CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES' DILEMMA IN ARMING INDIA AFTER THE SINO-INDIA WAR

The widening rift between India and China arising from their border dispute on the heights of the Himalayas, towards the closing years of 1950’s and the opening years of 1960’s, provided unique opportunities to the United States in her efforts to draw India into a closer working association with herself on an anti-communist basis. The India-China border dispute, which escalated into an armed conflict in October 1962, and the Soviet Union’s equivocal attitude towards the development arising mainly from the Cuban Missile Crisis during the same fateful month, led the Indian government into closer cooperation with and complete

dependence on the Western Powers led by the United States. India's acceptance of the prompt military assistance from the Western Powers during the crisis, resulted in the reversal of her much publicized policy of not accepting military assistance from any quarter — which she considered inimical to the policy of non-alignment. On the other hand, the United States' prompt response to India's difficulties seemed to endanger her own alliance-relationship with Pakistan, and hence, the U.S. felt impelled to persuade New Delhi into agreeing to a series of talks with the Pakistanis on the Jashmir problem.\(^2\) The termination of the Cuban crisis enabled the Soviet Union to take an active interest in the South Asian developments to India's satisfaction, and this in turn, enabled New Delhi to avoid being completely dependent on the Western Powers. After the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire, and as the danger of another Chinese intervention grew less, India saw in her complete dependence on the Anglo-American powers two dangers to her interests. First, for the small amount of arms from these powers to defend her disputed boundary with China, she might have had to barter away the greater part of Kashmir; and, secondly, the possibility of the loss of the Soviet good will so seriously built up over the years and which alone saved her in difficult situations in the past. India, therefore, tried to let herself off the Western hook neutralizing her ultra-

\(^2\) In case of an accord between India and Pakistan on Jashmir, it is observed, "Washington might have been relieved of its ally as well, in view of Pakistan's reasons for joining the alliance - a point that American leaders apparently overlooked." Barada ("India and America At Odds", *International Affairs* (*J.l.A.*), Vol. 49, No. 3, July 1973, p. 377.
friendliness with the Anglo-Americans by equally urgently directing her efforts to be in good book of Moscow. United States, herself, was placed on the two horns of a dilemma — whether to allow Pakistan, already in her alliance partnership, to drift towards China in exchange for a hesitant and uncertain India. She made her efforts to get the differences between India and Pakistan sorted out so that these South Asian countries could forge an understanding between themselves for the common defence of the sub-continent with her backing. But the bone-deep differences between India and Pakistan led American experiment on a joint front to its logical failure. Disappointed with her experiments, United States reverted to her old policy of preference for Pakistan in South Asia, despite the new China-Pakistan entente that had emerged soon after the Indo-China war. On the other hand, failing to enlist unqualified United States' support in matters vitally affecting her national interests — such as the Kashmir question — India realised the inexpedience of the overt friendship which was threatened by her conspicuous dependence on the West. Further, only by maintaining all the attributes of the policy of non-alignment could India maintain maximum manoeuvrability both with her neighbours and with the Super Powers. Constrained, as they were, to direct their efforts to attain their long-range national interests within the inflexible setting of power-relationship, India and the United States gradually reverted to their own respective positions — India to a qualitative equidistance between the power blocs, and the United States to a pro-Pakistan neutrality in the South Asian squabbles. The brief Indo-American military-honeymoon, overshadowed by the United States' unsuccessful efforts to bring harmonious relations between the two South Asian rivals, characterised Indo-American relations during the period between
the Himalayan border war and the South Asian War over Kashmir in 1962.

India's Requests For Support Against China: United States' Response:

Even before the Sino-Indian dispute assumed armed proportions by 20 October 1962, United States policy-makers viewed with satisfaction the new Indian policy of 'forward defence' vis-à-vis China. The acting Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sparkman, pledged continued assistance to India on the ground that she (India) was 'pressing very hard against Communist China' and was 'moving in the direction that we have been wanting her to move for a long time.' On the other hand, India's policy makers at that time could not foresee the danger of any armed clash of the magnitude that was to start in October 1962. India, during the summer of 1962 was occupied with the problem of Kashmir which was before the Security Council. During the debate in the Security Council defence minister V.P. Krishna Menon declared on 3 May 1962 that the Sino-Indian relations 'were happy' and 'will continue to be happy.' A few days later he responded to reported willingness of the U.S. to assist India's military defence against China stating that he would not 'drop a post card to the Pentagon.' India could not carry the United States all the way with it on matters relating to the Kashmir question, and on 29 June 1962 Prime Minister Nehru regretted that 'when matters concerning subjects which concern us greatly ... drop up, it should be our misfortune that the two Great Powers, the United


States and the United Kingdom, should invariably be against us. 5 On 14 August 1962 he turned down the demands for seeking foreign military assistance to prepare in defence against China on the ground that it would inhibit the policy of non-alignment: "Personolly I do not think that we shall maintain our independence for long if we go about seeking military aid from others to defend ourselves. That is apart from its being fundamentally opposed to the policy we have pursued all this time of being unaligned (emphasis added) — a policy which is not only being recognised everywhere as the right policy but which is spreading all over the world. Even those stout and big countries that are aligned have come to respect it ...... But to get military aid (is) to become somebody else's dependent in that way ...... If our country cannot defend itself and die if necessary in the attempt then we are not either maintaining our honour or dignity or strength or capacity. 6

However, the armed clashes on the border, amounting to an undeclared war starting on 20 October 1962 between China and India, 'had awakened in India a new sense of realism.' 7 Nehru himself admitted that India was


6. Lok Sabha debates, Third Series, Vol. 6, No. 7, 14 August 1962, col. 1754 and col. 1772. In order Years before, when the United States decided to give military aid to Pakistan, Nehru declared in Parliament that India will not 'commit that wrong', because by the acceptance of foreign military aid, Nehru said 'we will be doomed and we will have no justification left for any policy after that ...... it is entirely opposed to the basic policy that we have been pursuing. And if we take any country's aid ...... our whole policy ends there and we have to consider afresh as to how we should proceed in the matter.' *Parliamentary Debates: House of the People, Official Report*, art 2, Vol. 1, No. 4, 22 February 1964, col. 428.

'getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world' and was
'living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation.' India, therefore,
was 'shocked out of it.'

Encompassed by the new 'realities' Nehru's India was constrained to
seek assistance from the outside world to resist the Chinese advance,
India's declared and much publicised inhibition on the latter notwith-
standing. The unhelpful Soviet attitude during the first few days of the
undeclared war, which was regarded in New Delhi 'not only as making out
even as offensive' was contrasted by prompt American gesture of support
to India. The American State Department in a communiqué dated 21 Octo-
expressed that the United States 'was shocked at the violent and aggressive
action of the Chinese Communists against India', and an official end-it

8. Times of India, 26 October 1962.

9. Within hours of the undeclared war, Premier Khruschev in a letter
to Nehru expressed concern at the Indian decision to take up arms
against China and called it 'very dangerous path' and called on
Nehru to accept the Chinese proposals for further negotiations.
See: Sayar (Kuldip), Between the Lines, Allied, Bombay 1969, p. 192.
For China's offer see Ministry of External Affairs, Time Paper
No. VII, 23-24 Oct., p. 194. On 25 October Sayar observed the
notorious 'McMahon Line', which was never recognized by China, was
foisted on the Chinese and Indian Peoples. ..... The imperialists
are dreaming day and night of seizing these great powers (China and
India) at loggerheads, as well as undermining the Soviet Union's
friendship with fraternal China and friendly India. The article also
condemned the 'reactionary circles inside India' for provoking the
conflict. It also welcomed the Chinese offer of 24 October disengage-
ment and talks as sincere and constructive which could be an accept-
able basis for the talks to start. As reported in New York Times,
23 October 1962. For the evolution of the Soviet policy during the
period, Vaidyanath (P.), "The Reaction of the Soviet Union and other
Communist States" International Studies, Vol. 5, Nos. 1-2, July-
October, 1963, pp. 70-74; Sayar (Kuldip), Soviet Policies towards India
From Stalin to Brezhnev, Vikas, Delhi, 1970, pp. 163-161.

clear that any Indian request for aid to resist the Chinese would be 'considered sympathetically.' India, in the background of the overt antipathy, had little choice other than looking forward to the United States-led western powers, whom Nehru castigated as 'at least as bad as the Chinese,' to help her in resisting the Chinese. Rejecting the Chinese offer to 'reopen peaceful negotiations' and determining to resist the 'blatant aggression by China' 'at all cost,' Nehru addressed a general appeal to all heads of governments or states, barring Portugal and South Africa, for 'support and sympathy' in resisting the Chinese advance. The issue involved in the border war was 'not of small territorial gain', but of 'standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries' and 'whether the world will allow the principle of "right is right" to prevail in international relations.' He also pointed out that 'this crisis is not only of India but of the World' and will have far-reaching consequences on the standards of international behaviour and on the face of the world.'

According to a Kennedy associate, Nehru's letter was delivered to the President by the Indian ambassador B. Nehru in person. The Indian ambassador while delivering the letter explained to Kennedy that "the

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13. In a note given by the ministry of external affairs, New Delhi, to the embassy of China in India, on 22 October 1962, included in *White Papers No. VII*, p. 127.

Prime Minister, after all these years in the neutralist pacifist camp, found it difficult to make a direct request for armaments from the United States. He (Prime Minister Nehru) was hoping, instead, that the President in his reply would offer 'support' instead of 'military assistance' on the basis of 'sympathy' instead of an 'alliance'.

Kennedy in his reply to Nehru pointed out that he had no intention to take advantage of 'India's misfortune to coerce her into a pact' and the United States would support India on the basis of 'sympathy'. He translate the U.S. support into 'military specifics' should be left to the American representatives in India. Long before the armed clashes between China and India, United States have India to understand that she could not allow China to destroy her. In January 1962 Dr. Henry Kissinger, who visited South Asia then as President Kennedy's special emissary, promised India of U.S. support in case of a Chinese invasion. According to the then Pakistani resident, Nehru requested American military assistance even before the border war started. According to him, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States could gather from an American state department official on 2 October 1962 that Nehru in his meeting with ambassador eleventh that morning asked for American military assistance against the Chinese and said about: not only promised to assist but also stated it was for India


16. Ibid., p. 665.

to spell out the specific requirements. According to the same account, on 8 October the Pakistani ambassador to Washington was informed of a specific Indian request for arms, together with a request to Pakistan to make a gesture of good will towards India which could impress India into solving the Kashmir problem. 18

In reply to Nehru's request for support and sympathy, President Kennedy replied on 27 October: 'The occasion of it is a difficult and painful one for you and a sad one for the whole world. Yet there is a sense in which I welcome your letter, because it permits me to say to you what has been in my mind since the Chinese Communists have begun to press their aggressive attack into Indian territory. I know I can speak or my whole country when I say that our sympathy in this situation is wholeheartedly with you. You have displayed an impressive degree of forbearance and patience in dealing with the Chinese. You have put into practice what all great religious teachers have urged and so few of their followers have been able to do. Alas, this teaching seems to be effective only when it is shared by both sides in a dispute. I want to give you support as well as sympathy. This is a practical matter, and if you wish, my ambassador in New Delhi can discuss with you and the officials of your government what we can do to translate our support into terms that are practically most useful to you as soon as possible.' 16 Despite his preoccupation with the


19. in Nayar (Kuldip), Between the Lines, Hind Pocket Books, Delhi, 1971, pp. 192-198.
Cuban missile crisis which occurred during the border war. President Kennedy regarded the India-China border war as 'more significant in the long run' because India was the only country on the mainland Asia capable of competing for political and economic leadership with the Chinese. After 20 October special groups in the American government were set up to monitor the India-China clashes and by Monday morning, 20 October, "Washington was in a position to devote a lot of attention to the Chinese-Indian problem as the Cuban missile crisis came to an end. United States also, for the first time, took a public position supporting the Indian assertion of the validity of the Kaschmir Line as the accepted international border.


between India and China. 23

India's determination to resist the Chinese advance, however, was contingent upon Pakistan's willingness not to embroil herself — or at least to maintain neutrality — in the war. United States' stake in preventing the Chinese Communists from advancing into the South Asian land mass at this critical point of time depended on the behaviour of its NATO and SADTO ally. 24 United States and her British ally, therefore, persuaded the Pakistanis to refrain from intervening against the troubled Indians at the moment of the great peril to the whole of South Asia. Parallelizing his

23. Ambassador, Walter L. Ulbrait, said in a statement on 27 October: 'The non-armed line is the accepted international border and is sanctioned by modern usage. Accordingly, we regard it as the northern border of the Nanking area.' Cited in Hindustan Standard, 28 October 1962. Later, he elaborated that 'as a practical matter, even more than as a moral issue,' United States supported 'the Indian view that borders that are sanctioned by modern usage must be accepted, if nations are to live in peace with each other.' Here it otherwise, he observed, Italy of today could claim England, in a speech at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, on 20 February 1963. Hindustan Standard, 21 February 1963.

