and methods of knowledge of object. But Vaiśeṣika develops the atomic constitution of things.\(^1\)

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1 IP, (Vol. II), P. 177
2 NB 1, 1.4
The earliest available commentary on vaisesika-sutras is Vaisesika bhāsyā or padārtha-dharma-Sangraha by Prasastapāda. There are four commentaries written on Prasastapāda bhāsyā which are namely

(1) Vyomavati by Vyomasivacārya
(2) Nyāya Kandali by Sridhara
(3) Kiranāvali by Udayanacārya
(4) Lilavati by vallabhacārya or Srivatsa.3

Vyomavati is earlier but its date is not known. Saṅkara and uddyotakara are familiar with the work of Prasastapāda. Dharmapāla and Paramarthā also discuss prasastapāda’s view. Sridhar’s Nyāyakandali was written in A.D. 991, and the author is familiar with the views of kūmarila, Mandana and Dharmottara. Lilāvati and kiranāvali perhaps came immediately after Nyāyakandali. Both Sridhara and udayana admit the existence of God and accept the category of non-existence Sivāditya’s sapta Padārthi belongs to this period. It presents the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika principles as parts of one whole. Laugaksi Bhāskara’s Tarkakaumudi is another work based on prasastapāda’s treatise. Visvanātha in seventeenth century treats of Kanāda’s scheme in his Bhāsāpariccheda and the

3 IP, (Vol-II), P. 181
commentary on it called siddhānta muktāvali. He was influenced by the modern School of Nyāya.

Vaiśeṣika-sūtras are regarded as earlier to Nyāya Sūtras. Dr. Dasgupta says that Vaiśeṣika-sūtras were written certainly before caraka (80 A.D.)

And he is also inclined to think that they are pre-Buddhistic. The date of a part of Nyāya- Sūtras, according to Dasgupta, is not earlier than second century A.D.

Dr. Radhakrishnan thinks that the earlier of the sutras belong to 300 B.C., though some of the contents are certainly of a post-christian era. Accordingly to Dr. D.N. Shastri, the date of the Nyāya-Sūtras may be put at the close of the second century.

A similar literature of commentaries and sub-commentaries has found in Nyāya sūtras. The earliest commentary written on vātsyayana- bhasya by vātsyayana. The date of vātsyayana is placed in 4th century A.D by Dasgupta, Sinha and Dr. Radhakrishnan.

4 Ibid, P. 181
5 HIP, (Vol-I), P. 280
6 Ibid, PP. 280-305
7 Ibid, P. 302
8 IP, (Vol-II),P. 36
9 CIR, P. 99
10 HIV, (Vol-I), P-307, IP (Vol.-II), P. 88, AHIV (Vol.-I), P. 452

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According to Dr. D.N. Sastri, it can not be later than 300 A.D.\textsuperscript{11} Udayana, in the end of the tenth century.\textsuperscript{12} Wrote a sub-commentary on Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparya-tika called tātparya-tīkā-parisuddhi. It was again commented upon by vardhamāna (1225 A.D.)\textsuperscript{13} By the name of Nyāya–Nibandha-Prakāśa, Padmaṇābha wrote a sub-commentary on it called \textit{vardhamanendu} and Saṅkara Miśra (1425 A.D.) wrote a commentary called \textit{Nyāya-tātparya-mandana} on vardhamānendu.\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Nyāya Manjari} by Jayanta Bhatta is the most important among them. Another important Nyāya work of udayana is \textit{Ātma-tattva-viveka} in which he tries to prove the Nyāya doctrine of soul against the attacks of Buddhists. Besides these there are some original works of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika namely sapta-padarthi by sivāditya, Tarkika-rakṣā by varadarāja, Tarka-bhāsa by keśava-miśra. Nyāya- siddhānta muktāvali is the most popular manual of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika School.

The Vaiśeṣika categories include not only things predicable of another, but also subjects capable of having things predicated of them. Aristotle’s categories are a logical classification of predicates only, and not a metaphysical classification of all thinkable objects. The Vaiśeṣika Thinkers, as much as Aristotle, seem to have been aware of the intimate relation between name and thing. The Vaiśeṣika adopts a sixfold classification of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} CIR, P. 99
  \item \textsuperscript{12} IP (Vol.-II), P-40 HIV (Vol.-I), P. 307
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid
  \item \textsuperscript{14} HIV (Vol.-I), P. 307
\end{itemize}
padārthas into substance (dravya), quality (guna), activity (Karma), generality (Sāmānyya), Particularity (Viśeṣa), and inherence (Samavāya), besides these (abhāva) non-existence was added by the later Vaiśeṣikas namely sridhara, Udayana and sīvāditya. The inclusion of non-existence under padārthas suggests the transformation of an ontological into an epistemological scheme. A thing in that which possesses certain properties besides mere existence. Whatever exists it must have certain qualities. We have two kinds of qualities, those which reside in a plurality of objects and those which are confined to individuals. The former are the general qualities (Sāmānyya), while the later are distinguished as permanent (guna) and transitory (karma). Inherence is a special kind of relation.¹⁵

The first three categories of substance, quality and action posses a real objective existence.¹⁶ Kaṇāḍa calls them artha and declares, in treating of Yogic insight, that we can have an intuition on them¹⁷. The other three, generality, particularity, and inherence are products of intellectual discrimination. (buddhyapeksam). They are logical categories.¹⁸

Substance:

Substance implies the self-subsistence and the absolute and independent nature of things. In the Vaiśeṣika System, the category of

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¹⁵ IP, (Vol.-2), P-185
¹⁶ VS, I, 2,7
¹⁷ VS, IX, I, 14
¹⁸ VS, I, 2,3
substance implies the unfolds pluralistic realism. Substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. Substance is that where qualities exist. According to Vaiśeṣika philosophy the dravyas are nine and include material and spiritual substances. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy is pluralistic as well as realistic but not materialistic since it admits spiritual substances.

Haribhadrasuri mentions six categories of the Vaiśeṣika. Abhāva is recognized as the seventh category later on. Kanāda speaks of abhāva, but does not give it the status of a padārtha (category), an object to be thought (Jneya) and named (abhidheya). The author speaks of the varieties of these categories.

1. tatra dravyam navadha bhuja latejoanilantarikṣāni /
   kaladigatmamanamsi ca gunah punascaturvimsatidha //19

2. sparasarasarūpaganḍhāḥ śabhadhaḥ sarīkhyāvibhāgasānyogau /
   parimāṇam ca prthaktvam tathā paratvāparatvā ca //20

3. buddhiḥ sukhaduhkhecchā dharmadharmau prayatnasamskarau /
   dveṣāḥ snehagurutve dravatvavegau guṇa //21

Among them, substance is nine namely earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, spirit and mind. Quality is of twenty four kinds. They are Touch, taste, colour, odour, sound, number, conjunction, size, separateness,

19 SDSKS, 61
20 Ibid 62
21 Ibid 63
otherness, oneness, consciousness, pleasure, pain, desire, merit, demerit, volition, impression, aversion, attachment, heaviness, liquidity and speed are the qualities.  

