CHAPTER VI
THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINS.

In view of geographical proximity and ethnological affinities between the Chins and the Lushais the history of the two areas is interrelated. For this reason the English coined the term "Chin-Lushais" and the primary aim of the Chin Lushai Conference 1892 was the creation of a separate administrative unit for the whole of the Chin Lushai country. The Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India drafted the plan, adhering strictly to the geography of the Chin Lushai land. But his plan did not materialise because of Alexander Mackenzie's opposition. The Chins were placed under the Administration of Burma and the Lushais under Assam but the policies adopted in the Chin Hills were almost similar to that of the policies in the Lushai Hills. Moreover, for the execution of the policies, the two administrations cooperated with each other. Like the Lushais, eventual pacification and extension of sovereignty were the guiding principles of Anglo-Chin relationship. Military explorations or survey operations in the Chin Hills were conducted in strict conformity with the Lushai Hills. For every administrative measure the authorities of Rangoon kept informed the Governments of Bengal and Assam. The Chin Lushai Expedition 1889-90 under the generalship of Tregear which completed the annexation of the Chin Lushai country started the operations from Burma, and the Chittagong and Cachar authorities assisted it. Both the Chin Hills and
Lushai Hills were incorporated into the British dominion on the same date September 6, 1896. Thus the study of the problem of the Chins is, in a sense, the integral part of the study of the Anglo-Lushai relationship.

The river Kolodyne is the boundary between the Chin and Lushai Hills (south) and the tribes living to the east of that river are generally known as Chins. 'Chin' is a Burmese term synonymous with 'khwen', pronounced as 'Chin'. There are many clans of Chin tribes as for instance Siyin, Nowangal, Sokta, Kambuy, Bungsha, Poi and Shindus. Like the Lushais the Chins are also known according to the name of the Chief or of the village viz. the Chief of Falam, Chief of Haka, Chief of Yakwa etc.

The British officers of Chittagong came in contact with the Shindus of the Chin tribes during the sixties of the nineteenth century. They lived on the Chittagong frontier outlying Arakan. They frequently raided the southern Lushai villages. In the sixties the topography of the Shindu country was not fairly known, moreover it was reported by the local officers of Chittagong that the Shindus could not be approached through Bengal.

Entry into the Shindu country from the side of Burma was also difficult because the English were the master of Lower Burma only. The ferocious Shindus created trouble every now and then in the Chittagong frontier but the authorities of Calcutta were powerless to check them. Because of these difficulties during the Lushai Expedition 1871-72, the Government of India did not consider
it proper to invade the Shindu country. The Lushai Expedition 1871-72, was so extensive that it affected all the tribes of Cachar and Chittagong frontiers but the Shindus remained unaffected by the operations. The military authorities carefully avoided the Shindu country. This made Shindus very bold. They frequently tormented the Syloos and Howlongs of the South Lushai Hills. Their ferocity and revenge created a constant terror in the minds of the Lushais on the Chittagong frontier. Immediately after the Lushai Expedition the Shindus swoop upon the stronghold of Rutton Poea, the great ally of the English, and destroyed his clan once for all. The English could not avenge the death of their trusted friend. In January 1882 about two or three hundred Shindus and Mallum Puis headed by Chief, Howsata, attacked the Lushai Chief, Lalsova. He requested the authorities of Chittagong to help him in his venture against the Shindus but this was refused. The Government of Bengal did not like to get involved with the Shindus directly. The authorities of the Fortwilliam followed a policy of conciliation towards the Shindus. They sent note of instructions to the local officers of Chittagong to punish the offending Howlongs of the Lushai Hills but not to disturb the Shindus. This policy yielded certain results. Some Shindu Chiefs courted friendship with the English. Most important of them were the Chief, Saipuia Lal, and his three brothers. Saipuia was a great friend of Murray, the Assistant Political Officer of Chittagong Hill Tracts. He and his brothers helped
the British garrison during the Chin Lushai Expedition 1889-1890. Saipula was so straightforward that, at times, he mercilessly criticized the activities of Murray. He timely informed the Survey Party of Stewart of the evil design of the Shindu Chief, Jahuta but Stewart did not pay any attention to the warning of Saipula and thus invited his death. Saipula Lal once rebuked Murray of pusillanimity because he did not send punitive expedition against Jahuta. Indeed, he sent the British messenger back with the message that Murray should hence forward wear the women's garment. The murder of Stewart compelled the authorities of the Fort William to feel that a negative policy like conciliation would fail to solve the problem of the Shindu incursions. They must be brought to book.

ANNEXATION OF UPPER BURMA: ITS EFFECT UPON THE ANGLO-CHIN RELATIONSHIP.

Before the annexation of Upper Burma the prospect of effective dealings with the Shindus or any other Chins was out of question. But the annexation of Upper Burma towards the close of the year 1885, brought a revolutionary change in the Chin Lushai problem. The said annexation brought the English into contact with the Chins along the course of Myitha and Chindwin rivers. It had also saddled the Government with the responsibility of protecting the new British subjects of Burma from the Chin raids on the frontier. The authorities of the Fort William seriously pondered over the frequent Chin raids on the settled districts of Burma and Bengal in order to devise effective means to check
them. In the mean time much information as to the land and people of the Chin Hills was received by the Government of India. The annexation of Upper Burma made it easy for the entry of the British troops into the Chin Hills and the political necessities made the administration of Assam, Bengal and Burma to follow a concerted line of action for the security of the settled districts surrounding the Chin Lushai country.

**PUNITIVE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE NORTHERN CHINS AND THE FORMATION OF CHIN LEVY.**

In October 1888, the Chins attacked the British villages and the local officers recommended a punitive expedition against the offending tribes. But the Government of India did not sanction an extensive Chin expedition that year because Lord Lansdowne was already preoccupied with two large scale expeditions in the North West Frontier of India. Sir George White, the Chief Commissioner of Burma, accordingly sent a small expedition into the northern Chin Hills. The British garrison gallantly fought against the Chins. A permanent post was established on the border of Chin Hills and Lushai Hills and it was named Fort White. Very soon this fort became the stronghold of the British soldiers in the Chin Hills. The establishment of the Fort White was definitely a gain of the expedition but it failed to achieve any tangible result.

For the protection of the frontiers of Burma from the Chin incursions the local officers suggested the formation of
'Chin Levy' like the 'Kukie Levy' in Cachar. The proposal was placed before the Government of India by the Chief Commissioner of Burma and the former sanctioned the formation of Chin Levy. The force was to consist of Gorkhas and Punjabis, and Lieutenant Rainey, Commandant of the Pakoku Police Battalion, was selected as the Officer in Charge of the Levy.