24. A rockings Institution publication concluded as early as 1960 that from the point of view of security India and Pakistan constituted a single entity: 'The main question that arises (after the transfer of British authority) is of the ability of India and Pakistan, either by themselves or with such support as Great Britain and the United States can give them, to carry out the responsibility of defence that they have acquired. This responsibility is divided between them, and the successful fulfilment of it depends on the harmonious co-operation of the two states in a common defense. For the new political boundaries of the Indian sub-continent have little relation to strategic position,' it also observed that the 'feasible approach' for external threat was by way of the northwest land frontier 'the defense of which lies wholy in Pakistan hands' and hence 'the security of India is directly dependent on the readiness of Pakistan to take action' (emphasis added). 'The defense of the sea approaches, in contrast, is primarily the responsibility of India....' It concluded: 'Thus relations between the two states are a measure of the security of the sub-continent' (emphasis added).— Brookings Institution (International Studies Group of the ______); Washington, D.C., Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1950, George Indiana Publishing Company, Inc., Madison, Wisconsin/Washington, D.C., 1950, p. 354. See also pp. 291-292 and p. 258.
letter to Nehru, promising U.S. sympathy and support, President Kennedy in a confidential communication with his Pakistani counterpart Ayub Khan, assured him that the proffered military aid to India was conditioned by its use strictly against the Chinese and it would not be used against the Pakistanis. He also promised that the aid to India to be used against the Chinese would not inhibit United States' larger commitments to Pakistan in military assistance. Kennedy also suggested Ayub to privately assure Nehru that Pakistan would not interfere against India in the war and the Indian troops stationed in the Pakistan border could safely be immobilized to engage them against the Chinese. This generous move on Pakistan's part, Kennedy stressed, could create a favourable atmosphere for the Kashmir settlement. 25

Although, Ayub showed his anguish against the American decision brusquely telling the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan that he would not be available for a week to read Kennedy's letter 26 and took off on a hunting trip to the Karakoram Mountains and 'thereby avoided having to receive President Kennedy's letter', 27 the United States' indication that it would look with any idea of Pakistan's embroilment in the war with concern, limited Pakistan's hostilities against India merely to verbal utterances. However, Kennedy's hints at a Kashmir settlement, later en posed almost as a quid pro quo for arms which was promised to India, created much of the

25. Text of the letter in Khan (Field Marshal Mohamed Ayub), Friends, pp. 141-143; also see Sorensen (Theodore C.), Kennedy, pp. 664.


embarrassment to the United States and India soon after the border war.

United States' NATO ally Great Britain was equally concerned at the possibility of Pakistan being dragged into the war making India's resistance more difficult. Even before President Kennedy's request to Pakistan, its Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogo, assured Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth Secretary, in London on 27 October that India was in no danger of attack from Pakistan. While conveying to Nehru through the Anglo-American channels his indication that Pakistan would not create any new military problems for India, President Ayub hinted what he wanted as a price for his government's neutrality, in his reply to Nehru's general appeal through the letter of 26 October. He endorsed Nehru's plea for maintenance of principles of international behaviour and added that the Indo-Pakistani disputes over Kashmir could also be resolved amicably 'should the Government of India decide to apply these principles with sincerity and conviction.' This was even made more clear to the United States through Agha Hillaly, the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi who proposed to Ambassador Galbraith to press the Indians for 'a reasonable position in Kashmir in return for a guarantee from Pakistan.'

While United States could restrain her NATO and SEATO ally from troubling India in her resistance against the Chinese Communists, she was


put into an embarrassing situation of her having to ask new Delhi in its hour of peril to come to terms with the Pakistanis. However, Kennedy rejected a suggestion from Galbraith 'of forcing the Indians to make a generous Kashmir offer by conditioning a large aid offer upon it.' The Kennedy government was put into a dilemma similar to the one for Great Britain to maintain Fascist Italy in the 'free world' without encouraging her aggressiveness. The new geopolitical realities warranted that Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. must not block the path of American-Indian cooperation against China. In the words of an American columnist: 'Washington recognizes Pakistan's loyalty to the two Asian alliances arranged by the Eisenhower Administration and rather less enthusiastically endorsed by Kennedy. But we also recognize that Pakistan represents only 20 per cent of the subcontinent and is divided into distant halves. The sole hope of establishing a viable competitor to China is in India. So our affection for an ally is tempered by geographical reality.' United States, in her determination to prevent the Chinese from overrunning India was selective in her approach and was determined not to provoke the Pakistani wrath.

According to Sorensen, Kennedy saw no gains for India and for the United States, or for the 'free world' in 'making this fight our fight in the

32. Sorensen (Theodore C.), op.cit., p. 664. Galbraith, however, gave a different account. He recorded in his diary on 29 October that he counselled, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan in a telegram on the contents of Kennedy's letter to Ayub suggested that if Ayub would assure Nehru as regards China, the United States would take a strong stand on Pakistan's behalf on Kashmir. Galbraith also recorded his concern thus: 'This alarmed me. It would seem that the Americans and Pakistanis were working together to seek the surrender of territory just as the Chinese were grabbing land.' Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, Jaico, op.cit., p. 159.

United States' policy, after it decided to support India, was to give the Chinese an impression of the strength that will deter them; by forging an informal South Asian Locarno.

On 29 October, Ambassador Galbraith called on Nehru with the letter from President Kennedy offering sympathy and support. Nehru told the U.S. Ambassador that India 'indeed have to have aid and it would have to come from the United States,' but he 'wanted to avoid irritating the Soviets as much as possible' by open dependence on the United States. United States' assistance to India would be accepted by the Soviets as 'inevitable' if that did not mean a military alliance. Galbraith assured Nehru that United States insisted 'on no such thing.' Subsequently, Galbraith in a statement made it more clear that the 'military assistance which the United States is giving India is not intended to involve India in a military alliance or otherwise influence her policy of non-alignment,' but was solely designed 'to help defend India's independence.'

After the border war United States appeared to display almost a vested interest in preserving India's independent policy and in an IndoSoviet working association. Because Soviet assistance to India would


35. Galbraith, Jaise., op. cit., p. 146. A telegram from the State Department to the American Embassy in New Delhi indicated this policy on 30 October 1962.


37. Statement issued on 6 November 1962. Text in *Indian Statesman, 7 November 1962,* also excerpted in *Hindustan Standard*, 1962-1964, p. 1:164. Analyzing his point, Galbraith also said in his statement that the United States 'repeatedly' extended military assistance to nations both allied and not allied with herself, 'without impairing their independence'. He pointed out that, between 1941 and 1945, even before United States joined the World War II, President Roosevelt extended many billions of dollars worth of military aid to the Soviet Union when it was attacked by Hitler, and it has not been suggested 'that this impaired, the independence of the Soviet Union.'
exacerbate the tension between the Communist countries and United States would be relieved, in proportion to the Soviet aid to India, from her own aid programme at a time when India's development was important for the United States. This was made clear by Under Secretary Hafinger a few months later thus: '...... There are some people who think we should not give aid to India unless they break with Moscow. I think that is a very stupid thing. I think it is pleasant to see Mr. Khrushchev on the horns of a dilemma between his friend India and his eternal brother China. Why should we relieve him of that embarrassment? I think that is very much in our interest that Soviet Union continues to give economic assistance to India...... (The Russian assistance to India) can offset the obligation on the responsibility for which will otherwise rest upon us and our European associates...... but certainly we want to avoid doing what may tend to bring the two together...... we should in no sense attempt to interfere with India's foreign policy as it relates to Russia at the present time......'.

Despite United States' restraint in not demanding a formal alliance from India as a price for the military hardware, efforts were made to draw India into the American frame of mind in matters of foreign policy substituting informal tie-up for a formal alliance. India's insistence on receiving military assistance within the framework of the non-alignment policy led the United States and other western powers 'to redefine' the nature and purposes of their military alliances accommodating an informal alliance with India 'an alliance which is compatible with both alignment and non-alignment, an alliance springing from an emergency but based perhaps on a greater awareness of the realities of the modern world' and the steps

that free peoples must take to protect their freedoms and ensure their survival. A rising from the sudden emergency for India, the extraordinary convergence of national interests turned India and the United States into virtual allies to fight out the common enemy. Even before the preferred U.S. military assistance reached India, the Indian Government supplied military information to the Americans.

The first consignments of American munitions supplied reached the Dumdum Airport on 3 November 1962 from West Germany where 16... transport planes had begun 'round-the-clock' air lift. Between 3 November and 16 November 60 phaneloads of automatic weapons and ammunition were flown to India from stocks in Europe and the United States.

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39. Palmer (Norman D.), "Trans-Himalayan Confrontation", Litoria, vol. 1, no. 4, Winter 1962, pp. 524-525. The Economist later observed: 'Nevertheless, it is partly China's doing that non-alignment has been transformed from a rather crude 'nep' - type game into something at least as subtle as mahjong. The label 'non-alignment' by itself no longer gives any real guide to a government's actual position. It also needs to know (adapting the wartime phrase about Irish neutrality) who it is non-aligned against? Love-Hate and Love-All: When allies fall out, how are the 'non-aligned' to line up?', Economist, vol. 210, no. 4287, 22 February 1964, p. 689.

40. Galbraith, for example, recorded in his diary on 28 October 1962: 'While I was meeting with Kaul, Col. Curtis, our Army Attaché, was having a session with various Army Intelligence people. Our military relations with the Indians, always rather distant, have become extremely intimate these last days. Orders of battle and other military information are being provided. Arrangements are being made for Curtis to go to Tezpur if he wishes. And I have been brought up from Wellington, for such advice as he can give, an American specialist in guerrilla operations who happens to be attending the staff school there. A week ago, of course, all this would have been unthinkable.' — Galbraith (John Kenneth), Ambassador's Journal, Boston, 1969, p. 443; Taico, 1972, pp. 140-141.


42. Ibid.
Nothing brought India closer to the United States than the spontaneous and instantaneous assistance that she received from the United States within weeks of the border war. This closeness was particularly marked by India's resentment of the Soviets' ambivalence. 44 On 9 November Nehru moved a resolution in the Lok Sabha which 'graciously' acknowledged the 'sympathy' and the 'moral and material support' received from a large number of friendly countries — United States included — in this crisis hour of our struggle against aggression and invasion. 45 Nehru described the border war as 'a turning point not only in the history of India but of Asia and possibly even of the world.' 46 Nehru saw extraordinary convergence of interests between India and the Western powers. While India was 'very grateful to the United States, to the United Kingdom especially, and other countries', Nehru pointed out the response of these powers 'could not have

43. Fylee (M. L.), "Challenge for Indian Leadership", Current History, Vol. 48, No. 270, February 1964, p. 80. According to an Indian senator, 'Much of this spontaneous expression of support and sympathy for India ... was the result of the negative image of China rather than of any positive image of India.' Gupta (Srin), 'The United States' Reaction', International Studies, (Indian School of International Studies), Vol. 5, Nos. 1-2, July-October 1963, p. 97.

