CHAPTER - 4

SĀṆKHYA PHILOSOPHY OF PRAKṛṬI
4: Śāṁkhya Philosophy of Prakṛti:

The fundamental principles of Śāṁkhya as per general acceptance are prakṛti or pradhāna and puruṣa or self. ThoughĪśvarakṛṣṇa has tried to establish Śāṁkhya as dualistic system by accepting puruṣa and prakṛti as two ultimate principles, yet puruṣa seems not to be accepted by all as the most fundamental principle of Śāṁkhya.Īśvarakṛṣṇa has put puruṣa side by side prakṛti as one of the fundamental principles. Critics are of the opinion that the concept of puruṣa has been introduced in the system somewhat inconsistently. As it is obvious fromĪśvarakṛṣṇa’s projection of puruṣa as a mute spectator of the process of evolution which prakṛti itself undergoes, it is sometimes felt that the puruṣa could possibly be dropped altogether from the Śāṁkhya system. According to them, the main objective of Śāṁkhya is its philosophy of prakṛti and this ultimate principle seems more consistent in Śāṁkhya than puruṣa. It has been our basic purpose throughout this research work to examine this hypothesis.

4.1: Critical Appreciation of the Kārikā:

From the discussions of the previous chapters it can be understood thatĪśvarakṛṣṇa’s Śāṁkhyā-Kārikā is supposed to be the oldest available text of Śāṁkhya philosophy. There undoubtedly are references to the philosophical doctrine known as Śāṁkhya in texts dated earlier than this, but they are just
scattered references and do not form a full, independent text expounding the doctrines of the system. Here questions may arise: how do we know, that these scattered references are Sāṅkhyan in character? Is it only because they agree with what is written in the *Sāṅkhya-Kārika*, the standard work for knowing what the Sāṅkhya means in the Indian philosophical tradition? If, however, there is some disagreement between them, shall we hold them to be non-Sāṅkhyan or only partially Sāṅkhyan in character?

Daya Krishna says, the problem, in a sense, remains the same whether we treat *Sāṅkhya-Kārika* in relation to the pre-*Kārika* or, so to say, the post-*Kārika* Sāṅkhya. Supposing there are relevant philosophical differences in the work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and those of Vācaspati Miśra, Vījñānabhikṣu or the other interpreters of the texts; shall we, in that case, give preeminence to the *Sāṅkhya-Kārika* alone and treat the divergent elements as non-Sāṅkhyan in character, or that Īśvarakṛṣṇa as only a precursor who held some non-Sāṅkhyan views also?¹

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, of course, as it has been seen, claims that he himself has merely summarized the teachings handed down through a succession of teachers and disciples starting from Kapila to his disciple Āsuri and from Āsuri to Pañcaśikha onwards in ancient time.² But the same claim can also be made by Vācaspati Miśra, Vījñānabhikṣu or the other interpreters. The *Tattvā-Kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra is a straight commentary upon the *Sāṅkhya-Kārika*. The *Sāṅkhya-Sūtras* ostensively try to pass themselves off as the work of Kapila, and Vījñānabhikṣu’s *Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya* is a commentary
upon them. Yet, it can be said, there are significant differences between the ways Vijnānabhikṣu try to interpret the Śāṃkhya-Sūtra and the sūtras themselves. Likewise, if we accept the usual contention that there was a theistic pre-Kārikā Śāṅkhya, then the claim of the author of the Śāṃkhya-Kārikā to summarize the ancient teachings is as spurious as that of Vijnānabhikṣu with respect to the Śāṅkhya-Sūtra.³

Daya Krishna says: “the so-called, Śāṅkhya is itself understood differently, even in classical times, by different thinkers and it would be difficult to find grounds for preferring one philosopher’s interpretation to another’s. Questions can arise - why should we prefer Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s interpretation to that of Vijnānabhikṣu’s or vice versa? Further, in case of Śāṅkhya we do not even know what they are interpreting. There is no complete text available which is earlier than the Śāṃkhya-Kārikā, and if it too is regarded as an interpretation, it is difficult to see how in the absence of that which presumably is being interpreted, we can judge the adequacy or inadequacy of the interpretation”.⁴

One important thing that may be put forward i.e. Sarirasthānam of the Caraka-Samhitā wherein an account of Śāṅkhya is given. Just as we have an abstracted view of a certain school of Śāṅkhya philosophy in the Śāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, so we have perhaps another abstracted view of the doctrines of another school of the same philosophy, in the Caraka-Samhitā. It is said as “another school of the Śāṅkhya philosophy” because the account differs vitally from the account of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Śāṃkhya-Kārikā. The
categories described in *Caraka-Saṁhitā* are said to be twenty-four, whereas, the *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā* treats of twenty-five categories including *puruṣa* as a separate entity. In Caraka’s account, however, *puruṣa* is not a separate entity at all but is, rather, an aspect of *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*.\(^5\)

The significant fact is that the *Caraka-Saṁhitā* is older than the *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā* and the treatments of the *Sāṁkhya* in the two texts are substantially different\(^6\). This led Dasgupta\(^7\) to think that ‘the account of the *Sāṁkhya* given by Caraka represents probably an earlier school.’ One important thing is whether Caraka’s versions of the *Sāṁkhya* were actually the same as original *Sāṁkhya* may still be an open question. It seems, though *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*’s *Kārikā* happens to be the oldest available systematic work on this system, we cannot uncritically rely on it for our knowledge of original *Sāṁkhya*. The fact may be that the *Sāṁkhya* is extremely old and modifications have been continually introduced into it from very early times.\(^8\)

Again the above mentioned inadequacy of the interpretation of *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā* can be evidenced by its inner inconsistencies also. Even it is found; the total number of *kārikās* itself is not confirmed. Interpreters are in diverse opinion regarding the total numbers of the *kārikās* as it is discussed earlier. Now let us have an evaluative overview of the *Kārikā*.

The first *kārikā* gives the chief, if not the sole, purpose of *Sāṁkhya* philosophy. It is to relieve mankind from the suffering of three different types. Here *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* says, “Being afflicted by three-fold miseries which are intra-organic (*adhyātmika*), caused by external influences (*adhibhautika*) and caused
by supernatural agencies (adhidaivika) man desires to enquire about a means to overcome it; if it is said that such an inquiry is superfluous since visible means exist, we reply, no; for these means do not secure absolute and final relief.” Here, it can be seen that in the very beginning of his Kārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has shown his intention to concern with the problems of our practical life rather than to talk about some metaphysical principles.

Secondly, in the kārikā no-II, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says:

Drṣṭavādānusṛavikaḥ,

Sa hyaviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktah |

Tadviparitah śreyān

Vyaktāvyaktajñāviṃjñānāt || (kārikā - II)

(Drṣṭavādānusṛavikaḥ – like the obvious means the revealed (Vedic) means; Sa hyaviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktah – it is attended with impurity, decay and excess; Tadviparitah – opposite to both i.e. the visible and the Vedic means; śreyān vyaktāvyaktajñāviṃjñānāt – the discriminative knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest and the cogniser is preferable.)

Here Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as it is mentioned earlier, says, “The means revealed by the scriptures for terminating the misery are like the temporal, perceptible means; they are connected with impurity, destruction and excess. A contrary method is better, and this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the manifested (forms of matter), the unmanifested (prakṛti or primeval matter) and the knower (soul)”. In this kārikā, it can be imagined that Īśvarakṛṣṇa is giving less importance on the Vedic knowledge. Vedas were supposed to have been heard
by the wise men (ṛṣis) as a divine communication, and hence called Śrūti (hearing). Though Sāṁkhya is accepted as a follower of the Vedic tradition, still, probably, in the judgment of Kapila the Vedic system was not perfectly efficient and sound.⁹ Here, in the kārikā - no-II, Īśvarakṛṣṇa seems to give stress on the fact that the complete and final blessedness of the soul, which consists of an absolute self-existence, cannot be gained by any religious rites. It is obtained by discriminative knowledge of the self with the knowledge of i) manifest or developed matter (vyakta); ii) the un-manifested or primal matter, called prokṛti or pradhāna (avyakta); and iii) the knowing soul (jñā).

In Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, the Sāṁkhya system is established as a dualistic system. Prakṛti and puruṣa are accepted as the two ultimate principles though such types of statements seem not to have occurred in the Kārikā. In the kārikā no-XXI, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has simply mentioned how due to the connection (saṃyoga) of prakṛti and puruṣa evolution takes place. But in the kārikā no-III, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says,

\[ \text{Mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtir-} \]
\[ \text{Mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayah sapta } | \]
\[ \text{Ṣoḍaśakastu vikāro-} \]
\[ \text{Na prakṛtir-na vikṛtih puruṣah } || \quad (\text{Kārikā no-III}) \]

(Mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtir – the root evolvent or Primal Nature is not evolute; Mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayah sapta – the group of seven beginning with buddhi and the rest are both evolvents and evolutes; Ṣoḍaśakastu vikāro – the
sixteen are merely evolutes; *Na prakṛtir-na vikṛtih puruṣah* – *puruṣa* is neither evolvent nor the evolute)

It means, “the original *prakṛti*, the root of all is not a product; the seven principles beginning with *mahat* (*buddhi*) are both productions and productive; but the sixteen (five organs of sense, five of action, the mind and the five gross elements) principles are only products and not productive. The *puruṣa* (self) is neither a product nor productive”. Here, it has been clearly stated that *prakṛti* is the root cause of the evolution. The *puruṣa* (spirit) is neither a product nor productive. If it is really so, question may arise regarding the necessity of *puruṣa* in Sāṁkhya philosophy.

Again questions may arise regarding the sufficiency of the *pramāṇas* mentioned in the *kārikā* no-IV to provide the knowledge of *puruṣa*. Perception is the ascertainment of the objects through the contact of the sense-organs, by which it is not easy to establish the existence of the ultimate principle like *puruṣa*. Next, by inference knowledge of some unknown objects can be gained on the basis of some known facts. But it can at least be said that in Sāṁkhya evolution no known facts about the inactive *puruṣa* can be found to provide support for its existence. Then the only means for knowing the existence of *puruṣa* left is testimony (*śabda*). But question may be raised as to how far testimony can be regarded as a valid means of knowledge. Again, even in the case of valid testimony also, it seems not to be possible for the renowned persons to know about the metaphysical principle like *puruṣa*. On the other
hand prakṛti can be known by perceiving its evolutes and its constituents (guṇas) which is also supported by the Sāṅkhyan doctrine of causality.

It seems, to establish the metaphysical reality, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has applied the doctrine of satkāryavāda, according to which effect must exist in the cause before its production. It means that the cause and effect are homogeneous. But, though Īśvarakṛṣṇa has tried hard to apply this particular theory of causation (satkāryavāda) in Sāṅkhya tradition yet some weaknesses can also be noticed in this theory as pointed out by the asatkāryavādins. According to Sāṅkhya, an effect already exists in its material cause and when it is supposed to be produced, it is only manifested. Here critics may ask –“was this manifestation of effect exists before the operation of cause, or, was it non-existent?” If the latter, you accept the production of what is non-existent. If the former, there is no necessity of the causal operation. We do not see any use of the causal operation when the effect (the form of manifestation) is already there.

The answer to this objection from the standpoint of Sāṅkhya may be: there is no fault in the manifestations of the effect which pre-exist in the cause because these manifestations follow each other in a continuity as we see in the case of seed and plant. Arguments of this types are however not founded on sound logic. Yet, it can be said that the doctrine of causality in Sāṅkhya cannot be ignored easily.

One important thing regarding the Sāṅkhya theory of satkāryavāda mentioned by Prof. B. N. Seal is that—"the Sāṅkhya view of causation follows at once as a corollary from this doctrine of the conservation and transformation
of energy. As the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same Ultimate Energy. The sum of effects exist in the sum of causes in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the gunās, but without creation of anything new."\(^{11}\)

So, here it can be said that the Śāṅkhya theory of satkāryavāda can bring a new dimension to the so called dualistic Śāṅkhya tradition which is shown very scientifically and factually by the above mentioned interpretation of B. N. Seal. This prakṛtiparināmavāda theory seems to be very scientific in the explanation of the Śāṅkhya-evolution and it can be said this theory is very much close to svabhāvavāda (naturalism). In the Śāṅkhya evolution the mūlaprakṛti is accepted as the root cause of all the twenty-three principles. These principles are the modifications of the root cause i.e. prakṛti.

In the kārika no-XI, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has said, the manifests (evolutes) are constituted of the three attributes i.e. sattva, rajas and tamas, are non-distinguishable, objective, common, non-intelligent and prolific which are the character of the primordial nature (prakṛti) also. Again in this kārika, the author said that the spirit (puruṣa) is of reverse character of all those mentioned above. So, question may arise, if we support satkāryavāda, where is the place for puruṣa as one of the causes of the world?

In the kārika no-XV, Īśvarakṛṣṇa put forward five arguments to establish the existence of prakṛti. Here, it seems he has tried to give the status of
material and self-sufficient cause of the world to *prakṛti*. If we regard *prakṛti* to be matter then evolution that is the upward motion of this world always involves matter alone. This can be said as a very significant factor of materialism in Śāńkhya. Another synonym for *prakṛti* is *pradhāna* as Īśvarakṛṣṇa has mentioned in the *kārikā* no-XI. In Sanskrit language *pradhāna* means ‘chief’ or ‘main’. So, it may be realized here that *prakṛti* is the main principle in Śāńkhya. Again this word *pradhāna* may thus relegate the other principle *puruṣa* to a subsidiary or secondary position or status. According to the critics it signifies that the material principle is vital in the Śāńkhya philosophy and all other principles are subsidiary to it.

The word *pradhāna* may also signify *prakṛti* as a self sufficient principle. It can by itself explain all the changes in the world. *Prakṛti* is the cause and the world is its effect. *Prakṛti* is known as *pradhāna* since all effects are founded on it. It is the potential cause of all. All things and beings of the world exist potentially in it. Here, the products are caused, while *prakṛti* is uncaused; the products are dependent, while *prakṛti* is independent; the products are many in number, limited in space and time, while *prakṛti* is one, all pervading and eternal. By perceiving the signs of the evolutes, the existence of the ultimate principle *prakṛti* can be inferred. Actually *guṇas* too are not perceived by us. They are inferred from the objects of the world which are their effects. It has been explained in *Śāńkhya-Kārikā* that *prakṛti* can never be destroyed, and so it could never have been created. An intelligent principle
seems, not to be fitted as the material cause out of which the world is formed, for spirit cannot be transformed into matter.

Radhakrishnan says, “the Sāṁkhya description of the world in terms of one homogeneous substance, of which all things are but different configurations resulting from the different combinations of its ultimate constituents, has some resemblance to the materialistic theory. Both the Sāṁkhya and materialism attempt to attain a more rational conception of the universe.”¹² One significant point Radhakrishnan mentioned in his "Indian Philosophy"- vol-ii is that the agency belongs not to the puruṣa or the soul, but to the ahamkāra or self sense, which is a product of prakṛti. So, this type of interpretation can give a new direction to the Sāṁkhya tradition. There can be a scope to think of a self-sufficient prakṛti as the ultimate principle in the process of evolution.