**A FORWARD POLICY**

The Military Department of the Government of India was aware of the fact that a large scale military expedition in the Chin Lushai Country was imminent. And, accordingly, they made all kinds of preparations. In the meantime, the neighbouring Lushai Hills became restive immediately after the Lushai famine and it was feared by the Chief Commissioner of Burma that the Chin Hills too would follow the path of the Lushai Hills. In case of a rebellion among the Chines a combined operations from Burma and Bengal seemed necessary. So every precaution was made for the eventualities. According to Shakespeare—

"The military authorities in Calcutta, on whom in the ordinary course would rest the preparations of plans for any operations from the west, therefore thought it advisable to bring their informations as to lines of approach upto-date. To this end it was decided that winter reconnaissances, which at that time were carried out in every command both to train officers as well as to collect information, would be conducted in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Mr. D.Lyall, Commissioner of Chittagong, welcomed the suggestion, promising all assistance, and asking in return that the reconnaissance parties might be allowed to help the frontier authorities by improving the alignment of the patrol paths."

It has already been pointed out that Captain Stewart, the leader of such a party of reconnaissance, met his tragic death
at the hands of the Chin Chief, Jahuta. The Government of India realised the need for the construction of roads in the Chin Hills. The Chief Commissioner of Burma laid emphasis upon this point and the roads up to the village of Siyins from Port White was completed by December 1888. The Chins disturbed the party engaged in the construction work and inflicted considerable damage causing delay in the progress of the work but the road makers completed their task successfully, inspite of the hurdles.

THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION INTO THE NORTHERN CHIN HILLS HEADED BY GENERAL FAUNCE.

Formation of the Chin Levy was a measure for the defence of the frontier against the Chin incursions into the British territory. But this defensive measure was in itself not sufficient to check the fierce Chins. A powerful demonstration of force was necessary to coerce the northern Chins who made frequent depredations, killing and capturing the British subjects. The local officers of Burma recommended a punitive expedition and the Government of India approved of the recommendation. General Faunce was selected as the head of the expeditionary force to be conducted into the territory of the Northern Chin Hills. Major Rikes accompanied the force as Political Officer. Faunce inflicted punishment upon the Chin Chiefs he met in his advance but his expeditionary column failed to achieve the desired result. The failure of this expedition pointed out the utility of an extensive military operation in the Chin Hills.
CHIN LUSHAI EXPEDITION

The political condition of the British frontier in Burma became aggravated by the repeated border explosions. Inspite of the best precautionary measures the Chins committed frequent raids upon the British subjects. Simultaneously the condition of the Lushai border in India also became largely explosive. All these alarmed the Government of India and the Governor General-in-Council sanctioned the Chin Lushai Expedition 1889-90 under the stewardship of General Tregear. But immediately before the operations of the Chin Lushai Expeditionary Force the Government of Burma sent General Penn Symonds into the Chin Hills. The aim of sending the troops was to help the construction of roads which was in the making and the Public Works Department was just nearing the link between Burma and Chittagong. General Tregear was given Command of a larger force to co-operate with the Column of Symonds.

In the meantime the Government of India made heavy preparations for the mobilization of troops for the massive offensive into the Chin Lushai country. The force for the operation of Northern Chin Hills first came by Steamer to Pokoku on November 9, 1889 near the junction of Chindwin river with Irawadi. It has already been pointed out in Chapter V that Tregear was assisted by the Chittagong and Cachar authorities in the Chin Lushai Expedition. From Burma, Tregear entered into the Lushai Hills. According to his instructions the Chain of military
posts were extended from Tamu and other stations in the Kubo Valley to Gangaw, Minwa and Tilin on the Yaw border.

**ADVANCE TO HAKA : ESTABLISHMENT OF FORT TREGEAR.**

General Tregear's main force advanced from Lungleh eastwards crossed the Bolpui range down into the Mat and Koladyne valleys, after which came the ascent of the Darjaw Klang (5,700 feet). On an open spur of the Darjow Klang in helio communication with Lungleh and commanding extensive views over a sea of hills away to the Tao Peak in the Chin country a strong defensive post was constructed. While the work of construction was in full swing, a flying column headed by Captain Hall and certain British officers including Captain J. Shakespear advanced for Haka (Chin Hills) in March 1890 to link with General Symonds 17 garrison. Within a short time the flying column reached the Tao, village, a few miles beyond the upper Koladyne river (or the Boinu) which forms the boundary between the Chin Hills and Lushai Hills districts. Here the flying column was joined by a small column of Burma force under Captain Landel and Stevenson. The Paona Chief in whose possession had the Stewart's head, duly sent it to Randel and the people of Tvalam and Tlan Tlang surrendered the loot. The combined British garrisons reached Haka, eighteen miles east of Tlan Tlang. Here in a solemn manner the heads, including that of Stewart were buried. The army officers met at a small conference at Haka which was presided by General Penn Synod as to the punishment of the offending Chin Chiefs. All
agreed to inflict condign punishment to the offenders. Shortly after the meeting Captain Hall's Column retreated to Darjow Klang. The new post at Darjow Klang was named Fort Tregear and its supervision was placed on the shoulders of Captain Hutchinson and Lieutenant P. Boileau. By April 1890 the road from Fort Tregear to Haka became complete. The Expedition 1889-90 reduced the Shindu Chiefs who were responsible for the murder of Stewart. Strengthening of Haka, Fort Tregear and Fort Lungleh within the Chin Lushai country made the Shindus and Howlongs feel the offensive strength of the English. British Force captured many Siyin, Sagyilain and Kamhow villages, although the English failed to subjugate the Siyins. In the operation Second Lieutenant, W.G. Michael and Captain O. Mayne, the Surgeon were killed. The operation on the Northern Chins could not achieve the desired effect but it was a positive step in extending the British sovereignty in the Chin Hills.

OPERATION OF THE SOUTHERN COLUMN

The southern Chin column of the Expeditionary Force was concentrated at Pakokku and advanced to Kan. The plan was to face the Tashoons. The Tashoons were not so warlike and after a little resistance they sued for peace. To the south of Tashoons the Bungshes lived. The Southern column advanced westward from Kan and encountered the Bungshes. Haka and Yokwa were the principal villages of the two most powerful sections of the Bungshe tribe. From Haka they advanced towards north to deal with the Bungshes.
and the northern column from Port White cooperated simultaneously in the movement which has been referred earlier. After the defeat of the Tashoongings the troops came back to Haka, a large part of the force from here advanced west to meet the Bengal column and punished all the tribes they came across in their march.