44. Nehru, in spite of his disappointment at the Soviet attitude, expected that once the Cuban missile crisis ended the Soviet sympathy would be towards India rather than China. See Indian Express 10 November 1962. 'Soviets have been and are allies of China ... we did not expect them to do anything which would mean a definite breach with their ally,' Nehru said. Indian Express, 15 November 1962, 1.2. Chavan, new Defence Minister, was even forthright and ruled out any Soviet assistance against China. He said Soviet Union would help China when they described as 'brothers' rather than to the Indian 'friends'. Times, 16 November 1962.


occurred in peace time." 'Obviously', Nehru observed: 'It is when our or threatens us, just as we feel in a particular way, others feel too, and they think, as they rightly think, that this is not a mere matter of India being invaded by China, but it raises issues of vast importance to the world, to rase, and realising that they do it, they help us; that is, they feel this involves many issues in which they themselves are intensely interested.' Obviously, Nehru was prone to recognise the identity of Indian interests with those of the West. Nehru maintained that the acceptance of Western military aid were 'unconditional and without any strings' and therefore, its acceptance did not 'affect directly our policy of non-alignment which we value.' He also pointed out that 'Those countries which have helped us have themselves recognised this (non-alignment) and make it clear that they do not expect us to leave that policy.' Nehru at the same time made it clear that India approached other friendly countries including the Soviet Union for assistance to avoid being too

47. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. 9, No. 9, 14 November 1962, col. 1561.

48. Before the Chinese assault on India an altogether different perception prevailed. In 1962, Nehru summed the acceptance of military aid as 'entirely opposed to the basic policy that we have been pursuing.' In August 1962, he deprecated it as 'fundamentally opposed to the policy we have pursued all this time of being unaligned' - Elementary Debates: House of the People Official Report, 2nd, Vol. 1, No. 6, 22 February 1962, col. 416; and Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. 6, No. 7, 14 August 1962, col. 1982 (in order).

49. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. 9, No. 1, 9 November 1962, cols. 129-130. Later on Nehru said: 'The head of one western country now giving us arms have written me saying he had not wanted India to change its traditional policy of non-alignment.' New York Times, 12 November 1962. The New York Times reported added 'The Indian leader did not name the country or its head, but the audience believed he meant President Kennedy. "One could hear the name of President Kennedy passed from one person to another."' ibid.

50. Lok Sabha Debates, n 49, col. 120.
conspicuous of the dependence on Western military aid, while some members of Parliament demanded 'reorientation of our foreign policy,' to adopt an independent, effective, constructive policy of neutrality instead of an illusory, unprincipled policy of appeasement, and called upon the Government of India 'to desist from supporting or endorsing any move for the admission of the People's Government of China to the United Nations.' Nehru was careful to avoid using cold war vocabularies in describing the Chinese attack. He pointed out: 'I am not going into the question, as some people do, of Communism or anti-Communism. I do not believe that that is a major issue in this matter or any other. Communism may help; but the major issue is, an expansionist, imperialist minded country deliberately invading into a new country..... But today we are facing a naked agression, just the type of aggression which we saw in the 18th and 19th centuries; there was then no Communism anywhere.' Already, on 12 October 1962, at the height of confusion in New Delhi, the Government instructed the Indian delegation to the U.N. to support a Soviet resolution to meet Communist China in the U.N. On 27 October, within hours of India's request for military assistance to resist the Chinese on the Sino-Nepalese border.

51. Premanab Vir Shastri moving an amendment to Nehru's resolution. Ibid., col. 121.
52. Ram Swak Yadav moving an amendment to Nehru's resolution. Ibid., col. 139.
53. Dr. L. Sarin in his amendment move. Ibid., col. 126.
54. Ibid., col. 117.
55. Sayar (Kuldip), Between the Lines. Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 1971, p. 178.
the Indian delegation in New York voted in favour of Communist China's admission to the United Nations. This vote surprised and shocked the Americans 'while the Himalayan snows are stained red with Indian blood.'

Despite India's continued championship of China's N. membership, the new developments and India's sharp reactions obviously pleased the Americans. The U.S. Under Secretary of State Harriman was pleased to see the 'violent reaction within India itself' and claimed a 'right to be encouraged.' That impressed the Americans was that India thought alike with them on the nature of the expansionist policy of the Chinese. Nehru himself said, Harriman observed, that the attack of the Chinese was not merely a border dispute but was 'an attack' on the 'way of life'.

Chester Bowles, on the eve of his departure for India as the U.S. Ambassador, few months later observed in New York that 'The Chinese attack on India and the Sino-Soviet dispute mark a sea-change in history that may well offer the United States a new possibility to use our power and influence on behalf of free societies in Asia.'

The sudden convergence which emerged between United States and India created a favourable frame of mind to respect each other's declared policies, and efforts were made to draw each other to closer working relations within the framework of the declared policy goals. United States at the moment had


57. in a press release dated 19 April, in Department of State bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 1245, 6 May 1962, p. 895.

58. Ibid., p. 895.

almost a vested interest in maintaining India's non-aligned image particularly when she saw in the border war the Chinese 'desire to destroy the image of India as a great country, to humiliate India, and to build up their own prestige.' On the other hand, United States expected India to come to her closer working association without formally abandoning non-alignment. Nehru himself acknowledged that India's relations with the United States had never been 'as close and cordial as they are now.'

**Agreement on arms supply:**

On 14 November 1962 United States and India concluded an agreement on the supply of 50 arms to India in the form of an exchange of notes between the Indian ambassador to the United States B. Nehru and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot. According to the agreement, in response to the requests from the Government of India, the United States government would furnish assistance to India 'for the purpose of defense against Chinese aggression directed form Peking.' India agreed to give facilities to representatives of the American embassy in New Delhi to 'observe and review' the use of the American-supplied arms. The arms not deployed against the Chinese were to be returned to the United States. The question of payment for the arms to be received by India was to be discussed.

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separately. Talbot's note clearly stated that the American assistance in arms to India was 'for the purpose of defense against outright Chinese aggression' on the definite Indian undertaking to offer facilities to the American representatives to verify its use and to return the unused articles. 63

The new military relations, which emerged at the height of the border war, between the United States and India led to resentment in Pakistan which was formally aligned with the U.S. and whose enmity with India was deeply rooted. President Kennedy at his news conference on 20 November 1962 stated that the American military aid to India did not adversely affect Pakistan:

'In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All our aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion. Chinese incursions into the sub-continent are a threat to Pakistan as well as India, and both have a common interest in opposing it. We have urged this point in both Governments. Our help to India in no way divinities or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan and we have made this clear to both Governments as well.' 64

William Bundy, the American Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs that Indo-U.S. agreement for American military assistance to India clearly stated that 'the assistance was solely to resist Chinese communist aggression' and this condition was even more emphatic than conditions stipulated in the agreements for supply of military hardware to Pakistan.

63. Ibid.

Pakistan and other U.S. allies. A few days before the Talbot– \_K._Nahru Agreement, on 9 November 1962, the American Ambassador to Pakistan, c
Communiqued publicly stated in a Karachi Press Conference that 'The United
States in turn has assured the Pakistani Government officially that if this
assistance to India should be misused and misdirected against another country
in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance
with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without
the United Nations to thwart such aggression by India.'

The Pakistanis, however, were not reassured by the American promise
to restrain India in the use of its new arms. The Pakistani Foreign Minister
Mohammad Ali Bogra, for example, spoke 'in anguish' in the National Assembly
that: 'the present augmentation in Indian military strength and warlike
stores and the assistance now being extended by our friends to India is
going to seriously aggravate the situation against us and to our great
disadvantage. This is a matter of very grave concern to us and we cannot
afford to accept this position complacently.'

United States was caught on two horns of a dilemma and therefore its
policy was directed 'to minimize tensions between Pakistan and India' and
ultimately to secure their co-operation on the matter of defense of the
sub-continent' and to 'prevent the incursion of communism on their borders

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65. [Foreign Assistance Act of 1962: Hearings on House Resolution 5490
Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,

The wording of the assurance of \_K._Communiqued was the verbatim
repetition of President Eisenhower’s assurance to \_ehru in 1954 with
the difference that ‘India’ and ‘Pakistan’ changed places.

from the north' without aggravating their 'old and violent antagonisms.'

In the middle of November, however, a delicate India–United States military association took place. By 16 November India was not only requesting for American transport plans but during a meeting with the United States Ambassador, Galbraith, Nehru's Cabinet Colleague, T.T. Krishnamachari, who was 'worried about the danger of Calcutta being bombed, 'asked for interceptor aircraft.' On 17 November 1962 the Indian Foreign Secretary, J. Desai met Galbraith to request for more U.S. help against China. According to Galbraith 'the Indians want to supply them with transport air-raft to move troops from the Pakistan border to the combat area. 'In further modification of the non-alignment policy', Galbraith recorded, 'the Indians also wish pilots and crews to fly the aircraft.' On 19 November when the Chinese forces were merely at a 32 miles distance from Tejpur, Nehru in a confidential communication to President Kennedy delivered through the Indian Ambassador in Washington, requested for 16 Squadrons of fighter aircrafts to be manned by American pilots, so that the Indian air force


70. Ibid., p. 171; also Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1969, p. 481.
could be tactically employed without leaving the Indian cities unprotected.

Twelve U.S. Air Force turbo-jet transport planes left European bases for India on 21 November 1942, with some 200 American airmen to help India airlifting its troops and material. Each plane was capable of transporting 92 fully armed soldiers or 17 tons of cargo. By 6 December these American planes had air lifted almost 5,000 troops and more than 1,000,000 lb. of equipment since their arrival in India. Further, in response to Indian requests, an American aircraft carrier was dispatched towards the Bay of Bengal. But it was withdrawn before it reached the Bay of Bengal as the Chinese unilaterally ordered cease fire after Nehru's desperate appeal for American air intervention. The squadron of American transport aircrafts, on the other hand, relieved the pressure of the Indian air force by building a 'crucial air bridge' across the Himalayas between Leh in Ladakh and the Indian heart-land with 15 to 17 flights a day carrying 150 to 160 tons of supplies, equipment and munitions per day.

71. A Nehru associate gathered the information from President Kennedy, see Ghosh (Bashir), GANDHI'S WISDOM, Roma and Oxa, Calcutta, 1957, Chapter XI; also see Gabraith (John Kenneth), AMBASSADOR'S JOURNAL, Jaico, Bombay 1972, pp. 174-175; Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1949, p. 486. V.K. Krishna Menon, however, challenged this view twice: 'Panditji (Nehru) did not make this request ...... And do you think the Americans would want to become involved in a direct clash with China or any great power which may escalate into a world war? ...... so far as I know there is not an iota of truth in the story. There is one thing about Panditji - whatever the cost to himself, he would not do a thing of that kind', in, Brosher (Michael), INDIA AND WORLD POLITICS: KRISHNA MENON'S VIEW OF THE WORLD, Oxford Unviersity Press, London, 1969, pp. 172-173. On the other hand, it is in record that Nehru, himself declared in Leh Sabha on 19 November that India was asking for 'all the aid that we require' and 'there is no inhibition about it' — SINGH, 20 November 1942.


73. Maxwell (Neville), INDIA'S CHINA WAR, Jaico, Bombay, 1971, p. 411.

74. NEW YORK TIMES, 21 April 1943 and 8 July 1943.
Harriman Mission:

After India's urgent requests for military aid from the United States and the agreement of mid-November, the United States sent to India several military-diplomatic missions to assess the military needs. On 30 November, President Kennedy announced that he would send a team headed by Assistant Secretary of State, Averell Harriman to 'assess Indian needs' of military assistance from the United States to resist further Chinese advances. The Harriman mission left Washington on 31 November for India. It was of a politics-military character and it included as members the Assistant Secretary of Defence, Paul Nitze, the head of the U.S. Strike Command, General Paul D. Adams, and Roger Hilsman the Director of Intelligence, Department of State. United States' NATO ally Great Britain, too, sent a politics-military mission headed by the Minister of Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, which arrived in New Delhi on 22 November.