In the kārikā no-XVI Īśvarakṛṣṇa says, the general cause i.e. avyakta functions by means of three guṇas which are the constituents of it. If it is so, the prakṛti will be the main cause of evolution. In the kārikā no-XVII the author put forward some arguments for the existence of puruṣa. But if we see the position of puruṣa very carefully in Sāṁkhya tradition, it may be found that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was not able to establish puruṣa here without confusions. First confusion here is how by definition inactive, indifferent and isolated principle like puruṣa can influence prakṛti for the evolution of the universe. Secondly, the arguments for the plurality of puruṣa seem to be controversial. In these arguments, Īśvarakṛṣṇa mainly tries to establish the plurality of puruṣa from the
non-simultaneity of everything in this phenomenal (vyakta) world. But he, on
the other hand says -- the vyakta world is the composition of the triguṇas i.e.
sattva, rajas and tamas which are the constituents of the mūla-prakṛti only and
puruṣa is completely free from all these. Here question may arise how can from
this non-simultaneity of the vyakta world the plurality of puruṣa which is
devoid of the guṇas be inferred? Other challenges towards the arguments of
plurality of puruṣa are - if puruṣas are many, will all the puruṣas be counted as
the ultimate principles along with prakṛti and then how can it be called a
dualistic school? It seems, Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself is not clear regarding the
plurality of puruṣa, the concept of self and the concept of finite man. It is
argued that the proofs are put forward to prove the plurality of the
transcendental, pure puruṣa which has no connection with the finite bodies. But
it seems, the arguments prove not the plurality of the transcendental puruṣas
but that of the empirical ones i.e. jīvas. These proofs show that the puruṣas are
nothing but living organisms. Again we can come to know from Sāṁkhya-
Kārikā that the world evolves due to the contact between puruṣa and prakṛti.
But, here it is not very easy to understand how the plurality of puruṣas can
come into contact with one prakṛti, as Īśvarakṛṣṇa says -- prakṛti is one.

In the kārikā no- XIX, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says:

_Tasmācca viparyāsāt_

_Siddham sākṣitvamasya puruṣasya _

_Kaivalyam mādhyastham,_

_Draṣṭṛtvamakartrbhavaśca _|| (kārikā-XIX)
(Tasmāc ca viparyāsāt - and from that contrast; Siddham saṃśitvamasya puruṣasya - is established that puruṣa is witness; kaivalyam - is solitary; mādhyastham - is neutral; Draśṭṛtvamakarṭṛbhāvaśc - is a seer and is non-agent)

It means, “in contrast to the other principle i.e. the constituent of three guṇas, puruṣa being merely a witness, arbitrator, or seer, with no activity of its own, free from all connections with anything, and thus standing alone by itself”.

From this kārikā it can be understood that in contrast to prakṛti, the puruṣa is a witness, free from misery, a passive and neutral spectator. The role played by puruṣa in the evolution of prakṛti is very much passive. Here question may arise - can there be any necessity of such type of principle? Again, critics may argue, this passivity on the part of puruṣa amounts to its non-existence. Sometimes it seems Īśvarakṛṣṇa has somewhere failed to give a systematic, reasonable definition and proper position of puruṣa in his system. How can neutral passive principle influence upon anybody specially in the case of evolution? Here, it can be said that there is a scope for the question of the relevance of puruṣa in Sāṃkhya tradition.

E.H. Johnston says, “The ātman theory never looks quite at home in Sāṃkhya........” Here, it seems, Johnston has tried to show that puruṣa is not a reality. He says, “........to put it in terms of Sāṃkhya, the ātman is neither a tattva, nor included in any tattva, nor a combination of several tattvas, whence it follows that it is not a reality.” All the scholars like Garbe, Jacobi,
Pischel, Oldenberg and Stcherbatsky also have expressed their views in this tune.

In the karika no-XX and XXI, Ṣivāraṇa has explained the doctrine of evolution. The important and very controversial question regarding evolution is: how does evolution take place? Evidently when heterogeneous motion arises and rajas disturb the equilibrium stage of guṇas. Next significant question may be - how is the equilibrium disturbed? Though Ṣivāraṇa has made the influence of inactive puruṣa responsible for this disturbance of equilibrium, still it seems Sāṃkhya fails to answer this question satisfactorily. It seems critics are of opinion that it may be a fundamental blunder to separate prakṛti and puruṣa as absolute and independent entities. It is said if prakṛti and puruṣa are absolutely separate and independent entities, then they can never unite together, and if they cannot unite evolution cannot take place. Ṣivāraṇa says that the disturbance of the equilibrium of the guṇas which is the cause of evolution is made possible by the contact of puruṣa and prakṛti. Prakṛti needs puruṣa in order to be known, to be seen, to be enjoyed (darshanārtham); and puruṣa needs prakṛti in order to enjoy and also in order to obtain liberation, in order to discriminate between himself and prakṛti and thereby obtain emancipation (kaivalyārtham).

But, here the question is how can the two opposed and independent entities really come into contact? Sāṃkhya realizes this difficulty and in order to avoid it says that there is no real contact between puruṣa and prakṛti and that only the proximity of puruṣa, only the fact that puruṣa is near to prakṛti
(puruṣasannidhitra), is sufficient to disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas and thus lead to evolution. So, here in Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, there is a confusion regarding the cause of evolution whether it is contact (samyoga) between puruṣa and prakṛti or it is just proximity (sānnidhi).

Again, here another problem may arise regarding the contact between puruṣa and prakṛti. If puruṣa being always near to prakṛti (for the inactive puruṣa cannot move) evolution should never stop and dissolution would become impossible. Evolution, then, would be beginning less and the very conception of prakṛti as the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas would be impossible. It seems Sāṃkhya finds itself in a dilemma - either no contact and hence no evolution or else no equilibrium and hence no prakṛti in its original state and no dissolution.

In kārikā no- XX, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says, puruṣa is reflected in the intellect (buddhi), the first product of evolution and he wrongly identifies himself with his own reflection in the buddhi. If it is only this reflection of the puruṣa which practically brings the contact with prakṛti and not the puruṣa himself, there may arise some confusions. Because, the obvious question here will be if buddhi or mahat is regarded as the first evolute of prakṛti, then how can it arise before evolution to receive the reflection of the puruṣa? To avoid this difficulty it can be said that the puruṣa is reflected in the prakṛti itself. If it is so, then liberation and dissolution would become impossible because prakṛti being always there and it being the essential nature of the inactive (stable) puruṣa to identify himself with his reflection in the prakṛti, he would never get liberation
and the very purpose for which evolution starts would get defeated. So, here it seems which is again supported by many thinkers, that in order to defend the initial blunder regarding the acceptance of purusa and prakṛti as absolute and independent entities, Sāṃkhya commits blunders after blunders.

In the kārikā no-XXI, as we have mentioned above Ṛṣṭrakṛṣṇa says: for the exhibition of nature (prakṛti) to the spirit and for the emancipation of the spirit, there is conjunction between the spirit and nature (prakṛti) like the union between the lame and the blind; from their conjunction proceeds creation. The union of purusa and prakṛti is like the union of a lame man and a blind man for crossing a forest. But according to some critics this metaphor cannot be said to be proper. We cannot say a lame man totally inactive.