Dravya is defined as ‘kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇam dravyam’, i.e., the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the material cause of the composite objects produced by it. The substances in their simple, ultimate form are eternal and are not subject to production and destruction. They are the material causes of the compound objects.

Guṇa is an independent reality (padārtha) as it can be conceived (Prameya), thought (Jneya) and named (Abhidheya). But it cannot independently exist. The guṇas are the static and permanent features of substance, while actions are the dynamic and transient features. Guṇa is that which inheres in a substance, which does not possess quality or action, which does not produce any compound object, and which is not the cause of conjunction and disjunction.

Kinds of karma, sāmānya and viśeṣa explained in the vaiśeṣika philosophy by a specific manner. Viz. –

1. utkṣepavakṣe pāvā kuṇcanam prasāraṇam gamanam / 

   pancavidham karmaitatparapare dve tu sāmānye /  

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22 SDSKS 61-63
23 VS I.1. 16
24 SDSKS, 64
Karma (action) is five-fold as upward movement, downward movement, contraction, expansion, and locomotion. Higher and lower are the two generalities. ‘Being’ is the higher and ‘dravyatva’ etc, are the lower, particularity is, however, pointed out as that ultimate thing residing in eternal substances as their defferentium. (64-65)

Karma, like quality, inheres in a substance and cannot exist separately from it. But unlike quality, it is the cause of disjunction and conjunction and is transitory. It is of five kinds.

Sāmānyya is the class-concept or the universal. It is eternal, one and residing in many. ‘Nityamekamanekāṇugatam sāmānyam’. It is one while the individuals in which it resides are many, it is eternal while the individuals which it inheres is subject to birth and death, production and destruction. The generalities reside in substances, qualities and actions ‘dravyaguṇakarmavṛtti’. As generality is that which subsists in many, what subsists in one individual only, for instance, etherness, is not a generality. Although conjunction (Samyoga) inheres in many substances it conjoins, it can not be generality because it is not eternal. Viśeṣa is described as

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25 Ibid - 65
‘nityadravyavṛtti’ and ‘antya’. Atoms, souls, space, time and manas have their particularities.

These nine substances are (1) Earth (Prthivi) (2) Water (AP> (3) Fire (Tejas (4) Air (Vāyu) (5) Ether (Ākasha), (6) Time (Kāla), (7) Space (Dīk), (8) Spirit (Atman), (9) Mind or the intellect organ (Manas). Among these nine elements earth, water, fire and air not the transient or momentary objects but these are ultimate elements. Ether is not atomic but it is finite and eternal. Besides these four elements there are five physical elements (bhūta). Each of them possesses a peculiar quality which distinguishes it from the other qualities. The peculiar qualities of these five elements are smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. The elements are the substratum of these qualities. Time and space like ether, are one each (eka), eternal (nitya) and all pervading (vibhu). They are imperceptible and infinite substances and are partless and indivisible. Time is the cause of our cognitions of past, present and future and of ‘younger’ and ‘older’. Space (dik) is the cause of our cognitions of ‘east and west’, ‘here’ and ‘there’ ‘near’ and ‘far’ and is different from ether (ākāśa) which is the substratum of the sounds. There are innumerable souls and each is an independent, individual, eternal and all pervading spiritual substance. In Vaiṣeṣika philosophy, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Manas are atomic and eternal. The first four produce composite things but nanas does not. Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ether are the five gross elements. These five elements and including nanas are physical. Soul is spiritual. Time and space
are objective and not subjective forms of experience. Ether, Space, Time and Soul are all pervading and eternal. Atoms, minds and souls are infinite in number, Ether, space and time are one each.²⁶

The atomic theory of Vaiśeṣika is one of its distinguishing features. All physical substances of the world are composed of the first four substances namely earth, water, fire and air. These substances are products and their ultimate constituents are atoms. Atoms are not seen but we infer it. In Vaiśeṣika system we have seen that an effect as an avayavin in its parts. Atoms are passive by their nature. At the time of dissolution when all things are destroyed them atoms exist without causing any effect. At that time they are inactive, they are isolated and motionless. Motion is accompanied by a peculiar dharma which is known by adṛṣṭa. This adṛṣṭa in the form of merits (Pūnya) and demerits (Pāpa) which reside in the human souls. These merits and demerits are found by the souls through the actions which they performed at the time when they are in contact with the bodies.

The first four substances are both eternal and non-eternal and other five substances are only eternal because they do not produce further products. The first four substances together with ether, have been regarded as five elements (pansabhūta). Sridhara has clearly said that there is nothing in common to the

²⁶ ACSIP, PP. 177-178
five substances; the common name bhūta is simply assigned to them because the term has been in use for them. 27

The atoms are naturally passive. Their movement is due to external impact. During the dissolution of the world (Pralaya) the atoms subsist without producing any effects. Then they remain isolated and motionless. According to Vaiśeṣika, the movement of the ultimate atoms arises from a peculiar dharma. Prasastapāda mentions that actions which we find appearing in the rudimentary elements and for which we can not find any cause either by sense-perception or by inference, and which are yet found to be useful or harmful to us, must be regarded as produced by these unseen agencies. 28

**Refutation of the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika:**

If the world is created by the combination of atoms, the question is: what causes this combination? If it is a seen cause, it is not possible before the creation of the body. A seen cause can either be an endeavour, or an impact, or the like, unless there is the connection of the soul with the mind, there can be no endeavour on the part of the soul, according to the Vaiśeṣika assumption. And since before creation there is no body and therefore no mind, endeavour can not take place. Similarly with impact etc. If the cause is adrista (the unseen principle), does it inhere in the soul or in Atoms? In either case, it cannot be the cause of the first motion of the atoms; because adrista is

27 N.K. PP. 22-23
28 IP, (Vol-II), P. 197
non intelligent and it cannot act by itself. If the adrista is inherent in the soul then the soul being then inert and there is no intelligence to guide this adṛṣṭa. Again if it is inherent in the atoms then it being always present and a state of dissolution would be possible. But atoms are always active.

