To understand the proper nature of universal or jāti it is imperative to understand what upādhi or non-jāti is. Upādhis or jātibādhakas are the counter examples of universals. By counter example is meant a case to which the definition does not apply. A jātibāhaka is an argument which is put forward to defend the definition of universal or jāti against a counter example. All common traits do not necessarily constitute sāmāya or jāti. The universal is the natural and external class-essence such as, redness, potness, cowness etc. Other general characteristics such as, cookness, tallness, blindness etc. which are accidental features are recognised not as universals (jāti) but as upādhis.

It is usually said that the teachers of the Vaiśeṣika school are the advocates of the theory of jātibādhakas. It is Udayana who first introduces the theory of jātibādhakas in his Kiranāvalī, a commentary on Praśastapāda-bhāṣya. But actually he is a commentator of the Vaiśeṣika system and of the Nyāya system as well. Subsequently, a section of the later Nyāya school headed by Śāvanātha and
and Dinakara Bhaṭṭa follow the foot-prints left by Udayana on this issue and place this doctrine on a firm footing.

The distinction between jāti and upādhi becomes of immense importance in Nyāya-Nyāya, because of its conception of the essence of reality (padārthas). The conception of the universals belonging to the categories of substances, quality and action can be regarded as possessing genuine class-nature (jāti). The other categories, viz. universal (sāmānyya), particularity (viśeṣa), inherence (saṃvāya) and non-existence (abhāva) cannot be said to possess real class-nature (jāti) inhering in them. The champions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school like Udayana admit six impediments called jātibādhakas against the doctrine of universal or jāti.\(^1\)

Evidently the theory of jātibādhakas is expressed conforming to antilogical scheme of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In a case where one or more impediments are present, they to be regarded as upādhi. The impediments operate in distinct ways. The conditions that lead to invalidation of a jāti are:

1. Vyakta abhedas tulyatvam sañkarō'tha' navasthitih /
   Rūpahāmir asambandho jātibādhaka - samgrahah //
   - Kirāṇāvalī, page 33,
   See also NSM, p. 58-59.
Vyakterabheda: The character belonging to a particular cannot stand for jāti. The permanent trait of ākāśa (ākāṣatva) should not be regarded as universal, as it is unique to ākāśa. It is not a proper universal, but an imposed property. A proper universal must have more than one individual as instances.

Tulyatva: Two nomenclatures with the same meaning cannot stand for different universals. For example ghaṭatva and kalaṣatva cannot be considered a pair of universals. The words ghaṭa and kalaṣa denote the same particular. The same individuals cannot be the substrate of two distinct universal properties. If anyone insists that in addition to jarness (ghaṭatva) there is a second property kalaṣatva inhering in the same jar, he is certainly speaking of an imposed property.

Sāmkarya: If one of the two properties does not fall completely within the other, then neither is a proper universal property. But of them must be imposed properties. This fault is known as cross-connection (sāmkarya). The property of being elemental (bhūtatva) and the property of being material (mūrtatva) are not universals, for earth, water, fire and air are both elements and materials but ether (ākāśa) is an element and not material, while mind (manas) is material but not an element. So elemental hood
and materiality being two cross-dividing characters should be regarded as upādhīs.

Anavastha - If the incorporation of any property leads to an infinite regress (anavasthā) then it should not be regarded as a proper universal, but an imposed property. If we assume that universal property possesses another universal property (sāmānyatva) common to all universals such as firmness, cowness etc. then another universality (sāmānyatvatva) would have been required to make synthesis of the former with the latter. Similarly, a third universality would be necessary to synthesise the second with other universals in which it inheres and so on ad infinitum. 2

Rūpahāni - The specific qualities by nature cannot be regarded as a class. Ultimate differences (viśeṣas) of the Vaiśeṣikas are by nature things which differentiate without assimilating. If anyone insists that an identical property "viśeṣatva" inheres in all viśeṣas he is certainly speaking

2. sāmānyeṣu sāmānyam nāma nā paraṁ sāmānyam
   asti, atrā'pi sāmānyaprāptyā' navasthāvat -
   Nyāyakandalī, page 52, lines 7-8,
   Gaṅgānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā, Vol. I.,
   Varanasi 1963.
of an imposed property or upādhi, not a proper universal. Vīśeṣas can mutually be distinguished by their own specific qualities. If Vīśeṣṭva be admitted to distinguish diverse ultimate individuators it would contradict self identical nature and they will cease to be Vīśeṣas. 3

Asambandha - Absence of the relation of inherence debars samavāyatva and abhāvatva from being reckoned as universal. Universal inheres in its substrates. So things in which nothing can inhers cannot be the substrates of a universal. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, nothing inheres in the categories of inherence (samavāya) and non-existence (abhāva). If samavāyatva is considered to be a class of jāti inhering in inherence (samavāya) it would lead to infinite regress. In case of negation also nothing inheres in it because it is not a positive entity. Therefore, samavāyatva and abhāvatva should not be regarded as proper universal but

upādhis. Of these six impediments to universalhood the first and the third debar a character from being reckoned as universal. The second impediment sets aside the apparent difference between two characters each claiming to be a distinct universal. The three remaining impediments impede a thing from being the substrate of a universal.