The statement that “Prakṛti evolves only for the fulfillment of the purpose of purusa” is very much confusing. Because, it can be understood that there is no meaning to do something for an indifferent principle like purusa. The concept of liberation mentioned in the Kārikā too is not sound. Question may arise - how the inactive, indifferent, passive principle like purusa can come to be in bondage? How this indifferent principle can enter into the activities of the world? If purusa is inactive and indifferent, how can he be the enjoyer of the dance of prakṛti, as mentioned in the kārikā no - LIX? Again, the concept of ‘nirguna-purusa’ can also be criticized. If it is nirguna, then it will not be very easy to say that purusa has any influence upon the process of evolution.
In the *kārikā* no - XVII, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has put forward some arguments for the existence of puruṣa. Here he says, to direct the unintelligent *prakṛti* an intelligent principle like puruṣa is required. Puruṣa exists because all the composite products of *prakṛti* must be for the sake of another's use; because there must be some controlling agencies; because there must be an experiencer (*bhokta*) of the evolutes of *prakṛti*; because of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude etc.

In the *kārikā* no - XX, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says due to the reflection of buddhi the disinterested non-doer (i.e. the puruṣa) thinks himself to be the doer. Kārikā no - XXI says, the association of *prakṛti* and puruṣa serves a dual purpose of the *pradhāna* being contemplated upon by the puruṣa and the consequent attainment of *kaivalya* by the later. But in the *kārikā* no - LXII and LXIII Īśvarakṛṣṇa has given different types of views. In the first one he says,

\[
\text{Tasmānna badhyateddhā}
\]

\[
\text{Namucyate nāpi saṁsaratī kaścit |}
\]

\[
\text{Saṁsaratī badhyate mucyate ca}
\]

\[
\text{Nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ || (kārikā no - LXII)}
\]

(Tasmānna badhyateddhā – therefore the puruṣa is not bound; Namucyate nāpi saṁsaratī kaścit – nor ever he is released, nor ever does he migrate; Nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ – *prakṛti*, the supporter of the manifold creation; Saṁsaratī badhyate mucyateca – migrates, is bound and is released)
It means it is only the *prakṛti*, in her manifold forms, that suffers bondage, migrates and is finally liberated; the *puruṣa* is never under bondage, nor is he liberated, nor does he migrate. In the *kārikā* no - LXIII Ḣśvarakṛṣṇa says:

*Rūpaiḥ saptabhīreva tu*

*Badhnātyātmānamātmanā prakṛtiḥ |
Saiva ca puruṣārthamprati

*Vimocayatyekarūpena ||
(kārikā no - LXIII)*

(*prakṛtiḥ tu* - the *prakṛti*; ātmāna saptabhīreva rūpaiḥ – by means of her seven forms only; ātmānam badhnati – binds herself; Saiva ca – again she herself; ekarūpena – by means of one form; puruṣārthamprati – for benefit of the spirit; *Vimocayati* – causes deliverance.)

It means, *prakṛti*, by herself binds herself by means of seven forms, and it is she again, who by means of one form, releases herself for the benefit of the Spirit.

Critics may find the views of these two *kārikās* to be self-contradictory or confusing from Ḣśvarakṛṣṇa’s side. It may be due to the ambiguity of language on the part of him. Because in the previous *kārikā* he says that it is *puruṣa* and not *prakṛti* who comes into bondage who was originally free. Even it is one of the arguments for the existence *puruṣa* mentioned in the *kārikā* no - XVII. Here the author says, release is not possible for the inanimate principle like *prakṛti*. The release promised must refer to an entity other than matter (*prakṛti*), and that entity is nothing but *puruṣa* according to Ḣśvarakṛṣṇa. But here in these *kārikā* no - LXII and LXIII the author is giving reverse view of
his own. Question may arise, if puruṣa has nothing to do, and if it is only prakṛti who plays the significant role in every respect, which is admitted by the author himself then what is the necessity of all those descriptions or inclusion of puruṣa in Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.

In the kārikā no - LXIV and LXV Īśvarakṛṣṇa is talking about the discriminative knowledge of puruṣa. After getting this knowledge puruṣa realizes that nothing belongs to him. Īśvarakṛṣṇa says, possessed of this knowledge puruṣa (the pure spirit) rested like as spectator, perceives the prakṛti who has now become unproductive and devoid of her seven forms. On this version of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, question may arise - does the evolution take place only once, as here it is said prakṛti ceases to be productive. Again in Sāṅkhya-Kārikā it is not clear how prakṛti and puruṣa come into contact and why. Here is a possibility of another important question i.e. “Is Sāṅkhya evolution a teleological or accidental one?” Generally it is said Sāṅkhya philosophy is teleological as it is talking about the fulfillment of the purpose of puruṣa in evolution. But if we have a rational outlook of the Sāṅkhya evolution discussed in the Kārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa then we shall realize that it is not very easy to establish the teleology of Sāṅkhya evolution. We can have this realization from the above mentioned discrepancies of evolution. Critic says, it is not always necessary that there should be some purpose everywhere. Something can happen according to the Natural Law (svabhāvavāda) which is not concerned with any teleology. Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds that prakṛti evolves due to its proximity (sannidhi) of puruṣa. It has however not offered any significant
reason for this contact. Again it is declared that the evolution is for the purpose
of the enjoyment of the *puruṣa* but it has also to say that the real purpose is the
liberation of the *puruṣa* as it is mentioned in *kārikā* no - XXI. The two
purposes thus conceived contradicted each other. This conception of liberation,
too, is evidently borrowed from the *Upaniṣads* and probably it cost the
elementary self-consistency in Sāṃkhya.

4.2: Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata:

Materialism is as old as human civilization. In other words it can be said
it is as old as philosophy. Germs of it are found in the hymns of *Rg Veda.*
Several vestiges show that even in the pre-Buddhist India proclaimers of
purely materialistic doctrine appeared.¹⁵ It is well-known in the Indian
philosophical tradition that these materialistic tendencies finally crystallized
into Lokāyata *darśana,* the only traditionally accepted school of Indian
materialism which is also called Cārvāka or Bṛhaspati *darśana.*¹⁶ As a system,
it is said, it may have come into existence in the post-Upaniṣadic and pre-
Buddhistic period though it is not confirmed. The authorship of the Lokāyata
*darśana,* the one of the earliest schools of Indian philosophy, is traditionally
ascribed to the legendary figure of Bṛhaspati. This school denies the existence
of God, soul and ‘hereafter’ and ascribes reality only to the empirical world and
mundane values as it accepts perception as the only means of valid knowledge.
However it is disputed by some thinkers whether the Cārvākas accept only
perception as the valid source of knowledge, because some of the later
Cārvākās are said to have accepted inference side by side of perception as a valid source of knowledge. They are not against inference which is confined within empirical world. Of course this is a controversial issue which needs further discussions.

Chronologically it can be said that Sāṁkhya and Lokāyata are contemporary schools. Regarding the existence of transcendental realities like God both of these schools have put forward the same view, specially the Classical Sāṁkhya. Again, some thinkers are of the opinion that Sāṁkhya along with Lokāyata constitutes the truly secular and rationalist tradition in Indian philosophy. The difficulty is created by the assumption that while Lokāyata is admittedly a heterodox or nāstika philosophy, Sāṁkhya is orthodox or āstika philosophy. Here the important point that should be noticed is that how can we at all take these two philosophies as belonging basically to the same class?

The term orthodox or āstika, as it is well-known, is used in Indian philosophy in the restricted sense of ‘being based on the authorities of the Vedas, and just as its opposite heterodox or nāstika is supposed to mean a philosophy that flouts this authority’. Critic says, the criterion for classifying philosophical views into these two types is suggested neither by philosophers nor by philologists but by the law-giver Manu, whose own interest in philosophy is clearly extra-philosophical. Critics are of the opinion that there is really no ground to take the convention of this classification as seriously as it seems to be done ordinarily. Any qualitative difference between Lokāyata on
the one hand and Sāṁkhya on the other, in so far as it is based merely on the
dictate of the law-giver, can perhaps be ignored. Here the important question
is if Sāṁkhya really belongs to āstika tradition why it is silent about the
existence of God, as the believers in the Vedas seem to have belief in the
existence of the God. In the kārikā no-II Īśvarakṛṣṇa just has said about the
vyakta, avyakta and jñā which does not indicate the existence of God clearly;
rather in the later kārikās the author is talking about the existence of evolutes
(manifest), prakṛti and puruṣa (unmanifests).