Again it is said that soul is without parts like atoms. There is no possibility of any connection between the soul and the atoms. As a result, if the Adṛṣṭa inheres in the soul then it can’t influence the motion of the atoms not connected with the soul. Because in all cases original activity in the atoms is not possible, and in absence of that there can be no combination of atoms, as the Vaiśeṣika say. So the atomic theory of Vaiśeṣika is untenable.

Another objection is raised by Swami Vireswarananda that if the atoms are by nature active then creation would be permanent pralaya or dissolution mean a change in the nature of the atoms, which is possible. On the other hand, if they are by nature inactive then dissolution would be permanent and there will be no creation. For the same reason, their nature cannot be both active or inactive, they being contradictory. If they are neither, their activity and inactivity would depend on an efficient cause like adṛṣṭa. It is always connected with the atoms and always be active and then creation would be permanent. If there is no efficient cause, there will be no activity of the atoms and hence no creation. So this theory is not acceptable.

29 VS. PP. 184-185
30 VS PP. 186-187
In Indian philosophy, the system of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika first holds the theory of substance, quality, action, universal, inherence and particular. These seven things have been treated as “Padārthas” (category) and these seven fold category is informer of whole universe. The system divides these into some sub-categories. These sub-categories are –

1. **Substance:** (Dravya): (i) earth (Prthivi), (ii) water (Jala), (ii) heat and light (tejas), (vi) air (vāyu), (v) ether (ākāsa), (vi) time (kāla) (vii) space (dik) (vii) soul (atma) and (iv) internal organ (manas).

2. **Quality:** (guna): (1) Color (Rūpa), (2) test (Rasa), (3) Smell (gandha) (4) touch (sparsa), (5) number (saṁkhya), (6) size (parimāna) (7) Separateness (prthaktva), (8) contact (samyoga), (9) disjunction (vibhāga), (10) nearness (Paratva), (11) remoteness (aparatva), 912 judgment (budhi), (13) Pleasure (Sūkha), (14) Pain (Dūkha), (15) deire (icchā), (16) aversion (dveṣa), (17) effort (prayatva), (18) Weight (Gurutva), (19) Fluidity (dravatva) (20) viscosity (sneha), (21) dispositional tendency (samskāra), (22) merit (dharma), (23) demerit (adharma) and (24) sound (Sabda). 31

3. **Action:** Karma.

   (1) Throwing upwards (utkṣepana)

   (2) Throwing down wards (avakṣepana)

   (3) Bending or contraction (akuncana)

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31 VS, II, 6
4. **Universal** (Sāmānya):
   
   (1) Superior (para) and
   
   (2) Interior (apara)

5. **Inherence** (Samavāya)

6. **Particular** (visēsa)

7. **Absence** (abhāva)

Abhava is also two types – namely

(a) Relational absence (samsargabhāva)

(b) Mutual absence (anyonyabhāva) Samsargabhava is also three types. These are-

   (1) Prior – absence (pragabhāva)

   (2) Posterior – absence (pradhvamsa)

   (3) Absolute – absence (atyantabhāva)

The five kinds substances earth, water, fire and internal organ are mobile, one material (murta), have impetus (vega) and possess farness and nearness. The other four substances are contrary to these.

All nine kinds of substances possess qualities as in following series.

To create a substance atoms, electrons, protons and neutron play a vital role. One thing possess these differently and they are not similar in number.
### Nine Substances

24 qualities - earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24 qualities-</th>
<th>earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul internal organ.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Colour</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Test</td>
<td>0 0 - - - - - - -</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Smell</td>
<td>0 - - - - - - - -</td>
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<td>4. Touch</td>
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<td>6. Size</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Separateness</td>
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<td>8. Contact</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Disjunction</td>
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<td>10. Nearness</td>
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<td>11. Remoteness</td>
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<td>12. Judgment</td>
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<td>13. Pleasure</td>
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<td>14. Pain</td>
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<td>17. Effort</td>
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<td>19. Fluidity</td>
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<td>20. Viscidity</td>
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<td>21. Dispositional tendency</td>
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<td>22. Merit</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Demerit</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Sound</td>
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14, 14, 11, 9, 6, 5, 5, 14, 8
Nyāya- Vaiśesika is one of the most important systems among all philosophical systems of Indian philosophy. It describes the scientific approach of chemistry and matter which may be treated as original science because these are discovered very early in this co-system of Nyāya-Vaiśesika and other Vedic Philosophy as well.32

Kanāda defines a substance as an entity, which has qualities and actions, and which is the inherent or material cause of an effect.33

The Vaiśesika believes that a substance is something over and above the qualities. At the moment the substances are produced they are devoid of qualities. In other words, a substance is the basis of qualities, actual or potential, present or future.34 But in Vaiśesika philosophy, there is a distinction between eternal and non-eternal substances. Whatever depends on something else is not eternal, compound substances (avayavi dravya) are dependent and transitory. Simple substances have the characteristics of eternity, independence and ultimate individuality. They are neither caused nor destroyed. Non-eternal substances are caused and destroyed not by themselves, but by something different from themselves.35

Quality:

32 'Science and Technology in the Vedas' PP. 28-29
33 VS, i, I-15
34 SM, 3
35 PP, P. 20 N.K., P. 20
Kanāda defines a quality as an entity inhering in a substance and devoid of quality, which is not an unconditional caused of conjunction and disjunction. Prasastapāda adds one more characteristic of a quality. He defines it as an entity related to the genus of quality abiding in a substance and devoid of quality and action.36

The sūtra mentions seventeen qualities viz colour (Rūpa), taste (Rasa), smell (Gandha), touch (Sparsa), number (Satākhyā), size (Parimāna), individuality (Prthaktva), conjunction (Samyoga), disjunction (vibhāga).

Priority (Paratva), Posteriority (aparatva), knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (Sūkha), pain (Dūḥka), desire (icchā), Aversion (Dveṣa) and effort (Prayatna). To these prasasta pāda adds seven more, which are heaviness (Gurutva), fluidity (dravatva), viscosity (Sneha), merit (dharma), Demerit (adharma), sound (Sabda), and faculty (Samskāra).37 Beside these, lightness, softness, hardness are found among these qualities but they did not succeed, since lightness is only the absence of heaviness, and softness and hardness were regarded as representing different degrees of conjunction.38 Modern Naiyāyikas denies priority, posteriority, and individuality. Priority and posteriority are dependent on space and time and individuality is mutual non-existence. (anyonyabhāva). Mental and materials properties both reside in

36 VS, I, I, 16, PBh, P. 94
37 PP, P. 10
38 TSD, 4
qualities. A Composite substance is not devoid of qualities, but a quality is devoid of qualities. Action or movement also inheres in a substance and it is devoid of quality. It is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction. Quality is different from an action.