The Anglo-American military officials carried out on the spot studies of India's problem of defence in the North-East Frontier Agency and Ladakh.

75 In a news conference, Text in, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 47, No. 1224, 20 December 1962, p. 874. President Kennedy, at the moment, did not emphatically rule out the possibility of American troops being sent to India. In reply to a question, at the 20 November press conference, Kennedy merely said: 'I think we can get a more precise idea of what the Indians need to protect their territorial integrity when Mr. Harriman returns', and 'As of today, I have heard nothing about American troops being requested by India.' ibid.

76 Kennedy's, 1962-1964, p. 19195.

77 ibid.
General Adams of the American mission and General Hull of the British mission flew over the battle areas of KSAF on 25 November and over Ladakh on 26 November to study the terrain. Anglo-American military teams also visited Tenzpur and battle areas of KSAF to discuss questions of equipment and supplies with the Indian field commanders.78

Harriman and Sandys had 'long discussions' with Nehru 'about the Chinese invasion of India' and India's 'need for various kinds of equipment' to meet the Chinese attack.79 Nehru described the discussions as 'fruitful' and expected to get 'much of the equipment required' from the U.S. and U.K.80

The original stake of the United States in preventing the Chinese advance had, however, lost its urgency within hours after the announcement of the Harriman mission, because the Chinese announced cease-fire with effect from 22 November 1962.81 However, Indian fears were not abated by the Chinese declaration that 'China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence, and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.'82 Once the Chinese

78. ibid.
80. ibid.
82. ibid., p. 20.
ceased firing, the Harrison mission's main task was directed towards finding out a solution of the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan.

'Harrison spent', wrote a Kennedy associate, 'more time in India discussing Kashmir than arms shipments.' The Chinese cease-fire also led Nehru to give a second thought to his request for American air protection which he sought through his 10 November letter to Kennedy. In his later letter meeting with Harrison Nehru 'seemed to want to avoid talking about it at all, avoiding 'to great Americans over the ruins of his long pursued policy of neutralism.' While Harrison placated the Indian sensitivities by saying publicly at a New Delhi press conference on 28 November that on matters of the conduct of India's foreign policy, decisions were 'taken by the Indian Government itself,' he along with Duncan Sandys exerted considerable pressure upon the Indian Government to open discussions with the Pakistani Government on matters relating to Kashmir.

References:
83. Rostow (V.V.), *The Diffusion of Power*, op. cit., p. 262.
86. For their repeated insistence see Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on 30 November 1962, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Third Series, Vol. 10, p. 193, 30 November 1962, col. 3974. The British Prime Minister recorded in his diary on 3 December 1962 about the pressure exerted by Duncan Sandys thus: 'Commonwealth Secretary came later in day, after a successful statement in Parliament. He has co-tainly done a good job and has forced Nehru and Ayub at least to meet. Whether any child will ever be conceived and born after this shotgun wedding is rather doubt'— Macmillan (Harold), *At The End of The Day 1941-1963*, Macmillan, London, 1975, p. 292.
The demands for a Kashmir settlement were accompanied by promises to India that United States would stand by her in case of renewed Chinese attack. On 25 November the United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson proclaimed publicly that 'India, in the event of aggression, serious aggression, would have the support of the rest of the world. And this is something that Peking must think seriously about.' On the other hand, in New Delhi Harriman and Sandys told Nehru that their governments would be unwilling to provide long-term military aid to India while an appreciable part of the Indian army was deployed against Pakistan rather than for defense against China.

Duncan Sandys who urged India to enter a military alliance with the West to come under 'the protection of a non-nuclear deterrent,' after consultation with President Ayub wanted a joint statement to be issued on behalf of the Governments of Pakistan and India stating that a renewed effort should be made to resolve their outstanding differences. According to a BBC broadcast on 20 November 1962 Sandys suggested that partition of Jammu and Kashmir should provide the broad basis for the solution of India-Pakistan problem.

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The Harrisson mission recommended that military aid to India should be on a contingency basis during the emergency arising from the Chinese threat. It insisted on a political settlement between India and Pakistan to prevent the Chinese from getting advantageous position in South Asia. While observing that the United States could not make military aid to India conditional on a Kashmir settlement, it saw the danger of driving Pakistan further into the arms of China by continued military assistance to India in the absence of such a Kashmir settlement. Therefore, United States' efforts to help India by supplying military hardware was inhibited by its desire to maintain Pakistan's friendship. On the other hand, it found that India's non-alignment and friendly relations with the Soviet Union was in the interest of the United States. 92

The Anglo-American capacity to influence Indian thinking was so great, with the Chinese still threatening, that Nehru agreed to the idea of negotiations with Pakistan. 93 On 30 November Nehru and Ayub simultaneously announced that the two leaders had agreed that renewed efforts should be made to resolve the India-Pakistan differences 'on Kashmir and other related matters' initially through ministerial level talks, and later on


93. Galbraith reported to Washington, after the talks started, that India continued the talks largely out of fear of American wrath. Diplomatic pressures were applied on both Pakistan and India for a settlement among them. See Editorial, New York Times, 31 January, 1963.
through direct talks between themselves. The U.S. State Department, immediately after the Ayub-Ayub declaration, came forward with a statement welcoming it. Average Barrisan, calling the proposed Jashmir dialogue 'the most important single question before us, before the free world,' explained: 'You cannot have an adequate defence of the sub-continent unless the two countries work together. If they settle the Kashmir dispute, they will be able to work together in mutual defence of the continent.'

United States – Commonwealth Air Mission:

Once India agreed to the Anglo-American request to reopen negotiations with Pakistan, President Kennedy and Premier Macmillan opened discussions at Nassau, the Bahamas in December 1962, on 'the way in which the two governments might assist the Government of India to counter the Chinese aggression.' They also 'reviewed' the defence problems of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. They were 'hopeful that the common interests of Pakistan and India in the security of the sub-continent would lead to a reconciliation of India-Pakistan differences. To this end, they expressed their gratification at the friendship shown by President Ayub and Prime Minister Sheikh


in agreeing to renew their efforts to resolve their differences at this crucial moment.  

At the close of their Nassau meeting Kennedy and Macmillan announced a military aid programme of 120 million to India on an emergency basis to be evenly shared by the United States and the Commonwealth.

Meanwhile on 2 December 1962 the American Embassy in New Delhi discussed with the Indian officials the possibility of a joint air defence policy. United States was to contribute the planes and India the fields and ground support. The planes were to come into the field in emergencies. One day before that, India's Foreign Secretary N.J. Desai even raised with Ambassador Galbraith the question of a 'tactical air defence post.' According to this proposal India would prepare airstrips and radar, and in the event of a renewed Chinese attack the United States would undertake the defence of the Indian cities allowing the Indian airforce to be tactically engaged against the Chinese.

What price India would be required to pay was clear in a sentence from the diary of the American Ambassador to India entered on 27 December: 'I asked Nehru if we could count on India to help contain the Chinese should


98. see Subrahmanyan (K.), "Military Aid and Foreign Policy", _Foreign Affairs Reports_, Vol. 17, No. 11, November 1968, pp. 111-115; and Subrahmanyan (K.), "India's Problem of Security in Retrospect and Prospect", _South Asia Studies_, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1969, p. 96.


100. _Ibid._
they break out somewhere else in Asia. He told me this would be a matter
of great concern to them and they would help. 101 Further, soon after
aass on 29 December 1952, Premier Macmillan in a message to Premier Nehru propo-
sed sending a joint U.S.-U.K. team to study the whole question of India's
air defense. He also explained to Nehru the anxiety which he and President
Kennedy felt regarding the protection of the civilian population areas of
India against any Chinese bombing attacks. 'Kennedy and I', he wrote, 'have
accordingly decided that, if it is agreeable to you, we would be willing to
send a joint British-United States team to India to study with your air
staff the problem of strengthening your air defense system'. He also exp-
plained how anxious the United States and the United Kingdom were about the
successful outcome of an Indo-Pakistan discussion on Kashmir thus:
In our talks here in Nassau, Kennedy and I have not thought of our present military
aid to help you meet the immediate Chinese threat as conditional in any way
on the settlement of outstanding differences with Pakistan. However, it is
not necessary to explain to you how difficult it is for us to help you on
the scale we would like without drastically damaging our relations with Pakis-
tan. We also have to consider our own public opinion in India and America.
There is great sympathy among our peoples for India in this time of danger

101. Galbraith (John Kenneth), Ambassador's Journal, Jaico, Bombay, 1979,
p. 191. Identical Indian willingness to work in close co-operation
with the U.S. was shown by India's Foreign Secretary M.J. Doshi in
conversation with Galbraith on 5 January 1953. According to
Galbraith's account: 'M.J. Doshi told me about Indian thinking on
containment of the Chinese. They are willing to work with the United
States both politically and militarily in the rest of Asia. This is
vital prequeen for our assistance and quite remarkable advanced. Nehru
a week ago hinted that their thoughts were moving in this direction.'
1944, p. 200; also Galbraith (John Kenneth), Ambassador's Journal,
and a sincere desire to help. At the same time, their enthusiasm is bound to be a little dampened if many Indian resources are immobilised on the Pakistan border which would otherwise be available for defence against China.\textsuperscript{102}

After the Nassau meeting the U.S. State Department and the U.K. Commonwealth Relations Office announced on 23 January 1963 that a joint Commonwealth-U.S. mission led by Brigadier-General James Tipton of the United States Air Force and Air Commanders C.J. Mount of the Royal Air Force would leave London on 29 January 1963 at the invitation of the Government of India to examine, with the Indian Air Force the Problems and technical requirements involved in organizing an effective air defence against the possibility of any further Chinese attacks. The mission remained in India until 23 February 1963.\textsuperscript{103}

By the time the U.S.-Commonwealth mission reached India the urgency for western air protection to India grew less. Further, once the Kashmir problem was in the focus again the advantage of maintaining

\textsuperscript{102} Maxmillan (Harold), \textit{At The End of The Day 1961-1964}, op. cit., pp. 222-223.

cordial relations with the Soviets became important once again. As the Indian High Commissioner to the U.K. pointed out, India's 'non-align-ment' policy prevented the Soviet Union from supporting the Chinese and prevented the Union of the two Communist giants. The Soviet decision to cut off supplies of weapons, spare parts and aircraft fuel to China, accompanied by India's expectation of getting Soviet MIGs, must have impressed the Indian policy-makers of the necessity of not appearing to have been solely dependent on, and controlled by, the West in matters of air defence. Ambassador Galbraith claims that there were various 'quite categorical' Indian requests for the Western air-protection to India in case of an emergency, which was described as 'air-Umbrella' by the Press.

104. The Soviets also appeared to have changed their policy from supporting the Chinese view points to one of pro-Indian neutrality, as the China Crisis subsided. On 3 November 1962, the Pravda in an editorial demanded a cease-fire to end the conflict 'overcoming the war hysteria', and warned: 'The bloodshed cannot be allowed to continue'. Further, after China's unilateral cease-fire, Khrushchev in his message to the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962 criticised the Chinese policy thus: '..... how can you call this (the cease-fire) a reasonable step when it was taken after so many lives had been lost and so much bloodshed ...... There may, of course, be people who may say: the People's Republic of China was now withdrawing its troops actually to the line on which this conflict began, would it not have been better not to move from these positions on which these troops stood at one time?' The Present International Situation and the Soviet Foreign Policy, Soviet Land Booklets, the Soviet Embassy Publication, New Delhi, 1963, p. 40.