Most often modern thinkers have discussed that much of Sāṁkhya’s
original features are lost to us, that even in the extant expositions like Sāṁkhya-
Kārikā and the commentaries on Sāṁkhya-Sūtra the Sāṁkhya doctrines are
substantially modified. Here, the two important questions may be – firstly, in
spite of the doctrinal modifications suffered by Sāṁkhya even in its available
expositions, do we have any indication of its attitude to Veda and Vedic
beliefs? Secondly, do we have any indication of the attitude to Sāṁkhya in the
Vedic literature itself?

In the first two kārikās as it is mentioned in the previous chapters,
Īśvarakṛṣṇa says, “the main purpose of this philosophy is the removal of
suffering in all forms. It is a fact no doubt that certain remedies for suffering
are actually observed e.g. medicine offers remedy for physical suffering. Still,
the philosophy is not useless, because such ‘observed remedies’ cannot remove
suffering totally and absolutely. Like the remedies actually observed, according
to Sāṁkhya those mentioned in the Vedas (srūti) are incomplete, because they
are impure, subject to decay and marked by excesses. The scriptural means to end misery is ineffective, because it is linked with impurity; its effect is neither lasting nor always the same for all. The Sāṅkhya suggests instead a method that consists in a discriminative knowledge of the manifests (forms of matter), the unmanifest (prakṛti or primeval matter) and the knowing soul (puruṣa”).

Thus, it can be noticed that Sāṅkhya-Kārikā opens with a definite attitude to Veda and the salient points of this are:

1) The remedies for suffering suggested by Veda are no better than those actually observed in ordinary life, e.g. the remedies suggested by medical science.

2) The Vedic remedies are marked by three defects. They are (a) impurity (b) merely temporary and (c) marked by excess.

The knowledge that Sāṅkhya stands for is the very opposite of Vedic remedies. There can be no doubt about this point, because the text clearly says “tat-viparitaḥ” which means “the opposite of that”. (Kārikā no-II).

But how can this be said from the standpoint of a genuinely Veda-based philosophy? Though in the commentary of Sāṅkhya-Sūtra an effort has been made to tune Sāṅkhya into the Upaniṣadic idealism, the original hostility of this philosophy to Veda is yet to be completely washed away even in it. Vedic recommendations, it declares are not better than the worldly ones. Veda, it adds, cannot lead one to the summum bonum, because the results of Vedic rituals have a beginning and therefore also an end.18
Critics are of the opinion that even from the fragments that survive in this philosophy, it is not difficult to see that it must have originally been opposed to the Vedas. Garbe rightly says, “originally the Sāṁkhya must have taken up a position of direct opposition to the doctrines of the Brāhmaṇas, as is proved inter alia by its polemic against their ceremonial”. In the language of Radhakrishnan, it can be said that Sāṁkhya never openly opposes the Vedas, but adopts the more deadly process of sapping their foundations.

The other question is; what about the attitude to Sāṁkhya expressed in the Veda, particularly in its philosophical portions, namely the Upaniṣads? There is a tendency among some of the modern scholars to discover the germs of original Sāṁkhya in Upaniṣads. Of course, there are considerable number of such Upaniṣadic passages; but, it is said, though these passages contain some of the typical terminologies of Sāṁkhya philosophy, the real purpose of mentioning them in the Upaniṣads is for either rejecting them outright or proclaiming the superiority of the Upanisadic view over Sāṁkhya.

The example of Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad can be taken here, which is usually considered to be pre-Buddhist. Of all the Upaniṣads, it presents the idealist view with a pronounced theistic bias. Hence it has to settle its account with the atheistic and anti-theistic views prevalent at that time. The most prominent of such views, as judged by the Upaniṣad itself, is that of Kapila - the view, according to which the world evolves by natural laws (svabhāva) from primeval matter, called prakṛti or pradhāna. Critics say, the author of this Upaniṣad wants repeatedly and with great zeal to establish the superiority of
his view of one God over the fundamentals of Sāṅkhya. But the way it has been done is very interesting. It seems, he does not reject outright the Sāṅkhya views as the utterance of some deluded person, which he does while dismissing the doctrines according to which 'time' or 'natural law' is the first principle. He offers instead full recognition to the importance of the doctrine of pradhāna or prakṛti insisting only on the denial of its autonomy. Prakṛti is subservient to God, God rules over it and even produces it out of his own magical power.22

Here it is said, what is perishable is the pradhāna. What is immortal and imperishable is the soul. Over both the perishable and the soul, rules the one God. By meditating upon him, by uniting with him, and by reflecting on his being more and more, there is complete cessation from the illusion of the world.23

Significantly Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad questions neither the antiquity of Kapila nor the great wisdom he possesses. It only declares that the very wisdom he possesses is derived from God, the existence of which Kapila probably denies.24

These can be the ways in which the superiority of the Upaniṣadic view is proclaimed over that of the Sāṅkhya. Again these can be considered as the evidences of the power and popularity that Sāṅkhya enjoyed at the time of the Upaniṣad. But these can also be the evidences of the fact that the Upaniṣadic thinkers find their views directly confronted by the Sāṅkhya, without negating which probably the author of Upaniṣad cannot preach his own philosophy. Again it can be said that if the Sāṅkhya is given too importance as a
purvapaksa to be ignored by the Upaniṣadic thinkers, then it can be concluded that the internal evidences of Sāṁkhya showing its hostility to Veda are supported by the internal evidences of Veda showing its hostility to Sāṁkhya. Here, it can be imagined that far from having been a Veda-based philosophy, original Sāṁkhya is presumably opposed to Veda.25

Richard Garbe says, “......the origin of the Sāṁkhya system appears in the proper light only when we understand that in these regions of India which were little influenced by Brāhmaṇism the first attempt had been made to solve the riddles of the world and of our existence merely by means of reason. For the Sāṁkhya philosophy is, in its essence, not only atheistic but also inimical to Veda. All appeal to srūti in the Sāṁkhya texts lying before us are subsequent additions. We may altogether remove the Vedic elements grafted upon the system and it will not in the least be affected thereby. The Sāṁkhya philosophy had been originally, and has remained up to the present day, in its real contexts, un-Vedic and independent of the Brāhmaṇical tradition.”26 Even, as we have mentioned above, interpreters like Max-Muller also admit that Sāṁkhya has a non-Vedic origin. Sāṁkhya may therefore rightly be included in the atheist tradition of Indian philosophy.

Sometimes it seems, Lokāyata and Sāṁkhya philosophies stand for the rejection of idealism. It may imply that as against the persistent tendency of Indian idealists to deny the reality of the external world, Lokāyata and Sāṁkhya defend its reality. But this is not all that unites the two philosophies. What unites them further is another important point. Both these philosophies
also want to work out an explanation of the objective world in terms of their respective theories of the nature of matter. This is the most important feature that gives positive significance to the concept of the anti-thesis of Indian idealism. It is not the mere negation of the denial of the objective world; it is moreover the positive assertion that this objective world is made up of matter, though matter as conceived in these two philosophies is not the same. The Lokāyatas conceive matter as the bhūtas or physical elements - earth, water, air and fire. Hence their view is called bhūta-vāda or the theory of the physical elements. The Sāṃghkhya conceive matter as pradhāna, i.e. primeval subtle matter from which evolves everything in the world. Hence, their view is called pradhāna-vāda or the doctrine of pradhāna. Though there are such types of differences between Lokāyata and Sāṃghkhya, yet it can be said that they represent Indian attempts to understand the nature of matter. And it is in terms of these that the two philosophies want to explain the basic constitution of the external or objective world, the reality of which they defend against the idealists.