According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, colour, taste, smell and touch, together with sound are the special qualities of the five elements (bhūtas), fire, water, earth, air and ether respectively. Besides these qualities there are some general qualities they are number, size, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority and posteriority. They are found in many substances. Individuality (Prthaktva) is the basis of distinctions among things. Individuality refers to the numerical differences of things. Conjunction (Samyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga) are the causes of the notions of union and separation. Each of them, though one, resides in two substances. Priority (paratva) and posteriority (aparatva) are the basis of the notions of remote and near in time and space. They have a relative existence in time and space.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are qualities of soul. Individual soul is the substratum of all these qualities and the supreme soul possesses only three qualities namely knowledge, desire and effort. Heaviness (gurutva) is the quality of all things. It exists permanently in the atoms of earth and water. Fluidity (dravatva) is the cause of the action of following. It is self-existent (Samsiddhika) in water; but causal in earth and fire. Viscidity (Sneha) is the cause of cohesion, smoothness etc, it exists in
water. Merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) are the qualities of soul, through which it feels happiness, suffers misery. They are in the form of adrsta which is the unseen power produced by souls and things, and which governs the cosmic order and enables the souls to reap the harvest of their past works. According to Dr. Radhakrishnan “Serves as the general panacea for all logical difficulties.” Adrsta determines the upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing of wind and the original movement of atoms and manases. In the Vaiśesika philosophy adrsta is just like a vehicle through which God operates His will in this world. Velocity, (vega), elasticity (sthiti-sthapakatva) and mental impressibility (bhāvana) are the three faculty (Samskāra). Velocity keeps a thing in motion and it exist in four kinds of atoms and manases. Elasticity is the quality by virtue of which a thing reverts to its original state even when it is disturbed. It resides in earth only. Impressibility is the quality of soul through which it is able to remember and recognize things.

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39 IP. (Vol-II), P. 207
40 VS, V, I, 15
41 VS, V, II, 13
42 IP. (Vol.-II), P. 208
**Activity or Karma:**

Karma is regarded as an irreducible element of the universe. It is neither substance nor quality, but an independent category by itself. All movements belong to substances as much as qualities. A quality is a permanent feature of the substance. Activity is a transitory one. Qualities which continue to exist are called guna, while those that cease to exist are called karma. According to Kaṇāda, movement is that which resides in one substance, devoid of qualities and is the invariable cause of conjunction and disjunction.43

There are five kinds of movement are distinguished which are upward, downward, contraction, expansion and movement in general.44

Ether, time, space and soul though substances, are devoid of movement because they are incorporeal.45

**Universal (Sāmānya) and particularity (Viśeṣa):**

Universal means when a quality residing in many things then it is known as universal (Sāmānya) it is eternal, one and residing in many things belonging to the group of substance, quality or action.46

According to Kaṇāda, generality is a conceptual product. Universal or sāmānya is divided by prasatapada into two types: Para (higher) and aparā.46

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43 VS, I, 1,7
44 VS, I, 1,7
45 VS, V,2.21
46 VS, VI, 2.16
(lower) Sivāditya adds another more parāpara (higher – lower) to them. Para is the highest universal and that is only being (Sattva). If includes all existing things, but it is not included in anything, lower universal are called apara, Dravyatva, gunatva, and kāraṇtva are lower universal than sattva.

Prasastapāda says that Saṁānya is a reality independent of individual objects. The later vaiśeṣikas adopt the realist view of the independent existence of the universals, which are subsist in the state of pralaya or the destruction of the world. Kanāda suggests that generality and particularity are relative to thought. When we perceive things as different from one another then it is called particular. It is the basis of ejection. Kanāda makes particularity as much dependent on thought as generality. Prasastapāda makes it an independent reality residing in eternal substances distinguishing them from one another. An empirical object is distinguished from others on the basis of distinction of its parts. Atoms, time, space, akasa, souls and manas all have their particularity, which are not qualities of classes but only of individuals. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable, so are the particularities. The particularities which distinguish innumerable atoms, souls and manas are themselves innumerable.

47 PP, P. 311
48 SP, P. 12
49 IP, (Vol-II), P. 211
50 SP, P. 12
Inherence (Samāvaya):

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has made a distinction between substance (dharmam) and its properties (dharmas) which appear to be non-different. Though, for Kanāda, inherence is the relation between cause and effect. Prasastapāda defines it as the relation existing between things which are inseparable and stand to one another in the relation of the container and the contained being the cause of the notion “this is in that.”

Sridhara says that virtue and pleasure are not related by inherence, though they reside in the self, since they are not related as the container and the contained. Inherence is distinguished from conjunction in which the two things conjoined can be separated apart. Inherence is found to exist in five places: (1) Quality inherent in substance, (2) movement inherent in substance, (3) Universal or class inherent in the individuals of substance, quality or movement, (4) Particularity inherent in eternal substances, (5) Avayavin inherent in parts. This inherence, though subsisting in many places, in many things, is regarded as one and eternal.

Kanāda includes only causalities in the relation of samāvaya. Prasastapāda brings non-causal ones also under it. Generally the relation which binds a substance and its qualities, a whole and its parts, motion, and the object in motion, individual and universe, cause and effect, is that of

51 VS, VII, ii, 26
52 PP, P. 14
samavāya or inherence. The relationship of samavāya is not caused by the action of one of the members related. Conjunction terminates as soon as there is a disjunction of the members conjoined, while connection is indestructible. On the other hand, conjunction takes place between two independent substances, while the members related by way of inherence stand in the relation of the container and contained.\textsuperscript{53} Two things in the relation of samavāya can not be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. Samavāya takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction. It is external relation, while Samavāya is internal relation.\textsuperscript{54}

In case of samyoga two differents are joined together without forming a real whole which enters into each samavāya is a real coherence.