**YAKWA CONFERENCE : PEACE TREATY OF YAKWA 1890.**

Advance to Haka from Kan forms a most interesting piece of military history. British contingent started off from Kan on December 9, 1889 under Major Henry. The contingent advanced towards the Kabe hill. On December 15, 1889 Mr. D. Ross, Assistant Commissioner, arrived from Gangaw to act as the Political Officer. On October 14, Lt. Col. King-Harman left Kan to Chang-Kwa to help the construction of roads. Government premeditated the difficulties of communication and already sought the assistance and cooperation of the Raja of Manipur. Haka column received the help of the Naga coolies who were the subjects of Manipur. It is interesting to note that the Nagas of Naga Hills were at that time fighting against the English. The advance of the Haka column from Kan improved the means of communication and brought the Southern Chin Hills nearer to Manipur. Advance to Haka and Rawwan terrorised the Chins. A large number of delegates from the Chin Chiefs met the advancing army and sued for peace. The General refused to hear their arguments and said he should make the peace with the Chiefs only. On January 9, 1890 the Kook Chief, independent of Yowka Chief, met the British force and a treaty was
made. The Chief agreed to stoppage of raid and allowed a road to be constructed from Burma to the sea on the west through his territory. The Yokwa Chief also surrendered and on January 20, 1890 a Conference was called where he and his subordinate Chiefs assembled. They gave the following as the list of villages over which the Yokwa Chief exercised control, and from which they collected revenue:

- Yokwa
- Rawvan Kawa
- Tinam Lamlok
- Horngevin

In the Conference the Chiefs assented to return the Burmese captives at once and promised not to commit any raid upon the Burmese or any other British territory. They also undertook to assist the advance of the British army through their country. The English agreed to allow them to keep all their guns, and offer fair price for all the labour and supplies. At the end of the Conference Ratiaw, the Chief representative of the Yakwa Chief, accepted the British supremacy and made a comment on the road construction by saying "The road will be good enough for us to go down to trade."

**PEACE OF YAKWA**

The peace of Yakwa laid down the terms which were in favour of the English. The surrender of the Yakwa Chief and the subsequent treaty was a remarkable achievement of Major Symonds. He was jubilant in his success and sent a message from Yakwa, of not attacking the Chin villages without provocation. In this communication he clearly stated the help he received from the people.
of the villages of Rawvan. In the Conference the British officers dictated the terms of peace and the Chin Chiefs accepted them. But the English could not believe the Chins. This false sense of superior ethics, on the part of the Government officers, created a misunderstanding at the time of capture of the Lushai Chief, Lalchukla, which galled the entire relationship of the Lushais and the English in future. General Symonds committed the same mistake in his dealings with the Yakwa Chiefs. He altered the terms of peace which he himself dictated on January 20, and modified them into a different one. On January 20 the English guaranteed the Chiefs not to annex their country but on the 25th instant the General dictated that the English would annex their country but as long as they behaved well, the Government would not interfere with their villages or tribal organisations. Sheer demonstration of force cowed the fierce Chins to accept the modification of the treaty but this helped in brewing a disaffection. The General should not have act so hastily. It is interesting to note that almost all the British officers including Levin had charged the Chins and Lushais of low morals, duplicity and treachery but they forgot that the most civilized race of the world did not set very good examples to be followed by the 'simple savages'.

THE PEACE OF HAKA

Major Symons left Yokwa for Bwetet on February 12, 1890 and on February 13, advanced to Haka at the head of two
contingents. Haka was the target of the last offensive. Haka was earlier visited by a flying column from Bengal but it could not achieve the desired effect. Moreover Haka, from the standpoint of military strategy, offered a very suitable place for establishing a permanent post. The Chin Chiefs of Haka who had earlier witnessed the might of British army received the news of the surrender of powerful Yakva Chiefs. Haka Chiefs did not offer any resistance to the advancing army of Major Symons and sued for peace. Under the instruction of the Major the Chin Chiefs assembled in a Conference on February 14, 1890 where the motives and intentions of the British Government were clearly explained. They were simply the surrender of the captives,cession of raids, supply of labour for the construction of road through their country. The Hak Chiefs agreed to all these conditions. Peace was made the terms of which were similar to that of the terms dictated to the Yakvas. No fine was imposed on the Haka Chins, for they did not offer any resistance. After the surrender of the Haka Chiefs, Major Symons left Haka under a strong escort for Haka Ywema and reached the village on February 16, 1890.

The Southern Column of the Expeditionary Force broke off the moral of the chin tribes of the South Chin Hills. The peace of treaties of Haka and Yakva reduced the fierce Chins to submission. The British army established military posts at Haka, Yakva and Bawtet the most strategic places of the Chin Hills. These posts were made permanent with a view to suppress any rebellion in the Chin Hills. The superior arms of the English
struck terror into the minds of the Chins and they realised the risk of antagonizing the English. The Chin Lushai Expedition 1889-90, overran the whole of the Chin Hills and Lushai Hills. Each and every clan of the Chins had to feel the brunt of the expedition. General Tregear's troops reduced the Chins to submission but the expedition, although a complete success from the military standpoint, failed to exact the obedience of all the Chin tribes. To enforce that loyalty the Government of India subsequently had to sanction several small punitive expeditions against the disobedient tribes.

**MILITARY POSITION IN THE CHIN HILLS**

In the cold season of 1890-91 the Chins got down from their hills and committed raids upon the British territory as usual throwing aside their promises. The Chief Commissioner of Burma got alarmed and submitted before the authorities of Calcutta for an extensive military operation to exact the allegiance of the Chins. Government of India agreed to the demand of the Chief Commissioner and the military Department was requested to finalize the plans for operations.

According to the latest information received from the General Officer Commanding Burma District, the Military Department, Government of India, came to know of a very poor distribution of troops in the Chin Hills. Not only that, a substantial number of the troops were sick. This report raised a considerable hue and cry as to the future garrisoning of Chin Hills.
GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN BURMA.

Burma was incorporated into the British Empire in 1886 and for military reasons, the military installations of Chin Hills were separate from that of Burma, although the Chin Hills from the military point of view dependent on Burma generally. The portion of Burma conterminous with Manipur and Lushai land was included in the Upper Chindwin district which forms part of the Myingyan district of the Burma Command. The Myingan Command extended from Thayetmyo in the south to the Police Station of Homaliu, 80 miles north of Kendat. It had apparently no actual northern boundary, was bounded on east by the Chindwin, while its western boundary was the Koladyne river, and further south the Arakan Yoma. The Myingan Command extended over a vast area, and included a large population; on February 1, 1892, the garrison of the Myingyn Command consisted of 5,972 troops and about 5000 military Police. This area, especially in the Western and northern portions, was far from being completely subdued.

The question of the general military situation in Burma had been much under discussion. In connexion with the Chin Hills, General Officer Commanding in a report dated March 2, 1891 said that the arrangements for the protection of the frontier posts at Haka and Fort White on the withdrawal of the troops employed in the Chin Lushai Expedition of 1890 had been insufficient, and General Stewart made some appropriate remarks in this connexion.
It was then considered that British relations with the Chins were sufficiently well established to admit of leaving a small garrison at each post, namely, one regiment between them, with a long line of communication very lightly held back to the river bases at Pakokku and Myingyn. No account was taken of the possibility of hostilities, nor of the occurrence of unusual sickness among the garrison.

The troops suffered so much from sickness, that, early in October 1890, with the exception of some three hundred Gorkhas at Haka, who were fit for active operations, the garrisons in the hills and on the line of communications were barely effective for self defence. In November 1890, the 2-4th Gorkhas had to be relieved by the 2-3rd Gorkhas from India. This relief was especially fortunate as well as the arrival somewhat earlier of a wing of the 4th Madras Pioneers, and a Company of Sappers, as the Chins commenced raiding all along the border from Tamu in the north to Yawdwin on the south, and had not those fresh troops been available, reinforcements could only have been obtained elsewhere in Burma with great delay and difficulty. As it was they did not arrive in time to prevent an attempt being made on Thetta, nor were they strong enough to furnish the complement for the several columns organized to punish the raiders. The 2-4th Gorkhas had to be detained to assist in carrying out the punitive expedition.