Different philosophers have given different views regarding Sāṃghkhya materialism. According to some, Sāṃghkhya is quasi-materialistic and its materialistic nature is enhanced by its denial of any external authority like the creator or God. These interpreters say, in Sāṃghkhya philosophy, ‘prakṛti’ or ‘pradhāna’ has been accepted as the material cause of the universe. Yet it was too early for human mind to comprehend the nature and properties of matter and its interchangeability with energy, which provides for a materialistic
monism. Hence, he had to take recourse to a second principle, soul or ‘puruṣa’, to explain the origin and process of the world. Yet, here, unlike other schools, this acceptance of soul does not denounce or nullify the reality of matter because Sāṁkhya is a dualistic theory where both soul and matter are given the status of the fundamental principles of the universe.\textsuperscript{27}

On the other hand, another group of interpreters are of the opinion that the original Sāṁkhya was completely a materialistic system. May be, the materialism of that Sāṁkhya was archaic in nature. Probably there was scope to transform it to a refined materialism. But the historical conditions did not allow it to do so. In this context reference can be given to other Indian interpreters S.N. Dasgupta: “proceeding further in our search after the most prominent ideas about the material world and its evolution from the material point of view, the system that fully engrosses our attention is that of the two schools of Sāṁkhya of Kapila and Patanjali.”\textsuperscript{28} This is not a statement coming from an ordinary man, but from an outstanding scholar like Dasgupta who is very much expert in Sanskrit language. It can be confirmed that he has not said this without justification.

The Sāṁkhya has never denied the material world. Its explanation of the world evolution from the material standpoint is significant. Critic says, \textit{pradhānakāraṇavāda} combined with \textit{svabhāvavāda} may impart Sāṁkhya a completely materialistic character. Its representatives were Pañcaśikha and Caraka. Even critics have no hesitation in saying that in their philosophies we do not find the dualism of \textit{prakṛti} and \textit{puruṣa} which is a characteristic mark of
Classical Sāṅkhya. *Puruṣa*, as a separate entity is denied by both Pañcaśikha and Caraka. It can be noticed that both of them have recognized only twenty-four categories. Both Pañcaśikha and Caraka emphasize on the *avyakta* principle which is the blending of both materiality and spirituality.\(^{29}\)

As regards the explanation of consciousness also some materialistic tendencies can be noticed in Sāṅkhya tradition. In both Caraka and Pañcaśikha's philosophy, there is no tendency to consider consciousness or spirit as primary. The tendency on the contrary, is to view matter as primary and consciousness secondary. It is found, Caraka recognizes the human organism to be the *purusa* and consciousness to be the epiphenomenon of material ingredients.\(^{30}\)

Here, one thing should be kept in mind that if there are a number of scholars who maintain very strongly that the Sāṅkhya system is a system of materialism and it arose in reaction to Upaniṣadic idealism, there are others who equally strongly deny it and argue that the school is certainly not materialistic but a kind of idealism, which arose in order to check a growing tendency towards materialism.

Some scholars including Jacobi are inclined to look upon Sāṅkhya as the development of an early school of materialism. According to others, notably Radhakrishnan, this theory is untenable. The stress of Sāṅkhya on the absolute reality and independence of spirit has nothing comparable in any form of materialism. Moreover, the hedonistic materialists, characterized by Lokāyata, have not the conception of the world as full of misery, whereas
Sāṃkhya starts with the pessimistic idea that the worldly existence is subject to threefold misery as it is seen in the ‘Sāṃkhya-Kārikā’. The materialists aim at nothing but pleasure in life, whereas Sāṃkhya emphasizes viveka-jñāna as the means to liberation. Materialist seems not to be concerned with the liberation from the sufferings of life.

There are other views also, according to which Sāṃkhya is neither materialistic nor is it idealistic of any sort but a genuine dualism of matter (prakṛti) and spirit (puruṣa) in which the former (matter) plays a dominant role. One thing can surely be said that like Vedānta there is no stage in the Sāṃkhya philosophy where matter is treated as non-existent or secondary.31

Even some critics are of the opinion that Sāṃkhya which was originally fully atheistic and materialistic was submitted to a process of rigorous spiritualization, and the idealistic concepts were grafted on it in such a manner that at last the original Sāṃkhya passed into its opposite.32 In line with this, the observation made by Garbe is as follows: “the original Sāṃkhya came indeed to be perverted in the Śvetāvatara Upaniṣad, the epics and the Bhagavad-Gītā and latter still, in the theistic Yoga and the several sectarian and Vedānta coloured Purāṇas”.33

4.3: Naturalism of Sāṃkhya (Svabhāvavāda):

Naturalism refers to the philosophical belief that denies the need for any explanation going beyond or outside the universe in the explanation of the evolution or creation of this world. Naturalist accepts sense-experience as the
most important avenue of knowledge. It believes that knowledge is not esoteric, innate, or intuitive (mystical). Naturalism (svabhāvavāda) rejects supernatural teleology. The direction of the world is caused by the world itself. It is a theory which holds that natural processes are spontaneous that is completely independent of any interference from outside agencies.

It can be noticed, sometimes critics do not hesitate to say that svabhāvavāda has imparted the Sāṁkhya the most consistent character and it has contributed to it the capability of becoming a true rationalist philosophy. It is again said, by the introduction of this theory Sāṁkhya becomes very close to materialistic system. This theory is accepted as wholly responsible for the first impetus of prakṛti’s evolution. Regarding naturalism in Sāṁkhya Dale Riepe says:

“The naturalism of Sāṁkhya may be summarized in the following ways:

1) Early Sāṁkhya epistemology is naturalistic in its insistence upon the use of perceptual knowledge.

2) The Sāṁkhya atheistical position is clearly naturalistic, although the force of this is somewhat lessened by the adoption of puruṣa.

3) The Sāṁkhya theory of evolution is naturalistic when once puruṣa has initiated movement.

4) The proposed nominalism of Sāṁkhya is naturalistic.

5) The emphasis on the workings of prakṛti rather than emphasis on salvational ethics is a naturalistic tendency of Sāṁkhya.
We do not mean to imply by this that emphasis on ethics is necessarily non-naturalistic, but only that, since Sāṃkhya has slight concern with ethics as compared with its outstanding concern of nature, its trend is naturalistic.\(^{34}\)

The major concern of Sāṃkhya is to explain the workings of nature. We maintain that this cannot be wholly explained by its peculiar type of salvational ethics. Most of the ethical discussions of Sāṃkhya occur in the later commentators; the earlier emphasis is on cosmology and secondarily on epistemology. It can be said, the major interest of Sāṃkhya is similar to the primary interest of early Greek naturalism; indeed Sāṃkhya, with Caraka, more closely approximates to the Ionian and Abderian philosophies than to any of the other Indian systems. Sāṃkhya is as naturalistic as Aristotle and more naturalistic than Stoics. Perhaps one should place the adherents of Sāṃkhya on a level with the Epicureans despite the latter’s giving primacy to ethical considerations.\(^{35}\)

It seems, the naturalism (svabhāvavada) in Classical Sāṃkhya is not same as svabhāvavāda in Cārvāka. Cārvāka is not talking about even a slight motivation of transcendental or spiritual principle in the origination of this world. Garbe says, Sāṃkhya is desirous of understanding the processes of nature but cannot explain its initial movement without introducing, like Aristotle, a distinct and transcendental element. Of course it does not allow a Prime-Mover as God for this, not because it has not conceived the possibility,
but because it has rationalistically examined the arguments favouring this position and rejected them. It just has accepted the sentient principle to initiate the movement. Critic says, this can be said as the Upaniṣadic influence in the system.³⁶

Garbe, strongly says, “the belief that the principle of sentiency must be introduced from outside of nature is a non-naturalistic element in Sāṅkhya cosmology and leads to its greatest inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are as follows:

1) The untenable dualism of spirit and matter.