**Non – existence (Abhāva):**

Kanāda did not admit abhāva, as a non – existent separate category. It is regarded as a separate category from the tenth century up to the time of sivāditya.\textsuperscript{55} First abhāva is divided into two types – (i) Negation of correlation (Samsargabhāva), (2) Negation of identity (tadatmyabhāva). The negation of correlation means the non-existence of an object in another by a particular relation. For example, the non-existence of a jar on the earth by the

\textsuperscript{53} PP, P. 326
\textsuperscript{54} IP, (Vol.-II), P. 217
\textsuperscript{55} SP, P. 10
relation of conjunction. Tadatmyabhāva means mutual non-existence of two objects in each other i.e., A cloth is non-existent in a jar negation of correlation or samsargabhāva is again divided into three types-

(i) Prior non existence (Prabhāva)

(ii) Posterior non existence (dhvamsabhāva) and

(iii) Absolute non-existence (atyantabhāva)

Anyathāsiddha is an antecedent which is not causally connected with the effect, though conjoined with it. Visvanātha mentions different kinds of such causal antecedents. Prior non-existence is the non-existence of an effect in its material cause before its production. Prior non-existence is not produced but destroyed. Posterior non-existence is the non-existence of an effect by its destruction. It has beginning, but no end. When a jar is destroyed by the stroke of a club, it has posterior non-existence in its fragments, which is produced by an efficient cause.\(^{56}\)

The non-existence of a cow in a horse and the non-existence of a horse in a cow are mutual non-existence. Mutual non-existence has for its counter entity identity between two things. Negation other than mutual negation is known as negation of relation.\(^{57}\) Absolute negation is non-existence in all times. There is absolute negation of colour in air. Absolute negation is different from mutual negation. Mutual negation is denial of identity between

\(^{56}\) NK, P. 230, T.B.H, P. 20

\(^{57}\) NK, P. 230, T.B.H. P. 29
two things. It has specific nature. But absolute negation is denial of an absolutely non-existent entity in all times and in all places. Dr. Radhakrishnan says that self-contradictory notions, such as a barren women's son or the horns of the hare are to be absolutely non-existent. The opposite of reciprocal non-existence is an identity, while that of absolute non-existence is a connection. Sīvāditya holds that reciprocal non-existence is non-eternal, since it ceases to exist as soon as the cloth is destroyed. Sṛdhara admits four kinds of non-existence; prior, posterior mutual and absolute. Visvanātha develops a similar view. When the jar is on the ground, its existence is perceived, and its non-existence is perceived when it is removed from the ground. Visvanātha says that the non-existence was there all the time, though it was hidden when the jar was on the ground. The absolute non-existence of everything is at all times present everywhere, though it is hidden for the time and in the place the thing happens to be. Thus universal non-existence is limited in some direction or not limited at all.

**Definition of cause and effect:**

In the Vaiśeṣika system, Udayana, in his *Nyāya Kusumanjali*, defines cause as an invariable antecedent of an effect. Udayana regards it to be unconditional, necessary, (ananyathā) antecedent. But Visvanātha defines cause as a kind of unnecessary antecedent (anyathāsiddha). A cause is always

58 T.B.H. P. 29, N.K., P. 230

76
unconditional, invariable antecedent of effect. In western philosophy, J. S. Mill, Hume and Bain give a similar definition of cause. According to cārveth reed, the cause of any event is qualitatively, "the immediate. Unconditional, invariable antecedent of the effect" and quantitatively, is "equal to the effect".

Sivāditya defines effect as a prior non-existence. Prior non-existence is the non-existence of a thing before it comes into existence. Annambhatta says that effect is the counter entity of prior non-existence. Prior non-existence and non-existence due to destruction (dhvamsabhāva) are non-eternal, but non-existence due to destruction, which has a beginning but no end, is an effect, but prior non-existence has an end but not beginning, is not an effect. It is not a counter entity of itself. This definition of effect reflects the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view on causality.

Kinds of causes:

Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika mention three types of causes (1) the inherent cause, (2) the non-inherent cause, (3) the instrumental cause. Inherent cause is known Samavāyikāraṇa, non inherent cause is known asamavāyi Kāraṇa and instrumental cause is known nimitta kāraṇa.

59 SP, P. 72
60 TS, P. 26
61 Vide, TS, notes, P. 196
62 SP, P. 72, TS, P. 26
Inherent cause: (Samavāyi kārana)

According to the Vaiśeṣika, inherent cause is that where the effect is produced by the relation of inherence. For example, clay is the inherent cause of a pot and pot is the inherent cause of its colour etc. There is a relation between clay and pot and its colour. The relation of inherence has been defined by Kanāda as “that by virtue of which it may be said of cause and effect that the one is in the other”. Through which the effect and cause is recognised. Prasastapādā states that samavaya is the relation between two things which are anyathāsiddhas and it is the character bearer of container and the contained.

In the Tarkabhāsa, Kesāvamiśra defines samavāya as the relation which exists between two ‘anyathāsiddha’ entities, and one is dependent on the other in the state of being destroyed. The idea of inherent cause in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika is equal to the idea of material cause in śāṅkhya, but it is not exactly identical. Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika states that only substances can be inherent causes. Qualities, actions can not be inherent causes.

Non - inherent Cause: (Asamavāyi - Kārana)

A non-inherent cause means that which exists in the inherent cause which has the capacity of production or effect. The example is that of

63 SP, P-72, TS, P. 26, TB, P. 25
64 VS, VII, II, 26
65 PP, P. 14
66 SP, P. 72, TB, P. 36
conjunction of clay with respect to pot. According to Annam-bhatta, a non-inherent cause is that which inheres in a common object either with the effect or with the cause, and is a cause, is a non-inherent cause.\textsuperscript{67} Non-inherent causes have some special features (1) Only qualities and motions can be non-inherent causes.\textsuperscript{68} (2) of the qualities too, not all are non-inherent causes. Viz. colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, single separateness, viscosity, and sound.\textsuperscript{69} The particular qualities of the Soul such as knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, desire are not non-inherent causes.

**Efficient or instrumental cause:** (Nimittakārāṇa)

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, efficient cause means which is neither inherent cause nor non-inherent cause, of creation. For example, the potter is the efficient cause of the jar, while his stick and wheel are regarded as accessory (Sahakāri). Efficient causes have been divided into two kinds (1) Universal or general causes (Sādhāraṇ Kārāṇa) (2) Special causes (asādhāraṇ Kārāṇa) universal or general causes are those which work as efficient causes for all the effects of the universe. They are eight in number. Generally, God's knowledge, desire, and action, antecedent non-existence, space, time, merit and demerit, to which sometimes absence of counteracting influences is added to the universal or general causes.\textsuperscript{70} The special causes are different for

\textsuperscript{67} TS, PP. 26-27
\textsuperscript{68} VS, X, ii, 3-4
\textsuperscript{69} NK, P. 101
\textsuperscript{70} TS, PP. 207-208
different effects. The potter, the stick and the wheel are the special causes for a pot, and the weaver and the shuttle etc. are the special causes for a cloth. So these special efficient causes are innumerable in number. While there are all the three causes for existing things (bhava), for non-existing things (abhāva) the efficient cause is the only cause. The reason is that the relation of inherence can subsist only in two existent things, and as both the inherent and the non-inherent causes depend on inherence, they can only be for existent effects.  