107. In early December Nehru publicly stated that the promised MIGs would come to India on a later date. New York Times, 5 December 1962. On 7 December 1962 he said that 3 factories for production of MIGs would be set up. Statesman, 8 December, 1962. For the background story of the MIG Deal which was rumoured since the summer of 1961, and its impacts, see Graham (Ian C.C.), "The Indo-Soviet MIG Deal and its International Repercussions", Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 5, May 1964, pp. 823-833.
On 18 February 1963, the Indian External Affairs Ministry agreed with him that the Commonwealth U.S. air-team visited India at the invitation of the Indian Government, 'but hedged on the idea of American and Commonwealth squadrons having been asked to come in. They were having, they said, to be very cautious because of the Russians.'

Following unsubstantiated press reports that it was intended to establish foreign bases and aircraft in India as an 'air umbrella', Nehru made a statement in Lok Sabha on 21 February 1963 denying that this was the case. The discussions between the U.S.-Commonwealth Air Team and the Indian Air Force experts had led to 'speculations' in the Press about the establishment of foreign bases and foreign planes as an 'air umbrella' in India, Nehru said. But he maintained that these reports were 'incorrect and greatly exaggerated', and that the 'U.S.-Commonwealth air team, in their discussions with the Indian Air Force experts, have been dealing with assessment of the Chinese air threat and the extent to which the Indian Air Force requires strengthening in order to meet it.'

Nehru pointed out that the preliminary action that was considered necessary was the extension of existing air-strips and the improvement in ground control and communication system in connection with the air defence arrangements which would enable the Indian Air Force 'to function more effectively and, should a sudden emergency arise, with help from friendly countries'.

(Emphasis added). At the same breath, Nehru pointed out that there was no

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110. Ibid.
question of stationing of a foreign air force or the establishment of any foreign air bases in India. Nor did any of the friendly countries made any such suggestions. However, Nehru admitted that the U.S.-Commonwealth Air Team came to India at the invitation of the Government of India:

"In the event of a sudden emergency arising, the Government will have to deal with it in the light of developments and with support from friendly countries which may become suddenly necessary and be available. These matters were discussed with the friendly governments of the United States and the United Kingdom during November and December last, and the visit of the U.S.-Commonwealth air team was suggested, so that the problem of strengthening India's Air Defence could be studied by them with the Indian technical air staff and prompt action taken to implement the decisions taken... this air team was coming at the invitation of the Government of India.

Calling Nehru's statement of 21 February 1963 as 'a masterpiece of accommodation', Ambassador Galbraith points out: 'The assured the left that there would be no foreign bases. (Some were even intended). He denied that there was any project for an 'air umbrella'. This was quite safe. No one has ever said that an air umbrella was... We promised new planes to the Indian Air Force but said that stripe would be

111. Ibid., cols. 549-546. Ambassador Galbraith, in a speech, made it clear that: 'During these last weeks and months we have worked out a pleasant and co-operative relationship with your military people. But we are not providing anything they have not requested... This also applied to the problem of air defence. I have been firmly instructed to make clear to your Government that even the act of exploring the problem - which with Britain, Canada and Australia we are now doing - does not constitute a commitment... we have no interest in a military alliance, and neither are we in the market for military bases.' In a speech at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi on 20 February 1963. Hindustan Standard, 21 February 1963.

prepared so that in an emergency, friendly countries could help India. This of course was the main point.  

Indian readiness, at the moment, to allow the use of her air strips by foreign air-forces, in effect would have virtually transferred ultimate responsibilities of air-defence to the Western powers. On the other hand Nehru's palliations on the matter might have stemmed from the possible impact which it could have on the Soviet Union.

During the stay of the U.S.-Commonwealth air team, however, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi announced on 1 February that a military supply mission was being set up under the U.S. Ambassador and with Brigadier-General John F. Kelly as Chief of Mission. Out, it soon became apparent that the supply of United States-built fighter aircraft, 'either supersonic or subsonic' was 'out of the question for the time being.' Prime Minister Nehru, indicated 'impatience' at the time-consuming surveys before there was any decision on large-scale aid. Nehru pointed out that the only way to meet any major Chinese attack immediately, was 'to create an Indian Air Force able to do the job.' 'To depend on outside help, that is from the U.S. and Britain, would require granting them bases in India and it is also psychologically bad for our people to think in this way, to get the impression that others are going to protect us and that we do not have to build up our strength.' On the other hand, by April 1963,

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it became apparent that 'even the short-range Indian aid programme is unlikely to receive U.S. approval unless Prime Minister Nehru comes up with some new proposals which offer some hope of settling the Kashmir question when negotiations with Pakistan are renewed.'

U.S. Efforts for a Kashmir Settlement:

The announcement by Premier Nehru and President Ayub on 30 November during the visit of the Harriman mission, opened the way for renewed India-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir. Six rounds of talks were held between 27 December 1962 and 16 May 1963. But the talks were already inhibited by an announcement on the eve of the first round that Pakistan agreed with China to demarcate the boundary between China and Kashmir under its possession. Pakistan's initiative to come to an understanding with United States' principal adversary in Asia removed the hope for a possible joint-defence of the South Asian sub-continent, for which the Western powers pressurised India into agreeing into instant negotiation with Pakistan. Unsure of Pakistan's attitude, United States at the moment tried to placate India. Ambassador Kalbrait hinted at a New Delhi Press Conference on 28 December 1962 that 'The American assistance is in no way


118. 28 December 1962.
contingent on an India-Pakistan agreement on the Kashmir problem ..... The USA will not put a price on its aid and it is not out for a bargain. When our friends are in trouble, we are not doing business that way.\textsuperscript{119} After the first round of talks ended, Pakistan wanted the United States to exert pressures on India to settle the Kashmir problem to her satisfaction. On 2 January 1963 Ayub warned in a letter to Kennedy that only a 'speedy and just' Kashmir settlement could give Pakistan assurance that the contemplated increase of India's military power is not likely to be deployed against Pakistan in future.\textsuperscript{120} Pakistan also warned the United States that Western military aid to India might affect Pakistan's CENTO and SEATO obligations.\textsuperscript{121} Thus, through her new friendship with China, Pakistan hoped to overcome India and to threaten her Western allies with defection.\textsuperscript{122}

United States was put in a dilemma by the mounting Pakistani pressure. Under the circumstances, after accepting the idea of a negotiation on Kashmir, United States was reluctant to pursue it to a point which could destroy the friendship created by the Chinese war in

\textsuperscript{119} New York Times, 29 December 1962.
\textsuperscript{120} Khan (Mohammed Ayub), Friends Not Neighbors, op. cit., p. 190.
\textsuperscript{121} Hindustan Times, 2 January 1963.
India. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, closely following the American Ambassador to India, stated on 6 March 1963 that while the United States considered it "very important for the security of the entire sub-continent that India and Pakistan resolve their problems between them ......, I would not in any sense qualify our aid purposes by this word 'condition'." However, the United States continued her efforts to sort out the differences between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. This became all the more urgent as a result of Pakistan's border agreement with China on 2 March 1963. Even before the China-Pakistan Agreement was signed, when Pakistan's Foreign Minister S.A. Bhutto went to Peking to sign the agreement, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk warned the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington that the proposed agreement would endanger Pakistan's Kashmir negotiations with India. After the border agreement was signed

123. For identical views see Lakhv (A.), "Pakistan's Foreign Policy under Ayub: Continuity and Change", South Asia Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1969, p. 32. It appears from the following passage from the memoir of the then British Prime Minister that while the Britons wanted to pressurise the Indians for a Kashmir settlement, the Americans did not: 'This unhappy and apparently irresistible dispute immensely aggravated the difficulty of providing a defence for the sub-continent. While the negotiations proceeded, the Americans, obsessed with their anxiety about the aggressive intentions of 'Red' China, had not ceased to press for some positive steps. The American Ambassador in Delhi, J.K. Galbraith, took the view that India must feel secure enough to confront China and so take their minds off Kashmir. I felt very sceptical about this, and told the (U.S.) Frenzi ent frankly that in my view it would have the reverse effect: the more secure the Indians felt, the more intransigent they would be with the Pakistanis, who would then turn to the Chinese.' — "Macmillan (Harold), At The End of the Day, 1947-1965, "macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 227-228.


in March, the State Department reiterated Rush’s warning that the India-
Pakistan talk that was in progress, was in danger now.\textsuperscript{127} Despite this
new development, V.V. Rostow, an adviser to President Kennedy, visited
India and Pakistan during 1-7 April 1963 to assess the 'propects for an
accommodation' and 'to put to the leaders in the two countries the stren-
gest possible case' for a settlement of the Kashmir problem.\textsuperscript{128} He warned
the Indian leaders that India could not successfully conduct a 'three-
front-war' against the Chinese, the Pakistanis and against poverty.\textsuperscript{129}
While Indian military and civil leaders 'freely acknowledged' that the
American position in South East Asia was a major contribution to India’s
defence keeping the Chinese occupied and that joint defence-planning with
Pakistan to defend the northern frontier was the right defence solution,
Nehru hinted that the Kashmir settlement could merely create 'more ten-
sion.'\textsuperscript{130} In contrast to the earlier premises of Galbraith and Rush, the
Secretary of Defence Mr. Nasere, clearly stated that military assistance
to India was contingent on a Kashmir settlement. He testified before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee that 'Political and economic factors,
including India’s efforts to help and reduce the vulnerability of the
sub-continent by contributing to the resolution of Indo-Pakistani differ-
ences, will be given due consideration in arriving at our final recommenda-
tion to the President.'\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{127} New York Times, 6 March 1963.
\textsuperscript{128} Rostow (V.V.), The Diffusion of Power 1897-1972, op. cit., p. 205.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., pp. 205 and 651.
\textsuperscript{131} New Asia, 14 April 1963, quoted in Nasrul (Yuri), International
Relations and India’s Foreign Policy, Sterling, New Delhi, 1977, p. 300.
On the eve of the sixth round of Indo-Pakistani talks, after attending the CENTO meeting at Karachi, Dean Rusk accompanied by Phillips Talbot and William Bundy went to Delhi in May. Dean Rusk assured Nehru of United States' sympathy and support to India against the Chinese threat. While he made it clear that the U.S. aid to India to meet this threat was not linked with the settlement of the India-Pakistan differences, he pointed out that Chinese expansionist policies posed a threat to the entire sub-continent and therefore United States was interested in promotion of friendly relations between India and Pakistan. On 6 May 1963 it was announced that the Government of India accepted the good offices of Britain or America for a solution of the Kashmir problem. The New Delhi correspondent of the New York Times observed that acceptance of mediation by India did not mean any fundamental change in Indian policy. "But it has given Mr. Rusk something to take home from his trip", the report said, "it will give the Kennedy Administration a better position in its efforts to get an arms aid appropriation for India from Congress this summer, because India has made a concession.

United States was greatly disturbed and alarmed by the Indo-Pakistani agreement and increasingly realized the necessity of buttressing the Indian defences. She persuaded Britain and Australia to agree that a joint Air Defence mission should be sent to India. After the breakdown of nego-

112. They were in Delhi from 3-6 May.

113. see Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on 7 May 1963, Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. 18, No. 61, 7 May 1963, col. 14198.