2) The essential uselessness of the spirit, and

3) The attribution of physical properties to spirit.

It is interesting to note that one of the arguments used by the Classical Sāṅkhyaist to point out the absurdity of their opponents introducing deity into their systems applies equally to its own introduction of puruṣa. It can be said, Sāṅkhya’s own argument in favour of the existence of puruṣa is in no way superior.”³⁷

It is obvious that whatever is outside nature is presumably different from nature itself or it would not be outside. If this is so, then puruṣa is simply outside and it can be said, that may be the end of the issue for Sāṅkhya and for us. But it is not so in the Classical Sāṅkhya. Here it can be noticed, puruṣa (spirit) turns out to be outside nature (as the non-natural initiator of motion in nature) and also inside (as the individual souls). This is because of the confusion whether the puruṣa (the ultimate principle) and the individual souls
are same. Dale Riepe says, how initiation of motion can bring about sentiency or how there can be any localization of the individual soul in a particular prakṛti conglomeration (mind-body system) is not explained properly. The point is that Sāṅkhya makes mind part of nature, which is “a long step towards a thoroughly naturalistic ontology”.

It is again said Sāṅkhya theory of knowledge also supplies some naturalistic tendencies in this system. Sāṅkhya is talking mainly about three types of avenues of knowledge. These are – perception, inference and testimony. They are of the opinion that inference and testimony directly and indirectly depends on perception. It can be noticed that Sāṅkhya’s testimony is not self guaranteeing but depends upon perception or inference. Sāṅkhya does not admit the validity of intuition. Here it can be said that Sāṅkhya can be in agreement with later Cārvāka, which admits perception and inferential knowledge to be alone possible. For Kapila and Īśvarakṛṣṇa there is no super-empirical method of knowledge.

Here, it can be noticed that though the traditional Sāṅkhya metaphysics attempts to be radically dualistic it did not succeed in its attempts. It seems to be unsuccessful because of the strong naturalistic strain to explain events in a physicalistic rather than a spiritualistic fashion. The contradiction in the system can be the evidence of the reluctance of Sāṅkhya speculators to use spiritualistic explanation when naturalistic explanation can serve equally well.

It can be imagined that Sāṅkhya was not able to deny the whole doctrine of puruṣa even when the natural world already contained a principle of
motion, i.e. rajas (energy) and somehow it proves its inability to completely throw off Upaniṣadic speculations. Here puruṣa can be said as the specific link that unites Śāṅkhya with the other āstika schools. Critic tries to say that the doctrine of puruṣa is really incompatible with naturalism. Even if Classical Śāṅkhya has no deity, a non-naturalistic element like puruṣa may perform the function of the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover and also the function of migrating soul not subject to natural law.

The Śāṅkhya theory of causation can be a supporting doctrine of naturalism in Śāṅkhya. It somehow in agreement with Cārvāka, holds that nothing comes out of nothing; that everything must come out of something else. The statement does not mean that the effect already exists in the cause actually, but only that it does so potentially. The effect “comes from” the cause when acted upon under certain specifiable conditions. This is very much closer to Aristotelian notion according to which the effect is determined in advance by the nature of cause.

Some thinkers are of the opinion that Śāṅkhya cosmology, in contrast to that of Jainism and Buddhism is richer and more intricate, and in the early texts much more space is devoted to it than ethics. This testifies to greater concern with the processes of nature, no matter whether one approves the results of Śāṅkhya speculation or not. Dale Riepe says, “this marked interest in cosmology we hold to be associated with naturalism rather than with non-naturalism, particularly since prakṛti is uncreated and self-evolving.”
Generally it is found that naturalists posit nature above both matter and mind. In Sāṁkhya also we see such a tendency if we regard prakṛti in the sense of the western word ‘nature’. In this system it can be noticed that from prakṛti intellect, mind, sense-organs, subtle elements and gross material elements evolve. Here nature can be accepted as a material energy and matter as its form, i.e. modification. The unity of matter and mind is carried out by nature. It is obvious that prakṛti in Sāṁkhya is not a transcendent cause. There is no gap between prakṛti and the world evolutes. It can be said that this link is maintained by naturalism (svabhāvavāda). The cause (prakṛti) is constantly becoming effect (world evolutes). It is difficult to mark demarcating line between the two. The cause may be a distinct reality but not a different one. There is no fundamental difference between the cause and effect. They are rather two phases of one whole reality, which is a continuous process.

It can be noticed that, Suśruta-Saṁhitā and Caraka-Saṁhitā have cited many examples about the svabhāva theory in their discussions on Sāṁkhya. Most of the critics admit whoever admits of svabhāvavāda must be a materialist. According to them as Sāṁkhyaists admit of svabhāvavāda they can also be regarded as materialist. Although as it seems in the Classical Sāṁkhya the concept of puruṣa has been imported inconsistently, yet the existence of svabhāva tendency cannot be ignored here. It can be said, a spiritual principle and a material principle should not go together or it cannot get the same status. If it is so, from the above analysis, it may be said the spiritual principle
(puruṣa) will get less importance in the process of world evolution of Sāṁkhya.

The parināma theory of the Sāṁkhyaists involves svabhāvavāda. Delineating the Caraka view in this regard B.N. Seal says, “On this view (parināma), a new substance may arise by spontaneous change in the absence of any action from without”.45 One thing is true that svabhāvavāda is criticized by many as being a very simple theory of evolution. The western tradition is also not an exception of that. Even Aristotle is often criticized on this issue. He uses the word ‘natural’ as explanation of many natural phenomena. Many criticize him as lacking in thought in holding such a simple view. But W.T. Stace denies this allegation and says, “His use of the word ‘natural’ does not indicate lack of thought. There is thought, an idea, here,”46 So, svabhāvavāda cannot be said wholly as an unimportant theory. It has some value philosophically.

As it is discussed above major part of inconsistencies in Sāṁkhya especially in Sāṁkhya-Kārikā is due to the inclusion of the spiritual principle (puruṣa). It can be imagined that the inclusion of puruṣa principle in Classical Sāṁkhya is an obstacle to establish Sāṁkhya as a purely naturalistic system. Still critics are of the opinion that the Sāṁkhya atheistical position seems to be naturalistic although the force of this is somewhat lessened by adoption of puruṣa.
4.4: Scientific Approach of Sāñkhya Philosophy:

It seems quite obvious from the above discussions that the Sāñkhya which has been hailed as 'the oldest systematic school of Indian philosophy' or even as 'the first rationalistic philosophy of the world' is surely one of the most significant schools of Indian thought. It is supposed to have laid down the foundations of scientific thought in India. The Sāñkhya system possesses a unique interest in the history of thought as embodying the earliest, clear and comprehensive account of the process of cosmic evolution, viewed not as a mere metaphysical speculation but as a positive principle based on the conservation, the transformation and the dissipation of energy.