Plurality of causes:

The doctrine of plurality of causes means that it is possible for an effect to have more than one cause. This means that an effect may be produced by different causes at different times. For example, the cause of the death is disease or poison or drowning or fall from the roof of a building. In other words, A or B, or, C or D – any one of these causes may produce the same effect E

A

B

C

D

E

Footnote:

71 TB, P. 39
In Indian philosophy, Mimāṃsākas explain the problem of plurality of causes by imagining a common causal power (Sakti) in different causes. Vardhamana says that “We assume causal power after we assume causality, otherwise (if we do not assume causality), We shall have to assume causal power in an ass also, and we apprehend causality after we assume the causal power, because it is this causal power which satisfies the condition of co-presence and co-absence.”

The doctrine of plurality of causes is not acceptable from the scientific point of view. It is based on a misconception of the nature of causal relation. First, it may be pointed out that according to the doctrine of plurality of causes, the relation between cause and effect is a relation of what is called, ‘many-one’ relation. According to this relation, the causal relation is a relation between different causes (many) and (one) effect. In that case, the cause of a phenomenon cannot be regarded as invariable antecedent of an effect. If the cause is not invariable antecedent of the effect, it would have no scientific value. Thus, if the doctrine of plurality of causes be accepted, we have to go against the scientific definition of cause.

Modern thinkers regard this doctrine a result of generalization from the important practical consideration that different means will often lead us to the

72 NKS Prakasa, P. 72
same end, so that where we can not employ one we can often fall back on another.\textsuperscript{73}

The Nyāya also rejects plurality of causes. The causal relation is reciprocal. The same cause produces the same effect, and the same effect is produced by the same cause. But sometime it is seemed that the same effect is produced by a variety of causes. But Nyāya argues that the specific causes produce specific effects which appear to be the same, because they have special attendant consequences. Sometimes the cause which immediately produces the effect is called Kāraṇa, and is defined as the peculiar cause. It is, according to Keśava, Miśra, the cause par excellence. Collection of the causes that which immediately produces the effect is the cause. In the act of perception, knower and object of knowledge are both necessary, though the chief cause or kāraṇa is sense-contact. Nilakantha defines Kāraṇa as the cause without which the desired effect will never be produced. The potter's stick is the instrumental cause of the jar. The stick in the forest is not the cause. It becomes the cause only when it is actually employed in producing the jar. So the qualification "Vyāpāravād" is added. Modern Nyāya goes a step further and asserts that the Kāraṇa is not that in which the Vyāpāra or activity subsists, but is the activity itself which is the proximate cause of the appropriate effect.

\textsuperscript{73} Elements of Metaphysica, P. 108 A.E., Taylor
In the later Nyāya, the effect is defined as “the counter entity of its antecedent negation.” It is the positive correlate of prior negation. To say that the effect has prior non-existence is to admit that it has a beginning. This is the view of asatkāryavāda, or the doctrine that the effect has no existence before it is brought into being, also known as ārambhavāda, or the theory of new beginnings. The effect does not pre-exist in the cause but originates freshly. It is the doctrine of epigenesis or the creative process of reality that goes on adding fresh aspects to itself. Radhakrishnan, in his book Indian philosophy conclude that “When we perceive a new substance being produced by a fresh reconstitution, we infer from it the cessation or the destruction of the previous substance. The disruption of the component particles of the milk and their rearrangement bring into existence curds. The Naiyāyika concedes that a complete destruction of the previous substance will make the formation of the new impossible. It follows that the substance only relinquishes its former condition, though the Naiyāyika is not inclined to accept it openly. In the same book page 99, he also conclude that “Causation is really the ideal reconstruction of a continuous process of change in time. Between the coming together of the separate conditions and the beginning of the process is no halt or interval. Cause and effect are not divided by time in the sense of duration or lapse or inter space. They are

74 IP, (Vol.-II), P. 96
75 IP, (Vol-II), P. 97
separated in time by an ideal line which we draw across indivisible process.
For if the cause remained for the fraction of a second, it might remain through an indefinite future”. Again the thread of causation is an ideal unity which we discover and make within the phenomenal flux of the given. But it has no actual existence without the flux, but lives first within the world of universals.”

The Vaisēṣika admits that the qualities of the cause are the causes of the qualities of the effect. The black colour of the clay is the cause of the black colour of the pot, unless the counteracting force of heat changes the colour. The exception to this in the Vaisēṣika is the production of the diads from anus and triads from diads, where the member of the constituent elements determines the Parināma, or dimension. The Nyāya allows a change of qualities in compound substances.

In the Vaisēṣika philosophy, Dr. D.N. Sastri, in his book ‘critique of Indian Realism’ has mentioned that two types of causation. The early Nyāya Vaisēṣika school maintained that cause must be destroyed before its effect is produced – a view diametrically opposed to the later Nyāya-Vaisēṣikas theory, according to which the cause continues to exist simultaneously with its effect, the later residing in the former.

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76 IP, (Vol-II), P. 99
77 IP, (Vol-II), P. 101
78 CIR, P. 264
The reason for these two opposite theories as given by Śastri is that—

"The cause in the theory of the earlier Nyāya-vaiśešikas is conceived in the form of arrangement of parts preceding the effect. For instance, in the case of cloth, the previous arrangement of threads is its cause which is destroyed when the cloth is produced. According to the theory of the later Nyāya Vaiśešika, however, the threads are the cause which continue to exist simultaneously with their effect (cloth), the two being separate substances."

Nyāya-Vaiśešika raises some problems regarding avayavis. Specially the later thinkers raises these problems – These are mainly

1. The problem of separate essences and weights of parts and avayavin.
2. The problem of one object both red and not red.
3. The problem of one avayavin subsisting in many parts.
4. The problem of parts and "whole" (avayavin) occupying the same space.
5. The problem of a body at rest and limbs moving.

In the causation of Nyāya-Vaiśešika philosophy, some thinkers are directly involved to these problems and these thinkers tried to give some satisfactory answers. Among these thinkers namely Dr. D.N. Śastri, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra etc. explain their conception about the avayavin or whole.

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79 CIR, P. 262
As the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards avayavin to be a substance totally different from its parts, it is implied that the essenes and weights of the two should also be different. Sāmikhya regards material cause and effect to the same so far as their essence is related. But for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the inherent cause, like threads, is as extraneous to its effect as the accessory causes like loom, shuttle etc. Uddyotakara clearly suggests that an inherent cause is not a material cause but is extraneous like accessory causes. Uddyotakara says that threads are different entities from cloth, because they are causes like shuttle. The shuttle which are the causes of cloth, are seen to be different from cloth. Threads are similarly cause and, therefore, are a different entity.