The troops actively employed on March 2, 1891 were -

Two Companies, Sappers and Miners.
2-4th Gorkhas
59th Gorhwalis
Wing, 4th Madras Pioneers.
12th Burma Infantry.
28th Madras Infantry.
200 men, 32nd Burma Infantry.

The 2-4th Gorkhas were under orders to return to India in April, the Sappers and Miners were to spend the summer at Mandalay, and the 32nd was to go to Thayetmyo for training, only three regiments on the frontier and involving a repetition of the arrangements made in 1890, which proved a failure. General Stewart expressed himself as strongly of opinion that resting satisfied with such depositions would only be to court disaster.

The experience of 1890 showed that it was an imperative necessary to be prepared to meet the contingencies of sickness on the one hand, and of hostility on the part of the Chins on the other.

THE SCHEME OF GENERAL STEWART.

Stewart put forward a scheme for the occupation of the Chin frontier and its communication by four regiments with two in reserve, and had detailed the distribution he proposed as follows:—

"In addition to Haka and Fort White the following may be considered obligatory posts which it will be necessary to hold under the same conditions, namely:—

Kubo Valley
Auktaung or Kempat | Tamu
Yazagyo
Yaw Valley.

Yawdin and probably one or more advanced posts."
These conditions can only be fulfilled by their having adequately strong garrisons, at starting, namely:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rifles.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haka</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort White</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auktaung</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazagyo</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamu</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yadwin</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>New post</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>1,450</td>
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Total, two full regiments

"The extent of frontier is divided by the Nanka the river, geographically, and to a certain extent ethnographically, into two sections, which may be designated as the Northern or Fort White Section and the Southern or Haka Section, the former including the Siyin, Sagiilaing, and Kanhow tribes, with the Kubo and Kale Valleys as their objective in all raiding operations, and the latter Tashon, Haka, Yokwa, and Bungshe tribes who raid on the Myitha Valley and lower down the Chinbok tribes which raid on the Yaw Valley."

"The supports to be obligatory posts above mentioned would occupy posts on the line of communications, namely:—

Northern Sections.

Supports to Fort White —

| No. 4 Stockade | 50 |
| No. 3 " | 50 |
| Kalemyo | 350 |

Support to the Kubo Valley —

| Monywa | 400 |

Southern Sections —

Support to Haka

| Kan | 100 |
| Gungaw | 200 |

Supports to Yadwin

| Pank | 200 |
| Fukoku | 350 |
The actual distribution of the troops would be as follows:

**Northern Sections.**

One regiment, 39th Garhwaliz

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort White</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 Stockade</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 &quot;Supports&quot;</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalemyo</td>
<td>300</td>
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One regiment, 15th Madras Infantry-

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tamu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auktang</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazagyo</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monywa, support</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Southern Sections.**

One regiment, 12th Burma -

<table>
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<th>Location</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haka</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawvan</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanor Sinaung</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gungaw</td>
<td>200</td>
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</table>

One Regiment, 28th Madras Infantry-

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yawdwin</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Post</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pank</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakeko</td>
<td>350</td>
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"The two regiments quartered between Thayetmyo and Myingyan might be regarded as a reserve for the whole."27

Stewart in estimating the garrisons, the strength of regiments calculated at 800 rank and file. But average strength of regiments in Burma was seldom over 700.

Secretary, Foreign Department Government of India, made a very worthy comment in this connexion:-

"It will naturally strike any one, who considers the question, how differently it is proposed to treat the Lushais and
the Chins, the former to be controlled by police only, while the latter are deemed to require four battalions of regular troops, equal to the whole normal garrison of Assam. The reason may be found in the fact that we have long been in contact with the Lushais, while the Chins, the terror of the Burmese, have only recently felt the power of the British Government. At the same time it seems to be a question for consideration whether some what different distribution of force might not be made so as to provide for a more complete control over the whole Chin-Lushai country.

The scheme of Stewart received due recognition from the Government of India. It was fully realized that it would take time for the complete subjugation of the Chin tribes; by a gradual process the Chins would realize the transfer of sovereignty. At the same time the different clans of the Chins be allowed to feel the military strength of the English. The constant presence of the army might put a check upon their aggressiveness. Moreover, the army could easily be mobilized at the instance of the local officers. With this objective the military posts were reinforced and several other army pickets were distributed throughout the length and breadth of the country. The problem of law and order in the Chin Hills was somewhat different from the Lushai Hills. The Government of Burma was aware of the immense natural difficulties. So, after the Chin Lushai Expedition, the task of enforcing the order was entrusted with the troops and not with the Police, civil or military. And, inspite of the stringent precautionary measures to check the Chin raids, the tribes committed depredations again and again even at the cost of a terrible loss. The instinct of raid was so much ingrained upon the nature of the fierce Chins that it took a long time to uproot that
instinct. But the English were determined to restore order in the Chin Hills and to provide security to the settled districts outlying the Chin Hills. A strong line of posts, as indicated in the scheme of Stewart, put a constant watch upon the activities of the Chins.

**ADMINISTRATION OF THE CHIN HILLS TILL THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHIN HILLS REGULATION.**

It has already been pointed out that the Chin Lushai Expedition 1889-90 annexed the Chin Hills like the Lushai Hills and for the running of the administration Mr. B.C. Carey was appointed as the Political Officer of the Chin Hills with the headquarters at Falam. Carey was the son of the illustrious missionary William Carey of Serampore. The new Political Officer like his father was a great linguist and a naturalist. His hard labour and instinctive love for the hill men immensely helped the Government in establishing a sound administrative system in the Chin Hills. It would not be an exaggeration to state that Carey was the father of the Chin Policy of the Government since the time of the annexation of the Chin Hills. Sir Alexander Mackenzie, the Chief Commissioner of Burma, put so much reliance on him that in the Chin Lushai Conference (Calcutta), he produced a secret letter of Carey relating to the ethnology of the Chins which influenced the recommendations of the Conference.

Carey submitted annual reports to the Government of Burma and these reports were very valuable source of information.
He wrote, in his report, that the years 1891 and 1892 saw the explorations of the country almost throughout the length and breadth and except for a portion of the Pungsha country south of Lung and on the north of Chinbok tract of Arakan. Because of geographical proximity and allied nature of the administrative problem the Government of India formulated a policy that the Political Officer of the Chin Hills should meet the Superintendent of the South Lushai Hills at a convenient place every year. Accordingly, Carey met the Superintendent every year since 1890 but he informed the Chief Commissioner of Burma to abandon such an expensive experiment. The authorities in Rangoon approved of his suggestion and this practice was discontinued henceforward.

Administrative Measures Adopted by Carey.