115. ibid. Nehru told Lok Sabha on 7 May 1963: '...... we have made it quite clear that any idea of partitioning Kashmir Valley would be exceedingly harmful and would not be acceptable to us.' Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. 18, No. 61, 7 May 1963, col. 14368.
tensions between Nehru and Ayub on 16 May 1962, President Kennedy became more insistent on the despatch of the mission. Britain's disinclination for an 'open-ended' commitment for the Indian Air Defence, even led President Kennedy into sending a message to Premier Macmillan, on 22 May 1963, saying that if the British were unwilling to involve themselves by sending a squadron to India, United States perhaps would 'go it alone.' However, at British insistence, it was agreed between the United States and the United Kingdom on 1 June 1963, that the latter would send a fighter squadron which would be regarded as merely a visit 'for training purposes', and that it would not imply any British commitment to operate in any renewed conflict with the Chinese. President Kennedy, on the other hand, did not disguise his views that if the Chinese were to make a large-scale attack on India, and especially if undefended Indian cities were put to risk, the reaction of American opinion would be serious. Looking back on these developments Premier Macmillan observes: 'Washington was more nervous than London, for Chinese expansionist policies were believed to be responsible for all the troubles in South-East Asia.' United States, obviously, saw a commonality of purpose with India in containing the Chinese, and to this New Delhi agreed. During the visit of President Redhephrismen to the United States in June 1963 President Kennedy assured him that 'India could count on the warm sympathy and effective assistance of the

136. Macmillan (Harold), At The End Of the Day, op. cit., p. 234.
137. ibid., p. 234.
138. ibid., p. 238.
139. ibid., p. 238.
United States in its development and defense. They also agreed that their two countries 'share a mutual defensive concern to thwart the designs of Chinese aggression against the sub-continent.' They recognised the 'vital importance' of safeguarding the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of India 'for peace and stability not only in Asia but in the world.' United States also persuaded her British ally into her points of view on the necessity of further strengthening India. Meeting at Birch Grove in Sussex, President Kennedy and Premier Macmillan agreed on 30 June 1963 on 'their policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack.' The United States at Birch Grove agreed to extend further military assistance of $50 million to India while her British ally agreed to extend 'appropriate' amount as assistance. At Birch Grove, it was also decided to familiarise the Indian Air Force with supersonic fighter-bombers.

On 22 July 1963, announcements were made in New Delhi, Washington and London on the supply of radar and related communications equipment by the United States and the United Kingdom to India and the holding of joint

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141. ibid.


training exercises in India to 'help in testing the equipment and in enabling Indian Air Force personnel to master its use.'

Pursuing the installations of the radar system covering the northern border, United States offered to send some mobile radar sets and related communications equipment to India to provide coverage and to initiate training of the Indian Air Force technicians on those mobile radar sets in the interim period. These mobile radar sets were to remain the property of the U.S. Government and were to be withdrawn when permanent radar installations were completed. Within a period of 12 to 18 months the United States would send a certain number of permanent radar installations with related communications equipment. The permanent radar installations were to be the properties of the Government of India and were to be manned by Indian technicians trained during the interim period. The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Australia agreed that high performance fighter aircrafts from their Air Forces will temporarily visit India to participate in joint radar training exercises with the Indian Air Force to help in testing the equipment and to enable the I.A.F. personnel to master their use.

Prime Minister Nehru told Lok Sabha on 18 August 1963 that the proposed training exercises did not 'commit the U.S. or the U.K. Governments to any action in the event of a Chinese attack upon India.' However, the agreement was made with the intention of improving the radar training facilities in India.
he informed, in the event of India being invaded these two Governments 'will consult with the Government of India regarding further assistance in India's air defence', although 'the defence of India including its air defence' will continue to be 'wholly and solely the responsibility of the Government of India.'\textsuperscript{147}

Despite Nehru's palliation in Parliament that the participation of the foreign aircrafts 'merely for training purposes' did not make the 'slightest difference in our basic position that the responsibility for the air defence of India is solely that of the Indian Air Force', \textsuperscript{147} the promise to consult in the event of an attack, even before such eventuality actually occurred, gave new attributes to Indian policy towards the West which was at variance with the policy of non-alignment as Nehru presented.

Late in October 1963 the Western air forces began to arrive in India.\textsuperscript{149} Under the overall command of Air Vice-Marshall Arjan Singh of the I.A.F., British, American and Australian aircrafts co-operated with the Indian Air Force in joint air defense exercises ('Exercise Shikra') between 9-14 November 1963. Besides about 100 Indian planes, the exercise involved 18 U.S. air crafts, a squadron of British supersonic fighter crafts, and 2 Australian Canberra aircrafts. A communiqué between the United States, the United Kingdom, and India issued from New Delhi on 20 November 1963 expressed satisfaction with the exercise and its training.

\textsuperscript{147} In \\textit{Lok Sabha Debates}, Third Series, Vol. 19, No. 8, 19 August 1963, col. 1215.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, col. 1217.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Hindustan Times}, 19 October 1963.
value, without in any sense involving any commitment from the British and the Americans in the defence of India.\footnote{180}

The closer military co-operation between India and the United States had its political impact. India did not formally abandon non-alignment but was ready to co-operate with the United States politically. As the U.S. ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, recorded: 'In the summer and fall (of 1969) I had a series of long talks with Nehru, Defense Minister Yashwantrao Chavan and other Indian officials not only about their own military security problems vis-à-vis China, but also about their willingness to take a greater measure of responsibility for the stability of Asia as a whole. In mid-November I left for the United States with a tentative understanding with the Indian Government in my briefcase. Quite unexpectedly, Nehru, who had been emotionally shattered by the recent Chinese attack, had volunteered to support a genuine effort by our government to negotiate a political settlement that could end the fighting in Southeast Asia. (This was before U.S. ground forces became directly involved in Vietnam). He was also prepared to negotiate a scaling on military expenditures with Pakistan.'\footnote{181} India's 'understanding' of United States' problems in Asia was soon evident. General Maxwell Taylor hinted to Nehru on 17 December 1963 that United States was considering the dispatch of

\footnote{180} in Indian Information, Vol. 6, No. 22, 15 December 1969, p. 818.

\footnote{181} Bowles (Chester), "America and Russia in India", Asian Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971, p. 641. This did not materialise, according to Bowles, because of the assassination of Kennedy on 23 November 1963 six days after Bowles' arrival in Washington and Nehru's death six months later in May 1964. ibid., p. 642.
some units of the U.S. 7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{152} This evoked little concern to the Government of India. Nehru publicly stated that "outside the territorial waters of India, the Ocean is, naturally, open to them, as the naval vessels of any other country."\textsuperscript{153} He also ruled out that the voyage of the 7th Fleet in the Indian Ocean could cause "any particular concern" to the countries of the area because "most of the countries in South-east Asia are more or less allied to the United States Government."\textsuperscript{154}

The period of enlarged military and political co-operation between India and the United States was marked by the increasing 'flirtation' of Pakistan with China against whom Pakistan's alliance with the United States was directed. United States while warning Pakistan against such drifts, followed a policy of balancing India's needs for strengthening the defence against China with a policy of supporting Pakistan's views on the Kashmir problem. On 29 August 1962, Pakistan signed a Civil Aviation Agreement with China. Soon after Pakistan agreed to grant air rights to China, the United States suspended a $ 4.3 million loan to Pakistan for the improvement of the Dacca airport.\textsuperscript{155} After a visit of General Maxwell Taylor to Pakistan towards the close of 1963, obviously to prevail upon Pakistan, United States informed the Indian government that no additional F-104 supersonic aircraft would be supplied to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{152} Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. 24, No. 26, 19 December 1962, col. 5788.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid}.


before the Civil Aviation Agreement was signed the American State Depart-
ment warned: 'We look upon this as an unfortunate breach of free world
solidarity and take a dim view of it. ..... (which would) have an adverse
effect on efforts to strengthen the security and solidarity of the sub-
continent which the Chinese communists want to prevent.'\(^{157}\) The failure
of the United States' efforts to bring about an understanding between
Pakistan and India to prevent another Chinese invasion directed against
the sub-continent was clear from an interview of President Ayub who said
that if Pakistan was 'attacked by India' China 'would take notice of
that.'\(^{158}\)

The demonstrative Pakistani threat to go into the further embrace
of Peking, and the necessity of strengthening India against China, led the
United States government to follow a policy of satisfying both the South
Asian rivals by different means. She continued to promise military aid to
India while supporting the Pakistani views on the Indo-Pakistani differ-
ences over Kashmir.

Kashmir Debate in Security Council:

Kashmir debate reopened at Pakistan's request in the
Security Council in February 1964, United States, \(\ldots\) with added seal her
British ally, supported Pakistan's cause to a point which left a bad
taste in the Indian mouth. To India, the necessity or even the compulsion
of maintaining closer relations with the Soviet Union became all the more

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obvious, even if that meant a corresponding laxity in her relations with
the Anglo-Americans. India's Chief delegate at the U.N., B.N. Chakravarty
pointed out quite early that the developments in Kashmir did not justify
an early meeting of the Security Council. Pakistan's objective in calling
the Security Council meeting, he said, was to create sympathy in the U.S.
for her - by implying that if India received assistance to combat the
Chinese threat, Pakistan would take a 'stronger stand' over Kashmir.
Pakistan was motivated by the desire to discourage the U.S. from giving
military aid to India. 199

While the Soviet Union expressed surprise at Pakistan's move to
call a U.N. Security Council meeting to discuss Kashmir and hinted that
any resolution sponsored by any power which might be at variance with the
fundamental position of Kashmir being part of India, would be opposed by
her, 160 the Anglo-Americans persuaded the Ivory Coast delegate to sponsor a resolution 161 which would have questioned the territory of Kashmir
being part of India.

Speaking before the Security Council, India's Minister of
Education, M.C. Chandra tried to remind the West that embarrassment to
India in Kashmir could be disastrous to the Western move to check the
red Chinese onlookers from casting its shadows south of the Himalayas:
'India today is, perhaps, the only country which can stand up to Chinese
expansion and aggression. If India failed, there would be nothing to

161. ibid., 12 February 1964.
control the Chinese forward policy. It is, therefore, not only in the interest of India itself, but also in the interest of peace, that India should be strong. We are very grateful for the aid that we have received from friendly countries. .. Pakistan does not want India to be strong. .. Its recent flirtations with China are clear evidence of this fact. 163

Despite India's readiness to take up cudgels on behalf of the West's anti-Chinese crusade, United States' British ally took the lead in equating India and Pakistan whose flirtation with communist China was clear. Britain's delegate Sir Patrick Dean in his speech dismissed India's claim that Kashmir is law and in fact was an integral part of India as too legalistic and, therefore, too 'unrealistic.' He insisted on a Kashmir solution on the basis of the previous 24 resolutions proposing 'a fair and impartial plebiscite.' 163 According to the special correspondent of the Hindustan Standard at the U.N., there was considerable bitterness in the Indian delegation circles at the fact that while Pakistan's charge that India was changing Kashmir's status quo by breaking down Kashmir's special status within the Indian Union seemed to get a sympathetic hearing, not a word was said about Pakistan giving away for good 2,000 square miles of Kashmir territory to China. 164 While, in New Delhi, Sher's senior colleague and Minister without portfolio, Lal Bahadur Shastri


conveyed India's resentment to the envoys of the United States and the United Kingdom at the pro-Pakistan stand taken by the Western powers in the U.N. In New York India's Chief delegate N.C. Chadha expressed his anger by staying away from a reception given by Britain's Patrick Lee and declined to attend a 'working dinner' with the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk apparently on the ground that he would have to meet the Soviet U.S. delegate and the Czech Ambassador at the luncheon.