The manifested world is traced in the Sāñkhya to an unmanifested ground prakṛti which is conceived as formless and undifferentiated, limitless and ubiquitous, indestructible and undecaying, ungrounded and uncontrolled, without beginning and without end. The unity of prakṛti is in reality an undifferentiated manifold, an indeterminate infinite continuum of infinitesimal reals. These reals are termed as guṇas, as we have discussed above. It can be imagined that these guṇas are conceived to be real substantive entities, not, however, as self-subsistent or independent entities, but as interdependent moments in every real or substantive existence. Even energy (rajas) is said as substantive in this sense. The infinitesimals of energy do not possess inertia or gravity, and are not therefore material, but they possess quantum and extensity. The very nature of energy (rajas) is to do work, to overcome resistance, to produce motion. Energy therefore is ultimately kinetic; even potential energy
is only the energy of motion in imperceptible forms. The intelligent stuff 
(*sattva*) and the material stuff (*tamas*) cannot do any work, and are devoid of productive activity in them. All works come from *rajas*, the principle of energy, which overcomes the resistance of matter, and supplies even intelligence with the energy which it requires for its own work of conscious regulation and adaptation. The *guṇas* are always uniting, separating and uniting again. Everything in the world results from their peculiar arrangement and combination. S. N. Dasgupta elaborates this point in the following words, “the atoms are always vibrating by the energy of *rajas* with which they are charged and this vibration of atoms is the cause of changes of all kinds in nature.”

In Sāṁkhya philosophy evolution begins with the disturbance of the original equilibrium. How it is brought about is not very clear. Different interpreters say that the transcendental influence of the *puruṣa* initiates the process of creation which is again not beyond contradiction. A modern expounder of the Sāṁkhya supposes that the particle of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* possess a natural affinity which breaks up the uniform diffusion, and leads to unequal aggregation, therefore to the relative preponderance of one or more of the three *guṇas* over the others. Thus commences formative combination among the reals (*guṇas*) and consequent productive activity.

Interpreters are of the opinion that the *guṇas*, though assuming diversity of forms and powers, can neither be created nor destroyed. The totality of mass (*tamas*), as well as of energy (*rajas*), remains constant, if we take account both of the manifested and the unmanifested, the actual and the potential. This fact
is very close to the theory of conservation and transformation of energy in modern science.

Again the Sāṁkhya view of causation can be said as a corollary of this doctrine of the conservation and transformation of energy. As the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the guṇas, but without the creation of anything new. Everything in the phenomenal world is a special collocation of the ultimate reals (energy, mass and essence). What we call the qualities of things are only modes of energy acting in those collocations. Critic says, if we have a proper study of Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, then it will be realized that the cosmic evolution is a two-fold process, creative as well as destructive, dissimilative as well as assimilative. In one aspect there is the unequal aggregation of mass and energy with consequent transformation of energy, resulting in the creation of inorganic as well as organic matter, and the genesis of the worlds. But there may be a second aspect of this evolutionary process. Unequal aggregations are unstable; there is a constant tendency in things to go back to the original stable equilibrium, the state of uniform equal diffusion of reals.⁵³

Some contemporary thinkers do not feel any hesitation in saying that the method of analysis is the same in Sāṁkhya as in the modern science. Very similar to Sāṁkhya in science also gross matter is taken up first for analysis
which is carried ultimately to such a subtle stage that one may doubt whether the universe is at all real. In Sāṃkhya, the world is seen broadly from the worldly point of view, it takes one gradually to matters more and more subtle and ultimately leads him to a stage from which one may easily realize all the fundamentals. It is again said, the relativity and the quantum theories lend support to the conclusions of the Sāṃkhya philosophy and to one who is conversant with these theories, a proper understanding of the Sāṃkhya philosophy would be quite easy.\textsuperscript{54}

The great scientist Lord Rutherford proved that there is nothing real in this world except energy in the form of electricity which is again very close to the fundamental principle of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The entire scientific world in Europe was stunned by this discovery; but at the same time, it can be said, this discovery has enhanced the prestige of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.\textsuperscript{55} Rutherford found by experimentally smashing the atom that it consists of empty space full of electrical energy. Inside the atom there is a nucleus, round which revolve some electrons which are merely negative charges of electricity. The nucleus itself consists of protons, which are positive charges of electricity, and some electrons. Thus a number of protons and a lesser number of electrons are commented together to form the nucleus. The atom is like the solar system, the nucleus corresponding to the Sun and the revolving electrons to the planets. It is by the number of rotating electrons in an atom that the chemists identify elements. The total number of electrons in an atom determines both chemical as well as the physical properties of the element. The source of activity in an
atom is the electron alone. In the universe, all activities and all sorts of transformations are due to the activity of the electrons. There cannot be a smaller or subtler particle of energy than an electron.

Here, the constituents of atoms can be compared to the constituents of prakṛti in Sāṃkhya philosophy. Rutherford said, in the universe, all activities and all sorts of transformations are due to the activity of the electrons. Likewise in case of Sāṃkhya philosophy also, there is a possibility to think as it can be realized from above discussions, that all activities and all sorts of transformations in this universe take place due to the dialectical activities of the guṇas and prakṛti's evolution. Here, the affinity of Sāṃkhya doctrines to scientific orientation can be noticed.

Again, scientists are of the opinion that the universe is ceaselessly undergoing transformation, and till the end of the creation this transformation will go on. There is not a moment when the universe does not suffer any change. But this transformation is not merely pointless one. The universe is, according to the scientists leading towards disorganization from an organized state. Still there will come time after which there will be no transformation or change of any sort. Everything will ultimately be transformed into pure energy.56

The same thing can be noticed in the Sāṃkhya theory of 'evolution-dissolution' also. It seems, in Sāṃkhyā-Kārikā Īśvarakṛṣṇa has tried to explain both evolution and dissolution, though the fact of dissolution is not very distinct here. In the Īśvarakṛṣṇa's version we may find that "practising the
twenty-four tattvas, there results that jñāna (consciousness) - 'I do not exist', 'nothing is mine', 'I am not' - which is all-comprehensible, without impurity, and absolute. (kārikā no-LXIV). Then, the puruṣa, comfortably situated like a spectator, sees prakṛti whose activity has ceased due to the completion of her purpose, and who has turned back from the seven forms. (kārikā no-LXV). Here, it can be said that except the inclusion of puruṣa, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has made an effort to give a purely scientific view of evolution and dissolution of the world. In the process of dissolution the twenty-four principles go back to its original state i.e. mūla prakṛti which is again said by many Indian thinkers as shakti (energy). Like modern science, it can be said in case of Sāṅkhya philosophy also that if there is anything real in the universe, it is only energy (shakti) in some form or another (prakṛti or vikṛti). Lastly it can be said that modern science thus practically confirms the conclusion arrived at by the Sāṅkhya philosophy.\textsuperscript{57}
References:


2) Ibid., p.194.

3) Ibid., p.195.

4) Ibid., p.195.


14) Ibid., p.63.


17) Chattopadhyaya, D.P., *What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy*. P.251.

18) Ibid., p.253.


22) Ibid., P.254.


24) Ibid., v.2.

25) Chattopadhyaya, D.P., *What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy*. P.255.


27) Gupta, Uma., *Materialism in the Vedas*, p.12.


30) Ibid., p.112.


35) Ibid., p.220.

36) Ibid., p.220.

37) Ibid., p.221.

38) Ibid., p.221.

39) Ibid., p.222.

40) Ibid., p.224.

41) Ibid., p.224.


47) Theos Bernard, *Philosophical Education of India*. P.58; &
Chattopadhyaya, D.P., *Lokāyata - A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*, 
pp.365, 368.

48) Macdonell, *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p.368; cf. Chattopadhyaya,  

49) Jh. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p.22 & 
Chattopadhyaya, D.P., *Lokāyata - A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*, 
p. 458.


53) Ibid., pp. 13, 23.

54) Phukan, R.N., *The Sāmkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa - being a treatise on  

55) Ibid., p. 17.

56) Ibid., p. 20.