Carey divided the administrative functions into three principal heads—Maintenance of law and order, construction of roads and collection of tributes. Law and order was entrusted with the army but Carey had to remain in constant touch with each and every expeditions.

At the beginning of October 1892 serious revolt took place among the Nwengals and Siyins. On October 10, 1892 a native Burman Magistrate, his clerk and interpreter were suddenly ambuscaded by a large party of Chins when the Magistrate was proceeding to Doombar, and the three were killed along with the seven sepoys by first volley. A strong party from Fort White relieved the rest of sepoys who were fighting for three hours. Chins were since then
firing at Tidim. Reenforcements of 200 British and 100 Native infantry and 2 guns were further sent from Fort White and 120 rifles from Falam were also sent there. The news of rising reached Manipur and the Manipur Administration, to relieve the pressure on the Chin Hills Administration, offered to send a column but this was declined with thanks by the Officer Commanding Burma District. The Quarter Master General also received the news from the military authorities of Burma that although the Nwengal and Siyins country was suffering from rebellion the Tashoons and Kamhows remained loyal. The revolt of Siyins and Nwengals which had its start in October 1892 continued for the following year. It has already been stated earlier how according to the scheme of General Stewart, army was mobilized in the Chin country. To suppress the rebellion, punitive expeditions were sent and severe punishments were inflicted on the rebels. Only a few Siyins in the neighbourhood of Pimpi remained disaffected and the rest recoiled. The Nwengals made overtures of complete surrender. Government was ruthless in suppressing the Siyin rebellion and with that motive the principal military operations were undertaken under the overall supervision of Colonel Corrier Bird who was succeeded, in March 1894, by G.L. Rolland. The object of the operation was achieved, the rebels and their leaders surrendered. The leaders were deported to Burma.

Mr. Fowler, the Assistant Political Officer, made a tour in the Nwengal country and succeeded in withdrawing a number
of guns, in collecting tribute, and in resettling the scattered
villages. Mr. Tuck, the Assistant Political Officer, visited the
Bungshe country and enforced reparation for the Rawyya outrage.
He also collected tribute and settled intervillage disputes.

The attitude of the Tashoons, the most powerful and
influential of the Chin tribes, was satisfactory. The Yokwas,
Hakas and Klang Klangs as well as Kanhows behaved very well. The
Assistant Political Officer at Haka did his best to assert his
influence among them.

Peace was restored in the Northern Chin Hills and
throughout the Chin tracts the influence of the Political Officer
was extended and also strengthened. The Chins accepted the author-
ity of the Political Officer and began to submit their disputes
to the arbitration of the Political Officer. By the year 1893 the
disarmament of the northern tribes had been thoroughly effected, and
about 1,722 guns were surrendered by the Chins. Complete disarma-
ment of the Tashoons and of the southern tribes had not taken by
that time but nearly one thousand guns had been collected from
them. The disarmament of the entire Chin tribes was not possible
at once, so Carey proposed gradual disarmament which received the
approval of the Chief Commissioner of Burma as a wise policy. The
Chin country was subdivided into two tracts - a northern, controlled
from Fort White, a southern, controlled from Fort Haka. During
the cold season the mobile troops used to visit the interior of
the country. The Assistant Political Officers at the head of the
garrison used to march from their respective forts to different places to halt at Yawdin, where-from they supervised the hills bordering Upper Chindwin district and the hills bordering Arakan Hill Tracts. The Political Officer of the Chin Hills, like his counter part in the North Lushai Hills, enjoyed special powers and he was the sole in charge of the administration under the direct supervision of the Chief Commissioner of Burma.

The tract administered from Falam included the country between Manipur on the north and the Chinbek country on the South and between the Upper Chindwin and Pakoku districts on the east, and the Lushai Hills of Bengal and Assam on the West. B.S.Carey was in charge of the administration since 1890. But the administration of Carey was just a temporary arrangement and it took its final shape after the formal inclusion of the Chin Hills into British Empire on September 5, 1896. In November 1893, the Chin Hills were constituted into separate military commands with headquarters at Kalewa under Colonel Corrie Bird.

Ranged approximately from north to south the main tribes inhabiting the Chin Hills were

- Thados
- Soktes, including the Nwengals and Kanhows.
- Siyins, including the clans of Tok King.
- Sagyilaing and Bweman.
- Tashens.
- Klangklangs.
- Hakas.
- Yokwas.
- Bungshes.

The Thados lived on the border of Manipur and in the
The most important incident of the year 1893-94 in the country bordering on Sawinghsup (Thaungdut) and HKami (Kauti) and the upper Chindwin district, was the commission of two serious raids in February 1894 on villages on the Upper Chindwin (Burma). Mr. Porter, the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Chindwin district, successfully conducted a force of military Police into the hills and inflicted suitable punishment on the Kaswa-Aswatre. Porter proposed establishment of temporary military posts during the open season on the borders of Upper Chindwin district. The matter was placed before the Inspector General of Police, Burma, for consideration.

The Subdivisional Officer at Yawin controlled the country of the Chin-boks, Yadus, and Chinbons on the borders of Pakoku district. Tribute was collected only from a comparatively small area on the edge of the district, the tribes beyond that limit being left unadministered. Law and order was maintained by the presence of the post of 200 Madras Infantry at Mindat.

The tribute collections in the Chin Hills for 1892-93 amounted to Rs.11,964-8-0. Carey, in his report, stated that the Chins, unlike the Kukies under Manipur, did not grow rice and had therefore nothing to export, so that it was not possible to raise the house tax to Rs.3 as was done by that State, nor was it possible to take tribute in rice which would enable the administration to feed the
garrisons and save the cost of the carriage of rice from Burma.

The recovery of Burmese captives from the Chins was practically completed two years ago (i.e. 1891). About 600 had been set free and had returned to their homes. Many of the Naga and Kukies captured by the Chins were sold out by them as slaves. According to the Administration Report 1893-94 there were the following deportees in Burma:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Date of Deportation</th>
<th>Where confined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ddyin</td>
<td>Siyin</td>
<td>Rebel chief 1892-93</td>
<td>7th Aug. 1893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyimvum</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Rebel 1892-93</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Myingyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanhow</td>
<td>Sokte</td>
<td>Rebel chief 1892-93</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaitwork</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawsein Bungshe</td>
<td>Abetment of murder &amp; firing on troops</td>
<td>20th April 1894</td>
<td>Pakoku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wumki</td>
<td>Lushai</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>1st July 1892</td>
<td>Myingyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darakham Bungshe</td>
<td>Abetment of murder &amp; firing on troops</td>
<td>20th April 1894</td>
<td>Pokoku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kappow</td>
<td>Siyin</td>
<td>Rebel chief</td>
<td>4th May 1894</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaikam</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Mindat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangpore</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three men who died in confinement were
(1) Kavmlung, Chief of the Toklaing clan of Siyins (2) Twumtong, Chief of Kaptyal and leader of Siyin-Nurengal rebellion (3) Powdal, son of Twumtong. The death of these Chiefs in British prison
could be comparable to the death of the Lushai Chiefs under the similar circumstances. This was another example of neglect on the part of the British administration of the undertrial prisoners.

**THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE SET UP.**

The Chin Hills were not declared part of British India till September 5, 1895 and consequently the Political Officer and Session Judge could only deal judicially with British subjects and offences committed by others were to be dealt with in his administrative capacity. Assistant Political Officers had no magisterial power. They also disposed of cases in administrative capacity, as it was impossible for cases to be allowed to run on indefinitely whilst the Political Officer was absent for months at a time on expedition or other political work.

**THE CHIN HILLS REGULATION.**

Carey submitted a Draft Regulation to the Government of Burma. This Regulation remedied the defects of the present administration. The assistants of Carey were invested with magisterial powers which was the crying need of the hour. The Regulation bears the testimony of administrative skill and experience of Carey. It received the due recognition from the Government of Burma and soon it became the basis of future administration of Chin Hills. The Regulation came in force in March 1896.

**POWERS OF THE SUPERINTENDENT.**

The Chief executive of the Chin Hills was the Superintendent and for all practical purposes he was the Deputy
Commissioner and District Magistrate and Collector in addition to that he had certain special powers. The Assistant Superintendent was in charge of a subdivision and his powers were like that of an Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Collector of the first class. According to the Regulation, the Chief Commissioner was to exercise the powers of the Financial Commissioner. The Regulation provided that the Chin Hills should constitute a sessions division of which the Superintendent be the Session Judge. The Government of Burma could invest any Assistant Superintendent with all or any of the powers of a Superintendent under this Regulation. The Superintendent and every Assistant Superintendent had civil jurisdiction to conduct the civil suits.

Subject to the Control of the Chief Commissioner the Superintendent was invested with power to impose fines on villages and on village community for their collusion with the criminals. He was further empowered to take drastic action against the offending tribes. He could detain all or any members of the tribe, clan, or village, deport them from the hills for life or any shorter term, detain or confiscate their property. The Superintendent had the power to prohibit the forming of new villages or to direct removal of villages. He had the power to expel the unwanted persons (not Chins) from the Chin Hills. The Superintendent under the Regulation was to fix the number of fire-arms and the quantity and descriptions of ammunitions which might be possessed by any tribe, clan or village, and might issue licenses either to persons or to the members of any tribe. He might grant licenses to
tribes or villages for the manufacture of gunpowder.

The above powers of the Superintendent are similar to the powers of the executive heads of the Lushai Hills and the Nagal Hills. With the exception that in Chin Hills the Superintendent had wider magisterial powers.

**COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TRIBES.**

The Chins, before the annexation of the Chin Hills, were under the Chin Chiefs and they exerted tremendous influence in the Chin social and political life. The English also followed this tradition and thus attempted to maintain the social tranquility. The Regulation empowered the Superintendent to appoint the headman of a village or group of villages. The headman had the general control of the tribe and was entrusted with certain judicial functions. In dealing with the criminal cases he was to follow the customary law and not subject to the Criminal Procedure Code. The provision for the headman in the Regulation enforced the collective responsibility of the tribes and the villages. It is also relevant to point out in this connexion both the North Lushai Hills and South Lushai Hills administration had already introduced those responsibilities upon the Lushais and Carey borrowed the idea from them.

In this connexion let us discuss the structure and compositions of Chin villages. Villages of the Haka Tribe might be considered as an illustrative example.

Haka (36 miles south of Falam) consists of two villages, Kolun and Kotarr, the old and the new village. It was the village
in which all the Chiefs of the tribe lived and at one time its influence extended far across the Kolodyne and Tyao rivers. Hakn

Kolum was divided into five parts:

(1) Sakum, the Shanpi quarter, with Shwe Hlym at its head.
(2) The Shante quarter with Lyen Mo as Chief.
(3) Klangum, the Kenlant quarter, under Munkum.
(4) Korrdon, under Boi Lin, La Sin and Karr Tsim.
(5) Farr we, some times called little Haka under Lyen Kwe.

In 1891 the five Chiefs mentioned above were chosen out of the many to conduct the affairs of the tribe, but the influence of that council was being gradually centered in Shwe Hlyen and Lyen Mao, although it was still found impossible to ignore the influence of such men as Lyen Paung, Van Lein, and others who had a well established control over certain villages. In 1896 the population structure of the Chin Tribes of the Northern Chin Hills were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribes</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siyin</td>
<td>1,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokte</td>
<td>2,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokte(Nwengals)</td>
<td>3,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanhows</td>
<td>3,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,775</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROBLEMS BEFORE THE FORMAL ANNEXATION OF CHIN HILLS.

The Chin Hills District was formally incorporated into British Empire on September 5, 1896. But the British Administration was set up there since 1890. The Chin Lushai Expedition crushed the backbone of the Chin Chiefs but they did not lose any opportunity to antagonise the English. In addition to their
hostility towards the English the new administration had to face the serious types of intertribal feuds which affected the smooth running of the administration. The Saiyuns and Nowengals were very ferocious of all the Chin tribes and several small expeditions were sent to check them. Before the Chin Hills Regulation was introduced in 1896 there had been no law in force in the Chin Hills. So Carey, in dealing with the troublesome Chiefs, had to face many difficulties in enforcing his authority. The difficulties came to an end after the introduction of the Regulation. The Chins were brought under the settled administration.

Although the Chin Hills did not come under the settled administration formally before 1896, the British Government took it for granted since 1890 that this would be done soon and with that view attempted to consolidate the British rule there. The pacification of the turbulent tribes was the primary aim of the Government. The problem was more or less the same in both the administrations of Assam and Burma. Geographical proximity and administrative similarity made the two Governments to think for the formation of one administrative unit for the whole of Chin Lushai country. This was the central idea behind the Chin Lushai Conference 1892. Foreign Department of the Government of India very carefully investigated the merits and demerits of one unit. Alexander Mackenzie, the Chief Commissioner of Burma, objected to the idea on the ground that the Chins and Lushais did not belong to the same race. In this respect he was guided by the
advice of Carey. The Conference dropped the proposal of one unit but this blunder foreboded complications for the future. According to the recommendations of the Conference the Chin Hills remained under the administration of Burma and the chances of its amalgamation with the Lushai Hills vanished for ever.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES SINCE 1896.

The administration laid more emphasis upon the problem of law and order after the formal annexation and this question was closely connected with the disarmament of the Chins. The task of disarmament in the Lushai Hills was almost complete but in the Chin Hills it caused considerable headache to the local officers of the Government of Burma. But the British officers very cautiously advanced step by step to disarm the Chin tribes. The primary aim of the disarmament was the pacification of tribes.

By the end of 1898, the Assistant Superintendent received the information of the armament of the Northern Chins. A campaign of disarmament followed. Some of the unwilling Chiefs resisted the measure of the Superintendent. They refused to surrender the unauthorized guns but the stern attitude of the Government of Burma compelled them to bow down before the local authorities. The rebel Siyins were deported. After the Siyins, the Soktes were disarmed and then the Norms and Nwngals. The Kamhows of the Manipur-Chin Hills border were a gunbearing tribe and for geographical difficulties it became very difficult on the part of the Chin Hills administration to enforce the order of disarmament very strictly. But the disarmament of the Kamhows were necessary
for the security of the frontier. The Superintendent entrusted the task of disarming the Kamhow clan to Howechinkup, a reliable Chin Chief of unquestionable loyalty. The said Chief discharged his duties admirably.