India's sharp reaction reportedly led the United States to take a second look at its own position and tried to evolve a consensus in the nature of an appeal to India and Pakistan from the President of the Council asking them to maintain peace, start negotiation on all their differences including Kashmir, and accept good offices of any country or person, if they chose. Speaking before the Security Council the United States delegate Adlai E. Stevenson expressing 'greatest regret' of his Government at the inability of India and Pakistan to reach a settlement and expressing the desire of the U.S. 'to do what it could to compose the differences between the two friends', said: 'If India and Pakistan are genuinely desirous of compromising their differences, which is a prior condition of any political compromise, a fresh attempt must be made in light of today's realities to see how the basic principles can be applied to achieve such a political settlement. India, and indeed part of the very area in dispute, is under threat of Chinese Communist military attack. for

165. Ibid., 25 February 1964.
166. Ibid., 13 February 1964.
167. Ibid., 15 February 1964.
this reason, as well as because of our longstanding concern that the Kashmir question be peacefully resolved, we urged bilateral talks between the parties last year. While these talks did not bring about an agreement, neither were they useless. Exploration of disputes through negotiation is a fundamental principle of the United Nations. It is the only way agreement can be achieved short of imposition by force. An agreement cannot be imposed from outside.' 168

But Stevenson's prescription for the \textit{nexus operandi} and the implicit blame to India for the merger of Kashmir with India unilaterally, angered India. Stevenson insisted: 'It must be recognised by both countries that the problem of Kashmir cannot be settled \textit{unilaterally} (emphasis added) by either party. It can only be settled, as I say, by agreement and by compromise, taking into account the \textit{free expression of the will of the people concerned} (emphasis added) .... Given the history of efforts to resolve the issues between India and Pakistan in the past, my Government believes that the two countries should consider the possibility of resort to the good offices of a country or a person of their choice to assist them in bringing about the resumption of negotiations and in mediating their differences. My Government also suggests the Secretary General might be of assistance to the two countries in exploring the possibility of such third-party mediation.' 169


169. ibid.
Adlai E. Stevenson also reviewed the history of the Kashmir dispute since 1948 and observed that in that year India and Pakistan agreed that 'the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have the right to determine their future without coercion or intimidation from the military forces of either country', and added: 'our support of the United Nations resolutions is based on this principle of self-determination.' The special correspondent of the Hindustan Standard at the U.N. reporting on the role of the United States, added: '(by demanding self-determination for Kashmir) Mr. Stevenson joined hands with the British Representative to reject India's stand that Kashmir was already an integral part of India, that the Kashmiri people had already opted for India, that no new development had taken place to justify any Security Council action and that, in any case, it was unrealistic today to talk rigidly in terms of past United Nations resolutions .... What shocked (the) Indian delegation was the distinction Mr. Stevenson sought to make between people of India and people of Kashmir as also his reference to the entire period since 1948 when the Kashmir question was first brought before the Security Council, incidentally by India, as 'all these years of bloodshed and violence.'

Mr. Stevenson's reference to China-India conflict as a reason, among others, why his Government wanted a Kashmir settlement, naturally on lines proposed by him, left a rather bad taste in the mouth of the Indian delegation.'

170. ibid.

Mr. G. Chagla expressed his resentment in a New Delhi press conference on 21 February at the American role in the U.S. and commented caustically that 'The USA had today forgotten that Abraham Lincoln preferred a civil war to giving the right of self-determination to the south.'

Despite United States' efforts to build India as a counterweight against Communist China by committing military assistance, the paradox of her policies was all the more apparent to the Indians when it came to Kashmir.

In a statement before the Lok Sabha on the Kashmir debate in the Security Council, Chagla observed that the speeches of the United States representative 'was against us' although 'pitched in a much lower key.'

We explained thus why the U.S. supported Pakistan: "We must not forget that Pakistan is an ally of the U.S. and the U.S. We are not their ally. We are non-aligned, and we are proud of our policy of non-alignment. So that if there is a leaning on the side of Pakistan, we must understand it. There has always been a leaning. I have seen it in the U.S. I have seen it in the United States. There is always a feeling there that Pakistan is closer to us than India.' That is really, the explanation."
United States' support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue was promptly matched by her readiness to buttress India's defense preparedness against another Chinese attack, despite Pakistan's opposition to it. The United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed concern at the growing Chinese political activities with countries at India's periphery and more particularly with Pakistan. He discounted Pakistan's concern at the modest United States assistance to India to build up defences against China and pointed out that the programme was in the interest of United States and also Pakistan: "We see a very real need for India to improve the quality of its defences against the Chinese Communist threat, and we believe it is our national interest to assist them..... it is important to the entire free world, including Pakistan, that India should be able to defend against Chinese Communist aggression."

Despite United States' attempts to placate Pakistan supporting her on the Kashmir problem the Pakistan-China flirtation continued unabated. Pakistan enlisted China's support for solution of the Kashmir problem 'in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, as pledged to them by India and Pakistan' during Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in February in the midst of the Kashmir debate in the Security Council. On 8 March 1964 Pakistan also signed with China a protocol and related documents on technical and operational arrangements for the proposed air link between their two countries - developments which Washington


176. in the Peking-Chou joint communiqué of 23 February 1964, see LACRO, 24 February 1964.
looked with concern. After these developments United States hinted that
defence of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent was more vital to the United
States than the Kashmir problem.

Testifying before a House Foreign Affairs Committee on 8 April
1964, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of States for Near and Far East, "hi-
llips Talbot said that United States' interest was to 'balance the various
aspects' in South Asia, and explained: "..... If Kashmir were the most
important thing in the world to the United States, then I would think that
it would be our duty to say, no more aid to either country until the
Kashmir dispute is settled. If, on the other hand, in the sub-continent
it is more important to limit the opportunity of the Communist powers to
move in, to limit potential disintegration and chaos in these two coun-
tries so that they can develop viability and they can be effective actions
of the world, then we should take what measures we can to help them
constructively and in our diplomatic efforts, try very hard to help them
soften these bone-deep cultural, religious, social, economic, and politi-
cal disputes.' 177 Talbot also pointed out on 8 April 1964 that the Indian
sub-continent was indivisible in terms of military and political strategy,
and, therefore, neither India nor Pakistan 'could long endure in freedom
if communism or chaos should penetrate the area.' United States' attempts
to help compense differences on Kashmir was directed 'in order that our
energies and theirs may be concentrated on the threat of communism' in
South Asia. Justifying the U.S. assistance to India's defence build-up
without its being conditional on a Kashmir settlement as demanded by

177. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 : Hearings Before the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress,
2nd Session, 8 April, 1964, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Pakistan, Talbot pointed out: 'At the same time, Pakistan has moved to take advantage of communist overtures, designed to isolate India, by concluding trade, boundary, and civil air agreements with Red China and by expanding cultural exchanges ..... even if marginal benefits may accrue to Pakistan from these measures, the political effort is to give advantage to an enemy against which we are formally allied ..... We continue to believe that our national interests and those of Pakistan coincide and that is recognised by Pakistan as well.' Pakistan's credibility as an ally came under serious doubt but a corresponding Indian understanding of Washington's thorny path of alliance relationship with its South Asian neighbour did not synchronise. As an American news paper observed:

'Pakistan has become so overwhelmingly engrossed with her anti-Indian feud, she cannot--for the time being, at least--be regarded as a responsible ally against Chinese Communist aggression.' New Delhi understood it as well. But what displeased it was that despite Washington's awareness of Pakistan's close relationship with the United States' principal Asian adversary, on the Kashmir problem it supported Pakistan. Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi even said in an interview to New York Times, that United States was losing much of the good will in India because of her 'favoritism towards Pakistan' on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan had handed over chunks of Kashmir territory to China. And despite that, Indira Gandhi said, 'We feel that the West is on Pakistan's side, no matter.'


Under the stress of the vigorous Indian criticism of the American position on the Kashmir issue and demonstrative Pakistani disloyalty towards its alliance obligations to the Western bloc, accompanied by the possibility of a Soviet veto, United States in the resumed debate on the Kashmir problem between 8 May and 18 May 1964 refrained from pursuing a resolution being passed which she insisted in February. With the end of the Kashmir debate on 18 May with the summation of the different views by the Council President, United States now could concentrate on repairing the damage done to her relations with India as a result of her support to the Pakistani point of view on Kashmir, by promising more military aid to India — again without upsetting her relations with Pakistan.

India's Five Year Defence Plan:

Early in 1964, India formulated a Five Year Plan for the modernisation of the armed forces. The Plan envisaged the build up of the defence forces to a strength of 625,000 well-equipped men, a 43-squadron air force, replacement of obsolete aircrafts, modernisation of the air defence, radar and communication system, replacement of obsolete warships, increase in the defence production, improvement of the border road communication system, and


182. Inaugurating a 'Army Command-Conference' on 27 April 1964, Defence Minister Chavan revealed that his ministry 'recently' prepared a defence plan 'which would furnish the broad blue print for building up the country's Defence Potential during the next five years'. — *Hindustan Standard*, 28 April 1964.
modernisation in the organisation of defence. The plan called for the rise in the defence expenditure from $1 billion in 1962 to around $2 billion in 1969, representing a rise from about 3 per cent to 5 per cent of the national income.

Following the formulation of the Five Year Defence Plan, India's Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan journeyed to Washington on 13 May 1964 for talks with the U.S. government on further long-term military assistance. Mean time the United States had delivered virtually all of the $60 million worth of arms pledged to India in December 1962. But United States' later commitment to provide $50 million worth of additional military aid was not completely fulfilled. According to the New York Times, the much publicised American Military assistance to India since 1962 lagged behind that of the Soviet Union which was of the order of $131 million against the commitment of $110 million from the United States. On the other hand, according to the New York Times, 'If the USA undertakes a new program ...... and sends jet fighters and Sidewinder missiles to India, the U.S. aid would exceed the total Soviet aid.' Defence Minister Chavan during his talks with the U.S. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara on 30 May insisted on


getting supersonic U.S. F-104 jet intercepto-fighters to bridge a two-year gap in India's air defence. However, the adverse affects the supply of F-104's to India could cause on United States' relations with Pakistan and the question of Soviet help to India in the field of armaments led to 'a number of mental reservations' of the Americans. While a leading American News Paper report criticized India for playing the United States against the Soviet Union to get both MIG factory as well as F-104 jet fighters and factory, another urged India to enter into 'serious negotiations' with Pakistan in order to be qualified for further American military assistance. The latter commented: 'To the extent that we aid India, to that degree we endanger our relations with Pakistan, as long as the Kashmir dispute is unresolved..... Aid to India, which may be increased as a result of the current visit of its Defense Minister, is regarded by Pakistan as a support for a hostile neighbor. Intent on retaining territory to which its claim is questionable ...... We want to strengthen our ties with India, but not at the expense of those with Pakistan ......'  

Chavan had requested the United States for $ 350 million in military assistance over a period of five years including three squadrons of F-104 Sabre jet supersonic fighters, costing an estimated $ 150 million as part of the Five-Year Defense Plan. The American officials

pointed out that the three squadrons of F-104 would cost $150 million and would absorb almost the entire annual American defence ceiling to India for three years, and instead offered to supply F-5 fighters capable of landing and taking off from short and unprepared airfields. The Indian agreement, on the other hand, was that the F-5s were not of much use in Himalayan combat situation against the Chinese, and only all-weather supersonics would be useful, as was proved during the joint U.K.-Commonwealth-India air exercises in 1963. Chavan in vain tried to impress the Americans that China might attack India again at a time suited to her and that India's programme of defence build up was based upon the 'appreciation of the existing Chinese threat' and was 'the minimum to face the Chinese threat.' Chinese threat to India was also a threat to 'those countries who share and treasure with us the same pattern and values in life and in the mode of economic development.' United States, obviously, wanted something concrete in India's efforts to contain the Chinese outside South Asia instead of the verbal tirade against her. The U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk discussed during a tour de harissa talk with Chavan on 21 May 1964 mostly on Laos and South Vietnam.

Although Secretary Rusk did not ask for any specific Indian action in respect of Laos and South Vietnam, the discussion on those matters during the crucial arms talks was a broad enough hint that the United States would want from India as a quid pro quo for assisting India in a major arms build up. United States, perhaps, would have been ready to ignore

even Pakistan's protests against arming India but for India's hesitation to substitute Pakistan as an advanced anti-communist bastion even while formally maintaining non-alignment. Pakistan had one squadron of the F-104 supplied to her as a member of the Western bloc. The supply of three squadrons of F-104s to India would have definitely upset the South Asian balance of power. United States, perhaps, would have been ready to change her horse in South Asia but for India's unwillingness to accept responsibilities which accompany arms supply. On the other hand India continued to receive overt military aid of $111 million. Deliveries of Soviet ground-to-air missiles started even before Defence Minister Chavan journeyed to Washington. 8 Soviet missiles under a $40 million programme and 50 transport planes and unspecified number of helicopters already reached India. Under these circumstances the Chavan mission failed to get United States commitment to supply the F-104s.