Again in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika causation it is found that parts and 'whole' occupying the same space. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika causation the ultimate constituents of all substances are the four types of atoms. Two atoms combine to form a dyad and three dyads combine to form a triad which is the smallest visible particles of a substance. If we continue the series of cause and effect in case of a cloth, then, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, a number of trafts combine to form a small particle of cotton; a number of cotton particles combine to form a fibre of thread, a number of fibres combine to form a thread, and a number of threads combine to form a piece of cloth. Now, as each one of the subsequent substances of the series is in the form of avayavin residing in its parts, it occupies the same space as its parts.

80 NV, II, I, 34, P. 252
and thus the whole series from atoms to cloth occupy the same space. This is a clumsy situation for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the one hand it regards both parts and whole as two different substances, but on the other hand these two substances are regarded as occupying the same space. The theory offends against the principle that two corporeal substances can not occupy the same space. Besides Buddhists who hold that impenetrability is a necessary attribute of matter. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika too has a dictum that two gross substances cannot occupy the same desā.81

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had to face another problem for the conception of the causation of qualities. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, destruction of a quality or substance depends upon the destruction of its inherent or non-inherent cause. If the cause must precede the effect before the destruction of qualities then there must be the destruction of the cause of the qualities. Thus when a substance is destroyed, its qualities, which are destroyed after a moment, hang, as if, in vacuum, without a substratum, for one moment.82

Saṅkara criticizes the relation between substance and quality. If the two are inseparably related then the inseparability must refer to place, time, or nature. The two are not inseparable in place, since the cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads only and not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as its colour, occupy the place of

81 NK, P. 148, N.S.M. on verse-113
82 TB, P. 31
the cloth only and not that of the threads. If inseparability in time is the essence of the samavāya relation, then the right and the left horns of a cow would be related in that way. If it is the inseparability in nature or character, then it would be impossible to make any further distinction between substance and quality, since the two are one.

If the substance depends on its qualities, then it is not really independent. Substance is not only united with its qualities by the relation of samavāya, but all substances are united with the general notion of substantiality, and single substances are united in the same way with the notion of their own class. The Sāṁkhya regards substance and quality as possessing the same reality, the Advaita Vedānta looks upon the conception of substance as an illogical one, representing a mode of thought.

The cause is capable of separate existence conjunction and disjunction are more important in causal relation. A conjunction is never eternal. There is a difference between conjunction and a disjunction. Conjunction is destroyed by the disjunction of those very things that have been in conjunction, and therefore, unless they are disjoined, the conjunction remains untouched. But in case of disjunction, it is not destroyed only by the conjunction of two things disjoined. All disjunctions are momentary and exist only upto the time

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83 V.S., I, I, 10
84 IP, (Vol-II), P. 235
85 Ibid, PP. 235-236
there is the later conjunction. But there is never conjunction of two omnipresent objects because conjunction occurs only in two separate objects.\textsuperscript{86}

The theory of causation has been refuted by the \textit{cārvāka} philosophers. Their view about causation is known as Svabhāva-vāda or naturalism. The \textit{sūvetāsvatara upaniṣad} mentions nature (Svabhāva) as the cause of the world. Vāsaspati and Amalananda also mentioned naturalism separately. Carvaka do not believe in causality and its universality. Causality is an imaginary relation between antecedent and consequents which are perceived together on many occasions. In variable antecedence of one event and invariable consequence of another event are never perceived. No necessary connection can be known to exist between an antecedent and a consequent. Conjunction of two events on numerous occasions produces an expectation that they will always be conjoined.\textsuperscript{87} The carvaka do not believe in the production of an effect by a definite cause and in necessary and invariable connection between them.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system an existent cause produces a non-existence effect. This theory is also called Asatkāryavāda. (Satah asat Jayate’ iti).\textsuperscript{88}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} NK, PP. 149-150
\item \textsuperscript{87} NM, PP. 119-122
\item \textsuperscript{88} STK, P. 40
\end{itemize}
But this view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is also not acceptable for Vāsaspati. As there would be no identity between the sat and asat, the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by the cause and so.

According to the Vivartavāda of Saṁkara’s Vedānta, effect is unreal and cause is real, while according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, both cause and effect are real. Saṁkara’s school holds that actually there is no production (ajativāda), all production is only apparent, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is real production, again Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says that, everything of an effect, both substance and form, is non-existent in its cause. But visistadvaita concludes that only form is non-existent. In Dvaitavāda Mādhvācārya’s view as similar to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s view of causation. According to Mādhvā’s theory effect is both identical and different from the cause, it is identical with regard to substance and different with regard to form. The distinction of this view from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is, therefore, the same as we have seen in case of visistadvaita-vāda. Nimbārka and vallabha propounded the Dvaitadvaita vāda and sudhadvaita-vāda respectively. They advocate the same theory of causation as that of visistadvaita vāda and shows the same distinction with the theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

In the Nyāya view of causation, the effect is defined as the counter-entity of antecedent non-existence. (Pragabhāva Pratiyogi). It means that the effect suddenly leaps into existence by putting an end to its previous non-
existence. The effect does not exist in any shape or form before it actually comes into being. It emerges from a state of non-existence into the state of existence. Antecedent non-existence has no beginning but it has an end. When the effect comes into being it does so by putting an end to its antecedent non-existence. For example, a table is non-existent before its actual production. It is wrong to say that it potentially exists in the wood of which it comes to the made later. The fact that human effort is necessary to make the table shows that it is a new production in every sense and not simply the manifestation of something which already existed in an unmanifest condition. If effect are already implicit in their causes then there should be no need to put forth effort to call them into being. But we do put forth effort. The Nyāya therefore refuses to admit that the effect is already contained in the cause. The effect emerges suddenly from nothing.

According to Buddhist view atoms merely combine into mechanical wholes we would be hard put to it to explain the difference between a ring and a chain when both are made of the same quantity of gold. The specific character of the ring as distinct from that of the chain would remain unexplained on the view that atoms combine into mere aggregates. The Nyāya view is that the combination is creative. A new form emerges in the process and this is what is meant by the doctrine that the effect leaps from a state of non-existence to the state of existence. The same number of atoms can combine in different ways. Each is a new pattern of organization and has
its own special features. The doctrine is called asatkāryavāda which means that the effect was non-existent prior to its actual coming into being. It is also known as arambhavāda since it holds that the effect is something new. The doctrine does not deny the dependence of the effect on its material cause; what it denies is that the effect as such is already pre-existent in the cause. This theory bears a close resemblance of the emergent evolution.