It is to be noted that a section of neo-naiyāyikas do not view cross-division to be an impediment. They do not accept the principle that two universals cannot be partially coincident and partially exclusive.

Udayanācārya, a great champion of older school holds that two universals partially exclusive cannot be treated as jātis. He affirms that classes are systematically divided from the highest to the lowest. The lower classes though included in the highest ones, mutually exclude each other. If we admit mutually exclusive natural classes, all cross-division would totally be meaningless. It is for this

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5. tādṛśaniyame mānābhāvān na sāṅkaryam jātibādhakam iti navyāḥ - Dinakari, page 58.
reason Udayana declines to recognise cross-dividing attributes as universals.

But this view of Udayana does not satisfy a section of the neo-logicians. They hold that, there is no reason to support that two co-inhering universals must be related as higher and lower. If partial exclusion of one by the other is not regarded as a bar in the case of the universals related as higher and lower, there is no convincing reason to deny universality to the attributes which are partially coincident and partially exclusive.

Vardhamāna in his Prakāśa on Kṛṣṇa-valī observes that if cross-connecting attributes, are not considered as universals, many of the accepted genuine universals like goldness, pot- ness etc. would turn into upādhis, since these universals do partially coincide and are partially exclusive.

Thus it appears that the old and the new schools of Nyāya differ among themselves in regard to the treatment of cross-connection (sāmkarya). But we notice perfect harmony over the remaining five impediments. This distinction between jāti and upādhi brings out clearly the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of universal as natural class-essences existing in the objective world. General attributes other than universals,
known as upādhis, are also real characters of things. These attributes are imposed properties and they form the basis of many of our generalisations and classifications. Some neo-logicians like Rāmarudrī represents upādhi as sāmānya in a broader sense. Upādhis may again be sub-divided under two heads - sakhaṇḍa and akhaṇḍa. The former is analysable, and the latter is unanalysable.

We have already pointed out that a section of the Naiyāyikas admit the importance of the doctrine of jāti-bādhakas. By admitting the jātibādhakas we can indicate a systematic way of discussing or construing counter examples to the definition of sāmānya. These Naiyāyikas claim that the list of jātibādhakas is not a random collection of negative arguments but a systematic collection of all possible negative arguments that can defend the definition of universal against all possible counter examples to which the definition of universal does not apply.

The Great Commentator Dinakara Bhaṭṭā classifies the six jātibādhakas under two groups - jātibādhaka and jātimattva-bādhaka. The difference between jātibādhaka and jātimattva-bādhaka is that, while jātibādhaka rejects only the claim of certain properties of a thing to be regarded as jāti, jātimattvabādhaka does the same with subject to all the properties
of that thing. Of the six jātibādhakas the second and the third impediments in the list given in Kīcyāvalī belong to the first group and the remaining impediments to the second group.

The jātibādhakas are usually used to defend the definition of universal from the counter examples but the second and the third jātibādhakas (tulyatva and sāmkarya) in the list are obviously excluded by the definition in question. Therefore, these two jātibādhakas are not counter examples in any usual sense. In our consideration the first impediment 'Vyakterabheda' is not a jātimattvabādhaka, but a jātibādhaka in usual sense, since it rejects the claim of certain property viz., ākāsātva to be a jāti inhering in ākāśa. The last three of the second group of jātibādhakas are not actually jātibādhakas but jātimattvabādhakas. The second group, thus, actually consists of jātibādhaka and jātimattvabādhaka. Since the last three suggest some sort of unity, an attempt may be made to reduce their number.

The last three of the second group are used to demonstrate successively that sāmānya, viśeṣa and samavāya do not possess universal. The argument asambandha which is used to show that samavāya and abhāva do not possess universal can be used equally to show that sāmānya and viśeṣa do not possess universal. Dinakara Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on
Muktāvalī explains the word "asambandha" in the sense of "absence of the relation of inherence." None of these four categories can be a referent (positive or counter-positive) in the relation of inherence (pratiyogita-nuyogita-tānyatara sambandhena samavāyabhāvah). The three impediments—anavasthā, rūpahāni and asambandha can be merged into asambandha. We can, thus, reduce the number of jātibādhakas in the sense of jātimattvabādhakas. We have already discussed that there is only one jātibādhaka viz, vyakterabheda. Therefore, it would not be wrong to hold that the list of the jātibādhaka in the sense of either jātibādhaka or jātimattvabādhaka may be made to contain no more than two bādhakas.

Time seems to be appropriate to make a comment in this context that the introduction of the doctrine of jātibādhaka with a view to defend the definition of universal against all possible counter examples is not logically sound. If the knowledge of the counter examples is required to understand the proper

6. asambandhaḥ pratiyogitā' nuyogitā' nyatarasambandhena- samavāyabhāvah -
Dinakari, page 107.
essence of universal, similarly the comprehension of all possible counter examples would be required to defend the definitions of guṇa and karma. But neither Udayana nor his followers admit the guṇabādhakas or karmabādhakas. It is perhaps for this reason a section of the neo-logicians reject the doctrine of jātibādhaka.