The Indo-American talks on military aid during Chavan's Washington visit interrupted by Nehru's death on 27 May 1964 was resumed at official level subsequently, and on 6 June 1964 a general agreement was announced in a press communiqué. The United States steered carefully away from any commitment to provide India with supersonic aircrafts though 'the subject of air defence aircraft for India would continue to be under examination by both sides.' According to the Agreement an immediate United States credit of $10,000,000 was to be provided to India for the purchase of defence articles and services and the replacement and modernization of plant and equipment in ordnance factories.

199. see Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 1964, p. 109.
197. Ibid.
assistance by way of grants would continue by the United States Government during fiscal 1944-1968 ending June 'at about the present level', which was estimated to be of the order of $80 million. Further, an additional military sales credit to India in the fiscal year 1963 was promised. According to the communiqué, the two governments also agreed to continue to consult upon United States assistance related to India's long range defense efforts. By mutual agreement, the United States government agreed to underwrite the purchase of military arms and equipment made by the government of India directly from private parties in the United States within the limit of $80 million annually. According to an estimate the United States committed in 1964 military aid to India during the five year period totalling $250 million. The United States grants for military use had totalled $120,000,000 between October 1962 and June 1964. This together with the new commitments was estimated to total around $700,000,000 in a five year period.2

But all these were the commitments made and not deliveries of equipment. Since 1962 when the U.S. military assistance to India began with the emergency shipment of arms till the suspension of military aid in

199. Ibid., Hindustan Standard, 7 June 1964.
the midst of the India-Pakistan War of 1965, according to a testimony by Lieutenant Colonel Gross before a U.S. Foreign Affairs sub-committee, was around $92 million worth of military equipment. Defence Minister Chavan, on the other hand told Lok Sabha that the military assistance from the United States between October 1962 and September 1963 was roughly of Rs. 36.13 crores or $76 million worth of equipments providing limited support to few mountain divisions, and air defence equipment, aircraft spares, some trainer and transport air crafts, and road-building equipment. United States delivered only 45% of the pledged assistance. The United States never pledged to supply F-104 planes, although the 6 June Communiqué stated that the subject would continue to be under examination. But even before the halt of American military assistance in other fields, India gave up the hope of getting the F-104s. India's request for the planes was 'neither rejected nor accepted' by the United States. But for all practical purposes India 'was taken for granted that we are not likely to get these.'

During the brief period of United States-India military honeymoon, India received only selective items of defence articles and no major weapon


204. Lok Sabha on 30 November 1965, Hindustan Times, 30 November 1965. This assistance was merely 4% of India’s defence expenditure of any one year after 1962-63. Subramaniam (K.), "India’s Problem of Security: Retrospect and Prospect", pp. 49 and Subrahmanyan (K.), "Military Aid and Foreign Policy," pp. 115.

system was received. The emergency shipment of military equipment carefully steered clear of heavy weapons. The items covered under the emergency assistance were restricted to transport aircraft and spare parts, light infantry weapons for mountain divisions, communications equipment, engineering and medical equipments. The items for infantry weapons and mountain divisions included artillery and mortars, but no heavy tanks. Most of the items supplied for the six mountain divisions were portable. During the emergency military aid to India, United states' main concern was to strengthen India's defense vis-à-vis China without creating concern for the Pakistanis. The American long-term military aid till 1965 also covered the same type of equipments only to assist 'that part of the Indian armed forces which would bear the brunt of any future Chinese communist incursion' and for 'modernization and expansion of defense production facilities.' While United States supplied to Pakistan until 1965 some $1.2 billion worth of military hardware since the programme began


209. see the statement of Congressman Haley in the House of Representatives on 8 September 1965. Congressional Record, Vol. 111, part 17 (31 August 1965 - 13 September 1965), 8 September 1965, (House), p. 23166. According to Haley's information India received 'only about one-tenth' of what Pakistan received. ibid.
covering all sorts of sophisticated equipments including a squadron of F-104 supersonic fighters, the aid to India not only steered carefully clear of air power, tanks, and sophisticated weapons but also it was not fully implemented.

The United States' main dilemma was the adverse effect which the sophisticated weapons system in India with its aid could cause in Pakistan, a member of OEEC and SEATO, and the possible disturbance to the South Asian balance of power. President Kennedy expressed United States' dilemma as on the problem quite early: '... we want to sustain India, which may be attacked ... by China ... if that country becomes fragmented and defeated, of course, that would be a most disastrous blow to the balance of power. On the other hand, everything we give to India adversely affects the balance of power with Pakistan ... So we are dealing with a very, very complicated problem ...'

210. According to the Economist, India's receipt of arms from diversified sources already 'puts India in a position to become, by Asian standards, a major military power.' According to the Economist, the Russian arms offer to India in September 1964 was to bring India's supersonic fighter strength up to three squadrons, a total of 48 aircraft. The Russians were also to speed up the help they were already giving for the construction of MiG fighters in India. They were also to sell India another twenty helicopters. 'In air', therefore, 'India, long irked by Pakistan's possession of a squadron of F-104 supersonic fighters, has now been promised not merely the equality that the United States had persistently refused to provide, but superiority.' 'Multilateral Indian Arms', Economist, Vol. 212, No. 5912, 26 September 1964, pp. 1207-1208.

The United States' military aid was therefore limited to the marginal improvement of India's defense against China which could be of use only for a holding action allowing time to the United States to decide on the merit of an intervention. Despite Pakistan's flirtation with China, influential people close to the Pentagon like Senators Stuart Symington of Missouri, Richard B. Russell of Georgia, and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina urged that if increased military aid to India annoyed an ally like Pakistan, then the United States priority interests lay with its military ally. Further, the Pentagon valued its installation near Peshawar, which was of high value for the tracking of the Soviet missile shots. The geo-political location of Pakistan was of far greater value to the United States than that of India, and United States could not afford to lose it by arming Pakistan's most hated enemy. As Salley Harrison put it: 'from places like Pakistan on the Soviet periphery, you can 'listen in' on the Soviet military communications system and monitor key defense testing sites in central Asia..... Even a casual look at the map shows how useful north-west Pakistan would be for scientific spooks seeking to locate ICBM launching sites, track satellite experiments, penetrate Soviet radar defenses, or unravel codes. Tyura Tan, the Soviet Cape Kennedy, is only 670 miles away, and the rest of the major Russian military research centers are all concentrated in the desert fastnesses of Tadzhikistan and Kazakhistan. Placed together with intelligence gleaned by the same reconnaissance satellites, the accumulated 'take' from electronic surveillance activities in

213. Ibid.
the peripheral countries has been of great help to the United States in keeping up on the state of Soviet military progress, especially during the years since the U-2 flights were stopped. After the open Sino-Soviet rift just after United States' military aid programme to India began, United States perhaps saw less danger from China despite its involvement in South East Asia than the emerging Soviet interest in Europe. Pakistan's recrudescence anti-Soviet interest was perhaps weighed more in the minds of American policy makers than the emerging anti-Chinese interests in India. United States calculated that limited military assistance to India without causing a serious concern to Pakistan would make India continue to depend upon her; and Soviet aids in sophisticated areas to India was ruled out. According to Chester Bowles, the possibility of India's turning to the Soviet Union for a major weapons system in case of United States' disinclination to provide large scale sophisticated weapons was 'rejected by almost everyone in the State Department, Pentagon and White House. India, it was assured, had no place to go but to the United States.' Further,


216. In early 1969 Pakistan's Foreign Minister openly stated: '...... given geography and the power realities of the nuclear age, the military threat to us, if there is one, would come more from the Soviet Union than from China.' Washington Post, 10 March 1969.

217. Galows (Gaester), America and Russia in India, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971, p. 641.
the open Sino-Soviet rift must have impressed Washington that even without 
American military assistance to the extent India wanted, India would not 
collapse in the unlikely event of another Chinese assault, since China had 
called in the roll of enemies, her former patron with whose she was not a 
match. United States also, must have had the fear not only of inviting 
further Pakistani wrath in case of providing sophisticated weapons system 
to India, but also of the possible impact on other allies of Pakistan's 
reactions. On the eve of Defence Minister Chavan's journey to the United 
States in May 1964 in search for assistance for a major Indian military 
build up with plans to provide the Air Force with three squadrons of -104s, 
a leading Indian newspaper could grasp the dilemma of the Americans: 'So 
delicate are America's relations with countries of the block at the moment, 
and so pregnant with possibilities are the current diplomatic and commercial 
blunders made of Peking, that Washington has to treat with utmost caution 
the slippery path of changing international relations. Any obvious action 
indicating a deliberate cold-shouldering of an ally like Pakistan will have 
a dismaying effect on countries like Thailand, the Philippines and even Japan.'
The United States' reluctance to arm India in a way India wanted, 
could have been also the result of anxieties of some American officials 'wh-

218. China was weakened by the loss of Soviet military aid, and its air 
force in particular was short of both planes and petrol, and therefore 
short of training. On the other hand, 'the Indian forces may soon 
be able to prove a far tougher antagonist than the debacle of 1962 
would suggest.' 'Multilateral Indian Arms' Economist, Vol. 212, 
No. 6318, 26 September 1964, p. 1204.

thought they saw an Indo-Pakistan war coming. India was aiming at an independent defence capability against China receiving arms from all sources, thus extending non-alignment in matters of armament. This involved the question of maintaining weapons secrets which might leak to the Soviets. According to Defence Minister Chavhan, the question of possible leakage of weapons' secrets was examined both by India and the United States. Without strict military partnership in the form of an alliance, United States obviously had difficulties in furnishing all the types of weapons India wanted. Further, during the period of United States' military assistance to India, the ability of the former to influence the latter in matters of foreign policy to the extent it wanted, was limited. Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed his frustration in clear terms in a testimony on 3 September 1965: 'Our problem has been, and obviously we have not succeeded, to pursue policies with Pakistan and India related to matters outside the sub-continent.' India's posture of the maintenance of theoretical non-alignment by equating the prompt American support to her with the initially negative but later modified stance of the Soviets, in the wake of the 1962 border war with China, must have impressed the State Department and Pentagon that United States had little to gain by helping New Delhi in a large way in its


efforts to build a major weapons system. While United States had a stake in preventing the Chinese from making a major drive into South Asia, it had an equal stake in maintaining Pakistan in the anti-Communist front to which New Delhi was obviously reluctant to be dragged. Under the circumstances, the United States, it appears, intended to meet both ends by marginally increasing India's defence capability against China by limited supply of weapons without giving India the weapons and air-crafts which were supplied to Pakistan. Pakistan's anger for the limited supply of weapons was appeased by continued support to her in matters relating to Kashmir. India saw more advantage in a closer working relation, within the framework of non-alignment, with the Soviet Union as the Kashmir problem came to the forefront. The Sino-Soviet split led to a convergence of Indian interests more with the Soviet Union than with the United States. While the United

233. An Indian commentator observed: '..... most Americans began to expect a series of changes in India's external posture and policies - changes which to them were only logical in view of what appeared to them as a demonstration to India of the validity of their view of the world's major problems. As the Indian response to the crisis began to appear as somewhat different from what was expected, the old liberal-conservative tussle over India re-asserted itself.' Gupta (Sikir), "The United States' Reaction", International Studies. Vol. 5, Nos. 1-2, July-October 1969, pp. 37-55.

The difference of policies towards Communist China, between India and the United States was evident from the following excerpt from an interview of Premier Chastri to the Indian correspondent of the Economic:

A. 'We have taken American help to resist the Chinese menace and we cherish our friendship with the United States. I must, however, make it clear that our objectives are limited while the United States has much wider aims in South-East Asia' — "Mr. Chastri Interviewed", Economic, Vol. 212, No. 6316, 29 August 1964, p. 504.

B. From the 1962 issue of The United States' Reaction, etc., vol. 5, no. 1-2, July-October, pp. 37-55.
States military aid to India was handicapped by its relations with Pakistan, the Soviet aid was no longer inhibited by its relations with China. The kaleidoscopic changes in South Asia's geopolitics after 1962, combined with the Sino-Soviet split, made the Indo-American military honeymoon short of serious matrimonial partnership in the years to come.