According to the Nyāya the causal relation is a general metaphysical outlook of the system and it is both realistic and pluralistic. The Nyāya holds that substance and attribute are separate entities and it is connected by a relation which is called Samavāya and it is external to them. The same view holds in case of the relationship between cause and effect. They are externally related and the idea of the former growing or developing into the latter is quite foreign to the system. Movement according to the Nyāya only means change of place not change of form. It has no idea that a thing may remain where it is and yet may undergo change of form. A mango which is unripe at one time becomes ripe at another time. This is change in time not in place. The Nyāya only explains spatial change and not of temporal. So its view of causal relation is very limited. It does not apply to cases where the change is internal and not external.

The Nyāya holds that the effect is in inseparable relation to the cause has not been pushed to its logical conclusion. We know that the effect can not exist independently of its material cause. When all the threads that go to
make up a piece of cloth are removed, the latter can no longer exist. When the clay is removed, the pot will automatically disappear. That the effect, when it subsists, depends on its material cause is a common place. The question is whether the dependence began after the effect came into being or before it came into being. The Nyāya view is the former. When the effect has come into being it is in inseparable relationship with its material cause. But how did it come into being? If the pot has no relationship with the clay before it is made, it means that the pot is non-existent in the clay. Then why should we work on clay when we want a pot and not on any other material? The pot is non-existent not only in the clay but also in the sand. When the pot is equally non-existent in two substances there is no particular reason why we should select one of them when we want to make a pot and not the other. 89

The preference can be explained only on the assumption that the pot, as a possibility, is connected with the clay even before it comes into being. 90

The dependence of the pot on the clay therefore goes deeper. In respect of both substance and form the effect is rooted in the cause. It is not a sudden development but only the manifestation of a potency that was implicit in the cause. It is not the emergence of something wholly new for something cannot

89 aviṣṭe hi prāgutatpateḥ sarvasya sarvataḥsattve kasmāt kṣirād eva dadhyutpadyate
na mṛttikāyāṁ mṛttikāyā eva ghaṭa utpadyate na kṣirāt, S.W. Vol. II, P. 320

90 athāviṣeṣeṣe prāgaśatvā kṣira eva dadhānāḥ kaścid atiśayo na mṛttikāyāṁ mṛttikāyāṁ eva ca
ghaṭasya Kascid atiśayo na kṣire, Ibid
come out of nothing. The upanisad asks how the existent come spring from
the non-existent?  

Ex nihilo nihil fit. A magician may throw up a rope, go to its top,
appear to engage in a fight, fall to the ground hacked to pieces and then rise
up whole. We witness the show and simply smile at the trick. He may make it
appear that he is producing all sorts of things out of an empty bag, but we
refuse to believe in it.  

Comparison of the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika theory of causation with the theories
of other school.

Carvāka philosophers deny the theory of causation. They accept
svabhāva-vāda or naturalism. It implies that the things of the world are worn
by its own nature. No cause is there. They hold that the origination is without
any cause. It is seemed that sharpness of thorns without any origination.

Nyāya-Vaiśeśika and Samkhya Yoga:

These two schools hold the opposite views on causation. The two
schools explain the theory of causation differently. Their views are
completely opposite to each other. Samkhya Yoga accepts Satkārya-Vāda and
Nyāya-Vaiśesika holds asatkārya Vāda. According to Satkārya Vāda effect is
pre-exist in its material cause, and asatkāryavāda holds that effect is non-exist

91 Ch. Up. VI. ii, I, Katham asatah saj jayeta.
92 S.W, (Vol. V), P. 102
in its material cause. It is a new creation. Former is called parināma-vāda and later is called arambha vāda.

But there is a similarity among these systems – Saṁkhya Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accept nimitta Kāraṇa as a separate cause. It is seemed that the idea of the nimitta Kāraṇa is the same in both schools, but it is not actually true. In the Saṁkhya-Yoga, nimitta Kāraṇa removes the barriers in the way of the material cause to transforming into effect. Actually it does not activate the material cause to transform into effect, the activity being inherent in the self-activated Prakṛti. But the matter in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is inert and such the nimitta kāraṇa here does not only remove the barriers, but also activates the samavayi-kāraṇa to produce a new effect.

Vedānta theory of causation accept satkāryavāda. It holds that effect pre-exist in its cause. There are several schools of Vedānta. Saṁkara’s school of Vedānta supports Vivarta vāda. According to this school cause is real and effect only appears to be produced out of this cause, though, it is not so. According to Vivartavāda effect is unreal only cause is real. But Nyāya Vaiśeṣika says that both cause and effect are real. Saṁkara holds that actually there is no production (ajativāda), all production is only partial, but Nyāya Vaiśeṣika holds that there is a real production. In the Visistadvaita school Rāmānuja accepts parināmvāda and admits that effect is existent in its cause as a substance but form is non-existent. But Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hold that both substance and form is non-existent in its cause. Mādhvācārya holds that cause
and effect are similar to that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. He says that an effect is non-existent in its cause. Nimbārka and vallabha also accept the same theory of causation of visistadvaita vāda and maintain the same distinction with the theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The Buddhinst theory of causation is known as pratityasamutpāda-vāda or the theory of dependent origination. It means that 'Whatever exists arises from causes and conditions, and is in every respect impermanent. All existence is impermanent becoming and all becoming is subject to the law of causation. Pratityasamutpāda means arising (Samutpāda) after getting (Pratitya). It means the production of an effect out of a complement of cause and conditions. When the cause and conditions disappear, the effect appears.

There are two types of theory of causation, one is the particular and other is general. This particular concerns with the wheel of twelve parts representing the human life. It is not linked with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. The general theory of causation is concerned with the worldly life so it is compared with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. According to both Buddhists and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika there is not one cause of an effect. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the number of causes is limited. But in the Buddhist theory of causation the number of causes are unlimited. So, Dr. D.N. Shastri concludes that the dissimilarity or unsuitableness and implications of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation lead to the Buddhist theory of causation.
Jaina philosophy holds that effect to be both existent (sat) and non-existent (asat) in its causal relation. Substance and qualities or pudgala and gunas are existent and its modes or paryāyas are non-existent. There is a similarity between jaina view and Nyāya-Vaśesika view. Two kinds of originations and destructions due to effort (prayogika) and natural (vaisrasika), referred to by Jaina, are not to be found in the Nyāya-Vaśesika system. Jaina’s conception of skandha is similar to the Nyāya-vaiseśika’s concept of avayavin but only a difference is that avayavin is completely different from its parts, but skandha is not different from its parts. The essence of skandha is the same as its parts while the essence of avayavin is different from its parts.

Mīmāṁsā has adopted the Nyāya-Vaśesika concept of causation except in the case of potency (Sakti). Mīmāṁsā maintains that there is a potency in a cause which is responsible for their effect. Nyāya vaśesika also accept that potency and says that potency is the very nature of a substance it is not different from it.