The measure of disarmament although did not achieve a spectacular success it attained the desired goal. The Chins were forced to realize that unauthorised possession of guns would not be tolerated by the Superintendent. Some clever Chiefs seized the opportunity of the policy and they even came forward to assist the local officers in this respect. The total number of guns withdrawn throughout the year 1898 amounted 2,808. In the succeeding years the Superintendent was more successful in his campaign of disarmament.

CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS.

The Chin country was not explored fully before the Chin Lushai Expedition. Before the Expedition the Military Department constructed certain roads to facilitate the advance of the army. But the number of roads in the Chin Hills were very few. Geographical difficulties were so immense that the Government of Burma realised that it was not possible to undertake a largescale programme of the construction of roads in the Chin Hills within a short time. But the roads became all the more necessary after the introduction of the British administration. So the authorities of Rangoon undertook to construct roads and adopted a phased programme. Two alternative routes from Falam to the Tyao river and from Tiddim to the Tyao river were surveyed during 1897-98
with the object of opening out a road into the Lushai Hills.

The Chin tribes living in the neighbourhood of Chindwin frontier gradually came in contact with the people of the plains due to the new facilities of communication and education was imparted to them.

**POLICE MEASURES.**

Immediately after the incorporation of the Chin Lushais into the British Empire, the local officers of the respective units met at a Conference at Lungleh. The Lushai Hills Military Police Battalion was brought into one unit under Major Loch. The strength of the Chin Hills Battalion was reduced from ten to nine companies which saved the treasury of Burma a lakh of rupees. An Assistant Superintendent of Police was appointed for the better management of the Police Department. The Governor General-in-Council soon communicated the Lieutenant Governor of Burma to consider further reduction in future. The communication, however, clearly stated that the number of British officers attached to the Chin Hills Police Battalion need not be reduced.

The instructions of the Viceroy helped the Exchequer and also the persons engaged in the Chin Hills Police Battalion but it failed to satisfy the Government of Burma. The problem of law and order still posed a challenge to the authorities of Rangoon. Reduction of expenditure and force from the Chin Hills was fraught with risk. On the other hand, the men in the troops had to feel the attack of hostile Nature. During the rains the soldiers fell
ill and a large number of them were considered unfit for any military operation. They did not like to stay at the unhealthy places of the Chin Hills. The memory of mutiny of the Lungleh Battalion was still fresh in the minds of the Government of India. All those considerations prompted the Viceroy to instruct the Government of Burma to adopt the principle of reduction of the Police.

Since 1897 Mindat was selected as the head quarters of the Assistant Superintendent of the Chin Hills Tract. The Assistant Commandant of the Military Police was stationed at Mindat Sakan. Both the Civil and Military Police worked hand in hand to ensure law and order in the Chin Hills.

The Inspector General of Police, Burma, in conformity with the spirit of instruction of the Vice-roy, proposed the withdrawal of the forces during the rains from Mindat Sakan and advised garrisoning of the fort during the winter only. The Government of Burma declined to accept the suggestion because that would make impossible for the Assistant Superintendent to remain at Mindat during the rains. Moreover, that course would cause unnecessary restiveness among the friendly Chins and Burmese.

Disarmament and collection of tribute were the two principal measures adopted by the Chin Hills administration and in execution of these the Chin Hill Police closely cooperated with the Superintendent. The Police force also guarded the survey parties and other bodies engaged in construction work. In short, the Police had been the backbone of the Government in restoring peace in the Chin Hills.
COLLECTION OF TRIBUTE.

The Chin Chiefs were comparatively less powerful than the Lushai Chiefs because almost all the petty village Chiefs were independent of others. The ryots of each village used to pay tribute to his Chief. This was the prevalent custom before the British rule. But the British administration levied tributes upon the Chin villages to enforce the sovereignty of the Crown. In Lushai Hills the tribute was almost fixed three rupees per house, but in Chin Hills it was left to the discretion of the Superintendent. In the Lungleh Conference in 1897 it was decided that in fixing the tribute the Chin administration should not follow any hard and fast rule. In 1892-93 only Rs.11,984-8-0 was collected from the entire Chin Hills. There was very little increase in the amount in the subsequent years. The tribute for the years 1896-97 being Rs. 17,098 and for 1897-98 being Rs.18,333. The Lushais were rice cultivators but not the Chins, therefore, the rice could not be levied upon the Chin ryots so that it could feed the British garrison posted in the Chin Hills. The cost of carriage of rice to the Chin Hills from Burma was very high. The authorities of Rangoon once proposed the collection of rice from the Chins but as early as 1893, Carey informed the Chief Commissioner of the futility of the proposal.

ABOLITION OF SLAVERY.

Slavery existed in the Chin Hills. The local officers persuaded the Chin Chiefs to do away with the custom gradually.
Although the order of the Government adversely affected the socio-economic life of the Chins, a large number of Chin Chiefs conceded to the demand made by the Superintendent. During the year 1897-98 a considerable number of slaves were released under the orders of the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendents. It was a positive step to secure the abolition of slavery in the Chin Hills. The Chin administration was very much particular on this point and gradually the slavery was abolished.

DEMARCATION OF THE BOUNDARIES.

The Chin Hills came under the control of British army during the Chin Lushai Expedition 1889-90. But the Government of Burma did not know correctly the exact area of the Chin Hills district. The tribes inhabiting in the border were the most troublesome subjects and they adversely affected the poise of law and order. In 1893-94 the Chief Commissioner of Burma appointed a Boundary Commission to demarcate the Manipur Chin Hills boundary. Carey and Porteous were engaged in the work throughout the cold season of that year and finally demarcated the border which is now recognized as the international frontier of India and Burma.

In 1897-98 the Government of Burma set up another Boundary Commission to demarcate the line between the Chin Hills and upper Chindwin and Pkokku districts. Mr. Inman was entrusted with this task. The demarcation commenced on the Tinzin Channg (Tuisa) in the Kabaw valley at the easternmost boundary pillar erected by the Manipur Chin Hills Boundary Commission in 1894, and terminated at a point six miles due west of the village Tillin on the Hill
above the Tilin Chaung in the Pakokku District. It is worth
mentioning in this connexion that this frontier of the Chin Hills
was comparatively well connected with the more advanced portion
of the settled districts of Burma and the delimitation of this
boundary brought the Chin tribes of this area gradually with the
light of the civilization.

PROBLEMS OF THE UNADMINISTERED TRACT.

It has already been pointed out that the Civil and Military
Police assisted the Superintendent in restoring the peace in the
Chin Hills. In the mean time the Chin Police was introduced. The
local tribes were recruited and trained under competent Gorkha
Subadars. The Chin Police proved to be very efficient soon.

Peace was restored in the administered tract of Chin Hills
but the unadministered territory adjoining the Pakkoku, Chin Hills
posed a challenge to the law and order problem of the Chin Hills.
In December 1900 the Chief of the village Khrum raided on the
tribute paying village of Shi-Khru-it. A British column of 150
rifles advanced against the Khrum village via Mindat. The garrison
halted at Khrum for three days, killed all the live stock they
found and when no one came to negotiate, the army burnt the village
and all the grains. In the punitive expedition the head Chief
Kwi Nai who attempted an escape was arrested and killed. The ring
leader of Shi-Khru-it massacre went underground. The English
inflicted severe punishment on the people of Khrum but failed to
bring them to book.

Mr. Cholmelby, the Commissioner, Minbu Division, went a
letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Burma urging the occupation of the Khrum country as soon as possible. He further suggested that the Government should better keep a proper watch upon the movement of the Khrum people and prevent their 'taungyas' on the unadministered tract. Although the Khrum people were punished, the Commissioner apprehended danger from the escaped ringleaders who were determined to carry on their intertribal feuds. In that case they might draw the more powerful trans-Mon tribes into quarrel. To put a check upon those border explosions the Commissioner proposed the incorporation of the entire Khrum country into Burma by extending the existing boundary which would then pass round the head of the Tlutlong or Mon river and then down the western watershed of that river to where it meet the present boundary. He, however, pointed out the heavy expenditure and other difficulties in this respect.

**TYD'S ADVANCE TO KHRUM.**

The presence of the powerful gunbearing tribes in the Khrum country became a nightmare to the local officers who employed equally ferocious Chin Police to check the offenders. For some time the Pokokku Chin frontier witnessed the bloody duel between the uncontrolled Chins and the Chin Police. The Khrum Chins under the cover of nights perpetrated horrible raids upon the British subjects. The Chin Police under Mr. Tyd advanced into the unadministered tract to capture the outlaws. The force under Tyd took terrible revenge upon the Chins. He proposed the
annexation of the tract but the Government of Burma did sanction it because the disadvantages were more than the advantages of occupying the Khram country. The Government of Burma instructed, however, to the Inspector General of Police to post an Assistant Commandant of Military Police to Kan Patlet in place of the Inspector of Police.

But this was just a temporary measure for the maintenance of law and order. Very soon the unadministered tract posed another serious challenge to the Chin administration and the tract continued to be the thorn on the flesh of the Government of Burma.

EXTENSION OF CIVILIZATION.

The pace of extension of civilization in Chin Hills was comparatively slower than that of the Lushai Hills. The Lushais came in contact with the English earlier and they lived in close proximity of Silchar or Chittagong but the Chins lived in such an isolated place far off from Rangoon that it took a considerable period of time to civilize them. Since the annexation of Upper Burma (1886), the occupation of Chin Hills became inevitable from the standpoint of law and order, and naturally the British Government was interested in the law and order more than anything else. The entire administrative machine was geared up to that effect. But it would be wrong to state that the Government did not do anything to civilize the Chins. In 1892 a telegraph office was opened at Falam. The settlement of the boundary between the Northern Chin Hills and Chindwin district
brought the border Chins closer with the people of the plains of Burma. This helped the spread of education. From Yokwa and Haka the Chin traders came down to Tidim and other places through the newly constructed roads to sell their hill produce. So long they lived in splendid isolation but gradually that spell was broken although very slowly. In Lushai Hills the Missionary enterprise largely contributed to extend the civilizing influence among the tribes but the Chins were unfortunate in this regard because no Mission, Christian or Buddhist, undertook this responsibility in the Chin Hills.
Notes on Chapter VI

I.F.Pol A - is the abbreviation of India, Foreign Department, Political (A) Proceedings.

I.F.Ext A - is the abbreviation of India, Foreign Department, External Proceedings (A).

I.F.Ext A K.W.- is the abbreviation of India, Foreign Department, External Proceedings, Keep with (the notes of the officers.)

B.P.P. - Bengal, Political Proceedings.

B.J.P.(Pol)- Bengal, Judicial Proceedings of the Political Department.


8. I.F.Extl A. March 1889 No. 15. Translation of report from Lukhon Singh, Private, through the Officers Commanding at Demagiri.


10 + 11. Reid A.S. - Chin Lushai Land p-60.

13. I.F.Extl A. March 1889. No. 56. The Govt of India's memorandum to the Secretary of State. Also Shakespear L.W.- Op cit. p-84. See also Reid A.S. op cit p-60.


17. Ibid p. 92.


19. 'Bung Shey' in the Burmese means long turban. In Burma the 'Shindus' of Arakan frontier are known in the Burmese dialect as 'Bungshey'. Reid A.S. p.94.

20. Supra p. 97.

21. Kobo Valley for long had been under the rule of the Rajas of Manipur who connected the valley with the Manipur State Capital.


23. "Yokwa has submitted and has agreed to all our terms. They have guaranteed that no more shots will be fired at posts or convoys. If another shot be fired, please burn at once nearest village except Rawvan, which is not to be destroyed except under the General's special instructions, without further warning. Rawvan village is working for us" - Message of Major Symonds - Chin Lushai Land p-114.


36. Ibid. Extract from the proceedings of the Chief Commissioner of Burma No. 4R-8.

37. Ibid.

38. B.B.P. May 1896. No. 7 File 777 DRAFT REGULATION corresponding number of section in the Kachin Hill Tribes Regulation.
39. Ibid. Section 14(1) of the Regulation.
40. Ibid Section 22 of the Regulation.
41. Ibid See HEADMEN AND THEIR POWERS Section 6(2) of the Regulation.
47. I.F.Extl A. January 1897. No. 172. List of subjects to be considered and reported on by the conference to be held at Lungleh in December 1896. See also I.F.Extl A. February 1898 No. 96. E.A.Gait, Secretary, Chief Commissioner of Assam to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bengal. See also No. 97. Secretary, Govt of India to the Chief Commissioner, Assam.
48. I.F.Extl A. September 1901. No. 24. Officiating Chief Secretary, Govt of Burma to the Secretary, Foreign Department, Govt of India. Dated June 1, 1901.
50. I.F.Extl A. May, 1900 No. 150, Demarcation of the boundary between the Lushai Hills and Manipur, Report by of the Commissioners.
52-53. I.F.Extl A. June 1901. Nos. 72-73. Commissioner of Minbu Division to the Chief Secretary, Govt of Burma, (A copy of the Report by the Assistant Superintendent, Pakokku Chin Hills, on the punitive expedition taken against Khrum).
'Taungyas' - Chin method of periodical cultivation.
55. In 1907 the villagers from the South Lushai Hills were kidnapped by the people of the village Zongling (unadministered tract) and were subsequently murdered. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam took up the matter with the Government of India to devise means for the punishment of the Chief of Zongling.- I.F.Extl. A. February 1908, No. 113. Extract from the summary of
events submitted by the officiating Superintendent, Chin Hills, for the week ending in February 1907.


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